Guevarra vs Eala

Facts: Joselano Guevarra filed a Complaint for Disbarment before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a.
Noli Eala (respondent) for "grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's
oath."
The complainant first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's) then-fiancee
Irene Moje (Irene) introduced respondent Atty. Eala, a lawyer and a sportscaster, to him as her
friend who was married to Mary Ann Tantoco with whom he had three children.
After his marriage to Irene, complainant noticed that Irene had been receiving from respondent
cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which read "I love you," "I miss you," or "Meet you
at Megamall." He also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the
morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked about
her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parents' house in Binangonan, Rizal or she
was busy with her work. More so, complainant has seen Irene and respondent together on two
occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the
conjugal house.
Moreover, Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social card bearing the
words "I Love You" on its face, which card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated
October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding to Irene. Also, it was revealed that Irene gave birth to a
girl in 2002 and Irene named respondent in theCertificate of Live Birth as the girl's father.
In his answer, Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous relationship
with Irene, the truth of the matter being that their relationship was low profile and known only to
the immediate members of their respective families. He also said that his special relationship
with Irene is neither under scandalouscircumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct
as would be a ground for disbarment.

Issue: Whether the respondent be disbarred from the practice of Law.

Held: YES. The case at bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married
woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly.
While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between two
unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is
not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital
relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered
disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the
marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.
Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took beforeadmission to practice law.
Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct,"
and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any
"conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law."

As a lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract
of marriage. In carrying on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that
her marriage with complainant was null and void, and despite respondent himself being married,
he showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness
to be a lawyer.

Worcester vs Lorenzana
Facts: It appears that the appellant Frederick L. Worcester was the owner of a piece of real
estate known as "La Cumbre de Guadalupe", situated in San Pedro, Makati, Rizal, which, in July,
1950, was sold by him to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila through the mediation of a
broker named Benito V. Jalbuena. Claiming credit for having negotiated and brought about the
sale, another broker, the herein appellee Ramon Lorenzana, asked Worcester to pay him his
brokerage commission and, upon the demand being refused, he brought suit in the Court of First
Instance of Manila to recover commission and moral damages. Worcester contested the suit,
characterized its filing as "malicious and unjustified", and set up a counterclaim for actual and
moral damages. Replying to the counterclaim, Lorenzana denied its allegations and on his part
set up a claim for moral damages suffered on account thereof.
It also appears that once the suit was filed, Lorenzana had attachment levied on property
belonging to Worcester upon verified petition that the latter was disposing of his properties with
the intent to defraud him. But the attachment was discharged upon the filing of the required
bond.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Manila found Lorenzana not entitled to any commission
and rendered judgment dismissing his complaint and, on the other hand, awarding Worcester, on
his counterclaim, P5,895.80 as compensatory damages and P1,000.00 as moral damages. On
appeal to the Court of Appeals, that court upheld the judgment of dismissal but revoked the
award of damages. Protesting against the revocation of the award, Worcester brought the case
here on appeal by certiorari.
ISSUE: WON the Lower Court erred in their decision
RULING: S After going over the record, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the award of
damages to defendant was unwarranted. That court found from the evidence that defendant had
placed his property for sale in the hands of several brokers, among them plaintiff himself and
Benito V. Jalbuena, without giving any of them exclusive authority to sell, but "on a winner take
all basis", by which it was meant that "the broker who could close the deal and sell the property
would receive the whole commission of 5%" which defendant had agreed to pay; that once
defendant had engaged plaintiff's services on that basis, plaintiff was able to interest the Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila as a prospective buyer to the extent of having His Grace promise
that he would study the offer of sale and inspect the property; that though he was informed of
this development, "defendant did not then revoke the authority he had given plaintiff, but
allowed the latter to proceed with the negotiations"; that informed several days later by broker
Jalbuena that he too had found a prospective buyer, who was no other than the Archbishop of
Manila, and seeing that "plaintiff's and Mr. Jalbuena's prospects were the same, the defendant
advised Mr. Jalbuena that the plaintiff was ahead of him for about a week, and so he would be

given a chance to close the deal"; that to this "Jalbuena agreed" and "the defendant
communicated this incident to the plaintiff"; that notwithstanding this fact, defendant, some time
later, instructed plaintiff to withdraw the offer he had made to the Archbishop and then got in
touch with Jalbuena and instructed him to proceed with his negotiations with his Grace; that
proceeding as instructed, Jalbuena was able to secure a definite offer from the Archbishop, which
defendant accepted; that defendant then instructed his lawyers to prepare the necessary deed of
sale, and upon the deed being signed, the purchase price paid and the transaction
consummated, defendant paid Jalbuena his commission and thereafter left for Jamaica. On the
basis of these facts the Court of Appeals ruled that plaintiff was not entitled to a commission on
the theory that it was Jalbuena and not he "who was the efficient procuring cause of the sale in
question." But that court also found that plaintiff's suit was not clearly unfounded and was not
filed in bad faith. It says:
. . . The present action is not clearly unfounded. It is admitted that the appellant was engaged by
the appellee to sell the property in question, and that he was the first to offer the property to the
Archbishop of Manila, to whom he wrote a letter containing the offer to sell with a detailed
description thereof, and whom he interviewed several times for the purpose. The appellant is not
a lawyer. He is not supposed to know the intricacies of the law which regulates broker's
commission in this jurisdiction. Such being the case, it is not improbable that he believed in good
faith that, as he had intervened, with proper authority, in the sale of the property in question, he
was entitled to a commission for its sale. In bringing this action, therefore, it cannot be held that
he acted in gross and evident bad faith.
We agree to this finding, for it is obvious that plaintiff did really have some intervention in the
sale to the extent and under circumstances which might lead an ordinary person to believe in
good faith that he was entitled to a commission.
Defendant makes capital of the fact that the reply to his counter-claim was in the form of a
general denial, which, according to him, constitutes an admission of the averment in said
counter-claim that he had incurred damages as a consequence of the "malicious and unjustified"
institution of the present action. But while the rule is that the material allegations in the
complaint other than those as to the amount of damages shall be deemed admitted when not
specifically denied (section 8, Rule 9), it is to be noted that the counterclaim for damages in the
present case is based on the supposition that plaintiff's action was "malicious and unjustified",
which is a mere conclusion unsupported by the facts alleged in the counter-claim and which the
Court of Appeals, as already found to be without basis. Needless to say, that conclusion cannot
be deemed admitted even when not specifically denied.

Dominguez vs Filipinas
Facts: It appears that prior to the institution of the present action, or on March 10, 1973, one
Gustavo A. Suarez, doing business under the trade name of "Davao Arrastre Service", filed in the
Court of First Instance of Davao a complaint against defendant Benito E. Dominguez, Jr.,
docketed as Civil Case No. 7877, for recovery of a sum of money, with prayer for issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment, plus damages.
The complaint therein substantially averred that on various dates commencing from October 16,
1968 up to November 24, 1972, Suarez granted Dominguez several loans and/or advances
totalling P626,600.00, the latter binding himself to pay the same, with 12% interest per annum,

upon collection of his claim from the NAWASA in Civil Case No. 8039 of the Court of First Instance
of Manila, entitled "Integrated Services Corporation vs. Engineering Construction, Inc. versus
NAWASA", and that despite payment of the sum of P13,437,084.95 by NAWASA to the Integrated
Services Corporation, of which Dominguez was the president, the latter failed and refused to
settle his indebtedness to the damage and prejudice of the Davao Arrastre Services. The trial
court rationalized the dismissal of the complaint as follows:
The Court sustains the contention of the defendant and rules that res judicata is present in this
case. And, therefore, having been dismissed with finality and with prejudice in Davao, the case
cannot be revived by circumventing the Davao decision and substituting another party- plaintiff
over the same cause of action against the same defendant and for the same am unt. To
countenance this complaint and give it due course will be to subject the defendant to endless
harassment because as several plaintiffs have already lost the case, another party-plaintiff could
again be substituted and there will be no end to this litigation
ISSUE: WON the trial court erred
RULING: S We find the appeal meritorious. The dismissal with prejudice of Civil Case No. 7877
by the Court of First Instance of Davao did not in any way affect the right of action of the present
plaintiff against Dominguez. Such dismissal, decreed on motion of Suarez, the plaintiff therein,
constitutes at best a waiver of Suarez' cause of action. By his voluntary renunciation of the suit,
Suarez forever lost Ms action against Dominguez. But the dismissal with prejudice is personal to
him alone and may not be invoked in abatement of the right of action of the present plaintiff
against the same defendant.
While it is true that Civil Case No. 7877 and the present case involve the same amount of
P626,600.00, nevertheless there is no Identity of parties. The party- plaintiff in Civil Case No.
7877 is Gustavo A. Suarez, while the plaintiff in the present case is FISCO, an entity entirely
distinct and separate from Gustavo A. Suarez, FISCO was not a party in Civil Case No. 7877;
neither is it a successor- in- interest of Gustavo A. Suarez. Not having been a party in the former
case, the order of dismissal with prejudice entered therein does not constitute a bar to the
present case.
Neither is there Identity of causes of action. The cause of action of the plaintiff Suarez in Civil
Case No. 7877 arose from an alleged loan he had extended to defendant Dominguez, while
FISCO's complaint stems from the failure of Dominguez, as former president and general
manager of FISCO, to account for and turn over the amount of P626,600.00 which he had
received for and in behalf of the plaintiff corporation.
In fine, the dismissal of the present action by the trial court on ground of res judicata was
improper and erroneous.
Since the defendant Dominguez has relied exclusively on the defense of res judicata and has
submitted the case for decision solely on that issue, he -is deemed to have admitted all the
material allegations of the complaint (Machinery and Engineering Supplies Inc. vs. Quintano, 98
Phil.. 892). Upon this premise, judgment must be rendered in favor of plaintiff-appellant FISCO for
the amount claimed in its complaint, plus interest.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is reversed, and defendant- appellee Benito E.
Dominguez, Jr. is hereby ordered to render an accounting or turn over to the plaintiff-appellant

FISCO the sum of P626,600.00, with interest from the filing of the complaint Costs against
defendant appellee Benito E. Dominguez, Jr.
The petitioner prays that the decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed and that, instead, the
trial court's order of dismissal be affirmed. "In the alternative, petitioner prays that the case be
remanded to the trial court for trial on the merits, since all that was had was merely a
preliminary hearing on the affirmative defense of res judicata."
The petition is impressed with merit.
We agree with the Court of Appeals, for the reasons stated in its decision, that the dismissal of
Civil Case No 92277 by the Court of First Instance of Manila on ground of res judicata was
improper and erroneous.
However, We cannot agree with its statement that,:
Since, the defendant Dominguez has relied exclusively on the defense of res judicata and has
submitted the case for decision solely on that issue, he is deemed to have admitted all the
material allegations of the complaint (Machinery and Engineering Supplies, Inc. vs. Quintano, 98
Phil. 892). Upon this premise, judgment must be rendered in favor of plaintiff-appellant FISCO for
the amount claimed in its complaint, plus interest.
The relevant statement in the Quintano case cited by the Court of Appeals is found on page 897
and reads as follows:
For the above reasons, we hold that the dismissal of present action by the trial court on the
ground ofres judicata was improper and erroneous. As defendant relied solely on the defense
of res judicataand submitted the case for decision on that issue, he is deemed to have admitted
all the material allegations of the complaint. Consequently, judgment may be rendered, as it is
hereby rendered, in favor of plaintiff-appellant for all amounts claimed in its complaint i.e.,
P3,733.53 under its first cause of action, and P2,000 under its second cause of action, plus
interest.
It can thus be seen that for a defendant to be deemed to have admitted all the material
allegations of the complaint so that judgment can be rendered accordingly, the following must
both take place, namely: (a) he must have relied solely on the defense of res judicata; and (b) he
must have submitted the case for decision on that issue.
The two conditions are not present in the instant case. For the fact of the matter is that the
petitioner (defendant in the trial court) did not rely solely on the defense of res judicata and he
did not submit the case for decision on that issue.
We take note that in both his original Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim (Record on Appeal,
pp. 131-139) and his Supplemental Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim (Record on Appeal,
pp. 164-172), res judicata was interposed as an affirmative and special defense but it was not
the only defense. Moreover, the case was not submitted for decision on that issue alone. Thus in
his Manifestation and Motion dated October 22, 1974, the petitioner (defendant) said:
1. Pursuant to agreement of the parties through counsel and permission of this Honorable Court
on October 17, 1974, defendant is hereby filing his "Supplemental Answer" incorporating under
par. 7 thereof the new development in the Court of First Instance of Davao in Civil Case No. 8387
wherein the same "Agreement" relied upon herein by the same plaintiff in both cases was found

invalid as it "does not bear the written consent of the Bureau of Customs and the Department of
Finance."
2. That, accordingly, defendant hereby moves that a preliminary hearing on the special and/or
affirmative defense of bar by final judgment be held in this case, to determine the propriety of
dismissing the complaint at this stage without further trial as allowed under the Rules of Court.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, defendant prays that the attached Supplemental Answer be admitted and that a
preliminary hearing on the special/affirmative defense of bar by final judgment be held in this
case on November 5, 1974 at 8:30 A.M. (Record on Appeal, p. 161, Emphasis supplied.)
And the dispositive portion of the decision of the trial court dismissing the complaint reads:
IN VIEW THEREOF OF THE FOREGOING, the Court renders judgment, sustaining
defendant'sspecial defense in the form of motion to dismiss, without pronouncement as to costs,
damages and attorney's fees. (Record on Appeal, p. 188, Emphasis supplied.)
It is manifest that the Quintano doctrine is inapplicable in the instant case because the two
conditions required by the doctrine are absent.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby modified in that the Court of First
Instance of Manila shall try Civil Case No. 92277 on the merits and render a decision accordingly.
No special pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE VS MORAN
FACTS: S On March 31, 1922, the decision of this court in the present case, affirming the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, was published, but the term of
imprisonment by the said court upon the accused, for a violation of the Election Law, defined and
punished in section 2639 of the Administrative Code, was increased to six months from which
judgment the present appeal was taken by the accused. The accused, after asking for a
reconsideration of the said decision and a rehearing and pending the resolution on the said
petition, filed a special motion on May 2d of this year, alleging that the crime complained of had
prescribed under the provision of section 71 of Act No. 3030, enacted by the Legislature on
March 9, 1922, and praying that they be absolved from the complaint. Upon this motion the
Attorney-General was heard, having filed an answer and a supplemental answer, with the
corresponding arguments, opposing the same, as well as the accused who filed their reply
thereto and supplementary replies, both parties stating at length the reasons and legal grounds
for their respective contentions.
While it is a rule of general application that unless the defense of prescription is pleaded in the
trial court, it will be deemed to have been waived and cannot later be raised, yet this rule is not
of absolute application in criminal cases, for if the prescription of the crime, as well as of the
penalty whereby criminal responsibility is extinguished, may, as is the case here with regard to
the former, be provided by statute after the termination of all the proceedings in the trial court,
as well as in the appellate court, and when the case has already been submitted for discussion
and is awaiting only the final judgment; and if the prescription of the crime is but the
extinguishment of the right of the State to prosecute and punish the culprit, it is beyond question

that, once the State has lost or waived such right, the accused may, at any stage of the
proceeding, ask and move that the same be dismissed and that he be absolved from the
complaint. And not only that, the right to prosecute and punish the criminal having been lost
by the prescription of the crime expressly provided by the statute, the State itself, the
Government through the proper court, is in duty bound to make a pronouncement to that effect.
Therefore, as on March 9th of this year, 1922, when Act No. 3030 went into effect, providing in its
section 71 that offense resulting from the violations thereof shall prescribe one year after their
commission, the accused and the Attorney-General had already filed their respective briefs in
this court for the prosecution of the appeal taken from the judgment of the court below, and the
hearing of the case had already been held, this court itself, without the necessity of any motion
of the accused, or of the Attorney-General, should have declared the crime in question to have
prescribed, in view of the provision of said section. Consequently, as this court had not up to that
time made such pronouncement, the accused are perfectly justified in asking, as they have done
in their motion of May 2d of this year, that the offense having prescribed, they be absolved from
the complaint. This duty is imperative upon the courts of justice at any moment that the offense
appears to have prescribed under the provision of the law. With particular reference to the
present case, this conclusion is necessarily reached from the letter as well as the spirit of the
provisions of the Penal Code relative to prescription, and from that of section 71 of the aforesaid
Act No. 3030, for once the offense or the penalty has prescribed, the State has no right to
prosecute the offender, or to punish him, and if he has already been punished, it has no right to
continue holding him subject to its action by the imposition of the penalty. The plain precept
contained in article 22 of the Penal Code, declaring the retroactivity of penal laws in so far as
they are favorable to persons accused of a felony or misdemeanor, even if they may be serving
sentence, would be useless and nugatory if the courts of justice were not under obligation to
fulfill such duty, irrespective of whether or not the accused has applied for it, just as would also
all provisions relating to the prescription of the crime and the penalty.
That such is the duty of the courts of justice and has been so recognized by this court, is shown
by the decision in the case of United States vs. Rama, R. G. No. 16247,[[1]] for the crime of
murder of four persons, committed in the month of July, 1902, in the province of Cebu, in which
one of the accused was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of the said province to death
and the other two to life imprisonment. That case was brought to this court on appeal and, after
the filing of the respective briefs of the accused and the Attorney-General a hearing was had. No
allegations was made as to the prescription of the crime, yet this court rendered a decision (not
yet published in the Official Gazette) wherein, after finding that two crimes of murder and two of
homicide had been committed and that seventeen years had already elapsed from the
commission of the latter to the institution of the judicial proceeding for the investigation and
punishment thereof, that is, more than the fifteen years fixed by lay for the prescription of the
crime of homicide, this court held that the said two crimes of homicide had prescribed and the
criminal responsibility of the three accused for the said crimes extinguished, convicting the
accused only of the two crimes of murder. There is, therefore, on reason whatsoever why the
allegation of prescription made by the accused in their motion of the 2d of May of this year
cannot legally be considered; on the contrary, said motion must be decided before the petition
for the reconsideration of the decision published on the 31st of March of last year, and for a
rehearing of the case, or, to be more exact, the said petition must be ignored, for the resolution
of the aforesaid motion, if favorable to the accused, would put an end to the proceeding right at
its present stage.
ISSUE:

WON DEFENSES NOT WAIVED IS DEEMED NOT RAISED

RULING: s Article 22 provides that "Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they
favor the person guilty of a felony or misdemeanor, although at the time of the publication of
such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving same." This provision
clearly has no direct application to the provisions of the Penal Code. Its (art. 22) application to
the Penal Code can only be invoked where some former or subsequent law is under
consideration. It must necessary relate (1) to penal laws existing prior to the Penal Code; or (2)
to laws enacted subsequent to the Penal Code, in which the penalty was more favorable to the
accused. Rule 80, Ley Provisional para la aplicacion de las disposiciones del Codigo Penal. Under
the provisions of said article 22, if a crime had been committed prior to the date of the Penal
Code the punishment for which was more favorable to the accused than the provisions of the
Penal Code, it is believed that the accused might invoke the provisions of said article (22) even
though he was not placed upon trial until after the Penal Code went into effect. (U.
S. vs. Cuna 2). So also if by an amendment to the Penal Code or by a later special law the
punishment for an act was made less severe than by the provisions of the Penal Code, then the
accused person might invoke the provisions of said article. It appears to be clear, then, that
article 22 of the Penal Code can only be invoked when the provisions of some other penal law
than the provisions of the Penal Code are under consideration. In other words, the provisions of
article 22 can only be invoked with reference to some other penal law. It has no application to the
provisions of the Penal Code except in relation with some other law. It is not believed, therefore,
that the Legislature in enacting article 7 of the Penal Code intended to provide that article 22
should not be applicable to special laws.
There can be no doubt whatsoever that such was the intention of the legislature, in view of the
doctrine laid down by the supreme court of Spain, whose authority as regards the application and
interpretation of the provisions of the Penal Code of the Philippines is unquestionable, because
said Code is the same as that of Spain. In two cases (decisions of July 13, 1889 and April 26,
1892), among others decided by that court, in which article 22 of the Penal Code was alleged to
have been violated by the imposition of the penalty of prison correccional prescribed by the said
Code, instead of prison menor, prescribed by article 168 of the Election Law of August 30, 1870,
upon the accused therein, who were found guilty of a violation of the said Election Law, which,
was therefore, a special law in force prior to the said Penal Code of that same year, the said Code
having substitute the penalty of prision correccional for that of prision menor, said court held
that the appeal was not well taken on the ground that the penalty of prision correccional had
taken the place of that of prision menor prescribed by the Election Law, and while the duration of
both penalties was the same, the correctional penalty was lighter and more advantageous and
favorable to the accused than prision menor, as it was of a less grave nature; so that in those
two cases, the supreme court of Spain not only applied the provisions of the Penal Code to a
special law, but also gave retroactive effect to said provisions on account of being more
favorable to the therein accused, in accordance with the precept of article 22 of the Penal Code.
And here we have a most complete, clear and satisfactory solution of whatever doubt might have
arisen as to the interpretation of articles 7 and 22 of the Penal Code aforesaid.
It cannot be maintained that said article 22 of the Penal Code refers only to penalties and is not
applicable to appeals and proceedings, because the prescription of the crime is intimately
connected with that of the penalty, for the length of time fixed by the law for the prescription
depends upon the gravity of the offense, as may be seen from Title VI of Book I of the Penal
Code, containing, as its heading indicates, "General Provisions Regarding Felonies and
Misdemeanors, the Persons Liable and the Penalties," without distinguishing between the
penalties and the extinguishing of the criminal responsibility dealt with in said Title VI of said

Book, which title comes next to Title V, treating of the penalties incurred by those who evade
service of sentence and those who, while serving sentence, or after having been convicted by a
final judgment not yet served, commit some other crime. And aside from this intimate
connection between the prescription of the crime and that of the penalty, a statute declaring the
prescription of the crime has no other object and purpose than to prevent or annul the
prosecution of the offender and, in the last analysis, the imposition of the penalty. Moreover, if
the provisions relative to the prescription of ownership and to the prescription of actions in civil
matters are part of the civil law, it cannot be denied that the provisions relative to the
prescription of crimes and of penalties are penal laws or form part thereof.
With regard to the question whether prescription must be considered as a matter of procedural
or formal law, or as a substantive law for the purpose of the retroactivity of laws, we must state,
with reference to the present case, that the prescription provided in section 71 of Act No. 3030 is
of the nature both of a substantive law, in so far as it gives a person accused of any of the crimes
therein referred to, the right not to be prosecuted nor punished after the lapse of the period of
one year from the commission of said crimes, within which the criminal action must be
commenced, and of a procedural or adjective law in so far as it fixes the time within which such
action must necessarily be commenced in order that the prosecution may be legal and the
proper penalty may lawfully be imposed. but however said provision may be considered, the
same must have a retroactive effect, as will be seen later on.
Therefore, as the instant case involves two special laws of the Philippine Legislature, to wit, the
Election Law contained in the above-mentioned chapters of the Administrative Code, and Act No.
3030 which amended and modified the former, it is evident that the provision declaring that
offenses resulting from the violations of said Act shall prescribe one year after their commission
must have retroactive effect, the same being favorable to the accused.

Trajano vs Cruz
FACTS: sn this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek the reinstatement of the order
dated November 4, 1976 6f the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XII, at in City, in Civil Case
No. C-4032 granting their "Motion for Admission of Answer and admitting their "Answer", it a that
said order had been rifted and set aside in a subsequent dated January 21, 1977 reviving a
previous order of default, which the court reiterated in its order dated March 21, 1977 denying
their motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners herein are the defendants in a complaint filed by private respondents as the lessors of
the premises occupied by the former at 12 E. Alonzo Street, Daang Hari Navotas, Rizal for the
recovery of the value of certain improvements allegedly destroyed demolished and/or damaged
by them, namely: (1) Two giant patis tanks of poured concrete (buhos) worth P6,000.00 each ....
P12,000.00; (2) Steelmatting gate and fences with adobe/concrete bases P12,000.00; (3) One
toilet bowl with water closet. ... P650.00, all totalling P24,650.00.
Petitioners, as defendants below, were served summons through one Helen Avendano, an
employee in petitioners' factory and not the person-in-charge, on August 12, 1976. They
allegedly found the said summons after the expiration of the reglementary period for filing the
answer, as said Helen Avendano did not , deliver the same to the defendants but merely placed it
in one of the tables in the office.

On September 22, 1976, petitioners filed their "Motion for Admission of Answer" and attached
thereto their "Answer" to the complaint but failed to attach the proof of service of the
aforementioned pleadings to the adverse parties. This motion was set for hearing on October 6,
1976 by petitioners' counsel but since the respondent Presiding Judge of the trial court was on
vacation leave on that date, the Acting Branch Clerk of Court issued a notice to the parties
resetting the hearing of said motion to October 27, 1976.
In the meantime, on October 13, 1976, respondents' counsel filed an "Ex-Parte Motion to Declare
Defendants in Default" and set the same for hearing on October 20, 1976. In resolving said
motion, the trial court issued an order on October 26, 1976 declaring the petitioners in default.
At the hearing of the "Motion for Admission of Answer" of petitioners on October 17, 1976, the
trial court dictated an order in open court denying the same. However, upon every that said
motion was filed earlier than the "Ex-Parte Motion to Declare Defendants in Default" of
respondents, the trial court changed the order of denial and instead considered the said "Motion
for Admission of Answer" submitted for resolution of the court. Then on November 4, 1976, the
trial court issued an order granting the same "it appearing that said motion was filed before the
plaintiffs asked that defendants be declared in default, for reasons stated therein and in the
interest of justice." The conclusion that becomes inescapable from the fact that petitioners filed
their answer before respondents asked for a declaration of default is that respondents were not
particularly diligent in the exercise of their rights and that they were not in any way prejudiced
by the late filing of the answer by petitioners. Further, there was no evidence showing that
petitioners intended to unduly delay the case. On the contrary, petitioners even attached their
"Motion for Admission of Answer" to the complaint upon the filing of their "Motion for Admission
of Answer" and did not even file an extension of time to file the same of any other dilatory
motion.
Most importantly, petitioners set forth in. their "Answer" facts which when duly proved may
constitute good and substantial defenses against the complaint of respondents. They alleged
therein that they were not the original lessees of the premises and at the time they entered into
possession of the same, the toilet bowl and the water closet were no longer in place. They
further alleged that they replaced the steelmatting gate and the steelmatting fences since they
were already rotting due to the passage of time and the elements. At any rate they assured
respondents that the discarded steelmatting materials and the toilet bowl and its complements
are still in the premises. As regards the two giant patis tanks, they alleged that they are intact
and in place in exactly the same condition as they were when petitioners became the learn of the
premises.
ISSUE: WON THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
RULING: SConsequently, We hold that the trial court erred in issuing the 4, 1976 and in
maintaining its stand in the order dated March 2 1, 1977. In the case of Baares vs. Flordeliza
and Gavito, No. 29355, July 20, 1928, 51 Phil. 786, this Court held that when a motion to set
aside the order of default is made without loss of time and before a date is set for the hearing of
the case on the merits and is accompanied by a sworn statement of merits and copies of
documents which constitute prima facie a just and valid defense, such failure is insufficient to
deprive a defendant of is rights, as in the present case, and the refusal to set aside the order of
default constitutes an abuse of discretion, and especially when such setting aside of the order of
default will in no way prejudice the plaintiff.

In the same vein, this Court held in the case of Ladislao vs. Pestano, L-7623, April 29, 1955, 96
Phil, 890, that "no prejudice could have been caused to plaintiff by the admission of defendant's
answer, since the latter had not yer been declared in default and plaintiff had not yet presented
her evidenc on the merits. The lower court, therefore, in the exercise of its discretion, should
have admitted defendant's answer instead of declaring her in default."Tumambing vs. Ganzon, L17456, October 22, 1966, 18 SCRA 411.
It should be noted that it was only upon the resolution of a "Motion for Reconsideration" by
respondents of the order dated November 4, 1976 that the trial court considered two other
failures and/or ommissions of petitioners, namely: (a) failure to furnish plaintiffs' counsel a copy
of the "Motion for Admission of Answer", and (b) failure to file the opposition to the "Motion for
Reconsideration" within the period prayed for by defendants' counsel and granted by the court.
However, such fact of non-service was alleged by respondents for the first time in their "Motion
for Reconsideration" of the order of November 4, 1976 since at the hearing of the "Motion for
Admission of Answer" by petitioners, respondents' counsel merely manifested that he was
submitting the motion for the resolution of the court. Besides, petitioners' counsel offered copies
of the aforementioned pleadings to respondents' counsel who, however, refused to accept the
same. So petitioners' counsel just sent the copies by registered mail before the "Motion for
Reconsideration of respondents could even be resolved.
Anent the failure of petitioners' counsel to file his opposition to the "Motion for Reconsideration"
of respondents within the period granted to him by the trial court, suffice it to say that such
failure does not warrant the declaration of default of petitioners. At any rate, petitioners' counsel
satisfactorily explained his failure as due to physical weakness aas a result of influenza.
We must stress here again that it is the policy of the law to have every litigated case tried on the
merits. It is for this reason that judgments by defaults are generally looked upon with disfavor. As
aptly held in the leading case of Coombs vs. Santos, 24 Phil. 446, "a default judgment does not
pretend to be based upon the merits of the controversy. Its existence is justified on the ground
that it is the one final expedient to induce defendant to join issue upon then allegations tendered
by the plaintiff, and to do so without unnecessary delay. A judgment by default may amount to a
positive and considerable injustice to the defendant; and the possibility of such serious
consequences necessitates a careful examination of the grounds upon which the defendant asks
that it be set aside."
CARANDANG VS CABATUANDO
FACTS: S Petitioner Jose Carandang was the caretaker of private respondent Consuelo D. Pandy's
1.5 hectare of coconut land situated at Puting-Buhangin, San Juan, Batangas. He had a house
inside the landholding. He also owned a parcel of land adjoining it. On February 21, 1963
respondent Pandy filed a verified petition (CAR Case No. 866) for ejectment and damages in the
Court of Agrarian Relations of San Pablo alleging that petitioner, in gross violation of the terms
and conditions agreed upon between him and the landowner, had stubbornly refused and failed
to clear the land of bushes and grasses, to take proper care of the coconut land and
improvements thereon, and to perform the necessary work in accordance with the customs and
proven practices in the locality; that petitioner had been feeding his hogs and chickens with
coconuts from the landholding; that he gathered nuts and sold copra without notifying the
respondent; and praying that petitioner be dismissed as caretaker of the landholding and be
ordered to pay as damages the sum of P370.00, plus attorney's fees.

Petitioner, having been served, on March 8, 1963, with the summons and a copy of the
complaint, and having failed to file his answer, the agrarian court, acting on the motion filed by
respondent, declared petitioner in default and set the reception of respondent's evidence on July
2, 1963 before the commissioner of the court.
ISSUE: s Was there an abuse of discretion on the part of the court when it declared petitioner in
default, and did not lift, upon proper motion, said order?
RULING: S It cannot be seriously urged that the trial court abused its discretion when after
having declared petitioner in default, it proceeded to receive respondent's evidence and render
judgment granting him such relief as the complaint and the facts proven warranted. The trial
court simply acted in accordance with the provisions of the rules of court.
The trial court cannot be said to have abused its discretion when it denied on April 17, 1964, the
motion dated March 13, 1964 to lift the order of default, for neither said motion nor the affidavit
supporting it stated facts constituting a valid and meritorious defense. Section 3, Rule 18, of the
new Rules of Court, already in force as of that date, provided that the motion to set aside the
order of default must show that the failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable neglect and that the movant has a meritorious defense. Anent this matter it has been
held that when a motion to lift the order of default does not show that the defendant has a
meritorious defense and that his failure to answer the complaint on time is legally excusable, or
that anything would be gained by having the order of default set aside, the denial by the court of
the motion to lift the order of default does not constitute abuse of discretion (Manzanillo vs.
Jaramilla, 84 Phil. 809, 811).
The trial judge likewise legitimately exercised his jurisdiction, when he rendered the decision
dated October 28, 1964, based on respondent's evidence, and when on February 1, 1965 he
denied the motion for reconsideration in open court.
From all the foregoing, it is apparent that herein petition was given notice and opportunity to be
heard before judgment was rendered. He was not denied of his right to due process of law. Due
process contemplates notice and opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered affecting
one's person or property. (Macabingkil v. Yatco, L-23174, September 8, 1967, 21 SCRA 150, 157;
Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. Cadiao,
L-28725, March 12, 1968, 22 SCRA 987, 994; Bermejo vs. Barrios, 31 SCRA 764, 775).
Did the trial court commit a grave abuse of discretion when it rendered its decision based on
respondent's evidence on the ground that said evidence was self-serving? The law itself provides
that a party or any other person interested in the outcome of a case may testify (Section 18, Rule
130, Rules of Court). The testimony of an interested witness, this Court has said, should not be
rejected on the ground of bias alone, and must be judged on its own merits, and if such
testimony is clear and convincing and not destroyed by other evidence on record, it may be
believed (U.S. vs. Mante, 27 Phil. 134, 138). Neither can said testimony be said to be self-serving.
This Court has said that self-serving evidence is an evidence made by a party out of court at one
time; it does not include a party's testimony as a witness in court (National Development Co. vs.
Workmen's Compensation Commission, L-21724, April 27, 1967, 19 SCRA 861, 865-866).
Even assuming, arguendo, that the trial judge committed an error in basing his decision on the
testimony of herein respondent, the petitioner had a remedy by appeal and not by a petition
for certiorari. Appeal from the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations is provided in Section
156 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844) and Rule 43 of the Rules of

Court. Petitioner did not avail of this remedy. Instead, on December 2, 1965, after the period for
appeal had lapsed, he filed the instant special civil action for certiorari. He cannot now avail
of certiorari. Where petitioner had failed to file a timely appeal from the trial court's order, he can
no longer avail of the remedy of the special civil action for certiorari in lieu of his lost right of
appeal, if there is no error of jurisdiction committed by the trial court (Mabuhay Insurance &
Guaranty, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, L-28700, March 30, 1970, 32 SCRA, 245, 252).
Petitioner claims that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to adjudicate in whole the
indemnification petitioner was entitled to as provided in section 22 of Republic Act No. 1199. It is
to be recalled that petitioner, having been declared in default, did not testify. It was to be
expected that there was no evidence to show that petitioner was entitled to indemnification.
Even then the trial judge, in the interest of justice, set aside the order of execution dated
February 26, 1965, and granted to petitioner herein the benefits of section 22 of Republic Act No.
1199 providing for the payment of indemnification, as is shown by the order dated March 2,
1965, which recited:
Wherefore, plaintiff's motion for execution is hereby set for hearing on March 25, 1965 at 9:00
o'clock in the morning ... to determine the said indemnification.
Due hearing on the amount of indemnification was held and the court issued an order, dated
April 2, 1965, directing the ocular inspection of the subject landholding. Petitioner was present at
the ocular inspection. The Report, dated April 5, 1965, on the ocular inspection, determining the
number of coconut trees and their ages, was submitted to the court. Petitioner did not file any
objection to said report. The matter was set for hearing on July 12, 1965, as per notice of hearing
dated June 28, 1965. Petitioner did not appear at the hearing. Another hearing on the report was
set for August 4, 1965, but petitioner again did not appear. The respondent judge therefore,
issued the order of August 4, 1965 awarding petitioner the amount of P173 as the
"indemnification he is entitled to under section 22 of Republic Act No. 1199," and the same time
directed the Clerk of Court to issue a writ of execution covering paragraph 1 of the dispositive
portion of the decision dated October 28, 1964 in the sense that petition herein was ordered to
vacate the subject landholding. The order of the court further states that the plaintiff (respondent
herein) waived her right to the damages awarded to her in the decision of October 28, 1964 in
excess of P173.00. Copy of this order was received by petitioner's counsel on August 4, 1965. No
step was taken to attack or assail this order of execution, or the sufficiency of the
indemnification. No motion for reconsideration or for new trial to call the attention of the court to
the insufficiency of the indemnification or to the illegality of the order was ever filed, until 3
months later when the instant petition for certiorari was filed on December 2, 1965. Such
inaction could mean only that petitioner was completely satisfied with the order of August 4,
1965, otherwise he could have filed within the reglementary period the necessary motion for
reconsideration or motion for new trial. The decision had become final; execution followed as a
matter of course, and the court cannot be accused of having exceeded its jurisdiction or gravely
abused its discretion in ordering the execution.
Can the trial court be accused of not having granted the whole indemnity to which petitioner was
entitled? The indemnity to the tenant was governed by Section 22 of Republic Act No. 1199, as
amended, which provides as follows:
(4) The tenant shall have the right to be indemnified for his labor and expenses in the cultivation,
planting, or harvesting and other incidental expenses for the improvement of the crop raised in

case he is dispossessed of his holdings, whether such dismissal is for a just cause or not,
provided the crop still exists at the time of the disposition.
On the basis of said statutory provision, petitioner, in his "Bill of Accounting", dated March 25,
1965, which he submitted to the trial court, claimed a total indemnity of P4,000 for various trees,
besides coconut trees, namely: coffee, banana, native atis, star apple, Persian atis, black pepper
tree, jackfruit, mango and santol, and P5,000 for his labor for 16 years, making a total of
P9,000.00. It is noteworthy that the aforequoted Section 22 enumerated the indemnity to which
the tenant is entitled "for his labor and expenses in the cultivation, planting or harvesting and
other incidental expenses for the improvement of the crop raised." ... The landholding under
consideration is a coconut land. The crop raised is coconut. The tenant is entitled to indemnity
for the labor and expenses in the cultivation, planting or harvesting of the crop raised on the land
at the time of dispossession. The diverse fruit trees other than coconut which petitioner claimed
to have planted were not for the improvement of the crop raised. The law does not provide
indemnity therefor. Thus in Paz vs. Court of Agrarian Relations, L-12570, April 28, 1962, 4 SCRA
1160, 1162, this Court held that it was an error for the Court of Agrarian Relations to order a
tenant to be indemnified for the value of fruit trees on the land, this Court saying that Section 22
"does not provide for indemnity for the value of permanent improvements existing on the
land, ... nor for the expenses in clearing the same upon taking possession thereof originally by
the tenant. ... Such being the case, any award that may be made with regard to the value of said
permanent improvements, or the expenses of clearing the land, whether fruit land
or talahib land, is improper and unauthorized, and so the court a quo erred in including in the
award an indemnity for the items abovementioned."
From the above discussions it is evident that the trial court committed no abuse of discretion and
it did not exceed its jurisdiction. The remedy of petitioner, if he was not satisfied with the trial
court's decision, was appeal. This petition for certiorari must necessarily be denied.
DENSO VS IAC
FACTS: S On June 23, 1984, at about 11 o'clock in the evening, a fire broke out at the
Nippondenso Building at Pasong Tamo Ext., Makati, Metro Manila. The building was owned by the
Kayamanan Development Corporation (hereafter, simply referred to as KAYAMANAN), and was
then under lease to Denso (Phils), Inc. (hereafter, simply DENSO). The fire caused extensive
damage. DENSO and its correspondent firm in Japan, NIPPONDENSO, reportedly suffered losses
amounting to P6,131,976.65 and P682,212.58, respectively. On the other hand, KAYAMANAN's
loss was placed at P1,750,000.00. A year or so later, KAYAMANAN instituted an action against
DENSO in the Regional Trial Court at Makati, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 10768, for
recovery of (a) unpaid rentals from June, 1984 to March, 1985, amounting to an aggregate of
P471,546.69; (b) the cost of repairing the damage caused by the fire to the leased building, it
being alleged that DENSO was bound to bear said cost under their lease agreement; and (c)
unrealized monthly rents and attorney's fees. 2
Summons was served on DENSO on June 10, 1985. It would seem, however, that the summons
(together with the accompanying copy of the complaint) was not referred by DENSO to its
counsel until June 22, 1985. This prompted the latter to file on June 25, 1985 a "MOTION FOR
EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE ANSWER," pleading the late referral, the need to attend to other
legal work of equal importance, as well as the time requirement for study of the factual and legal
points involved in the action, and praying, in consequence, for an additional period of 15 days
from June 25 within which to present the requisite responsive pleading. The motion for extension

was however denied by Order of Judge Teofilo Guadiz, Jr. dated June 26, 1985, "considering,"
according to His Honor, "that there was no proof of service that plaintiff received a copy of said
motion." While all this was happening, and evidently in complete ignorance thereof, DENSO's
counsel drew up its answer to the complaint, which was completed on July 5, 1985 and filed on
July 8, 1985. To this pleading were appended copies of letters from DENSO to KAYAMANAN
appealing for a 30% rental rebate due to the prejudicial consequences of the fire of June 23,
1984; giving notice of the termination of the lease on May 12, 1985; and formally turning over
the leased premisses-as well a copy of the Police Arson Investigation Report of the fire. 10
Inevitably, DENSO learned of the order of default and the judgment by default. It then filed on
August 2, 1985 a verified motion for reconsideration of said order and judgment.
ISSUE: WON THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
RULING: S Petitioner's motion for extension of time to file answer was, therefore, improperly
denied for lack of proof of service on the respondent, said motion having been seasonably filed
and, as already fully shown, there being no impediment to its being heard ex-parte. No pretense
is made that the motion was denied as having been filed merely for delay, but even if that
ground were read into the otherwise clear terms of the order of denial which do not even hint
thereat, it would still be belied by the fact that what was sought was only an extension of
the originalreglementary period as well as that prima facie meritorious reasons were pleaded for
the desired extension. The petitioner's answer, alleging defenses 30 which, if established, could
defeat the respondent's claim, wholly or in part, was filed well within the period of extension
prayed for. All these considered, the order declaring petitioner in default for alleged failure to
timely file answer was clearly arbitrary; it ought not to have been issued and should be struck
down.
While the order of default was in fact set aside by the Trial Judge on motion of the petitioner, he
failed to afford petitioner the complete relief that the arbitrary and improper issuance of said
order and of the earlier order denying the motion for extension clearly called for. Ideally, the
slate should have been wiped clean by setting aside also the hearing at which the respondent
presented its evidence ex-parte, so that the parties would stand on even terms with neither
having the advantage of the other. Instead, the Judge prescribed that the evidence presented by
the KAYAMANAN would remain in the record without right on the part of DENSO to cross-examine
the witnesses who had already testified, and by necessary implication, also denied DENSO the
right to object to the documentary evidence submitted by respondent. This, too, was abuse of
discretion. If a defendant is improperly declared in default his time to answer not having
expired because of a timely ex-parte motion for extension he should be entitled to relief which
should consist not only in the admission of his responsive pleading, but of the right to crossexamine the witnesses presented and to object to the exhibits offered in his absence, if not
indeed to have trial commence all over again. He should not, under these circumstances, be
penalized by loss of the right to cross-examine. This would be grossly unwarranted and unfair; it
would amount to a denial of due process.
The Appellate Court's observation that "*** it cannot be denied that the petitioner had other
remedies at hand after the court a quo had set aside the questioned Order of default and Default
Judgment ***" 31 It is somewhat perplexing. Given the character of said orders, particularly of the
order of default, this Court is hard put to conceive how DENSO could have acted to protect its
rights otherwise than as it did here, namely by exhausting all recourse toward a reconsideration
before the Trial Court and then applying for corrective relief in the Intermediate Appellate Court.

De hoya vs virata
FACTS: S This case is about the appealability of an order denying a motion to set aside
an order of default as distinguished from the denial of a motion to set aside a judgment by
default.
The petitioners, Marciana Hoyo-a and her eight children, filed in 1978 against Dominador Virata
with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, San Carlos City branch, two injunction cases
to restrain him from occupying portions of two homesteads, with areas of sixteen and eight
hectares, applied for by Heracleo Hoyo- a, Marciana's deceased husband, and by Marciana
herself. The homesteads are portions of Lot No. 2527 located at Sitio Labilabi, Barrio Mabini,
Escalante, Negros Occidental.
In its order dated April 19, 1978, the trial court dismissed the two cases for being premature. The
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of that order. It was reconsidered by Judge CorpuzMacandog in her order ofDecember 18, 1981 (p. 101, Record),
In another order dated February 20, 1984, Virata was declared in default by Judge Severino C.
Aguilar upon theex parte motion of the petitioners. Virata's motion to set aside the order of
default was denied in the order of June 19, 1984. His motion for reconsideration of the denial
order was also denied.
Judge Aguilar did not give due course to Virata's appeal from the denial order. The case was set
for reception of petitioners' evidence. Mrs. Hoyo-a testified at the hearing on March 6, 1985.
In the meantime, Virata was able to secure from the Appellate Court (Justices PV Sison, Bidin and
Veloso) a resolution dated April 10, 1985 requiring the trial court to elevate the records of the
two cases. They were elevated to the Appellate Court. That resolution is assailed by the
petitioners in this prohibition case.
ISSUE: WON THE DEFULAT IS PROPER
RULING: S We hold that the order denying the motion to set aside the order of default is not
appealable. It is interlocutory because the trial court has still to render a judgment by default
(Abesames vs. Garcia, 98 Phil. 769; 2 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 289. See section
2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court).
To do justice in these 1978 cases, whose disposition has been scandalously delayed, Virata is
hereby given an unextendible period of ten (10) days from notice of the finality of this judgment
to answer the complaints in the two cases. After the petitioners have answered the counterclaim,
if any, in Virata's answer, the case should be set for pre-trial and then tried. Virata's counsel can
cross-examine Mrs. Hoyo-a.
If Virata does not file any answer, then the order of default should stand and Mrs. Hoyo-a can
continue the presentation of her evidence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The records of the two cases are remanded to the lower
court for further proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

ODRIGUEZ vs. BORJA

17 SCRA 41
FACTS:
In this case, there were 2 proceedings. First was an intestate proceeding instituted meaning, a
proceeding to settle the estate of a deceased person who died without a will. But subsequently, a
will was found and again another proceeding was instituted, this time, testate proceeding
wherein the estate of the deceased person is settled if that person has left a will. We are
confronted here of 2 proceedings, one was instituted ahead of the other.
ISSUE:
Which proceeding should be preferred?
RULING:
As long as there is a will, even if that will is found later and even if the proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of a person with a will is filed later, that should be
preferred. The will should be probated. The will should be given effect as much as possible in
order to give effect to the wishes of the testator. The wishes of the testator must be given such
preference first. Probate of the will is needed in order to determine whether or not the will was
indeed valid, whether or not the will was executed in observance with the formalities required by
law and whether or not the testator executed it with a sound mind.
If later on in the probate proceeding, the will is found not to have validly executed, then you go
to intestate proceeding. But first you go to testate.
Dela Cruz vs Ejercito
FACTS: S On May 20, 1974 Milagros de la Cruz was charged with bigamy in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga, Angeles City Branch IV for having married Sergeant Dominick L. Gaccino
on September 15, 1973 while her prior marriage to Teodoro G. David was undissolved. The
information was filed at the instance of her first husband (Criminal Case No. 3128).
On August 1, 1974 Milagros de la Cruz filed in the same court at its San Fernando Branch III a
complaint for the annulment of her marriage to Sergeant Gaccino on the ground of duress (Civil
Case No. 4188).
Defendant Gaccino did not answer the complaint. Judge Mariano Castaeda, Jr. ordered the
Provincial Fiscal to investigate whether there was a collusion between the parties. A special
counsel of the Fiscal's office reported that there was no collusion. .
On December 16, 1974 Judge Castaeda rendered a decision annulling the marriage of Milagros
de la Cruz to Gaccino. No appeal was taken from that decision. It became final. In view of the
annulment of her second marriage, Milagros de la Cruz filed on January 27, 1975 a motion to
dismiss the bigamy charge. The private prosecutor and the prosecuting fiscal opposed the
motion.
Judge Bienvenido Ejercito denied it in his order of May 27, 1975 on the ground that the decision
in the annulment case is not controlling in the criminal case because the parties and the issues in
the two cases are not the same.

That refusal of Judge Ejercito to dismiss the bigamy case, not withstanding the judicial
pronouncement that her second marriage was a nullity, prompted Milagros de la Cruz to file the
instant special civil action of certiorari and prohibition
Issue: s whether the bigamy case became moot or untenable after the second marriage, on
which the prosecution for bigamy is based, was annulled.
RULING: S The City Fiscal of Angeles City contends that the lower court acted correctly in
denying the motion to dismiss the bigamy charge. He argues that the decision in the annulment
case should be set up as a defense by Milagros de la Cruz during the trial and that it would not
justify the outright dismissal of the criminal case.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General manifested that the stand of Milagros de la Cruz should
be sustained because one element of bigamy is that the alleged second marriage, having all the
requisites, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage (People vs. Mora
Dumpo, 62 Phil. 246, 248; Merced vs. Hon. Diez, 109 Phil. 155; Zapanta vs. Montesa, 114 Phil.
1227).
We hold that the finding in the annulment case that the second marriage contracted by Milagros
de la Cruz with Sergeant Gaccino was a nullity is determinative of her innocence and precludes
the rendition of a verdict that she committed bigamy. To try the criminal case in the face of such
a finding would be unwarranted.
As noted by Groizard, it is essential "que el segundo matrimonio 'ha de constituir un acto
solemne en que concurran los requisitos exigidos para la existencia del sacramento o del
contrato' " (2 Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, 12th ed., p. 675, note 2). As pointed out in
the Merced case, supra, it is necessary in a prosecution for bigamy that the second marriage be
declared valid if its validity was questioned in a civil action.
And even supposing arguendo that the decree annulling the second marriage was questionable
or erroneous because it was issued in a judgment by default, still that would not prevent the
decree from having legal effect. "An erroneous judgment is not a void judgment" (Chereau vs.
Fuentebella, 43 Phil. 216).
WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of May 27, 1975, denying the motion to dismiss of Milagros
de la Cruz, is set aside. The writ of prohibition is granted. No Costs.