So if you believe the JCPOA is a positive agreement and you want it to succeed, you

should also be in favor of continued efforts to build better relations with Iran.

1NR Alternative Causes

Despite the direction of the status quo, there are several alternative causes
that soak up the affs ability to effectuate their internal link even if they win
there is a need for higher relations -A.) Oil Prices -- GF 1/14 says oil prices are key to coop aff cant overcome
structural disincentives
low oil prices mean Tehran does not have as much of an incentive to cooperate as it did when
the negotiations began.

It outweighs -- Europe and private industries are the key internal link to oil
AND other restrictions are key
-proves we never actually shift policy

Gallucci 1/29 (Maria, Iranian Oil Exports: US-Iran Relations Complicate European Efforts To
Ship Crude, http://www.ibtimes.com/iranian-oil-exports-us-iran-relations-complicate-europeanefforts-ship-crude-2286019) [nagel]
Executives of shipping companies are
struggling to obtain insurance for oil tankers holding Iranian crude, highlighting a potential roadblock to
Irans plans to ramp up exports after the end of sanctions imposed by the West, the Wall Street Journal reported Friday. Half a
dozen oil companies and trading firms, including Frances Total SA and Switzerlands Litasco Group, in recent
days have sought tankers to ship 8 million barrels of Iranian crude to the European Union for
delivery next month. An executive at a Greek oil-tanker company said he agreed to book a load of Iranian crude, but
couldnt find insurance to cover the shipment . I am just testing the waters. But I had to give
up, he told the Journal. The U.S. this month lifted a broad set of sanctions on Iran in exchange for
limits to the Iranian nuclear program. But several restrictions remain in place, including a ban on direct
relations between American companies and financial institutions and Iran, as well as a prohibition on
using U.S. dollars in transactions with Iran. The policy has had a chilling effect on Western insurance
companies, which are reluctant to underwrite shipments of Iranian crude to European shores,
U.S. policy toward Iran is complicating efforts to ship Iranian oil to Europe.

according to the Journal. For instance, Londons International Group of Protection & Indemnity Club has an American member in its
group of insurers, making it subject to U.S. policy. The Treasury Department recently reminded the group of the prohibitions on U.S.Iran relations, the newspaper reported.

B.) Reactionaries -- CX didnt have an answer -- they said the policy was
structural -- GF ev says (in un-underlined part) reactionaries in both
governments prevent cooperation obviously the GOP isnt going to just
give up its attacks on Iran just because we withdraw presence
Domestic opponents of both governments will continue to play a key role in sustaining
much of the status quo.

C.) Rezaei Laundry List -- 1AC Rezaei says US threats inevitable and
irrelevant, but that ISRAEL threats are triggered by increased cooperation
and that THAT triggers Iran build up READ BLUE
Rezaei 11/15

Apart from the United States, which has always been threatening Iran the Israeli regime, which is
close to Iran in geographical terms, has never given up its overt threats against the country and
has even worked out numerous scenarios for launching a military attack against Iran. The new
round of such threats began in 2011, when many heated debates were going on about the
reaction that the United States and Israel would show to Iran's peaceful nuclear activities. It was
due to these threats and aggressive intentions that Iran's military doctrine, through a public
address by Ayatollah Khamenei, entered a new phase on the basis of the balance of threats.
The leader, in an important speech made at Imam Ali Military Academy in October 2011, announced that in the face of
threat we will resort to threat . It was here that the concept of balance of threat was added to Iran's military strategy.
Hefty military spending by Iran's neighboring countries with support from the West, has
increasingly faced Iran with a security dilemma. Therefore, since Iran's defense capabilities
have relatively reduced in comparison with neighboring countries as a result of multiple kinds of sanctions
imposed on the country, the Islamic Republic has a clear reason to embark on developing its missile
industries in order to defend its security . In fact, the proven ability of Israel and the United States to
attack their potential rivals, along with their immunity to punishment, has encouraged Iran to
acquire conventional military potentials and armament so that its enemies would not be able to attack it. These
realities also force Iran to try and maintain its position in the regional balance of powers by acquiring the necessary amount of power

the dominant behavioral

model and military doctrine of the Islamic Republic, based on Ayatollah Khamenei's views, is
geared toward creating balance. In this way, Iran assesses threats posed to it by other countries on
the basis of its own relative power, geographical proximity and propinquity, as well as the defense-offense
balance before taking step toward creating internalized and externalized balance. According to externalized balance, the leader
instead of pursuing hegemonic goals. Therefore, within the framework of defensive realism,

of Iran believes that the Islamic Republic of Iran should relay on its national potentialities to boost its power and counteract threats in
a unilateral manner. Iran's

foreign policy and defensive behavior during the imposed war as well as in
the course of the nuclear diplomacy can be analyzed within this framework. According to the model of
creating externalized balance, the Islamic Republic of Iran adopts a multilateral approach in order to build new coalitions and
alliances as a prelude to creating balance. Iran's policy of looking to the east, which was based on establishing closer relations with
the Peoples Republic of China and membership at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, can be considered as an example of
externalized creation of balance as purported by the Iranian leader to counter and thwart threats posed by the United States and
Israel. This

issue proves that Iran's military strategy under the command and in line with the
approach of Ayatollah Khamenei is of a defensive nature whose main goal is to maintain the
status quo. Even American officials have at times admitted to this issue. Therefore, following suit with this military strategy, Iran
has turned into an independent actor with independent defensive approaches, which are based on active deterrence. According to
this approach, as adopted by Ayatollah Khamenei, Iran has a historical background and important identity in regional issues and this

Therefore,
despite all shortcomings and considerations with which we are faced in this regard, defensive
realism is the closest theory of international relations to Ayatollah Khamenei's way of thinking.
is why the country never shifts its strategy in the face of regional issues and continues to pursue a single principle.

[END OF JAMES MADISONS CARD]

1NR China Advantage

1NR Pivot Bad

Pivot is perceived as excluding China that causes increased tensions and
wont last because of budget cuts -- proves the failure of the security
paradigm
Aberg and Novak 14
(John H.S. Aberg is pursuing his doctoral studies in International Relations at Lingnan University under the Hong Kong PhD
Fellowship Scheme. Nathan W. Novak is an eight-year resident of southern Taiwan and a Masters student at the Institute of China
and Asia-Pacific Studies and the Center for Japanese Studies at the National Sun Yat-sen University in Kaohsiung, Taiwan. The
Diplomat. The Risk of Asia- Pacific Multilateralism 4/22/14 http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/the-risks-of-asia-pacificmultilateralism/,TSW)
This capacity to act and to mobilize is facilitated by three particular conditions: it must be supported by an ideational dimension that
is culturally harmonious and resonates among significant audiences; it depends on the degree centrality of the broker (the denser
the ties, the greater the likelihood of mobilization); and, it is also enabled by its between-ness centrality (a network position that
enjoys exclusive ties, contrary to a network structure with multiple brokers equipped with mobilizing capacity). The U.S. military
alliance system in Asia fulfills all of these requirements and gives U.S. military a unique capacity to act. In particular, this was
demonstrated by the U.S. pivot (or rebalance) to Asia. The dissemination of the idea of an increasingly assertive China resonated
well in the region, and the American security ties are dense and built on exclusivity, which stands in stark contrast to the multilateral
security structure of NATO in Europe. Although

the pivot has been interpreted by China as a containment

strategy, with symbolic acts pointing towards the direction of a new cold war , constructing a
multilateral security structure would signal even greater hostility and lead to new self-fulfilling
prophesies of growing U.S.-China antagonism. This is because collective security institutions are usually geared
to deterring and punishing aggression (security against an adversary). The development of a multilateral security
institution in Asia that excludes China would thus come to resemble NATOs exclusion of
Russia. Maintaining the hub-and-spokes system on the military front would therefore avoid outright hostility and preserve strategic
flexibility and maneuverability (Indeed, here we begin to see the justification for the development of situational/ad hoc multilateral
constructs that function as extensions of bilateral relations across issue areas). Of course, while the U.S. intention is to maintain,
and even enhance, its international primacy, one

can question how long U.S. military centrality can be

sustained when the very viability of a military insurance policy is challenged by budgetary
constraints that reduce the coverage of the insurance.

Pivot causes serial policy failure EVEN within a realist security framework
Glaser 13
(John Glaser , freelance journalist based in Washington, DC, The Washington Times, "The asia pivot: making an enemy of china,"
6/24/13 http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/john-glaser-intelligence-foreign-policy-world/2013/jun/24/asia-pivotmaking-enemy-china/, TSW)
But there is one aspect of Obamas bellicose foreign policy so far removed from the al-Qaeda threat that he has been unable to
conjure it: the so-called Asia

Pivot. The rebalancing to East Asia is a confrontational policy that

involves surging American military and naval presence throughout the region in the
Philippines, Vietnam, Japan, Australia, Guam, South Korea, Singapore, etc. and
boosting support to Chinas neighboring rivals . Washington has been refurbishing old WWII military
bases in the region and building new ones in order to lay the groundwork for an air-sea battle with China. Weve even
deployed surveillance drones near Chinas borders. One wonders how might America react to such gestures in her backyard.
What villainous offense has China committed against American security? Are they supporting terrorists? Have they threatened
us with military attack? Are they amassing weapons of mass destruction pointed at Washington? No, nothing like that. Obama
hasnt been able to invoke a monster to destroy in China because there isnt one. Chinas mere existence as a rising economic
and military power is its major transgression. China threatens not the security of Americans, but the hegemony of Washington .

The Asia Pivot harks back to a time when imperial powers didnt have to justify military
expansionism with tall tales of impending attacks on the homeland. It more resembles the famed
Great Game in which the British Empire fought with the Russian Empire for strategic supremacy in Central Asia. According to
Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, writing in Foreign Affairs, China is the only country widely seen as a possible threat to
U.S. predominance. Indeed, Chinas rise has led to fears that the country will soon overwhelm its neighbors and one day

supplant the United States as a global hegemon. They add that America

is the most intrusive outside actor in

Chinas internal affairs, the guarantor of the status quo in Taiwan, the largest naval presence in the East China and
South China seas, the formal or informal military ally of many of Chinas neighbors, and the primary framer and defender of
existing international legal regimes. The U.S. could cut its defense budget in half tomorrow and still outspend China on its
military. But that hasnt calmed the Obama administration into easing his approach. This comes with serious risks.
Already by 2011, the Center for Strategic International Studies identified in a report the unintended consequences that could
come with Obamas stern posture in Asia. The report predicted a shift in Chinese foreign policy based on the new leaderships
judgment that it must respond to a U.S. strategy that seeks to prevent Chinas reemergence as a great power. The

U.S.
Asia pivot has triggered an outpouring of anti-American sentiment in China that will increase
pressure on Chinas incoming leadership to stand up to the United States, the report added.
Nationalistic voices are calling for military countermeasures to the bolstering of Americas
military posture in the region and the new U.S. defense strategic guidelines. Or, in the words of
former Chinese diplomat Jia Xiudong: Dont treat China as an enemy. Otherwise you end up with an
enemy in China. The economic interdependence between the U.S. and China has risen to
unprecedented levels, and thats a good thing. Left to their own devices, Americans and Chinese would
continue to engage in peaceful, mutually beneficial trade. Only Washington, going abroad in search of
monsters to destroy, could turn that into a casus belli .

1NR No China War

No impact to China rise the Zurong evidence says:
A) Their evidence is based on biased alarmism which draws from Chinese
documents to prove aggression, but those documents havent been
translated into English
B) Common interest is growing in economics and education because
cooperation is mutually beneficial for example, trade volume surpassed
500 billion
C) Military exchanged are increasing to avoid accidental conflict
D) Even by 2049, there will still be a large gap between China and the US
All of these overwhelm the affs internal link and even if they dont -- its
inevitable
Wu Zurong 15, research fellow at the China Foundation for International Studies, The
Assumption that a Rising China Seeks Hegemony is Wrong March 4, 2015, KB
Chinas rise is inevitable , which can never be stopped by any force in the world. China had been the largest economy in
the world for centuries before prior to the 19th century, but lagged behind in the early 19th century, and the gap with the rising world
China will again be the largest economy
in the world in the near future. China has two hundred-year dreams, one is from 1921 to 2021, that is the dream of the
powers became larger after the Opium War in 1840. It is not a surprise that

100 years of the Communist Party of ChinaCPC, the goal of which is for China to resolve the problems of food, clothing,
housing and daily necessities for its entire population, and the other is from 1949 to 2049, that is the dream of the 100 years of the
Peoples Republic of China (PRC), the goal of which is for China to reach a middle-level for developed countries in terms of
economics and social development. Even

by 2049, there will still be a big gap between China and the
U.S., and there will be no such a thing as Chinas replacement of the U.S. as the global
superpower. Chinas population is four times that of the U.S. When will per capita GDP of China
be equal to that of the U.S.? Perhaps, the answer will not be available for a fairly long historical period. Therefore, it is
purely an illusory assumption that China has a secret strategy to replace the U.S. as the
global superpower in 2049, not to mention China does not have that intention at all.
With a Cold War mentality and zero-sum game logic , such a stale approach to observing
China often leads to misunderstanding and misjudgments, resulting in the theory of China
threat. Neglecting all the important characteristics of Chinas rise are among the main causes for the blemish in observation and
research. China is doing its utmost to make her rise peaceful and beneficial to all, believing that all
countries, big or small, are equal in international affairs, and big powers, including China and
the U.S., should and can build a new type of relations based on mutual benefit and win-win
cooperation. A rising China can not only live in peace with the U.S., but also work together
with the U.S. to realize the long-term goal of sustainable common security and common
prosperity for the whole world.

No China NFU rollback---its durable and constrained by the physical

composition of their nuclear arsenal
Caitlin Talmadge 15, Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at the
George Washington University, May 2015, Preventing Nuclear Escalation in Conventional

Conflict: The Case of the United States and China,

https://nuclearconference2015.files.wordpress.com/2014/09/talmadge-nsri-draft.pdf
Similarly, China's no first use (NFU) pledge and broader strategic culture make it unlikely that
China would gravitate toward an explicit posture of deliberate use of nuclear weapons to
stalemate a conventional war. China has repeatedly emphasized from the time of nuclear
acquisition that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons. This is consistent with longstanding Chinese characterization of nuclear weapons as useful for retaliation in the event that it
is attacked. The current size and composition of China's arsenal are consistent with this
approach, suggesting that the NFU pledge is not mere cheap talk.55
Of course, pledges can be unpledged, and there already is some slippage regarding what China
considers "first" and "use."56 Currently, however, it is difficult to envision China adopting a
nuclear posture akin to that of North Korea or Pakistan or NATO in the Cold War. Notably, all of
those actors face or faced a serious risk of being overrun in a rapid land war, a danger from
which China is largely insulated.

No US/China war
-

Chinese military inferiority

Economic interdependence

American alliance system

Artyom Lukin 14, Professor @ Far Eastern Federal University (Russia), Imagining World War
III -- In 2034, 8/4/2014, The World Post (partnership of the Huffington Post and Berggruen
Institute, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/artyom-lukin/world-war-iii_b_5646641.html
three reasons war is unlikely anytime soon . First, despite the double-digit annual growth
in its defense budgets, China's military still significantly lags behind the U.S.'
Second
China depends on America much more than
the other way round. China is still critically reliant on the U.S and its allies, the EU and Japan, as
its principal export markets and sources of advanced technologies and know-how. Overall,
China's dependence on international markets is very high , with the trade to GDP ratio standing
at 53 percent. China imports many vital raw materials, such as oil and iron ore.
China would be extremely vulnerable to a naval blockade , which is likely to be mounted
by the U.S. in case of a major conflict.
There are

It will take China 15 to 20 years to attain parity or

near-parity with the U.S.-Japan allied forces in the East Asian littoral.

, for all the talk of mutual interdependence,

As most of its commodity imports are shipped

by the sea,

Both for economic and strategic reasons, the Chinese government pursues policies to reduce the country's reliance on foreign markets, trying to shift from an

export-oriented model to domestic sources of growth. It is also making efforts to secure raw materials in the countries and regions contiguous to China, like Central Asia, Russia or Burma, so as to reduce dependence on sea-born shipments. However, at least for

Third, China would have to confront not the U.S.

alone but also America's Asian allies, including Japan, Australia and perhaps India.
the next 15 to 20 years China's dependency on the West-dominated global economic system is going to stay very significant.

Thus China needs at least one

major power ally and some lesser allies. Whether China dares to pose a serious challenge to the U.S. will, to a large extent, hinge upon Beijing and Moscow forming a Eurasian geopolitical bloc. This is already happening now, but it is going to take some more time.

The bottom line: over the next 15 to 20 years a major war in Asia is highly unlikely because
Beijing will be playing a cautious game . Even if a military clash does occur, it will be short ,
with China being quickly routed by the preponderant American force .
However, around 2030 the balance is bound to undergo

considerable changes, if China is successful in: 1) closing military gap with the U.S.; 2) making its economy less reliant on the Western markets and overseas raw resources; and 3) forming its own alliance structure.

No china war they have no motive answers miscalc

Babones, 2015, American comparative sociologist at the University of Sydney in Sydney,
Australia (Salvatore, Is China a Threat? The Devils in the Details, http://fpif.org/is-china-athreat-the-devils-in-the-details/)
Take, for example, Chinas possible future capacity to
dominate its adjacent waters: the East China Sea, Taiwan Strait, and South China Sea. An oftenStaying Open for Business The devil is in the details.

cited figure is that 40 percent of world trade (reportedly worth $5.3 trillion) passes through the South China Sea. Throw in the East
China Sea and the Taiwan Strait and the total must be more than 50 percent. Could

a more capable Chinese army

choke off that trade? Of course it could. Any country can shut down sea lanes with patrols and antiship mines. But nearly all of the civilian navigation in question represents trade to and from
China. Its hard to imagine any circumstance under which the Chinese government would
want to shut it down . Ditto the airspace over Chinas near seas. Nearly all of the civilian
aviation through it consists of flights to and from China . Space and cyberspace are more
difficult commons to control. But the effective militarization of space has long been a Star Wars
fantasy , and Chinas cyberspace is essentially a walled garden. Anarchist hackers pose as much of a threat
to the Internet as the Chinese military does. While all forms of Internet security need improvement, they
dont particularly need improvement on account of a specific threat from China. Trouble in the
Neighborhood? What about regional conflict? Chinas growing military certainly sounds like a
regional menace. But a menace to whom? Here again the details get in the way of the China threat story. To the east,
Japans government is responding to Chinese expansion by boosting its own defense spending
to record levels, proposing to change its pacifist constitution to allow greater military flexibility,
and making a renewed push to resolve the long-standing Kuril Islands dispute with Russia. If
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe finally succeeds in making peace with Russia, that would leave China and its ally North Korea as the sole
focus for Japans entire military capacity. Japan is a rich, technologically advanced country of 127 million people. It can look after

China poses little threat to South Korea . China increasingly views

North Korea more as a burden than as an advance column for an attack on the South. And China
has recently been courting South Korean technology investment in order to reduce its dependence on Japan. Political
relations across the Taiwan Strait are inevitably dominated by questions over the status of
Taiwan. Every election in Taiwan sparks talk about and fears of Chinese invasion. But no
country in the world has staged a large-scale amphibious assault since the U.S. landings
at Incheon, South Korea in 1950 . For more than half a century, even American adventures abroad have been smallscale (Grenada) or launched from land bases (Iraq). The Chinese military will never have the capacity to
invade Taiwan against armed resistance not now, not later, not ever . It just cant be done in
the contemporary military context in which a single cruise missile can sink a transport ship
carrying thousands of troops. It makes no sense to worry about something that is not
technically possible . The Philippines? Why would China want to invade the Philippines?
Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar? Ditto, ditto, ditto . China is involved in a plethora of minor border
disputes with its neighbors, but none of these involve core territorial interests or serious
legal claims that China (or most of its neighbors, for that matter) have historically been interested in
pushing . Theyre all frozen conflicts that are unlikely ever to thaw. Some pundits worry
about the increasing Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean. India may not rival China as a great
power, but even India should be able to contain Chinas ability to project power as far away
as the Indian Ocean and India has every reason to do so. In short, its difficult to imagine
concrete scenarios for major regional conflict sparked by China. Resource Conflicts Its true that
itself. For very different reasons,

there are many flashpoints for minor conflict: the Senkaku Islands, various shoals and reefs
in the South China Sea, Chinas expanded air defence identification zone, and most
notoriously Chinas building of a whole new island in the middle of the ocean , presumably
intended to form the basis for reinforcing its maritime claims. The outcome of these disputes may determine who
gets to drill for deep offshore oil decades in the future. But they dont involve major national
interests for any of the countries concerned, least of all the United States. So while its
possible that China will become involved in a minor air or sea incident with one or more of its
maritime neighbors, its entirely unlikely that China will become involved in a major
regional conflict with any of them . No one is going to go to war because two warplanes
collide in mid-air . Historically countries have not even gone to war over the intentional
shooting down of civilian airliners, never mind military accidents. One China war scenario is credible, but it
doesnt threaten U.S. interests: the possibility of war between China and Russia. Contemporary Russia is a deceptively unstable
country that could suddenly descend into anarchy at any moment in an unsuccessful military coup, on the unexpected death of
Vladimir Putin, in a future color revolution, etc. As Russian academic Artyom Lukin explains, the Russian far east has massive
natural resources needed by China and a population of just 6 million. In a chaotic situation it could be a tempting target, but Chinas
current leadership seems rational enough not to run the risk of thermonuclear war. A Phantom Menace So why play up the
challenge from China? Let

China modernize its military. Chinas neighbors will bulk up in response to

any perceived threat, many of them by purchasing expensive U.S. weapons. Chinas leadership (much closer to the
action than Americas leadership) presumably understands this. If Chinas military budget is growing,
it is likely because China is growing, not because China has any specific invasion plans.
There are as yet no signs that Chinas military expansion threatens the United States. Quite the
contrary: It might support greater Chinese involvement in international peace-keeping, and it could
spark more appropriate burden-sharing among Americas Asian allies. When the China
challenge is broken down into its constituent parts, the China threat tends to evaporate . Far
from identifying any real rationale for action, Carafanos article seems designed to drum up interest in the Heritage Foundations
2015 defense review, which makes a 313-page case for higher military spending. Carafano himself freely admits that there

is
no evidence that Beijing has any interest in engaging in armed conflict with Washington .

If thats the case, why arm to forestall that threat? Peaceful coexistence is a much cheaper and much less provocative strategy.

1NR Not Realist

Mearsheimer is wrongno SQ conflict 5 reasonswill settle differences
peacefully
Etzioni 15 (professor of international relations and a University Professor at The George
Washington University)
http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/mearsheimers-war-with-china/
In the process,

Mearsheimer ignores

that if one does not follow the kind of real politik analysis for which he is famous

sentiments, beliefs, and loyalties a rather different

conclusion emerges. First, the United States and China both have enormously pressing domestic
problems . Chinas slowing economic growth and the United States slow economic growth make it
impossible for either country to without neglecting these domestic demands invest many taxpayer dollars in their
military . Second, a military confrontation is very likely to be exceedingly costly for both sides.
China cannot reasonably expect to war with the U nited S tates without suffering serious, lasting
damage at best. Third, the United States did not fare particularly well in four of its last five wars, as Henry Kissinger delicately
that is, an analysis that looks at security rather than at

pointed out, and it has a hard time dealing even with ISIS, which has at most 35,000 fighters and lacks a navy, air force, nuclear

most importantly, the United States and China share

many important shared and complementary interests . These include slowing nuclear
proliferation , curbing Islamic extremism , protecting the environment, preventing climate
change, and fostering economic growth and stability. Moreover, the two countries have very
little real reason to confront each other . China can secure access to the energy and raw
materials essential to its economic well-being, without any harm coming to the United
States unless the two countries turn every change to the status quo into a crisis of prestige. And China has shown ,
so far largely through land disputes, that it can settle differences with its neighbors
peacefully . The main value of Mearsheimers provocative thesis is that it alerts those of us on both sides of the power divide to
weapons, or significant cyber capabilities. Fourth and

redouble our efforts to prevent his dire predictions from coming true.