The Much Maligned Empress Dowager: A Revisionist Study of the Empress Dowager Tz'u-Hsi

(1835-1908)
Author(s): Sue Fawn Chung
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1979), pp. 177-196
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/312122 .
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ModernAsianStudies,13, 2 (1979), pp. I77-196. Printed in Great Britain.

The Much MalignedEmpressDowager:

A Revisionist
Studyof the Empress
Dowager Tz'u-hsi (1835-1908)
SUE

FAWN

CHUNG

Universityof Nevada, Las Vegas

CLIO, the Muse of History, has not been kind to the Empress Dowager
Tz'u-hsi (I835-I908). Traditional Chinese historians always have been
prejudiced against feminine influence in court. Moreover, historians
have long relied upon the works of men such as K'ang Yu-wei (I858I927)

and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao

(I873-I929),

the two leaders of the radical

reform movement, and other pro-Emperor radical reformers, most

notably Wang Chao (I859-1935), Yiin Yii-ting (1863-1918), Lo
Tun-jung (d. I923), and Li Hsi-sheng, for their information about
the workings of the Ch'ing court during the period I898 to I900.
Since these men were opposed to the power and conservatism of the
Empress Dowager, their prejudice is reflected in their writings about
the court at that time. Many historians also have relied upon the
works of Western writers such asJ. O. P. Bland, Sir Edmund Backhouse,
Abbreviations
The following abbreviations have been used for collections of documents and
articles:
CKCPNS Chung-kuo
chin-painien-shihtzu-liao [Materials on Chinese history of the
last century], edited by Tso Shun-sheng (Shanghai, 1931).
KCT
Kung-chungtang Kuang-hsiich'ao tsou-che[Secret palace memorials of
the Kuang-hsii period], edited by the Kuo-li ku-kung po-wu yuan
(Taipei, I973-75).
SL
Ch'ing Te-tsungChing huang-ti shih-lu [The veritable records of the
Ch'ing Kuang-hsii Emperor], edited by Ch'en Pao-shen (Taipei,
TH
WHPF

China
Blue
Books

I970 edition).

Tung-huahsii-lu,Kuang-hsiich'ao[Continuation of the official documents

recorded at the Tung-hua Gate], edited by Chu Shou-p'eng (Shanghai,
I909).
Wu-hsiipien-fa [I898 Reform Movement], edited by Chien Po-tsan,
et al., of the Chung-kuo hsin-shih-hsueh yen-chiu hui (Shanghai,
I953). Another edition exists under the title of Wu-hsiipien-fa wenhsien,edited by Yang Chia-lo (Taipei, I973).
Correspondence
Respectingthe Affairsof China: (Blue Books) China, Great
Britain, Parliamentary Papers (London, 1899-1901).

oo26-749X/79/0202-o i 77$02.oo ? 1979 Cambridge University Press

I77

I78

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and Hosea B. Morse for their information about this period. In fact,
Bland and Backhouse's China Under the Empress Dowager is the book
which has shaped many of our present-day negative images of Tz'u-hsi.
Recently the reliability of Sir Edmund Backhouse has been seriously
challenged by Hugh Trevor-Roper in his excellent study, Hermit of
Peking. There can be no doubt that Western writers drew their facts
from exchanges with the writings by the Chinese radical reformers,
from unreliable eunuchs, and from highly biased newspapers, such as
the Jorth China Herald (a pro-reform Western-oriented Shanghai
newspaper) and the Ch'ing-i pao [China Discussion], which was edited
by Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and published in Yokohama. Thus historians
have been presented with a rather one-sided view of the Ch'ing court
and have given undeserved credence to numerous myths and misconceptions about the Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi.
The traditional analysis of the significance of the January 24, I900
appointment of an heir apparent is an example of this maligning of the
Empress Dowager. The leaders of the radical reform movement and
their supporters created and successfully popularized the idea that the
establishment of an heir apparent was evidence of a plot by Tz'u-hsi
to depose the Kuang-hsii Emperor (r. I875-1908). According to these
anti-Empress Dowager stories, the Kuang-hsii Emperor had been
imprisoned on the desolate island of Ting-t'ai since the September 1898
coup d'etat. By circulating these rumors, the radical reformers hoped to
discredit the Empress Dowager and gain support for their own causes,
which included the restoration to full power of the Kuang-hsii Emperor.'
By suggesting that the Empress Dowager was responsible for the
Emperor's imprisonment and that she had forced him to sign edicts
which she had composed, the radical reformers were able to attack the
Empress Dowager's power and assert that they were the loyal supporters
of the legitimate ruler of China. Consequently, the radical reformers,
fearful of the removal of their symbolic leader, opposed any move to
depose the Emperor and vigorously propagandized against the selection
of an heir apparent.
However, there are documents which show that the appointment of
an heir apparent was the result of the imperial household's concern
for the lack of an heir in the face of the Emperor's declining health.
The appointment of an heir apparent also had the advantage of preFor more information, see Kung-ch'iian
K'ang ru-wei, Reformerand Utopian, i858-I927

Hsiao, A Modern China and a New World:

(Seattle and London, I975), andJoseph
W. Esherick, Reformand Revolutionin China: The igr9 Revolutionin Hunanand Hubei
(Berkeley, 1976).

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cluding the unpleasant imperial family rivalry over the choice of a new
ruler, which would surely occur in the event of the Emperor's death
without an heir. Lastly, the appointment of an heir apparent would
insure a smooth transition of government in a time of internal and external difficulties. Thus the daily court records, such as the Tung-hua
hsi-lu, Kuang-hsiich'ao [Continuation of the official documents recorded
at the Tung-hua Gate for the reign of Kuang-hsii] (1909), the Ta
Ch'ing Te-tsungChinghuang-tishih-lu [The veritable records of the Ch'ing
Kuang-hsii Emperor] (1939), and the Kung-chung tang Kuang-hsii
ch'ao tsou-che [Secret palace memorials of the Kuang-hsii period]
confirmed by independent accounts of various officials,
(I973-I975),
offer a radically different interpretation of the appointment of an heir
apparent. Contrary to the radical reformers' assertation that this was
a dethronement plot, these documents suggest that this was done to
avoid a succession crisis.
The Radical Reformersand the Court
One of the main issues involved in the appointment of the heir
apparent was the actual political role of the Kuang-hsii Emperor after
September 2I, 1898. On that day, repeating a request which he had
made in 1887, the Kuang-hsii Emperor beseeched the Empress Dowager
to resume the task of hsin-cheng (giving instruction in the art of governance) and the Empress Dowager agreed to act as regent for the third
time in her life. Contrary to the popular belief that the Kuang-hsii
Emperor was under house arrest and had no power, the Emperor
continued to be active in government after this date. For example, on
September 2 I, 1886, he began the practice of making personal comments
upon secret memorials and he never stopped doing this until his
death in I908. He made notations on several secret memorials on
September 20, 1898 and resumed this task four days later, on September
24, I898.2 From his comments on the secret memorials, it is obvious
that he, like the Empress Dowager, was especially concerned about
2 KCT
I2/I6I-6, 169-70. The Emperor did not read secret memorials every day,
so this is not an unusual interval of time. Yen-p'ing Hao and Kwang-Ching Liu,
'The Importance of the Archival Palace Memorials of the Kuang-hsu Period,
I875-1908,' CSWT 3: I (November I974), 78, have asked the rhetorical questions:
'Were the endorsements after the coup so successfully forged by the dowager empress
that they look like the previous ones in calligraphy? Or has the public in general,
and historians in particular, simply been misled by the reformers of I898, especially
Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, who over-emphasized the captivity of the emperor after the coup
d'etat?' The imperial comments photographically reproduced in the KCT appear
to be from the hand of the Emperor. Only an art expert who has specialized in
calligraphy and examined the original documents can really confirm or deny this.

i8o

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military reforms, such as those involving the pao-chia and t'uan-lien

and he felt the urgent need to develop strong military troops.3 As a
direct reaction to the failure of the One Hundred Days Reform Movement, he demonstrated a great concern about 'empty talk' and worried
that the approved moderate reform proposals would not be properly
instituted.4 This anxiety was also reflected in court edicts issued between
late 1898 and early 1900. In contrast to the popular image of his being
weak and indecisive, the Kuang-hsi Emperor's comments on the secret
memorials revealed a somewhat decisive and firm ruler, who was more
compatible in ideas to that of the Empress Dowager than traditional
historians have led people to believe.
There were also eye-witness accounts that confirmed the fact that the
two rulers were on the throne together. Yiin Yii-ting, a court official
and supporter of the Emperor, commented that 'after the coup d'etat
the Empress Dowager and Emperor both sat on the throne [she on the
left and he on the right] as if there were two rulers.'5 During his court
the
appearance on November 5, 1898, Yano Fumio (I850-I931),
Japanese Minister to China, also observed that the two rulers sat on
the throne.6 By October, 1898, Liu K'un-i (1830-I902), Chang Chihtung (I836-I909), and other high officials believed that the two were
ruling the country jointly and referred to the rulers as Liang-kung
(Two Palaces).7 Moreover, in a letter dated November 3, 1898, to a
close friend, Liu K'un-i commented, 'Both the Empress Dowager and
the Emperor trust each other. This is really the happiness of the
country.'8 Although the Empress Dowager, as regent, held the greater
authority, the Emperor was not a puppet at court audiences. During the
times when he was present at court audiences, Yiin Yii-ting observed
that although the Emperor said very little when officials memorialized
to the throne in late 1898, by 1899 the Emperor spoke to officials when
3
See, for example, the documents dated October 5, 1898, KCT
and December 29, 1898, KCT 12/424.
7, I898, KCT 12/214-I6;

12/19I-2;

October

4 Ibid.

5Yuin Yu-ting (I863-I918

of Kiangsu province), 'Ch'ung-ling chuan-hsin lu'
[The true story of the Kuang-hsu Emperor], dated I9I I, in CKCPNS, Vol. 2, p. 463.
6 The fact that the
Japanese Minister had seen the two rulers together on the
throne was quickly circulated throughout the foreign communities. See Rev. J. E.
Walker, 'China's Dowager Empress and Emperor,' Missionary Herald 94 (December
1898), 494. SL 430/7a and TH 149/I66.
7 Liu
K'un-i, Liu Chung-ch'eng-kung(K'un-i) i-chi [The works of Liu K'un-i], ed. by
Ou-yang Fu-chih, originally published in 192 I (Taipei: Wen-hai ch'u-pan she, 1970),
telegram to Jung-lu, probably dated October 6, I898, but misprinted as September
6, 1898, I/4a-b. This is one of numerous examples of Liu's reference to the two rulers

as Liang-kung.
8 Liu K'un-i,

Works, 'shu-tu,' I3/Ia.

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questions were directed to him and by I900 he initiated discussions

with officials.9 During this period, the Emperor also personally issued
edicts on several different topics, including the condemnation of K'ang
Yu-wei and his followers and the encouragement of men of talent to
enter government service. Consequently, the image of a hapless Emperor
at this time does not seem to be an accurate perception.
However, the radical reformers were anxious that the Chinese
people and the foreigners believe that the Emperor had nothing to do
with the present administration and that the Empress Dowager was in
complete control. K'ang Yn-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao quickly learned
the power of propaganda and used it to their advantage by spreading
stories against the Empress Dowager. As soon as Liang Ch'i-ch'ao
learned about the September 2ISt change of government and edict
charging K'ang Yu-wei with being connected with a clique that was
scheming for its own self-interest and using 'rebellious words' that led
to misgovernment, he sent a telegram to the radical reformers in
Shanghai about the situation.10 These Shanghai followers, who were
close to the British and other foreigners in the city, probably began to
circulate the rumor that the Empress Dowager had taken over the
government by force and that the Emperor was dead. British Acting
Consul-general Brenan, believing the rumor to be fact, telegraphed the
news to Lord Salisbury in London on September 23, i898.11 On the
next day, the NCH and other foreign newspapers picked up the story.12
By the time K'ang Yu-wei arrived in Shanghai on September 24th,
an atmosphere of great sympathy for K'ang and the 'deceased' Emperor
had been created. As a result, a British official, John Otway Percy
Bland, decided to help K'ang escape to safety in Hong Kong. During
the voyage, K'ang revealed his first version of the coup d'dtat to his
sympathetic, but slightly skeptical, British travelling companions,
claiming that the Empress Dowager took advantage of the discontent
9 Yiin Yii-ting, 'Ch'ung-ling,' p. 463.
10K'ang Yu-wei, 'Chronological Autobiography of K'ang Yu-wei (Nan-hai
K'ang hsien-sheng tzu-pien nien-p'u),' trans. by Jung-pang Lo, in K'ang ru-wei,
ed. byJung-pang Lo (Tucson, Arizona: University of Arizona Press, I967), pp. 136-7.
1 Brenan to Salisbury, China Blue Books, September 23, 1898, China No. I (1899),
Doc. 237, p- 254.

12 NCH
(September 24 and 28, 1898). Court eunuchs often provided information
about the court to NCH informants and to foreigners such as Bland and Backhouse.
The NCH writers often admitted this and Sir Edmund T. Backhouse revealed this in
a posthumous work, see 'Their Mortal Hour,' ed. by R. Hoeppli, AsiatischeStudien

Etudes Asiatiques, 28: I (1974), 1-48. On the unreliability of eunuch information, see
Robert Crawford, 'Eunuch Power in the Ming Dynasty,' TP 49:3 (196 ), I 115-48,

and Howard J. Wechsler, Mirrorto the Son of Heaven: Wei Chengat the Courtof T'ang
T'ai-tsung (New Haven, I974),

8 I-2.

I82

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among the higher officials caused by the sweeping reform edicts to oust
the Emperor.13 While some Britishers, including Henry Cockburn,
the Chinese Secretary to the British Legation in Peking, doubted
this interpretation, many Chinese and foreigners accepted the idea
that the coupd'etat was, as K'ang asserted, a power struggle between the
Empress Dowager and the Emperor.
The most widely believed rumor stemming from the brushes of the
radical reformers asserted that the Emperor, as a result of the power
struggle, had been imprisoned on Ying-t'ai from around September
24, I898 until the court left Peking for Sian in late I900. Ting-t'ai,
which has been described as an island paradise, the former study and
library of the Kao-tsung Emperor, and the designated retreat for the
Empress Dowager, who had been improving the buildings and grounds
for her anticipated comfort, was a palace complex surrounded on all
sides by the waters of the Nan-hai (South Sea) and located just outside
the southwestern walls of the Forbidden City.14 Although three bridges
originally led to the island, only one footbridge was in existence in
late I898 and thus the Emperor could be easily guarded while he was
confined to a bare room on the island. Many versions of this rumor have
been perpetuated through the years. The most widely accepted version
was that the Empress Dowager had thrown the Emperor into a bare
room there shortly after her return to power, assigned twelve to twenty
local eunuchs to guard him, prohibited him from moving about freely,
provided him with inedible food or poisoned his daily food, separated
him from Chen-fei ('Pearl Concubine,' I876-I900), his true love and
only close companion, and forbade any visitors other than his wife the
Empress Hsiao-ting (I868-I913, later known as the Empress Dowager
Lung-yii) whom the Emperor reportedly despised but who was very
loyal to the Empress Dowager,1s These stories evoked much sympathy
for the Emperor. The radical reformers used the tales to rally the Chinese
13

MacDonald to Salisbury, China Blue Books, October 13, 1898, China No. I

(I899), Doc. 40I, p. 303.

14 Osvald Siren's The

ImperialPalacesof Peking (Paris and Brussels, 1926), 3 vols,
contains some lovely pictures of Ying-t'ai. See also Frank Dorn, The ForbiddenCity:
The Biographyof a Palace (New York, I970) and Chin Liang, KuangHsiianhsiao-chi
[Insignificant remarks about the Kuang-hsii and Hsiian-t'ung reigns] (n.p., 1933),
78, for gossip about Ying-t'ai and the Emperor's imprisonment.
15 This is a summary of the highlights of the various versions. See, for example,
chi [Notes of the I898 coupd'etat], reprint of 1957
Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, Wu-hsiicheng-pien
edition, Taipei (Taiwan: Wen-hai ch'u-pan she, I970), (also in WHPF, Vol. I,

pp. 249-314),

hereafter abbreviated

WHCPC, chuan 2; Su Chi-tsu in WHPF 1/252

and 348, Ch'iu Tsung-chang, 'Tsai-t'ien wai-chi' [On the (Kuang-hsii Emperor)
Tsai-t'ien], I-ching 29 (May 5, I937), 34-43, and Yao Hsin-nung, The Malice of
Empire,trans. by Jeremy Ingalls (London, 1970).

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people and the foreigners to the cause of reform and the establishment
of a constitutional monarchy and to denounce the present regime.
The radical reformers also discredited edicts signed by the Emperor
by saying that the Empress Dowager coerced him to sign them.
In September 1898, the radical reformer Wang Chao told the Americans
who helped him escape to Japan that the Emperor was forced to request
the assistance of the Empress Dowager in the governing of the country.l6
This explanation was applied to later edicts, especially those which
denounced the radical reformers. The JVCH,for example, often labeled
the Emperor's edicts of this period as 'What the Emperor Was Forced
to Say.'17 These interpretations of the facts formed the foundation of
the helpless, docile image of the imprisoned Emperor.
The inconsistencies of the news reports stemming from the radical
reformers and their supporters were noted by a small minority of
foreigners. For example, in late I898, J. E. Walker, a missionary
wrote :18

A few weeks ago we were informed that Kuang-hsu, the Emperor of

China, had been made way with. Next we heard that he had been deposed
and was in poor health, and that the empress dowager had appointed another
person in his place. A little later we heard that the empress dowager had
married Li Hung Chang and now we hear that the Japanese minister has
been granted an audience with the emperor and empress dowager, and that
he found the former in good health, but the latter occupied the higher seat.
All this goes to show that... news from Peking is very unreliable.
Most of the foreigners were not privy to the information that the Emperor continued his practice of making notations on secret memorials,
still sat on the throne with the Empress Dowager during court audiences,
and initiated discussions with officials in court. Although the Empress
Dowager was a domineering and authoritative woman, it seems highly
unlikely that she would coerce the Emperor to sign the edicts issued in
his name if he was actively participating in government. Moreover,
according to Liu K'un-i, who often met with the two rulers, the Emperor
and Empress Dowager trusted each other. It seems more likely that
the radical reformers invented these stories in order to counter the
charges against them that were issued by the Emperor.
In fact, it was the Emperor, not the Empress Dowager, who issued
16 Mr and MrsIsaac
TaylorHeadlandassistedin WangChao'sescapefromChina,
but they also greatlyadmiredthe EmpressDowager.CourtLifein China:TheCapital,

Its Officials,and People(New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, I909), p. 159. See

also K'ang Yu-wei,'Nien-p'u,'p. I34.

17

See, for example, ANCH(April 4, 1900).

18 Walker,'China's

DowagerEmpress,'p. 494.

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all of the edicts against the radical reformers. On September 29,

1898, the Emperor signed an edict charging K'ang Yu-wei with advocating heterodox theories, deluding the people, planning to confuse the
laws, plotting to restrain the Empress Dowager in the Summer Palace,
betraying the Emperor, and founding a secret society, the Pao-kuo hui
(Society to Preserve the Nation), 'which proclaimed to protect China
but not protect the great Ch'ing dynasty.'19 Several days later, on
October 8th, the Empress Dowager issued her own edict on the subject
of conspirators who had secretly planned and advocated misgovernment, but she did not mention anyone specifically.20 In another personal
edict issued on October I Ith, Tz'u-hsi denounced the establishment of
societies and associations of any sort.21 She believed that such organizations, while declaring that their primary objective was to exhort the
people to be good and virtuous, usually ended up by disturbing the
peace. High officials were ordered to search diligently for members of
these societies and to punish them accordingly. Because there were
many active secret societies at that time, this was not a direct attack
upon K'ang and his followers, but the timing of the decree may have
indicated that it was directed at K'ang's organization.
Support for the court's position against the radical reformers was
immediate. Among those who telegraphed the court about the rebellious plot of K'ang and the subsequent disturbance of the people were
Chang Chih-tung and Liu K'un-i. Liu was among those who asked for
amnesty for the radical reformers as a gesture of good faith in order to
quiet the people and permit them to resume peaceful activities. Liu
felt that since K'ang, Liang, and other radical reformers had fled to
other countries, there was not much that could be done, so the court
should turn its attention to other pressing matters and adopt a 'very
tolerant' attitude toward the radical reformers.22 At first, the court
seemed receptive to these suggestions.
The tolerant attitude of the court was stressed in two edicts of December 1898. On December 5th the court issued an edict to the Grand
Council accusing K'ang and others of conspiring to incite a rebellion
and announced that because of the court's tolerance, the court was
unwilling to act upon these charges.23 However, the court had received
19 SL 427/5b-7a

20 SL 428/5b-6b and TH I48/I8a.

and TH i48/8a-b.
Liu K'un-i, Works, 'telegrams,' dated October 13, 1898, I/44b-45a. See also
Chang Chih-tung, (i837-1909),
Chang Wen-hsiang kung ch'iian-chi [The complete
works of Chang Chih-tung], ed. by Wang Shu-nan (Peiping: Wen-hua chai, I928),
22 SL 432/9b-ioa.
I57/Ia-b and selection in WHPF 2/617.
23 SL
434/ia-b. See also Yang T'ing-fu, T'an Ssu-t'ung nien-p'u [Chronological
biography ofT'an Ssu-t'ung] (Peking, I957), II2.
21

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information that the rebels were trying to return to the country and that
their associates were planning to cause trouble in the country. Thus
the court warned the high provincial officials that they should investigate the situation and capture the rebels if possible. On December 28th
the court announced that more evidence against K'ang Yu-wei had
been brought to light by T'an Chung-lin, the Governor-general of
Liang-Kwang, who had found some very damaging letters in K'ang's
Canton residence.24 One letter stated that T'an Ssu-t'ung (1865-1898)
was to be chosen as the president of a republic. Moreover, the letters
did not use the traditional 'Kuang-hsii dating system,' indicating the
radical reformers' revolutionary aims. The court reiterated that it
would 'remain tolerant and did not wish to examine deeply the
implications [of these letters],' but the serious nature of the ideas
expressed in these letters indicated that K'ang was guilty of more than
just spreading heterodox theories. Eventually, the court took a less
tolerant view of radical reform activities in China.
Reports of more subversive activities of the radical reformers prompted
the court to change its position. One factor was the appearance and
growing circulation of the CIP, edited by Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, published
in Yokohama, and distributed in China by underground supporters
in port cities such as Shanghai. The radical reformers' journal published
its first issue on December 23, 1898, and by late February 1899, Chang
Chih-tung, as well as other high officials, had read a copy. On March 2,
1899, Chang informed the Tsungli Yamen about the CIP and its
corrupting influence on the minds of the people.25 Lo Tun-jung, a wellknown historian from Kwangtung and colleague of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao,
claimed that the court official Kang-i presented the Empress Dowager
with a copy of the CIP some time after June 1899 and that the articles
criticizing her caused her to be 'very angry.' Nevertheless, the court
did not take any direct action against the journal's circulation at this
time. This task was in the hands of high officials, particularly Liu
K'un-i and Chang Chih-tung, who personally attempted to stop the
importation of the CIP.26 Their efforts were not very successful. The
24

Chang Chih-tung, Works, 80/16.

Lo Tun-jung, 'Ch'uan-pien yu-wen' [More tales of the Boxer uprising], in
CKCPNS, pp. 555-7. This work was also serialized in Tung-yen I:2 (December I6,
1912), i-i6; 1:3 (January I, I913), I-i6; 1:4 (January 16, 1913), 1-16. Lo claimed
that the Empress Dowager extended her anger to the foreigners, who permitted the
publication and circulation of this journal and who protected the radical reformers.
26
Chang was particularly incensed by the 'slanderous lies' of K'ang Yu-wei.
See also, Esherick, Reform
Chang Chih-tung, Works, I59/27-28 and I03/15-I6.
25

and Revolutionin China.

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radical reformers continued to agitate in the Chekiang-Kiansu-Hunan

areas, so the court ordered the respective provincial officials to take
precautionary measures against these rebels and offered rewards for the
capture of the leaders. The court also took the drastic step of pressuring
the Japanese government to force K'ang to leave Japan, which he did
with funds from the Japanese officials. Then on October 28, I899, the
court received information that K'ang had sailed from Canada to
Yokohama on October 27th.27 The court warned officials in Hong Kong,
Shanghai, and other port cities to watch for K'ang's possible secret
arrival. Thus the court became increasingly concerned about the
activities of the radical reformers and their supporters both at home
and abroad.
Finally the court took concrete action to dispel some of the prevailing rumors. On December 20, I899, the Kuang-hsii Emperor
issued a personal edict denouncing K'ang and his followers.28 The
Emperor began this edict by praising the Empress Dowager for her
boundless energy and numerous years of instruction in the art of
governance. Then he condemned K'ang Yu-wei for seeking to incite a
rebellion, gathering selfish men around him, and planning to inaugurate
a republican form of government. The Emperor also claimed that he
did not realize what was going on until very late and at that point he
sought the protection of the Empress Dowager and requested her to
resume the reins of government as his regent. Furthermore, he chastised
K'ang and Liang for continuing their efforts to incite a revolution
from abroad and for trying to create discontent with their treasonable
publications, which had influenced adversely 'one or two in a hundred or
a thousand of our people.' He closed this long edict by ordering the
high provincial officials to use every means in their power to capture
K'ang and Liang, either dead or alive. By issuing this edict, the Emperor reiterated his closeness to the Empress Dowager and his opposition
to K'ang Yu-wei and his supporters.
The court continued its attack against the radical reformers, particularly because the radical reformers were trying to undermine the
establishment of the heir apparent. On January i, I900, the court
charged Li Hung-chang (I823-I901), who had just assumed the post
of Acting Governor-general of Liang-Kwang-the
home of K'ang and
and
the
center
of
much
radical
reform
the
Liang
agitation-with
of
the
of
the
of
heterodox
ideas
responsibility
stopping
spread
K'ang
and Liang.29 The court also warned all high provincial officials,
particularly those in Fukien, Chekiang, and Kwangtung, to be alert
27

SL 451 /5b-6a.

28

SL 455/3a-4b.

29

SL 458/9a.

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for radical reform agitation, to investigate and stop the circulation of

the CIP and other subversive literature, and to be on the lookout for the
radical reform leaders.30 Then on February I4, I900, the Emperor
issued another personal edict offering a reward ofTls Ioo,ooo to anyone
who captured K'ang or Liang dead or alive.31 The Shanghai Taotai
was given the money to hold for immediate dispensation to the successful captors. At the same time, the high provincial officials were ordered
to accelerate their investigation of the sale of the radical reformers'
writings and to arrest and severely punish anyone found buying or
reading these materials. The Emperor felt that in this way the spread of
sedition could be controlled and the minds of the people would be
quieted. Thus again the Emperor took the lead in the attack on the
radical reform leaders and the Empress Dowager publicly remained
silent.
The political acumen of the Empress Dowager was clearly demonstrated by the way in which she dealt with the radical reformers. At no
time did she personally attack K'ang and his friends in any of her
i-chih ('empress edicts'). This task was left in the hands of the disillusioned Emperor. He personally issued the edicts (shang-chih, 'emperor's
edicts') condemning K'ang Yu-wei and his supporters. This permitted
the high provincial officials, for example, Chang Chih-tung, to act
with great vigor against groups which he believed to be associated with
K'ang Yu-wei.32 The great failure of the court was in not recognizing
the power of the press until it was too late. The court should have
vigorously halted the circulation of the radical reformers' writings or
countered them with its own publications, but the court did neither.

Plots to Depose the Kuang-hsii

Emperor

The most damaging rumor which the radical reformers circulated

through their publications was the plots by the Empress Dowager to
depose the Kuang-hsii Emperor. Dethronement was a key issue by
which the radical reformers could rally support from the Chinese
and foreigners in China and the Chinese in foreign countries, so this
was constantly stressed in their writings. The rumor of these plots also
undermined the establishment of the heir apparent in January I900,
30January 14, I900, SL 458/I Ia-b.
SL 458/I Ia-b.
32Chang Chih-tung, Works, 51/24a-26a
(Independence Society).
31

on his suppression

of the Tz'u-li

hui

I88

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created doubts in the minds of the uninformed about the harmony

between the two rulers, and led to continual interference by foreigners
in internal court matters.
From the very first issue of the CIP, dated December 23, 1898, the
radical reformers revealed plots to dethrone the Emperor. In order
to make the present threat more convincing, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao asserted
that there had been efforts as early as I895.33 Tz'u-hsi was accused of
plotting to place a certain Prince Sun on the throne but her plans were
thwarted by the reformer Wen T'ing-shih (I856-I904), who was able
to persuade Liu K'un-i and other high officials to protest against the
dethronement.34 The story gained much credence. Years later, the
anti-Manchu revolutionist Chang Ping-lin (1868-1936), in a letter to
K'ang Yu-wei trying to persuade him that the Emperor was 'a public
enemy of the Chinese race,' treated this rumor as fact:35 'Since the
2Ist year of Kuang-hsii (I895), the Emperor has lived in nervous
dread of his dethronement by the Empress Dowager. Nervously depressed by this prospect, he laid his plans . . .' Other writers also
accepted the tale and perpetuated it without questioning how Liang,
who was working on a newspaper in Shanghai at that time, got his
information or why the collected writings of Liu K'un-i made no
mention of Wen T'ing-shih or this plot during the period from 1895
to 1896. Nevertheless, the 'fact' that there was a plot in I895 lent
credence to the rumor that there was another plot in 1898.
The plan to depose the Emperor in 1898 was called the 'Tientsin
Plot' because the Emperor was to be deposed during a military review
at Tientsin. According to Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, the Empress Dowager and
had worked out the details long before the One
Jung-lu (I836-I903)
Hundred Days Reform, but they did not initiate the plan until June
15, 1898.36 On that day two significant

edicts were issued: one appoint-

ing Jung-lu as Governor-general of Chihli and commander-in-chief

of the Pei-yang Army and the second announcing that the Emperor
and Empress Dowager would be present at a military review of the
Pei-yang Army in Tientsin in October or November of that year.
During this review, Tz'u-hsi and Jung-lu, backed by the military
33Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, WHCPC, chiian 2 and in WHPF 1/256-9, lists six issues,
but these two are the most significant and the ones usually cited by later historians.
34Arthur W. Hummel, EminentChineseof the Ch'ing Period, I644-I9I2,
2 vols
(Washington, I943-44), 855.
35This letter was published in the Su-paoand NCH (July
I7, 1905). See Y. C.

Wang, 'The Su-paoCase: A Study of Foreign Pressure, Intellectual Fermentation,

and Dynastic Decline,' MonumentaSerica24 (1965), 102.
36Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, WHCPC,chiian 2 and in WHPF 1/260.

THE

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forces, would depose the Emperor. Liang also claimed that the Emperor
and radical reformers knew about this plot months before the coup
d'etat. When, on August 24, 1898, the date of the inspection was set
for October 19, I898, the Emperor reportedly became very agitated
and swore to I-k'uang (Prince Ch'ing, 1836-1916), that he would
never go to Tientsin.37 However, the actual execution of this plot was
canceled because the Empress Dowager resumed power on September
21,
1898, and thereby made it unnecessary to depose the Emperor.
The fact that the coup d'etat could be accomplished with such ease has
caused many scholars to question the validity of this story, particularly
the necessity for Tz'u-hsi to depose the Emperor in Tientsin.
The general conclusion of most historians was that this story was
not true. Su Chi-tsu, a contemporary historian, raised the issue of
why Tz'u-hsi and Jung-lu should take the trouble to leave Peking,
where the Empress Dowager had tremendous power and influence,
and go to Tientsin in order to depose the Emperor.38 Moreover, Su
realized that the outcry from officials and foreigners would have been
great and questioned whether the Pei-yang Army would have been
powerful enough to resist the dissension in the empire and the adverse
reaction of the foreigners, who were looking for any excuse to gain
more power in China. Yano Jin'ichi simply denied that there was any
truth to the tale.39 Liu Feng-han demonstrated that it would have been
strategically unwise for the military forces to attempt to depose the
Emperor in Tientsin and therefore doubted the validity of the Tientsin
plot.40 Nevertheless, there were some who believed this rumor or
other variations of this rumor.
Foreigners in China were particularly gullible. The editors of the
Shen-pao politely commented that the foreigners did not understand
the situation in China and therefore spread erroneous stories.41 One
such rumor was created by a Japanese correspondent in Peking. He
probably learned about the Tientsin plot, but had his facts slightly
mixed up. He reported that on October 23, 1898, the Empress Dowager,
37Hsiao I-shan, like many others, believed this tale. See Ch'ing-taiT'ung-shih[A
comprehensive history of the Ch'ing dynasty], Taiwan: Shang-wu yin-shu-kuan
(Commercial Press), I963. 4 vols, 4/2126-2127. Edict announcing inspection date SL
423/ oa-b.
38 Su Chi-tsu,
'Ch'ing-t'ing wu-hsii ch'ao pien chi' [Notes on the 1898 Ch'ing

court rebellion], in WHPF, 1/336.

39 Yano
Jin'ichi, 'Bojutsu no hemp6 oyobi siehen' [The reform and coup d'etat of
1898], Shirin (Kyoto, 8: I-3 (I923), 456.
40 Liu
iian Shih-k'aiyii Wu-hsiichengpien [Yuan Shih-k'ai and the coup
Feng-han,
d'e'tat of 1898] (Taipei: Wen-hsing shu-tien, I964).
41 Shen-pao (October 24, 1898).

Igo

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with the assistance of the military forces under the command of I-k'uang
and Tsai-i (Prince Tuan), would depose the Emperor in the Forbidden
City.42 The story was published in the Jii Shimbun [Current Events
Newspaper] around October I9, I898, and later quoted by Liang
Ch'i-ch'ao as further evidence of the danger which surrounded the
Emperor.
Although these earlier plots had very dubious points, the I899
plot to dethrone the Emperor was generally regarded as being truthful
because a successor to the throne was established. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao,
in his articles in the CIP, was adamant about the danger to the Emperor's
life and position and together with K'ang Yu-wei, he sponsored a Paohuang hui [Society to Protect the Emperor] among the overseas Chinese
as early as July, I899.43 K'ang and Liang regarded the announcement
of the establishment of the heir apparent as proof of their allegations.
Their position that there was a plot was confirmed by three pro-radical
reform writers, Yiin Yii-ting, Wang Chao, and Lo Tun-jung, whose
publications have greatly influenced later historians and writers.
Yiin's account has been accepted by later historians because he was
a member of the Hanlin Academy and present in court at the time.
However, his reliability must be questioned. For example, Yiin quoted
Jung-lu as saying to the Empress Dowager that the new heir apparent
would be 'regarded as the-heir to both the late T'ung-chih (Mu-tsung)
Emperor and the present Emperor.'44 In his edict ofJanuary 24, 1900,
the Kuang-hsii Emperor clearly stated that the heir apparent was to
continue only the T'ung-chih line.45 This kind of glaring error should
not have been made by a person actively involved in court matters.
Moreover, Yiin, an ardent supporter of the Kuang-hsii Emperor,
wrote this account in I9II and had it published in I9I4 in Tung-yen
[The Justice], a journal edited by Liang Ch'i-ch'ao. This indicates that
Yiin probably was active in the K'ang-Liang faction. He certainly
supported their anti-Manchu and anti-Empress Dowager position.
Wang Chao's version of the dethronement plot has some variations
from Yiin's story.46 Jung-lu is given a more active role because the
42Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, WHCPC2/113 and WHPF 1/265-6. Text of article in Hsiao
I-shan, Ch'ing-tait'ung-shih,4/21 65-6.
43On the society, see Hellmut Wilhelm, 'The Poems from the Hall of Obscured
Brightness,' in K'ang ru-wei, ed. by Jung-pang Lo (Tucson, Arizona, I967), 329-30.
See also Ch'ing-ipaofrom late 1899 to early 1900; see especially the following editions:
29 (October 5, 1899), I7a-b; 37 (March I, i9oo), Ia-3b, and 38 (March II, I900),
9a-I2b.

44Yiin Yii-ting's account is from

'Ch'ung-ling,' pp. 464-5.
45SL 457/Ioa-I Ib.
46
Wang Chao, Fang-chiayian tsa-yiinchi-shih [Miscellaneous memoirs of Wang

THE

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I9I

Empress Dowager, realizing the need for support of the military in such
a matter, gave him the responsibility to decide about the dethronement.
Jung-lu, in doubt as to what to do, sent a secret telegram to Liu K'un-i
to ascertain his opinion. In his reply dated early 1900, Liu supposedly
stated that the negative public opinion of the Chinese and foreigners
would be difficult to suppress and suggested that an heir apparent,
rather than a new emperor, be established. Jung-lu relayed the message
to the Empress Dowager, who reluctantly followed this course of action.
Wang Chao, an active participant in the radical reform movement,
fled to Japan in late 1898 and did not return to China until mid-1900.47
At best his information had to be second-hand. Moreover, Liu's
collected writings do not include such a telegram, but in October
I898, Liu did send the Tsungli Yamen a telegram which read:48
It has been unfortunate for the country that there had been this drastic
reform [movement] ... We must beware of public opinion inside and outside
of the country... The people feel afraid. The foreign powers are seeking
an opportunity to take advantage [of the situation] ... I support the Empress
Dowager and the Emperor...
Others, such as the writer Hu Ssu-ching, also misquoted this telegram
to support the notion that Liu opposed the dethronement plot.49
If Liu was truly a leading critic of the plot, his career certainly did not
suffer from his active opposition to the January 24, I900 edict because
one month later he was honored with extraordinary rewards for his
services and in March, 1900, he was appointed to the prestigious
position of Junior Guardian to the Heir Apparent. Wang Chao's
story was probably fabricated or reflected Wang Chao's propensity
for repeating gossip, a trait clearly revealed in his collected writings.
ch'iian-chi
Chao], prefacedated I913, reprintedin Shui-tung
[The completeworksof
(Wang Chao of) the Eastern Waters] (Taipei, 1964), 7a-9b.
47Wang Chao, Hsiao-han,3/42a. He stated that he left Japan in the fourth moon of
1900.

48Liu K'un-i, Works,'telegrams,' dated October 13, I898, I/44b-45a. See also,
Wang Chao, Fang-chia,7a-b, and Shen Yiin-lung, 'Wan Ch'ing kung-t'ing cheng-

ch'ihyii I-ho-ch'uanshih-chien'[LateCh'ingpalacepoliticsand the Boxeruprising],

Min-chup'ing lun 8:22 (November I6, I957), 524. Liu K'un-i actually did send the

EmpressDowagerand the Emperorseparatememorialscongratulatingthem on

their decisionto select an heir apparent.See Liu K'un-ii-chi [The writingsof Liu
K'un-i], ed. by Chung-kuok'o-hsueh-yuanli-shih yen-chiu so (Peking, 1959),
memorial dated February 9, 1900, 3/1206-7.
49

Hu Ssu-ching,Kuo-wen
pei-ch'eng
[Recordof nationalaffairs],in T'ui lu ch'iianchi

(Taipei, 1970), 3/2a-3b. Hu dates the quote as i898, but changes some of the charac-

ters of the telegramand thus changesthe entire meaningof Liu's message.Other

writersoftenstatethat Liu sent this telegram(as misinterpreted
by Hu) in late 1899
and thereforewas a leaderin the oppositionto dethronethe Emperor.

I92

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Like Yiin and Wang, Lo Tun-jung wrote his variation of the account
from hindsight.50 Unlike the others, he included Li Hung-chang in the
plot. Li, who had been appointed to the post of Governor-general of
Liang-Kwang, privately asked the foreign ministers in Peking whether
they would congratulate an heir apparent. When the ministers refused,
Li told Jung-lu, who, in turn, told the Empress Dowager. She was
enraged by the news and became more xenophobic, thus causing her
to support the anti-foreign Boxer rebels. Lo, a noted historian, was on
the regular staff of rung-yen, which indicates his close ties with Liang
and the radical reform goals. As a native of Kwangtung, he or his family
may have been adversely affected by Li Hung-chang's governorgeneralship, hence his negative portrayal of Li. Consequently, it is not
surprising that neither the records of the foreign ministers nor the
writings of Li Hung-chang contain any data to verify his tale of the
dethronement plot.
The JVCH also published several accounts of dethronement plots
and efforts. The sources of much of their information were court
eunuchs, who, in one case, claimed that Li Lien-ying and I-k'uang
(Prince Ch'ing) had engineered the forced 'abdication' of the Emperor
on January 24, g9oo.51 The NCH consistently supported the radical
reformers and opposed the existing 'reactionary' government. These
foreigners believed that the reformers respected the foreigner's skill and
capital, upon which China's prosperity depended. Consequently, most
of the foreign readers of the NCH wanted to believe that the Emperor
was on the verge of being deposed because such an interpretation could
serve as a justification for future imperialistic actions against the
Empress Dowager and in the name of the unfortunate Emperor.

Succession Crisis
A more rational explanation for the establishment of an heir apparent
is that a succession crisis existed in late 899. The fact that the Emperor
had no son and was in poor health precipitated the succession crisis.
The interference of foreigners in court affairs, the development of rival
court factions, the failure to achieve moderate reforms in many critical
areas, and the growing unrest among the populace during a period
of natural calamities also contributed to the necessity to select an heir
to the throne as a precautionary measure. Thus if the Emperor's
50 Lo Tun-jung,
'Chu'iian-pien,' 555-7.
51 NCH (March 14, 900o). See also, JCH (January 30, Igoo and May 2, I9oo).

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illness proved to be fatal, the next ruler would have been selected so
that there could be a smooth transition in leadership.
Many were concerned about the Emperor's state of health. When, on
September 25, 1898, the Emperor first informed the Grand Secretariat
that he had been ill since the fourth moon (May 20 to June I8, 1898)
and asked for recommendations of physicians to cure him, all kinds of
rumors arose.52 Liang Ch'i-ch'ao quickly denied that anything had
been wrong with the Emperor because he did not want the radical
reform edicts discredited.53 He also claimed that the Empress Dowager
had forced the Emperor to send a telegram to each province stating that
K'ang Yu-wei had given him the drug hung-wan ('red pills'), which
caused his illness. Liang asserted that it was actually the Empress
Dowager who was administering this drug. Years later, the revolutionaries publicly pointed out that the Emperor could not have lived for so
many years if anyone had forced him to take this drug.54 Nevertheless,
the radical reformers raised enough concern for the Emperor's welfare
that the foreign ministers decided to intervene.
On October 13, I898, the British Minister Sir Claude MacDonald,
in response to these rumors, warned the Ch'ing authorities that the
Western nations would take a dim view of any attempt on the Emperor's
life.55 The British insisted that a foreign physician examine the Emperor.
With much reluctance on the part of the court, the French Legation's
physician was allowed to examine the Emperor on October 18, I898.56
He reported that the Emperor was afflicted with Bright's disease, which
caused his physical stamina to be weak at times and normal at other
times. This was not the kind of report which the British and other
foreigners wanted to hear. National antagonisms and other factors
entered into the picture and as a result, the French physician's skills
were regarded as incompetent. The British were not completely satisfied
about the Emperor's condition until the British Legation's physician
returned from England and periodically examined the Emperor
throughout 1899.
Among the high officials who did not favor this kind of interference
SL 426/13b and TH I48/6a.
WHCPC, chuan 2 and WHPF 1/262.
85.
55 MacDonald to Salisbury, China Blue Books, October
I6, 1898, China No. I
(I899), Doc. 358, p. 264.
56 MacDonald
to Salisbury, China Blue Books, October 29, 1898, China No. I
(I899), Doc. 373, p. 275. Hosea Ballou Morse, International Relations, 3/145, stated
that 'It is certain that the emperor's life was only saved by the fear of foreign
adverse opinion and by the difficulty of immediately finding a successor.' This is an
exaggeration of the situation. See also, NCH (September 4, I899).
52

53 Liang Chi'-ch'ao,
54 Min-pao I (i905),

I94

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of foreigners in court affairs, Liu K'un-i was the most explicit. He

speculated that the foreign powers might want to take advantage of
the present situation and on the pretext of assisting the ailing Emperor
use military force.57 He also felt that if the rumor was true that K'ang
and others had been poisoning the Emperor, the court should officially
announce this to the foreign governments. Like several other officials,
Liu decided to send his own physician to treat the Emperor and he was
overjoyed when he heard that by late December I898, the Emperor's
health had improved.58 Liu's physician continued to care for the
Emperor until around January 1899, when he announced that if the
Emperor lived to see Chinese New Year's (February Io, 1899), he
would regain his strength by spring.
The Emperor's health continued to wax and wane throughout
1899 and this caused alarm in court. The poor physical condition of the
Emperor, together with the fact that he had no son and probably would
not have one, triggered a potential succession crisis. Succession crises
were not new to the Ch'ing imperial family nor to the Empress Dowager.
All ten of the Ch'ing emperors rose to power out of succession crises,
such as contention between the princes; armed revolts; deposition,
restoration, and redeposition of an heir; liquidation of brother-princes;
delay in naming an heir-successor; intruding into the imperial procession; and various other power struggles.59 Theoretically, women were
not supposed to meddle in state affairs, but throughout Chinese
history, Empresses and Empress Dowagers have been active in designating the successor to the throne as well as ruling as regent to an
infant, child, or teenage emperor.60 Tz'u-hsi was very experienced in
the problem of succession because her young son had died without an
heir. When the possibility of another succession crisis manifested itself
in late 1899, the Empress Dowager undoubtedly wished to avoid the
difficulties which had occurred when she adopted her nephew and
placed him on the throne. The Kuang-hsii Emperor, being fully aware
of the past succession problems, probably concurred with the Empress
Dowager and with this in mind, he implored his 'Imperial Mother
to select from the close relatives a person who would be the descendant
57Liu K'un-i, Works, 'telegrams.' October I3, 1898, 1/44b-45a; 'shu-tu (letters),
November 3, I898, I3/Ia.
58 Liu K'un-i, Works, 'shu-tu (letters),' dated KH 24/II (December
13, I898 to
January II, I899), I3/7b-8b.
59Dison Hsiieh-feng Poe, 'Imperial Succession and Attendant Crisis in Dynastic
China-An
Analytic-quantitative
Study through the Five-element Approach,'
Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies, n.s. 8: I-2 (August I970), I42-3.
60Ibid., 94 and ioI.

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of the Mu-tsung [T'ung-chih] Emperor.'61 Thus P'u-chiin, the eldest

son of Tsai-i (Prince Tuan), was selected.
There were indications that court factionalism was reaching a critical
point by the fall of I899 in anticipation of a succession crisis. From
August to October 1899, the CIP reported that there had been attempts
to poison the Empress Dowager and that, as a result, she was very sick.62
If this was true, the court factionalism and gravity of the urgent need
to select an heir apparent can be easily understood. Throughout the
autumn and winter of that year, there were drastic administrative
changes and movement of high officials in and out of Peking. Some of
the activity was due to the worsening of the Emperor's health, but
most of it was due to the critical state of the nation. Many of the moderate reform programs initiated by the court throughout 1899 were either
not carried out or in their infancy stage.63 All of the provinces were
plagued with some type of natural calamity. The flooding of the Huang
Ho and Yangtze caused considerable damage in many provinces. In
the autumn of 1899, the prospects for the coming year's crops looked
bleak. In anticipation of the potential famine, the court ordered all
provincial officials to purchase and store grain, assist the people in
flood areas, and try to assuage the people's fears of starvation or being
left homeless.64 The worsening conditions contributed to an increase in
banditry and encouraged the rise of rebel organizations, such as the
infamous Boxers. Radical reformers and revolutionaries also were
causing unrest among the people. The provincial military forces seemed
to be unable to cope with these problems. At the same time, the
foreigners were becoming more aggressive in their attempts to gain
control over larger pieces of the 'Chinese melon' and this gave rise to a
general xenophobia at all levels of Chinese society. The country was on
the brink of a serious disaster. Clearly, if the Emperor did die at this
unpropitious time, the transition to a new ruler would be easier if an
heir apparent had already been selected.
On the basis of the available evidence, it is impossible to refute the
radical reformers' assertion that the selection of an heir apparent
on January 24, I900, was the final step in the plot to dethrone the
61January 24, I900,
62
20

Ch'ing-ipao

63

SL 457/ oa- I b.
(August 8, 1899), I6b and 29 (October 5, I899), I7a.

For a detailed study of the court's efforts at moderate reform during the period

September 1898, to mid-9Ioo, see my doctoral dissertation, 'The Much Maligned

Empress Dowager: A Revisionist Study of the Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi' (unpublished dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, I975), Ch. III.
64November 5, I899, SL 452/5a-6b is one of
many edicts describing the worsening

conditions in the countryside.

I96

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Kuang-hsii Emperor. On the other hand, the dethronement of the

Emperor never materialized. Moreover, the most damaging evidence
to support this dethronement plot rumor came from the writings of
the radical reformers and their foreign supporters. The radical reformers took advantage of the situation to further their campaign against
the present government, particularly the Empress Dowager. The
foreigners supported them because they believed it was beneficial
to their own interests. The validity of their assertions must be viewed
in that light. A close study of existing court documents and the writings
of high officials who were close to the court suggests that it is much
more probable that the announcement was the result of efforts to avoid
the terrible succession crises which have plagued the ruling houses in
China for centuries. The absence of a natural male heir, the precarious
health of the Emperor, and the critical state of the nation prompted
the court to establish an heir apparent as a precautionary measure.
Historians unfortunately have long relied upon the writings of the
radical reformers and their colleagues, accounts by foreigners, and newspapers such as the CIP and VCH. The reliability of these works until
now have not been challenged and Clio's disciples have not seriously
considered the wealth of information that presents a radically different
and more positive image of the activities of the Empress Dowager Tz'uhsi. Consequently, Clio has not been kind to the much maligned Empress
Dowager Tz'u-hsi. This study is an attempt to look at other historical
documents from the period so that we might obtain a different, and
perhaps more accurate, view of the Empress Dowager and the period
in which she lived.