COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY:

IHL Rule 153. Commanders and other superiors are

criminally responsible for war crimes committed by their
subordinates if they knew, or had reason to know, that the
subordinates were about to commit or were committing
such crimes and did not take all necessary and reasonable
measures in their power to prevent their commission, or if
such crimes had been committed, to punish the persons
responsible.
i.

ii.

iii.

Civilian command authority. Not only military

personnel but also civilians can be liable for war
crimes on the basis of command responsibility.
Commander/subordinate
relationship.
The
relationship between the commander and the
subordinate does not necessarily need to be a
direct de jure one. De facto command
responsibility is sufficient to occasion liability of the
commander.
The commander/superior knew, or had reason to
know.
Practice
confirms
that
command
responsibility is not limited to situations where the
commander/superior has actual knowledge of the
crimes committed or about to be committed by his
or her subordinates, but that constructive
knowledge is sufficient. The latter idea is
expressed in various sources with slightly different
formulations: had reason to know, had
information which should have enabled [the
commander/superior]
to
conclude
in
the
circumstances
at
the
time,
the
commander/superior (owing to the circumstances
at the time,) should have known,
the
commander/superior was at fault in having failed
to
acquire
such
knowledge,
and
the
commander/superior was criminally negligent in
failing to know. These formulations essentially
cover the concept of constructive knowledge.

Philippine Application: To attribute responsibility or

accountability to former President Arroyo, Rodriguez
contends that the doctrine of command responsibility may
be applied. As we explained in Rubrico v. Arroyo, command
responsibility pertains to the responsibility of commanders
for crimes committed by subordinate members of the
armed forces or other persons subject to their control in
international wars or domestic conflict.
HABEAS DATA
G.R. No. 203254, October 08, 2014
DR. JOY MARGATE LEE, Petitioner, v. P/SUPT. NERI A.
ILAGAN, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N Before the Court is a petition for review on
certiorari1 assailing the Decision 2 dated August 30, 2012 of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 (RTC) in
SP No. 12-71527, which extended the privilege of the writ
of habeas data in favor of respondent Police Superintendent
Neri A. Ilagan (Ilagan).
Facts: In his Petition for Issuance of the Writ of Habeas
Data3 dated June 22, 2012, Ilagan alleged that he and
petitioner Dr. Joy Margate Lee (Lee) were former common
law partners. Sometime in July 2011, he visited Lee at the
latters condominium, rested for a while and thereafter,
proceeded to his office. Upon arrival, Ilagan noticed that his
digital camera was missing. 4 On August 23, 2011, Lee
confronted Ilagan at the latters office regarding a
purported sex video (subject video) she discovered from
the aforesaid camera involving Ilagan and another woman.
Ilagan denied the video and demanded Lee to return the
camera, but to no avail. 5 During the confrontation, Ilagan

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allegedly slammed Lees head against a wall inside his office
and walked away.6Subsequently, Lee utilized the said video
as evidence in filing various complaints against Ilagan,
namely: (a) a criminal complaint for violation of Republic
Act No. 9262,7otherwise known as the Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004, before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati; and (b) an
administrative complaint for grave misconduct before the
National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM). 8 Ilagan claimed
that Lees acts of reproducing the subject video and
threatening to distribute the same to the upper echelons of
the NAPOLCOM and uploading it to the internet violated not
only his right to life, liberty, security, and privacy but also
that of the other woman, and thus, the issuance of a writ of
habeas data in his favor is warranted.9
Finding the petition prima facie meritorious, the RTC issued
a Writ of Habeas Data10 dated June 25, 2012, directing Lee
to appear before the court a quo, and to produce Ilagans
digital camera, as well as the negative and/or original of the
subject video and copies thereof, and to file a verified
written return within five (5) working days from date of
receipt
thereof.
In her Verified Return11 dated July 2, 2012, Lee admitted
that she indeed kept the memory card of the digital camera
and reproduced the aforesaid video but averred that she
only did so to utilize the same as evidence in the cases she
filed against Ilagan. She also admitted that her relationship
with Ilagan started sometime in 2003 and ended under
disturbing circumstances in August 2011, and that she only
happened to discover the subject video when Ilagan left his
camera in her condominium. Accordingly, Lee contended
that Ilagans petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas
data should be dismissed because: (a) its filing was only
aimed at suppressing the evidence against Ilagan in the
cases she filed; and (b) she is not engaged in the
gathering, collecting, or storing of data regarding the
person of Ilagan.12
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision13 dated August 30, 2012, the RTC granted the
privilege of the writ of habeas data in Ilagans favor, and
accordingly, ordered the implementing officer to turn-over
copies of the subject video to him, and enjoined Lee from
further reproducing the same.14
The RTC did not give credence to Lees defense that she is
not engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data
regarding the person of Ilagan, finding that her acts of
reproducing the subject video and showing it to other
people, i.e., the NAPOLCOM officers, violated the latters
right to privacy in life and caused him to suffer humiliation
and mental anguish. In this relation, the RTC opined that
Lees use of the subject video as evidence in the various
cases she filed against Ilagan is not enough justification for
its reproduction. Nevertheless, the RTC clarified that it is
only ruling on the return of the aforesaid video and not on
its admissibility before other tribunals. 15
Dissatisfied, Lee filed this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Courts resolution is whether or
not the RTC correctly extended the privilege of the writ of
habeas data in favor of Ilagan.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas
Data (Habeas Data Rule), was conceived as a response,
given the lack of effective and available remedies, to
address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and
enforced disappearances.16 It was conceptualized as a

judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most

especially the right to informational privacy of
individuals, 17 which is defined as the right to control the
collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of data
about oneself.18
As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of
habeas data now stands as a remedy available to any
person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security
is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of
data or information regarding the person, family,
home, and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
Thus, in order to support a petition for the issuance of such
writ, Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule essentially requires
that the petition sufficiently alleges, among others, [t]he
manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened
and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security
of the aggrieved party. In other words, the petition
must adequately show that there exists a nexus
between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the
right to life, liberty or security on the other .19
Corollarily, the allegations in the petition must be supported
by substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened
violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of
the victim.20 In this relation, it bears pointing out that the
writ of habeas data will not issue to protect purely property
or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in
support of the petitions therefor are vague and doubtful. 21
In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to
sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in life, liberty or
security was or would be violated through the supposed
reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject
sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the
suppression of this video which he fears would somehow
find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for
public consumption he failed to explain the connection
between such interest and any violation of his right to life,
liberty or security. Indeed, courts cannot speculate or
contrive versions of possible transgressions. As the rules
and existing jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging
and eventually proving the nexus between ones privacy
right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or security are
crucial in habeas data cases, so much so that a failure on
either account certainly renders a habeas data petition
dismissible,
as
in
this
case.
In fact, even discounting the insufficiency of the allegations,
the petition would equally be dismissible due to the
inadequacy of the evidence presented. As the records show,
all that Ilagan submitted in support of his petition was his
self-serving testimony which hardly meets the substantial
evidence requirement as prescribed by the Habeas Data
Rule. This is because nothing therein would indicate that
Lee actually proceeded to commit any overt act towards the
end of violating Ilagans right to privacy in life, liberty or
security. Nor would anything on record even lead a
reasonable mind to conclude 22 that Lee was going to use
the subject video in order to achieve unlawful ends say
for instance, to spread it to the public so as to ruin Ilagans
reputation. Contrastingly, Lee even made it clear in her
testimony that the only reason why she reproduced the
subject video was to legitimately utilize the same as
evidence in the criminal and administrative cases that she
filed against Ilagan.23 Hence, due to the insufficiency of the
allegations as well as the glaring absence of substantial
evidence, the Court finds it proper to reverse the RTC
Decision and dismiss the habeas data petition.
WRIT OF AMPARO
G.R. No. 184467 June 19, 2012EDGARDO NAVIA,
RUBENDIO, and ANDREW BUISING, Petitioners,
vs.

KLCP_2015
VIRGINIA PARDICO, for and in behalf and in
representation of BENHUR V. PARDICO Respondent.
Facts:
Bong and Ben were suspects in stealing the street lamp.
Bong then signed a statement to the effect that the guards
released him without inflicting any harm or injury to him.
His mother Lolita also signed the logbook below an entry
which states that she will never again harbor or entertain
Ben in her house. Thereafter, Lolita and Bong left the
security office leaving Ben behind.
The following morning, Virginia, Bens wife, went to the
Asian Land security office to visit her husband Ben, but only
to be told that petitioners had already released him
together with Bong the night before. She then looked for
Ben, asked around,and went to the barangay. Since she
could not still find her husband, Virginia reported the matter
to the police. The last time Ben was seen was Lolita and
Bong left him in petitioners custody at the security office
Exasperated with the mysterious disappearance of her
husband, Virginia filed a Petition for Writ of Amparo Before
the RTC of Malolos City. Finding the petition sufficient in
form and substance, the amparo court issued an Order
dated June26, 2008 directing, among others, the issuance
of a writ of amparo and the production of the body of Ben
before it on June30, 2008
Issue:
Whether or not the writ of amparo may be issued against
the Asian Land security officers.
Held:
But lest it be overlooked, in an amparo petition, proof of
disappearance alone is not enough. It is likewise essential
to establish that such disappearance was carried out with
the direct or indirect authorization, support or acquiescence
of the government. This indispensable element of State
participation is not present in this case.
The petition does not contain any allegation of State
complicity, and none of the evidence presented tend to
show that the government or any of its agents orchestrated
Bens disappearance. In fact, none of its agents, officials, or
employees were impleaded or implicated in Virginias
amparo petition whether as responsible or accountable
persons.
Thus, in the absence of an allegation or proof that the
government or its agents had a hand in Bens
disappearance or that they failed to exercise extraordinary
diligence in investigating his case, the Court will definitely
not hold the government or its agents either as responsible
or accountable persons.
We are aware that under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC
a writ of amparo may lie against a private individual or
entity. But even if the person sought to be held accountable
or responsible in an amparo petition is a private individual
or
entity,
still,
government
involvement
in
the
disappearance remains an indispensable element.
Here, petitioners are mere security guards at Grand Royale
Subdivision in Brgy. Lugam, Malolos City and their principal,
the Asian Land, is a private entity. They do not work for the
government and nothing has been presented that would
link or connect them to some covert police, military or
governmental operation. As discussed above, to fall within
the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA No.
9851, the disappearance must be attended by some
governmental involvement. This hallmark of State
participation differentiates an enforced disappearance case
from an ordinary case of a missing person.

KLCP_2015
are obliged to bring proceedings against the perpetrator,
regardless of the location of the crime and the nationality of
the perpetrator or the victim'. Universal jurisdiction allows
for the trial of international crimes committed by anybody,
anywhere in the world.
RA 9262 (VAWC)
Garcia vs. J. Drilon and Garcia, G. R. No. 179267, 25
June 2013
Nature of the Case: Petition for Review of Republic Act
(R.A.) 9262
Facts:
Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition
before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary Protection
Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262,
entitled An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their
Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims,
Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes. She
claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional, psychological
and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of
custody of her children and of financial support and also a
victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.
The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully
comply with the conditions set forth by the said TPO,
private-respondent filed another application for the issuance
of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a modified TPO and
extended the same when petitioner failed to comment on
why the TPO should not be modified. After the given time
allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the
required comment as it would be an axercise in futility.
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with
prayer for injunction and TRO on, questioning the
constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due
process and equal protection clauses, and the validity of the
modified TPO for being an unwanted product of an invalid
law.
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but
however, denied the petition for failure to raise the issue of
constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and
the petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued
by the trial court constituted collateral attack on said law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
Thus, this petition is filed.
Issues: WON the CA committed serious error in failing to
conclude that RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust and
violative of the equal protection clause.
Decision:
2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of
equal protection of the laws. Equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should
be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope
Workerkers Union, the Court ruled that all that is required
of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which
means that the classification should be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to existing
conditions only; and apply equally to each member of the
class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid classification
and did not violate the equal protection clause by favouring
women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom
the Senate extends its protection.
PRINCIPLE OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
Is classically defined as 'a legal principle allowing or
requiring a state to bring criminal proceedings in respect of
certain crimes irrespective of the location of the crime and
the nationality of the perpetrator or the victim';' The
rationale behind it is based on the notion that 'certain
crimes are so harmful to international interests that states

Universal jurisdiction allows states or international

organizations to claim criminal jurisdiction over an accused
person regardless of where the alleged crime was
committed, and regardless of the accused's nationality,
country of residence, or any other relation with the
prosecuting entity. Crimes prosecuted under universal
jurisdiction are considered crimes against all, too serious to
tolerate jurisdictional arbitrage.
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (ICC)
Located in The Hague, is the court of last resort for
prosecution of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity. Its founding treaty, the Rome Statute, entered
into force on July 1, 2002. Over the last decade the court
has made significant headway in putting international
justice on the map. As of June 2015, the ICC had 123
states parties, had opened investigations in eight countries,
and had issued three verdicts. But while the ICC is now
responsible for international criminal accountability, its
daunting mandate and world-wide reach have made the its
flaws more visible. The court and its member countries face
major challenges in meeting expanded expectations for the
court in its second decade.
The ICC has the jurisdiction to prosecute individuals for the
international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity,
and war crimes. The ICC is intended to complement
existing national judicial systems and it may therefore only
exercise its jurisdiction when certain conditions are met,
such as when national courts are unwilling or unable to
prosecute criminals or when the United Nations Security
Council or individual states refer investigations to the Court.
Complemenarity is a fundamental principle on which the
functioning of the International Criminal Court is based.
Under the Rome Statute, which established the Court, the
ICC can only exercise its jurisdiction where the State Party
of which the accused is a national, is unable or unwilling to
prosecute. Hence the term complemenatarity, which
makes the ICC a Court of last resort. Where a national of,
say Sudan, is accused, then the ICC will only have
jurisdiction over the crime where there is an unwillingness
or incompetence of Sudanese judicial institutions to
prosecute. The reason this principle came into existence
was the fear on the part of many prospective States party
that the ICC would become a supra-national criminal court
and would result in countries losing domestic control of
criminal prosecutions.
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW
International humanitarian law and international human
rights law (hereafter referred to as human rights) are
complementary. Both strive to protect the lives, health and
dignity of individuals, albeit from a different angle.
Humanitarian law applies in situations of armed conflict
(see Q7), whereas human rights, or at least some of them,
protect the individual at all times, in war and peace alike.
However, some human rights treaties permit governments
to derogate from certain rights in situations of public
emergency. No derogations are permitted under IHL
because it was conceived for emergency situations, namely
armed conflict.
Humanitarian law aims to protect people who do not or are
no longer taking part in hostilities. The rules embodied in
IHL impose duties on all parties to a conflict. Human rights,

being tailored primarily for peacetime, apply to everyone.

Their principal goal is to protect individuals from arbitrary
behaviour by their own governments. Human rights law
does not deal with the conduct of hostilities.
The duty to implement IHL and human rights lies first and
foremost with States. Humanitarian law obliges States to
take practical and legal measures, such as enacting penal
legislation and disseminating IHL. Similarly, States are
bound by human rights law to accord national law with
international obligations. IHL provides for several specific
mechanisms that help its implementation. Notably, States
are required to ensure respect also by other States.
Provision is also made for an enquiry procedure, a
Protecting Power mechanism, and the International FactFinding Commission. In addition, the ICRC is given a key
role in ensuring respect for the humanitarian rules.
Human rights implementing mechanisms are complex and,
contrary to IHL, include regional systems. Supervisory
bodies, such as the UN Commission on Human Rights, are
either based on the UN Charter or provided for in specific
treaties (for example the Human Rights Committee, which
is rooted in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights of 1966). The Human Rights Commission and its
Subcommissions have developed a mechanism of special
rapporteurs and working groups, whose task is to monitor
and report on human rights situations either by country or
by topic. Six of the main human rights treaties also provide
for the establishment of committees (e.g. the Human Rights
Committee) of independent experts charged with
monitoring their implementation. Certain regional treaties
(European and American) also establish human rights
courts. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights (UNHCHR) plays a key part in the overall protection
and promotion of human rights. Its role is to enhance the
effectiveness of the UN human rights machinery and to
build up national, regional and international capacity to
promote and protect human rights and to disseminate
human rights texts and information.

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KLCP_2015

CONVENTIONS
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Againts Women (CEDAW)

Optional Protocol

RA 9710

RA 10354

Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC)

RA 9344 as amended by RA 10630

International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities

RA 7277 as amended by RA 9442

International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their Families (CMW)

RA 8042 as amended by RA 10022

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Punishment (CAT)

RA 9745

International Convention for the Protection of All Persons Against Enforced Disappearances (CPAPED)

RA 10353

Writ of Amparo

Writ of Habeas Data

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court

RA 9851