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A anlise de Aug (1992: 41, 51, 100) da sobremodernidade como produtora de no-lugares (eroso
dos
sentidos e das referncias partilhados) coloca o indivduo sob a necessidade quotidiana irremedivel de
produzir sentido, de dar sentido, de recompor os lugares e de levantar uma morada sua um lugar
antropolgico.
Cada tipo de reflexividade, por sua vez, pode ocorrer: por um lado,
atravs da mediao dos "sistemas especialistas"; ou, por outro, contra a
natureza desses sistemas especialistas. aqui que termina a notvel
antropologia (e a sociologia)
reflexiva tem o sentido de entendermos nossos prprios conceitos,
no como categorias, mas como esquemas interpretativos, como predisposies
e orientaes, como nossos prprios hbitos. A cincia humana
reflexiva depende da emergncia de uma traduo entre nossos esquemas
e os esquemas de nossos referentes. Implica que entendamos reflexivamente
que nossos "conceitos" so apenas outro conjunto de esquemas
privilegiados (por um acidente do Ocidente). A cincia humana reflexiva
But beyond these classic critiques, which can be found just as easily in
Hume, Fichte, Hegel, or Heidegger, the foundation also designates a point of
view that would allow us to speak of science and of knowledge in general.
Apparently targeted here are not only neo-Kantian theoreticians of
knowledge like Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp but presumably also
epistemologists like Karl Popper who indeed adopt a point of view
considered to be, if not better, at the very least neutral, from which they can
speak of scientific knowledge.
Saying and the Said: Two Paradigms for the Same Subject
This is the thesis that Austin criticizes, in showing that a statement does not
necessarily represent facts but can also manifest a desire, exert an
influence, etc. In the analytic context, critique of representation is
constructed around the idea that a signs function is not necessarily to refer
to a being or a state of affairs external to the sign. This is why, in Austins
pragmatism, what is examined is not the things excess with respect to
representation but rather the statements excess with respect to the
exclusive representation of facts. The excess here is an excess of the sign,
which says more than it ought to say and thus goes beyond its simple
referential function.
A SEGUNDA FORMA DE CRTICA DA REPRESENTAO VEM NA FORMA DE UM
EXCESSO DO SIGNO, UM DIZER QUE DIZ MAIS QUE O DITO, QUE FAZ....
On the other hand, the second wave of the linguistic turn, 6 which
Wittgenstein and Austin inaugurated in the second half of the twentieth
century, today embodies a widely shared trendwhich we must examine
insofar as it is a
No Avaliaes outro lado, a segunda onda da "virada lingustica", 6 qui
Wittgenstein e Austin Inaugurada na segunda metade do sculo XX,
incorpora hoje uma tendncia amplamente compartilhada-que devemos
examinar na medida em que um
A VISO DE AUSTIN
On this point, his treatment of the old and enduring philosophical their
appearances?) 8 is emblematic of his general approach. But by means of
this clear rupture, amply underscored, Austin decisively breaks with the
first wave of analysis 9 initiated by the Vienna Circle, who, granting what
Austin decried as the descriptive fallacy, 10
beyond the narrow framework of morality and of politics and becomes the
cardinal concept of knowledge, in the same way that, for Austin, the order of
the sayable became that of action and the act of expression, the expression
of an act. At the end of this analysis, we can directly answer the question
why we should speak of an act and not of a fact. We are authorized to do so
quite simply an action and not of a fact or an event.
the law of self-reference is the law that gives philosophy its distinctive
status and structures its propositions;
this law provides philosophy its dimension of knowledge in contrast to
scientific learning or literary creation;
this law of self-reference does not point to some sort of metaphysical
substrate, nor does it necessitate some sort of psychological introspection,
but is a law immanent in philosophical discourse.
In a word, this law of reflexivity 35 avoids all the pitfalls usually denounced
by contemporary philosophy while overcoming the generalized its
consistency by systematically contrasting it with the most contemporary
theories of self-reference