G.R. No.

133778

March 14, 2000

ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE
NIAL, INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO NIAL, JR., petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
after his death?
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage
were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985.
One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma
Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an
affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997,
Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a
marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the
second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who
could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59,
dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to
resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the
declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with her specially so
when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is null and
void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage after
it was dissolved due to their father's death. 1
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void
their father's marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family
Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an action for annulment of
marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure question of law.
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioner's
averment that the allegations in the petition are "true and correct"." It was thus treated as an
unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. 3
However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the
petition for review. 4
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in
effect at the time of their celebration. 5 A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under
Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to

Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article 58. 8 The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the
State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of
which the general public is interested. 9 This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that
the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic
"autonomous social institution." 10 Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an
"inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be protected by the
State. 11 This is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent
union" 12 and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment." 13
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is
dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, 14 referring to the marriage of a man
and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no
license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage
due to the publication of every applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the
marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve peace
in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of
gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy
and exempt them from that requirement.
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma was celebrated
without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have
attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, and that we now desire to marry each other." 16 The only issue that needs to be
resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code
to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing
a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each
other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both
parties have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire
five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully
married, which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened sometime during the
cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for
five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of
a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of
marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period,
which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union
had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years
immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized
by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at anytime within the 5 years and continuity
that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any
distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five
years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law
relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be
strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be
afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing
element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption
from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the
exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons
are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any
impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar. 17 The Civil Code
provides:

Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the
marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar
shall forthwith make an investigation, examining persons under oath. . . .
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought
to his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the
application for a marriage license. . . .
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the
concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage
subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void, 18 subject
only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled.
The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or more
marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and
concubinage and adultery. 19 The law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have
lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From
the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only
about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in
fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already
lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the
cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under
the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a
subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that
when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse.
The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial
companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third
party as being one as "husband and wife".
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the
exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of
such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare
their father's marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20 cannot be applied even
by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of
marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at
anytime before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods
and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The
Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void
marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the
court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken place
21 and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free
cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be
assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked

collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party
but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of
either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly
valid. 22 That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages
where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper
interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those
declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or
ownership through actual joint contribution, 23 and its effect on the children born to such void
marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54
of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally
conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the alleged marital
bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong
premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should be noted
that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of either
extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to
establish the nullity of a marriage. 24 "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore
the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of
avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the
peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained
and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary
circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon
the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal
purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be
material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether
before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the
facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts."
It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding
instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be
impeached, and is made good ab initio. 26 But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides
that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a
party can enter into a second marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final
judgment to that effect. 28 For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if the death of either party
would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be
considered imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity.1wphi1 For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination
of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime,
or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit
not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a
final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry.
The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of
the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo
City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said
case is ordered REINSTATED.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.

openjurist.org
635 F2d 1045 Moe v. Dinkins
635 F.2d 1045
Maria MOE, Raoul Roe, and Ricardo Roe, an infant by his
father, Raoul Roe, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
David DINKINS, individually and as City Clerk of New York
City, on behalf of himself and all town and city clerks in
New York State, and David Axelrod, individually, and as New
York State Commissioner of Health, Defendants- Appellees.
No. 454, Docket 80-7676.
United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit.
Submitted Nov. 25, 1980.
Decided Dec. 9, 1980.
Janet M. Calvo, New York City (Washington Square Legal Services, Inc., of counsel), for plaintiffsappellants.
Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen. of the State of New York, New York City (Robert J. Schack, Asst. Atty.
Gen., George D. Zuckerman, Asst. Sol. Gen., New York City, of counsel), for defendant-appellee
Axelrod.
Allen G. Schwartz, Corp. Counsel of the City of New York, New York City (June A. Witterschein,
New York City, of counsel), for defendant-appellee Dinkins.
Before KAUFMAN and TIMBERS, Circuit Judges, and PIERCE, District Judge.*
IRVING R. KAUFMAN, Circuit Judge:
1
Federal adjudication of constitutional challenges to state statutes is an arduous task, for the
delicate balance between federal and state power must be crafted with a sensitivity responsive to
their respective authorities. The Constitution and Congress equip federal courts with authority to
void state laws that transgress federal civil rights, but comity toward state sovereignty counsels the
power be sparingly used. Accordingly, the doctrine of abstention authorizes our federal courts to
refrain from interpreting state law where ambiguities in that law might enable a plaintiff to prevail in
the courts of the state. Abstention, however, creates a lapse in the federal protection of civil rights.
Accordingly, we are instructed to utilize the doctrine with strict circumspection. Plaintiffs in this case
sue to vindicate what they contend to be at the heart of our constitutional liberties, the right to
marry and to raise a family without unreasonable social and legal stigma. Their chances of success
under state law alone are attenuated at best. The harm they allege is immediate. Abstention is
therefore improper, and we reverse the district court's order dismissing the complaint and remand
for further proceedings.I.
2
A brief review of the facts is instructive. Raoul Roe1 was born on March 9, 1962, and Maria Moe
was born on March 2, 1965. In late November 1978, Maria became pregnant by Raoul. He was

sixteen; she was thirteen. Maria's mother, who is a widow, urged Maria to have an abortion; Maria
refused. In April 1979, Maria and Raoul moved into an apartment together, and decided to marry.
Raoul's parents gave their permission, but Maria's mother refused. On August 21, 1979, Maria
bore a son, Ricardo Roe.
3
Maria, Raoul, and Ricardo filed suit on March 19, 1980, in the federal district court under 42 U.S.C.
1983 (1976). Their complaint alleged that the New York statute controlling the marriage of
minors, New York Domestic Relations Law 15, unconstitutionally burdened Maria's and Raoul's
right to marry.2 New York law forbids marriage without a license,3 and section 15 provides in part:
4
If it shall appear ... that the woman is under the age of eighteen years and is not under fourteen
years of age then the town or city clerk before he shall issue a license shall require the written
consent to the marriage from both parents of the minor ... or such as shall then be living ....4
5
Beyond the denial of Maria's and Raoul's right to marry, plaintiffs alleged, the New York statute
deprived Maria of workmen's compensation benefits, Social Security benefits, and intestate
succession rights she might enjoy as Raoul's wife.5 Further, they claimed that section 15 inflicted
all of the social and economic disabilities of illegitimacy on Ricardo. Therefore, time was of the
essence in the prosecution of their suit.
6
Defendants moved to dismiss, contending that the federal court should abstain from adjudication.
Judge Motley, in a careful opinion, found section 15 "unclear in a number of respects," and
dismissed the action.6 This appeal followed.
II.
7
The legal standard for federal judicial abstention has been considered on numerous occasions,
and the law is clear. When asked to void a state law on constitutional grounds, a federal court will
stay its hand if the state statute is susceptible of two or more constructions, and if one of the
interpretations will either save the statute or modify the constitutional issue. See Railroad
Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941); Pharmaceutical
Society, Inc. v. Lefkowitz, 586 F.2d 953, 956 (2d Cir. 1978); Winters v. Lavine, 574 F.2d 46, 69 (2d
Cir. 1978); McRedmond v. Wilson, 533 F.2d 757, 760 (2d Cir. 1976).7 Should the federal court
abstain and the state tribunal elect the saving construction, dividends of comity redound. But
should the state suit produce an interpretation in which constitutional infirmities persist, the plaintiff
is forced, usually years later,8 to return to the federal court.
8
Crucial to the abstention decision, therefore, is the ambiguity of the state statute. A clearly-worded
law leaves even the most constitutionally-sensitive state court little room to maneuver its way to a
saving construction. Remand under such circumstances serves no purpose of comity; it wastes the
plaintiff's, the defendant's, and the state court's time, and causes unseemly delay in the federal
court adjudication.
9
The statute before us is clear. No ambiguous words or phrases exist; the parties concur on the
import and application of "consent," "parents," and every other material term. They also agree that
the statute as written creates a total bar to Maria's marriage so long as her mother demurs. To
evade the constitutional analysis that seems to us so clearly mandated, the state poses three
alternative constructions of section 15 which might permit Maria and Raoul to marry. The
suggestions are quite strained, and none of the three is sufficiently tenable to merit abstention.

10
First, the state argues New York courts might impute a requirement of "reasonableness" into the
parents' decision to give or withhold consent. Such a standard is, of course, not in the statute, and
New York courts have never departed from a literal interpretation of section 15. In In re Powers, 96
Misc.2d 183, 408 N.Y.S.2d 761 (Fam.Ct.1978), a widowed mother refused to consent to the
marriage of her seventeen-year-old son, and the son sued to secure approval. The Family Court
held itself without subject matter jurisdiction, "even were (consent) shown to be unreasonably
withheld or refused ...." In Berger v. Adornato, 76 Misc.2d 122, 350 N.Y.S.2d 520 (Sup.Ct.1973), an
under-age male whose parents would not consent challenged the constitutionality of an earlier
version of the statute's creation of different age limits for males and females. The court did not
embrace the opportunity to impute "reasonableness" into the parental consent requirement and
allow the plaintiff to marry on that ground; instead, it declared the age differential totally
unconstitutional. Moreover, where one parent is insane, and therefore presumably unable to give
reasoned consent, the permission of that parent is still required. 1964 Op.Atty.Gen. 138. And, the
consent of a court-appointed guardian cannot bypass the statutory requirement of parental
consent, regardless of the unfairness created by a refusal to grant permission. 1973 Op.Atty.Gen.
144-45.
11
Second, the state argues that New York courts could read into section 15 a "best interests of the
child" standard. This technique, however, has been employed less frequently than the state
maintains, and then only in child custody cases. See, e. g., In re Wesley L. III, 72 A.D.2d 137, 423
N.Y.S.2d 482 (1st Dep't 1980). In those instances, the governing statute, New York Social Services
Law 384-b, subd. 1 (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980), contains an explicit direction that "the best
interests ... of the child" shall be considered. New York courts have curtailed the application of this
standard even in the child custody context. See In re Sanjivini K., 47 N.Y.2d 374, 391 N.E.2d 1316,
418 N.Y.S.2d 339 (1979). Moreover, they have never imputed this language into a statute where
the language was by the legislature that passed it.
12
Finally, the state suggests New York courts might read section 15 to exempt "emancipated minors"
from the parental consent requirement. Here too, courts have shown no tendency to stray from the
words of the statute toward such an interpretation. In Berger v. Adornato, supra, 350 N.Y.S.2d at
523, the court found the plaintiff to "a mature, emancipated man," but did not find that this status
afforded an exemption from the clear words of section 15. Moreover, we note that even if an
"emancipated minor" exemption could be read into section 15, it would probably not apply to Maria,
for she is not emancipated. New York minors are emancipated by agreement of parent and child,
or by unilateral action of the parent. Emancipation is not within the sole power of the child. Sevrie v.
Sevrie, 90 Misc.2d 321, 394 N.Y.S.2d 389 (Fam.Ct.1977); Bates v. Bates, 62 Misc.2d 498, 310
N.Y.S.2d 26 (Fam.Ct.1970). Further, emancipation is generally applied to those over eighteen, see
New York Gen.Oblig.Law 3-101 (McKinney 1977) (declaring contracts of persons over eighteen
effective); New York Pub. Health Law 2504 (McKinney 1977) (allowing persons over eighteen to
consent to medical treatment), or over sixteen, see People ex rel. C. v. Spence-Chapin Services,
48 U.S.L.W. 2709 (Sup.Ct.N.Y.Co. March 27, 1980) (sixteen-year-old may give up her child for
adoption, since no statute disables minors from doing so). Where minors have been treated as
adults, see, e. g., New York Penal Law 30.00 (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980) (youthful offender
statute); New York Pub. Health Law 2305(2) (McKinney 1977) (allowing treatment for venereal
disease regardless of age), that practice has been afforded by statute and not by judicial fiat.
Moreover, specific problems of public health and safety seem to be the domain covered.
13
While a proper solicitude for state sovereignty might lead us to abstain where a plausible claim of
saving construction is made, we will not elevate resourceful conjurations to probable interpretations
in the name of pyrrhic comity. If that were the law, few cases would withstand an abstention attack.
In Naprstek v. City of Norwich, 545 F.2d 815, 818 (2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam), we refused to refrain

from constitutional examination of a New York statute because we found the suggested alternative
construction "would require the state courts to supply a missing term in the ordinance." In
Pharmaceutical Society, supra, 586 F.2d at 957, we declined to forbear, and stated, "Abstention
could hardly be justified on the theory that the state court might invent an interpretation at odds
with the statute's clear language." Accord, Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 439, 91
S.Ct. 507, 511, 27 L.Ed.2d 515 (1971); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 249-52, 88 S.Ct. 391, 396,
19 L.Ed.2d 444 (1967); Quinn v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 616 F.2d 38, 41 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
The crystalline parlance of section 15 has remained unchanged since its enactment over seventy
years ago.9
14
The propriety of our rule is confirmed by the Supreme Court's decisions in Bellotti v. Baird, 428
U.S. 132, 96 S.Ct. 2857, 49 L.Ed.2d 844 (1976), and Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 49 L.Ed.2d 788 (1976), decided the same day. In both cases, a state statute
required parental consent whenever a female under eighteen desired an abortion. If the parents
refused, the statute in Bellotti allowed a court to override that refusal "for good cause shown;" the
statute in Danforth was silent. The Supreme Court held abstention proper in Bellotti, since state
courts might well cure the constitutional objections through construction of the ambiguous "good
cause" term in the statute.10 The statute in Danforth was strikingly similar to section 15: short,
clear and unambiguous.11 The Supreme Court found abstention improper.
15
Finally, we cannot ignore the urgent equities of plaintiffs' complaint. Aside from our usual
reluctance to relegate civil rights plaintiffs to the state courts, see Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519,
525 (2d Cir. 1967), this case presents a pressure of time which counsels strongly against the use
of abstention. Ricardo has lived as an illegitimate child for over a year; his parents have cohabited
out of wedlock for a year-and-a-half. If Maria and Raoul have a constitutional right to marry, its
exercise should not be postponed. Such facts "(do) not permit us the luxury of a Pullman
abstention ...." Billington v. Hayduk, 565 F.2d 824, 825 (2d Cir. 1977) (per curiam). Accord, Harman
v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 85 S.Ct. 1177, 14 L.Ed.2d 50 (1965); Gangemi v. Sclafani, 506 F.2d
570, 572 (2d Cir. 1974).
III.
16
Our decision today does not imply that a colorable claim of saving construction should be ignored.
Nor does it require a federal court to reach the constitutional merits of a slightly vague state statute
every time a violation of civil rights is alleged. We hold here only that the remote and implausible
suggestions of ambiguity surrounding the statute before us do not justify abstention. In drawing the
boundary of federalism as we do, we acknowledge the difficulty of our craft in this area of the law.
17
The order of dismissal is reversed. Since the issue of the constitutionality of section 15 has not
been decided below or briefed or argued here, we do not reach it. See, e. g., McRedmond v.
Wilson, supra, 533 F.2d at 764; Pierce v. La Vallee, 293 F.2d 233, 236 (2d Cir. 1961). The case is
remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
KATIPUNAN vs TENORIO

NILO OROPESA,
vs
CIRILO OROPESA,

April 25, 2012

DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure of the
Decision[1] dated February 29, 2008, as well as the Resolution[2] dated September 16, 2008, both
rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88449, entitled NILO OROPESA vs. CIRILO
OROPESA. The Court of Appeals issuances affirmed the Order[3] dated September 27, 2006 and
the Order[4] dated November 14, 2006 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque City,
Branch 260 in SP. Proc. Case No. 04-0016, which dismissed petitioner Nilo Oropesas petition for
guardianship over the properties of his father, respondent Cirilo Oropesa (a widower), and denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration thereof, respectively.

The facts of this case, as summed in the assailed Decision, follow:

On January 23, 2004, the (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, a petition
for him and a certain Ms. Louie Ginez to be appointed as guardians over the property of his father,
the (respondent) Cirilo Oropesa. The case was docketed as SP Proc. No. 04-0016 and raffled off
to Branch 260.

In the said petition, it is alleged among others that the (respondent) has been afflicted with several
maladies and has been sickly for over ten (10) years already having suffered a stroke on April 1,
2003 and June 1, 2003, that his judgment and memory [were] impaired and such has been evident
after his hospitalization; that even before his stroke, the (respondent) was observed to have had
lapses in memory and judgment, showing signs of failure to manage his property properly; that due
to his age and medical condition, he cannot, without outside aid, manage his property wisely, and
has become an easy prey for deceit and exploitation by people around him, particularly Ms. Ma.
Luisa Agamata, his girlfriend.

In an Order dated January 29, 2004, the presiding judge of the court a quo set the case for
hearing, and directed the court social worker to conduct a social case study and submit a report
thereon.

Pursuant to the abovementioned order, the Court Social Worker conducted her social case study,
interviewing the (petitioner) and his witnesses. The Court Social Worker subsequently submitted
her report but without any finding on the (respondent) who refused to see and talk to the social
worker.

On July 6, 2004, the (respondent) filed his Opposition to the petition for guardianship. On August 3,
2004, the (respondent) filed his Supplemental Opposition.

Thereafter, the (petitioner) presented his evidence which consists of his testimony, and that of his
sister Gianina Oropesa Bennett, and the (respondents) former nurse, Ms. Alma Altaya.

After presenting evidence, the (petitioner) filed a manifestation dated May 29, 2006 resting his
case. The (petitioner) failed to file his written formal offer of evidence.

Thus, the (respondent) filed his Omnibus Motion (1) to Declare the petitioner to have waived the
presentation of his Offer of Exhibits and the presentation of his Evidence Closed since they were
not formally offered; (2) To Expunge the Documents of the Petitioner from the Record; and (3) To
Grant leave to the Oppositor to File Demurrer to Evidence.

In an Order dated July 14, 2006, the court a quo granted the (respondents) Omnibus Motion.
Thereafter, the (respondent) then filed his Demurrer to Evidence dated July 23, 2006.[5] (Citations
omitted.)

The trial court granted respondents demurrer to evidence in an Order dated September 27, 2006.
The dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, considering that the petitioner has failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish
that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa is incompetent to run his personal affairs and to administer his
properties, Oppositors Demurrer to Evidence is GRANTED, and the case is DISMISSED.[6]

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the trial court in an Order dated
November 14, 2006, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, considering that the Court record shows that petitioner-movant has failed to
provide sufficient documentary and testimonial evidence to establish that Gen. Cirilo Oropesa is
incompetent to run his personal affairs and to administer his properties, the Court hereby affirms its
earlier Order dated 27 September 2006.

Accordingly, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.[7]

Unperturbed, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but his appeal was dismissed
through the now assailed Decision dated February 29, 2008, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed orders of the
court a quo dated September 27, 2006 and November 14, 2006 are AFFIRMED.[8]

A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but this was denied by the Court of Appeals in
the similarly assailed Resolution dated September 16, 2008. Hence, the instant petition was filed.

Petitioner submits the following question for consideration by this Court:

WHETHER RESPONDENT IS CONSIDERED AN INCOMPETENT PERSON AS DEFINED

UNDER SECTION 2, RULE 92 OF THE RULES OF COURT WHO SHOULD BE PLACED UNDER
GUARDIANSHIP[9]

After considering the evidence and pleadings on record, we find the petition to be without merit.

Petitioner comes before the Court arguing that the assailed rulings of the Court of Appeals should
be set aside as it allegedly committed grave and reversible error when it affirmed the erroneous
decision of the trial court which purportedly disregarded the overwhelming evidence presented by
him showing respondents incompetence.
In Francisco v. Court of Appeals,[10] we laid out the nature and purpose of guardianship in the
following wise:

A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which one person, called a
guardian acts for another called the ward whom the law regards as incapable of managing his own
affairs. A guardianship is designed to further the wards well-being, not that of the guardian. It is
intended to preserve the wards property, as well as to render any assistance that the ward may
personally require. It has been stated that while custody involves immediate care and control,
guardianship indicates not only those responsibilities, but those of one in loco parentis as well.[11]

In a guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a qualified guardian if the prospective ward is
proven to be a minor or an incompetent.

A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us that persons who, though of sound
mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes, are incapable of taking
care of themselves and their property without outside aid are considered as incompetents who may
properly be placed under guardianship. The full text of the said provision reads:

Sec. 2. Meaning of the word incompetent. Under this rule, the word incompetent includes persons
suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb
who are unable to read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid
intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and
other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their
property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation.

We have held in the past that a finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored on clear,
positive and definite evidence.[12] We consider that evidentiary standard unchanged and, thus,
must be applied in the case at bar.

In support of his contention that respondent is incompetent and, therefore, should be placed in
guardianship, petitioner raises in his Memorandum[13] the following factual matters:

a.
Respondent has been afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for over ten (10)
years already;

b.
During the time that respondent was hospitalized at the St. Lukes Medical Center after his
stroke, he purportedly requested one of his former colleagues who was visiting him to file a loan
application with the Armed Forces of the Philippines Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI)
for payment of his hospital bills, when, as far as his children knew, he had substantial amounts of
money in various banks sufficient to cover his medical expenses;

c.
Respondents residence allegedly has been left dilapidated due to lack of care and
management;

d.
The realty taxes for respondents various properties remain unpaid and therefore petitioner
and his sister were supposedly compelled to pay the necessary taxes;

e.
Respondent allegedly instructed petitioner to sell his Nissan Exalta car for the reason that
the former would be purchasing another vehicle, but when the car had been sold, respondent did
not procure another vehicle and refused to account for the money earned from the sale of the old
car;

f.
Respondent withdrew at least $75,000.00 from a joint account under his name and his
daughters without the latters knowledge or consent;

g.
There was purportedly one occasion where respondent took a kitchen knife to stab himself
upon the orders of his girlfriend during one of their fights;

h.
Respondent continuously allows his girlfriend to ransack his house of groceries and furniture,
despite protests from his children.[14]

Respondent denied the allegations made by petitioner and cited petitioners lack of material
evidence to support his claims. According to respondent, petitioner did not present any relevant
documentary or testimonial evidence that would attest to the veracity of his assertion that
respondent is incompetent largely due to his alleged deteriorating medical and mental condition. In
fact, respondent points out that the only medical document presented by petitioner proves that he
is indeed competent to run his personal affairs and administer his properties. Portions of the said
document, entitled Report of Neuropsychological Screening,[15] were quoted by respondent in his
Memorandum[16] to illustrate that said report in fact favored respondents claim of competence, to
wit:

General Oropesa spoke fluently in English and Filipino, he enjoyed and participated meaningfully
in conversations and could be quite elaborate in his responses on many of the test items. He
spoke in a clear voice and his articulation was generally comprehensible. x x x.

xxxx
General Oropesa performed in the average range on most of the domains that were tested. He
was able to correctly perform mental calculations and keep track of number sequences on a task of
attention. He did BEST in visuo-constructional tasks where he had to copy geometrical designs
using tiles. Likewise, he was able to render and read the correct time on the Clock Drawing Test. x
x x.

xxxx

x x x Reasoning abilities were generally intact as he was able to suggest effective solutions to
problem situations. x x x.[17]

With the failure of petitioner to formally offer his documentary evidence, his proof of his fathers
incompetence consisted purely of testimonies given by himself and his sister (who were claiming
interest in their fathers real and personal properties) and their fathers former caregiver (who
admitted to be acting under their direction). These testimonies, which did not include any expert
medical testimony, were insufficient to convince the trial court of petitioners cause of action and
instead lead it to grant the demurrer to evidence that was filed by respondent.

Even if we were to overlook petitioners procedural lapse in failing to make a formal offer of
evidence, his documentary proof were comprised mainly of certificates of title over real properties
registered in his, his fathers and his sisters names as co-owners, tax declarations, and receipts
showing payment of real estate taxes on their co-owned properties, which do not in any way relate
to his fathers alleged incapacity to make decisions for himself. The only medical document on
record is the aforementioned Report of Neuropsychological Screening which was attached to the
petition for guardianship but was never identified by any witness nor offered as evidence. In any
event, the said report, as mentioned earlier, was ambivalent at best, for although the report had
negative findings regarding memory lapses on the part of respondent, it also contained findings
that supported the view that respondent on the average was indeed competent.

In an analogous guardianship case wherein the soundness of mind of the proposed ward was at
issue, we had the occasion to rule that where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is
not necessary [and that] the observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing the
persons state of mental sanity will suffice.[18]
Thus, it is significant that in its Order dated November 14, 2006 which denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration on the trial courts unfavorable September 27, 2006 ruling, the trial court highlighted
the fatal role that petitioners own documentary evidence played in disproving its case and,
likewise, the trial court made known its own observation of respondents physical and mental state,
to wit:
The Court noted the absence of any testimony of a medical expert which states that Gen. Cirilo O.
Oropesa does not have the mental, emotional, and physical capacity to manage his own affairs.
On the contrary, Oppositors evidence includes a Neuropsychological Screening Report which
states that Gen. Oropesa, (1) performs on the average range in most of the domains that were
tested; (2) is capable of mental calculations; and (3) can provide solutions to problem situations.
The Report concludes that Gen. Oropesa possesses intact cognitive functioning, except for mildly
impaired abilities in memory, reasoning and orientation. It is the observation of the Court that
oppositor is still sharp, alert and able.[19] (Citation omitted; emphasis supplied.)
It is axiomatic that, as a general rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on
certiorari because the Court is not a trier of facts.[20] We only take cognizance of questions of fact
in certain exceptional circumstances;[21] however, we find them to be absent in the instant case. It
is also long settled that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, will
not be disturbed by this Court. As a rule, such findings by the lower courts are entitled to great
weight and respect, and are deemed final and conclusive on this Court when supported by the
evidence on record.[22] We therefore adopt the factual findings of the lower court and the Court of

Appeals and rule that the grant of respondents demurrer to evidence was proper under the
circumstances obtaining in the case at bar.

Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence,
the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff
has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If
the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have
waived the right to present evidence.
A demurrer to evidence is defined as an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect
that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to
make out a case or sustain the issue.[23] We have also held that a demurrer to evidence
authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the defendant having to submit evidence
on his part, as he would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiffs evidence shows that he is not entitled to
the relief sought.[24]
There was no error on the part of the trial court when it dismissed the petition for guardianship
without first requiring respondent to present his evidence precisely because the effect of granting a
demurrer to evidence other than dismissing a cause of action is, evidently, to preclude a defendant
from presenting his evidence since, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to
relief.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated
February 29, 2008 as well as the Resolution dated September 16, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 88449 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 166803

October 11, 2012

CREWLINK, INC. and/or GULF MARINE SERVICES, Petitioners,

vs.
EDITHA TERINGTERING, for her behalf and in behalf of minor EIMAEREACH ROSE DE
GARCIA TERINGTERING, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the
reversal of the Decision1 dated July H, 2004 and Resolution2 dated January 17, 2005 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 79966, setting aside the Resolutions dated February 20, 20033
and July 31, 20034 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which affirmed in toto the
Decision5 dated February 12, 2002 of the Labor Arbiter.
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Respondent Editha Teringtering (Teringtering), spouse of deceased Jacinto Teringtering
(Jacinto), and in behalf of her minor child, filed a complaint against petitioner Crewlink, Inc.
(Crewlink), and its foreign principal Gulf Marine Services for the payment of death benefits, benefit
for minor child, burial assistance, damages and attorney's fees.

Respondent alleged that her husband Jacinto entered into an overseas employment contract
with Crewlink, Inc. for and in behalf of its foreign principal Gulf Marine Services, the details of
which are as follows:
Duration of Contract
:
12 months
Position
:
Oiler
Basic Monthly Salary
:
US $385.00
Hours of Work
:
48 hrs/wk
Overtime :
US $115.50
Vacation Leave with pay :
1 mo. leave after
12 months
Point of Hire
:
Manila, Philippines
xxxx
Teringtering claimed that before her husband was employed, he was subjected to a preemployment medical examination wherein he was pronounced as "fit to work." Thus, her husband
joined his vessel of assignment and performed his duties as Oiler.
On or about April 18, 2001, a death certificate was issued by the Ministry of Health of the United
Arab Emirates wherein it was stated that Jacinto died on April 9, 2001 due to asphyxia of drowning.
Later on, an embalming and sealing certificate was issued after which the remains of Jacinto was
brought back to the Philippines.
After learning of the death of Jacinto, respondent claimed from petitioners the payment of death
compensation in the amount of US$50,000.00 and burial expenses in the amount of US$1,000.00,
as well as additional death compensation in the amount of US$7,000.00, for the minor Eimaereach
Rose de Gracia Teringtering but was refused without any valid cause. Hence, a complaint was filed
against the petitioners.
Respondent claimed that in order for her husband's death to be compensable it is enough that
he died during the term of his contract and while still on board. Respondent asserted that Jacinto
was suffering from a psychotic disorder, or Mood Disorder Bipolar Type, which resulted to his
jumping into the sea and his eventual death. Respondent further asserted that her husbands death
was not deliberate and not of his own will, but was a result of a mental disorder, thus,
compensable.
For its part, petitioner Crewlink alleged that sometime on April 9, 2001, around 8:20 p.m. while at
Nasr Oilfield, the late Jacinto Teringtering suddenly jumped into the sea, but the second engineer
was able to recover him. Because of said incident, one personnel was directed to watch Jacinto.
However, around 10:30 p.m., while the boat dropped anchor south of Nasr Oilfield and went on
standby, Jacinto jumped off the boat again. Around 11:00 p.m., the A/B watchman reported that
Jacinto was recovered but despite efforts to revive him, he was already dead from drowning.
Petitioner asserted that Teringtering was not entitled to the benefits being claimed, because
Jacinto committed suicide. Despite the non-entitlement, however, Teringtering was even given
burial assistance in the amount of P35,800.00 and P13,273.00 on May 21, 2001. She likewise
received the amount of US$792.51 representing donations from the GMS staff and crew. Petitioner
likewise argued that Teringtering is not entitled to moral and exemplary damages, because
petitioner had nothing to do with her late husband's untimely demise as the same was due to his
own doing.
As part of the record, respondent submitted Ship Captain Oscar C. Morado's report on the
incident, which we quote:

At arround 2000 hrs. M/V Raja 3404 still underway to Nasr Complex w/ 1 passenger. 2018 hrs.
A/side Nasr Complex boatlanding to drop 1 passenger At 2020 hrs. Mr. Jacinto Tering Tering
suddenly jump to the sea, while the boat cast off from Nasr Complex boatlanding. And the second
Engr. Mr. Sudarto jump and recover Mr. Jacinto Tering Tering the oiler.
2040 hrs. Dropped anchor south of Nasr oilfield and standby. And that time informed to GMS
personnel about the accident, And we informed to A/B on duty to watch Mr. Jacinto Tering Tering.
2230 hrs. The A/B watch man informed that Mr. Jacinto Tering Tering jump again to the sea. And
that time the wind NW 10-14 kts. and strong current. And the second Engr. jump to the sea with life
ring to recover Mr. Jacinto Tering Tering. 2300 hrs. We recovered Mr. Jacinto Tering Tering onboard
the vessel and apply Respiration Kiss of life Mouth to Mouth, And proceed to Nasr Complex to take
doctor.
2320 hrs. A/side Nasr Complex boatlanding and the doctor on-board to check the patient. 2330
hrs. As per Nasr Complex Doctor the patient was already dead. Then informed to GMS personnel
about the accident.
I Captain Oscar C. Morado certify this report true and correct with the best of my knowledge and
reserve the right, modify, ratify and/or enlarge this statement at any time and place, According to
the law.6
In a Decision dated February 12, 2002, the Labor Arbiter, after hearing, dismissed the case for
lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter held that, while it is true that Jacinto Teringtering died during the
effectivity of his contract of employment and that he died of asphyxiation, nevertheless, his death
was the result of his deliberate or intentional jumping into the sea. Thus, his death was directly
attributable to him.
Teringtering then appealed before the NLRC which affirmed in toto the ruling of the Labor
Arbiter.
Unsatisfied, Teringtering filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals
and sought the nullification of the NLRC Resolution, dated February 20, 2003, which affirmed the
Labor Arbiters Decision dated February 12, 2002.
On July 8, 2004, the CA reversed and set aside the assailed Resolution of the NLRC, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution dated February 20, 2003 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents Crewlink, Inc. and Gulf Marine Services are hereby
DECLARED jointly and severally liable and, accordingly, are directed to pay deceased Jacinto
Teringtering's beneficiaries, namely respondent Editha Teringtering and her daughter Eimaereach
Rose de Gracia, the Philippine Currency equivalent to US$50,000.00, and an additional amount of
US$7,000, both at the exchange rate prevailing at the time of payment.
SO ORDERED.7
Thus, before this Court, Crewlink, Inc. and/or Gulf Marine Services, as petitioner, raised the
following issues:
I
WHETHER A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION OF CERTIORARI INCLUDES CORRECTION OF THE
NLRC'S EVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE AND FACTUAL FINDINGS BASED THEREON OR
CORRECTION OF ERRORS OF FACTS IN THE JUDGMENT OF THE NLRC;
II

WHETHER THE NEGLIGENT ACTS OF SUPPOSEDLY FAILING TO TAKE SUCH MEASURES

FOR THE COMFORT AND SAFETY OF THE DECEASED SEAFARER, AMONG OTHERS,
WHICH WERE ESPECIALLY EMPHASIZED IN THE ASSAILED CA DECISION AND WHICH
ACTUALLY REFERRED TO ACTS COMMITTED BY THE SHIPMATES OF THE DECEASED, BUT
POSITIVELY ATTRIBUTED TO PETITIONERS AND FOR WHICH THE LATTER ARE NOW
BEING HELD LIABLE ARE IN THE NATURE OF AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT SOURCE OF
OBLIGATION THAT IS PREDICATED ON QUASI-DELICT OR TORT AS PROVIDED UNDER
OUR CIVIL LAWS AND, THUS, HAS NO REFERENCE TO OUR LABOR CODE;
III
WHETHER THE DEATH OF SEAFARER IN THIS CASE WAS A RESULT OF A DELIBERATE/
WILLFUL ACT ON HIS OWN LIFE, AN ACT DIRECTLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE DECEASED,
AND NO OTHER, AS FOUND AND SO RULED BY THE LABOR ARBITER AND NLRC, AS TO
RENDER HIS DEATH NOT COMPENSABLE.
Petitioner claimed that Jacinto's death is not compensable, considering that the latter's death
resulted from his willful act. It argued that the rule that the employer becomes liable once it is
established that the seaman died during the effectivity of his employment contract is not absolute.
The employer may be exempt from liability if he can successfully prove that the seaman's death
was caused by an injury directly attributable to his deliberate or willful act, as in this case.
We find merit in the petition.
In a petition for review on certiorari, our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law in the
absence of any showing that the factual findings complained of are devoid of support in the records
or are glaringly erroneous. We are not a trier of facts, and this applies with greater force in labor
cases. Findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired
expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only
great respect but even finality. They are binding upon this Court unless there is a showing of grave
abuse of discretion or where it is clearly shown that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in utter
disregard of the evidence on record. This case is no different.
As found by the Labor Arbiter, Jacinto's jumping into the sea was not an accident but was
deliberately done. Indeed, Jacinto jumped off twice into the sea and it was on his second attempt
that caused his death. The accident report of Captain Oscar Morado narrated in detail the
circumstances that led to Jacinto's death. The circumstances of Jacinto's actions before and at the
time of his death were likewise entered in the Chief Officer's Log Book and were attested to by
Captain Morado before the Philippine Embassy. Even the A/B personnel, Ronald Arroga, who was
tasked to watch over Jacinto after his first attempt of committing suicide, testified that despite his
efforts to prevent Jacinto from jumping again overboard, Jacinto was determined and even shoved
him and jumped anew which eventually caused his death.
Considering the foregoing, we do not find any reason to discredit the evidence presented as well
as the findings of the Labor Arbiter. Settled is the rule that factual findings of labor officials, who are
deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their jurisdiction, are generally accorded not
only respect but even finality by the courts when supported by substantial evidence, i.e., the
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion. More so, when there is no showing that said findings were arrived at arbitrarily or in
disregard of the evidence on record.
Likewise, the provisions of the Code of Commerce are certainly inapplicable in this case. For
precisely, the issue for resolution here is the obligation of the employer to its employee should the
latter die during the term of his employment. The relationship between the petitioner and Jacinto is
one based on contract of employment and not one of contract of carriage.

Under No. 6, Section C, Part II of the POEA "Standard Employment Contract Governing the
Employment of All Filipino Seamen On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels" (POEA-SEC), it is provided
that:
xxxx
6. No compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death
resulting from a willful act on his own life by the seaman, provided, however, that the employer can
prove that such injury, incapacity, disability or death is directly attributable to him. (Emphasis ours)
Indeed, in order to avail of death benefits, the death of the employee should occur during the
effectivity of the employment contract. The death of a seaman during the term of employment
makes the employer liable to his heirs for death compensation benefits. This rule, however, is not
absolute. The employer may be exempt from liability if it can successfully prove that the seaman's
death was caused by an injury directly attributable to his deliberate or willful act.
In the instant case, petitioner was able to substantially prove that Jacinto's death was
attributable to his deliberate act of killing himself by jumping into the sea. Meanwhile, respondent,
other than her bare allegation that her husband was suffering from a mental disorder, no evidence,
witness, or any medical report was given to support her claim of Jacinto's insanity. The record does
not even show when the alleged insanity of Jacinto did start. Homesickness and/or family problems
may result to depression, but the same does not necessarily equate to mental disorder. The issue
of insanity is a question of fact; for insanity is a condition of the mind not susceptible of the usual
means of proof. As no man would know what goes on in the mind of another, the state or condition
of a persons mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior. Establishing the insanity of
an accused requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately
acquainted with the person claimed to be insane, or who has rational basis to conclude that a
person was insane based on the witness own perception of the person, or who is qualified as an
expert, such as a psychiatrist.8 No such evidence was presented to support respondent's claim.
The Court commiserates with the respondent, but absent substantial evidence from which
reasonable basis for the grant of benefits prayed for can be drawn, the Court is left with no choice
but to deny her petition, lest an injustice be caused to the employer. Otherwise slated, while it is
true that labor contracts are impressed with public interest and the provisions of the POEA-SEC
must be construed logically and liberally in favor of Filipino seamen in the pursuit of their
employment on board ocean-going vessels, still the rule is that justice is in every case for the
deserving, to be dispensed with in the light of established facts, the applicable law, and existing
jurisprudence.9
WHEREFORE, the petition Is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 79966, dated July 8, 2004, and its January 17, 2005 Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The February 20, 2003 and July 31, 2003
Resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR OFW Case No. (M)
01-06-1144-00, affirming the February 12, 2002 Decision of the Labor Arbiter, are hereby
REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
lawphil.net
G.R. No. 126010
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 126010 December 8, 1999
LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIO C. HERNANDEZ, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals, dated January
30, 1996, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, dated April
10, 1993, which dismissed the petition for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner.
Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private respondent Mario C. Hernandez were married
at the Silang Catholic Parish Church in Silang, Cavite on January 1, 1981 (Exh. A). 2 Three
children were born to them, namely, Maie, who was born on May 3, 1982 (Exh. B), 3 Lyra, born on
May 22, 1985
(Exh. C), 4 and Marian, born on June 15, 1989 (Exh. D). 5
On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, a
petition seeking the annulment of her marriage to private respondent on the ground of
psychological incapacity of the latter. She alleged that from the time of their marriage up to the time
of the filing of the suit, private respondent failed to perform his obligation to support the family and
contribute to the management of the household, devoting most of his time engaging in drinking
sprees with his friends. She further claimed that private respondent, after they were married,
cohabited with another woman with whom he had an illegitimate child, while having affairs with
different women, and that, because of his promiscuity, private respondent endangered her health
by infecting her with a sexually transmissible disease (STD). She averred that private respondent
was irresponsible, immature and unprepared for the duties of a married life. Petitioner prayed that
for having abandoned the family, private respondent be ordered to give support to their three
children in the total amount of P9,000.00 every month; that she be awarded the custody of their
children; and that she be adjudged as the sole owner of a parcel of land located at Don Gregorio
Subdivision I in Bo. Bucal, Dasmarias, Cavite, purchased during the marriage, as well as the jeep
which private respondent took with him when he left the conjugal home on June 12, 1992. 6
On October 8, 1992, because of private respondent's failure to file his answer, the trial court
issued an order directing the assistant provincial prosecutor to conduct an investigation to
determine if there was collusion between the
parties. 7 Only petitioner appeared at the investigation on November 5, 1992. Nevertheless, the
prosecutor found no evidence of collusion and recommended that the case be set for trial. 8
Based on the evidence presented by the petitioner, the facts are as follows: 9
Petitioner and private respondent met in 1977 at the Philippine Christian University in
Dasmarias, Cavite. Petitioner, who is five years older than private respondent, was then in her
first year of teaching zoology and botany. Private respondent, a college freshman, was her student
for two consecutive semesters. They became sweethearts in February 1979 when she was no
longer private respondent's teacher. On January 1, 1981, they were married.
Private respondent continued his studies for two more years. His parents paid for his tuition
fees, while petitioner provided his allowances and other financial needs. The family income came
from petitioner's salary as a faculty member of the Philippine Christian University. Petitioner
augmented her earnings by selling "Tupperware" products, as well as engaging in the buy-and-sell
of coffee, rice and polvoron.

From 1983 up to 1986, as private respondent could not find a stable job, it was agreed that he
would help petitioner in her businesses by delivering orders to customers. However, because her
husband was a spendthrift and had other women, petitioner's business suffered. Private
respondent often had smoking and drinking sprees with his friends and betted on fighting cocks. In
1982, after the birth of their first child, petitioner discovered two love letters written by a certain
Realita Villena to private respondent. She knew Villena as a married student whose husband was
working in Saudi Arabia. When petitioner confronted private respondent, he admitted having an
extra-marital affair with Villena. Petitioner then pleaded with Villena to end her relationship with
private respondent. For his part, private respondent said he would end the affairs, but he did not
keep his promise. Instead, he left the conjugal home and abandoned petitioner and their child.
When private respondent came back, however, petitioner accepted him, despite private
respondent's infidelity in the hope of saving their marriage.
Upon the recommendation of a family friend, private respondent was able to get a job at
Reynolds Philippines, Inc. in San Agustin, Dasmarias, Cavite in 1986. However, private
respondent was employed only until March 31, 1991, because he availed himself of the early
retirement plan offered by the company. He received P53,000.00 in retirement pay, but instead of
spending the amount for the needs of the family, private respondent spent the money on himself
and consumed the entire amount within four months of his retirement.
While private respondent worked at Reynolds Philippines, Inc., his smoking, drinking, gambling
and womanizing became worse. Petitioner discovered that private respondent carried on
relationships with different women. He had relations with a certain Edna who worked at Yazaki;
Angie, who was an operator of a billiard hall; Tess, a "Japayuki"; Myrna Macatangay, a secretary at
the Road Master Driver's School in Bayan, Dasmarias, Cavite, with whom he cohabited for quite
a while; and, Ruth Oliva, by whom he had a daughter named Margie P. Oliva, born on September
15, 1989 (Exh. E). 10 When petitioner confronted private respondent about his relationship with
Tess, he beat her up, as a result of which she was confined at the De la Salle University Medical
Center in Dasmarias, Cavite on July 4-5, 1990 because of cerebral concussion (Exh. F). 11
According to petitioner, private respondent engaged in extreme promiscuous conduct during the
latter part of 1986. As a result, private respondent contracted gonorrhea and infected petitioner.
They both received treatment at the Zapote Medical Specialists Center in Zapote, Bacoor, Cavite
from October 22, 1986 until March 13, 1987 (Exhs. G & H). 12
Petitioner averred that on one occasion of a heated argument, private respondent hit their eldest
child who was then barely a year old. Private respondent is not close to any of their children as he
was never affectionate and hardly spent time with them.
On July 17, 1979, petitioner entered into a contract to sell (Exh. J) 13 with F & C Realty
Corporation whereby she agreed to buy from the latter a parcel of land at the Don Gregorio
Heights Subdivision I in Bo. Bucal, Dasmarias, Cavite and placed a partial payment of
P31,330.00. On May 26, 1987, after full payment of the amount of P51,067.10, inclusive of
interests from monthly installments, a deed of absolute sale(Exh. K) 14 was executed in her favor
and TCT No. T-221529 (Exh. M) 15 was duly issued.
According to petitioner, on August 1, 1992, she sent a handwritten
letter 16 to private respondent expressing her frustration over the fact that her efforts to save
their marriage proved futile. In her letter, petitioner also stated that she was allowing him to sell
their owner-type jeepney 17 and to divide the proceeds of the sale between the two of them.
Petitioner also told private respondent of her intention to fill a petition for the annulment of their
marriage.
It does not appear that private respondent ever replied to petitioner's letter. By this time, he had
already abandoned petitioner and their children. In October 1992, petitioner learned that private

respondent left for the Middle East. Since then, private respondent's whereabouts had been
unknown.
Ester Alfaro, petitioner's childhood friend and co-teacher at the Philippine Christian University,
testified during the hearing on the petition for annulment. She said that sometime in June 1979,
petitioner introduced private respondent to her (Alfaro) as the former's sweetheart. Alfaro said she
was not impressed with private respondent who was her student in accounting. She observed
private respondent to be fun-loving, spending most of his time with campus friends. In November
1980, when petitioner asked Alfaro to be one of the secondary sponsors at her forthcoming
wedding, Alfaro wanted to dissuade petitioner from going through with the wedding because she
thought private respondent was not ready for married life as he was then unemployed. True
enough, although the couple appeared happy during the early part of their marriage, it was not long
thereafter that private respondent started drinking with his friends and going home late at night.
Alfaro corroborated petitioner's claim that private respondent was a habitual drunkard who carried
on relationships with different women and continued hanging out with his friends. She also
confirmed that petitioner was once hospitalized because she was beaten up by private respondent.
After the first year of petitioner's marriage, Alfaro tried to talk to private respondent, but the latter
accused her of meddling with their marital life. Alfaro said that private respondent was not close to
his children and that he had abandoned petitioner. 18
On April 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision 19 dismissing the petition for annulment of
marriage filed by petitioner. The pertinent portion of the decision reads: 20
The Court can underscore the fact that the circumstances mentioned by the petitioner in support
of her claim that respondent was "psychologically incapacitated" to marry her are among the
grounds cited by the law as valid reasons for the grant of legal separation (Article 55 of the Family
Code) not as grounds for a declaration of nullity of marriages or annulment thereof. Thus, Article
55 of the same code reads as follows:
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a
common child, or a child of the petitioner;
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
xxx xxx xxx
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.
xxx xxx xxx
If indeed Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, which mentions psychological
incapacity as a ground for the declaration of the nullity of a marriage, has intended to include the
above-stated circumstances as constitutive of such incapacity, then the same would not have been
enumerated as grounds for legal separation.
In the same manner, this Court is not disposed to grant relief in favor of the petitioner under
Article 46, paragraph (3) of the Family Code of the Philippines, as there is no dispute that the
"gonorrhea" transmitted to the petitioner by respondent occurred sometime in 1986, or five (5)

years after petitioner's marriage with respondent was celebrated in 1981. The provisions of Article
46, paragraph (3) of the same law should be taken in conjunction with Article 45, paragraph (3) of
the same code, and a careful reading of the two (2) provisions of the law would require the
existence of this ground (fraud) at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the
annulment of petitioner's marriage with the respondent on this ground, as alleged and proved in
the instant case, cannot be legally accepted by the Court.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on January 30, 1996, rendered its decision
affirming the decision of the trial court. Citing the ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals, 21 the Court
of Appeals held: 22
It is clear in the above law and jurisprudence that the psychological incapacity of a spouse, as a
ground for declaration of nullify of marriage, must exist at the time of the celebration of marriage.
More so, chronic sexual infidelity, abandonment, gambling and use of prohibited drugs are not
grounds per se, of psychological incapacity of a spouse.
We agree with the Solicitor General that petitioner-appellant failed to prove that her respondenthusband was psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Certainly,
petitioner-appellant's declaration that at the time of their marriage her respondent-husband's
character was on the "borderline between a responsible person and the happy-go-lucky," could not
constitute the psychological incapacity in contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code. In fact,
petitioner-appellant herself ascribed said attitude to her respondent-husband's youth and very
good looks, who was admittedly several years younger than petitioner-appellant who, herself,
happened to be the college professor of her respondent-husband. Petitioner-appellant even
described her respondent-husband not as a problem student but a normal one (p. 24, tsn, Dec. 8,
1992).
The acts and attitudes complained of by petitioner-appellant happened after the marriage and
there is no proof that the same have already existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage
to constitute the psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the respondent Court of Appeals erred
I. IN FINDING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT
TO COMPLY WITH HIS ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS DID NOT EXIST FROM THE TIME
OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE MARRIAGE.
II. IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT PSYCHOLOGICALLY
INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH HIS ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS.
III. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DENYING THE AWARD OF
PERMANENT CUSTODY OF THE CHILDREN TO PETITIONER.
IV. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DENYING THE PRAYER FOR
ISSUANCE OF AN ORDER REQUIRING PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO GIVE SUPPORT TO THE
THREE CHILDREN IN THE AMOUNT OF P3,000,00 PER CHILD.
V. IN NOT DECLARING THE REAL PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY PETITIONER AS HER
EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY.
The issue in this case is whether or not the marriage of petitioner and private respondent should
be annulled on the ground of private respondent's psychological incapacity.
Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioner failed to show that
private respondent's psychological incapacity existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

She argues that the fact that the acts of incapacity of private respondent became manifest only
after the celebration of their marriage should not be a bar to the annulment of their marriage.
Art. 36 of the Family Code states:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. 23
In Santos v. Court of Appeals, 24 we held:
"Psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality,
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The
law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual
relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which
considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be
"legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party
being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or
lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If
drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the
marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.
These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various
circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that
may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in
every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is
peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons
with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.
In the instant case, other than her self-serving declarations, petitioner failed to establish the fact
that at the time they were married, private respondent was suffering from a psychological defect
which in fact deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its
concomitant responsibilities. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, no evidence was presented to
show that private respondent was not cognizant of the basic marital obligations. It was not
sufficiently proved that private respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some
incapacity of a psychological nature, and not merely physical. Petitioner says that at the outset of
their marriage, private respondent showed lack of drive to work for his family. Private respondent's
parents and petitioner supported him through college. After his schooling, although he eventually
found a job, he availed himself of the early retirement plan offered by his employer and spent the
entire amount he received on himself. For a greater part of their marital life, private respondent was
out of job and did not have the initiative to look for another. He indulged in vices and engaged in
philandering, and later abandoned his family. Petitioner concludes that private respondent's
condition is incurable, causing the disintegration of their union and defeating the very objectives of
marriage.

However, private respondent's alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for finding that he is suffering from
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that these
acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make private respondent completely
unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, and not merely due to private
respondent's youth and self-conscious feeling of being handsome, as the appellate court held. As
pointed out in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals: 25
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (citing Salaita v. Magtolis, supra) nevertheless
such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of
private respondent's psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception
of the marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon rests petitioner.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as
the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the
family. 26 Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. 27
We, therefore, find no reason to reverse the ruling of respondent Court of Appeals whose
conclusions, affirming the trial court's finding with regard to the non-existence of private
respondent's psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage, are entitled to great weight and
even finality. 28 Only where it is shown that such findings are whimsical, capricious, and arbitrary
can these be overturned.
The conclusion we have reached makes it unnecessary for us to pass upon petitioner's
contentions on the issue of permanent custody of children, the amount for their respective support,
and the declaration of exclusive ownership of petitioner over the real property. These matters may
more appropriately be litigated in a separate proceeding for legal separation, dissolution of
property regime, and/or custody of children which petitioner may bring.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeal is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Buccat vs Buccat

G.R. No. L-15853

July 27, 1960

FERNANDO AQUINO, petitioner,
vs.
CONCHITA DELIZO, respondent.

GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to review a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal which dismissed petitioner's complaint for annulment of his
marriage with respondent Conchita Delizo.
The dismissed complaint, which was filed on September 6, 1955, was based on the ground of
fraud, it being alleged, among other things, that defendant Conchita Delizo, herein respondent, at
the date of her marriage to plaintiff, herein petitioner Fernando Aquino, on December 27, 1954,
concealed from the latter that fact that she was pregnant by another man, and sometime in April,
1955, or about four months after their marriage, gave birth to a child. In her answer, defendant
claimed that the child was conceived out of lawful wedlock between her and the plaintiff.
At the trial, the attorney's for both parties appeared and the court a quo ordered Assistant
Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco to represent the State in the proceedings to prevent collusion. Only the
plaintiff however, testified and the only documentary evidence presented was the marriage contract
between the parties. Defendant neither appeared nor presented any evidence despite the
reservation made by her counsel that he would present evidence on a later date.
On June 16, 1956, the trial court noting that no birth certificate was presented to show that
the child was born within 180 days after the marriage between the parties, and holding that
concealment of pregnancy as alleged by the plaintiff does not constitute such fraud sa would annul
a marriage dismissed the complaint. Through a verified "petition to reopen for reception of
additional evidence", plaintiff tried to present the certificates of birth and delivery of the child born of
the defendant on April 26, 1955, which documents, according to him, he had failed to secure earlier
and produce before the trial court thru excusable negligence. The petition, however, was denied.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, that court held that there has been excusable neglect in
plaintiff's inability to present the proof of the child's birth, through her birth certificate, and for that
reason the court a quo erred in denying the motion for reception of additional evidence. On the
theory, however, that it was not impossible for plaintiff and defendant to have had sexual
intercourse during their engagement so that the child could be their own, and finding unbelievable
plaintiff's claim that he did not notice or even suspect that defendant was pregnant when he
married her, the appellate court, nevertheless, affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.
On March 17, 1959, plaintiff filed a motion praying that the decision be reconsidered, or, if such
reconsideration be denied, that the case be remanded to the lower court for new trial. In support of
the motion, plaintiff attached as annexes thereof the following documents:
1. Affidavit of Cesar Aquino (Annex A) (defendant's brother-in-law and plaintiff's brother, with
whom defendant was living at the time plaintiff met, courted and married her, and with whom
defendant has begotten two more children, aside from her first born, in common-law relationship)
admitting that he is the father of defendant's first born, Catherine Bess Aquino, and that he and
defendant hid her pregnancy from plaintiff at the time of plaintiff's marriage to defendant;
2. Affidavit of defendant, Conchita Delizo (Annex "B") admitting her pregnancy by Cesar Aquino,
her brother-in-law and plaintiff's own brother, at the time of her marriage to plaintiff and her having
hidden this fact from plaintiff before and up to the time of their marriage;

3. Affidavit of Albert Powell (Annex "C") stating that he knew Cesar Aquino and defendant lived
together as husband and wife before December 27, 1954, the date of plaintiff's marriage to
defendant;
4. Birth Certificate of defendant's first born, Catherine Bess Aquino showing her date of birth to
be April 26, 1955;
5. Birth Certificate (Annex "D") of Carolle Ann Aquino, the second child of defendant with Cesar
Aquino, her brother-in-law;
6. Birth Certificate (Annex "E") of Chris Charibel Aquino, the third child of Cesar Aquino and
defendant; and
7. Pictures of defendant showing her natural plumpness as early as 1952 to as late as
November, 1954, the November, 1954 photo itself does not show defendant's pregnancy which
must have been almost four months old at the time the picture was taken.
Acting upon the motion, the Court of Appeals ordered the defendant Conchita Delizo and
Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, who was representing the Government, to answer the motion
for reconsideration, and deferred action on the prayer for new trial until after the case is disposed
of. As both the defendant and the fiscal failed to file an answer, and stating that it "does not believe
the veracity of the contents of the motion and its annexes", the Court of Appeals, on August 6,
1959, denied the motion. From that order, the plaintiff brought the case to this Court thru the
present petition for certiorari.
After going over the record of the case, we find that the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint cannot
be sustained.
Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage,
she was pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment
of marriage. (Art. 85, par. (4) in relation to Art. 86, par. (3). In the case of Buccat vs. Buccat (72
Phil., 19) cited in the decision sought to be reviewed, which was also an action for the annulment
of marriage on the ground of fraud, plaintiff's claim that he did not even suspect the pregnancy of
the defendant was held to be unbelievable, it having been proven that the latter was already in an
advanced stage of pregnancy (7th month) at the time of their marriage. That pronouncement,
however, cannot apply to the case at bar. Here the defendant wife was alleged to be only more
than four months pregnant at the time of her marriage to plaintiff. At that stage, we are not
prepared to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent, especially since she was "naturally
plump" or fat as alleged by plaintiff. According to medical authorities, even on the 5th month of
pregnancy, the enlargement of a woman's abdomen is still below the umbilicus, that is to say, the
enlargement is limited to the lower part of the abdomen so that it is hardly noticeable and may, if
noticed, be attributed only to fat formation on the lower part of the abdomen. It is only on the 6th
month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the woman's abdomen reaches a height above the
umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent. (See Lull, Clinical
Obstetrics, p. 122) If, as claimed by plaintiff, defendant is "naturally plump", he could hardly be
expected to know, merely by looking, whether or not she was pregnant at the time of their marriage
more so because she must have attempted to conceal the true state of affairs. Even physicians
and surgeons, with the aid of the woman herself who shows and gives her subjective and objective
symptoms, can only claim positive diagnosis of pregnancy in 33% at five months. and 50% at six
months. (XI Cyclopedia of Medicine, Surgery, etc. Pregnancy, p. 10).
The appellate court also said that it was not impossible for plaintiff and defendant to have had
sexual intercourse before they got married and therefore the child could be their own. This
statement, however, is purely conjectural and finds no support or justification in the record.

Upon the other hand, the evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial, taken together with
what has already been adduced would, in our opinion, be sufficient to sustain the fraud alleged by
plaintiff. The Court of Appeals should, therefore, not have denied the motion praying for new trial
simply because defendant failed to file her answer thereto. Such failure of the defendant cannot be
taken as evidence of collusion, especially since a provincial fiscal has been ordered of represent
the Government precisely to prevent such collusion. As to the veracity of the contents of the motion
and its annexes, the same can best be determined only after hearing evidence. In the
circumstance, we think that justice would be better served if a new trial were ordered.
Wherefore, the decision complained of is set aside and the case remanded to the court a quo for
new trial. Without costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Labrador, Concepcion, and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.
Barrera, J., concurs in the result.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

G.R. No. L-27930 November 26, 1970

AURORA A. ANAYA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
FERNANDO O. PALAROAN, defendant-appellee.
Isabelo V. Castro for plaintiff-appellant.
Arturo A. Romero for defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from an order of dismissal, issued motu proprio by the Juvenile & Domestic Relations
Court, Manila, of a complaint for annulment of marriage, docketed therein as Civil Case No.
E-00431, entitled "Aurora A. Anaya, plaintiff vs. Fernando O. Palaroan, defendant."
The complaint in said Civil Case No. E-00431 alleged, inter alia, that plaintiff Aurora and
defendant Fernando were married on 4 December 1953; that defendant Fernando filed an action
for annulment of the marriage on 7 January 1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained
through force and intimidation, which action was docketed in the Court of First Instance of Manila
as Civil Case No. 21589; that judgment was rendered therein on 23 September 1959 dismissing
the complaint of Fernando, upholding the validity of the marriage and granting Aurora's
counterclaim; that (per paragraph IV) while the amount of the counterclaim was being negotiated
"to settle the judgment," Fernando had divulged to Aurora that several months prior to their
marriage he had pre-marital relationship with a close relative of his; and that "the non-divulgement
to her of the aforementioned pre-marital secret on the part of defendant that definitely wrecked
their marriage, which apparently doomed to fail even before it had hardly commenced ... frank
disclosure of which, certitude precisely precluded her, the Plaintiff herein from going thru the
marriage that was solemnized between them constituted 'FRAUD', in obtaining her consent, within
the contemplation of No. 4 of Article 85 of the Civil Code" (sic) (Record on Appeal, page 3). She
prayed for the annulment of the marriage and for moral damages.
Defendant Fernando, in his answer, denied the allegation in paragraph IV of the complaint and
denied having had pre-marital relationship with a close relative; he averred that under no
circumstance would he live with Aurora, as he had escaped from her and from her relatives the day
following their marriage on 4 December 1953; that he denied having committed any fraud against
her. He set up the defenses of lack of cause of action and estoppel, for her having prayed in Civil
Case No. 21589 for the validity of the marriage and her having enjoyed the support that had been
granted her. He counterclaimed for damages for the malicious filing of the suit. Defendant

Fernando did not pray for the dismissal of the complaint but for its dismissal "with respect to the
alleged moral damages."
Plaintiff Aurora filed a reply with answer to the counterclaim, wherein she alleged:
(1) that prior to their marriage on 4 December 1953, he paid court to her, and pretended to
shower her with love and affection not because he really felt so but because she merely happened
to be the first girl available to marry so he could evade marrying the close relative of his whose
immediate members of her family were threatening him to force him to marry her (the close
relative);
(2) that since he contracted the marriage for the reason intimated by him, and not because he
loved her, he secretly intended from the very beginning not to perform the marital duties and
obligations appurtenant thereto, and furthermore, he covertly made up his mind not to live with her;
(3) that the foregoing clandestine intentions intimated by him were prematurely concretized for
him, when in order to placate and appease the immediate members of the family of the first girl
(referent being the close relative) and to convince them of his intention not to live with plaintiff,
carried on a courtship with a third girl with whom, after gaining the latter's love cohabited and had
several children during the whole range of nine years that Civil Case No. 21589, had been litigated
between them (parties); (Record on Appeal, pages 10-11)
Failing in its attempt to have the parties reconciled, the court set the case for trial on 26 August
1966 but it was postponed. Thereafter, while reviewing the expendiente, the court realized that
Aurora's allegation of the fraud was legally insufficient to invalidate her marriage, and, on the
authority of Brown vs. Yambao, 102 Phil. 168, holding:
It is true that the wife has not interposed prescription as a defense. Nevertheless, the courts can
take cognizance thereof, because actions seeking a decree of legal separation, or annulment of
marriage, involve public interest, and it is the policy of our law that no such decree be issued if any
legal obstacles thereto appear upon the record.
the court a quo required plaintiff to show cause why her complaint should not be dismissed.
Plaintiff Aurora submitted a memorandum in compliance therewith, but the court found it
inadequate and thereby issued an order, dated 7 October 1966, for the dismissal of the complaint;
it also denied reconsideration.
The main issue is whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital
relationship with another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage.
We must agree with the lower court that it is not. For fraud as a vice of consent in marriage,
which may be a cause for its annulment, comes under Article 85, No. 4, of the Civil Code, which
provides:
ART. 85. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the
marriage:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as her husband or his
wife, as the case may be;
This fraud, as vice of consent, is limited exclusively by law to those kinds or species of fraud
enumerated in Article 86, as follows:

ART. 86. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in number 4 of the
preceding article:
(1) Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting parties;
(2) Non-disclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of a crime involving moral
turpitude, and the penalty imposed was imprisonment for two years or more;
(3) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a
man other than her husband.
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute
such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage.
The intention of Congress to confine the circumstances that can constitute fraud as ground for
annulment of marriage to the foregoing three cases may be deduced from the fact that, of all the
causes of nullity enumerated in Article 85, fraud is the only one given special treatment in a
subsequent article within the chapter on void and voidable marriages. If its intention were
otherwise, Congress would have stopped at Article 85, for, anyway, fraud in general is already
mentioned therein as a cause for annulment. But Article 86 was also enacted, expressly and
specifically dealing with "fraud referred to in number 4 of the preceding article," and proceeds by
enumerating the specific frauds (misrepresentation as to identity, non-disclosure of a previous
conviction, and concealment of pregnancy), making it clear that Congress intended to exclude all
other frauds or deceits. To stress further such intention, the enumeration of the specific frauds was
followed by the interdiction: "No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or
chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage."
Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the
enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further excluded
by the last paragraph of the article, providing that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to ...
chastity" shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage. While a woman may detest such nondisclosure of premarital lewdness or feel having been thereby cheated into giving her consent to
the marriage, nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief after her consent was solemnly
given, for upon marriage she entered into an institution in which society, and not herself alone, is
interested. The lawmaker's intent being plain, the Court's duty is to give effect to the same,
whether it agrees with the rule or not.
But plaintiff-appellant Anaya emphasizes that not only has she alleged "non-divulgement" (the
word chosen by her) of the pre-marital relationship of her husband with another woman as her
cause of action, but that she has, likewise, alleged in her reply that defendant Fernando paid court
to her without any intention of complying with his marital duties and obligations and covertly made
up his mind not to live with her. Plaintiff-appellant contends that the lower court erred in ignoring
these allegations in her reply.
This second set of averments which were made in the reply (pretended love and absence of
intention to perform duties of consortium) is an entirely new and additional "cause of action."
According to the plaintiff herself, the second set of allegations is "apart, distinct and separate from
that earlier averred in the Complaint ..." (Record on Appeal, page 76). Said allegations were,
therefore, improperly alleged in the reply, because if in a reply a party-plaintiff is not permitted to
amend or change the cause of action as set forth in his complaint (Calo vs. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445),
there is more reason not to allow such party to allege a new and additional cause of action in the
reply. Otherwise, the series of pleadings of the parties could become interminable.
On the merits of this second fraud charge, it is enough to point out that any secret intention on
the husband's part not to perform his marital duties must have been discovered by the wife soon
after the marriage: hence her action for annulment based on that fraud should have been brought

within four years after the marriage. Since appellant's wedding was celebrated in December of
1953, and this ground was only pleaded in 1966, it must be declared already barred.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed order is hereby affirmed. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor, JJ.,
concur.
Dizon and Makasiar, JJ., are on leave.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
G.R. No. 179620

August 26, 2008

MANUEL G. ALMELOR, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LAS PIAS CITY, BRANCH 254, and LEONIDA T.
ALMELOR, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
MARRIAGE, in its totality, involves the spouses' right to the community of their whole lives. It
likewise involves a true intertwining of personalities.1
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying
the petition for annulment of judgment and affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Las Pias, Branch 254. The CA dismissed outright the Rule 47 petition for being the wrong
remedy.
The Facts
Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida Trinidad (Leonida) were married
on January 29, 1989 at the Manila Cathedral.3 Their union bore three children: (1) Maria Paulina
Corinne, born on October 20, 1989; (2) Napoleon Manuel, born on August 9, 1991; and (3) Manuel
Homer, born on July 4, 1994.4 Manuel and Leonida are both medical practitioners, an
anesthesiologist and a pediatrician, respectively.5
After eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the RTC in Las Pias City to
annul their marriage on the ground that Manuel was psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital obligations. The case, docketed as LP-00-0132 was raffled off to Branch 254.
During the trial, Leonida testified that she first met Manuel in 1981 at the San Lazaro Hospital
where they worked as medical student clerks. At that time, she regarded Manuel as a very
thoughtful person who got along well with other people. They soon became sweethearts. Three
years after, they got married.6
Leonida averred that Manuel's kind and gentle demeanor did not last long. In the public eye,
Manuel was the picture of a perfect husband and father. This was not the case in his private life. At
home, Leonida described Manuel as a harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous, easily
angered. Manuel's unreasonable way of imposing discipline on their children was the cause of their
frequent fights as a couple.7 Leonida complained that this was in stark contrast to the alleged
lavish affection Manuel has for his mother. Manuel's deep attachment to his mother and his
dependence on her decision-making were incomprehensible to Leonida.8

Further adding to her woes was his concealment to her of his homosexuality. Her suspicions
were first aroused when she noticed Manuel's peculiar closeness to his male companions. For
instance, she caught him in an indiscreet telephone conversation manifesting his affection for a
male caller.9 She also found several pornographic homosexual materials in his possession.10 Her
worse fears were confirmed when she saw Manuel kissed another man on the lips. The man was a
certain Dr. Nogales.11 When she confronted Manuel, he denied everything. At this point, Leonida
took her children and left their conjugal abode. Since then, Manuel stopped giving support to their
children.12
Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was presented to prove Leonida's claim.
Dr. del Fonso Garcia testified that she conducted evaluative interviews and a battery of psychiatric
tests on Leonida. She also had a one-time interview with Manuel and face-to-face interviews with
Ma. Paulina Corrinne (the eldest child).13 She concluded that Manuel is psychologically
incapacitated.14 Such incapacity is marked by antecedence; it existed even before the marriage
and appeared to be incurable.
Manuel, for his part, admitted that he and Leonida had some petty arguments here and there.
He, however, maintained that their marital relationship was generally harmonious. The petition for
annulment filed by Leonida came as a surprise to him.
Manuel countered that the true cause of Leonida's hostility against him was their professional
rivalry. It began when he refused to heed the memorandum15 released by Christ the King Hospital.
The memorandum ordered him to desist from converting his own lying-in clinic to a primary or
secondary hospital.16 Leonida's family owns Christ the King Hospital which is situated in the same
subdivision as Manuel's clinic and residence.17 In other words, he and her family have competing
or rival hospitals in the same vicinity.
Manuel belied her allegation that he was a cruel father to their children. He denied maltreating
them. At most, he only imposed the necessary discipline on the children.
He also defended his show of affection for his mother. He said there was nothing wrong for him
to return the love and affection of the person who reared and looked after him and his siblings. This
is especially apt now that his mother is in her twilight years.18 Manuel pointed out that Leonida
found fault in this otherwise healthy relationship because of her very jealous and possessive
nature.19
This same overly jealous behavior of Leonida drove Manuel to avoid the company of female
friends. He wanted to avoid any further misunderstanding with his wife. But, Leonida instead
conjured up stories about his sexual preference. She also fabricated tales about pornographic
materials found in his possession to cast doubt on his masculinity.20
To corroborate his version, he presented his brother, Jesus G. Almelor. Jesus narrated that he
usually stayed at Manuel's house during his weekly trips to Manila from Iriga City. He was a
witness to the generally harmonious relationship between his brother Manuel and sister-in-law,
Leonida. True, they had some quarrels typical of a husband and wife relationship. But there was
nothing similar to what Leonida described in her testimony.21
Jesus further testified that he was with his brother on the day Leonida allegedly saw Manuel
kissed another man. He denied that such an incident occurred. On that particular date,22 he and
Manuel went straight home from a trip to Bicol. There was no other person with them at that time,
except their driver.23
Manuel expressed his intention to refute Dr. del Fonso Garcia's findings by presenting his own
expert witness. However, no psychiatrist was presented.
RTC Disposition

By decision dated November 25, 2005, the RTC granted the petition for annulment, with the
following disposition:
WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the marriage contracted by herein parties on 29 January 1989 and all its effects
under the law null and void from the beginning;
2. Dissolving the regime of community property between the same parties with forfeiture of
defendant's share thereon in favor of the same parties' children whose legal custody is awarded to
plaintiff with visitorial right afforded to defendant;
3. Ordering the defendant to give monthly financial support to all the children; and
4. Pursuant to the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC:
a. Directing the Branch Clerk of this Court to enter this Judgment upon its finality in the Book of
Entry of Judgment and to issue an Entry of Judgment in accordance thereto; and
b. Directing the Local Civil Registrars of Las Pias City and Manila City to cause the registration
of the said Entry of Judgment in their respective Books of Marriages.
Upon compliance, a decree of nullity of marriage shall be issued.
SO ORDERED.24 (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the ground of Article 36, but Article 45 of the Family
Code. It ratiocinated:
x x x a careful evaluation and in-depth analysis of the surrounding circumstances of the
allegations in the complaint and of the evidence presented in support thereof (sic) reveals that in
this case (sic) there is more than meets the eyes (sic).
Both legally and biologically, homosexuality x x x is, indeed, generally incompatible with hetero
sexual marriage. This is reason enough that in this jurisdiction (sic) the law recognizes marriage as
a special contract exclusively only between a man and a woman x x x and thus when
homosexuality has trespassed into marriage, the same law provides ample remedies to correct the
situation [Article 45(3) in relation to Article 46(4) or Article 55, par. 6, Family Code]. This is of
course in recognition of the biological fact that no matter how a man cheats himself that he is not a
homosexual and forces himself to live a normal heterosexual life, there will surely come a time
when his true sexual preference as a homosexual shall prevail in haunting him and thus
jeopardizing the solidity, honor, and welfare of his own family.25
Manuel filed a notice of appeal which was, however, denied due course. Undaunted, he filed a
petition for annulment of judgment with the CA.26
Manuel contended that the assailed decision was issued in excess of the lower court's
jurisdiction; that it had no jurisdiction to dissolve the absolute community of property and forfeit his
conjugal share in favor of his children.
CA Disposition
On July 31, 2007, the CA denied the petition, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the present Petition for Annulment of Judgment is hereby DENIED. The Court
AFFIRMS in toto the Decision (dated November 25, 2005) of the Regional Trial Court (Branch
254), in Las Pias City, in Civil Case No. LP-00-0132. No costs.27
The CA stated that petitioner pursued the wrong remedy by filing the extraordinary remedy of
petition for annulment of judgment. Said the appellate court:
It is obvious that the petitioner is questioning the propriety of the decision rendered by the lower
Court. But the remedy assuming there was a mistake is not a Petition for Annulment of Judgment
but an ordinary appeal. An error of judgment may be reversed or corrected only by appeal.
What petitioner is ascribing is an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction, which is properly the
subject of an ordinary appeal.
In short, petitioner admits the jurisdiction of the lower court but he claims excess in the exercise
thereof. "Excess" assuming there was is not covered by Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Rule refers the lack of jurisdiction and not the exercise thereof.28
Issues
Petitioner Manuel takes the present recourse via Rule 45, assigning to the CA the following
errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT TREATING THE PETITION FOR
ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT AS A PETITION FOR REVIEW IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE
OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED AND IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE;
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE
TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE ORDER DECLARING THE MARRIAGE AS NULL AND VOID
ON THE GROUND OF PETITIONER'S PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY;
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE
TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE ORDER TO FORFEIT THE SHARE OF PETITIONER IN HIS
SHARE OF THE CONJUGAL ASSETS.29
Our Ruling
I. The stringent rules of procedures may be relaxed to serve the demands of substantial justice
and in the Court's exercise of equity jurisdiction.
Generally, an appeal taken either to the Supreme Court or the CA by the wrong or inappropriate
mode shall be dismissed.30 This is to prevent the party from benefiting from one's neglect and
mistakes. However, like most rules, it carries certain exceptions. After all, the ultimate purpose of
all rules of procedures is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.31
Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is a last remedy. It can not be resorted to if the ordinary
remedies are available or no longer available through no fault of petitioner.32 However, in
Buenaflor v. Court of Appeals,33 this Court clarified the proper appreciation for technical rules of
procedure, in this wise:

Rules of procedures are intended to promote, not to defeat, substantial justice and, therefore,
they should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. The exception is that while the
Rules are liberally construed, the provisions with respect to the rules on the manner and periods
for perfecting appeals are strictly applied. As an exception to the exception, these rules have
sometimes been relaxed on equitable considerations. Also, in some cases the Supreme Court has
given due course to an appeal perfected out of time where a stringent application of the rules
would have denied it, but only when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and in
the exercise of equity jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.34 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
For reasons of justice and equity, this Court has allowed exceptions to the stringent rules
governing appeals.35 It has, in the past, refused to sacrifice justice for technicality.36
After discovering the palpable error of his petition, Manuel seeks the indulgence of this Court to
consider his petition before the CA instead as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
A perusal of the said petition reveals that Manuel imputed grave abuse of discretion to the lower
court for annulling his marriage on account of his alleged homosexuality. This is not the first time
that this Court is faced with a similar situation. In Nerves v. Civil Service Commission,37 petitioner
Delia R. Nerves elevated to the CA a Civil Service Commission (CSC) decision suspending her for
six (6) months. The CSC ruled Nerves, a public school teacher, is deemed to have already served
her six-month suspension during the pendency of the case. Nevertheless, she is ordered
reinstated without back wages. On appeal, Nerves stated in her petition, inter alia:
1. This is a petition for certiorari filed pursuant to Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution of the
Philippines and under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
2. But per Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 (Revised Circular No. 1-91)
petitioner is filing the instant petition with this Honorable Court instead of the Supreme Court.38
(Underscoring supplied)
The CA dismissed Nerves' petition for certiorari for being the wrong remedy or the inappropriate
mode of appeal.39 The CA opined that "under the Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular
No. 1-95 x x x appeals from judgments or final orders or resolutions of CSC is by a petition for
review."40
This Court granted Nerves petition and held that she had substantially complied with the
Administrative Circular. The Court stated:
That it was erroneously labeled as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
only a minor procedural lapse, not fatal to the appeal. x x x
More importantly, the appeal on its face appears to be impressed with merit. Hence, the Court of
Appeals should have overlooked the insubstantial defects of the petition x x x in order to do justice
to the parties concerned. There is, indeed, nothing sacrosanct about procedural rules, which
should be liberally construed in order to promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding. As it has been said, where
the rigid application of the rules would frustrate substantial justice, or bar the vindication of a
legitimate grievance, the courts are justified in exempting a particular case from the operation of
the rules.41 (Underscoring supplied)
Similarly, in the more recent case of Tan v. Dumarpa,42 petitioner Joy G. Tan availed of a wrong
remedy by filing a petition for review on certiorari instead of a motion for new trial or an ordinary
appeal. In the interest of justice, this Court considered the petition, pro hac vice, as a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65.

This Court found that based on Tan's allegations, the trial court prima facie committed grave
abuse of discretion in rendering a judgment by default. If uncorrected, it will cause petitioner great
injustice. The Court elucidated in this wise:
Indeed, where as here, there is a strong showing that grave miscarriage of justice would result
from the strict application of the Rules, we will not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of
substantial justice.43 (Underscoring supplied)
Measured by the foregoing yardstick, justice will be better served by giving due course to the
present petition and treating petitioner's CA petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, considering
that what is at stake is the validity or non-validity of a marriage.
In Salazar v. Court of Appeals,44 citing Labad v. University of Southeastern Philippines, this
Court reiterated:
x x x The dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is frowned upon. While the right to
appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial system
and courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, but
rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.45
Indeed, it is far better and more prudent for a court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the
parties a review of the case on the merits to attain the ends of justice.46
Furthermore, it was the negligence and incompetence of Manuel's counsel that prejudiced his
right to appeal. His counsel, Atty. Christine Dugenio, repeatedly availed of inappropriate remedies.
After the denial of her notice of appeal, she failed to move for reconsideration or new trial at the
first instance. She also erroneously filed a petition for annulment of judgment rather than pursue an
ordinary appeal.
These manifest errors were clearly indicative of counsel's incompetence. These gravely worked
to the detriment of Manuel's appeal. True it is that the negligence of counsel binds the client. Still,
this Court has recognized certain exceptions: (1) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel
deprives the client of due process of law; (2) when its application will result in outright deprivation
of the client's liberty and property; or (3) where the interest of justice so require.47
The negligence of Manuel's counsel falls under the exceptions. Ultimately, the reckless or gross
negligence of petitioner's former counsel led to the loss of his right to appeal. He should not be
made to suffer for his counsel's grave mistakes. Higher interests of justice and equity demand that
he be allowed to ventilate his case in a higher court.
In Apex Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,48 this Court explained thus:
It is settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is based on the rule that any act
performed by a counsel within the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an act of
his client. However, where counsel is guilty of gross ignorance, negligence and dereliction of duty,
which resulted in the client's being held liable for damages in a damage suit, the client is deprived
of his day in court and the judgment may be set aside on such ground. In the instant case, higher
interests of justice and equity demand that petitioners be allowed to present evidence on their
defense. Petitioners may not be made to suffer for the lawyer's mistakes. This Court will always be
disposed to grant relief to parties aggrieved by perfidy, fraud, reckless inattention and downright
incompetence of lawyers, which has the consequence of depriving their clients, of their day in
court.49 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, this Court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule
whenever the demands of justice require it. With more conviction should it wield such power in a

case involving the sacrosanct institution of marriage. This Court is guided with the thrust of giving a
party the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of one's action.50
The client was likewise spared from counsel's negligence in Government Service Insurance
System v. Bengson Commercial Buildings, Inc.51 and Ancheta v. Guersey-Dalaygon.52 Said the
Court in Bengson:
But if under the circumstances of the case, the rule deserts its proper office as an aid to justice
and becomes a great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions
thereto and to prevent a miscarriage of justice. In other words, the court has the power to except a
particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the purposes of justice require it.53
II. Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a marriage, not homosexuality
per se.
Manuel is a desperate man determined to salvage what remains of his marriage. Persistent in
his quest, he fought back all the heavy accusations of incapacity, cruelty, and doubted masculinity
thrown at him.
The trial court declared that Leonida's petition for nullity had "no basis at all because the
supporting grounds relied upon can not legally make a case under Article 36 of the Family Code." It
went further by citing Republic v. Molina:54
Indeed, mere allegations of conflicting personalities, irreconcilable differences, incessant
quarrels and/or beatings, unpredictable mood swings, infidelities, vices, abandonment, and
difficulty, neglect, or failure in the performance of some marital obligations do not suffice to
establish psychological incapacity.55
If so, the lower court should have dismissed outright the petition for not meeting the guidelines
set in Molina. What Leonida attempted to demonstrate were Manuel's homosexual tendencies by
citing overt acts generally predominant among homosexual individuals.56 She wanted to prove
that the perceived homosexuality rendered Manuel incapable of fulfilling the essential marital
obligations.
But instead of dismissing the petition, the trial court nullified the marriage between Manuel and
Leonida on the ground of vitiated consent by virtue of fraud. In support of its conclusion, the lower
court reasoned out:
As insinuated by the State (p. 75, TSN, 15 December 2003), when there is smoke surely there is
fire. Although vehemently denied by defendant, there is preponderant evidence enough to
establish with certainty that defendant is really a homosexual. This is the fact that can be deduced
from the totality of the marriage life scenario of herein parties.
Before his marriage, defendant knew very well that people around him even including his own
close friends doubted his true sexual preference (TSN, pp. 35-36, 13 December 2000; pp. 73-75,
15 December 2003). After receiving many forewarnings, plaintiff told defendant about the rumor
she heard but defendant did not do anything to prove to the whole world once and for all the truth
of all his denials. Defendant threatened to sue those people but nothing happened after that. There
may have been more important matters to attend to than to waste time and effort filing cases
against and be effected by these people and so, putting more premiums on defendant's denials,
plaintiff just the same married him. Reasons upon reasons may be advanced to either exculpate or
nail to the cross defendant for his act of initially concealing his homosexuality to plaintiff, but in the
end, only one thing is certain - even during his marriage with plaintiff, the smoke of doubt about his
real preference continued and even got thicker, reason why obviously defendant failed to establish
a happy and solid family; and in so failing, plaintiff and their children became his innocent and
unwilling victims.

Yes, there is nothing untoward of a man if, like herein defendant, he is meticulous over even
small details in the house (sic) like wrongly folded bed sheets, etc. or if a man is more authoritative
in knowing what clothes or jewelry shall fit his wife (pp. 77-81, TSN, 15 December 2003); but these
admissions of defendant taken in the light of evidence presented apparently showing that he had
extra fondness of his male friends (sic) to the extent that twice on separate occasions (pp. 4-7,
TSN, 14 February 2001) he was allegedly seen by plaintiff kissing another man lips-to-lips plus the
homosexual magazines and tapes likewise allegedly discovered underneath his bed (Exhibits "L"
and "M"), the doubt as to his real sex identity becomes stronger. The accusation of plaintiff versus
thereof of defendant may be the name of the game in this case; but the simple reason of
professional rivalry advanced by the defendant is certainly not enough to justify and obscure the
question why plaintiff should accuse him of such a very untoward infidelity at the expense and
humiliation of their children and family as a whole.57
Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the allegations that Manuel is a
homosexual and that he concealed this to Leonida at the time of their marriage. The lower court
considered the public perception of Manuel's sexual preference without the corroboration of
witnesses. Also, it took cognizance of Manuel's peculiarities and interpreted it against his sexuality.
Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a homosexual, the lower court cannot
appreciate it as a ground to annul his marriage with Leonida. The law is clear - a marriage may be
annulled when the consent of either party was obtained by fraud,58 such as concealment of
homosexuality.59 Nowhere in the said decision was it proven by preponderance of evidence that
Manuel was a homosexual at the onset of his marriage and that he deliberately hid such fact to his
wife.60 It is the concealment of homosexuality, and not homosexuality per se, that vitiates the
consent of the innocent party. Such concealment presupposes bad faith and intent to defraud the
other party in giving consent to the marriage.
Consent is an essential requisite of a valid marriage. To be valid, it must be freely given by both
parties. An allegation of vitiated consent must be proven by preponderance of evidence. The
Family Code has enumerated an exclusive list of circumstances61 constituting fraud.
Homosexuality per se is not among those cited, but its concealment.
This distinction becomes more apparent when we go over the deliberations62 of the Committees
on the Civil Code and Family Law, to wit:
Justice Caguioa remarked that this ground should be eliminated in the provision on the grounds
for legal separation. Dean Gupit, however, pointed out that in Article 46, they are talking only of
"concealment," while in the article on legal separation, there is actuality. Judge Diy added that in
legal separation, the ground existed after the marriage, while in Article 46, the ground existed at
the time of the marriage. Justice Reyes suggested that, for clarity, they add the phrase "existing at
the time of the marriage" at the end of subparagraph (4). The Committee approved the suggestion.
63
To reiterate, homosexuality per se is only a ground for legal separation. It is its concealment that
serves as a valid ground to annul a marriage.64 Concealment in this case is not simply a blanket
denial, but one that is constitutive of fraud. It is this fundamental element that respondent failed to
prove.
In the United States, homosexuality has been considered as a basis for divorce. It indicates that
questions of sexual identity strike so deeply at one of the basic elements of marriage, which is the
exclusive sexual bond between the spouses.65 In Crutcher v. Crutcher,66 the Court held:
Unnatural practices of the kind charged here are an infamous indignity to the wife, and which
would make the marriage relation so revolting to her that it would become impossible for her to

discharge the duties of a wife, and would defeat the whole purpose of the relation. In the natural
course of things, they would cause mental suffering to the extent of affecting her health.67
However, although there may be similar sentiments here in the Philippines, the legal overtones
are significantly different. Divorce is not recognized in the country. Homosexuality and its alleged
incompatibility to a healthy heterosexual life are not sanctioned as grounds to sever the marriage
bond in our jurisdiction. At most, it is only a ground to separate from bed and board.
What was proven in the hearings a quo was a relatively blissful marital union for more than
eleven (11) years, which produced three (3) children. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage rests on Leonida. Sadly, she failed to discharge this onus.
The same failure to prove fraud which purportedly resulted to a vitiated marital consent was
found in Villanueva v. Court of Appeals.68 In Villanueva, instead of proving vitiation of consent,
appellant resorted to baseless portrayals of his wife as a perpetrator of fraudulent schemes. Said
the Court:
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide with those of the trial court,
as in the instant case, are generally binding on this Court. We affirm the findings of the Court of
Appeals that petitioner freely and voluntarily married private respondent and that no threats or
intimidation, duress or violence compelled him to do so, thus Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did not
freely consent to be married to the appellee. He cited several incidents that created on his mind a
reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger to his life and safety. x x x
The Court is not convinced that appellant's apprehension of danger to his person is so
overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not
disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in
a bank. Given the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself
out of harm's way. x x x
Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to believe by appellee that
the latter was pregnant with his child when they were married. Appellant's excuse that he could not
have impregnated the appellee because he did not have an erection during their tryst is flimsy at
best, and an outright lie at worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to copulate
with the appellee. x x x
xxxx
x x x The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of
any of the grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud,
intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit with
the appellee on any of these grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld.69
Verily, the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion, not only by solely taking into account
petitioner's homosexuality per se and not its concealment, but by declaring the marriage void from
its existence.
This Court is mindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.70 The State and the
public have vital interest in the maintenance and preservation of these social institutions against
desecration by fabricated evidence.71 Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of
marriage.

III. In a valid marriage, the husband and wife jointly administer and enjoy their community or
conjugal property.
Article 96 of the Family Code, on regimes of absolute community property, provides:
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse
to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the
date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the common properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance without the
authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or
consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed
as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the
court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
A similar provision, Article 12472 prescribes joint administration and enjoyment in a regime of
conjugal partnership. In a valid marriage, both spouses exercise administration and enjoyment of
the property regime, jointly.
In the case under review, the RTC decreed a dissolution of the community property of Manuel
and Leonida. In the same breath, the trial court forfeited Manuel's share in favor of the children.
Considering that the marriage is upheld valid and subsisting, the dissolution and forfeiture of
Manuel's share in the property regime is unwarranted. They remain the joint administrators of the
community property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed Decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the petition in the trial court to annul the marriage is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 132955

October 27, 2006

ORLANDO VILLANUEVA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LILIA CANALITA-VILLANUEVA, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the January 26, 1998
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832, affirming with modification the
Decision2 dated January 12, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch
172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92 (a) dismissing petitioner's petition for the annulment of his
marriage to private respondent and (b) ordering him to pay moral and exemplary damages,
attorneys fees and costs. Also assailed is the March 5, 1998 Resolution3 denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia Canalita-Villanueva got married on
April 13, 1988 in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed with the trial
court a petition for annulment of his marriage alleging that threats of violence and duress forced
him into marrying Lilia, who was already pregnant; that he did not get her pregnant prior to the
marriage; that he never cohabited with her after the marriage; and that he later learned that private
respondent's child died during delivery on August 29, 1988.4
In her answer with compulsory counterclaim,5 Lilia prayed for the dismissal of the petition,
arguing that petitioner freely and voluntarily married her; that petitioner stayed with her in Palawan
for almost a month after their marriage; that petitioner wrote letters to her after he returned to
Manila, during which private respondent visited him personally; and that petitioner knew about the
progress of her pregnancy, which ended in their son being born prematurely. Private respondent
also prayed for the payment of moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs.
On January 12, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Dismissing the above-entitled case; and
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00,
exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and attorney's fees in the amount of
P20,000.00, plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.6
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts dismissal of the petition and the award of
attorneys fees and costs, but reduced the award of moral and exemplary damages to P50,000.00
and P25,000.00, respectively. The Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration,
hence, the instant petition for review based on the following assigned errors:
I. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN NOT GRANTING THE ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE THE CONSENT OF THE
PETITIONER HAVING BEEN OBTAINED BY FRAUD, INTIMIDATION AND UNDUE AND
IMPROPER PRESSURE AND INFLUENCE PLUS THE FACT THAT THERE WAS NO
COHABITATION WHATSOEVER BETWEEN PETITIONER AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
II. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS ERROR IN AWARDING
MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AS WELL AS ATTORNEY'S FEES, SAID AWARDS NOT
BEING THOSE ALLOWED BY LAW.7
The issues for resolution are (a) whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of
vitiated consent; and (b) whether petitioner should be liable for moral and exemplary damages as
well as attorneys fees and costs.
The petition is partly granted.
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide with those of the trial court,
as in the instant case, are generally binding on this Court.8 We affirm the findings of the Court of
Appeals that petitioner freely and voluntarily married private respondent and that no threats or
intimidation, duress or violence compelled him to do so, thus
To begin with, We are at once disturbed by the circumstance that despite the alleged coerced
consent which supposedly characterized his marriage with Lilia on April 13, 1988, it was only on
November 17, 1992 or after a span of not less than four (4) years and eight (8) months when
Orlando took serious step to have the same marriage annulled. Unexplained, the prolonged

inaction evidently finds basis in Lilias allegation that this annulment suit was filed by Orlando solely
in the hope that a favorable judgment thereon would bolster his defense, if not altogether bring
about his acquittal in the criminal case for bigamy which was then already pending against him.
Unfortunately, however, let alone the fact that the criminal case was admittedly decided ahead with
a judgment of conviction against Orlando x x x even the very outcome of the present case
disappointed his expectation. At this late, with his appeal in the bigamy case still pending with this
Court x x x Orlando must be hoping against hope that with a decree of annulment ensuing from
this Court, he may yet secure an acquittal in the same bigamy charge. Viewed in this perspective,
the instant appeal is, therefore, understandable.
But even in terms of merit, the recourse must have to fall.
Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did not
freely consent to be married to the appellee. He cited several incidents that created on his mind a
reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger to his life and safety, to wit:
the harassing phone calls from the appellee and strangers as well as the unwanted visits by three
men at the premises of the University of the East after his classes thereat, and the threatening
presence of a certain Ka Celso, a supposed member of the New Peoples Army whom appellant
claimed to have been hired by appellee and who accompanied him in going to her home province
of Palawan to marry her.
The Court is not convinced that appellants apprehension of danger to his person is so
overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not
disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in
a bank. Given his employment at that time, it is reasonable to assume that appellant knew the
rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself out of harms way.
For sure, it is even doubtful if threats were indeed made to bear upon appellant, what with the fact
that he never sought the assistance of the security personnel of his school nor the police regarding
the activities of those who were threatening him. And neither did he inform the judge about his
predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage.
Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to believe by appellee that
the latter was pregnant with his child when they were married. Appellants excuse that he could not
have impregnated the appellee because he did not have an erection during their tryst is flimsy at
best, and an outright lie at worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to copulate
with the appellee. His counsel also conceded before the lower court that his client had a sexual
relationship with the appellee x x x. He also narrated x x x that sometime in January 1988, he and
the appellee went to a hotel where "the sexual act was consummated, with the defendant on top" x
x x.
Instead of providing proofs that he was tricked into marrying his wife, appellant resorted to
undermining the credibility of the latter by citing her testimony that her child was born, and died, on
August 29, 1989, a year off from August 29, 1988, the date of fetal death as appearing in the
registry of deaths of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Puerto Princesa City x x x.
To Our mind, appellant cannot make capital of the lapse because it is inconsequential, as there
is no controversy regarding the date of death of appellees fetus. Nevertheless, during the
continuation of the cross-examination of the appellee, she declared that her child was prematurely
born on August 29, 1988, matching the date in the certification of the Civil Registrar x x x. The
Court is not prepared to disbelieve the appellee and throw overboard her entire testimony simply
on account of her confusion as to the exact date of the death of the fetus, especially when she
herself had presented documentary evidence that put August 29, 1988 as the date her fetus died.
Appellants propensity to rely on his perceived weakness of the appellees evidence continues in
his argument that if indeed there is truth to her claim that she was impregnated sometime in
December 1987, then she could not have a premature delivery on August 29, 1988, as she had

testified during the trial, because the 35-week period of pregnancy is complete by that time.
Whether the appellees impression that she had delivered prematurely is correct or not will not
affect the fact that she had delivered a fetus on August 29, 1988. In the light of appellants
admission that he had a sexual intercourse with his wife in January 1988, and his failure to
attribute the latters pregnancy to any other man, appellant cannot complain that he was deceived
by the appellee into marrying her.
Appellant also puts in issue the lower courts appreciation of the letters allegedly written by him
to the appellee. During his cross-examination, when confronted with thirteen (13) letters, appellant
identified the seven (7) letters that he sent to the appellee, but denied the remaining six (6) x x x.
The letters admitted by the appellant contained expressions of love and concern for his wife, and
hardly the rantings of a man under duress. During the re-direct examination, however, appellant
suddenly changed mind and denied authorship of those seven (7) letters, claiming that he was
forced to admit them because he was threatened with harm by the appellee. If he was laboring
under duress when he made the admission, where did he find the temerity to deny his involvement
with the remaining six (6) letters? The recantation can only be motivated by a hindsight realization
by the appellant of the evidentiary weight of those letters against his case.
As to the second assignment of error, appellant cannot claim that his marriage should be
annulled due to the absence of cohabitation between him and his wife. Lack of cohabitation is, per
se, not a ground to annul a marriage. Otherwise, the validity of a marriage will depend upon the will
of the spouses who can terminate the marital union by refusing to cohabitate. The failure to cohabit
becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling
the marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue influence x x
x. Since the appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of those
grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld.9
We also agree that private respondent is entitled to attorneys fees. Article 2208 (11) of the Civil
Code provides that attorneys may be awarded where the court deems it just and equitable under
the circumstances, as in the instant case.
We, however, delete the award of moral and exemplary damages for lack of factual and legal
basis. There is nothing in the records or in the appealed decision that would support an award of
moral damages. In justifying the award, the Court of Appeals merely said thus:
It is not difficult to imagine the suffering of the appellee from the baseless portrayal of her by the
appellant as the perpetrator of fraudulent schemes to trap an unwilling mate. x x x10
However, the aforesaid finding is only a supposition as it has no reference to any testimony of
private respondent detailing her alleged physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury as
would entitle her to moral damages.
In Mahinay v. Velasquez, Jr.,11 we held that:
In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof of moral
suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like. While respondent alleged in his complaint that he
suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and moral shock, he failed to prove
them during the trial. Indeed, respondent should have taken the witness stand and should have
testified on the mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and other emotional and mental
suffering he purportedly suffered to sustain his claim for moral damages. Mere allegations do not
suffice; they must be substantiated by clear and convincing proof. No other person could have
proven such damages except the respondent himself as they were extremely personal to him.
As private respondent is not entitled to moral damages, a fortiori, she is not entitled to exemplary
damages. This is clear in Article 2234 of the Civil Code, which provides:

ART. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must
show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may
consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded. In case liquidated
damages have been agreed upon, although no proof of loss is necessary in order that such
liquidated damages may be recovered, nevertheless, before the court may consider the question of
granting exemplary in addition to the liquidated damages, the plaintiff must show that he would be
entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages were it not for the stipulation for liquidated
damages.
Hence, exemplary damages is allowed only in addition to moral damages such that no
exemplary damages can be awarded unless the claimant first establishes his clear right to moral
damages.12 In the instant case, private respondent failed to satisfactorily establish her claim for
moral damages, thus she is not likewise entitled to exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The January 26, 1998 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832 affirming with modification the January 12, 1996 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92
dismissing petitioners petition for the annulment of his marriage with private respondent, is
AFFIRMED. However, the award of moral and exemplary damages is DELETED for lack of basis.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12790

August 31, 1960

JOEL JIMENEZ, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
REMEDIOS CAIZARES, defendant.

Republic of the Philippines, intervenor-appellant.

Acting Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for appellant.
Climaco, Ascarraga and Silang for appellee.
PADILLA, J.:
In a complaint filed on 7 June 1955 in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga the plaintiff Joel
Jimenez prays for a decree annulling his marriage to the defendant Remedios Caizares
contracted on 3 August 1950 before a judge of the municipal court of Zamboanga City, upon the
ground that the office of her genitals or vagina was to small to allow the penetration of a male
organ or penis for copulation; that the condition of her genitals as described above existed at the
time of marriage and continues to exist; and that for that reason he left the conjugal home two
nights and one day after they had been married. On 14 June 1955 the wife was summoned and
served a copy of the complaint. She did not file an answer. On 29 September 1956, pursuant to the
provisions of article 88 of the Civil Code, the Court directed the city attorney of Zamboanga to
inquire whether there was a collusion, to intervene for the State to see that the evidence for the
plaintiff is not a frame-up, concocted or fabricated. On 17 December 1956 the Court entered an
order requiring the defendant to submit to a physical examination by a competent lady physician to
determine her physical capacity for copulation and to submit, within ten days from receipt of the
order, a medical certificate on the result thereof. On 14 March 1957 the defendant was granted
additional five days from notice to comply with the order of 17 December 1956 with warning that
her failure to undergo medical examination and submit the required doctor's certificate would be
deemed lack of interest on her part in the case and that judgment upon the evidence presented by
her husband would be rendered.

After hearing, at which the defendant was not present, on 11 April 1957 the Court entered a
decree annulling the marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant. On 26 April 1957 the city
attorney filed a motion for reconsideration of the decree thus entered, upon the ground, among
others, that the defendant's impotency has not been satisfactorily established as required by law;
that she had not been physically examined because she had refused to be examined; that instead
of annulling the marriage the Court should have punished her for contempt of court and compelled
her to undergo a physical examination and submit a medical certificate; and that the decree sought
to be reconsidered would open the door to married couples, who want to end their marriage to
collude or connive with each other by just alleging impotency of one of them. He prayed that the
complaint be dismissed or that the wife be subjected to a physical examination. Pending resolution
of his motion, the city attorney timely appealed from the decree. On 13 May 1957 the motion for
reconsideration was denied.
The question to determine is whether the marriage in question may be annulled on the strength
only of the lone testimony of the husband who claimed and testified that his wife was and is
impotent. The latter did not answer the complaint, was absent during the hearing, and refused to
submit to a medical examination.
Marriage in this country is an institution in which the community is deeply interested. The state
has surrounded it with safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and permanence. The security
and stability of the state are largely dependent upon it. It is the interest of each and every member
of the community to prevent the bringing about of a condition that would shake its foundation and
ultimately lead to its destruction. The incidents of the status are governed by law, not by will of the
parties. The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds, that must be proved to exist by
indubitable evidence, to annul a marriage. In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in
question was decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was expected to give testimony
tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the
wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily established, becase from the
commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the decree she had abstained from taking part
therein. Although her refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show indifference on her
part, yet from such attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not
arise or be inferred because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would
not submit to a physical examination unless compelled to by competent authority. This the Court
may do without doing violence to and infringing in this case is not self-incrimination. She is not
charged with any offense. She is not being compelled to be a witness against herself.1 "Impotency
being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency."2
The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is
insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife.
The decree appealed from is set aside and the case remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings in accordance with this decision, without pronouncement as to costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Gutierrez
David, and Dizon, JJ. concur.
Footnotes
1 Section 1, paragraph 18, Article III of the Constitution.
2 Marciano vs. San Jose, 89 Phil., 62.

VERONICA CABACUNGAN ALCAZAR,

Petitioner,
- versus REY C. ALCAZAR,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 174451
DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse the Decision[1] dated 24 May 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84471, affirming the Decision dated 9 June 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos City, Branch 85, in Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, which
dismissed petitioner Veronica Cabacungan Alcazars Complaint for the annulment of her marriage
to respondent Rey C. Alcazar.
The Complaint,[2] docketed as Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, was filed by petitioner before the RTC
on 22 August 2002. Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that she was married to respondent on 11
October 2000 by Rev. Augusto G. Pabustan (Pabustan), at the latters residence. After their
wedding, petitioner and respondent lived for five days in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, the
hometown of respondents parents. Thereafter, the newlyweds went back to Manila, but respondent
did not live with petitioner at the latters abode at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila.
On 23 October 2000, respondent left for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where he worked as an
upholsterer in a furniture shop. While working in Riyadh, respondent did not communicate with
petitioner by phone or by letter. Petitioner tried to call respondent for five times but respondent
never answered. About a year and a half after respondent left for Riyadh, a co-teacher informed
petitioner that respondent was about to come home to the Philippines. Petitioner was surprised
why she was not advised by respondent of his arrival.

Petitioner further averred in her Complaint that when respondent arrived in the Philippines, the
latter did not go home to petitioner at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. Instead,
respondent proceeded to his parents house in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Upon learning that
respondent was in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, petitioner went to see her brother-in-law in
Velasquez St., Tondo, Manila, who claimed that he was not aware of respondents whereabouts.
Petitioner traveled to San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, where she was informed that respondent had
been living with his parents since his arrival in March 2002.

Petitioner asserted that from the time respondent arrived in the Philippines, he never contacted
her. Thus, petitioner concluded that respondent was physically incapable of consummating his
marriage with her, providing sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage pursuant to paragraph
5, Article 45 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code). There was also no more
possibility of reconciliation between petitioner and respondent.
Per the Sheriffs Return[3] dated 3 October 2002, a summons, together with a copy of petitioners
Complaint, was served upon respondent on 30 September 2002.[4]

On 18 November 2002, petitioner, through counsel, filed a Motion[5] to direct the public prosecutor
to conduct an investigation of the case pursuant to Article 48 of the Family Code.

As respondent did not file an Answer, the RTC issued on 27 November 2002 an Order[6] directing
the public prosecutor to conduct an investigation to ensure that no collusion existed between the
parties; to submit a report thereon; and to appear in all stages of the proceedings to see to it that
evidence was not fabricated or suppressed.

On 4 March 2003, Public Prosecutrix Veronica A.V. de Guzman (De Guzman) submitted her
Report manifesting that she had conducted an investigation of the case of petitioner and
respondent in January 2003, but respondent never participated therein. Public Prosecutrix De
Guzman also noted that no collusion took place between the parties, and measures were taken to
prevent suppression of evidence between them. She then recommended that a full-blown trial be
conducted to determine whether petitioners Complaint was meritorious or not.

Pre-trial was held and terminated on 20 May 2003.

On 21 May 2003, the RTC received the Notice of Appearance of the Solicitor General.

Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.

During trial, petitioner presented herself, her mother Lolita Cabacungan (Cabacungan), and clinical
psychologist Nedy L. Tayag (Tayag) as witnesses.

Petitioner first took the witness stand and elaborated on the allegations in her Complaint.
Cabacungan corroborated petitioners testimony.

Petitioners third witness, Tayag, presented the following psychological evaluation of petitioner and
respondent:

After meticulous scrutiny and careful analysis of the collected data, petitioner is found to be free
from any underlying personality aberration neither (sic) of any serious psychopathological traits,
which may possibly impede her normal functioning (sic) of marriage. On the other hand, the
undersigned arrived to (sic) a firm opinion that the sudden breakdown of marital life between
petitioner and respondent was clearly due to the diagnosed personality disorder that the
respondent is harboring, making him psychologically incapacitated to properly assume and comply
[with] essential roles (sic) of obligations as a married man.

The pattern of behaviors displayed by the respondent satisfies the diagnostic criteria of a disorder
clinically classified as Narcissistic Personality Disorder, a condition deemed to be grave, severe,
long lasting in proportion and incurable by any treatment.

People suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder are known to have a pervasive pattern of
grandiosity (in fantasy or behavior), need for admiration, and lack of empathy, beginning by early
adulthood and present in a variety of contexts, as indicated by five (or more) of the following:

1. has a grandiose of self-importance (e.g. exaggerates achievements and talents, expect to be

recognized as superior without commensurate achievements)

2. is preoccupied with fantasies of unlimited success, power, brilliance, beauty or ideal love

3. believes that he or she is special and unique and can only be understood by, or should
associate with, other special or high status people (institutions)

4. requires excessive admiration

5. has sense of entitlement, i.e., unreasonable expectations of especially favorable treatment or

automatic compliance with his or her expectations

6. is interpersonally exploitative, i.e., takes advantage of others to achieve his or her own ends

7. lacks empathy: is unwilling to recognize or identify with the feelings and needs of others

8. is often envious of others or believes that others are envious of him or her

9. shows arrogant, haughty behavior or attitudes.

The root cause of respondents personality disorder can be attributed to his early childhood years
with predisposing psychosocial factors that influence[d] his development. It was recounted that
respondent is the first child of his mothers second family. Obviously, unhealthy familial constellation

composed his immediate environment in his growing up years. Respondent had undergone a
severe longing for attention from his father who had been unfaithful to them and had died early in
life, that he was left alone to fend for the family needs. More so that they were coping against
poverty, his caregivers failed to validate his needs, wishes or responses and overlooked the love
and attention he yearned which led to develop a pathological need for self-object to help him
maintain a cohesive sense of self-such so great that everything other people offer is consumed.
Hence, he is unable to develop relationship with other (sic) beyond this need. There is no capacity
for empathy sharing, or loving others.

The psychological incapacity of the respondent is characterized by juridical antecedence as it

already existed long before he entered into marriage. Since it already started early in life, it is
deeply engrained within his system and becomes a[n] integral part of his personality structure,
thereby rendering such to be permanent and incurable.[7]

Tayag concluded in the end that:

As such, their marriage is already beyond repair, considering the fact that it has long been (sic)
ceased to exist and have their different life priorities. Reconciliation between them is regarded to
be (sic). The essential obligations of love, trust, respect, fidelity, authentic cohabitation as husband
and wife, mutual help and support, and commitment, did not and will no lon[g]er exist between
them. With due consideration of the above-mentioned findings, the undersigned recommends, the
declaration of nullity of marriage between petitioner and respondent.[8]

On 18 February 2004, petitioner filed her Formal Offer of Evidence. Public Prosecutrix Myrna S.
Lagrosa (Lagrosa), who replaced Public Prosecutrix De Guzman, interposed no objection to the
admission of petitioners evidence and manifested that she would no longer present evidence for
the State.

On 9 June 2004, the RTC rendered its Decision denying petitioners Complaint for annulment of her
marriage to respondent, holding in substance that:

In the case at bar, the Court finds that the acts of the respondent in not communicating with
petitioner and not living with the latter the moment he returned home from Saudi Arabia despite
their marriage do (sic) not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is
absolutely no showing that his defects were already present at the inception of their marriage or
that these are incurable.

That being the case, the Court resolves to deny the instant petition.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Annulment of Marriage is hereby DENIED.[9]

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[10] but it was denied by the RTC in an Order[11]
dated 19 August 2004.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
84471. In a Decision[12] dated 24 May 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision
dated 9 June 2004. The Court of Appeals ruled that the RTC did not err in finding that petitioner
failed to prove respondents psychological incapacity. Other than petitioners bare allegations, no
other evidence was presented to prove respondents personality disorder that made him completely
unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state. Citing Republic v. Court of
Appeals,[13] the appellate court ruled that the evidence should be able to establish that at least
one of the spouses was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that said person could not have
known the marital obligations to be assumed; or knowing the marital obligations, could not have
validly assumed the same. At most, respondents abandonment of petitioner could be a ground for
legal separation under Article 5 of the Family Code.

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution[14]
dated 28 August 2008.

Hence, this Petition raising the sole issue of:

WHETHER OR NOT, AS DEFINED BY THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, RESPONDENT IS

PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO PERFORM THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL
OBLIGATONS.[15]

At the outset, it must be noted that the Complaint originally filed by petitioner before the RTC was
for annulment of marriage based on Article 45, paragraph 5 of the Family Code, which reads:

ART. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the
marriage:
xxxx

(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and
such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; x x x.

Article 45(5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to copulate.[16] Incapacity to consummate
denotes the permanent inability on the part of the spouses to perform the complete act of sexual
intercourse.[17] Non-consummation of a marriage may be on the part of the husband or of the wife
and may be caused by a physical or structural defect in the anatomy of one of the parties or it may
be due to chronic illness and inhibitions or fears arising in whole or in part from psychophysical
conditions. It may be caused by psychogenic causes, where such mental block or disturbance has
the result of making the spouse physically incapable of performing the marriage act.[18]

No evidence was presented in the case at bar to establish that respondent was in any way
physically incapable to consummate his marriage with petitioner. Petitioner even admitted during
her cross-examination that she and respondent had sexual intercourse after their wedding and
before respondent left for abroad. There obviously being no physical incapacity on respondents
part, then, there is no ground for annulling petitioners marriage to respondent. Petitioners
Complaint was, therefore, rightfully dismissed.
One curious thing, though, caught this Courts attention. As can be gleaned from the evidence
presented by petitioner and the observations of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, it appears that
petitioner was actually seeking the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent based on
the latters psychological incapacity to comply with his marital obligations of marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code.
Petitioner attributes the filing of the erroneous Complaint before the RTC to her former counsels
mistake or gross ignorance.[19] But even said reason cannot save petitioners Complaint from
dismissal. It is settled in this jurisdiction that the client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of the
counsel in the realm of procedural technique.[20] Although this rule is not a hard and fast one and
admits of exceptions, such as where the mistake of counsel is so gross, palpable and inexcusable
as to result in the violation of his clients substantive rights,[21] petitioner failed to convince us that
such exceptional circumstances exist herein.
Assuming for the sake of argument that we can treat the Complaint as one for declaration of nullity
based on Article 36 of the Family Code, we will still dismiss the Complaint for lack of merit,
consistent with the evidence presented by petitioner during the trial.

Article 36 of the Family Code provides:

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[22] the Court declared that psychological incapacity under Article 36
of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It should refer,
rather, to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability.[23]

The Court laid down the guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage,
based on Article 36 of the Family Code, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,[24] to wit:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution
and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
protected by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be a) medically or clinically identified, b)
alleged in the complaint, c) sufficiently proven by experts and d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as
not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless
such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I dos. The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the

exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in

diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x.

Being accordingly guided by the aforequoted pronouncements in Republic v. Court of Appeals, we

scrutinized the totality of evidence presented by petitioner and found that the same was not
enough to sustain a finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated.

Petitioners evidence, particularly her and her mothers testimonies, merely established that
respondent left petitioner soon after their wedding to work in Saudi Arabia; that when respondent
returned to the Philippines a year and a half later, he directly went to live with his parents in San
Jose, Occidental Mindoro, and not with petitioner in Tondo, Manila; and that respondent also did
not contact petitioner at all since leaving for abroad. These testimonies though do not give us much
insight into respondents psychological state.

Tayags psychological report leaves much to be desired and hardly helps petitioners cause. It must
be noted that Tayag was not able to personally examine respondent. Respondent did not appear
for examination despite Tayags invitation.[25] Tayag, in evaluating respondents psychological
state, had to rely on information provided by petitioner. Hence, we expect Tayag to have been
more prudent and thorough in her evaluation of respondents psychological condition, since her
source of information, namely, petitioner, was hardly impartial.

Tayag concluded in her report that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder,
traceable to the latters experiences during his childhood. Yet, the report is totally bereft of the basis
for the said conclusion. Tayag did not particularly describe the pattern of behavior that showed that
respondent indeed had a Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Tayag likewise failed to explain how
such a personality disorder made respondent psychologically incapacitated to perform his
obligations as a husband. We emphasize that the burden falls upon petitioner, not just to prove that
respondent suffers from a psychological disorder, but also that such psychological disorder renders
him truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage.[26] Psychological incapacity must be more than just a
difficulty, a refusal, or a neglect in the performance of some marital obligations.

In this instance, we have been allowed, through the evidence adduced, to peek into petitioners
marital life and, as a result, we perceive a simple case of a married couple being apart too long,
becoming strangers to each other, with the husband falling out of love and distancing or detaching
himself as much as possible from his wife.

To be tired and give up on ones situation and on ones spouse are not necessarily signs of
psychological illness; neither can falling out of love be so labeled. When these happen, the remedy
for some is to cut the marital knot to allow the parties to go their separate ways. This simple
remedy, however, is not available to us under our laws. Ours is a limited remedy that addresses
only a very specific situation a relationship where no marriage could have validly been concluded
because the parties; or where one of them, by reason of a grave and incurable psychological
illness existing when the marriage was celebrated, did not appreciate the obligations of marital life
and, thus, could not have validly entered into a marriage.[27]

An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage. As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos[28]:

Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so
grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume. x x x.

Resultantly, we have held in the past that mere irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personalities in no wise constitute psychological incapacity.[29]

As a last-ditch effort to have her marriage to respondent declared null, petitioner pleads
abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondent. In a Manifestation and Motion[30] dated 21
August 2007 filed before us, petitioner claims that she was informed by one Jacinto Fordonez, who
is residing in the same barangay as respondent in Occidental Mindoro, that respondent is living-in
with another woman named Sally.

Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code. Again, petitioner must be able to establish that respondents
unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality, which makes him completely unable
to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.[31]

It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its
recognition of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution. Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence
and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.[32] Presumption is always
in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.[33] In the case at bar,
petitioner failed to persuade us that respondents failure to communicate with petitioner since
leaving for Saudi Arabia to work, and to live with petitioner after returning to the country, are grave
psychological maladies that are keeping him from knowing and/or complying with the essential
obligations of marriage.

We are not downplaying petitioners frustration and misery in finding herself shackled, so to speak,
to a marriage that is no longer working. Regrettably, there are situations like this one, where
neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every individual problem.[34]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The 24 May 2006 Decision and 28 August 2008 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84471, which affirmed the 9 June 2004 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos City, Branch 85, dismissing petitioner Veronica Cabacungan
Alcazars Complaint in Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, are AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 198780

October 16, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court assailing the
September 29, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which
affirmed the April 25, 2008Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring the
marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from the
beginning.
The facts

On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia
I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a
Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.3
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her
marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never
lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a married
state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as
one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios
filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine the existence of a
collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and reported that she could not
make a determination for failure of both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the
hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits
ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of
Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a necessary
consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the surname of respondent as
she never acquired any right over it and so as to avoid a misimpression that she remains the wife
of respondent.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving
credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to
enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the
sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer
returned to the United States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not
pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus,
ruled that when marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal
and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying
the motion for want of merit. It explained that the marriage was declared void because the parties
failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it
and used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found
that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not

understand the nature and consequence of getting married and that their case was similar to a
marriage in jest. It further explained that the parties never intended to enter into the marriage
contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that their
purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for
Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A
MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS
DONEIN JEST, HENCE, LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFCONSENT.8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and for
Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they
knowingly and willingly entered into that marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of
being bound by it. According to the OSG, consent should be distinguished from motive, the latter
being inconsequential to the validity of marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest.
The parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were
otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition, reiterating her stand that her
marriage was similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its arguments in its petition for review
on certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage, contracted for the
sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the
ground of lack of consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud
for the purposes of immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development
of marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United States,
marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific benefits,
have been referred to as "limited purpose" marriages.11 A common limited purpose marriage is
one entered into solely for the legitimization of a child.12 Another, which is the subject of the
present case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention
of the couple at the time of their marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those who use marriage
solely to achieve immigration status.14
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,15 established the
principal test for determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a
"marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time
they were married. "This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage

Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the
marriage was not "entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United
States." The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life together, to
determining the intention of evading immigration laws.16 It must be noted, however, that this
standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the
legal validity or existence of a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the
limited purpose of immigration is also legally void and in existent. The early cases on limited
purpose marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of
United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in the
country, the parties had agreed to marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce within six
months. The Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert temporary into
permanent permission to stay in the country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is necessary
to every contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating
the contrary, they do not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may always be proved. x x x
Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite true
that a marriage without subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a
marriage only for the sake of representing it as such to the outside world and with the
understanding that they will put an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they
have never really agreed to be married at all. They must assent to enter into the relation as it is
ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive
others.18
(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines,19 which declared
as valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating
that a valid marriage could not be avoided "merely because the marriage was entered into for a
limited purpose."20 The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee,21 further recognized that a
fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been recognized as
problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is
first necessary.22 At present, United States courts have generally denied annulments involving"
limited purpose" marriages where a couple married only to achieve a particular purpose, and have
upheld such marriages as valid.23
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondents marriage not void
In declaring the respondents marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered
into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and
should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying the OSGs motion for
reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was declared void because the
parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally
bound by it and used it only as a means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship.
Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held that
the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married. As in the
Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering that the
parties only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of

$2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never intended to live as
husband and wife or build a family.
The CAs assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties supposed lack of consent.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the
same Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab
initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the
presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties
willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not
vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the Family
Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence.24 Consent must also be conscious
or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and
both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.25 Their understanding should not be
affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real
consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent
was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and
inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their
consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American
citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately
contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to
fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete
understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal
tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to
a marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into
as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear
understanding that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct
indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation.27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to be
real and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine
consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but
for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the parties have
absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
The respondents marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest.1wphi1 Albios and
Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to
allow the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would
allow them to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an
application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage
status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly
present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish
a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention
to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in
accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents of
marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be
declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a
marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares,
such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal
requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided
by law, it shall be declared valid.28

Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot
dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would
go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions.29 The
right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they
see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and
so on.30 Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as
convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal
requisites,31 are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not
the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support
a marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondents attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest
purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondents marriage may be
considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and
continues to be valid and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of
the Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may constitute
fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude; (2)
concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted
disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other
misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a marriage.
Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify under
any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only be
brought by the injured or innocent party. In the present case, there is no injured party because
Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage
with Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court
cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for immigration benefits,
after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These unscrupulous
individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios
already misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be
allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded
from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that
marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily
nullified when no longer needed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for
utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO*

Associate Justice ARTURO D. BRION**
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTE STATI O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
PRESBITER J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E RTI F I CATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation,
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
* Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen per
Special Order No. 1570 dated October 14. 2013.
** Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad. Per Special Order
No. 1554dated September 19, 2013.
1 Rollo. pp. 26-32; penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez. Jr. and concurred in by
Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato. Jr. and Associate Justice Fiorito S. Macalino of the Fifth
Division. Manila.
2 Id. at 38-39.
3 Id. at 37.
4 Id. at 33-35.
5 Id. at 38-39.
6 Id. at 39.
7 Id. at 48-49.
8 Id. at 13.
9 Id. at 61-71.
10 Id. at 89-95.

11 Abrams, Kerry. Marriage Fraud . 100 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2012);http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/

papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000956. Lutwak v. United States , 344 U.S. 604, 612-613 (U.S. 1953).
12 Abrams, Kerry. Marriage Fraud . 100 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2012);http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000956; citing Schibi v. Schibi , 69 A.2d 831 (Conn. 1949) (denying
annulment where parties married only to give a name to a prospective child); Bishop v. Bishop ,
308 N.Y.S.2d 998 (Sup. Ct. 1970); Erickson v. Erickson , 48 N.Y.S.2d 588 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (holding
similarly to Schibi ); Delfino v.Delfino , 35 N.Y.S.2d 693 (Sup. Ct. 1942) (denying annulment where
purpose of marriage was to protect the girls name and there was an understanding that the parties
would not live together as man and wife); Bove v. Pinciotti , 46 Pa. D. & C. 159 (1942); Campbell v.
Moore , 189 S.E.2d 497 (S.C.1939) (refusing an annulment where parties entered marriage for the
purpose of legitimizing a child); Chander v. Chander , No.2937-98-4, 1999 WL 1129721 (Va. Ct.
App. June 22, 1999) (denying annulment where wife married husband to get his pension with no
intention to consummate marriage because husband knew that was the purpose of the marriage).
13 Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage; 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1625
(2007);http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf; citing
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 237(a)(1)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(G) (2000).
14 Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage ; 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1625
(2007);http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf; citing
132 CONG.REC. 27,012, 27,015 (1986) (statement of Rep Mc Collum) (promoting the Immigration
Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986).
15 511 F.2d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 1975).
16 Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage; 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1625
(2007);http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf.
17 151 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1945).
18 United States v. Rubenstein , 151 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1945).
19 Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. , 323 F. Supp. 865 (S.D. Tex. 1969), affd , 440 F.2d 1163 (5th
Cir. 1971).
20 Abrams, Kerry. Marriage Fraud . 100 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2012);http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000956; citing Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. , 323 F. Supp. 865 (S.D.
Tex. 1969), affd, 440F.2d 1163 (5th Cir. 1971).
21 Matter of McKee, 17 I. & N. Dec. 332, 333 (B.I.A. 1980).
22 Lynn D. Wardle and Laurence C. Nolan, Family Law in the USA, (The Netherlands: Kluwer
Law International, 2011) p. 86.
23 Abrams, Kerry. Marriage Fraud. 100 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2012);http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000956.
24 Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, (Quezon City,
Philippines: Joer Printing Services, 2005), p. 4.
25 Melencio S. Sta. Maria, Jr., Persons and Family Relations Law, (Quezon City, Philippines:
Rex Printing Company, Inc., 2010), Fifth Edition, p. 121.
26 Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines,
(Manila, Philippines: Central Book Supply, Inc., 2004), Volume I, p. 231.

27 Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines,
(Manila, Philippines: Central Book Supply, Inc., 2004), Volume I, p. 231; citing McClurg v. Terry, 21
N.J. 225.
28 Article 4, Family Code.
29 Bark v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 511 F.2d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 1975).
30 Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage; 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1625
(2007);http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf; citing
McGuire v. McGuire , 59 N.W.2d 336, 337 (Neb. 1953). Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
48586 (1965).
31 Article 4, Family Code.
32 Const. ( 1987), Article XV, Section 2.
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