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Article VI

Section 27 (2). The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he
does not object.
Bengzon vs. Drilon, 208 SCRA 133
Facts: As early as 1953, RA 910 was enacted to grant pensions to retired Justices of the Supreme
Court and Court of Appeals. This was amended by RA 1797 which provided for an automatic
adjustment of the pension rates. In 1975, President Marcos issued PD 644, repealing the
automatic adjustment of pension rates.
Under the impression that PD 644 had reduced the pensions of the Justices, Congress passed HB
16297 in 1990 to restore the repealed provisions. President Aquino vetoed the bill, reasoning that
it would erode the governments policy on standardization of compensation.
But in 1991, a group of Justices petitioned the Court for a readjustment of their monthly pensions
in accordance with RA 1797. They claimed that PD 644 did not become law as there was no
valid publication pursuant to the ruling in Taada v. Tuvera. The Supreme Court, in a Resolution
that same year, granted their request.
Pursuant to that resolution, Congress included in the General Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year
1992 certain appropriations for the Judiciary intended for the payment of the adjusted pension
rates due the retired Justices. The Executive used her item veto power, claiming that the Courts
resolution had effectively nullified her veto of HB 16297.
Issue: Whether the Presidential veto is unconstitutional in this case.
Decision: Petition granted, the questioned veto is set aside, being illegal and unconstitutional.
The Constitution provides that only a particular item or items may be vetoed. There is no
authority to veto a part of an item and yet approve the remaining portion of the same item.
The general fund adjustment is an item which appropriates P500,000,000.00 to enable the
Government to meet certain unavoidable obligations which may have been inadequately funded
by the specific items for the different branches, departments, bureaus, agencies, and offices of
the government. The President did not veto this item. What were vetoed were methods or
systems placed by Congress to insure that permanent and continuing obligations to certain
officials would be paid when they fell due.
An examination of the entire sections and the underlined portions of the law which were vetoed
will readily show that portions of the item have been chopped up into vetoed and unvetoed parts.
Less than all of an item has been vetoed. This cannot be done.
The augmentation of specific appropriations found inadequate to pay retirement payments, by
transferring savings from other items of appropriation is a provision and not an item. It gives
power to the Chief Justice to transfer funds from one item to another. There is no specific
appropriation of money involved.

Further Notes:
When the President vetoed certain provisions of the 1992 General Appropriations Act, she
actually vetoed
(1) Republic Act No. 1797, enacted in 1957; and
(2) the Resolution of the Supreme Court dated November 28, 1991 in Administrative Matter
No. 91-8-225-CA.
But no President may veto the provisions of a law enacted thirty-five (35) years before his or her
term of office. Neither may the President set aside or reverse a final and executory judgment of
this Court through the exercise of the veto power.
The authority of the Chief Justice to use savings for the possible deficiencies in the payment of
adjusted pensions of retired Justices was one of the items vetoed. In this case the Court insisted
on its fiscal autonomy. The veto cannot impair the power of the Chief Justice to augment other
items in the Judiciary's appropriation.
The retired Justices have a vested right to the accrued pensions due them pursuant to RA 1797.
The provisions regarding retirement pensions of justices arise from the package of protections
given by the Constitution to guarantee and preserve the independence of the Judiciary.

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