STATE OF MICHIGAN

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF OAKLAND

JEFFREY S. NEWTON, an individual, and
RICHARD A. NEWTON, an individual,

Case No. 97-543058 CZ

Hon. Denise Langford-Morris

Plaintiffs,
vs.
THOMAS PATRICK FREYDL, an individual, and
FREYDL & ASSOCIATES,
Defendants.
______________________________________________________________________________
JEFFREY S. NEWTON (P41537)
THOMAS PATRICK FREYDL
RICHARD A. NEWTON
Defendant, In Pro Per
Plaintiffs, In Pro Per
600 Anton Blvd., #1143
5446 Hermitage Ave
Costa Mesa, CA 92626
Valley Village, CA 48067
(310) 629-8254
(248) 694-1400
______________________________________________________________________________

DEFENDANT THOMAS PATRICK FREYDLS MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN

OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR RELIEF PURSUANT TO MCR 2.612

INTRODUCTION
NOW COMES Defendant Thomas Patrick Freydl, individually, and as former proprietor
of Freydl & Associates, a dissolved Michigan Assumed Name (hereinafter FREYDL) and in
support of his Opposition to the pending Motion filed by Plaintiff, Jeffrey S Newton (hereinafter
NEWTON), pursuant to MCR 2.612 for Relief from December 21st 2011 Order granting
Freydls Motion to Vacate Order Of Consent Judgment Renewal files, This Courts consideration
following Memorandum of Law.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 11, 1999, this Court entered a Revised Final Judgment By Consent in favor of
Newton and his brother, in the amount of $70,000.00 (hereinafter August 11, 1999 Judgment).
Under Michigan law, unless properly renewed, the August 11, 1999 Judgment expired ten (10)
years after entry. MCLA 600.5809(3):
(1) A person shall not bring or maintain an action to enforce a noncontractual
money obligation unless, the person commences the action within the
applicable period of time prescribed by this section.
*****
(3) Except as provided in subsection (4), the period of limitations is 10 years for
an action founded upon a judgment or decree rendered in a court of record
of this state, or in a court of record of the United States or of another state of
the United States, from the time of the rendition of the judgment or decree.
(Embolding Supplied)
The execution of the judgment by the court statutorily constitutes the date of its entry for
purposes of the commencement of the running of the Statute of Limitations. MCR 2.602(2)
(The date of signing an order or judgment is the date of entry), regardless of when it was filed
with the Clerk of the Court (See: Moriarity v Shields, 260 Mich. App. 566, 571(2004) ([The
Rule] specifies that judgments and orders are considered entered the date they are signed by the
Court, whether or not they are also filed with the clerk of the court on that date.) (Emphasis
Supplied). Thus, the Statute of Limitations on the August 11, 1999 Judgment began to run on the
2

date of its execution, August 11, 1999, and expired at midnight, August 11, 2009. Importantly,
only a Judge can enter a Michigan judgment, even a renewal judgment (MCR 2.602(A)(1).
Prior to the expiration of the ten (10) year statute of limitations to which the August 11,
1999 Judgment was subject, NEWTON filed a Summons and Complaint. NEWTON
affirmatively testified he filed a Summons and Complaint to renew his Judgment (9/2/11
Transcript, p. 106, ln. 5),. The specific pleading he filed was entitled, Plaintiffs Complaint for
Renewal Of August 13, 1999 (sic) Revised Final Judgment By Consent Pursuant to MCL
600.5809 With Service Of the New Summons and Complaint Upon Karen V. Freydl, filed at
3:23 P.M. on the last day of the tenth (10) year from the date of entry of the August 11, 1999
Judgment (hereinafter August 11, 2009 Renewal Action). The Summons accompanying the
August 11, 2009 Renewal Action expired by its terms on November 10, 2009.
Upon proper showing, the Michigan Court Rules expressly provides that a plaintiff,
within the ninety-one (91) days of the term of a Summons, may seek an order from the assigned
judge for the issuance of a second summons for a definite period, not exceeding one (1) year
from the date the complaint is filed. MCR 2.102(D) (Expiration. A summons expires 91 days
after the date the complaint is filed. However, within those 91 days, on a showing of due
diligence by the plaintiff in attempting to serve the original summons, the judge to whom the
action is assigned may order a second summons to issue for a definite period not exceeding 1
year from the date the complaint is filed.) NEWTON never applied to the Court under MCR
2.102(D) for an order granting the issuance of a second Summons, and allowed the original
Summons to lapse.
The filing of the Summons and Complaint in the August 11, 2009 Renewal Action did not
toll the running of the statute of limitations on the August 11, 1999 Judgment. In Michigan,
MCLA 600.5856, exclusively governs tolling, stating: The statutes of limitations or repose are
tolled in any of the following circumstances:
3

(a) At the time the complaint is filed, if a copy of the summons and complaint are
served on the defendant within the time set forth in the supreme court rules.
(b) At the time jurisdiction over the defendant is otherwise acquired.
(Emphasis Supplied)
Further, in order to fulfill FREYDLs right of due process, it was mandatory that he be
served with a copy of the Summons and Complaint filed in the August 11, 2009 Renewal Action.
MCR 2.105(J)(1) (Provisions for service of process contained in these rules are intended to
satisfy the due process requirement that a defendant be informed of an action by the best means
available under the circumstances.)
See: McGraw v. Parsons, 142 Mich. App. 22 (1985) (Judgment Debtor served with process of
Renewal Complaint); Ewing v. Bolden, 194 Mich. App. 95 (1992) (Judgment Debtor entitled to
service of process of Renewal Complaint), holding:
We find that the Genesee Circuit Court had continuing personal jurisdiction over
defendant in this case, MCL 600.5853; MSA 27A.5853, and that plaintiff had a
means for service of process on defendant sufficient to bring the action to collect the
judgment. Consequently, MCL 600.5853, MSA 27A.5853 was inapplicable to toll the
limitation period in this case. Id. at 101-102. (Embolding Supplied)
Accord: Van Reken v. Darden, Neef & Heitsch, 259 Mich. App. 454 (2003) (Judgment Debtor
entitled to service of process of Renewal Complaint).
It is stipulated that FREYDL, at all time relevant, was a resident of the City of Newport
Beach, California (September 2, 2011 Transcript, p. 24, ln. 13-15). Therefore, to perfect service
on FREYDL of the August 11, 2009 Renewal Action, NEWTON could have personally served
his Summons and Complaint upon FREYDL, or served him by:
Sending a summons and a copy of the complaint by registered or certified mail,
return receipt requested, and delivery restricted to the addressee. Service is made
when the defendant acknowledges receipt of the mail. A copy of the return receipt
signed by the defendant must be attached to proof showing service under subrule
(A)(2). (Emphasis Supplied)
(MCR 2.105(A)

Further, NEWTON was statutorily responsible for arranging the mailing and filing of the
Proof of Service with the Court. MCR 2.104(C) (The party requesting issuance of the summons
is responsible for mailing and filing proof of service). At the September Evidentiary Hearing
4

NEWTON acknowledged this responsibility under oath (9/6/11 Transcript, p. 42, ln. 10-14).
Thus, the requirement FREYDL be served by registered or certified mail, return receipt
requested and delivery restricted to the addressee, is the mandated to ensure FREYDLs is
guaranteed due process of law. Nevertheless, the facts and NEWTONs own Proof of Service
document FREYDL was never served with the August 11, 2009 Renewal Action.
NEWTONs purported Proof of Service demonstrates FREYDL was not properly served.
It merely alleges:
On August 16, 2008, I served the Summons and Complaint in this matter upon Defendant
Thomas Patrick Freydl by depositing a copy of same into a sealed envelope with U.S.
postage fully prepaid into the U.S. mail receptacle at the U.S. Post Office in Royal Oak,
Michigan, addressed to him at 20434 South Santa Fe Avenue, Long Beach, California,
90810. (Emphasis Supplied)
2011 Evidentiary Hearing, Defendants Exhibit
At the time of the alleged mailing of the August 11, 2009 Renewal Action to FREYDL,
he was continually working in Manhattan in connection with the United States District Court,
case of captioned, Freydl v. John C. Meringolo, et al, District Court Case No. 09 CV 7196,
which was filed on August 14, 2009. Specifically, FREYDLs signature was notarized on August
14, 2009 by a Notary Public, acting in the State of New York, County of New York, named Lucy
H. Levy (Def. Exhibit I-26) (9/2/11 Transcript, p. 24, ln. 17-24) FREYDL personally filed the
Meringolo action in Manhattan on August 14, 2009. (Def. Exhibit W, Docket Entry No. 1)
(9/2/11 Transcript, p. 25, ln. 2-7). Similarly uncontroverted on this record that from October
2008 through 2009, FREYDL had no office, business, or agents operating in Long Beach, CA
(9/2/11 Transcript, p. 73, ln. 4-25, p. 74, ln. 1-25, p. 75, ln. 1-10).
Thus, NEWTONs alleged Proof of Service is statutorily defective in that (a) it does not
reflect a mailing to FREYDL by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, (b) its
delivery was not restricted to addressee, (c) no copy of a return receipt signed by FREYDL was
attached to the Proof of Service, and (d) it was sent by regular mail to an address in Long Beach,

California when FREYDL was physically in New York City, and to a location where he would
not have received it.
From August 11, 2009 through November 10, 2009, the period of its Summonss
viability, NEWTON made no attempt to comply with the Michigan Court Rule governing service
of process on FREYDL as an out-of-state resident. In fact, NEWTON testified that from August
11, 2009, the date of the filing of his Renewal Action, until February 1, 2011, he took no other
action under the August 11, 2009 complaint (9/6/11 Transcript, p. 75, ln. 22) (I didnt file any
other pleadings, no.) In fact, during the period of August 11, 2009 to February 1, 2011,
NEWTON testified he did not recall whether he had checked the Docket in this Court, regarding
the case he had instituted on August 11, 2009 (9/6/11 Transcript, p. 85, ln. 14). He further
testified that he failed to provide FREYDL with the Scheduling Order in the August 11, 2009
Renewal Action (9/6/11 Transcript, p. 67, ln. 3). Likewise, he filed no discovery (9/6/11
Transcript, p. 76, ln. 4-6), and did not file a Proof of Service for seventeen (17) months, Finally
Filing it, on February 1, 2011.
Because of his failure to prosecute the August 11, 2009 Renewal Action, on October 24,
2009, this Court issued NEWTON its ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE FOR FAILURE TO MAKE
SERVICE OF PROCESS, in which it ordered him to appear on November 18, 2009 at 8:30 A.M.
to Show Cause why the Defendant had not been served Hearing Exhibit. In furtherance of said
Show Cause Order, at the November 19, 2009 Hearing, this Court found: that this cause is
not being diligently pursued, and ruled:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the within cause of action shall be
and the same is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice.
Therefore, by no later than November 19, 2009, the August 11, 2009 Renewal Action Complaint
became a legal nullity with no further judicial force or effect.

Based on the foregoing, because FREYDL was never served with the August 11, 2009
Renewal Action, by operation of MCLA 600.5856, the statute of limitations on the August 11,
1999 Judgment ran no later than November 11, 2009, when its Summons had expired.
(A) Individuals. Process may be served on a resident or nonresident individual by
(1) delivering a summons and a copy of the complaint to the defendant
personally; or
(2) sending a summons and a copy of the complaint by registered or certified
mail, return receipt requested, and delivery restricted to the addressee. Service
is made when the defendant acknowledges receipt of the mail. A copy of the
return receipt signed by the defendant must be attached to proof showing
service under subrule (A)(2).
(D) Expiration. A summons expires 91 days after the date the complaint is filed.
However, within those 91 days, on a showing of due diligence by the plaintiff in
attempting to serve the original summons, the judge to whom the action is
assigned may order a second summons to issue for a definite period not exceeding
1 year from the date the complaint is filed.
(E) Dismissal as to Defendant Not Served.
(1) On the expiration of the summons as provided in subrule (D), the action is
deemed dismissed without prejudice as to a defendant who has not been served
with process as provided in these rules, unless the defendant has submitted to
the court's jurisdiction.
(2) The motion must be made within a reasonable time, and, for the grounds
stated in subrules (C)(1)(a), (b), and (c), within one year after the judgment,
order, or proceeding was entered or taken.
In his pending Petition Newton argues to this Court Freydls perjurous testimony that he was in
New York City when he was served in Long Beach, California was the sole basis for This
honorable Courts December 21st 2011 Order Vacating Renewal of Consent Judgment. Inasmuch
as the Court apparently determined that Freydl was not served in California since he testified that
he was in New York on the date of service. Plaintiffs Brief in Support of Motion for Relief.
P.17
After taking the entire matter under advisement, on December 21st, 2011, pursuant to an
Order entitled ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO VACATE FEBRUARY 16, 2011
7

RENEWAL ORDER, ( hereinafter December 21, 2011 Vacating Order), categorically ruled in
favor of Freydl, and against Newton , holding
This matter was before the Court on Defendants Motion. The Court
conducted an evidentiary hearing and took the matter under advisement.
The Court, having reviewed the applicable law and being fully advised in the
premises finds that because Defendant was not served with the Summons and
Complaint issued in the August 11, 2009 Renewal Action, by operation of law,
the statute of limitations expired on the August 11, 1999 Judgment when the
Summons expired on November 11, 2009. Plaintiff has failed to identify any
legal theory, which would permit the renewal of the Judgment under the
circumstances presented in this case.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants Motion to Vacate the February
16, 2011 Renewal Order is GRANTED. (Embolding Supplied)
(Exhibit 6: December 21th, 2011 Vacating Order Oakland County Michigan
Circuit Court)

Thus, in its December 21st, 2011 Order, This Court not only voided the Renewal Judgment
reflected in her February 16, 2011 Ex Parte Renewal Order, but also determined Newton had lost
all rights against Freydl originally arising under the August 11, 1999 Revised Consent Judgment,
as of November 11, 2009. Finally, she rejected all of Newtons fabricated legal theories,
determining that they were without any merit. The essence of the December 21, 2011 Vacating
Order was that Judge Langford Morris recognized under Michigan Law she had no judicial
authority to renew a Michigan Judgment after its Statute of Limitations had run.
Newton Failed Attempts To Overturn Judge Langford Morris December 21th, 2011 Order
Vacating The Fraudulent February 16, 2011 Ex Parte Renewal Order.
After his decisive loss in this Court, Newton attempted to have its Ruling overturned by
the Michigan Court of Appeals. However, by Order of the Appellate Court dated February 11th,
2013 his Appeal was DISMISSED, because he had failed to perfect it in a timely manner.
(Exhibit:- Order of Michigan Court of Appeals). Thereafter, Newton again attempted to achieve
8

appellate review of the December 21, 2011 Vacating Order by applying, on March 25, 2013, to
the Michigan Supreme Court for Leave to Appeal. (Exhibit :- Application for Leave to Appeal
Michigan Supreme Court) In his Application, Newton certified that an issue to be resolved was
Did the Trial Court error when it ruled that the Statute of Limitations for the Renewal of the
1999 Consent Judgment Expired? Id. at p.ix. He affirmatively states: Freydl also contested the
service of the said motion at the Evidential Hearing, even though he had listed the utilized
service address as the official service address for the Meringolo case. [Manhattan Law
Firm] Id. at p.7. Likewise, he stated that he served Freydl with said motion at Vernon &
Ginsburg, which was the only viable address known to Newton at the time (Freydls
presence at Focus On Cars (in California) was unknown and unknowable at the time.) Id.
at p. 17 (Embolding Supplied)
Finally Newton admits at page 10 of his Application to the Supreme Court The Court
issued its Order on December 21, 2011 granting Freydls Motion and vacating Newtons 1999
Consent Judgment, ... (Embolding Supplied) Subsequently by Order dated June 25th 2013, the
Michigan Supreme Court denied Newtons Application, because we are not persuaded that
the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. (Exhibit 9: Michigan Supreme
Court Order, June 25th, 2013), thereby exhausting all of Newtons appellate rights.
Newtons Perpetuates His Fraudulent Hoax Post December 21th, 2011
After the entry of December 21st, 2011 Vacating Order setting aside the Fraudulent
February 16, 2011 Ex Parte Renewal Order, and being fully aware that its determination nullified
any rights under the August 11, 1999 Revised Consent Judgment, on May 3, 2012, Newton,
nevertheless, filed a Motion to Intervene in the case of Freydl v. Meringolo, 09 Civ. 7196

(NYSD), pending in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in
which Freydl was a pro se plaintiff. In his Motion to Intervene, Newton alleged that he had an
interest in this diversity action by virtue of his status as a judgment creditor of Freydl under the
extinguished August 11, 1999 Revised Consent Judgment. However, after receiving Freydls
Opposition, Judge Oetken the presiding judge denied Newtons Motion to Intervene by Order
date on May 22, 2012.
Thereafter on January 10, 2013, Newton filed a 150-page Complaint against Freydls
former wife, his son, Freydl, and other entities in United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, claiming he was a valid judgment creditor of Freydl, and alleging civil
conspiracy and other torts by the Defendants arising out of the long expired August 11, 1999
Revised Consent Judgment. (United States District Court Southern District, Docket No. 13 Civ.
303 (LAP). Upon reading Newtons 150 page abuse of process, on February 15, 2013, Chief
Judge Preska ordered Newton to Show Cause why the case should not be dismissed, citing that it
was essentially an attempt to collect on a 1999 Michigan Judgment (Exhibit 10: Order of
Dismissal). Later, after reviewing Newtons response, by Order of Dismissal entered May 20,
2013 Judge Preska threw Newton out of Court.
Meanwhile, in his fraudulent Action in this Court before Judge Banks referred to above,
Bank of America demurred to Newtons Complaint, at which time Freydl provide it with a copy
of the December 21, 2011 Vacating Order . After realizing his position was indefensible, Newton
offered no Opposition to Bank of Americas demurrer, and abandoned the entire lawsuit, which
was Dismissed by Judge Banks, pursuant to Minute Order dated April 26, 2012 (Exhibit 11)
The Running Of Its Statute Of Its Limitation Permanently Extinguished The 1999 Revised
Consent Judgment
10

The Michigan substantive law states in pertinent part:

(1) A person shall not bring or maintain an action to enforce a
noncontractual money obligation unless, the person commences the
action within the applicable period of time prescribed by this section.
*****
(3) Except as provided in subsection (4), the period of limitations is 10
years for an action founded upon a judgment or decree rendered in a
court of record of this state, or in a court of record of the United
States or of another state of the United States, from the time of the
rendition of the judgment or decree. (Embolding Supplied)

Thus, the governing statute provides three tenets. First, that a party has no standing to
commence or maintain an action on the judgment after its statute has expired. Secondly, upon its
termination, the judgment becomes unenforceable, which, of course, is its only legal essence,
And, third, no Court has the judicial authority to renew it after it has been rendered extinguished.
For example, in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Yashinsky, 270 F. 3rd 591,596 (6th Cir 1998), the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeal held that the expiration of the Statute of Limitations on a Michigan
Judgment rendered it moot, and concluded that it had no further enforceability. (We find that the
coercive aspect of the contempt order is now mooted because the underlying judgment has
expired under Michigans stature of limitations on judgments***** compliance with postjudgment discovery was now moot because the underlying judgment, the collection of which it
sought to facilitate, had expired under Michigans ten-year statute of limitation for the
enforcement of judgments on March 19, 1996.). Accordingly, the California judgment is, by
operation of doctrine, likewise unenforceable.
NEWTONS MOTION IS TIME BARED

11

In this Proceeding, Newton seeks relief from this Courts Dismissal in November
of 2009 of his 2009 Renewal Action, referenced in this Courts December 21, 2011 Ruling. In
fact, it was Newtons recognition that his 2011 Renewal Action was dismissed that he filled his
Motion to Renew which resulted in the February 16, 2011 Order, later vacated by the December
21st 2011 Order as a basis for his motion, Newton specifically relies on MCR 2.612 (C)(1)(b)(c)
and (f). However, the Court Rule expressly bars any motion in reliance upon MCR 2.612 (C) (1)
to one (1) year from date of Entry of the challenged judgment or order, stating in pertinent part:
(2) The motion must be made within a reasonable time, and, for the grounds stated in
subrules (C)(1)(a), (b), and (c), within one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was
entered or taken , a motion under this subrule does not affect the finality of a judgment or
suspend its operation.

Thus, this Court has no statutory authority after one (1) year, (let alone five (5) years in
the case of the November 2009 Order of Dismissal and three (3) years in the case of the
December 21, 2011 order) in which to grant relief under MCR 2.612. Newton in his pleadings
fails to address this limitation, or otherwise cite any authority which would authorize this Court
to grant relief after the expiration of the one (1) year limitation.
NEWTONS MOTION IS BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA
In this Proceeding Newton is requesting that this Court reverse its determination that Freydl was
not properly served as provided for by statute when it entered its dismissal of his August 11th
2009 Renewal Complaint which resulted under Michigan Law in the running of the 10 year
statute of limitations on the August 11th 1999 Revised Consent Judgment. The Court will recall
that this dismissal was the result of Newtons failure to provide any Proof of Service reflecting
12

statutory service on Freydl in his failure to respond to this Courts Order to Show Cause
regarding such failure. The Court will further recall that it, not the Court Clerk, dismissed it by a
Signed Order. Finally, the Court will recall that Newton took no further action until 15 months
later when he had his friend Richard Ferrente file a deficient Proof of Service as referred to
above and proceeded to circumvent this Courts dismissal and its consequential expiration of the
10 year Statute of Limitations, which first triggered the February 16th 2011 challenged Order and
this Courts ultimate ruling on December 21st 2011.
Under Michigan Law as set down by the Michigan Supreme Court in Adair V. State, 470
Mich. 105, 680N.W.2d 386, 396 (2004):
Res Judicata bars a second, subsequent action when (1) the prior
action was decided on the merits (2) Both Actions involved the same parties or
their privies, (3) the matter in the second Case was, or could have been resolved
in the first case.
Further, Michigan, has taken a broad approach to the doctrine of Res Judicata, hoding
that it bars not only claims already litigated but also every claim arising from the same
transaction that the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, could have raised but did not. Id.
See: Ludwig V. Township of Van Buren, 682 F.3d 457, 460 (6th Cir 2012)
NEWTONS CONTENTION FREYDL WAS SERVED WITH THE 2009
RENEWAL ACTION IS WITHOUT MERIT.
In his brief to this Court in support of the Pending Motion Newton once again asks this
Court to conclude that Freydl was properly served with the Summons and Complaint by mail
to the address that he used in the pleadings 20434 South Fanta (sic) Avenue, Long Beach,
California 90810 (Plaintiffs brief pp10-11). This is the precise argument he made in his
application to the Michigan Supreme Court challenging this Courts December 21, 2011
specifically he argued to the High Court
in the case at bar the Trial Court abused its discretion and committed reversible error
when it determined that Freydl was not served with the summons and complaint in the Consent
13

Judgment Renewal Action the service address of 20434, Long Beach, California 90810 was
the address that address Freydl continuously used in the proceeding of this case, commencing in
1997 application for leave to appeal, Michigan Supreme Court March 25, 2013 page 16 as
sited above the Michigan Supreme Court denied Newtons application we are not persuaded
that the question presented shall not be reviewed by this court., Newton v Freydl Supreme
Court of Michigan order dated June 25, 2013, exhibit .
It is Newtons theory throughout this proceeding that the mere mailing of a Summons and
Complaint without any evidence in the record that it was received constitutes valid service of
process under Michigan law he simply ignores, and urges this court to ignore the sited
constitutional safe guards establish by the Michigan Court Rules that address service of process
by mail
Rule 2.105 Process; Manner of Service
(A) Individuals. Process may be served on a resident or nonresident individual by
(1) delivering a summons and a copy of the complaint to the defendant personally; or
(2) sending a summons and a copy of the complaint by registered or certified mail, return receipt
requested, and delivery restricted to the addressee. Service is made when the defendant
acknowledges receipt of the mail. A copy of the return receipt signed by the defendant must be
attached to proof showing service under subrule (A)(2).
Newton rather than substantiating to this court that Freydl was properly served by mail
under this statute, submits that the mere purported mailing of a Summons and Complaint with no
evidence of its receipt constitutes valid service of process in Michigan he simply asks that Court
to ignore the statutory terms required constitutionally under 2.105 (A)(2) that it be.
Nowhere in his moving paper does Newton attempt to defend his alleged service of
process by reference to the statutory mandates. There is no claim or evidence that the Summons
and Complaint was sent by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested and delivery
restricted to the addressee nor does he support his alleged service with a copy of a return receipt
signed by the defendant which he attached to the proof of service filled with the Court he simply

14

expects this Court to ignore the conditions imposed upon service by mail by the statute.
Specifically, he asks this Court to find that Freydl was served because on two (2) occasions he
paid parking at the Long Beach Airport parking structure and purchased gas between September
9th and November 5th of 2009 on five (5) occasions in the city limits of Long Beach at the
Chevron station by the Long Beach Airport, which is off the 405 freeway used in Southern
California to go from Orange County where Freydl lived and worked to Los Angeles. Without
any supporting proof he asks this Court to speculate that Freydl actually came into possession of
this Summons and Complaint indeed without any evidence on the record Newton states that the
service was received in Long Beach California on August 18, 2009 stating That Freydl was at
Focus on Cars in Long Beach California on August 18, 2009 when Newtons service was at his
long standing office at Focus on Cars. There is absolutely no evidence that supports this
allegation Newton cannot provide this Court with either proof that the Summons and Complaint
arrived on August 18,2009 at Focus on Cars nor that Freydl was there on that date
nevertheless, these conjectures and speculations are the sole grounds offered by Newton to this
Court to establish that Freydl was properly served under the Michigan Court Rules with the 2009
Renewal Actions Summons and Complaint such a proposition five years after the fact is simply
preposterous. Ironically, the first time Newton claims Freydl was in Long Beach was twenty one
(21) days later when he purchased gas at the Chevron station September 9th.
At all times relevant, FREYDL is, and was a resident of Newport Beach (Freydl Decl.,
2). On February 16, 2011, this Court granted NEWTONs Ex Parte Motion, renewing the
Consent Judgment entered by this Court on August 11, 1999. Thereafter, because FREYDL was,
and is, a resident of Newport Beach, California, situated in Orange County, California, on or
about April 21, 2011, NEWTON together with Richard A. Newton and the Estate of Joyce

15

Newton, commenced an Action against FREYDL in the Superior Court for the County of
Orange, State of California, to domesticate this Courts February 16, 2011 Renewal Judgment
(Case No. 30-2011-0046931), which Action is presently pending (hereinafter the First
California Case). Subsequently, the same Plaintiffs filed another lawsuit in the California
Orange County Superior Court against FREYDL on June 22, 2011 (Case No. 30-201100485897), which Action, likewise, was for enforcement of the 1999 Michigan Consent
Judgment. Also named in this Action, were Bank of America, and FREYDLs affiliated
corporation. A true and accurate copy of the relevant allegations of this Complaint, including
assertion of FREYDLs California residence, are attached as Exhibit A.
Pursuant to the First California Case, on June 16, 2011, Plaintiffs, including NEWTON,
have scheduled a Creditors Examination Hearing in Department C-3, of the Orange County
Superior Court, 700 Civic Center Drive, Santa Ana, California, of FREYDL and his affiliated
third party corporation, at 9:00 AM on August 4, 2011. A true and accurate copy of the Docket
Entry and Hearing Schedule in connection with the First California Case, is attached as Exhibit
B.
Meanwhile, on or about July 5, 2011, FREYDL brought before this Court a Motion to
Vacate and Set Aside this Courts Order and Judgment of February 16, 2011, pursuant to MCR
2.612, et seq. On July 13, 2011, a hearing was conducted by this Court on FREYDLs abovereferenced Motion, at which time this Court determined that there was an issue regarding
FREYDLs Notice by NEWTON of the critical February 16, 2011 Hearing. As a consequence of
that finding, this Court ruled that it would conduct an Evidentiary Hearing regarding the issue of
FREYDLs Notice of the February 16, 2011 Hearing, scheduled for September 2, 2011, at 8:30
AM, in Courtroom 3-A. In the event this Court rules in favor of FREYDL with respect to the
matter at issue at the September 2, 2011 Hearing, the Renewal Judgment would be set aside and

16

vacated without prejudice. Alternatively, if the Court rules in his favor with respect to the other
outstanding issues framed by his Motion under MCR 2.612, he would likewise be granted the
relief sought in his July 13, 2011 Motion.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, on or about July 22, 2011, in contravention of the
provisions of the applicable Michigan Court Rules, NEWTON attempted to serve FREYDL, a
non-resident Defendant, with a Subpoena duces tecum to appear on July 29, 2011, at 10:30 AM
in the Oakland County Circuit Court for a Creditors Examination (hereinafter Subpoena). A
copy of said Subpoena is attached as Exhibit C. The Subpoena was issued pursuant to MCR
2.305, and is, therefore, governed by the expressed provisions of that Statute. Accordingly, based
upon an analysis of the underlying provisions of said Rule, demonstrating the fatally inferred
character of the Subpoena, this Court is urged to enter an order quashing, or modifying as
unreasonable or oppressive, the Subpoena. Alternatively, it is urged to enter a Protective Order
all as provided for by law.
DISCUSSION
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, FREYDL respectfully prays this Court quash, or modify the
challenged Subpoena, or otherwise enter a Protective Order consistent with the interest of justice
in light of the pending Evidentiary Hearing scheduled for September 2, 2011.
Dated: October 9, 2014
Costa Mesa, CA

Respectfully Submitted,
________________________
Thomas Patrick Freydl
Defendant, Pro Se

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