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In Re: Column of Ramon Tulfo

Column of Ramon Tulfo


Facts:In Oct. 13, 1989, Tulfo wrote an article in his column in PDI 'On Target' stating that the
Supreme Court rendered an idiotic decision in legalizing checkpoints, and again on Oct. 16,
1989, where he called the Supreme Court stupid and "sangkatutak na mga bobo justices of
the Philippine Supreme Court". Tulfo was required to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt. Tulfo said that he was just reacting emotionally because he had been
a victim of harassmen in the checkpoints, and "idiotic" meant illogical and unwise, and "bobo"
was just quoted from other attorneys, and since the case had been decided and terminated,
there was not contempts. Lastly, the article does not pose any clear and present danger to
the Supreme court.
Issue:Wheter or not Tulfo is in contempt
Held:Yes.
1. At the time Tulfo wrote the article, the checkpoints case had not yet been decided upon,
and the Supreme Court was still acting on an MR filed from the CA.
2. Power to punish is inherent as it is essential for self-preservation. Contempt of ocurt is
defiance of the authority, justice and dignity of the courts. It brings disrepute to the court.
There are two kinds of publications which can be punished for contempt:
a. those whose object is to affect the decision in a pending case.
b. those whose object is to bring courts to discredit.
Tulfo's article constituted both.
3. It should have been okay to criticize if respectful language was used, but if its object is only
to degrade and ridicule, then it is clearly an obstruction of justice. Nothing constructive can be
gained from them. Being emotional is no excuse for being insulting. Quoting is not an excuse
also, because at the end of his article, Tulfo said, "So you bobo justices, watch out!" Also, he
said he was not sorry for having written the articles.
Tulfo is found in contempt of court and is gravely censured.
Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP [GR 64261, 26 December 1984] En Banc, Escolin (J): 10
concur, 1 took no part Facts: On 7 December 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz-Pao, Executive
Judge of the then CFI Rizal [Quezon City], issued 2 search warrants where the premises at
19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers,
respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia,
motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said
newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature
alleged to be in the possession and control of Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We
Forum" newspaper, were seized. A petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was filed after 6 months following the raid to
question the validity of said search warrants, and to enjoin the Judge Advocate General of the
AFP, the city fiscal of Quezon City, et.al. from using the articles seized as evidence in
Criminal Case Q- 022782 of the RTC Quezon City (People v. Burgos). The prayer of
preliminary prohibitory injunction was rendered moot and academic when, on 7 July 1983, the
Solicitor General manifested that said articles would not be used until final resolution of the
legality of the seizure of said articles. Issue: Whether the continued sealing of the printing
machines in the offices of Metropolitan Mail and We Forum is anathematic to the

democratic framework. Held: The premises searched were the business and printing offices
of the "Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum newspapers. As a consequence of the search
and seizure, these premises of the Metropolitan Mail and We Forum were padlocked and
sealed, with the further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were
discontinued. Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to
the freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual
denial of Burgos, et. al.'s freedom to express themselves in print. Thus state of being is
patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant press is
essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry. Although the public
officers would justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the ground that they
have been sequestered under Section 8 of PD 885, as amended, which authorizes "the
sequestration of the property of any person, natural or artificial, engaged in subversive
activities against the government and its duly constituted authorities in accordance with
implementing rules and regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of National Defense."
It is doubtful, however, if sequestration could validly be effected in view of the absence of any
implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the Minister of National Defense.

ROMMEL CORRO, petitioner,


vs.
HON. ESTEBAN LISING Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch
XCV HON. REMIGIO ZARI Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 98; CITY FISCAL'S
OFFICE, Quezon City; LT. COL. BERLIN A. CASTILLO and 1ST LT. GODOFREDO M.
IGNACIO, respondents,
Reynaldo L. Bagatsing for petitioner.
RELOVA, J.:

On September 29, 1983, respondent Regional Trial Court judge Esteban Lising of Quezon
City, upon application filed by Lt. Col. Berlin Castillo of the Philippine Constabulary Criminal
Investigation Service, issued Search Warrant No. Q-00002 authorizing the search and
seizure of

repeat, rendered moot and academic by the recent Agrava Report. (p. 27,
Rollo)
On January 28, 1985, respondent Judge Lising denied the motion in a resolution, pertinent
portions of which state:

1. Printed copies of Philippine Times;


2. Manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication in the Philippine Times;
3. Newspaper dummies of the Philippine Times;
4. Subversive documents, articles, printed matters, handbills, leaflets,
banners;
5. Typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recording
machines, video machines and tapes
which have been used and are being used as instrument and means of committing the crime
of inciting to sedition defined and penalized under Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by PD 1835 ... (p. 24, Rollo)
On November 6, 1984, petitioner filed an urgent motion to recall warrant and to return
documents/personal properties alleging among others that:
2. ... the properties seized are typewriters, duplicating machines,
mimeographing and tape recording machines, video machines and tapes
which are not in any way, inanimate or mute things as they are, connected
with the offense of inciting to sedition.
3. More so, documents or papers seized purporting to do the body of the
crime has been rendered moot and academic due to the findings of the
Agrava Board that a military conspiracy was responsible for the slaying of the
late Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. on August 21, 1983 at the Manila
International Airport. The Agrava Board which has the exclusive jurisdiction to
determine the facts and circumstances behind the killing had virtually
affirmed by evidence testamentary and documentary the fact that soldiers
killed Benigno Aquino, Jr.
4. More so, the grave offense of libel, RTC, Q.C. Branch XCV has dismissed
said case against the accused on all documents pertinent and more so as we

... The said articles presently form part of the evidence of the prosecution
and they are not under the control of the prosecuting arm of the government.
Under these circumstances, the proper forum from which the petition to
withdraw the articles should be addressed, is the Office of the City Fiscal,
Quezon City and not with this Branch of the Court. It is to be further noted
that it is not even with this Branch of the Court that the offense of inciting to
sedition is pending. (p 29, Rollo)
Hence, this petition for certiorari and mandamus, with application for preliminary injunction
and restraining order to enjoin respondent Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region,
Branch 98 from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No. S3-Q-29243, praying (a) that
Search Warrant No. Q-00002 issued by respondent Judge Esteban M. Lising be declared null
and void ab initio and that a mandatory injunction be issued directing respondents City
Fiscal's Office of Quezon City and Lt. Col. Berlin Castillo and 1st Lt. Godofredo Ignacio jointly
and severally to return immediately the documents/properties illegally seized from herein
petitioner and that final injunction be issued enjoining respondents City Fiscal's Office of
Quezon City, Lt. Col. Castillo and 1st Lt. Ignacio from utilizing said documents/properties as
evidence in Criminal Case No. 29243; and (b) that respondent PC-CIS officers Lt. Col. Berlin
A. Castillo and lst Lt. Godofredo Ignacio be directed to reopen the padlocked office premises
of the Philippine Times at 610 Mezzanine Floor, Gochengco Building, T.M., Kalaw, Ermita,
Manila.
In Our Resolution of February 19, 1985, respondents were required to file their comment. The
plea for temporary restraining order was granted and respondents City Fiscal's Office of
Quezon City, Lt. Col. Berlin Castillo and 1st Lt. Godofredo Ignacio were enjoined from
introducing as evidence for the state the documents/properties seized under Search Warrant
No. Q-00002 in Criminal Cage No. Q-29243 (Sedition case against petitioner), pending
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98, effective immediately and
continuing until further orders from the Court.
Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that (1) the present
action is premature because petitioner should have filed a motion for reconsideration of
respondent Judge Lising's order of January 28, 1985; (2) probable cause exists justifying the
issuance of a search warrant; (3) the articles seized were adequately described in the search

warrant; (4) a search was conducted in an orderly manner; (5) the padlocking of the searched
premises was with the consent of petitioner's wife; (6) the findings of the Agrava Board is
irrelevant to the issue of the validity of the search warrant; (7) press freedom is not an issue;
and, (8) the petition is barred by laches.
There is merit in the petition.
Respondents contend that petitioner should have filed a motion for reconsideration of the
order in question before coming to Us. This is not always so. When the questions raised
before the Supreme Court are the same as those which were squarely raised in and passed
upon by the lower court, the filing of the motion for reconsideration in said court before
certiorari can be instituted in the Supreme Court is no longer a pre-requisite. As held in Bache
& Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823, (t)he rule requiring the filing of a motion for
reconsideration before an application for a writ of certiorari can be entertained was never
intended to be applied without considering the circumstances. The rule does not apply where,
the deprivation of petitioners' fundamental right to due process taints the proceeding against
them in the court below not only with irregularity but also with nullity." Likewise, in Pajo, et al.
vs. Ago, et al., 108 Phil. 905 and in Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, 3 SCRA 465, this Court
ruled that "it is only when questions are raised for the first time before the high court in a
certiorari case that the writ shall not issue, unless the lower court had first been given an
opportunity to pass upon the same." Further, in the case of Matute vs. Court of Appeals, 26
SCRA 768, We held that "while as a matter of policy a motion for reconsideration in the lower
court has often been considered a condition sine qua non for the granting of a writ of
certiorari, this rule does not apply where the proceeding in which the error occurred is a
patent nullity or where 'the deprivation of petitioner's fundamental right to due process ...
taints the proceeding against him in the court below not only with irregularity but with nullity
(Luzon Surety Co. v. Marbella et al., L-16038, Sept. 30, 1960), or when special circumstances
warrant immediate and more direct action. ..." The records of this petition clearly disclose that
the issues herein raised have already been presented to and passed upon by the court a
quo.
Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provides:
SEC. 3. ...no search warrant or warrant of arrest issue except upon probable
cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as
may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
and, Section 3, Rule 126 of the New Rules of Court, states that:

SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not
issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined by the judge or justice of the peace after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.
Probable cause may be defined as "such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances, as
will warrant a cautious man in the belief that his actions, and the means taken in prosecuting
it, are legally just and proper (Burton vs. St. Paul, M & M. Ry. Co., 33 Minn. 189, cited in U.S.
vs. Addison, 28 Phil. 566)." Thus, an application for search warrant must state with
particularly the alleged subversive materials published or intended to be published by the
publisher and editor of the Philippine Times, Rommel Corro. As We have stated in Burgos,
Sr. vs. Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, 133 SCRA 800, "mere
generalization will not suffice." A search warrant should particularly describe the place to be
searched and the things to be seized. "The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is
to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search
warrant- to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they should
seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be committed, that
abuses may not be committed Bache & Co. Phil. Inc. vs, Ruiz, supra)." The affidavit of Col.
Castillo states that in several issues of the Philippine Times:
... we found that the said publication in fact foments distrust and hatred
against the government of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities,
defined and penalized by Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1835; (p. 22, Rollo)
and, the affidavit of Lt. Ignacio reads, among others
... the said periodical published by Rommel Corro, contains articles tending
to incite distrust and hatred for the Government of the Philippines or any of
its duly constituted authorities. (p. 23, Rollo)
The above statements are mere conclusions of law and will not satisfy the requirements of
probable cause. They can not serve as basis for the issuance of search warrant, absent of
the existence of probable cause. In fact, as a consequence of the search warrant issued, the
items confiscated from the premises of the office of the Philippine Times at 610 Mezzanine
Floor, Gochengco Bldg., T.M. Kalaw, Ermita, Manila were the following:
1. One bundle of assorted negative;

2. One bundle of assorted lay out;


3. Three folders of assorted articles/writings used by Philippine Times news
and other paraphernalias;
4. Four tape alleged speech of Mayor Climaco, two alleged speeches of
Aquino and a speech of one various artist;

where a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the political enlightenment and
growth of the citizenry."
Finally, respondents argue that while the search warrant was issued on September 29, 1983
and was executed on the very same day, it was only on November 6, 1984, or one (1) year,
one (1) month and six (6) days when petitioner filed his motion for the recall of the warrant
and the return of the documents/personal properties. Having failed to act seasonably,
respondents claim that petitioner is guilty of laches.

5. One bundle Dummies;


6. Ten bundles of assorted copies of Philippine Times issued on different
dates (Nos. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15):
7. One Typewriter Remington Brand Long Carriage with No. J-2479373;
8. OneTypewriterAdler-short with No. 9003011;
9. Three (3) bundles of Philippine Times latest issue for Baguio City (p. 26,
Rollo)
In Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383, this Court held that search warrants authorizing the
seizure of books of accounts and records "showing all the business transactions" of certain
persons, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal, contravene the explicit
comment of the Bill of Rights that the things to be seized should be particularly described and
defeat its major objective of eliminating general warrants. In the case at bar, the search
warrant issued by respondent judge allowed seizure of printed copies of the Philippine Times,
manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication, newspaper dummies, subversive documents,
articles, etc., and even typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recording
machines. Thus, the language used is so all embracing as to include all conceivable records
and equipment of petitioner regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. The search
warrant under consideration was in the nature of a general warrant which is constitutionally
objectionable.
Respondents do not deny the fact that the business office of the "Philippine Times" of which
petitioner was the publisher-editor was padlocked and sealed. The consequence is, the
printing and publication of said newspaper were discontinued. In Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, supra, We held that "[sluch closure is in the nature of
previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the
fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express
themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework

Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. The
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it (Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy, L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 35).
In his petition, Corro alleged that on October 1, 1983, less than forty-two (42) hours after the
military operatives shut down his newspaper on September 29, 1983, he was invited by the
Director-General PC/INP, and subsequently detained. Thereafter, he was charged with the
crime of inciting to sedition before the City Fiscal's Office in Quezon City, and on October 7,
1983, a preventive detention action was served upon him. Consequently, he had to file a
petition for habeas corpus. It was only on November 8, 1984 when this Court issued its
Resolution in G.R. No. 68976, entitled: In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of
Rommel Corro Angle Corro vs. Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, et al., releasing Rommel Corro on
recognizance of his lawyers, Attys. Humberto B. Basco, Reynaldo Bagatsing and Edilberto
Balce, In the same month, November 1984, petitioner filed his motion to recall warrant and to
return the seized documents. When respondent judge denied the motion, he came to Us.
Considering the above circumstances, the claim that petitioner had abandoned his right to the
possession of the seized properties is incorrect.
WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. Q-00002 issued by the respondent judge on September
29, 1983 is declared null and void and, accordingly, SET ASIDE.
The prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized articles is GRANTED
and all properties seized thereunder are hereby ordered RELEASED to petitioner. Further,
respondents Lt. Col. Berlin A. Castillo and lst Lt. Godofredo M. Ignacio are ordered to REOPEN the padlocked office premises of the Philippine Times at 610 Mezzanine Floor,
Gochengco Bldg., T.M. Kalaw, Ermita, Manila.
SO ORDERED.

Babst vs. National Intelligence Board [GR L-62992, 28 September 1984] Resolution En Banc,
Plana (J): 6 concur, 2 concur in result, 2 on leave, 1 concur in separate opinion, 2 dissent in
separate opinions Facts: Arlene Babst, Odette Alcantara, Ceres P. Doyo, Jo-Ann Q.
Maglipon, Domini Torrevillas-Suarez, Lorna Kalaw-Tirol, Cielo Buenaventura, Sylvia Mayuga,
Sheila S. Coronel, et al. are columnists, feature article writers and reporters of various local
publications. At different dates since July 1980, some of them have allegedly been
summoned by military authorities who have subjected them to sustained interrogation on
various aspects of their works, feelings, sentiments, beliefs, associations and even their
private lives. Aside from the interrogations, a criminal complaint for libel was filed by Brig.
Gen. Artemio Tidier, Jr. on 9 February 1983 with the Office of the City Fiscal, Manila, against
Domini Torrevillas-Suarez, editor of the Panorama, and Ma. Ceres Doyo based on an article
written by Doyo and published in the 28 March 1982 issue of the Panorama, on which the
author had been interrogated by Brig. Gen. Wilfredo Estrada (Ret.), Col. Renato Ecarma, NBI
Asst. Director Ponciano Fernando, Col. Balbino Diego, Col. Galileo Kintanar, Col. Eustaquio
Peralta, et. al. The complaint included an staggering P10 million claim for damages. (An
information for libel has since been filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Region against Suarez and Doyo.) On 3 March 1983, Babst, et. al. filed a petition for
prohibition with preliminary injunction, which was superseded by the amended and
supplemental petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction, seeking to prohibit the
respondents (a) from issuing subpoenas or letters of invitation to Babst, et. al. and
interrogating them, and (b) from filing libel suits on matters that have been the subject of
inquiry by the National Intelligence Board (NIB). Issue: Whether the issuance by the NIB of
letters of invitation to Babst, et.al., their subsequent interrogation, and the filing of libel suits
against Suarez and Dayo, are illegal and unconstitutional as they are violative of the
constitutional guarantee on free expression since they have the effect of imposing restrictive
guidelines and norms on mass media. Held: Prohibition will not issue in respect of the libel
charges now pending in court against Suarez and Doyo and similar suits that might be filed.
The writ of prohibition is directed against a tribunal, board or person acting without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion vis-a-vis certain proceedings pending
before it. The libel cases adverted to are not pending before the NIB or any other respondent.
Further, the issue of validity of the libel, charges by reason of their alleged collision with
freedom of expression, is a matter that should be raised in the proper forum, i.e., before the
court where the libel cases are pending or where they may be filed. The same rule applies to
the issue of admissibility as evidence of matters that have been elicited in the course of an
inquiry or interrogation conducted by the NIB, which Babst, et. al. claim to have been illegally
obtained. Finally, the right to seek redress when libeled is a personal and individual privilege
of the aggrieved party, and no one among the officials has the authority to restrain any of his
subordinates who has been libeled from vindicating his right by instituting a libel suit. Brig.
Gen. Tadiar has filed the libel case against Suarez and Doyo in his personal capacity.
Moreover, he is not even a member of the NIB. And the NIB does not appear to have
anything to do with Gen. Tadiar's private right to complain of libel.

G.R. No. L-33615 April 22, 1977

MANUEL ELIZALDE, FRED J. ELIZALDE, PRUDENCIO R. EUROPA, petitioners,


vs.
HON. MARIO J. GUTIERREZ, Presiding Judge, CFI-Ilocos Sur, Branch III, and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented in this instance by JESUS F. GUERRERO,
Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Sur,respondents.

FERNANDO, J:
It was the refusal of respondent Judge Mario J. Gutierrez 1 to grant motion to quash of
petitioners, who were the accused in a prosecution for libel, notwithstanding the invocation of
their constitutional right to freedom of expression 2 that led to this suit for certiorari and
prohibition. All that could be alleged in the information against them was the publication in the
Evening News, a newspaper of general circulation, of an item reproducing in full a dispatch
from the Philippine News Service, a reputable news-gathering agency. It summarized the
testimony of Jaime Jose in a pending rape case wherein the name of Vincent Crisologo, the
offended party in the information for libel, was mentioned. This excerpt from the recent case
of Bocobo v. Estanislao 3 comes to mind: "This is contrary to the legal tradition of the
Philippines dating back to the landmark case of United States v. Bustos, where Justice
Malcolm emphasized that to prevent dilution of the constitutional right to free speech and free
press, every libel prosecution should be tested by the rigorous and exacting standard of
whether or not it could be violative of such fundamental guarantee. 4 It is easily
understandable then why in the motion to quash, the main reliance was on the Bustos
doctrine, although other grounds were alleged as warranting the dismissal of the
information. 5 When respondent Judge ignored such a fundamental constitutional principle,
the proper basis for a certiorari and prohibition proceeding was laid. Petitioners are entitled to
the remedies sought.
The alleged offending news item was a reproduction of a news item coming from the
Philippine News Service, furnished the Evening News, of which petitioners Manuel Elizalde
and Fred J. Elizalde were the Publisher and Assistant Publisher and Prudencio R. Europa
was the Editor-in-Chief. It reads thus: "Jaime Jose implicated Tuesday Vincent Crisologo, son
of Rep. Floro Crisologo ( N, Ilocos Sur ) as among his four companions the night of the
alleged rape of a former nightclub hostess last year. Jose, one of four principal accused in the
celebrated Maggie de la Riva rape case, denied, however, the charges of forcible abduction
with rape and robbery filed against him and his companions by Zenaida de la Cruz, 28, and
Araceli Sy, both nightclub hostesses. Jose mentioned Vincent Crisologo as among his
companions while testifying in his defense before Judge Francisco de la Rosa of the local
court of first instance. Jose claimed that both Zenaida and Araceli went voluntarily with his

group to the Queen's Court motel here in the early morning of July 4, 1966. Jose said
Zenaida and Crisologo went to a room together. However, Jose said, the two girls complained
when he and his companions failed to give the girls any money. ... 6 This was the continuation
of such news item: "The girls charged that they were robbed by Jose and his friends of cash
and jewelry inside the hotel. In their original complaint filed with the fiscal's office, the two girls
named Vincent Crisologo as among the accused. The taxi driver, whose vehicle was used by
Miss de la Cruz, also Identified Vincent Crisologo among the five youths in the incident. But
the girls later executed an affidavit saying that they were mistaken in Identifying Crisologo as
among the five men who allegedly abused them. Jose testified that he and Tillman were
about to go to a party in Mandaluyong, Rizal, on the night of July 3, 1966, when Crisologo
with three companions arrived. Jose said that young Crisologo wanted to borrow his car since
his car would be used by his congressman father. Jose said that after the party they
proceeded to Pasay City where Crisologo and a companion went to Bayside nightclub to look
for Crisologo's girl friend. Minutes later, Crisologo and his friend went out of the club and they
all proceeded to the Barbecue Plaza where they drank liquor. Shortly before 2 a.m., July 4,
the group allegedly started for home in Jose's two-toned Mercedez Benz car. On the way, a
taxicab overtook them. The cab allegedly carried Zenaida and Araceli. Jose said that Zenaida
called Vincent and shouted for them to stop. They then proceeded to Queen's Court motel,
Jose said. 7 The alleged offended party, according to the information filed by respondent
Provincial Fiscal, Jesus F. Guerrero, is Vincent Crisologo. The information is dated February
5, 1970. Thereafter, there was a motion to quash filed by petitioners on August 14, 1970. An
opposition was then filed by an assistant provincial fiscal on September 25, 1970. The order
by respondent Judge denying the motion to quash came on December 17, 1970. An
extensive motion for reconsideration submitted on February 23, 1971 having proved futile in
view of an order of denial a month later from respondent Judge, this petition for certiorari and
prohibition was filed with this Court.
As noted at the outset, certiorari and prohibition lie.
1. Petitioners were prosecuted for libel because the Evening News carried in its issue of
September 1, 1967 a news item furnished it by the Philippine News Service. It was a faithful
and accurate summary of what was testified to by a witness in a pending rape case. That was
all. The name of the alleged offended party, Vincent Crisologo, was repeatedly mentioned in
such testimony. It would have been a plain and simple distortion thereof if such a fact were
omitted by the Philippine News Service. The Evening News in turn published such item. This
is a case therefore that falls squarely within the protection of the free press provision found in
the Constitution. That such news item possessed a defamatory aspect is beside the point. It
cannot justify a prosecution for libel. Even prior to the 1935 Constitution, under the previous
organic act, the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, which contained a similar provision
mandating a free press, this Court, in the epochal Malcolm opinion in United States v.

Bustos 8 decided almost sixty years ago, to be precise on March 8, 1918, enunciated the
principle that the freedom of the press is
"so sacred to the people of these Islands and won at so dear a cost, [that it] should now be
protected and carried forward as one would protect and preserve the covenant of liberty
itself." 9 Thus it is clear that a prosecution for libel lacks justification if the offending words find
sanctuary within the shelter of the free press guarantee. This Court has since then been
committed to such an authoritative doctrine. 10 The opinion of Chief Justice Paras
in Quisumbing v. Lopez, 11 a 1955 decision, is even more explicit on the matter. Thus: "The
newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously
and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories,
press reporters and edition usually have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with
good faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point of suppression,
for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words. 12At the beginning of this decade,
this Court in Lopez v. Court of Appeals 13 expressed its commitment to such a principle in
these words: "No inroads on press freedom should be allowed in the guise of punitive action
visited on what otherwise could be characterized as libel whether in the form of printed words
or a defamatory imputation resulting from the publication of respondent's picture with the
offensive caption as in the case here complained of. ... If the cases mean anything at all then,
to emphasize what has so clearly emerged, they call for the utmost care on the part of the
judiciary to assure that in safeguarding the interest of the party allegedly offended, a realistic
account of the obligation of a news media to disseminate information of a public attendant on
the business of publishing cannot be ignored. 14
2. To be more specific, no culpability could be imputed to petitioners for the alleged offending
publication without doing violence to the concept of privileged communication implicit in
freedom of the press. As was so well put by Justice Malcolm in Bustos: "Public policy, the
welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded protection
for public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and
adoption of the doctrine of privilege. 15 He then quoted this excerpt from an American
Supreme Court decision,Abbott v. National Bank of Commerce: "The doctrine of privileged
communication rests upon public policy, 'which looks to the free and unfettered administration
of justice, though as incidental result, it may in some instances afford an immunity to the evildisposed and malignant slanderer. 16 Considering how ample is the protection afforded a
person alleged to have injured another's reputation, it appears quite obvious that respondent
Judge did infringe on the constitutional right of petitioners to press freedom when it denied
the motion to quash. He apparently was equally unaware of this relevant paragraph in the
Malcolm opinion: "A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic
examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive scrutiny would defeat
the protection which the law throws over privileged communications. The ultimate test is that
of bona fides. 17 By no stretch of the imagination then could it be said that the Philippine News

Service and the Evening News exhibited mala fides by the mere fact of narrating in a news
item the testimony of a witness in a rape case just because it did cast a reflection on the
conduct of a third party. The prosecution in its pleadings before the lower court could not
deny the accuracy of what was reported. Petitioners then ought not to have been subjected to
the annoyance, inconvenience, and trouble of going to a distant province and defend
themselves against a charge unwarrant under well-settled norms of constitutional dimension.
The doctrine of privileged communication moreover is explicitly provided for in the Revised
Penal Code, as an exception to the general principle that every defamatory imputation is
presumed to be malicious, even if it is true in the absence of "good intention" and "justifiable
motive" thus: "A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of
any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of
any statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed
by public officers in the exercise of their functions. 18
3. There being a denial of a constitutional right, a jurisdictional issue was raised. It has been a
well-settled doctrine since Conde v. Rivera, 19 that under such circumstances, the
competence of a court to continue with a pending case ceases. 20 Nor is it to indulge merely
in general propositions. In People v. Andres, 21 this Court precisely sustained a court of first
instance when it quashed an information for libel, the accused, respondent Andres, relying on
press freedom to show that the fact charged do not constitute an offense. As pointed out in
the opinion of Justice Barrera, it was argued by the prosecution "that the trial court erred in
dismissing the case on a mere motion to quash, contending that the trial judge's conclusion
on the face of the information that defendant-appellee was prompted only by good motives
assumes a fact to he proved, and that the alleged privileged nature of defendant-appellee's
publication is a matter of defense and is not a proper ground for dismissal of the complaint for
libel ... ." 22 That contention was rejected in this wise: "While there is some point to this
contention, yet when in the information itself it appears, as it does in the present case, that
the communication alleged to be libelous is contained in an appropriate pleading in a court
proceeding, the privilege becomes at once apparent and defendant need not wait until the
trial and produce evidence before he can raise the question of privilege. And if added to this,
the questioned imputations appear, as they seem in this case, to be really pertinent and
relevant to defendant's plea for reconsideration based on complainant's supposed partiality
and abuse of power from which defendant has a right to seek relief in vindication of his
client's interest as a litigant in complainant's court, it would become evident that the facts thus
alleged in the information would not constitute an offense of libel. 23 Similarly, a motion to
quash was sustained in the later case of People v. Alvarez, 24 In the opinion of Justice
Regala, it was pointed out: "As heretofore stated, this Court has adopted a liberal attitude in
favor of the writer in matter of the relevancy of allegedly libelous statements in judicial
pleadings. In U.S. v. Bustos, et al., 37 Phil. 731, this Court found occasion to express ills
opinion on privileged communications, to wit: ... A privileged communication should not be

subjected to miscroscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such


excessive scrunity would defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged
communication. ... It is worthy to mention here that in the information for libel, there is no
allegation of the irrelevancy or impertinency of the questioned statements to the cause.
Considering the above, We are of the opinion and so hold that no error was committed by the
lower court in considering the questioned remarks of the appellee as privileged and in
consequently dismissing the information for lack of cause of action. 25 In a third case, People
v. Aquino, 26 reference was made toPeople v. Andres to demonstrate that it is fitting and
appropriate for a court of first instance to dismiss an information on a motion to quash where
the privileged character of the, alleged offending publication is apparent. Respondent Judge
ought not to have betrayed lack of sensitivity to the categorical pronouncements of this Court
in the above three decisions that call for application,
4. Nor is a different conclusion called for just because the heading of the news item arising
from the testimony of Jaime Jose was worded thus: "LINK CRISOLOGO SON TO PASAY
RAPE CASE." How else could it have been expressed? That was to portray with accuracy
what was contained in the news item. What was testified to was to that effect. It succinctly set
forth the facts. There was no attempt to sensationalize. The tone is both neutral and
objective. Again there is relevance to the following excerpt from Quisumbing v. Lopez: "The
Court of Appeals found 'that the context of the article in question, is a fair, impartial and true
report of official or public proceeding authorized by law. The news item was the result of a
press release in connection with an official investigation of the Anti-Usury Division, N. B. I.,
and was a substantial, if not a faithful reproduction of the said press release which was, in
turn, an accurate report of the official proceedings taken by the Anti-Usury Division. The
article merely reported a raid on the 'business offices of three alleged money lenders;' and
related the steps actually taken or to be taken by the proper officials relative to the
investigation. It did not go beyond the actual report of official actuations. The theory of the
petitioner, stripped of incidentals, is that while the body of the news item may be considered
as being fair, impartial and accurate report of an official investigation of the Anti-Usury
Division of the National Bureau of Investigation and therefore privileged, its headline NBI
MEN RAID OFFICES OF 3 CITY USURERS, admittedly not forming part of the basic press
release but merely added by the respondents, is libelous per se, because the petitioner had
thereby been branded and condemned as a 4 usurer' when as a matter of fact no criminal
charge was even filed against him for the crime of usury in any court of
justice. 27Nonetheless, the newspaper publisher was not held liable. The Chief Justice then
explained why: "We are of the opinion that the appealed decision is correct. The petitioner,
while assuming that the article in question is privileged, argues that the headline (libelous per
se) added by the respondents rendered the same actionable, because said headline is not
borne out by the facts recited in the context. We believe that nobody reading the whole news
item would come to the conclusion that the petitioner had been accused or convicted of

usury. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the headline complained of may fairly be said
to contain a correct description of the news story. The fact that the raid was conducted by
anti-usury agents following receipt of a complaint against the petitioner and two others,
coupled with the announcement by the Chief of the NBI Anti-Usury Division that criminal
action would be filed in the city fiscal's office, naturally would lead one to think that the
persons involved were usurers. Nothing in the headline or the context of the article suggested
the Idea that the petitioner was already charged with or convicted of the crime of usury. 28
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is granted and the order of respondent Judge
denying the motion to quash of December 17, 1970 as well as the order of respondent Judge
of March 25, 1971 denying the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners are set aside
and nullified. The writ of prohibition is likewise granted and the restraining order issued on
June 10, 1971 made permanent, respondent Judge or any person who may have taken his
place being prohibited from taking any action in Criminal Case No. 11-V for Libel except for
the purpose of dismissing the same. No costs.
Antonio and Concepcion Jr., JJ., concur.

LUMEN POLICARPIO vs. THE MANILA TIMES PUBLICATION CO., INC., CONSTANTE C.
ROLDAN, MANUEL V. VILLA-REAL, E. AGUILAR CRUZ and CONSORCIO BORJE
FACTS: Policarpio was executive secretary of UNESCO Natl Commission. As such, she had
filed charges against Herminia Reyes, one of her subordinates in the Commission, & caused
the latter to be separated from the service. Reyes, in turn, filed counter-charges which were
referred for investigation. Pending completion, Reyes filed a complaint against Policarpio for
alleged malversation of public funds & another complaint for estafa thru falsification of public
documents. Policarpio filed a libel suit to Manila Times Publishing Co. for publishing two
defamatory, libelous and false articles/news items in Saturday Mirror of August 11, 1956 and
in the Daily Mirror of August 13, 1956 which are as follows:
Saturday Mirror (Aug 11, 1956):
WOMAN OFFICIAL SUED PCAC RAPS L. POLICARPIO ON FRAUDS Unesco Official
Head Accused on Supplies, Funds Use by Colleague
Daily Mirror (Aug 13, 1956): PALACE OPENS INVESTIGATION OF RAPS AGAINST
POLICARPIO Alba Probes Administrative Phase of Fraud Charges Against Unesco Woman
Official; Fiscal Sets Prelim Quiz of Criminal Suit on Aug 22 The articles contain news on
Reyes charges against Policarpio for having malversed public property and of having

fraudulently sought reimbursement of supposed official expenses. It was said that Policarpio
used several sheets of government stencils for her private and personal use. The other
charge refers to the supposed reimbursements she had made for a trip to Quezon and
Pangasinan. Reyes complaint alleged that Policarpio had asked for refund of expenses for
use of her car when she had actually made the trip aboard an army plane. Policarpio was
said to be absent from the Bayambang conference for which she also sought a refund of
expenses. CFI dismissed the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff had not proven that
defendants had acted maliciously in publishing the articles, although portions thereof were
inaccurate or false. ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant is guilty of having published
libelous/defamatory articles HELD: Yes. The headline of the Aug 11 article was given
prominence with a 6-column (about 11 inches) banner headline of 1-inch types. Its sub-title
PCAC raps Policarpio on fraud printed in bold 1 cm type is not true. Also, the statement in
the 1st paragraph of the article, to the effect that plaintiff was charged with malversation &
estafa by the Presl Complaint & Action Commission (PCAC) is not true, the complaints for
said offenses having been filed by Reyes. Neither is it true that said criminal action was
initiated as a result of current administrative investigation. Plaintiff maintains that the effect of
these false statements was to give the general impression that said investigation by Col. Alba
had shown that plaintiff was guilty and that, as a consequence, PCAC had filed the
corresponding complaints w/ the fiscals office. She also said that the article did not mention
that fact that the number of stencils involved in the charge was only 18 or 20; that the sum
allegedly misappropriated by her was only P54, and that the falsification imputed to her was
said to have been committed by claiming that certain expenses for which she had sought
reimbursement were incurred in trips during the period from July 1 Sept 30 1955, although
the trips actually were made from Jul 8-Aug 31, 1955. By omitting these details, plaintiff avers
that the Aug 11 article had the effect of conveying the idea that the offenses imputed to her
were more serious than they really were. Defendants contend that though the complaints
were filed, not by the PCAC but by Reyes, this inaccuracy is insignificant & immaterial to the
case for the fact is that said complaints were filed. As regards the number of sheets & the
nature of the falsification charged, they argue that these details do not affect the truthfulness
of the article as a whole. Besides, defendants had no means of knowing such details. Prior
to Aug 11, Col. Alba had already taken the testimony of witnesses; hence, defendants could
have ascertained the details had they wanted to. The number of stencil sheets used was
actually mentioned in the Aug 13 article. Moreover, the penalty for estafa/embezzlement
depends partly upon the amount of the damage caused to the offended party. Hence, the
amount or value of the property embezzled is material to said offense. It is obvious that the
filing of criminal complaints by another agency of the Govt, like the PCAC, particularly after
an investigation conducted by the same, imparts the ideal that the probability of guilt is
greater than when the complaints are filed by a private individual, wspecially when the latter
is a former subordinate of the alleged offender, who was responsible for the dismissal of the
complainant from her employment. Newspapers must enjoy a certain degrees of discretion in
determining the manner in which a given event should be presented to the public, and the
importance to be attached thereto, as a news item, and that its presentation in a sensational
manner is not per se illegal. Newspapers may publish news items relative to judicial,
legislative or other official proceedings, which are not of confidential nature, because the
public is entitled to know the truth with respect to such proceedings. But, to enjoy immunity, a
publication containing derogatory information must be not only true, but, also, fair, and it must

be made in good faith and without any comments or remarks. Art. 354, RPC provides that
Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious even if it be true, if no good
intention & justifiable motive for making it is shown, except, A fair and true report, made in
good faith, w/o any comments or remarks. In the case at bar, aside from containing
information derogatory to the plaintiff, the Aug 11 article presented her in a worse
predicament than that in which she, in fact was. Said article was not a fair and true report of
the proceedings therein alluded to. What is more, its sub-title PCAC raps Policarpio on fraud
is a comment or remark, besides being false. Accordingly, the defamatory imputations
contained in said article are presumed to be malicious In falsely stating that the complaints
were filed by PCAC, either defendants knew the truth or they did not. If they did, then the
publication would actually be malicious. I f they did not, or if they acted under a
misapprehension of the facts, they were guilty of negligence in making said statement. We
note that the Aug 13 article rectified a major inaccuracy in the 1st article, by stating that
neither Col. Alba nor the PCAC had filed the complaints. It likewise indicated the number of
stencil sheets involved. But, this rectification or clarification does not wipe out the
responsibility arising from the publication of the Aug 11 article, although it should mitigate it.
HELD: Decision reversed. Defendants ordered to pay plaintiff moral damages, attys fees plus
cost.

Lopez vs. Court of Appeals [GR L-26549, 31 July 1970] First Division, Fernando
(J): 4 concur, 2 concur in result, 1 dissents in separate opinion
Facts: In the early part of January 1956, there appeared on the front page of The Manila
Chronicle, of which Eugenio Lopez was the publisher, as well as on other dailies, a news
story of a sanitary inspector assigned to the Babuyan Islands, Fidel Cruz by name, sending a
distress signal to a passing United States Airforce plane which in turn relayed the message to
Manila. He was not ignored, an American Army plane dropping on the beach of an island an
emergency-sustenance kit containing, among other things, a two-way radio set. He utilized it
to inform authorities in Manila that the people in the place were living in terror, due to a series
of killings committed since Christmas of 1995. Losing no time, the Philippines defense
establishment rushed to the island a platoon of scout rangers led by Major Wilfredo
Encarnacion. Upon arriving at the reported killermenaced Babuyan Claro, however, Major
Encarnacion and his men found, instead of the alleged killers, a man, the same Fidel Cruz,
who merely wanted transportation home to Manila. In view of this finding, Major Wilfredo
Encarnacion branded as a "hoax," to use his own descriptive word, the report of Fidel Cruz.
That was the term employed by the other newspapers when referring to the incident. This
Week Magazine of the Manila Chronicle, then edited by Juan T. Gatbonton, devoted a
pictorial article to it in its issue of 15 January 1956. Mention was made that while Fidel Cruz
story turned out to he false, if brought to light the misery of the people living in that place, with
almost everybody sick, only two individuals able to read and write, food and clothing being
scarce. Then in the 29 January 1956 issue of This Week Magazine, the "January News Quiz"
included an item on the central figure in what was known as the Calayan Hoax, who

nevertheless did the country a good turn by calling the government's attention to that
forsaken and desolate corner of the Republic. Earlier in its Special Year End Quiz appearing
in its issue of 18 January 1956, reference was made to a health inspector who suddenly felt
"lonely" in his isolated post, cooked up a story about a murderer running loose on the island
of Calayan so that he could be ferried back to civilization. He was given the appellation of
"Hoax of the Year." The magazine on both occasions carried photographs of the person
purporting to be Fidel Cruz. Unfortunately, the pictures that were published on both occasions
were that of Fidel G. Cruz, a businessman-contractor from Santa Maria, Bulacan. It turned
out that the photographs of Cruz and that of Fidel Cruz, sanitary inspector, were on file, in the
library of the Manila Chronicle in accordance with the standard procedure observed in other
newspaper offices, but when the news quiz format was prepared, the two photographs were
inadvertently switched. As soon, however, as the inadvertent error was brought to the
attention of Lopez and Gatbonton, the following correction was immediately published in This
Week Magazine on January 27, 1957: "While we were rushing to meet the deadline for
January 13th issue of This Week, we inadvertently published the picture of former Mayor
Fidel G. Cruz of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, businessman and contractor, in 'Our Own Who's Who
feature in the Year End Quiz' of This Week in lieu of the health inspector Fidel Cruz, who was
connected with a story about a murderer running loose on Calayan Island. We here express
our profound regrets that; such an error occurred." Together with the foregoing correction,
Lopez and Gatbonton published the picture of Fidel Cruz; the photographs and the correction
moreover were enclosed by four lines, the type used was bolder than ordinary, and the item
was placed in a conspicuous place in order to call the attention of the readers to such
amends being made. The businessman Fidel G. Cruz sued Lopez and Gatbonton in the
Court of First Instance of Manila for the recovery of damages alleging the defamatory
character of the above publication of his picture. After trial duly had, he was awarded P5,000
as actual damages, another P5,000 as moral damages, and P1,000 for attorney's fees. That
judgment was affirmed on appeal to the appellate Court. Lopez and Gatbonton filed the
petition for certiorari. Issue: Whether the claim of freedom of the press negates Lopez and
Gatbontons liability arising from libel. Held: A libel was defined as a "malicious defamation,
expressed either in writing, printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, tending to blacken the
memory of one who is dead or to impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation, or publish the
alleged or natural defects of one who is alive, and thereby expose him to public hatred,
contempt, or ridicule." There was an express provision in such legislation for a tort or a quasidelict action arising from libel. There is reinforcement to such a view in the new Civil Code
providing for the recovery of moral damages for libel, slander or any other form of defamation.
According to the standard treatise of Newell on Slander and Libel: "Publication of a person's
photograph in connection with an article libelous of a third person, is a libel on the person
whose picture is published, where the acts set out in the article are imputed to such person."
Why libel law has both a criminal and a civil aspect is explained by Hale in his Law of the
Press thus: "On the one hand, libeling a person results in depriving him of his good
reputation. Since reputation is a thing; of value, truly rather to be chosen than great riches, an
impairment of it is a personal wrong. To redress this personal wrong money damages are
awarded to the injured person. On the other hand, the publication of defamatory statements
tends strongly to induce breach of the peace by the person defamed, and hence is of peculiar
moment to the state as the guardian of the public peace. Viewed from this angle, libel is a
crime, and as such subjects the offender to a fine or imprisonment." No inroads on press

freedom should be allowed in the guise of punitive action visited in what otherwise could be
characterized as libel whether in the form of printed words or a defamatory imputation
resulting from the publication of Cruz's picture with the offensive caption as in complained of.
This is not to deny that the party responsible invites the institution either of a criminal
prosecution or a civil suit. It must be admitted that what was done did invite such a dire
consequence, considering the value the law justly places on a man's reputation. This is
merely to underscore the primacy that freedom of the press enjoys. It ranks rather high in the
hierarchy of legal values. If the cases mean anything at all then, to emphasize what has so
clearly emerged, they call for the utmost care on the part of the judiciary to assure that in
safeguarding the interest of the party allegedly offended, a realistic account of the obligation
of a news media to disseminate information of a public character and to comment thereon as
well as the conditions attendant on the business of publishing cannot be ignored. However,
the correction promptly made by Lopez and Gatbonton would thus call for a reduction in the
damages awarded. It should be noted that there was no proof of any actual pecuniary loss
arising from the above publication. It is worthwhile to recall what Justice Malcolm referred to
as the tolerant attitude on the part of appellate courts on this score, the usual practice being
"more likely to reduce damages for libel than to increase them."

LIWAYWAY PUBLISHING, INC. AND U.S. AUTOMOTIVE CO., INC., petitioners,


vs.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, HON. RAMON A. DIAZ,
DEPUTY MINISTER, HON. MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA
COMMISSIONER, respondents.
G.R. No. 79126 April 15, 1988
BULLETIN PUBLISHING CORPORATION (BULLETIN), petitioner,
vs.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) SECRETARY RAMON
A. DIAZ AND COMMISSIONER MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA, respondents.
RESOLUTION

G.R. 77422 is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order filed on February 24, 1987 by Liwayway Publishing, Inc. (Liwayway
hereafter) and U.S. automotive Co., Inc. (US Automotive hereafter) seeking to annul and set
aside two writs of sequestration issued by the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(Commission hereafter) on February 12, 1987 on the shares of stocks of U.S. Automotive in
Liwayway, as well as the implementing directive addressed to the Central Bank Governor of
even date and to prohibit the Commission from conducting proceedings in connection with
the said sequestration.
G.R. 79126 is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for preliminary
writ of injunction and urgent ex-parte restraining order filed on July 27, 1987 by Bulletin
Publishing Corporation (Bulletin hereafter) to set aside the April 14, 1987 order issued by the
Commission which declared their intent to vote the "sequestered shares" in Bulletin; to
prohibit the voting of Bulletin shares by respondents, their successors, on their
representatives, to enjoin respondents, their successors, or their representatives from taking
part or intervening, directly or indirectly, in any acts, in the management of Bulletin; and to
direct the immediate acceptance by the Commission of Bulletin's offer to debosit in cash,
under escrow, so as to protect the interest of the government, if any, a specific amount for the
value of sequestered shares in the Bulletin pursuant to the restrictions on their transferability
as provided in its Articles of Incorporation, with any banking institution as may be designated
by this Court, pending and subject to final determination/adjudication of the ownership of said
shares and to lift the sequestration order of April 11, 1986.
Liwayway and Bulletin are domestic corporations engaged in the business of publication of
newspapers and magazines. The former publishes a daily newspaper, the "Balita," and three
weekly vernacular magazines, namely, "Liwayway," "Bisaya" and "Bannawag," while the latter
publishes the "Manila Bulletin" a daily newspaper and its weekly magazines, The "Philippine
Panorama," all of general and national circulation. In both corporations, Mr. Emiho T. Yap is
the biggest stockholder and Chairman of the Board of Directors. As of February 21, 1986, he
held 2,617 Bulletin shares, while, U.S. Automotive, 1 a corporation wholly owned and
controlled by him and his family, held 318,084 shares out of the total outstanding Bulletin
shares of 567,808.5 with 198,052.5 thereof as treasury shares and 765,861 subscribed
shares. 2 In Liwayway, "(B)y April, 1986, ... U.S. Automotive Co. owned almost 70% of total
Liwayway issued shares ... 3

TEEHANKEE, C.J.:

I. LIWAYWAY CASE

These two cases are jointly resolved because of the common identity of and related issues by
the parties, without prejudice to the writing of an extended opinion.

In G.R. 77422, the Commission had issued on February 12, 1987 two writs of sequestration,
one addressed to the President/Chairman of the Board of the U.S. Automotive sequestering
the President/Chairman's shares of stocks in the Liwayway as of April 15, 1986, and the other

addressed to the President/Chairman of the Board of Liwayway sequestering all shares of


stocks pertaining to U.S. Automotive in Liwayway Publishing, Inc. as of April 15, 1986.

unnecessary by the Commission's manifestation and undertakings, the Court enjoined faithful
compliance therewith by all concerned.

On the same date, the Commission requested the Central Bank to instruct all commercial
banks and non-bank financial institutions not to allow any withdrawals, transfers or
remittances from funds or assets under any type of deposit accounts, trust accounts, and/or
money market placements, including safety deposit boxes, stocks and bonds, bearer
certificates and unnumbered accounts, except those which may pertain to payment of regular
salaries and wages of Liwayway and HM Holding and Management, Inc. (hereafter HMH&M).

This renders moot this particular issue of unwarranted intervention of the Commission and
impairment of press freedom. But with the closing out of this case, as hereafter ordered and
the denial of petitioner's plea to lift the sequestration orders, the Court will formalize the
parties' agreement through the issuance of an injunction to the same effect, to assure
compliance regardless of any change in the composition of the Commission or of other public
officials concerned.

Petitioners' plea for a temporary restraining order was heard on February 26, 1987, the
hearing being limited to whether a restraining order should issue to restrain the commission
against denying Liwayway the use and availment of its funds in the banks to put out its
regular publications as well as against the Commission's interference or intervention in the
management or operations of Liwayway, considering the Central Bank's blanket
memorandum, at the Commission's behest, to all banks not to allow any withdrawals or
remittances from its funds, except for "payment of regular salaries and wages" which would
virtually shut down its publications.

As to the sequestration orders, the Commission claims that Emilio Yap, founder of U.S.
Automotive Co., organized long before martial law, is a "crony" if not downright "dummy" of
the deposed President Ferdinand Marcos. Mr. Yap, in turn, has strongly countered the
Commission's allegations as to his alleged business association with Mr. Marcos and
their prima facie sufficiently in this wise:

The then Solicitor General, now Secretary of Justice, Sedfrey Ordoez, as well as the
Commission's then Vice-Chairman, now Chairman, Ramon Diaz, assured the Court that
Liwayway's funds would not be choked off and that the Commission would not in any way
interfere or intervene in the management or operations of the publication nor with its editorial
policy or reportage or in any way impinge upon its freedom. It was brought out that Liwayway
made over P8 million in 1986 and paid more than half of that in income tax, and they agreed
further to preserve the status quo ante pending joining of the issues on the merits or a
showing of some irregularity that would warrant the Commission's intervention.
On February 27, 1987, the Solicitor General filed his manifestation as undertaken by him,
submitting a copy of the Commission's letter dated February 26, 1987, to the CB Governor,
Jose Fernandez, modifying its previous memorandum of February 12th and asking him to
instruct all banks to honor all checks of Liwayway and further stating that "(A)lthough mention
is made in the letter of the naming of a fiscal agent, respondent Commission is not naming
anyone at this time.
On the issue of freedom of the press, the Court noted with commendation the Solicitor
General's pledge at the hearing that the Commission will not in any way act in such a way as
to impinge upon the freedom of expression or freedom to publish the newspaper. The Court
gave due faith and credence thereto and the above-cited undertakings of the
Commission. Accordingly, in lieu of a temporary restraining order which has been rendered

On March 2, 1987, petitioners filed its manifestation and reply to the opposition alleging the
following:
1. Mr. Yap admits that he owns 2,508 shares of stocks of BASECO which
constitute less than 2% of the total 218,819 outstanding shares of stocks of
the company. He acquired the original 240 shares by subscription at the time
of incorporation and augmented by stock dividends to the present
stockholding of 2,508 shares.
2. Regarding the BASECO certificates of shares of stocks purportedly
belonging to Yap and endorsed to "someone" whose name was left in blank
this Court should require the respondents to produce the originals of said
stock certificates in order to verify the claim that they have been endorsed in
blank.
3. He had resigned from the chairmanship of BASECO since October 20,
1983. Out of his duly paid investment of P60,000, he never received any
cash dividend nor profited from BASECO.
4. He has never been a stockholder nor an officer of the Jai-Alai Corporation.
5. He owned only one qualifying share in the Manila International Port
Terminals, Inc.(MIPTI) which he later endorsed to the new MIPTI Chairman.
He resigned as chairman of the Board before the Aquino administration.

6. He invested in the Bulletin in 1961, as second biggest stockholder on the


invitation of Gen. Menzi long before Mr. Marcos became president.
7. All original stock certificates issued to U.S. Automotive and treasury shares
are all in the respective possession of the registered owners and have not
been endorsed to anyone.
But as the Court has consistently held and reiterated in PCGG vs. Pea, G.R. No. 77663,
decided also this month, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and the parties' conflicting
factual contentions have to be threshed out and adjudged in the Sandiganbayan, which is
vested with exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
II. BULLETIN CASE

Cojuangco, Jr., under sequestration, the petitioner has offered to deposit in cash the value of
the shares with the Commission, in the amount of P8,174,470.32 per PTC Check No.
607590, issued on October 15, 1987 which awaits the Commission's acceptance.
Respondents' memorandum of January 26, 1988, however, stated that only Mr. Campos'
shares were voluntarily surrendered, hence, they were accepted by the Commission. On the
matter of the shares of Cojuangco and Zalamea, it contended that unless there is a
confession or admission that the said shares are "ill-gotten assets" of Mr. Marcos and/or his
cronies, the true ownership of the shares has still to be determined by the Sandiganbayan
where Civil Case No. 0022 entitled "Republic ... vs. Emilio T. Yap, et al." is pending.
Petitioner, however, denies being a party therein. Subject to said admission, the Commission
considers it premature to enter into any transaction affecting those shares pending
determination of their ownership.

In G.R. 79126, the Commission issued on April 22, 1986 an order sequestering the shares of
former President Marcos, Emilio Yap, Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., their nominees or agents in
the Bulletin Publishing Corporation. In an order dated April 14, 1987, the Commission
declared their intent to vote the sequestered shares. Thus, on July 27, 1987, the instant
petition was filed seeking the nullification of the above mentioned order. It is petitioner's
contention that what is at stake here is the freedom of our press institutions to independently
manage their own affairs and effectively preserve editorial policies and objectives, without the
shadow of government participation in the same, that governmental presence in petitioner's
board will most certainly cast that shadow and threaten the independence of the press as an
institution of mass media protected and guaranteed by the Constitution. The Court issued a
temporary retraining order on July 28, 1987 ordering the respondents, their successors,
agents or representatives to cease and desist from voting Bulletin shares, or otherwise from
taking part or intervening, directly or indirectly, in any acts in the management of the Bulletin
daily newspaper.

In their Memorandum, respondents Commission and members expressly have declared that
the Commission no longer intends to exercise its right to vote the sequestered shares, that
the Commission's present role is confined largely to monitoring Bulletin's activities in terms of
preventing any dissipation and disposition of funds and assets and does not extend to the
exercise of the voting of the shares, unless subsequent events or circumstances call for such
exercise pursuant to law. Thus, respondents urge the dismissal of the petition "for want of
factual basis." As in the Liwayway case, the Commission concedes that it may not lawfully
intervene and participate in the management and operations of a private mass media such as
Bulletin for the purpose of maintaining its freedom and independence as guaranteed by the
Constitution and therefore the temporary restraining order heretofore issued on July 28, 1987
ordering the Commission or its representative to "cease and desist from voting the shares or
otherwise from intervening directly or indirectly in the management of petitioner Bulletin" will
be made permanent. The issue left for resolution is whether the Commission may continue to
refuse to accept the cash deposit offered for the present balance of 46,626 minority
sequestered shares in the name of Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco as prayed for in the petition.

Respondents' comment alleged that the Commission will vote only the shares of Cesar
Zalamea (121,178 shares), Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. (46,626 shares), and Jose Y. Campos
(46,620.5 shares) for a total of 214,424.5 shares which were the subject of the sequestration
order and that the shares of Emilio Yap were excluded by virtue of the Commission's order
dated March 16, 1987.

It is admitted of record that the Sequestration Order of April 22, 1986 is limited to a minority of
214,424.5 shares in the name of Messrs. Cesar Zalamea, Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and Jose
Y. Campos at the time of its issuance, as follows:
Cesar Zalamea 121,178 shares

Subsequently, however, petitioner alleged in its memorandum of January 2, 1988 that on


July 31, 1987, the Commission sold to it 46,620.5 Bulletin shares of Mr. Jose Y. Campos for a
total price of P8,173,506.06 per PTC Check No. 606380 and voucher and 121,178 Bulletin
shares of Cesar Zalamea for a total price of P21,244,926.96 per PTC Check No. 607887 and
voucher issued on October 15, 1987. As to the remaining 46,626 Bulletin shares of Mr.

Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. 46,626 shares


Jose Y. Campos 46,620.5 shares

Total 214,424.5 shares


and that the Bulletin shares of Emilio Yap owned by him since 1961 were excluded from the
said sequestration, by virtue of the Commission's order of March 16, 1987.
Likewise, in consonance with the Commission's very purpose and objective of preserving the
assets and ill-gotten wealth that may be recovered, pertaining to the deposed President
Marcos, and converting them into cash to be returned to the people in government projects
such as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), it has acknowledged the
recognized vested right of the Bulletin to purchase Bulletin shares that may be put up for sale,
since the government is barred anyway from acquiring ownership and management of private
mass media such as the Bulletin Publishing, Inc. under Art. XVI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution
which provides: "Sec. 11(1). The ownership and management of mass media shall be limited
to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations, cooperatives or associations, wholly-owned
and managed by such citizens."
In the letter dated July 8, 1987 of Commission Chairman Diaz to Kapisanan ng mga
Manggagawa sa Media ng Pilipinas (KAMMP), he recognized the restrictions on the
transferability of Bulletin shares accruing in favor of petitioner Bulletin when he wrote.
In view of the foregoing, when and if we dispose of those shares, the first
step to take is to offer the same to the corporation, and the corporation may
offer it to the other stockholders if it so desires. But we cannot avoid the
circumstance that the corporation itself will desire to buy the stocks and
therefore, the transaction will end here.
(1) Thus, on July 31, 1987, PCGG sold to petitioner Bulletin 46,620.5 Bulletin shares of Mr.
Jose Y. Campos for a total price of P8,173,506.06 per PTC Check No. 606380 and Voucher
(pp. 11-12, Petitioner's Addendum).
(2) The PCGG also sold to petitioner Bulletin 121,178 Bulletin shares of Mr. Cesar C.
Zalamea for a total price of P21,244,926.96 and accepted PTC Check No. 607887 and
Voucher issued on October 15, 1987 (pp. 12-13, Petitioner's Addendum), now as (Annex 'A').
As already noted hereinabove, there is a counter-allegation on the part of the Commission
that it had not sold the Zalamea shares but there are indications that it had accepted the
check and voucher therefor as stated herein. Whatever be the case, this is immaterial in the
light of the resolution of the case providing for the exercise of petitioner Bulletin's right of
preemption over such shares.

(3) As to the remaining 46,626 Bulletin shares of Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. under
sequestration, petitioner Bulletin has consistently offered to deposit in cash the value of the
shares with respondent PCGG, in the amount of P8,174,470.32 per PTC check No. 607590,
issued on October 15, 1987, and which awaits PCGG acceptance. (pp. 13-14, Petitioner's
Addendum).
Petitioner correctly maintains that its offer in good faith to PCGG of the cash deposit for the
sequestered shares will protect the interest of the government, if any, pending final
determination/adjudication of the matter.
The offer of cash deposit is in line with the government program on privatization and in
keeping with constitutional guarantee of press freedom and to maintain private mass media
free from government intervention in its management directly or indirectly.
The Commission has nothing to lose and everything to gain by accepting the cash deposit
offered by petitioner for the shares in the name of Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr.
The cash deposit being offered by petitioner is similar in nature and purpose to a cash bond
put up for a litigant during the pendency of the case. In both situations, the rights of the
parties and of the government, are adequately protected.
This cash deposit including interest earning is to be applied on the said 46,626 shares under
any of the following two (2) alternatives specifically proposed by petitioner:
Alternative "A" To standby as full payment plus whatever interest earnings
thereon upon final judgment of the Court declaring the Republic of the
Philippines as owners of the 46,626 shares, accompanied by the
corresponding original stock certificates, issued in the name of the
government, duly endorsed in favor of the Bulletin Publishing Corporation,
free from liens and encumbrances; or
Alternative "B" To immediately return to Bulletin Publishing Corporation the
cash deposit in the amount of P8,174,470.32 plus whatever interest earnings
thereon upon final judgment by the Court declaring that Mr. Eduardo
Cojuangco, Jr. is the true owner of the 46,626 shares.
This Resolution is issued to uphold the freedom of our press institutions to independently
manage their affairs and effectively preserve their editorial policies and objectives, without the
shadow of government participation and intervention. The Commission itself has recognized
that government presence in petitioner's Board will most certainly cast that shadow and

threaten the independence of the press which is protected and guaranteed by the
Constitution, and hence had given up its initial Idea to vote the sequestered shares in
petitioner Bulletin.

by its Editor-in-Chief Letty Jimenez Magsanoc, TETCH TORRES, PHILIPPINE STAR


represented by its Editor-in-Chief Isaac Belmonte, and EDU PUNAY, Respondents.
DECISION

ACCORDINGLY, in the Liwayway case, G.R. No. 77422, judgment is rendered.


CARPIO, J.:
1. As per agreement of the parties as set forth in the Resolution of March 3, 1987, enjoining
the Commission from any act interfering or intervening in any way or manner with the
management or operations or afffirms of petitioner Liwayway Publishing, Inc.; and
2. Dismissing the petition for a writ of prohibition to enjoin respondents from enforcing in any
manner the writs of sequestration heretofore issued over the questioned Liwayway shares
whose ownership will have to be tried and determined in the Sandiganbayan.
In the Bulletin case, G.R. No. 79126, judgment is likewise rendered.
1. Making permanent the temporary restraining order heretofore issued on July 28, 1987;
2. Directing the Commission to accept the cash deposit of P8,174,470.32 offered by petitions;
for the 46,626 sequestered shares in the name of Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. expressly
subject to the alternative conditions (A and B) hereinabove set forth, and likewise directing
the Commission to accept the cash deposit, if it has not actually sold the Cesar C. Zalamea
Bulletin shares to petitioner (supra, p. 13, par. [2]) of P21,244,926.96 for the sequestered
shares of Bulletin in the name of Mr. Cesar Zalamea under the same alternatives already
mentioned; and
3. Remanding the case regarding the issue of ownership of the said sequestered Bulletin
shares for determination and adjudication to the Sandiganbayan.

PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN, Petitioner,


vs.
PRIMA JESUSA B. QUINSAYAS, MA. GEMMA OQUENDO, DENNIS AYON, NENITA
OQUENDO, ESMAEL MANGUDADATU, JOSE PAVIA, MELINDA QUINTOS DE JESUS,
REYNALDO HULOG, REDMOND BATARIO, MALOU MANGAHAS, DANILO GOZO, GMA
NETWORK INC., through its new editors Raffy Jimenez and Victor Sollorano, SOPHIA
DEDACE, ABS-CBN CORPORATION, through the Head of its News Group, Maria Ressa,
CECILIA VICTORIA OREA-DRILON, PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, INC. represented

The Case
Before the Court is a petition for Contempt filed by Atty. Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun (petitioner)
against Atty. Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas (Atty. Quinsayas), Ma. Gemma Oquendo (Gemma),
Dennis Ayon (Ayon), Nenita Oquendo (Nenita), Esmael Mangudadatu (Mangudadatu), Jose
Pavia (Pavia), Melinda Quintos De Jesus (De Jesus), Reynaldo Hulog (Hulog), Redmond
Batario (Batario), Malou Mangahas (Mangahas), and Danilo Gozo (Gozo). Atty. Quinsayas
and the other respondents, who are not from the media, are referred to in this case as Atty.
Quinsayas, et al. Petitioner also named as respondents GMA Network, Inc. (GMA Network)
through its news editors Raffy Jimenez and Victor Sollorano, Sophia Dedace (Dedace), ABSCBN Corporation (ABS-CBN) through the Head of its News Group Maria Ressa (Ressa),
Cecilia Victoria Orea-Drilon (Drilon), Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc. (PDI) represented by its
Editor-in-Chief Letty Jimenez Magsanoc, Tetch Torres (Torres), Philippine Star (PhilStar)
represented by its Editor-in-Chief Isaac Belmonte, and Edu Punay (Punay). Respondents
Atty. Quinsayas, et al. and respondent media groups and personalities are collectively
referred to in this case as respondents.
The Antecedent Facts
On 23 November 2009, a convoy of seven vehicles carrying the relatives of then
Maguindanao vice-mayor Esmael "Toto" Mangudadatu, as well as lawyers and journalists,
was on their way to the Commission on Elections office in Shariff Aguak to file Mangudadatus
Certificate of Candidacy1 when they were accosted by a group of about 100 armed men at a
checkpoint in Sitio Malating, Ampatuan town, some four to ten kilometers from their
destination.2 The group was taken hostage and brought to a hilly and sparsely-populated part
of Sitio Magating, Barangay Salman, Ampatuan, Maguindanao. 3 The gruesome aftermath of
the hostage-taking was later discovered and shocked the world. The hostages were
systematically killed by shooting them at close range with automatic weapons, and their
bodies and vehicles were dumped in mass graves and covered with the use of a backhoe.4
These gruesome killings became known as the Maguindanao Massacre. A total of 57 victims
were killed, 30 of them journalists. Subsequently, criminal cases for Murder were filed and
raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 221, and docketed as Criminal
Cases No. Q-09-162148-172, Q-09-162216-31, Q-10-162652, and Q-10- 163766. Petitioner

is the counsel for Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr. (Ampatuan, Jr.), the principal accused in the
murder cases.
In November 2010, Atty. Quinsayas, et al. filed a disbarment complaint against petitioner
before this Court, docketed as Bar Matter No. A.C. 8827. The disbarment case is still
pending.
Petitioner alleged that on 22 November 2010, GMA News TV internet website posted an
article, written by Dedace, entitled "Mangudadatu, others seek disbarment of Ampatuan
lawyer," a portion of which reads:
On Monday, Maguindanao Governor Esmael "Toto" Mangudadatu and four others filed a 33
page complaint against lawyer Sigrid Fortun whom they accused of "engaging in every
conceivable chichancery or artifice to unduly delay the proceedings by using and abusing
legal remedies available."5
On even date, Inquirer.net, the website of PDI, also published an article, written by Torres,
which according to petitioner also stated details of the disbarment case, as follows:
"Respondent Atty. Fortun had astutely embarked in an untiring quest to obstruct, impede and
degrade the administration of justice by filing countless causes of action, all in the hope of
burying the principal issue of his clients participation or guilt in the murder of 57 people that
ill-fated day of November 23, 2009," the petitioners said. 6
Petitioner further alleged that on 23 November 2010, PhilStar published an article, written by
Punay, which gave details of the disbarment allegations, thus:
"Attorney Fortun used and abused legal remedies available and allowed under under the
rules, muddled the issues and diverted the attention away from the main subject matter of the
cases, read the complaint.
***** ***** *****
"Respondent Attorney Fortuns act of misleading the prosecution and trial court is a
dishonest/deceitful conduct violative of Code of Professional Responsibility," read the
complaint.
"In so doing, he diminished the public confidence in the law and the legal profession,
rendering him unfit to be called a member of the Bar." 7

Further, petitioner alleged that on 23 November 2010, Channel 23 aired on national television
a program entitled "ANC Presents: Crying for Justice: the Maguindanao Massacre." Drilon,
the programs host, asked questions and allowed Atty. Quinsayas to discuss the disbarment
case against petitioner, including its principal points. Petitioner was allegedly singled out and
identified in the program as the lead counsel of the Ampatuan family.
Petitioner alleged that Atty. Quinsayas, et al. actively disseminated the details of the
disbarment complaint against him in violation of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on the
confidential nature of disbarment proceedings. Petitioner further alleged that respondent
media groups and personalities conspired with Atty. Quinsayas, et al. by publishing the
confidential materials on their respective media platforms. Petitioner pointed out that Drilon
discussed the disbarment complaint with Atty. Quinsayas in a television program viewed
nationwide
Petitioner alleged that the public circulation of the disbarment complaint against him exposed
this Court and its investigators to outside influence and public interference. Petitioner alleged
that opinion writers wrote about and commented on the disbarment complaint which opened
his professional and personal reputation to attack. He alleged that the purpose of
respondents in publishing the disbarment complaint was to malign his personal and
professional reputation, considering the following: (1) the bases of the charges were not new
but were based on incidents that supposedly took place in January 2010; (2) it was timed to
coincide with the anniversary of the Maguindanao Massacre to fuel hatred, contempt and
scorn for Ampatuan, Jr. and his counsel and violated the accuseds right to presumption of
innocence and due process; (3) it was published following articles written about petitioners
advocacy for the rights of an accused and negated the impact of these articles on the public;
and (4) respondents knew that the charges were baseless as petitioner always opted for
speedy trial and protection of the accuseds rights at trial. Petitioner further alleged that in
announcing their "causes of action" in the disbarment case, respondents were only seeking
the approval and sympathy of the public against him and Ampatuan, Jr.
In its Comment, GMA Network alleged that it has no newspaper or any publication where it
could have printed the article. It alleged that it did not broadcast the disbarment complaint on
its television station. GMA Network alleged that the publication had already been done and
completed when Atty. Quinsayas distributed copies of the disbarment complaint and thus, the
members of the media who reported the news and the media groups that published it on their
website, including GMA Network, did not violate the confidentiality rule. GMA Network further
alleged that Dedace, a field reporter for the judiciary, acted in good faith and without malice
when she forwarded the news to the news desk. GMA News also acted in good faith in
posting the news on its website. GMA Network denied that it conspired with the other
respondents in publishing the news. GMA Network alleged that it posted the disbarment

complaint, without any unfair, critical, and untruthful comment, and only after it was
"published" by Atty. Quinsayas, et al. who furnished copies of the disbarment complaint to the
media reporters. GMA Network alleged that it had no intention to malign petitioners personal
and professional reputation in posting the news about the disbarment complaint on its
website.
In her Comment, Dedace clarified that she is a field news reporter of GMA Network and not a
writer of the GMA News TV website. Her beat includes the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, and the Department of Justice. Dedace alleged that on 22 November 2010, she
received an advice from fellow field reporter Mark Merueas that the lawyer of Mangudadatu
would be filing a disbarment case against petitioner. She waited at the Supreme Court. At
around 5:00 p.m., Atty. Quinsayas arrived. Atty. Quinsayas gave copies of the petition to news
reporters and Dedace received one. Dedace prepared and sent her news story to GMA
Network where it went to the editor. Dedace alleged that she did not breach the rule on
confidentiality of disbarment proceedings against lawyers when she reported the filing of the
disbarment complaint against petitioner. She alleged that she acted in good faith and without
malice in forwarding her news story to the news desk and that she had no intention to, and
could not, influence or interfere in the proceedings of the disbarment case. She further
alleged that she honestly believed that the filing of the disbarment complaint against
petitioner was newsworthy and should be reported as news.
PDI alleged in its Comment that it shares content with the Inquirer.net website through a
syndication but the latter has its own editors and publish materials that are not found on the
broadsheet. It alleged that Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc. and Inquirer Interactive, Inc. are two
different corporations, with separate legal personalities, and one may not be held responsible
for the acts of the other.
Torres8 alleged in her Comment that on 17 November 2010, a private prosecutor told her and
several other reporters that a disbarment case would be filed against petitioner. The
disbarment case was actually filed on 22 November 2010 when Torres received a copy of the
complaint. Since the lead of the story came from a lawyer, Torres did not consider that writing
a story about the filing of the disbarment complaint might amount to contempt of court. Torres
alleged that the writing of the story was an independent act and she did not conspire with any
of the other respondents. Torres maintained that she acted in good faith in writing the news
report because the Maguindanao Massacre was a matter of public concern and the
allegations in the disbarment complaint were in connection with petitioners handling of the
case. Torres further asserted that petitioner is a public figure and the public has a legitimate
interest in his doings, affairs and character.

In her Comment, Ressa alleged that she was the former head of ABS-CBNs News and
Current Affairs Group and the former Managing Director of ANC. However, she was on
terminal leave beginning 30 October 2010 in advance to the expiration of her contract on 3
January 2011. Ressa alleged that she had no participation in the production and showing of
the broadcast on 23 November 2010. Ressa adopts the answer of her co-respondents ABSCBN and Drilon insofar as it was applicable to her case.
ABS-CBN and Drilon filed a joint Comment. ABS-CBN alleged that ABS-CBN News Channel,
commonly known as ANC, is maintained and operated by Sarimanok Network News (SNN)
and not by ABS-CBN. SNN, which produced the program "ANC Presents: Crying for Justice:
the Maguindanao Massacre," is a subsidiary of ABS-CBN but it has its own juridical
personality although SNN and ABS-CBN have interlocking directors. ABS-CBN and Drilon
alleged that the presentation and hosting of the program were not malicious as there was no
criminal intent to violate the confidentiality rule in disbarment proceedings. They alleged that
the program was a commemoration of the Maguindanao Massacre and was not a report
solely on the disbarment complaint against petitioner which took only a few minutes of the
one-hour program. They alleged that the program was not a publication intended to
embarrass petitioner who was not even identified as the respondent in the disbarment
complaint. Drilon even cautioned against the revelation of petitioners name in the program.
ABS-CBN and Drilon further alleged that prior to the broadcast of the program on 23
November 2010, the filing of the disbarment complaint against petitioner was already the
subject of widespread news and already of public knowledge. They denied petitioners
allegation that they conspired with the other respondents in violating the confidentiality rule in
disbarment proceedings. Finally, they alleged that the contempt charge violates their right to
equal protection because there were other reports and publications of the disbarment
complaint but the publishers were not included in the charge. They also assailed the penalty
of imprisonment prayed for by petitioner as too harsh.
In their joint Comment, respondents Mangudadatu, Ayon, Nenita, and Gemma alleged that
petitioner failed to prove that they actively participated in disseminating details of the
disbarment complaint against him. They alleged that while they were the ones who filed the
disbarment complaint against petitioner, it does not follow that they were also the ones who
caused the publication of the complaint. They alleged that petitioner did not provide the name
of any particular person, dates, days or places to show the alleged confederation in the
dissemination of the disbarment complaint.
Respondents De Jesus, Hulog, Batario, and Mangahas, in their capacity as members of the
Board of Trustees of the Freedom Fund for Filipino Journalists, Inc. (FFFJ) and Atty.
Quinsayas, former counsel for FFFJ, also filed a joint Comment claiming that the alleged
posting and publication of the articles were not established as a fact. Respondents alleged

that petitioner did not submit certified true copies of the articles and he only offered to submit
a digital video disk (DVD) copy of the televised program where Atty. Quinsayas was allegedly
interviewed by Drilon. Respondents alleged that, assuming the articles were published,
petitioner failed to support his allegations that they actively disseminated the details of the
disbarment complaint.
In their joint Comment, PhilStar and Punay alleged that on 22 November 2010, Atty.
Quinsayas, et al. went to this Court to file the disbarment complaint but they were not able to
file it on that day.9 Atty. Quinsayas, et al. were able to file the disbarment complaint the
following day, or on 23 November 2010. PhilStar and Punay alleged that their news article,
which was about the plan to file a disbarment complaint against petitioner, was published on
23 November 2010. It came out before the disbarment complaint was actually filed. They
alleged that the news article on the disbarment complaint is a qualified privileged
communication. They alleged that the article was a true, fair, and accurate report on the
disbarment complaint. The article was straightforward, truthful, and accurate, without any
comments from the author. They alleged that Punay reported the plan of Mangudadatu, et al.
to file the disbarment complaint against petitioner as it involved public interest and he
perceived it to be a newsworthy subject. They further alleged that assuming the news article
is not a privileged communication, it is covered by the protection of the freedom of
expression, speech, and of the press under the Constitution. They also alleged that the case
is a criminal contempt proceeding and intent to commit contempt of court must be shown by
proof beyond reasonable doubt. They further alleged that they did not commit any
contemptible act. They maintained that the news article did not impede, interfere with, or
embarrass the administration of justice. They further claimed that it is improbable, if not
impossible, for the article to influence the outcome of the case or sway this Court in making
its decision. The article also did not violate petitioners right to privacy because petitioner is a
public figure and the public has a legitimate interest in his doings, affairs, and character.
Pavia died during the pendency of this case10 and was no longer included in the Comment
filed for the FFFJ Trustees. Gozo resigned as member of the FFFJ Trustees and was no
longer represented by the FFFJ counsel in filing its comment. 11 Gozo did not file a separate
comment.
The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether respondents violated the confidentiality rule in
disbarment proceedings, warranting a finding of guilt for indirect contempt of court.
The Ruling of this Court

First, the contempt charge filed by petitioner is in the nature of a criminal contempt. In People
v. Godoy,12 this Court made a distinction between criminal and civil contempt. The Court
declared:
A criminal contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or
a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to
bring the court into disrepute or disrespect. On the other hand, civil contempt consists in
failing to do something ordered to be done by a court in a civil action for the benefit of the
opposing party therein and is, therefore, an offense against the party in whose behalf the
violated order is made.
A criminal contempt, being directed against the dignity and authority of the court, is an
offense against organized society and, in addition, is also held to be an offense against public
justice which raises an issue between the public and the accused, and the proceedings to
punish it are punitive. On the other hand, the proceedings to punish a civil contempt are
remedial and for the purpose of the preservation of the right of private persons. It has been
held that civil contempt is neither a felony nor a misdemeanor, but a power of the court.
It has further been stated that intent is a necessary element in criminal contempt, and that no
one can be punished for a criminal contempt unless the evidence makes it clear that he
intended to commit it. On the contrary, there is authority indicating that since the purpose of
civil contempt proceedings is remedial, the defendants intent in committing the contempt is
immaterial. Hence, good faith or the absence of intent to violate the courts order is not a
defense in civil contempt.13
The records of this case showed that the filing of the disbarment complaint against petitioner
had been published and was the subject of a televised broadcast by respondent media
groups and personalities.
We shall discuss the defenses and arguments raised by respondents.
GMA Network, Inc.
GMA Networks defense is that it has no newspaper or any publication where the article could
be printed; it did not broadcast the disbarment complaint in its television station; and that the
publication was already completed when Atty. Quinsayas distributed copies of the disbarment
complaint to the media.
GMA Network did not deny that it posted the details of the disbarment complaint on its
website. It merely said that it has no publication where the article could be printed and that

the news was not televised. Online posting, however, is already publication considering that it
was done on GMA Networks online news website.
Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc.
PDI averred that it only shares its contents with Inquirer.net through a syndication. PDI
attached a photocopy of the syndication page stating that "[d]ue to syndication agreements
between PDI and Inquirer.net, some articles published in PDI may not appear in
Inquirer.net."14
A visit to the website describes Inquirer.net as "the official news website of the Philippine
Daily Inquirer, the Philippines most widely circulated broadsheet, and a member of the
Inquirer Group of Companies."15 PDI was not able to fully establish that it has a separate
personality from Inquirer.net.
ABS-CBN Corporation
ABS-CBN alleged that SNN is its subsidiary and although they have interlocking directors,
SNN has its own juridical personality separate from its parent company. ABS-CBN alleged
that SNN controls the line-up of shows of ANC.
We agree with ABS-CBN on this issue. We have ruled that a subsidiary has an independent
and separate juridical personality distinct from that of its parent company and that any suit
against the the latter does not bind the former and vice-versa. 16 A corporation is an artificial
being invested by law with a personality separate and distinct from that of other corporations
to which it may be connected.17 Hence, SNN, not ABS-CBN, should have been made
respondent in this case.
Maria Ressa
Respondent Ressa alleged that she was on terminal leave when the program about the
Maguindanao Massacre was aired on ANC and that she had no hand in its production.
Ressas defense was supported by a certification from the Human Resource Account Head of
ABS-CBN, stating that Ressa went on terminal leave beginning 30 October 2010. 18 This was
not disputed by petitioner.
Sophia Dedace, Tetch Torres, Cecilia Victoria Orea-Drilon,
and Edu Punay

Basically, the defense of respondents Dedace, Torres, Drilon, and Punay was that the
disbarment complaint was published without any comment, in good faith and without malice;
that petitioner is a public figure; that the Maguindanao Massacre is a matter of public interest;
and that there was no conspiracy on their part in publishing the disbarment complaint. They
also argued that the news reports were part of privileged communication.
In Drilons case, she further alleged that the television program was a commemoration of the
Maguindanao Massacre and not solely about the filing of the disbarment case against
petitioner. Even as the disbarment complaint was briefly discussed in her program,
petitioners name was not mentioned at all in the program.
Violation of Confidentiality Rule by Respondent Media Groups and Personalities
Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 18. Confidentiality. - Proceedings against attorneys shall be private and confidential.
However, the final order of the Supreme Court shall be published like its decisions in other
cases.
The Court explained the purpose of the rule, as follows:
x x x. The purpose of the rule is not only to enable this Court to make its investigations free
from any extraneous influence or interference, but also to protect the personal and
professional reputation of attorneys and judges from the baseless charges of disgruntled,
vindictive, and irresponsible clients and litigants; it is also to deter the press from publishing
administrative cases or portions thereto without authority. We have ruled that malicious and
unauthorized publication or verbatim reproduction of administrative complaints against
lawyers in newspapers by editors and/or reporters may be actionable. Such premature
publication constitutes a contempt of court, punishable by either a fine or imprisonment or
both at the discretion of the Court. x x x19
In People v. Castelo,20 the Court ruled that contempt is akin to libel and that the principle of
privileged communication may be invoked in a contempt proceeding. The Court ruled:
While the present case involves an incident of contempt the same is akin to a case of libel for
both constitute limitations upon freedom of the press or freedom of expression guaranteed by
our Constitution. So what is considered a privilege in one may likewise be considered in the
other. The same safeguard should be extended to one whether anchored in freedom of the
press or freedom of expression. Therefore, this principle regarding privileged communications
can also be invoked in favor of appellant.21

The Court recognizes that "publications which are privileged for reasons of public policy are
protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech." 22 As a general rule,
disbarment proceedings are confidential in nature until their final resolution and the final
decision of this Court. In this case, however, the filing of a disbarment complaint against
petitioner is itself a matter of public concern considering that it arose from the Maguindanao
Massacre case. The interest of the public is not on petitioner himself but primarily on his
involvement and participation as defense counsel in the Maguindanao Massacre case.
Indeed, the allegations in the disbarment complaint relate to petitioners supposed actions
involving the Maguindanao Massacre case.
The Maguindanao Massacre is a very high-profile case. Of the 57 victims of the massacre, 30
were journalists. It is understandable that any matter related to the Maguindanao Massacre is
considered a matter of public interest and that the personalities involved, including petitioner,
are considered as public figure. The Court explained it, thus:
But even assuming a person would not qualify as a public figure, it would not necessarily
follow that he could not validly be the subject of a public comment. For he could; for instance,
if and when he would be involved in a public issue. If a matter is a subject of public or general
interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is involved or
because in some sense the individual did not voluntarily choose to become involved. The
publics primary interest is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the
participant and the content, effect and significance of the conduct, not the participants
prior anonymity or notoriety.23 (Boldface in the original)
Since the disbarment complaint is a matter of public interest, legitimate media had a right to
publish such fact under freedom of the press. The Court also recognizes that respondent
media groups and personalities merely acted on a news lead they received when they
reported the filing of the disbarment complaint.
The distribution by Atty. Quinsayas to the media of the disbarment complaint, by itself, is not
sufficient to absolve the media from responsibility for violating the confidentiality rule.
However, since petitioner is a public figure or has become a public figure because he is
representing a matter of public concern, and because the event itself that led to the filing of
the disbarment case against petitioner is a matter of public concern, the media has the right
to report the filing of the disbarment case as legitimate news. It would have been different if
the disbarment case against petitioner was about a private matter as the media would then
be bound to respect the confidentiality provision of disbarment proceedings under Section 18,
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.

Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court is not a restriction on the freedom of the
press.1wphi1 If there is a legitimate public interest, media is not prohibited from making a
fair, true, and accurate news report of a disbarment complaint. In the absence of a legitimate
public interest in a disbarment complaint, members of the media must preserve the
confidentiality of disbarment proceedings during its pendency. Disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers must still remain private and confidential until their final determination. 24 Only
the final order of this Court shall be published like its decisions in other cases. 25
Petitioner also failed to substantiate his claim that respondent media groups and personalities
acted in bad faith and that they conspired with one another in their postings and publications
of the filing of a disbarment complaint against him. Respondent media groups and
personalities reported the filing of the disbarment complaint without any comments or
remarks but merely as it was a news item. Petitioner failed to prove that respondent media
groups and personalities acted with malicious intent. Respondent media groups and
personalities made a fair and true news report and appeared to have acted in good faith in
publishing and posting the details of the disbarment complaint. In the televised broadcast of
the commemoration of the Maguindanao Massacre over ANC, the disbarment case was
briefly discussed but petitioner was not named. There was also no proof that respondent
media groups and personalities posted and published the news to influence this Court on its
action on the disbarment case or to deliberately destroy petitioners reputation. It should also
be remembered that the filing of the disbarment case against petitioner entered the public
domain without any act on the part of the media. As we will discuss later, the members of the
media were given copies of the disbarment complaint by one of the complainants.
Esmael Mangudadatu, Dennis Ayon, Nenita and Ma. Gemma Oquendo
Respondents, while admitting that they were some of the complainants in the disbarment
complaint against petitioner, alleged that there was no proof that they were the ones who
disseminated the disbarment complaint. Indeed, petitioner failed to substantiate his allegation
that Mangudadatu, Ayon, Nenita, and Gemma were the ones who caused the publication of
the disbarment complaint against him. There was nothing in the records that would show that
Mangudadatu, Ayon, Nenita, and Gemma distributed or had a hand in the distribution of the
disbarment complaint against petitioner.
Melinda Quintos De Jesus, Reynaldo Hulog, Redmond Batario, Malou Mangahas, and
Atty. Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas
Respondents De Jesus, Hulog, Batario, Mangahas, and Atty. Quinsayas alleged that
petitioner was not able to establish the posting and publication of the articles about the
disbarment complaint, and that assuming the posting and publication had been established,

petitioner failed to support his allegation that they actively disseminated the details of the
disbarment complaint. They further alleged that they did not cause the publication of the news
articles and thus, they did not violate the rule on privacy and confidentiality of disbarment
proceedings.
Indeed, petitioner failed to prove that, except for Atty. Quinsayas, the other respondents,
namely De Jesus, Hulog, Batario, Mangahas, and even Gozo, who did not file his separate
comment, had a hand in the dissemination and publication of the disbarment complaint
against him. It would appear that only Atty. Quinsayas was responsible for the distribution of
copies of the disbarment complaint. In its Comment, GMA Network stated that the
publication "had already been done and completed when copies of the complaint for
disbarment were distributed by one of the disbarment complainants, Atty. Prima
Quinsayas x x x."26 Dedace also stated in her Comment that "Atty. Quinsayas gave copies
of the disbarment complaint against Atty. Fortun and she received one." 27
Atty. Quinsayas is bound by Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court both as a
complainant in the disbarment case against petitioner and as a lawyer. As a lawyer and an
officer of the Court, Atty. Quinsayas is familiar with the confidential nature of disbarment
proceedings. However, instead of preserving its confidentiality, Atty. Quinsayas disseminated
copies of the disbarment complaint against petitioner to members of the media which act
constitutes contempt of court. In Relativo v. De Leon,28 the Court ruled that the premature
disclosure by publication of the filing and pendency of disbarment proceedings is a violation
of the confidentiality rule.29 In that case, Atty. Relativo, the complainant in a disbarment case,
caused the publication in newspapers of statements regarding the filing and pendency of the
disbarment proceedings. The Court found him guilty of contempt.
Indirect contempt against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank is
punishable by a fine not exceeding P30,000 or imprisonment not exceeding six months or
both.30 Atty. Quinsayas acted wrongly in setting aside the confidentiality rule which every
lawyer and member of the legal profession should know. Hence, we deem it proper to impose
on her a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000).
WHEREFORE, we find Atty. Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas GUILTY of indirect contempt for
distributing copies of the disbarment complaint against Atty. Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun to
members of the media and we order her to pay a FINE of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000).
SO ORDERED.

Blo Umpar Adiong vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 103956, 207 SCRA 712 ,
March 31, 1992
Case Nature: PETITION to review the decision of the Commission on Elections.
Division: EN BANC
Counsel: Romulo R. Macalintal
Ponente: GUTIERREZ, JR., CRUZ
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of
Section 15(a) of Resolution No. 2347 of the Commission on Elections providing that decals
and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph
(f) of Section 21 hereof is DECLARED NULL and VOID.
Syllabi Class: Constitutional Law|Commission on Elections|Freedom of Speech
Syllabi:1. Constitutional Law; Commission on Elections; Freedom of Speech; The
COMELECs prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on mobile places whether public
or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on
constitutional grounds.The COMELECs prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on mobile places whether
public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and
void on constitutional grounds.2. Constitutional Law; Commission on Elections; Freedom of
Speech; The qualitative significance of freedom of expression arises from the fact that it is the
matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other freedom.This qualitative significance of freedom of expression arises from the fact that it is the matrix,
the indispensable condition of nearly every other freedom. (Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319 [1937]; Salonga v. Pao, 134 SCRA 438 [1985]) It is difficult to imagine how the other
provisions of the Bill of Rights and the right to free elections may be guaranteed if the
freedom to speak and to convince or persuade is denied and taken away.3. Constitutional
Law; Commission on Elections; Freedom of Speech; Verily, the restriction as to where the
decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizens
private property which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle.The resolution prohibits the posting of decals and stickers not more than eight and one-half
(8-1/2) inches in width and fourteen (14) inches in length in any place, including mobile
places whether public or private except in areas designated by the COMELEC. Verily, the
restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it
encompasses even the citizens private property, which in this case is a privately-owned
vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the
Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no
person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.4. Constitutional Law;
Commission on Elections; Freedom of Speech; The prohibition on posting of decals and
stickers on mobile places whether public or private except in the authorized areas

designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the


Constitution.In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on mobile places whether public or
private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship
which cannot be justified by the Constitution.

National Press Club vs Comelec


In the three (3) consolidated Petitions before us, the common question raised by petitioners is
the constitutionality of Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646.
Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media which are prevented
from selling or donating space and time for political advertisements; two (2) individuals who
are candidates for office (one for national and the other for provincial office) in the coming
May 1992 elections; and taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of
election issues and of credentials of the candidates is being curtailed.
It is principally argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 invades and
violates the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression. Petitioners maintain
that the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship, because it selects and
singles out for suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only publications of a
particular content, namely, media-based election or political propaganda during the election
period of 1992. It is asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of media's role, function and
duty to provide adequate channels of public information and public opinion relevant to
election issues. Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of
speech of candidates, and that the suppression of media-based campaign or political
propaganda except those appearing in the Comelec space of the newspapers and on
Comelec time of radio and television broadcasts, would bring about a substantial reduction in
the quantity or volume of information concerning candidates and issues in the election
thereby curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and opinion.
The statutory text that petitioners ask us to strike down as unconstitutional is that of Section
11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646, known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987:
Sec. 11 Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. In addition to the forms
of election propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
881, it shall be unlawful;

xxx xxx xxx


b) for any newspapers, radio broadcasting or television station, other mass
media, or any person making use of the mass media to sell or to give free of
charge print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes except
to the Commission as provided under Sections 90 and 92 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or
personality who is a candidate for any elective public office shall take a leave
of absence from his work as such during the campaign period. (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 should be taken together with Sections 90 and 92 of
B.P. Blg. 881, known as the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, which provide
respectively as follows:
Sec. 90. Comelec space. The Commission shall procure space in at least
one newspaper of general circulation in every province or city: Provided,
however, That in the absence of said newspaper, publication shall be done in
any other magazine or periodical in said province or city, which shall be
known as "Comelec Space" wherein candidates can announce their
candidacy. Said space shall be allocated, free of charge,
equally and impartially by the Commission among all candidates within the
area in which the newspaper is circulated.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 92. Comelec time. The Commission shall procure radio and
television time to be known as "Comelec Time" which shall be allocated
equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of
all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio
broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide
radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of the campaign.
(Emphasis supplied)
The objective which animates Section 11 (b) is the equalizing, as far as practicable, the
situations of rich and poor candidates by preventing the former from enjoying the undue
advantage offered by huge campaign "war chests." Section 11 (b) prohibits the sale or
donation of print space and air time "for campaign or other political purposes" except to the
Commission on Elections ("Comelec"). Upon the other hand, Sections 90 and 92 of the
Omnibus Election Code require the Comelec to procure "Comelec space" in newspapers of

general circulation in every province or city and "Comelec time" on radio and television
stations. Further, the Comelec is statutorily commanded to allocate "Comelec space" and
"Comelec time" on a free of charge, equal and impartial basis among all candidates within the
area served by the newspaper or radio and television station involved.
No one seriously disputes the legitimacy or the importance of the objective sought to be
secured by Section 11 (b) (of Republic Act No. 6646) in relation to Sections 90 and 92 (of the
Omnibus Election Code). That objective is of special importance and urgency in a country
which, like ours, is characterized by extreme disparity in income distribution between the
economic elite and the rest of society, and by the prevalence of poverty, with the bulk of our
population falling below that "poverty line." It is supremely important, however, to note that
objective is not only a concededly legitimate one; it has also been given constitutional status
by the terms of Article IX(C) (4) of the 1987 Constitution which provides as follows:
Sec. 4. The Commission [on Elections] may, during the election
period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or
permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of
communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions
granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its
subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal
opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable,
equal rates therefor,for public information campaigns and forums among
candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections. (Emphasis supplied)
The Comelec has thus been expressly authorized by the Constitution to supervise or regulate
the enjoyment or utilization of the franchises or permits for the operation of media of
communication and information. The fundamental purpose of such "supervision or regulation"
has been spelled out in the Constitution as the ensuring of "equal opportunity, time, and
space, and the right to reply," as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use
of such media facilities, in connection with "public information campaigns and forums among
candidates." 1
It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights which enshrines freedom
of speech, freedom of expression and freedom of the press (Article III [4], Constitution) has to
be taken in conjunction with Article IX (C) (4) which may be seen to be a special provision
applicable during a specific limited period i.e., "during the election period." It is difficult to
overemphasize the special importance of the rights of freedom of speech and freedom of the
press in a democratic polity, in particular when they relate to the purity and integrity of the

electoral process itself, the process by which the people identify those who shall have
governance over them. Thus, it is frequently said that these rights are accorded a preferred
status in our constitutional hierarchy. Withal, the rights of free speech and free press are not
unlimited rights for they are not the only important and relevant values even in the most
democratic of polities. In our own society, equality of opportunity to proffer oneself for public
office, without regard to the level of financial resources that one may have at one's disposal,
is clearly an important value. One of the basic state policies given constitutional rank by
Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution is the egalitarian demand that "the State shall
guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as
may be defined by law." 2
The technical effect of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution may be seen to be that no
presumption of invalidity arises in respect of exercises of supervisory or regulatory authority
on the part of the Comelec for the purpose of securing equal opportunity among candidates
for political office, although such supervision or regulation may result in some limitation of the
rights of free speech and free press. For supervision or regulation of the operations of media
enterprises is scarcely conceivable without such accompanying limitation. Thus, the
applicable rule is the general, time-honored one that a statute is presumed to be
constitutional and that the party asserting its unconstitutionality must discharge the burden of
clearly and convincingly proving that assertion. 3
Put in slightly different terms, there appears no present necessity to fall back upon basic
principles relating to the police power of the State and the requisites for constitutionally valid
exercise of that power. The essential question is whether or not the assailed legislative or
administrative provisions constitute a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or
regulation of the operations of communication and information enterprises during an election
period, or whether such act has gone beyond permissible supervision or regulation of media
operations so as to constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech and freedom
of the press. The Court considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the permissible
bounds of supervision or regulation of media operations during election periods.
In the constitutional assaying of legislative provisions like Section 11 (b), the character and
extent of the limitations resulting from the particular measure being assayed upon freedom of
speech and freedom of the press are essential considerations. It is important to note that the
restrictive impact upon freedom of speech and freedom of the press of Section 11 (b) is
circumscribed by certain important limitations.
Firstly, Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability. By virtue
of the operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11 (b) is limited in its
applicability in time to election periods. By its Resolution No. 2328 dated 2 January 1992, the

Comelec, acting under another specific grant of authority by the Constitution (Article IX [C]
[9]), has defined the period from 12 January 1992 until 10 June 1992 as the relevant election
period.
Secondly, and more importantly, Section 11 (b) is limited in its scope of application. Analysis
of Section 11 (b) shows that it purports to apply only to the purchase and sale, including
purchase and sale disguised as a donation, 4 of print space and air time for "campaign or
other political purposes." Section 11 (b) does not purport in any way to restrict the reporting
by newspapers or radio or television stations of news or news-worthy events relating to
candidates, their qualifications, political parties and programs of government. Moreover,
Section 11 (b) does not reach commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters
or broadcasters or editors or commentators or columnists in respect of candidates, their
qualifications, and programs and so forth, so long at least as such comments, opinions and
beliefs are not in fact advertisements for particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum,
Section 11 (b) is not to be read as reaching any report or commentary other coverage that, in
responsible media, is not paid for by candidates for political office. We read Section 11 (b) as
designed to cover only paid political advertisements of particular candidates.
The above limitation in scope of application of Section 11 (b) that it does not restrict either
the reporting of or the expression of belief or opinion or comment upon the qualifications and
programs and activities of any and all candidates for office constitutes the critical
distinction which must be made between the instant case and that of Sanidad v. Commission
on Elections. 5 In Sanidad, the Court declared unconstitutional Section 19 of Comelec
Resolution No. 2167 which provided as follows:
Sec. 19. Prohibition on Columnists, Commentators or Announcers During
the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite day, no
mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his
column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite
issues.
Resolution No. 2167 had been promulgated by the Comelec in connection with the plebiscite
mandated by R.A. No. 6766 on the ratification or adoption of the Organic Act for the Cordillera
Autonomous Region. The Court held that Resolution No. 2167 constituted a restriction of the
freedom of expression of petitioner Sanidad, a newspaper columnist of the Baguio Midland
Courier, "for no justifiable reason." The Court, through Medialdea, J., said:
. . . [N]either Article, IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 [b], 2nd par. of
R.A. 6646 can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been
granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media

practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite


periods.Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during
plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In
fact, there are no candidates involved in the plebiscite.Therefore, Section 19
of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis." 6 (Emphasis partly
in the original and partly supplied)
There is a third limitation upon the scope of application of Section 11 (b). Section 11 (b)
exempts from its prohibition the purchase by or donation to the Comelec of print space or air
time, which space and time Comelec is then affirmatively required to allocate on a fair and
equal basis, free of charge, among the individual candidates for elective public offices in the
province or city served by the newspaper or radio or television station. Some of the
petitioners are apparently apprehensive that Comelec might not allocate "Comelec time" or
"Comelec space" on a fair and equal basis among the several candidates. Should such
apprehensions materialize, candidates who are in fact prejudiced by unequal or unfair
allocations effected by Comelec will have appropriate judicial remedies available, so long at
least as this Court sits. Until such time, however, the Comelec is entitled to the benefit of the
presumption that official duty will be or is being regularly carried out. It seems appropriate
here to recall what Justice Laurel taught in Angara v. Electoral Commission 7 that the
possibility of abuse is no argument against the concession of the power or authority involved,
for there is no power or authority in human society that is not susceptible of being abused.
Should it be objected that the Comelec might refrain from procuring "Comelec time" and
"Comelec space," much the same considerations should be borne in mind. As earlier noted,
the Comelec is commanded by statute to buy or "procure" "Comelec time" and "Comelec
space" in mass media, and it must be presumed that Comelec will carry out that statutory
duty in this connection, and if it does fail to do so, once again, the candidate or candidates
who feel aggrieved have judicial remedies at their disposal.
The points that may appropriately be underscored are that Section 11 (b) does not cut off the
flow of media reporting, opinion or commentary about candidates, their qualifications and
platforms and promises. Newspaper, radio broadcasting and television stations remain quite
free to carry out their regular and normal information and communication operations. Section
11 (b) does not authorize any intervention and much less control on the part of Comelec in
respect of the content of the normal operations of media, nor in respect of the content of
political advertisements which the individual candidates are quite free to present within their
respective allocated Comelec time and Comelec space. There is here no "officious
functionary of [a] repressive government" dictating what events or ideas reporters,
broadcasters, editors or commentators may talk or write about or display on TV screens.
There is here no censorship, whether disguised or otherwise. What Section 11 (b), viewed in

context, in fact does is to limit paid partisan political advertisements to for a other
than modern mass media, and to "Comelec time" and "Comelec space" in such mass media.
Section 11 (b) does, of course, limit the right of free speech and of access to mass media of
the candidates themselves. The limitation, however, bears a clear and reasonable connection
with the constitutional objective set out in Article IX(C) (4) and Article II (26) of the
Constitution. For it is precisely in the unlimited purchase of print space and radio and
television time that the resources of the financially affluent candidates are likely to make a
crucial difference. Here lies the core problem of equalization of the situations of the
candidates with deep pockets and the candidates with shallow or empty pockets that Article
IX(C) (4) of the Constitution and Section 11 (b) seek to address. That the statutory
mechanism which Section 11 (b) brings into operation is designed and may be expected to
bring about or promote equal opportunity, and equal time and space, for political candidates
to inform all and sundry about themselves, cannot be gainsaid.
My learned brother in the Court Cruz, J. remonstrates, however, that "t[he] financial disparity
among the candidates is a fact of life that cannot be corrected by legislation except only by
the limitation of their respective expenses to a common maximum. The flaw in the prohibition
under challenge is that while the rich candidate is barred from buying mass media coverage,
it nevertheless allows him to spend his funds on other campaign activities also inaccessible
to his strained rival." True enough Section 11 (b) does not, by itself or in conjunction with
Sections 90 and 92 of the Omnibus Election Code, place political candidates on complete
and perfect equality inter se without regard to their financial affluence or lack thereof. But a
regulatory measure that is less than perfectly comprehensive or which does not completely
obliterate the evil sought to be remedied, is not for that reason alone constitutionally infirm.
The Constitution does not, as it cannot, exact perfection in governmental regulation. All it
requires, in accepted doctrine, is that the regulatory measure under challenge bear a
reasonable nexus with the constitutionally sanctioned objective. That the supervision or
regulation of communication and information media is not, in itself, a forbidden modality is
made clear by the Constitution itself in Article IX (C) (4).
It is believed that, when so viewed, the limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the right to free
speech of the candidates themselves may be seen to be not unduly repressive or
unreasonable. For, once again, there is nothing in Section 11 (b) to prevent media reporting
of and commentary on pronouncements, activities, written statements of the candidates
themselves. All other fora remain accessible to candidates, even for political advertisements.
The requisites of fairness and equal opportunity are, after all, designed to benefit the
candidates themselves.

Finally, the nature and characteristics of modern mass media, especially electronic media,
cannot be totally disregarded. Realistically, the only limitation upon the free speech of
candidates imposed is on the right of candidates to bombard the helpless electorate with paid
advertisements commonly repeated in the mass mediaad nauseam. Frequently, such
repetitive political commercials when fed into the electronic media themselves constitute
invasions of the privacy of the general electorate. It might be supposed that it is easy enough
for a person at home simply to flick off his radio of television set. But it is rarely that simple.
For the candidates with deep pockets may purchase radio or television time in many, if not all,
the major stations or channels. Or they may directly or indirectly own or control the stations or
channels themselves. The contemporary reality in the Philippines is that, in a very real sense,
listeners and viewers constitute a "captive audience." 8
The paid political advertisement introjected into the electronic media and repeated with minddeadening frequency, are commonly intended and crafted, not so much to inform and
educate as to condition and manipulate, not so much to provoke rational and objective
appraisal of candidates' qualifications or programs as to appeal to the non-intellective
faculties of the captive and passive audience. The right of the general listening and viewing
public to be free from such intrusions and their subliminal effects is at least as important as
the right of candidates to advertise themselves through modern electronic media and the right
of media enterprises to maximize their revenues from the marketing of "packaged"
candidates.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions should be, as they are hereby, DISMISSED for lack of merit. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED

Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan [GR 79690-707, 1 February 1989]; also Zaldivar vs.
Gonzales
[GR 80578] Resolution En Banc, Per Curiam: 15 concur Facts: [Acquired from 27 April 1988
decision] Enrique A. Zaldivar, governor of the province of Antique, sought, through a petition

for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, to restrain the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan
Raul Gonzalez from proceeding with the prosecution and hearing of Criminal Cases 12159 to
12161 and 12163-12177 on the ground that said cases were filed by said Tanodbayan
without legal and constitutional authority, since under the 1987 Constitution which took effect
on 2 February 1987, it is only the Ombudsman (not the present or incumbent Tanodbayan)
who has the authority to file cases with the Sandiganbayan. Similarly, Enrique A. Zaldivar, on
substantially the same ground as the first petition, prays that Tanodbayan Gonzalez be
restrained from conducting preliminary investigations and filing similar cases with the
Sandiganbayan. The Supreme Court granted the consolidated petitions filed by Zaldivar and
nullified the criminal informations filed against him in the Sandiganbayan; and ordered Raul
Gonzalez to cease and desist from conducting investigations and filing criminal cases with
the Sandiganbayan or otherwise exercising the powers and functions of the Ombudsman.
[Present case] Tanodbayan Gonzales allegedly made contumacious acts or statements in a
pleading filed before the Court and in statements given to the media. In its Resolution dated 2
May 1988, the Supreme Court required Tanodbayan Gonzales to explain "why he should not
be punished for contempt of court and/or subjected to administrative sanctions" and in
respect of which, Gonzales was heard and given the most ample opportunity to present all
defenses, arguments and evidence that he wanted to present for the consideration of this
Court. The Court did not summarily impose punishment upon Gonzales which it could have
done under Section 1 of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court had it chosen to consider
Gonzales' acts as constituting "direct contempt." In the per curiam resolution dated 7 October
1988, the Court found Tanodbayan Gonzalez to be "guilty both of contempt of court in facie
curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the bar." Gonzales
filed a motion for reconsideration. Issue: Whether the statements made by Tanodbayan
Gonzales transcended the permissible limits of free speech. Held: The "clear and present
danger" doctrine is not a magic incantation which dissolves all problems and dispenses with
analysis and judgment in the testing of the legitimacy of claims to free speech, and which
compels a court to exonerate a defendant the moment the doctrine is invoked, absent proof
of impending apocalypse. The "clear and present danger" doctrine has been an accepted
method for marking out the appropriate limits of freedom of speech and of assembly in certain
contexts. It is not, however, the only test which has been recognized and applied by courts.
Although the prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a limitation;
another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of the press, which
includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio, television and the movies, is the
"balancing-of interests test." The principle requires a court to take conscious and detailed
consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation'
Still, under either the "clear and present danger" test or the "balancing-of-interest test" the
Corut believes that the statements made by Gonzalez are of such a nature and were made in
such a manner and under such circumstances, as to transcend the permissible limits of free
speech. This conclusion was implicit in the per curiam Resolution of October 7, 1988. It is
important to point out that the "substantive evil" which the Supreme Court has a right and a
duty to prevent does not, in the present case, relate to threats of physical disorder or overt
violence or similar disruptions of public order. What is here at stake is the authority of the
Supreme Court to confront and prevent a "substantive evil" consisting not only of the
obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but also the avoidance of the
broader evil of the degradation of the judicial system of a country and the destruction of the

standards of professional conduct required from members of the bar and officers of the
courts. The "substantive evil" here involved, in other words, is not as palpable as a threat of
public disorder or rioting but is certainly no less deleterious and more far reaching in its
implications for society.
Eastern Broadcasting Corporation vs. Dans [GR L-59329, 19 July 1985] Resolution En Banc,
Gutierrez Jr. (J): 6 concur, 1 concurs and submits brief statement, 1 concurs in separate
opinion, 1 concurs in dispositive portion, 1 took no part, 2 voted for dismissal.
Facts: Radio Station DYRE was closed on the ground that the radio station was used to incite
people to sedition. A petition was filed by Eastern Broadcasting to compel the Minister of
Transportation and Communications, Ceferino S. Carreon (Commissioner, National
Telecommunications Commission), et. al. to allow the reopening of Radio Station DYRE
which had been summarily closed on grounds of national security; alleging denial of due
process and violation of its right of freedom of speech. On 25 March 1985, before the Court
could promulgate a decision squarely passing upon all the issues raised, Eastern
Broadcasting through its president, Mr. Rene G. Espina suddenly filed a motion to withdraw
or dismiss the petition. Eastern Broadcasting alleged that (1) it has already sold its radio
broadcasting station in favor of Manuel B. Pastrana as well as its rights and interest in the
radio station DYRE in Cebu including its right to operate and its equipment; (2) the National
Telecommunications Commission has expressed its willingness to grant to the said new
owner Manuel B. Pastrana the requisite license and franchise to operate the said radio
station and to approve the sale of the radio transmitter of said station DYRE; (3) in view of the
foregoing, Eastern Broadcasting has no longer any interest in said case, and the new owner,
Manuel B. Pastrana is likewise not interested in pursuing the case any further. Issue: Whether
radio broadcasting enjoys a more limited form Held: The case has become moot and
academic. However, for the guidance of inferior courts and administrative tribunals exercising
quasi-judicial functions, the Court issues the following guidelines: (1) The cardinal primary
requirements in administrative proceedings laid down by the Court in Ang Tibay v. Court of
Industrial Relations (69 Phil. 635) should be followed before a broadcast station may be
closed or its operations curtailed; (2) it is necessary to reiterate that while there is no
controlling and precise definition of due process, it furnishes an unavoidable standard to
which government action must conform in order that any deprivation of life, liberty, or
property, in each appropriate case, may be valid (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
Association v. City Mayor, 20 SCRA 849); (3) All forms of media, whether print or broadcast,
are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of speech and expression clause. The test
for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and present danger rule that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to
prevent; (4) the clear and present danger test, however, does not lend itself to a simplistic
and all embracing interpretation applicable to all utterances in all forums. Broadcasting has to
be licensed. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated among qualified users; (5) The clear
and present danger test must take the particular circumstances of broadcast media into
account. The supervision of radio stations whether by government or through selfregulation by the industry itself calls for thoughtful, intelligent and sophisticated handling; (6)
the freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative
democracy; and (7) Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all forms of

media by the due process and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution. A broadcast
corporation cannot simply appropriate a certain frequency without regard for government
regulation or for the rights of others.All forms of communication are entitled to the broad
protection of the freedom of expression clause. Necessarily, however, the freedom of
television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to
newspaper and print media. Radio broadcasting, more than other forms of communications,
receives the most limited protection from the free expression clause, because: First,
broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all citizens.
Material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but in the
privacy of his home. Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children. Bookstores and
motion picture theaters may be prohibited from making certain material available to children,
but the same selectivity cannot be done in radio or television, where the listener or viewer is
constantly tuning in and out. Similar considerations apply in the area of national security. The
broadcast media have also established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all
Filipinos. Newspapers and current books are found only in metropolitan areas and in the
poblaciones of municipalities accessible to fast and regular transportation. Even here, there
are low income masses who find the cost of books, newspapers, and magazines beyond their

humble means. Basic needs like food and shelter perforce enjoy high priorities. On the other
hand, the transistor radio is found everywhere. The television set is also becoming universal.
Their message may be simultaneously received by a national or regional audience of
listeners including the indifferent or unwilling who happen to be within reach of a blaring radio
or television set. The materials broadcast over the airwaves reach every person of every age,
persons of varying susceptibilities to persuasion, persons of different I.Q.s and mental
capabilities, persons whose reactions to inflammatory or offensive speech would be difficult to
monitor or predict. The impact of the vibrant speech is forceful and immediate. Unlike readers
of the printed work, the radio audience has lesser opportunity to cogitate, analyze, and reject
the utterance. Still, the government has a right to be protected against broadcasts which
incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. Radio and television may not be used to organize
a rebellion or to signal the start of widespread uprising. At the same time, the people have a
right to be informed. Radio and television would have little reason for existence if broadcasts
are limited to bland, obsequious, or pleasantly entertaining utterances. Since they are the
most convenient and popular means of disseminating varying views on public issues, they
also deserve special protection.

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