Becoming More Than Human Affective Posthumanisms Past and Future

Becoming More (than) Human: Affective Posthumanisms, Past and Future
Author(s): Myra J. Seaman

Source: Journal of Narrative Theory, Vol. 37, No. 2, Premodern to Modern Humanisms: The
BABEL Project (Summer 2007), pp. 246-275
Published by: Journal of Narrative Theory
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Becoming
Affective
More
(than)
Posthumanisms,
Human:
Past
and
Future
M yra J. Seaman
The humanlong presumedby traditionalEnlightenmentand post-Enlightenmenthumanismis a subject (generallyassumed male) who is at thecenterof his world (thatis, the world); is definedby his supreme,utterlyrational intelligence;does not depend (unlike his predecessor) upon a divine
authorityto make his way throughthe world but instead manipulatesit in
accord withhis own wishes; and is a historicallyindependentagent whose
thoughtand action produce history.1It is this human who is, as Tony
Davies notes, "always singular, always in the present tense, . . .
inhabiting] not a time or a place but a condition, timeless and unrealised" (32) - that is the subject of traditionalliberal humanism. His
power and superiorityinherein his human essence. Yet in a posthumanist
world,thishuman is an endangeredspecies.
Such a statementis hardlynews.2 Foucault, in 1966 in The Order of
Things,and Levi-Strauss,in 1962 in The Savage Mind, both revealed that
"the human" had been inventedby the Enlightenmentwhen it "discovered" this supposedly sovereign subject. The ensuing denaturalizationof
this subject has challenged the ontological foundationson which traditional humanism,and thus much of Westernsociety,has been based. The
recognitionthat human subjectivityhas been constructedby those who
have claimed it as theirexclusive featurehas made room for alternative
posthumanistphilosophies.3Posthumanismobserves thattherehas never
2007by
37.2(Summer
JNT:Journal
2007):246-275.Copyright
Theory
ofNarrative
JNT:Journal
Theory.
ofNarrative
BecomingMore(than) Human
247
been one unified,cohesive "human," a title that was grantedby and to

those withthe materialand culturalluxuryto bestow upon themselvesthe
faculties of "reason," autonomous agency, and the privileges of "being
human" (Davies 19; Hayles 286). As a result,not everyonewhose biology
would identifythemas homo sapiens have "counted" as human (Fuss 2).
Ideologically shaped distinctionshave determinedinclusion and exclusion, so thatfeatureswith culturalsignificance,such as race and gender,
have been misinterpreted
as biologically significantand used as markers
of supposed superiorityor inferiority
withinthe "species." Posthumanism
rejects the assumed universalismand exceptional being of Enlightenment
humanismand in its place substitutesmutation,variation,and becoming.
The posthumansubject involves a criticaldeconstructionof the universal, liberal humanistsubject,withthe thoughtof Freud, Marx, Lacan, Althusser,Foucault, and Derrida, among others,as centralinfluencesin this
deconstruction(Badmington4-10). Yet, outside of theoreticalcircles, the
posthumansubject is oftendescribed as a physical counterpart(and successor) to the universal human. This alternative,or extended, human
appears in popular cultureas a corporeal being whose existence is the hypotheticalresultof certaindevelopmentsin techno-science.It is a deliberately engineeredform,the imagined product of breakthroughs,both fictional and real, in genetic manipulation,reproductivetechnologies, and
virtual reality,and it reveals certain cultural anxieties about embodiment- perhapsmost especially when thatembodimentis rejectedor overcome in the attemptto release a supposedly "pure" cognition. Embodimentalways troublesthe human "person," and is a highlyslipperyentity
despite its apparentlyconcretegivenness. Caroline WalkerBynum writes,
Sometimesbody, mybody,or embodiedness
seemsto refer
to limitor placement,
whether
or
social.
Thatis,
biological
it refersto natural,physicalstructures
as
(such organsystems or chromosomes),to environment
or locatedness,
or
to
or
role
as
(such gender,race,
boundary definition,
- on the otherhand- it
class) as constraint.Sometimes
seemsto referpreciselyto lack of limits,thatis, to desire,
or sensuality/sexuality
... or to perpotentiality,
fertility,
son or identityas malleable representation
or construct
(1995b,5).
248
The second view- with the human "person" a "malleable representation

- has many affinitieswith
or construct"and embodimentas unconstrained
theoreticalposthumanism.The inherentpliability of the culturallyproduced body is celebratedby culturaltheoristssuch as JudithHalberstam
and Ira Livingston,who describe posthumanbodies as "the causes and effectsof postmodernrelationsof power and pleasure, virtualityand reality,
sex and its consequences. The posthumanbody is a technology,a screen,a
projectedimage. . . . The human itselfis no longer partof 'the familyof
man' but a zoo of posthumanities"(3). Theoretical posthumanismtransformsthe humanistsubject into many subjects, in part by releasing the
body fromthe constraintsplaced on it not only by naturebut also by humanistideology,and allowing it to roam freeand "join" withotherbeings,
animateand inanimate.
The popular cultureposthuman,by contrast,envisions the challenges
to the human as largelycorporeal ones resultingfromour supposedly intractablesituatednessin the so-called naturalworld. In this case, what is
called for is not a reconceptualizationof what "counts" as human, but
rather,an entirelynew and supposedlybetterhumanform.In thisview,the
body limits and constrains individual freedom. Physical alterationsmany of themquite radical and risky- are pursued not, however,to simply replace the weak body but to attainan extendedlifespanand improved
capabilitiesforthealready-existingembodied humanself.Modern technoscience, especially as depictedin the news media, encourages us to understandthatself in termsof scientificdiscovery:we conceive of our personalities and dispositionsas a geneticinheritanceand chemical mixture,our
brainas a computerhard drive,our memoriesas a series of snapshots,our
minds as processors of encountersand observations that can be reprogrammedor even erased. Our bodies are machines to be fine-tunedand
perfectedthroughadd-ons. So while technological and biological modifications to the body are intendedto improveits inadequacies, theiruse indicates an investmentin a distinctlyindividual and already human identity.4Likewise, in the posthumanas it is imagined in popular culture,the
bodily modificationsare pursuedbecause of the superiorcapabilities they
can add to the already-establishedself. The "idea of person" indicatedby
such a desire reflectsthe "idea of person" in the Middle Ages: "not a concept of soul escaping body or soul using body [but] a concept of self in
which physicalitywas integrallybound to sensation,emotion,reasoning,
249
identity"(Bynum 1995a, 11). The theoreticalposthumanistconception of

"person or identityas malleable representationor construct"is adamantly
refusedby popular posthumanism:the formsof our person may change,
- typically expressed in terms of "sensation, emotion, and
but identity
reasoning" persist.
Popular posthumanismcannot avoid recognizing,however,thataltering the body throughmechanical and biomedical improvementsnecessarily challenges our sense of identity,"integrallybound" as it is to "physicality" (Bynum 1995a, 11). Long-familiarprocesses and events such as
aging, disease, and accident are made aberrant and deviant (Turner
28-29), and previouslysturdyexpectationsof selfhoodare shaken. As expectationsof body change, expectationsof selfhood change as well. This
is the appeal but also the threataddressed by popular cultureengagements
with the posthuman.The pervasiveness of such a connectionwas exhibited in Rush Limbaugh's response to Michael J. Fox's appearance, during
the 2006 mid-termelections,in a series of political ads supportingcandidates in favor of stem cell research.In these ads, the symptomsof Fox's
Parkinson's disease (typically controlled pharmaceuticallywhen Fox is
acting) were fullyevident.On his radio program,Limbaugh attackedFox
by saying,"He is exaggeratingthe effectsof the disease. He's moving all
around and shaking and it's purely an act. . . . Either he didn't take his
medicationor he's acting" (qtd. in MontgomeryC01). Limbaugh argued
ratherthanbeing his naturalor "true"self,by althatFox was performing,
itselfthroughits symptoms;the honestthing,
his
disease
to
reveal
lowing
the most authenticthing,accordingto Limbaugh, would be to cover up or
alleviate the symptomsthroughmedical treatment.His unmediatedphysical state thus becomes false, disingenuous, because medicine makes it
avoidable. Not only Fox's body but his veryidentityis alteredby the disease. Such changes throughdisease leave us uncertainof the source of our
identity;Bynum wondersforus all, "Are we genes, bodies, brains,minds,
experiences,memories,or souls?" (2001, 165).
As reflectedin popular culturedepictionsof theposthuman,thisuncertaintyis respondedto withthe assertionthatalthoughall of these possible
features of our person can be modified (except, it is maintained, the
"soul"), the experiences of the body- perceived throughsensation and
processed throughemotion- remain the locus of individual identity.The
self thusenvisioned is mostreadilyidentifiablethroughits affect,a feature
250
INT
thatholds open even thebiomechanicallymodifiedhumanto a vulnerability seen as essential to maintaininghumanness.The techno-scientifically

enhanced human- and the line between human and posthuman that it
evokes but cannot definewith exact precision- provides the opportunity
to investigatethose qualities supposedly associated exclusively with the
human. It furtherreveals a desire to finda human identitythat remains
constantwithina flexibleand mutatingbody, and a key featurethattends
to endure,in such scenarios,is emotion,especially as a conduitforsignificant encounterswith and incorporationinto the world. If the brain is a
hard drive and the body a programmablemachine,what distinguishesone
human fromanotheris the unique way these "parts" functionto express a
unique and holistic self thatalways remainsjust to the side of any hardware thatmighttryto defineit.
Medieval persons conceptualized such scenarios, althoughin different
terms;they,too, examined and extendedtheirselfhoodthrougha blend of
the embodied self with somethingseeminglyexternalto it- not the products of scientificdiscovery,but Christ,as well as the promised embodimentafterdeath his sacrificeensured.In this way, the contemporarypopular posthumanis (perhaps surprisingly)tied to the premodern,the time
before the "discovery" of the human thatthus mightbe labeled "prehuman." In bothcases (medieval and modern)theposthumanis not a distinct
"other,"an entirelynew species; instead,the posthumanis a hybridthatis
a more developed, more advanced, or more powerfulversionof the existing self. The concept of the posthumanrevealed in medieval and contemporaryimaginativetexts is less an inevitable state of being than it is a
"taxonomiccategory"thatsuggestswhat people mean by "the human" in
a given place and time (Graham 42). As Diana Fuss claims, it shows "the
human" to be an incredibly"elastic fiction,"a qualityexhibitedin its ability to "mutatemany times over" as the characteristicsdetermininginclusion and exclusion have been repeatedly"redraftedto accommodate new
systemsof classificationand new discourses of knowledge" (2). Bynum
thinkersviewed change as a developmentof
argues thattwelfth-century
the already-extantforminto a new versionof itself,ratherthana complete
change into somethingit was not already (1995a, 8). This view is shared
by the contemporarypopular posthuman as well; while features are
adapted and weaknesses improvedthroughscientificapplication,the self
is notlost butenhanced,made notintoanotherspecies but ultimatelymore
251
like itself,yetbetter.Throughthe hybridizationof human and supplement,

what is supposedly best about the human remains- its supposedly always
rootedin its unpredictableemotionalresponsiveness.
open susceptibility,
As Bynum, JeffreyJeromeCohen, and others have demonstrated,a
fluidconception of the human such as thatrepresentedby the contemporary hybrid posthuman- part human, part mechanical or biomedical
adjunct- is hardlythe new and unnaturaloffspringof postmodernthought
and modernscience. Cohen writesthattheoriststend to use "posthuman"
to describe a "challenge to the boundedness of flesh,"the possibilityfor
which was supposedly provided only recentlyby moderntechno-science
(2003, xiii). However, in the medieval imagination,the human body was
commonlyblended with the non-humanin stories and also in images in
manuscriptmarginalia depicting werewolves, hybrid ox-men, humanofloral mixes, and the like. Medieval werewolf stories, in particular,
demonstratethe resistanceof the supposedly essential human self to full
absorptioninto non-humanness,particularlywhen considered in contrast
to storiesabout werewolves in ancientand more moderntraditions,where
werewolves oftenthreatenhuman survival and bringto vivid life the violent and rapacious beast latentwithinthe human,oftenat the expense of
the human identity which is ultimately overtaken by the supposedly
"alter" animal self. In contrast,medieval werewolves tend to be "sympathetic"(Bynum 2001, 94) - theyare human victimswho manage to maintain in theirwolvish bodies a rationalmentalityand human comportment.
The werewolf's physical state is not reflectiveof his innercorruptionbut
rather offers him the opportunityto reveal his true (human) nature,
throughthe great contrastbetween his appearance and his unexpectedly
humane actions.
In his twelfth-century
History and Topographyof Ireland, Gerald of
Wales relates a famous storyabout a priest's encounterwith a werewolf
and his wife who ask the priestto give her the viaticum,which the priest
agrees to do, but only afterthe she-wolf's skin is peeled back to reveal a
woman inside.5To be a suitable sacramentalrecipient,her humanitymust
be confirmed.Gerald uses his example of the she-wolf to investigate
whethersuch beings are human or bruteanimal, relyingforjudgment on
Augustine's example, in his Cityof God, of humans whose bodies become
bestial while theirmindsremainhuman,having the capacity to reason (see
Mills 33-34).6 This split,in Gerald's story,is what permitsthe characters'
252
INT
inclusionin theChristiancommunity.The potentiallymoreradical hybrid- is only suggested,for

ity- a being both human and wolf simultaneously
once the wolf skin is removed a complete human,both body and soul, remains. The wolf body was only superficial,like a suit of clothing,of a
piece withitselfand not physicallyintegratedinto the human inside.
In werewolf stories of the sort found in romances such as the fourMiddle English Williamof Palerne and Marie de France's
teenth-century
twelfth-century
Anglo-NormanBisclavret,the werewolfis more of a true
hybrid,exhibitinghuman and wolf characteristicsthatappear interwoven,
ratherthanbeing a humanbody and soul disguised in animal skins.7However, the human natureof the individual is still exhibitedamidst or over
the hybridity,expressed throughthe human person's affectand reason
ratherthanthroughhis physicalform.The werewolfis bothman and wolf,
not one or the otheror one afterthe other; yet human nature- in these
cases, a courteousnature- dominatesover and directsthe wolf's supposedly more ferocious instincts,which submitto the rational and sensitive
"person" directinghis movementsand gestures.
In theopeninglines of Bisclavret, Marie de France raises the specterof
a monstrous transformationin which the bestial does overpower the
human,when she explains thather werewolf,a Bretonbisclavret, is not to
be confused with the ferocious and rabidly inhumanegarulf of Norman
legend, who is a beste salvage ("savage beast") who devours humans.
Marie's bisclavret, to whom she never assigns a propername, is a victim
of betrayal(twice over) who behaves not like a murderousmonsterand
not even like a vicious wolf. The narrativetraces the betrayalof an unnamed knightby his wife,who out of fearof his alteranimal ego, arranges
forhis clothingto be takenwhile he is in werewolfform,therebypreventing him fromreturningto human body. It is importantto note thateven
thoughtthe knightmust regularlyturninto a wolf, he always goes away
fromhome to undergo this transformation,
so as to leave his wife and
household untroubledand unharmed.Afterbeing abandoned to his wolf
formand all alone in the woods, he is recognized by a king forhis noble
demeanorand human-likegestures;the king goes so faras to publiclydeclare the werewolfrationaland to make him a memberof his household.
Afterrepeatedlyprovingthe validityof the king's assessment,the werewolf uncharacteristically
attacks two people who are visitingthe court,
surprisingeveryonewho witnesses the assault, but only untilit is learned
BecomingMore{than) Human
253
thatthe violence is not unprovokedbestial aggressionbut rathera case of

rightfulvengeance againsthis wife and her new husband,who was her accomplice in the earliertheftof his clothing.Thus the wolf's one act of brutalityis acknowledged as evidence of his "real" human nature,in thathe
acted as a wronged husband requiringjustice. The bisclavrethas a complete humannature,as exhibitedby his reasoned actions and courteousbehavior,which neverthelessare expressed throughhis lupine form.Human
and wolf work togetherto pursuejustice, both public and private.
William of Palerne centers on two human-animal characterizations,
one of which is a truehybrid,the othersuperficial:the werewolfis simultaneouslywolf and man, with his two naturesunitedin the pursuitof his
(human) ends, while the hero and heroine of the storysimplydress up as
various animals to avoid capture. But whetherthe animal appearance is
genuine or feigned,both reveal the consistencyof what medieval English
cultureconsideredto be an ideal human nature.In this complicated narrative of noble sons wronglyrobbed of theirinheritance,one royal son, the
heir to the Spanish throne,Alphonse, is changed by his stepmotherinto a
werewolf so thather own son will become king. In this form,Alphonse
rescues anotherwrongedheir,William of Palerne,whose uncle attemptsto
have him assassinated. William is then taken in firstby a cowherd and
later by the Emperor of Rome, whose daughter, Melior, becomes
William's beloved. When she is to be marriedoffto the royal Greek heir,
she and William escape, hidden (still wearing theirnoble clothing)inside
whitebear skins. Incapable of caring forthemselvesin the wild, theyare
fed and protectedfrompredatorsby Alphonse the werewolf,who had previously rescued and raised William in his earlyyouth.Later,theirbear exteriorshavingbeen discovered by theirpursuersto be disguises, the lovers
switch to deerskins provided by the werewolf. The werewolf- who
William proclaims is more human than he himselfis- is indeed a wolf,
with wolf instinctsfor huntingand protectionagainst predators,unlike
William and Melior, who are clearlyjust animal imposters:theycan't feed
themselvesand are easy prey.The werewolfmustrepeatedlypreserveand
rescue them.However, he also is obviously and fundamentallyhuman: he
rationallydetermineshow to distractthose seeking William and Melior
(with his means for doing so depending on his instinctualwolf skills to
distractand lose the huntingdogs), and he helps the youngcouple because
he recognizes theirtruenobilityand pities theirplight.Based on theirex-
254
|NT
perienceswithhim,thelovers decide thewerewolfis human,regardlessof

his physique. In the man transformed
into a werewolf,whose hybridstate
is the resultof a curse placed on him by his stepmother,and in the threatened lovers,who mustbe disguised as animals in orderto hide theirnobilityfromtheirpursuers,the humanis forcedby others' inhumanebehavior
to take on animal form,but its self-identity
is neverfullyreplaced or covered over. Such storiespresentthe possibilityof physical boundarycrossing butconfirmtheconstancyof what medieval audiences believed was an
essential human nature,one thatwas centeredon reason and courtesyin
Marie's story,and on noble affectivity
in WilliamofPalerne. For medieval
audiences the flexibilityof the physical formwas not matched by a dangerous fluidityof mind or nature.Instead, certainidentitiesremain stable
at the "core" of the external,shiftingbody.
This idea of a stabilityof human identityin the Middle Ages can be
seen as rooted in the medieval conception of the relationshipbetween
humanbeings and thedivine. For medieval readers,theunchanging"core"
of identityis made manifestby the shape-shiftingof Christwho becomes
man, body and blood, thenbread and wine, with no change in his divine
essence. Hybridityis essentialto Christ'sparticipationin thehuman,as he
is botha humanpersonembodied in a livinghistoryand also a divine transhistoricalentity.In this regard,he models a posthumanityavailable to
Christianswho could share in his transhistoricity
by ingestingpieces of
his body and by believing in the resurrectionof theirbodies afterdeath.
Blendings of the human and inhuman- however discomfitedmany com- thusconfirmedand
mentatorsshowed themselvesto be by such hybrids8
authorizedmedieval conceptionsof humannature,because Christ'shybrid
embodimentas bothhumanand God leftundiminishedhis divine nature,a
view thatwas officiallysupportedby the Church. To thatend, it declared
hereticalthe Monophysite view that Christ had two wholly distinctnatures,withhis human naturebeing incompleteand his divine complete. A
parallel view promotedby Nestorius held thatthese two naturesare distinctbut thatthe human is the more important,and it, too, was deemed
heretical. Such attemptsto discover a hierarchywithin Christ's hybrid
identitywere refusedby the Church in favorof a single, unified,humanodivine being. The apparentlycontradictory
elementsco-exist,producinga
richhybrid,which is nevertheless"one." If Christ'shuman self were only
255
metaphorical,or inferior,or purelyhuman,theological claims forthe unity

of the individualin the afterlifewould be lost.
and particularity
The significanceof thatindividual embodied identitywas, withinmedieval Christianity,endorsed by the doctrine of bodily resurrection;as
Bynum notes, the returnof the physical self afterdeath "makes the body
crucial to the self in a way thatit is not in most otherculturaltraditions"
(1999). Hope in what Bynumtermsthe spatio-temporalcontinuityof individual identity,revealed in contemporarydebates about the possibilityof
mind uploading,9forexample, was essential formedieval people as well.
It inspiredmuch of the period's extensivetheorizingabout the logistics of
individualresurrection.The issue now as thendepends upon views toward
the relationshipbetween the tangible and intangibleelements of personof a singularindividualidenhood. In the Middle Ages, the fragmentation
of bodily resurrection,
about
the
doctrine
in
debates
a
central
question
tity,
was rejected. From the very early days of Christianity,resurrectiondepended upon the extensionof the self fromthis world to the next via the
earthlybody, which required (and assured) its material and spiritualintegrity,even to, as Augustinewas found of repeating,"the last hair on its
head."10 Theologians debated, for instance, how much of an individual
body would need to be available afterdeath (particularlya death involving
dismembermentor digestion) in order for resurrectionto be possible.
Jeromeand Augustine could not escape Tertullian'sconcern with the reassemblage of body pieces at resurrection(Bynum 1995a, 104), and the
glory of resurrectionwas presentednot in termsof a movementbeyond
the materialthroughrelease into the spiritual,but instead in termsof the
completerestorationof thebody inhabitedwhile alive, even withits scars,
making it finallyand permanentlysafe fromfurthercorruption.Bynum
of the individualself in relationto
sees modernconcernsover the integrity
a particularbody, despite modern technologythat allows for all sorts of
"body-hopping,"as a productof the later Middle Ages, with its sense of
personhood as comprisinga "particularindividual (not an essence)" and
"a unity(not a mind/bodyduality)" (1995b, 33). Medieval views on resurrectionrequireda continuityof identity,conceived of in termsof the continuityof the individual body thatis necessaryto sustain,or make palpable, a unique soul, or mind (see Bynum 1995a, 30, 37).
Because individual Christian personhood resided in both body and
soul, both were involved in intimatecommunion with God. As Bynum
256
centuriesa new attitudetoward

notes, in the thirteenth
throughfifteenth
the body accompanied Christocentricaffectivedevotion, in which physicality was not an obstacle but a path to union with the divine (1988, 51).
The existence of a perfectself is assured by the perfectionof Christ's
humanbody and is made possible throughthe ingestionand incorporation
of Christ'sbody in the Eucharist(which does not decay, and thusprotects
human bodies from decay upon resurrection)(Bynum 1995a, 111). In
1428, a woman accused of Lollardy maintainedthateating the Host "defile[d] and debase[d] him by a passage throughthe most inward,the most
profanely,and profoundlydissolving of the body's mediums" (Beckwith
24), but theChurchdisagreed,seeing ingestionand distributionas producing humanity'sholy union with Christ. The act elevated the Christian,
ratherthan degrading Christ,just as the Incarnation raised the human
ratherthandiminishingthedivine. Sarah Beckwithargues thatthecreative
brillianceof this conceit lies in the way it does not "create the transcendent throughsimple denial of the immanent,but rather[makes] of the finite,of the immanent,of the physical and mortalits verysource of generative power" (114).
Christ'saffectwas emphasized throughhis physical weakness, withhis
body an object of adorationthatdepended upon its ongoing violation,on
the renewal of his sacrifice(Beckwith 4). The medieval meditationon the
Seven Wounds of Christ,forexample, interprets
these wounds as "human
attributes[that]came to emphasize his vulnerability"(Turner 11). But he
was not,of course, onlybody,althoughhis affectivity
could be readilyexhis
human
and
it
this
is
form,
pressed through
quality thatperhaps most
fully articulates his humanity:Aquinas, throughAristotle,Bynum explains, "connected] wonder with pleasure and . . . associate[d] it with a
desire that culminates not so much in knowledge as in encounter with
majesty." An encounter,not knowledge itself,is the ultimategoal. From
this,Aquinas concluded that"the angel of the Annunciationshocked the
Virginbecause 'wonder is the best way to grab the attentionof the soul'
and insistedthatChrist'scapacity to wonder was not an indicationof dis"
comfortbut a proof of his humanity (Bynum 2001, 50-51; emphasis
added). Christshares the affectiveresponses of his followers,ratherthan
being above those responses. Because he looks and (generally) behaves
like them,but also because he feeIs like them,his followersknow theycan
be joined to, and extendedthrough,him.
257
In the fifteenth-century
autobiographyof MargeryKempe, The Book of
witness
the verypersonal relationshipwithChrist
MargeryKempe, we can
reveals the union of the human and
thatKempe develops, which strikingly
the divine throughthe emotionalexperience of sufferingin the world,and
of being vulnerable to the world's depredations.Kempe says that Christ
told her,"I am in you, and you in me. And those who hear you, theyhear
the voice of God" (18), and thuspositionshis divinityas situatedin a spiritual-physicalfusionwithher.Kempe' s embodied and even sensual participation in Christ's posthumanitypresentedher readers with a voluptuous
hybridityforwhich theywere unprepared,despite the Church's promotion
of such a communion. Indeed, Kempe's Book provides the details of her
trial in Leicester, England for heresy,as well as her neighbors' fear and
condemnationof her.Hers is such an intensecase of union throughthe incarnationthatthe textual representationof Kempe's third-personsubjectivitydepends entirelyupon her "imaging of the body of Christ" (Beckwith5). In her firstvision of him,Christcomes "in likeness of a man, most
seemly, most beautiful,and most amiable that ever mightbe seen with
man's eye" (7-8). ThroughChrist'sbeautiful,superlativebody Kempe understandsGod's goodness. Consistently,she focuses on God's manhood
ratherthan his godhood, explaining that the formeris approachable, the
When God asks forher hand in marriagein Rome, she
latterfrightening.
in
her
silence
soul and answered not thereto,for she was full sore
"kept
afraidof the Godhead, and she had no knowledge of the dalliance of the
Godhead, forall her love and all her affectionwas set on the manhood of
Christ" (63). She does not reduce God to mere man in her focus on
Christ's "manhood," a gesture that would affiliateher with the Monophysiteheresy;instead,the emphasis in her articulationof her communion
withChristis on multipleand shared identities.Christtells her that"those
who worshipyou, theyworship me; those who despise you, theydespise
me. ... I am in you, and you in me" (18). Christand Kempe, like Christ's
manhood and his divinity,are an indissoluble hybrid"one."
Kempe attainsthis communion with Christ througha type of mental
illness- as she puts it, "through[losing] her reason and wits, for a long
time untilour Lord by grace restoredher again" (3). By losing, or letting
go of, what most identifiesher as human, her reason, she experiences a
posthumanityin which she is no longer held back by temptationbut instead "was perfectlydrawn and stirredto enterthe way of high perfection,
258
INT
which perfectway Christ our Savior in his proper person exemplified"

(Kempe 3). In orderto experience this state,Kempe must not reason but
- confirmingAquinas's derathershe mustfeel- be "drawn and stirred"
scriptionof Christ's affectivityas revealing his affinitywith humanity.
Kempe's stateis supposedly beyond human,yet it remainsutterlyhuman
as well: embodied, and intenselyphysical. She does not lose her humanity
but she does become somethingnot onlyhuman,somethingthat,as Christ
assures her,shares in his simultaneouslydivine and corporalbeing.
For those such as Kempe living in the premodernworld, Christ's embodimentof the divine in human formnot only groundedthe truthof the
Word but also revealed the divinityavailable to the human; the eventual
salvation promised throughthe incarnate interventionof the divine in
human historythus elevated the subject (individually and collectively)
above its mortal and corruptible state. For medieval Christians, the
in which the
promise of participationin Christ's human-divinehybridity,
body could be exceeded yet not entirelyleftbehind,would have offereda
seeminglyliberatingimage of the posthuman.Similarly,the contemporary
techno-scientific
posthumanoffersanotherkind of emancipation,promising the self typicallyconceptualized in the formof the brain or mindfreedomfromthe limitationsof the body. This techno-scientific
fantasy
has much in common withliberal humanism,in its "unalloyed faithin the
primacyof the Enlightenmentsubject- rational,autonomous, self-determining" (Graham 159), and it extends that faithby pulling the curtain
back on a world in which individuals can directtheirevolution and subvert theirmortalitythroughmechanical intervention.The aim is to free
"the essential, rational self [to] endure unimpeded" (Graham 9), akin to
the promise of resurrectionofferedthe medieval Christianbut based on
ideas about what thatfreedomis.11
verydifferent
The contemporarypopular culture posthuman shares more with the
medieval posthumanthan with its historicalpeers: theoreticaland scientificposthumanistdiscourses. It resists the loss of certain individually
bounded identitiescelebrated by theoreticalposthumanismand fears the
reductionof self to the "all mind" hard drive promised by techno-science.12 By contrast,the popular cultureposthumanexhibitscertainanxieties about the possibility of becoming too posthuman,which calls to
mind the response to Margery'scelebrationof her hybridityexpressed by
her medieval neighbors,who shared her faithand hope yet feared some-
259
These apthingof their"selves" would be lost in the finaltransformation.

prehensions are also apparent in popular culture, where Francis
Fukuyama's concern with the end of historyis often articulated:"[T]he
most significantthreatposed by contemporarybiotechnologyis the possibilitythatit will alter human natureand therebymove us into a 'posthuman' stage of history"(7). Techno-science fantasynarrativestend to be
more optimisticabout the possibilities offeredby the posthumanthan is
Fukuyama,but they also reveal a desire to protect,or mournthe loss of,
somethinglong associated withpersonhood (since beforethe "discovery"
of the human in the Enlightenment)of which science oftenseems neglectful: the emotional self.13
Fictional considerations of the posthuman futuregenerally revolve
around nightmarescenarios (most familiarlyin the formof posthumans
such as Darth Vader and Robocop and the Terminator),oftenemployinga
versionof the apocalypticposthumandescribed by Elaine Graham as "the
"
fullytechnologized successor species to organic Homo sapiens (9) and
entitywhose boundaries
by KatherineHayles as "a material-informational
undergocontinuousconstructionand reconstruction"whereinthereis no
"naturalself" (3). This extreme,wholly otherposthuman,thougha common fixturein science fiction,remainsat the peripheryof textswhich centeron a hybridposthumanwho retainsa veryfamiliar"naturalself" and is
an extension of ratherthan "successor" to the human being. This hybrid
posthuman suggests possibilities of adaptation and continuationof the
human,not only in resistanceto but even withinthe posthuman,as a synthesis produced throughenhancementratherthan a full metamorphosis.
Despite the threatpresentedin such narrativesby technologiesoftenspun
out of control,the hybridposthumanpossessed of a "natural self" regularlyexpresses a faithin the resilience of the human and optimisticallyaffirmsthatin the posthumanworld the self is retainedand investedwiththe
potentialto sustain humanityeven in its newly developed form.The resilient characteristicaffiliatedby these texts with the human- typically
presentedin termsof "human nature"- is not the quality most esteemed
by liberal humanism or the scientificposthuman,the "universal instrument"of Cartesianreason (Badmington5); rather,it is an embodied affectivity.While this affectivitymakes the still-human(or, still somewhathuman) characters vulnerable to manipulation, suffering,and possible
260
extinction,it is also the one quality that allows them to overcome those
who threatento extinguishand replace the human.
Such narrativesreact against a techno-posthumanworld in which the
key componentsof thehuman- body and mind- are viewed as inherently
flawed,with science as the rescuer of the human fromits mortalself. In
this world, the human becomes an assemblage of parts,conceived of in
termsof a machine thatcan be fullyunderstood,operated,repaired,and
redesigned. Richard Dawkins exudes the delight of scientiststhat what
used to be describedeven in scientificdiscourse as the "irreduciblemysterious essence of life" has been replaced: "we've become wholly mechanisticwhen talkingabout life," a situationhe calls "most thrillingand exciting" ("Interview"). The "mysterious essence" is now a machine.
for each "part" of this machine science establishes an ideal
Furthermore,
standard
that,in a myriadof ways, an individualpartcan fail to
operating
meet. The role of science is to correctthis failure,a failurethatincreasinglyis viewed as resultingfromgeneticflaws,biological error.What has
traditionallybeen accepted as "normal" or inevitable- shortsightedness,
obesity,age-relatedillness,cancer,a tendencyto addiction,or the inability
of a boy to sit stilland focus- is pathologized and offeredup to science as
yet anotheropportunityto perfectthe species. In this scenario, science
deems the human an unfinishedand inherentlymalfunctioningorganism,
or clockwork, a view resisted in certain imaginative depictions of a
posthumanworld, in which an all too human vulnerabilitydefies science
and is endowed withredemptiveand even salvificqualities, even while it
is shown to be weak.
In the new incarnationof Battlestar Galactica (a very differentcreaturethantheon-the-verge-of-camp
series fromthe late 1970s), the distinction between the humans and the scientificallyproduced Cylons is most
evident in the Cylons' physical, psychological, and cultural supremacy,
which appears to make themnearlyinvulnerable.The humansof the series
are the descendantsof a people whose scientificprowess allowed themto
produce the Cylons who, over time, evolved to become theirpeers and
even superiors,sharingmore withthe gods the humans worshipthanwith
the humans themselves.14The Cylons were originallycreated as robotic
soldiers: shiny silver killing machines, toweringoverhead with a single
"eye" that continuouslyscans the environment,seeking only humans to
kill.15The Cylons were programmedso effectivelythattheyevolved at a
261
much more rapid pace thandid theircreators,such thateach of the qualities theywere endowed withdeveloped to an extremethe humans neither
intendednor anticipated.In the process, the most evolved Cylons become
humanoid,with a biology and psychology that mimic people so closely
thatonly a complex computertest can distinguishthe humans fromtheir
products. These Cylon bodies and minds, however, lack many of the
weaknesses of theirproducers'bodies and minds,fortheir"bodies" can be
replaced throughreincarnation(a kind of materialreplication) and their
"minds," which are conversantwithcomputers,are unimpededby a mortal body. The Cylons even become culturallyindependent,to the point of
developing a strongevangelical monotheismthatmotivatestheirencounterswiththe humans. The narrativepaints the humans as less evolved not
only in theirrelativephysical fragilitybut also in theirapparentlyinferior
culturalstructures:theyare nearlytribalin theirpolytheisticreligious expression,theirsupposedly universalmoralityis relativeand self-centered,
and theirapplication of theirjudicial system is repeatedly shown to be
hypocriticaland cynical.
And yetthe human is so precious thatthe centralconcernof the series
is the survivalof the species in the face of repeatedCylon attacks.Human
natureis so esteemed by the narrative,in fact,thatCylon evolution is, in
the currentthirdseason of the series, in the process of producingwhat appears to be a hybridof thehumanswho createdthemand the inhumanmachines the Cylons originallywere. These humanoid Cylons have certain
significantlimitations,physical (they are susceptibleto viruses) and emotional (they love, and they have even betrayed their own kind for this
love). While the firstgenerationof Cylon was all machine,and the second
human in appearance, the newest species is experiencinglife as humans,
which is to say, biologically and affectively.Their evolution seems to be
withthepotentialthattheywill ultakingthemto a hybridpost-machinity,
timatelybecome human, affirminghuman nature as the most desirable
possible form,despite its manyimperfections.
Battlestar Galactica attemptsto identifythe most salient featuresof
humanityby exploring changes experienced by a posthumanother as it
becomes human. Other narratives trace similar features through the
changes humans mightexperience when takingon extra-humanfeatures.
alien race
The 1998 filmDark Cityfocuses on the Strangers,a frightening
"as old as time itself" thatlooks nearlyhuman (in Gothic-Victorianattire,
262
witha mix of 1950s Martian). They are not posthumanin the way the Cylons of BattlestarGalactica are (thoughtheirmechanical humanoid form
evokes the post-apocalypticposthuman),for theyare not the productsof
humantechno-science,but of some alien evolutionin a distantworld. The
human protagonist, John Murdoch, unknowingly becomes a hybrid
posthumanas a resultof the Strangers'experimentationon him an experimentationthey are conductingin order to preserve themselves from
extinction.Despite theirenviable abilityto "alter physical realityby will
alone," as thehumandoctor-narrator
explains, "theywere dying,theircivilizationwas in decline, and so theyabandoned theirworld,seeking a cure
for theirown mortality."They seek this cure in the formof the human
soul- the necessary componentthey somehow recognize they lack- by
performingexperimentson unsuspectinghumans theyhave transportedto
a wholly fabricatedworld, the Dark City,whose landscape the Strangers
control by collectively focusing their telekineticenergies on machines
they have installed deep underground.They then treateach person as a
"blank slate" and physically inject a series of memories into his or her
mind (via a syringeto the brain), completelyunbeknownstto the subject
of the experiment.As the doctor-narrator
explains, the Strangersare "trywhat
makes
us
to
divine
unique." They do thisby changingall aspects
ing
- personal history,family,job, social status,
of an individual's identity
etc.- to see what remainsconstant.As Mr. Hand, leader of the Strangers,
explains at themomentof his own death,the Strangers"fashionedthiscity
on stolen memories. Differenteras, differentpasts, all rolled into one.
Each nightwe revise it, refineit, in orderto learn . . . about you and your
fellow inhabitants,what makes you human." The Strangersseek a constantessence theyassume is humans' definingcharacteristic.
The usual focus of Enlightenmenthumanismon the mind's capacity
forreason is replaced in thisnarrativewiththe soul's capacityforemotion.
Human behavior is depicted as naturallyand inevitablyrooted in feeling,
which the film shows to be the key characteristicof the soul, as represented via Murdoch's hybridposthumanity.Murdoch's identityis the result of an interruptedexperiment that gave him the powers of the
Strangerswithoutremovinghis human identity:his particularindividuality was lost, but his human naturewas not replaced by Strangernature.
Like the Cylons, he is a case of science gone awry,yet (like the evolving
Cylons themselves) his victimhood allows him a productively hybrid
263
he can manipulate
posthumanity:because the experimentwas interrupted,
the physical world at will while also retaininghis soul, as is exhibited
throughhis capacity to love irrationallyand to riskhimselfforthe sake of
his fellow humans,presentand future.As a result,he is whatthe Strangers
were tryingto become. Unlike them,however,he understandsthe importance of makingseeminglyirrationalyetprincipledchoices, as is revealed
throughhis decision love his wife, Emma, despite his discovery thatthe
entire relationshipwas artificiallyconstructedby the Strangersthrough
false memoriesinjected into Emma and himself.It is not simply a matter
of Murdoch's having achieved the Strangers' "superhuman" skills that
makes him capable of fightingthem; it is the combinationof those skills
withhis emotional orientations.
Murdoch confirms the narrative's investmentin affect as the vital
human capacity thatthe Strangersseek, in the formof the soul, although
the Strangersfail to recognize it as such. In his final confrontationwith
Mr. Hand, who explains, "Your imprintis not agreeable withmy kind. But
I wanted to know what it was like. How you feel," Murdoch responds,
"You wanted to know what it was about us that made us human. But
you're not going to findit here [pointingto his head]. You were looking in
the wrong place." His belief in love, which will not guarantee his
survival- deliberately and knowingly choosing a pseudo-love over
reason- produces his humanity.The movie's classic romance conclusion,
withthe hero and heroinereunitedand startingtheirlife together(albeit in
a constructedlandscape) shows thatlove, regardlessof the lack of authenticityof theirmemoriesand geography,makes themhuman.The Strangers
cannot develop this capacity,not because they are not hardwiredas humans but because they thinkthe soul is a tangible quality of the mind
ratherthan,as Murdoch explains and demonstrates,an intangiblequality
of the heart,which,technicallyspeaking,is a human fiction.
The filmappears to implythat,unlike Murdoch, scientistshave a tendency to devalue and deny the affectivecapacities thatproduce theirvery
humanity.The Strangersreveal themselvesto be operatingnot only froma
liberal humanistworldview,in which an unchanginghuman naturedirects
behavior, but also from a techno-scientificperspective in which that
human naturecan be investigatedand understoodby takingit apart. The
filmconfirmsthe firstof these assumptions(thereis somethingso universally essentialto humannaturethatit cannotbe eradicatedby science), but
264
challenges the last in that there is somethingopaque about an essential

human naturethat cannot be seen as a "moving part," nor mechanized.
The filmdepictsthe Strangersas artists,throughthefictionaltableaux they
make forthe characterstheyhave so carefullyconstructed,yettheyare incapable of learning from,or appropriatelyvaluing, theirart. They have
faithonly in science, and thatpreventsthemfromdeveloping or imagining
forthemselvesa soul. The humandoctorsharesthislimitation:he is physiologically human,yet unlike Murdoch he uses his intellectalone (which
allows him to collude with the Strangers despite their obviously evil
aims). An image of the doctorperformingexperimentson a rat in a large
maze makes a directequation betweenthe Strangersand today's scientists:
both seek scientific"answers" thatwill preservethemfromdecay and destructionand do so throughcontrolled(and cruel) experimentationon living subjects. Both represent liberal humanism's esteemed rationality,
while also revealingtechno-science'sinsufficient
abilitytofeel.
The hybridposthumanrepresentedin both Battlestar Galactica and
Dark Cityis one thatserves not to supporta "new ontological state"but to
highlightwhat the texts argue are centrallyintractablehuman qualities,
just as medieval werewolf stories did. Dark City expresses, moreover,a
resistanceto science's distrustof the intangible,that which cannot (currently,at least) be understood,explained, and manipulated by science.
Richard Dawkins describes religion,for instance,as a "by-product"of a
"psychological disposition"in humans- more specifically,what he calls a
"psychological weakness"- toward "believ[ing] things that they would
like to be trueeven if thereis no evidence forthem" ("Interview"). Dark
Cityand BattlestarGalactica confirmsthatthis tendencyis a disposition
among human beings, but one that despite its capacity for making them
gullible is also the one quality thattrulysets themapart,individuallyand
collectively,and provides value in theirlives, no matterhow vulnerable
those lives mightbe as a result.
Kazuo Ishiguro's 2006 novel Never Let Me Go , set in thelate twentieth
century,is narratedby a clone named Kathywhose body was scientifically
produced as a site forgrowingorgans to be "harvested"forthe preservation of "normal" humans threatenedby disease or otherphysical trauma.
The narrativetraces the psychological developmentof threeyoung clones
in particularwho form a lasting friendship:Kathy, Tommy, and Ruth.
They are raised and live togetherat Halisham, a boardingschool (which is
265
a type of orphanage), where they grapple with the great divide between
theirunderstandingof themselvesas humans and theirsociety's consider- as mere bodies lacking deep interiorselves
ation of themas non-humans
or souls, artificialproductsof a human science whose sole purpose is to
extend the lives of "genuine" humans. The clones are ultimatelyconstrained by a system which demands that they contributetheir bodies
(which involves certain death, or "completion," as it is called), as their
major organs are "donated" one by one in a sequence organized to delay
theirdeath formaximumharvestingopportunities.Moreover,theyare expected to donate theirliving services as well: most clones spend at least
some time servingas "carers,"or caretakers,to otherclones whose organs
are being surgicallyremoved. Both the humans and the clones theyproduce participatein an oppressive posthumanity:the clones (against their
will) as the techno-scientificposthumanproduct,and the humans, willfully,throughtheiracceptance thattheirown existence depends upon and
justifiesthis systemof the enforcedservice (and deaths) of others.
Both groupsclaim humanity,but only those who were not "artificially"
produced are freeto do as theychoose. By focusingthe novel on the experiences and feelings of the clones- representedthroughKathy's narration of her memoriesand experiences,especially with her closest friends,
Ruth and Tommy- Ishiguro makes clear thattheiridentityis no different
fromthatof the humans who createdthem,or those of us who are reading
theirstory;theyare concernedwithcompetition(Ruth continuallymanipulates Kathy to test her loyalty),sex (Kathy anxiously triesto prove that
hergreatinterestin sex, which she perceives as unusual and undesirablein
a woman, is an inheritedpredisposition),and the quest for an individual
identity(Tommy strugglesthroughouthis time at the school against his
reputationfor lacking artisticskill and is the favoritetargetof bullies).
Their experiences are wholly indistinguishablefromthose presentedby
any modernnarrativeabout childrengrowingup in an institutionalsetting,
discoveringlife forthemselves,based loosely on what theyare told (or, in
many cases, allowed to believe) by the few adults who chaperone and educate them.Kathy,like the narratorsin manyof Ishiguro's novel, reveals a
tendencyto self-delusionas a coping mechanism. In fact,this quality is
exhibitedby all of the asexually produced characters,who develop a variety of stories to explain theirexperiences and observations and to give
themselvesthe hope theyneed in orderto survivethe dehumanizingworld
266
INT
intowhichtheyhave been thrustbut about whichtheyhave only ever been

given half-truths.
A key mythdevelops forthe studentsas theyapproach the end of their
education,which is followed by a shorttransitionalperiod as theyprepare
to starttheirtime as "donors," thatis to say, as theyapproach theirdeath.
Their desire to live, one of the many topics they silentlyplace out of
bounds in orderto be able to carryon, takes theformof a belief in thepossibilityof a defermentfor those who can "prove" that they are in love.
This mythpiggybackson a myththatsustainedthemin theirearlierchildhood, when they were told thatthey could demonstratetheiruniqueness
throughtheir artwork,their "creativity,"as it is repeatedly called. The
young clones believe that theirartworkis selected and collected by the
school's regional director,Madame, based on its aesthetic value, and
placed in a special public gallery.As they age, they come to believe (in
stereotypicalstrugglingteenage fashion) that love will literallyrescue
them,and thatif theirlove can be deemed "true"by the artworktheyhave
produced throughouttheir lives that reveals their individual and "true"
identities,theycan be saved. They believe (thoughtheycan never articulate this openly) thattheirlove and creativity,theirability to emote authentically,will confirmtheirhumanityand thus preservethem fromthe
inhumanedeath thatis otherwisetheirfate.Kathy even dreamsof one day
being a mother.Indeed, it is revealed later thatthe teacherscollected the
best artworkin orderto prove to those outside the school thatclones have
souls and thus should be treatedwith more equity,but the ultimateresult
of their effortsis that Halisham is shut down. Ruth dies, followed by
Tommy,and the novel ends withKathy still alive, but resignedto the fact
thatshe will die soon.
For the reader,the clones' experiences and responses to those experiences regularlyconfirmtheirhumanity,but withintheposthumanworld of
the narrative,theirhumanitymustbe proven. For the clones- as theybelieved it is for the supposedly more "real" humans- to be human is to
have an interiorself thatis able to express what it feels, and thatfeels love
in particular.The clones who are the central figures of the novel are
shown,throughthe narrative,to meet thatrequirementas fullyas any humans. However,the more "real" and biologically enhanced humansare revealed to be lacking in the humanityexpressed in so many ways by their
scientificoffspring.They, not the clones, are the nightmareposthumans
267
here, not because of theirbioenhancementsbut because throughtheirattemptto extendtheirown lives, theyhave inhumanelydestroyedthe lives
of others purely for theirown benefitand in order to sustain that,they
must refuse to risk an affectivitythat would allow them to feel for the
clones. When Kathy and Tommy initiallyapproach Madame to request a
deferment,theyeagerlyannounce thattheyare "in love," to which her response (in a tone Kathydescribes as "almost sarcastic") is to ask, "You believe this?" and "How can you know it? You thinklove is so simple?"
(253). She is shocked to learn thattheybelieve in these old values, ones
- to extend her now inhumane
that she has sacrificedin order to benefit
selfhood- from the biological possibilities offered by techno-science.
This is not to say Madame does not regrether choices, as the situationof
the clones over whom she keeps watch oftendistressesher. Kathy,Ruth,
Tommy,and the other clones, however, make a more selfless sacrifice,
having been "broughtup to serve humanityin the most astonishingand
selfless ways, and the humanitytheyachieve in so doing makes us realize
thatin a new world the word must be redefined"(Yardley). Once again,
being human is revealed as a certainfeeling vulnerabilityand ability to
love others,even in the face of one's own inevitable and untimelydeath;
to be otherwiseis to have moved beyond "being human."
Dark City,BattlestarGalactica, and Never Let Me Go engage current
fantasies about science producing a posthumanworld in which disease,
frailty,and aging are the exception ratherthan the rule. Yet these narratives qualifythatdesire by retaininga nostalgia fortheweaknesses thatresult fromparticularembodied affectivities,
representingthese characterisa
tics as what ultimately separates hybrid posthuman- and thus the
human- from the alternatives.The texts promote an alternativeto the
techno-scientific
everypresumedweakquest forperfectionthatinterprets
ness as a problemin need of repair.Science is representedas so certainof
its own objectivityand reason thatall kinds of atrocitiesare possible. In
both Dark Cityand Never Let Me Go, medical scientistsare purelyselfish
antagonistsin their single-mindedreliance on "objective" reason, while
the hybridand posthumanprotagonistsexemplifythe "best" or more virtuous qualities traditionallyassociated with "human nature,"ones rooted
in emotion and in aesthetic expression. Indeed, the human must move
throughand beyond reason to reach thehybridposthumanitywithinwhich
what has always been human can best express itself.JohnMurdoch- like
268
MargeryKempe- locates his humannesson the otherside of a body and

mind transformation,occasioned by an illness-produced irrationality:
Murdoch is emotionallydiseased (seeking out the doctorinitiallybecause
of his anger over his real wife's affair),as Kempe experienced a loss of
reason as a consequence of childbirth.Centralhuman experiences such as
love and childbirthproduce supposedly irrationalfeelings and altered
statesof being, shown to be as fundamentallyhuman as reason. A certain,
which is
inherentlyflawed human embodimentnecessitates affectivity,
seen as essential to human experience and understanding more particu- in a way reason
larly,to humanemodes of expressionand understanding
is not.The hybridposthumanin its premodernand contemporarymanifestations,forall of its "out of body" and altered states,remainsrooted in a
feeling humanvulnerability.
- to pain, to supposedly
In a culture in which human vulnerability
aberrantemotionalstates,to aging, and even to death- is a stateof affairs
to be eradicated,science may not intendto reduce the self by conceptualizing it as a machine thatis only a sum of its parts,but what these contemporaryposthumannarrativesargue is that a reductionof the human
and even happiness, is the inperson's capacity for self-determination,
evitable effectof the realization of such a view. The posthumanthatresultsfromsuch a realization,these narrativesimply,may be physicallyenriched, its capabilities and life extended,but in the process much of its
identityand value as a singularwork of human art- cognitive,biological,
emotional- is lost. JohnMurdoch in Dark City and the Cylons of BattlestarGalactica are physicallymore adept and powerfulbecause of technology.And yetwhat makes Murdoch stillhumanis his willingnessto act
to sacrificehimselffor the good of "humanity"simply
extra-reasonably,
out of a belief, which can never be proven by a piling up evidence that
would satisfythe scientificmethod,in the value of the vulnerableand frail
human who would choose love over his own survival. Similarly,the biologically enhanced human beings in Never Let Me Go have made posthumans of themselves,and have therebyengaged in a devolution in which
they retaintheir(more durable) human bodies but sacrificetheirhuman
nature,as representedby theirlack of faithin love and hope and their
cruel treatment
of the clones who theyrefuseto view as fullyhuman. But
the clones are, in fact,more human thanMadame and the otherguardians
because of theirbelief thatthey mighthave a future,despite all the evi-
269
dence to the contrary.These narrativesultimatelysupportthe sociologist

Bryan Turner's belief that "[i]f the promise of modernitywere ever to
prove successful,it would reduce our vulnerability,and thus bring about
the end of humanity"(32).
Indeed, withoutvulnerability,a society of extremelyrational beings
experiencingno loss to decay or disease would findlittleneed to express
theirexperiences,theirindividual selfhood,throughart.Art- in the form
of stories,especially- is used in these texts to fashion identitiesfor the
hybridposthuman,providinghope forthe clones in Never Let Me Go and
producingthe whole basis forJohnMurdoch's life in Dark City. The stories are completelyuntrue,yet theyare necessary to survival. Both novel
and filmdemonstratethatart is necessary to human expression and selfunderstanding,especially in the midst of a culturein which the greatest
- is assumed to be
demonstrationof humanness- of human superiority
scientific,ratherthanartistic.Throughscience, it is suggested,we can create ourselves as we wish to exist, and can do so in the material world
ratherthanin the imaginaryworld of art.Yet art,these narrativesargue,is
where the always intangibleyet most valuable aspects of individual existence can best be expressed,interrogated,and celebrated.Indeed, identity
does not seem possible without stories- stories, moreover, that are
groundedin an emotional life thatcannot be quantitativelymeasured. In a
song released in 2007, Isaac Brock of theband Modest Mouse takes on the
persona of a scientificallyproduced individual and groans that he was
"born in a factory,faraway fromthe milkyteat" and indictshis audience
for"cheer[ing]as I was splitin half,a mechanical sacrificialcalf foryou."
The song's refrainis the question driving this posthuman's lament, the
central question to which contemporaryposthuman texts also respond:
"What's the use? Oh, what's the use?" Medieval Christiansfound "the
use" in theirhybridrelationshipwith Christ,who was both "divine" (i.e.,
perfect)and also human (i.e., feelinglyand bodily vulnerable); contemporarypersons, the science fictiondystopic narrativesargue, can findit in
even when it is "joined," perhapsmore so, to their
theirflawedaffectivity,
"bodies."
posthuman
Certain popular texts,both medieval and contemporary,intriguingly
hope forthe posthuencourage what could be seen as a counter-intuitive
the
"weakness"
of
embraces
human
one
which
man,
beings to "believe
if
would
like
to
be
true
even
there
is
no evidence for
that
they
things
270
them" (Dawkins). Margery (and the medieval theologians whose views

she pursuedto the hereticalfullest),Murdoch (and his "wife" Emma, who
accepts his experientiallyunfoundedlove), the evolved Cylons (who act,
against"type,"in accord withtheiremotionalattachments),and Kathyand
her clone friendsall value "the human" thattheirrespectivecultureshave
supposedlyleftbehind so intenselythattheirposthumansituatednessdoes
not preventthemfromexpressing,oftenwitha kind of tenacious despair,
whattheybelieve to be theirown singular,human identities.Like the medieval posthumancharacterizedby Christ,whose assumption of human
naturerequiredan acceptance of the frailtiesassociated with(but not limited to) the humanbody, the contemporaryposthumandefendsthe beauty
of the singularhumanby deliberatelyretaining,withinits machineryor alteredphysical state,theweaknesses and vulnerabilitiesthatresultfromthe
memoriesof its old, historicalbody,and hence, its all too affectedand affectiveself.
Notes
I owethanks
tomanywhohavehelpedmethrough
thisproject,
from
tocompleinception
tion:mydaughter,
Zoe Seaman-Grant,
forsharing
herobsession
withStarTrek:
NextGeneration
anditsfrequent
withtheposthuman;
DanielPowell,
experimentation
mystudent,
foragreeing
to pursuean independent
andforbeingendlessly
studyon posthumanity
on thesubject;
Birrer
forearlyandnecessarily
as I
provocative
Doryjane
patient
support
tookmyfirst
with
this
for
BABEL
the
discussion
session
on
"Medieval
to
steps
paper
ModernHumanisms"
at theSoutheastern
MedievalAssociation
in
meeting Daytona
in2005;andEileenJoyandChristine
Neufeld
fortheir
much-needed
editoBeach,Florida
rialassistance
andadvice.
1. SoperandDaviesprovide
anduseful
histories
ofthedevelopment
ofvarious
thorough
strains
ofhumanism,
itsEnlightenment
andpost-Enlightenment
manifestaincluding
tions.Badmington
offers
anoverview
ofposthumanism,
whichhegenerally
defines
as
"a refusal
totakehumanism
forgranted"
ofessaysthatincludes
(10),ina collection
texts
suchas Barthes,
Foucault,
Fanon,and
keyfoundational
posthumanist
bythinkers
others.
like
tends
to
be
understood
as a
Althusser,
Posthumanism,
humanism,
among
termthatrefers
notto a singleconcept
butto a cluster
ofrelated
and
concepts, the
booksbySoper,Davies,andBadmington
demonstrate
this.Hayles,Halberstam,
and
view
the
with
some
in
that
Haraway
posthuman
optimism,ways challenge
manytraditionalhumanist
values.
271
2. In fact,thedanger
hasbeenso broadly
as togenerate
theso-called
"Crisis
recognized
intheHumanities."
former
of
the
wrote
an
article
in
2001
tiPerloff,
MLA,
president
tledsimply
"CrisisintheHumanities,"
andtheinfluence
oftheconceptual
posthuman
informs
thetitle(andproject)of Scholes's2004 Presidential
Addressto theMLA,
"TheHumanities
ina Posthumanist
World."
inSoperandDavieshavemoststrongly
fluenced
on theissue;particularly
aretheircontribumyownthinking
encouraging
tionstothedevelopment
ofa "new"humanism
informed
bypoststructuralist
critique
andresponsive
tothechallenges
to
and
otherhumanism,
posed
post-Enlightenment
the
transition
to
a
world.
wise,by
posthuman
3. Foranoverview
oftheposthumanist
oftheliberal
humanist
inthescicritique
subject,
encesas wellas intheliterary
andother
arts,seeespecially
Hayles,HowWeBecame
Posthuman
andGraham,
Representations
ofthePost!Human.
4. Thepopular
mediamakesmuchoftechno-science's
To takea
imaginative
potential.
selectedexample,
thecoveroftheMay2007issueofthemagazine
Disrandomly
cover:Science
and TheFutureincluded
halfofwhich
, Technology,
eightheadlines,
"The PlasticBrain:KeepingThe MindForeverYoung";
playedup thisfeature:
Hardwired:
Is
"Morality
RightAnd WrongIn Our DNA?"; "Mind-Controlled
and
Animation:
How 10 Minutesin LimboCan Save Your
Robots"; "Suspended
Life."
5. Themostaccessible
edition
ofthistextin Englishis thetranslation
byO'Meara.It,
includes
the
first
recension.
For
a
more
however,
text,see Geraldof
only
complete
distension
in
Giraldi
Cambrensis
Hibernica,
Wales,Topographia
2,chapter
19,
Opera,
ed.J.S. Brewer,
F.Dimock,
James
andG. F.Warner,
8 vols.,RollsSeries,21 (London:
ofmedieval
wereGreen,ReaderandDyer,1861-91)5:101-7.Analyses
Longman,
thosedescribed
wolves,especially
(2001,
byGeraldofWales,areoffered
byBynum
ch.2),Cohen(2006,ch.3,and2003,ch.2), Mills,Bildhauer
andMills,andMittman.
6. Bynum
demonstrates
anextensive
ofGerald'svarious
versions
ofthe
through
analysis
thathisinterpretation
ofthestory's
whichdepends
story
significance,
upona problematicanalogue
ofChrist's
revealshisownambivalence
toward
the
incarnation,
actually
werewolves'
moralandhuman
status
(2001,16-18).
7. TheMiddleEnglish
William
French
versero(basedona thirteenth-century
ofPalerne
can
be
in
found
the
1867
Skeat
An
edition.
electronic
edition
Gerrit
H.V.
mance)
by
Buntwaspublished
in2002bytheUniversity
ofMichigan
Press.Marie'sBisclavret
is
oneofhertwelvelais(short
Breton
romances
written
inOldFrench
poeticverse)and
canbe readinEnglish
translation
intheedition
andFerrante.
byHanning
272
8. Forinstance,
medieval
resisted
a rangeofheresies
thatweredetheologians
actively
claredsuchinlargepartbecauseoftheir
"assault
not
on
perceived
just piouspractice
buton fundamental
notionsof thehuman"through
theboundaries
of
"denying
for
in
or
a
deification
which
was
lost
in
dithings preaching
metempsychosis
person
writes
thatwecan"seesuchresistance
inthethir2001,27). Bynum
vinity"
(Bynum
Church's
bothofmetempsychosis
andofantinomian
orquiteenth-century
rejection
etistteachings
thattheindividual
canbecomeGod"(2001,32).
9. Minduploading,
alsoknown
as mindtransfer
orelectronic
is themovetranscendence,
mentorrelocation
ofthehumanmindto a hardware
than
(other thehuman
system
that
is
considered
and
others
to
be
themind'soptimum
Kurzweil,
body)
byMoravec,
in
which
is
released
from
its"wet"andimperfect
condition,
cognitionfully
body;such
viewstendtoenvision
anevolvedstateinwhichthehuman
as weknowitis replaced
Moravec'sMindChildren
and
See, forexample,
bya newage of machines/robots.
Kurzweil's
TheSingularity
is Near.
10. In Book22,Chapter
21 ofhisCityofGod,Augustine
"Butevenifbysome
wrote,
misfortune
or
the
of
enemies
the
whole
grave
savagery
[body]shouldbe completely
to
dust
and
into
the
air
or
so
that
as faras itis possible,
ithas
water,
ground
dispersed
nobeingatall,bynomeansis itabletobebeyond
theomnipotence
oftheCreator,
but
nota hairofitsheadshallperish.
thespiritual
willbe subjected
flesh
tothe
Therefore,
notspirit;
wassub[willstillbe] flesh,
spirit,
yetnevertheless
justas thecarnalspirit
notflesh"
dei48:841;mytrans(De civitate
jectedtotheflesh,
yetwillstillbe spirit,
lation).
- in all itsimperfect
11. The concern
in theMiddleAgeswas withretaining
thebody
whereas
in
the
the
concern
is often
toescape
parts
contemporary
posthuman
fantasy
thebodyentirely,
either
out"orbymaking
thebodyso closeto
byliterally
"getting
thatitis anableandenduring
assistant
tothemind.
perfect
12. Ontheidea,again,that"mind"
couldbe separated
from
"brain"
(i.e.,"body")andupintheexperience
loadedtoa computer
without
aninterruption
ofself-idendatabase,
seeMoravec
andKurzweil.
tity,
13. Morerecently,
scientists
havebeenturning
to workon theemotions.
See especially
Descartes'
The
What
and
Damasio,
Error, Feelingof
Happens, Looking
forSpinoza.
14. Sucha scenario
is common
suchas theManarratives,
amongapocalyptic
posthuman
trixfilmtrilogy,
inwhichthehumans
thatevencreatetheveryArtificial
Intelligence
seizespowerandenslaves
human
bodiesas energy
thehuman
sources,
tually
keeping
braindistracted
itina virtual
theMatrix.
world,
byengaging
273
15. Somekeydifferences
between
thecurrent
incarnation
ofBattle
starGalacticaandits
in
demonstrate
a
shift
interests
on
the
of
those
precursor
part
imaginatively
investigatworld.In the1978-79television
series(anditsbrieffollow-up
seingtheposthuman
riesin 1980),theCylonsarea reptilian
alienracethatproduces
a military
robot
it
that,
Inthecurrent
is implied,
overtook
itscreator.
theCylonsarea product
ofthe
version,
humans
andthenarrative
traces
thehumans'
vexedrelationship
withtheir
themselves,
owncreation.
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De civitatedei. In AureliiAugustini
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April

Becoming More Than Human Affective Posthumanisms Past and Future

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Becoming More (than) Human: Affective Posthumanisms, Past and Future

Author(s): Myra J. Seaman

been one unified,cohesive "human," a title that was grantedby and to

The second view- with the human "person" a "malleable representation

identity"(Bynum 1995a, 11). The theoreticalposthumanistconception of

thatholds open even thebiomechanicallymodifiedhumanto a vulnerability seen as essential to maintaininghumanness.The techno-scientifically

like itself,yetbetter.Throughthe hybridizationof human and supplement,

inclusionin theChristiancommunity.The potentiallymoreradical hybrid- is only suggested,for

thatthe violence is not unprovokedbestial aggressionbut rathera case of

perienceswithhim,thelovers decide thewerewolfis human,regardlessof

metaphorical,or inferior,or purelyhuman,theological claims forthe unity

centuriesa new attitudetoward

which perfectway Christ our Savior in his proper person exemplified"

These apthingof their"selves" would be lost in the finaltransformation.

challenges the last in that there is somethingopaque about an essential

intowhichtheyhave been thrustbut about whichtheyhave only ever been

MargeryKempe- locates his humannesson the otherside of a body and

dence to the contrary.These narrativesultimatelysupportthe sociologist

them" (Dawkins). Margery (and the medieval theologians whose views

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