Election Law Digests

ADMIN | Election Law | 1
1. [G.R. No. 139357. May 5, 2000]
Revision Committee was created and its membership were duly

appointed in open court which committee was directed by the
ABDULMADID P.B. MARUHOM, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
COMELEC to finish therevision of ballots. After the Revision Committee
ELECTIONS and HADJI JAMIL DIMAPORO, respondents
was directed by the respondent to commence the revision of ballots, the
petitioner Maruhom thru counsel orally moved for the dismissal of the
FACTS:
protest on the grounds that (1) The ballot boxes containing the ballots in
the protested and counter-protested precincts have been violated; (2)
Petitioner and private respondent were both candidates for
Mayor in the Municipality of Marogong, Lanaodel Sur and voted as such Automated counting of ballots does not contemplate a manual recount
in the last May 11, 1998 national and local election. During the counting of the ballots
of votes, serious irregularities, anomalies and electoral frauds were
ISSUE:
committed at the instance of petitioner or his followers in that votes
actually casted for the private respondent were not counted and
WON the COMELEC may order manual recount of ballots even
credited in his favor thru the concerted acts, conspiracy and
not mentioned in R.A. 8436
manipulation of the Board of Election Inspectors, military, Election
Officer and the Machine Operator who happens to be a nephew of the
HELD: AFFIRMATIVE.Although admittedly there is a lacuna leges in
petitioner.
R.A.No.8436 which prescribes the adoption of an automatedelection
system. However, while conceding as much, thisCourt ruled
On several precincts, about 115 official ballots were refused or
inTupayLoongv.COMELECthat theCommission is nevertheless not
rejected by the counting machine which the private respondents
precluded from conducting amanual count when the automated
watchers or representatives have requested and insisted to be re-fed to counting system fails,reasoning thus:
the automated machine for the second and third times pursuant to the
provisions of Comelec Resolution No. 3030 but their requests were not In enacting R.A. No. 8436,Congress obviously failed to provide aremedy
heeded by the Election Officer and the Machine Operator,
where the error in countingis not machine related for humanforesight is
SolaimanRasad, who is a close kin of the Petitioner, and instead
not all-seeing.
considered the said ballots as finally rejected, while in other precincts 56
ballots were found therein which were not drawn from the official ballots We hold,however, that the vacuum in the law cannot prevent the
COMELEC fromlevitating above the problem
and were included in the counting of votes over the objection of the
private respondents watchers or representatives.
.Section 2(1) of Article IX (C) of theConstitution gives the COMELEC
thebroad power "to enforce andadminister all laws and regulations this
Before the termination of the counting of votes and the
provision is to give the COMELECall the necessary and
consolidation of the results, the machine operator and the Election
incidentalpowers for it to achieve the objectiveof holding free, orderly,
Officer carried away from the Kalimodan Hall the diskette and brought
honest,peaceful and credible elections.Congruent to this intent, this
the same to the down town without the knowledge of the private
Courthas not been niggardly in defining theparameters of powers of
respondents watchers or representatives. As a result of the foregoing
irregularities, anomalies and electoral frauds, the petitioner was illegally COMELEC inthe conduct of our elections . . . Inthe case at bar, the
COMELEC orderfor a manual count was not onlyreasonable. It was the
proclaimed as winnerbecause he appeared to have obtained 2,020
only way tocount the decisive local votes . . .The bottom line is that by
votes while the private respondent garnered 2,000 votes with a slight
means of the manual count, the will of thevoters of Sulu was
margin of only 20 votes. private respondent, knowing that he was
honestlydetermined.
cheated and the true winner for Mayor, filed before this Honorable
Commission a petition to annul the proclamation of petitioner Maruhom
as the duly elected Mayor of Marogong, Lanao del Sur. Subsequently, a
We cannot kick away the will of the people by giving aliteral

interpretation to R.A. 8436.R.A. 8436 did not prohibit manualcounting
when machine count doesnot work. Counting is part and parcelof the
conduct of an election which isunder the control and supervision of the
COMELEC.
the issues through a judicial revision and recounting of the ballots

pursuant to Section 255 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides
that
Sec. 255. Judicial counting of votes in election contest.- Where
allegations in a protest or counter-protest so warrant or whenever
in the opinion of the court the interests of justice so require, it shall
immediately order the book of voters, ballot boxes and their keys,
ballots and other documents used in the election be brought before it
and that the ballots be examined and votes recounted.
Our elections are not conducted underlaboratory

conditions. In running for publicoffices, candidates do not
follow the rules of Emily Post. Too often, COMELEC has
to makesnap judgments to meet
unforeseencircumstances that threaten to subvert thewill
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby
of our voters. In the process, the actionsof COMELEC
may not be impeccable, indeed,may even be debatable. DISMISSED for lack of merit.
We cannot, cannot kick away the will of the people
SO ORDERED.
by giving a literal interpretation to R.A. 8436. R.A.
8436 did not prohibit manual counting when machine
count does not work. Counting is part and parcel of the
conduct of an election which is under the control and
supervision of the COMELEC
Our elections are not conducted under laboratory
conditions. In running for public offices, candidates do not
follow the rules of Emily Post. Too often, COMELEC has
to make snap judgments to meet unforeseen
circumstances that threaten to subvert the will of our
voters. In the process, the actions of COMELEC may not
be impeccable, indeed, may even be debatable. We
cannot, however, engage in a swivel chair criticism of
these actions often taken under very difficult
circumstances.
Verily, the legal compass from which the COMELEC should take its
bearings in acting upon election controversies is the principle that
"clean elections control the appropriateness of the remedy.
Be that as it may, the fact is the averments in petitioners counter-protest
and private respondents protest already justified the determination of
replace the candidate. Private respondent argues that inasmuch as the

barangay election is non-partisan, there can be no substitution because
there is no political party from which to designate the substitute.
Contrary to the respondents claim, there being no specific provision
2. PETRONILA S. RULLODA vs. COMELEC and REMEGIO PLACIDO governing substitution of candidates in barangay elections, a prohibition
G.R. No. 154198
January 20, 2003
against said substitution cannot be said to exist.
Facts:
In the barangay election of July 15, 2002, Romeo N. Rulloda and
Remegio L. PLacido were the contending candidates for Barangay
Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan. On June 22, 2002,
Romeo suffered a heart attack and passed away at the Mandaluyong
Medical Center. His widow, Petronila Rulloda, wrote a letter to the
COMELEC on June 25, 2002 seeking permission to run as candidate
for Barangay Chairman in lieu of her late husband.
Comelec denied petitioners request to substitute her deceased
husband in the Barangay Chairman Candidacy despite the fact that
petitioner apparently garnered the highest votes when constituents
wrote her name in the ballots. Respondents cited resolution 4801 and
Section 7 of the Omnibus Election Code which prohibits substitution of
candidates. Private respondent Placido contended that it was only right
that he be proclaimed winner since he was the only one who filed a
certificate of candidacy and, hence, the only candidate running.
Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari seeking to annul
Resolutions of the Comelec which prohibits her from running as a
substitute and to nullify the proclamation of the respondent and to
proclaim her as the duly elected Barangay Chairman.
Issue:
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion when Comelec
denied petitioners request that she be allowed to run as a substitute
candidate in lieu of her deceased husband.
Ruling: YES. The SC granted the petition.
Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that in case of death,
disqualification, or withdrawal of a candidate, a person belonging to and
certified by the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to
Petitioners letter-request was considered a certificate of candidacy

when COMELEC issued its resolution denying the same. In contested
election, it was petitioner who obtained the plurality of votes.
Technicalities and procedural niceties in election cases should not be
made to stand in the way of the true will of the electorate. Laws
governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that
the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated
by mere technical objections.
3. G.R. No. 123169 November 4, 1996: PARAS VS COMELEC

FACTS: Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula,
Cabanatuan City. A petition for his recall was filed by the registered
voters of the barangay. COMELEC approved the petition, scheduled the
petition signing on October 14, 1995, and set the recall election on
November 13, 1995. At least 29.30% (more than the 25% requirement)
of the registered voters signed the petition. However, COMELEC
deferred the recall election in view of the opposition by Paras.
COMELEC set again the recall election on December 16, 1995. To
prevent the holding of such, Paras filed before the RTC Cabanatuan
City a petition for injunction which the RTC dismissed.
HELD: Under SEC74, an elective local official may be subjected to a

recall election once during his term, that is, during the second year of
his term of office. Thus, subscribing to the interpretation of the
phrase regular local election to include the SK election will unduly
circumscribe the novel provision of the Local Government Code on
recall, a mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the people
before the end of his term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A No.
7808 to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed
within the purview of the phrase "regular local election", then no recall
election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision.
Also, the interpretation of Section 74 of the Local Government Code
should not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of
Article X of the Constitution to "enact a local government code which
shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanism of recall, initiative, and referendum . . . ."
COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled the recall election an

January 13, 1996. Hence, this instant petition for certiorari with urgent
prayer for injunction. Paras, citing Section 74 (b) the Local Government
Code, insisted that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is
now barred as the SK election was set by RA 7808 on the first Monday
of May 1996, and every three years thereafter. He maintained that as
the SK election is a regular local election, hence no recall election can
be had for barely four months separate the SK election from the recall
election.
Finally, the purposes of the prohibition against the conduct of recall

election one year immediately preceding the regular local election is to
prevent the potentially disruption of the normal working of the local
government unit and incurring additional expenses. The prohibition is
also due to the proximity of the next regular election for the office of the
local elective official concerned. The voters could choose the official's
replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in
office than a successor elected through a recall election. It would,
therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of
Sec. 74. Limitations on Recall. (a) Any elective local the Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an
official may be the subject of a recall election only once election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be
during his term of office for loss of confidence.
recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible considering
from the date of the official's assumption to office or one that the next regular election involving the barangay office concerned is
(1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.
barely seven (7) months away, the same having been scheduled on
May 1997.
ISSUE: When a recall election may take place
charge of the same. Should there be in such municipality one or more

political parties or branches or fractions thereof, or political groups, then
two of said inspectors and two substitutes for the same shall belong to
the party which polled the largest number of votes in said municipality at
the next preceding election and the other inspector and his substitute
shall belong to the party, branch or fraction thereof, or political group
which polled the next largest number of votes at said election. Partido
Nacionalista Consolidado claimed that Fernandez run and accepted the
nomination of the party and won because of the support of the party,
thus the party should be given the 2 slots for inspector of election for
being the party who won the most number of votes in the next preceding
election with the victory of its claimed candidate Fernandez.
4. Papa vs municipal board. 47 phil 700
Papa vs Municipal Board (G.R. No. L-23892 Mar 23, 1925)
The terminology the next preceding election refers to the last election
held regardless of whether it is a special or general election.
The last general elections were held in 1922. In the city of Manila, the
Partido Democrata ran first, the Partido Nacionalista Colectivista
second, and the Partido Nacionalista third. The Partido Liberal also
polled some votes. A special election to fill a vacancy in the office of
Senator of the Fourth District including the City of Manila, was held on
October 2, 1923. At this special election, two persons, Juan
Sumulong(Partido Democrata) and Ramon J. Fernandez(Independent),
filed their certificates of candidacy. In the City of Manila, Juan Sumulong
received 16,022 votes and Ramon J. Fernandez, 19,380 votes. When
the time came for the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to name
election inspectors and poll clerks for the general election of 1925, it
refused all participation on election boards to the Partido Nacionalista
Consolidado, the political legatee of the Partido Nacionalista
Colectivista and the Partido Nacionalista. Instead, it provided for
election boards, as above indicated, by giving majority representation to
the Partido Democrata and minority representation to the Partido
Liberal. Act No. 3030 as amended by Act No. 3210 provides that
municipal council in each municipality wherein a general election is to
be held to appoint, ninety days immediately prior to the date of such
general election, three inspectors of election and one poll clerk, with
their respective substitutes, for each election precinct therein, who shall
hold office for three years or until their successors shall have taken
ISSUE: a. WON the 1923 special election should be the basis to

determine distribution of inspector of elections slots
b. WON Partido Nacionalista Consolidado should be credited with the
victory of Fernandez whom it claimed as its candidate c. WON the poll
clerk in each precinct should come from the party with the largest vote
in the next preceding election
Held: a. Yes, if the previous terminology at such preceding election
was not amended to the next preceding election, then the basis would
be the 1922 general election. The term the next preceding election
clearly refers to the 1923 special elections. The Philippine Legislature,
however, it again amended section 417 by the enactment of Act No.
3210 by changing the phrase "at such preceding election" to the phrase
"at the next preceding election." Possibly the law is still susceptible to
the interpretation that "the next preceding election" has relation with the
"general election" mentioned in the beginning of the section. But
obviously, the law was amended for some purpose. As the law now
exists, a special election is as much a "preceding election" as a general
election. This may be unfortunate, for a special election is an election
not regularly held to supply a vacancy in a particular office before the
expiration of the full term for which the incumbent was elected, and thus
does not as well echo the political sentiment of the electorate as does a
general election.
b. No, it is questionable if the Partido Nacionalista Consolidado can now
claim a monopoly of the benefits arising from an election when the
successful candidate ran as an independent. The certificate of
candidacy of Ramon J. Fernandez permitted the placing of his name
before the electorate. It was in the nature of a formal manifestation to

the whole world of his political creed or lack of political creed. It
constituted an authorized badge which the voter could scrutinize before
casting his ballot. The electors voted for Ramon J. Fernandez,
Independent. They did not vote for Ramon J. Fernandez, Colectivista,
Nacionalista, Liberal, or Democrata. It would be hard to say whether of
the 19,380 votes received by Senator Fernandez, 16,023 thereof, or
one more than was received by his opponent, came to him on account
of the backing of the Partido Colectivista and the Partido Nacionalista,
or whether such support only accounted for 16,021 votes, or one less
than was received by his opponent. It has been the practice of this court
to hold a person who does not belong to any political party, but is only
an independent candidate, has no right to recommend persons as
election inspectors. The statute, providing that election inspectors shall
be selected from the leading political parties, disclosed a legislative
intent to preserve and protect party organization. This court has likewise
held in at least two decisions and the same has been the judgment of a
member of this court, Justice Villamor, in his well-known work on
elections, that "for the proper and correct weighing of the evidence that
determines which of the political parties was victorious in the last
election, and the classification of the voters who cast the votes, the
political filiation and color of the candidate nominated and voted for
must be taken into account. Only the votes cast in favor of the official
candidates of a party, being homogenous, can be computed in the name
and in favor of the party to which said candidates voted for belonged.
The political filiation and color of the candidate voted for, which
determine those of his voters, must be judged and considered as of the
date of the election and not afterwards.
c. No, while the law is specific in providing that election inspectors shall
belong to the two leading parties, it is silent as to the political filiation of
poll clerks. It must, therefore, be assumed that the appointment of poll
clerks rests entirely within the discretion of the municipal council or the
Municipal Board. Poll clerks may belong to any political party or to no
party at all.
The Sangguniang Bayan ngMorong acted upon the petition

bypromulgating PambayangKapasyahanBlg. 18, Serye 1993,
requesting Congress of the Philippines to amend certain provisions of
RA 7227.
Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative under
theLGC of 1991.
On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on
theground that the subject thereof was merely a resolution and not an
ordinance.
5. SBMA vs COMELEC G.R. No. 125416 September 26, 1996
FACTS:
On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA. 7227 (The Bases
Conversionand Development Act of 1992), which created the Subic
EconomicZone. RA 7227 likewise created SBMA to implement the
declarednational policy of converting the Subic military reservation into
alternative productive uses.
On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the
Subicmilitary reservation to the Philippines government.
Immediately,petitioner commenced the implementation of its task,
particularly thepreservation of the sea-ports, airport, buildings, houses
and otherinstallations left by the American navy.
On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed
PambayangKapasyahanBilang 10,Serye 1993, expressing therein
itsabsolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to
jointhe Subic Special Economic Zone and submitted such to the Office
of the President.
On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed a petition with
theSangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul PambayangKapasyahan
Blg.10, Serye 1993.The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify
PambayangKapasyangBlg. 10 for Morong to join the Subic Special
Economi Zone,b) to allow Morong to join provided conditions are met.
On February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation No. 532

defining the metes and bounds of the SSEZ including therein theportion
of the former naval base within the territorial jurisdiction of
theMunicipality of Morong.
On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No.
2845and 2848, adopting a "Calendar of Activities for local referendum
andproviding for "the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of
thereferendum.
On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari contestingthe
validity of Resolution No. 2848 alleging that public respondent isintent
on proceeding with a local initiative that proposes anamendment of a
national law.
ISSUES:
1. WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in
promulgatingResolution No. 2848 which governs the conduct of the
referendum proposing to annul or repeal PambayangKapasyahanBlg.
10
2. WON the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the
powersof the people of Morong to enact; i.e., whether such initiative
"seeksthe amendment of a national law."
HELD:
1. YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.FIRST. The
process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE
butrespondent Comelec made preparations for a REFERENDUM only.In
fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the footnote

below,the word "referendum" is repeated at least 27 times, but
"initiative" is notmentioned at all. The Comeleclabeled the exercise as a
"Referendum"; thecounting of votes was entrusted to a "Referendum
Committee"; thedocuments were called "referendum returns"; the
canvassers, "ReferendumBoard of Canvassers" and the ballots
themselves bore the description"referendum". To repeat, not once was
the word "initiative" used in saidbody of Resolution No. 2848. And yet,
this exercise is unquestionably anINITIATIVE.As defined, Initiative is the
power of the people to propose bills and laws,and to enact or reject
them at the polls independent of the legislativeassembly. On the other
hand, referendum is the right reserved to the peopleto adopt or reject
any act or measure which has been passed by a legislativebody and
which in most cases would without action on the part of electorsbecome
a law.In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration
andsupervision of the process itself, akin to its powers over the conduct
of elections.
These law-making powers belong to the people, hence therespondent
Commission cannot control or change the substance or thecontent of
legislation.
2. The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the municipal
resolution isstill in the proposal stage and not yet an approved law.
The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet
anapproved law. Should the people reject it, then there would be
nothing tocontest and to adjudicate. It is only when the people have
voted for it and ithas become an approved ordinance or resolution that
rights and obligationscan be enforced or implemented thereunder. At
this point, it is merely aproposal and the writ or prohibition cannot issue
upon a mere conjecture orpossibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts
may decide only actualcontroversies, not hypothetical questions or
cases.In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to
reviewComelec Resolution No. 2848 to determine the commission of
grave abuse of discretion. However, it does not have the same authority
in regard to theproposed initiative since it has not been promulgated or
approved, or passedupon by any "branch or instrumentality" or lower
court, for that matter. TheCommission on Elections itself has made no
reviewable pronouncementsabout the issues brought by the pleadings.
The Comelec simply includedverbatim the proposal in its questioned
Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there isreally no decision or action made

by a branch, instrumentality or court whichthis Court could take
cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over, in theexercise of its review
powers.
total number of registered voters as required by Section 69[d] of the

Local Government Code of 1991. The COMELEC en banc, acting on
said Memorandum, issued the herein assailed Resolution No. 96-2951.
Petitioner now attacks the aforementioned resolution as being
unconstitutional and therefore invalid.
ISSUES
1) Whether the Resolution violated the statutory minimum requirement
of 25% as to the number of signatures supporting any petition for recall.
HELD, RATIO
6. ANGOBUNG versus COMELEC
1. NO. The recall election scheduled on 02 December 1996 is not

barred by the May 1997 Barangay Elections. The one-year bar finds no
application in the case; Resolution No. 96-2951 is therefore valid
G. R. No. 126576 (March 5, 1997) This is a petition for certiorari to

annul and set aside Resolution No. 96-2951
2. YES. Private respondent de Alban filed the petition for recall with only
herself as the filer and initiator. She claims in her petition that she has,
(15 October 1996) issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), together with many others in Tumauini, Isabela, lost confidence in the
which approved the Petition for Recall filed and signed by only one leadership of petitioner. The petition, however, does not bear the names
registered voter, private respondent Ma. Aurora S. de Alban, against of all these other citizens of Tumauini who have reportedly also become
petitioner incumbent Mayor Ricardo M. Angobung; set the further anxious to oust petitioner from the post of mayor
signing of said petition by the rest of the registered voters of Tumauini,
Isabela on 09 November 1996; and in case the said petition is signed
by at least 25% of the total number of registered votes in Tumauini,
Isabela, scheduled the recall election on 02 December 1996.
FACTS:
Petitioner Ricardo M. Angobung was the elected Mayor of the
Municipality of Tumauini, Isabela in the local elections of 1995. Private
respondent de Alban was also a candidate in said elections. In
September 1996, de Alban filed with the Local Election Registrar of
Tumauini, Isabela, a Petition for Recall against Angubong. Said petition
was forwarded to the Regional Office in Tuguegarao, Cagayan and then
to the main office of COMELEC in Manila, for approval. Deputy
Executive Director for Operations Pio Jose Joson then submitted to the
COMELEC en banc, a Memorandum (08 October 1996) which
recommends the approval of the petition for recall filed by de Alban and
its signing by other qualified voters in order to garner at least 25% of the
On May 20, 2004, the OSG filed a Manifestation (in Lieu of Comment)
stating that all qualified overseas Filipinos, including dual citizens who
care to exercise the right of suffrage, may do so, observing, however,
that the conclusion of the 2004 elections had rendered the petition moot
and academic.
Issue: Must the Supreme Court still resolve said petition considering
that under the circumstances the same has already been rendered moot
and academic?
7. Nicolas lewis vs comelec aug.4,2006

Nicolas-Lewis, et al. vs COMELEC (2006) (Political Law)
Loida Nicolas-Lewis, et al. vs. COMELEC | G.R. No. 162759 | August 4,
2006
Held: The holding of the 2004 elections had indeed rendered the petition
moot and academic, but only insofar as petitioners participation in such
political exercise is concerned. The broader and transcendental issue
tendered in the petition is the propriety of allowing dual citizens to
participate and vote as absentee voter in future elections, which
however, remains unresolved.
The issues are thus reduced to the question of whether or not
petitioners and others who might have meanwhile retained and/or
reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as
absentee voter under R.A. 9189.
Facts: Petitioners, who reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No.

9225, sought registration and certification as overseas absentee
voters however they were advised by the Philippine Embassy in the US
that as per a COMELEC letter to DFA dated September 23, 2003, they
have no right yet to vote in such elections owing to their lack of the one- [Ruling on the main issue: Considering the unison intent of the
year residence requirement prescribed by Sec. 1, Art. IV of the
Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion of the scope of that law
Constitution.
with the passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that dual
citizens may now exercise the right of suffrage thru the absentee voting
When petitioner Nicolas-Lewis clarified on said requirement, the
scheme and as overseas absentee voters.
COMELEC replied its position that the OAVL was not enacted for the
petitioners and that they are considered regular voters who have to
meet the requirements of residency under the Constitution.
The Court granted the instant petition and held that those who retain or
Faced with the prospect of not being able to vote in the May 2004
re-acquire Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 may exercise the
elections because of COMELEC's refusal to include them in the
right to vote under the system of absentee voting in R.A. No. 9189, the
National Registry of Absentee Voters, petitioners filed on April 1, 2004 a Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.]
petition for certiorari and mandamus.
On April 30, 2004 (a little over a week before Election Day), COMELEC
filed a Comment praying for the denial of the petition. Consequently,
petitioners were not able to register let alone vote in said elections.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if

garners more than 6% of the votes cast for the party-list election (3 seat
cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
(BANAT), a party-list candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as
the formula being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid;
Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to
qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes
cast in the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution.
Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the
20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution.
8. Barangay Association for National Advancement and

Transparency (BANAT)
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it

mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying vote, there
would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed
COMELEC
20% share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board new computation (which shall be discussed in the HELD portion of this
of Canvassers, made a partial proclamation of the winners in the party- digest).
list elections which was held in May 2007.
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate,
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC questions the validity of the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also
raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are allowed to
considered the following rules:
participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections limited to
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative sectoral parties.
vs
districts, while the remaining 20% shall come from

representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);
party-list
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a ISSUES:
party-list which garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in the partyI. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower
list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
house?
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it
garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats this is pursuant to II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives
the 2-4-6 rule or thePanganiban Formula from the case of Veterans mandatory or a mere ceiling.
Federation Party vs COMELEC.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no

constitutional basis to allow that only party-lists which garnered 2% of
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
the votes cast are qualified for a seat and those which garnered less
than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The
party-list elections.
Supreme Court explained:
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.
HELD:
*To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats.

Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants
in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the
votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us
further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes.
Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats.
Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this
situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available partylist seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to
100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get
two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible
for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as
long as the two percent threshold is present.
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats
allotted for legislative districts, there shall be one seat allotted for a
party-list representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that
there shall be not more than 250 members of the lower house. Using
the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would
be from party-list representatives. However, the Constitution also
allowed Congress to fix the number of the membership of the lower
house as in fact, it can create additional legislative districts as it may
deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007 elections, there
were 220 district representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the
5:1 ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted for party-list representatives. It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an
unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives 0.80) x (0.20) of Representatives.
= Number of Seats Available to Party-List Representatives
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of
Hence,
the votes cast, then it is guaranteed a seat, and not qualified. This
allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get a seat.
(220 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling
meaning, the number of party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% 1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the
of the total number of the members of the lower house. However, it is highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered
not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it
percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be against the remaining number of seats. The product, which shall not be
entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
rounded off, will be the additional number of seats allotted for the party
list but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking
in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their Example:
total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total votes cast for the party-list
three (3) seats.
elections (15,950,900).
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer
be included because they have already been allocated, at one seat
each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for
allocation as additional seats are the maximum seats reserved under
the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are
disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for
a rounding off of fractional seats.
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining

seats) = number of additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains
2. BUHAY is a two-percenter which means it has a guaranteed one seat
PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3 seats. Now if it so happens that
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats because the 3
seats. In the first round, all party-lists which garnered at least 2% of the seat limit rule prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.
votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their one seat each.
The total number of seats given to these two-percenters are then Now after all the two-percenters were given their guaranteed and
deducted from the total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 additional seats, and there are still unoccupied seats, those seats shall
party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those higher in rank in the
available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are occupied.
(Please refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation).
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the political parties (the likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating in
second round, particularly, in determining, first, the additional seats for the party-list elections.
the two-percenters, and second, in determining seats for the party-lists
that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the process Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no
prohibition either from the Constitution or from RA 7941 against major
filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives.
political parties from participating in the party-list elections as the word
party was not qualified and that even the framers of the Constitution in
How is this done?
their deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to
participate in the party-list elections provided that they establish a

sectoral wing which represents the marginalized (indirect participation),
Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7 other justices,
explained that the will of the people defeats the will of the framers of the
Constitution precisely because it is the people who ultimately ratified the
Constitution and the will of the people is that only the marginalized
sections of the country shall participate in the party-list elections. Hence,
major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections,
directly or indirectly.
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no
one party shall dominate the party-list system.
. 9.) BARRO vs COMELEC

Facts:
Petitioner Carmelinda C. Barro and private respondent Elpedio P.
Continedas, Jr. were candidates for Punong Barangay of
BarangayPlaridel, Palompon, Leyte during the October 29, 2007
synchronized Barangay and SangguniangKabataan Elections. Petitioner
garnered 150 votes, while respondent garnered 149 votes. The
Barangay Board of Canvassers proclaimed petitioner as the duly
elected Punong Barangay, winning by a margin of only one vote.
On November 5, 2007, private respondent filed an election protest
before the Municipal Trial Court of Palompon, Leyte (trial court),
impugning the result of the canvass in two precincts of the barangay.
After the revision of ballots, the trial court found that petitioner and
respondent both garnered 151 votes. The trial court held that the
Protestant and the Protestee received the same number of votes for the
position of Barangay Chairman of Brgy. Plaridel, Palompon, Leyte, there
shall be a drawing of lots and the party favored by luck shall be
proclaimed as the duly-elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay
Plaridel, Palompon, Leyte.
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal with the trial court and she stated in
her petition that she also paid the appeal fee required. Thereafter, the
records of the case were forwarded to the COMELEC.
On December 15, 2008, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the Order dated November 25, 2008. On the same date, she also
posted Postal Money Order payable to the Cash Division of the
COMELEC to cover the appeal fee.Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied by the First Division of the COMELEC.
Issue:
resolution, order or ruling of a Division, the Clerk of Court

concerned shall, within twenty-four (24) hours from the
filing thereof, notify the Presiding Commissioner. The
latter shall within two (2) days thereafter certify the case
to the Commission en banc.
Sec. 6. Duty of Clerk of Court of Commission to
Calendar Motion for Reconsideration. The Clerk of Court
concerned
shall
calendar
the
motion
for
reconsideration for the resolution of the Commission en
banc within ten (10) days from the certification thereof.
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion

In this case, the First Division of the COMELEC violated the
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in acting on the motion for
cited
provisions
of the Constitution and the COMELEC Rules of
reconsideration without elevating the same to the COMELEC en banc.
Procedure when it resolved petitioner's motion for reconsideration of its
final Order dated November 25, 2008, which dismissed petitioners
Held:
appeal. By arrogating unto itself a power constitutionally lodged in the
It is settled that under Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution. Commission en banc, the First Division of the COMELEC exercised
What may be brought to this Court on certiorari is the decision, order or judgment in excess of, or without, jurisdiction.[25] Hence, the Order
ruling of the COMELEC en banc. However, this rule should not apply issued by the First Division of the COMELEC dated January 9, 2009,
when a division of the COMELEC arrogates unto itself and deprives denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, is null and void.
the en banc of the authority to rule on a motion for reconsideration, like
in this case.
WHEREFORE,
the
petition
is GRANTED. The
case
is REMANDED to the First Division of the Commission on Elections for
Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution provides for the disposition in accordance with this Decision.
procedure for the resolution of election cases by the COMELEC, thus:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en
banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of
procedure in order to expedite disposition of election
cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such
election cases shall be heard and decided in
division, provided that motions for reconsideration of
decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
The constitutional provision is reflected in Sections 5 and 6, Rule
19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure as follows:
Sec. 5. How Motion for Reconsideration Disposed
of. Upon the filing of a motion to reconsider a decision,
10. Baytan vs Comelec Feb 4, 2003

Baytan vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 153945 February 4, 2003
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS: Petitioners, Reynato Baytan, Reynaldo Baytan and Adrian
Baytan were on their way to register for the May 1998 elections when
they met the newly elected Barangay Captain, Roberto Ignacio, in
Barangay 18, Zone II of Cavite City, who led them to register in Precinct
No. 83-A of Barangay 18.
Upon realizing that their residence is situated within the jurisdiction of

Barangay 28 not Barangay 18, petitioners proceeded to Precinct 129-A
of Barangay 28 and registered anew.
Subsequently, petitioners sent a letter to former COMELEC Assistant

Executive Director Jose Pio O. Joson requesting for advice on how to
cancel their previous registration.
Petitioners Voters Registration Records were forwarded to the

Provincial Election Supervisor, Atty. Juanito V. Ravanzo, for evaluation,
who, subsequently, recommended filing an information for double
registration against petitioners. The COMELEC affirmed Ravanzos
resolution. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which, was denied by
COMELEC en banc.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when 11. Pungutan vs comelec. 43s1
it recommended the prosecution of petitioners for double registration
despite lack of intent and substantial compliance with the requirement of ABDULGAFAR PUNGUTAN, vs.BENJAMIN ABUBAKAR,
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF
cancellation of previous registration.
CANVASSERS OF SULU
HELD: No. There is no question that petitioners registered twice on
different days and in different precincts without canceling their previous G.R. No. L-33541 January 20, 1972
registration. Since "double registration" is malum prohibitum, petitioners
claim of lack of intent to violate the law is inconsequential. Neither is the FACTS:
letter to Joson an application to cancel their previous registration. This
letter was sent after their second registration was accomplished and
The case had its origin from a petition filed on December 16,
1970, by respondent Abubakar and the other candidates, superseding
after the election officer of Cavite City had already reported their act of
double registration to a higher official.
an earlier one dated December 7, 1970 alleging that in the towns of
Siasi, Tapul, Parang and Luuk, no elections were in effect held in view of
Moreover, petitioners claims of honest mistake, good faith and
massive violence, terrorism and fraud. The respondents named therein,
substantial compliance with the Election Codes requirement of
including now petitioner Pungutan, answered on December 18, 1970 to
cancellation of previous registration are matters of defense best
the effect that the elections were duly held in the above-mentioned
ventilated in the trial proper rather than at the preliminary
municipalities and denied the allegation as to the existence of massive
investigation.The established rule is that a preliminary investigation is
fraud, terrorism and serious irregularities. The case was duly heard, with
not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties
oral testimony from five chairmen of certain precincts in Tapul, five
evidence. It is for the presentation of such evidence only as may
teachers from Parang, five teachers from Luuk and three teachers from
engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed
Siasi, followed by an examination of the precinct book of voters from
and the accused is probably guilty thereof.
said towns and the fingerprints and signatures of those who voted, as
shown at the back of CE Form No. 1 and CE Form No. 39 for the 1970 the canvass. We have no alternative but to affirm the Comelecs finding
elections for the Constitutional Convention
that they are spurious and manufactured. Nor is it to be lost sight of
that the power to reject returns of such a character has been exercised
On May 22, 1971, this petition for the review of the above most judiciously.
resolution of May 14, 1971 of respondent Commission was filed. Three
days later, a resolution was adopted by this Court requiring respondents Even a cursory perusal of the mode and manner of inquiry conducted by
to file an answer not later than June 4, 1971. Both respondent respondent Commission resulting in the challenged resolution should
Commission on Elections and respondent Abubakar duly filed their suffice to remove any doubt as to the absence of any impropriety or
answers on said date. Respondent Commission took pains to explain improvidence in the exercise of such a prerogative. Clearly, there was
with even more detail why such a resolution had to be issued care and circumspection to assure that the constitutional objective of
considering the massive voting anomalies ranging from substitute insuring that an election be free, orderly and honest be realized. If,
voting to grabbing of ballots to preparation of election returns and other under the circumstances disclosed, a different conclusion were arrived
election documents at gunpoint thus justifying its conclusion that the at, then certainly there is a frustration of such an ideal. Moreover, this
elections in the four towns amounted to a sham. Hence this petition.
Court has not displayed any reluctance in yielding the imprimatur of its
approval to the action taken by respondent Commission in the
discharge of its constitutional function of the enforcement of all laws
ISSUE:
relative to the conduct of elections.
Whether or not the commission is devoid of power to disregard and
12. Montejo v. Commission on Elections
annul the alleged anomalies in the election.
HELD:
NO. There is no merit to the contention that respondent Commission is
devoid of power to disregard and annul the alleged returns from 107
precincts of Siasi, 56 precincts of Tapul, 67 precincts of Parang and 60
precincts of Luuk for being spurious or manufactured. It is on that basis
that election returns are to be made. Where no such election was in fact
held as was found by respondent Commission with respect to the four
towns, it is not only justified but it is its clear duty to stigmatize the
alleged returns as clearly spurious and manufactured and therefore
bereft of any value. The words of Justice Castro, in the Usman decision,
referring to the election returns from Karomatan, considered as likewise
not entitled to credit because of their lack of integrity and authenticity,
are opposite: These circumstances definitely point, not merely to a few
isolated instances of irregularities affecting the integrity and authenticity
of the election returns, but to an organized, well-directed large-scale
operation to make a mockery of the elections in Karomatan. We find and
so hold that the election returns from the 42 precincts in question were
prepared under circumstances conclusively showing that they are false,
and are so devoid of value as to be completely unworthy of inclusion in
G.R. No. 118702

Ponente: Puno, J.
16 March 1995
FACTS:Petitioner Cirilo Montejo, representing the First District of Leyte,

pleads the annulment of Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 of the
COMELEC, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte as it is said to
violate the principle of equity of representation. Petitioner now seeks to
transfer the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Second
District of the province.
For an overview of the distribution in the province, see the below table
for the population distribution, census 1990 and 1994:
Census 1990
Census 1994
First District
303, 349
178, 688
Second District
272, 167
156, 462
125, 763and inhabitants in the 5 legislative districts of Leyte. But the issue
involves a problem of reapportionment of legislative districts and
Fourth District
269, 347
155, 995petitioners remedy lies with Congress. Section 5(4), Art. VI of the
Fifth District
309, 148
181, 242Constitution categorically gives Congress the power to reapportion. The
Court held that COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
ISSUES:
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated a resolution
transferring the municipality of Capoocan of the second district and
Whether COMELEC has the jurisdiction to promulgate Resolution No. themunicipality of Palompon of the fourth district to the third district of
Leyte.
2736
Third District
214, 499
HELD/RULING: NEGATIVE
The basic powers of COMELEC are spelled out in Section 2(c), Article
IX of the Constitution, which states:
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to
make minor adjustments of the reapportionment herein made.
13. PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE VS. COMELEC
The meaning of minor adjustments is found in the debates of the
G.R. No. 119694; 22 May 1995
Commission wherein it was stated that the transfer of one municipality
in a district to another district is not a minor adjustment; rather it is a
Facts: Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772
substantive one. Minor adjustments does not allow the change in
directing
newspapers to provide free Comelec space of not less than
allocations per district.
one-half page for the common use of political parties and candidates.
The Comelec space shall be allocated by the Commission, free of
charge, among all candidates to enable them to make known their
The COMELEC relies on the Ordinance appended to the 1987 qualifications, their stand on public Issue and their platforms of
Constitution as the source of its power of redistricting which is government. The Comelec space shall also be used by the Commission
traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws. But based on for dissemination of vital election information. Petitioner Philippine Press
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it denied to the Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of newspaper and
COMELEC the major power of legislative apportionment as it itself magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare Comelec
exercised the power. Section 2 of the Ordinance only empowered the Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it
COMELEC to make minor adjustments of the reapportionment violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the
made.Consistent with the limit of its power to make minor adjustments, government against the taking of private property for public use without
Sec. 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the COMELEC any authority just compensation. On behalf of the respondent Comelec, the Solicitor
to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another district.
General claimed that the Resolution is a permissible exercise of the
power of supervision (police power) of the Comelec over the information
It may well be that the conversion of Biliran from a sub-province to a operations of print media enterprises during the election period to
regular province brought about an imbalance in the distribution of voters safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.
Issue:Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is constitutional.

Held: No. The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as
unconstitutional. It held that to compel print media companies to donate
Comelec space amounts to taking of private personal property
without payment of the just compensation required in expropriation
cases. Moreover, the element of necessity for the taking has not been
established by respondent Comelec, considering that the newspapers
were not unwilling to sell advertising space. The taking of private
property for public use is authorized by the constitution, but not without
payment of just compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772 does not
constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. In the case at
bench, there is no showing of existence of a national emergency to take
private property of newspaper or magazine publishers
14. Abscbn vs comelec jan 28, 2000

This is a Petition for Certiorari assailing Commission on Elections
(Comelec) en banc Resolution No. 98-1419 1 dated April 21, 1998. In
the said Resolution, the poll body "RESOLVED to approve the issuance
of a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or any other groups, its agents
or representatives from conducting such exit survey and to authorize the
Honorable Chairman to issue the same." The Resolution was issued by
the Comelec allegedly upon "information from [a] reliable source that
ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with PR groups, to
conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections and to make [an] exit survey
of the vote during the elections for national officials particularly for
President and Vice President, results of which shall be [broadcast]
immediately." The electoral body believed that such project might
conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick
count of the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also
noted that it had not authorized or deputized ABS-CBN to undertake the
exit survey.
Held:
The Supreme Court grants the petition; the Comelec resolution is

nullified.
extremely high' before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be

guarded against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented. The
'dangerous tendency' rule, on the other hand, may be epitomized as
follows: If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the
state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not
Freedom of expression a fundamental principle of a democratic
necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or
government. The freedom of expression is a fundamental principle of
unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated
our democratic government. It is a 'preferred' right and, therefore,
in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be
stands on a higher level than substantive economic or other liberties.
reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or
Our Constitution clearly mandates that no law shall be passed abridging unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect
the freedom of speech or of the press. At the very least, free speech
of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the
and a free press consist of the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully
legislative body seeks to prevent.
any matter of public interest without prior restraint. The freedom of
expression is a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment, of attaining
the truth, of securing participation by the people in social and political
decision-making, and of maintaining the balance between stability and
Supreme Court adheres to the "clear and present danger" test.
change. It represents a profound commitment to the principle that
Unquestionably, this Court adheres to the "clear and present danger"
debates on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open. test. In setting the standard or test for the "clear and present danger"
18 It means more than the right to approve existing political beliefs or
doctrine, the Court echoed the words of Justice Holmes: "The question
economic arrangements, to lend support to official measures, or to take in every case is whether the words used are used in such
refuge in the existing climate of opinion on any matter of public
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
consequence. And paraphrasing the eminent Justice Oliver Wendell
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has
Holmes, we stress that the freedom encompasses the thought we hate, a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree."
no less than the thought we agree with.
Freedom of expression; limited by valid exercise of police power. The

realities of life in a complex society, however, preclude an absolute
exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Such freedoms
could not remain unfettered and unrestrained at all times and under all
circumstances. They are not immune to regulation by the State in the
exercise of its police power.
Theoretical tests in determining the validity of restrictions to freedom of

expression. There are two theoretical tests in determining the validity of
restrictions to freedom of expression. These are the 'clear and present
danger' rule and the 'dangerous tendency' rule. The first, as interpreted
in a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment
or utterance must be 'extremely serious and the degree of imminence
In borderline conflict between freedom of expression and state action to

ensure clean and free elections, the Court leans in favor of freedom.
Even though the government's purposes are legitimate and substantial,
they cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental
personal liberties, when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The
freedoms of speech and of the press should all the more be upheld
when what is sought to be curtailed is the dissemination of information
meant to add meaning to the equally vital right of suffrage. When faced
with borderline situations in which the freedom of a candidate or a party
to speak or the freedom of the electorate to know is invoked against
actions allegedly made to assure clean and free elections, this Court
shall lean in favor of freedom. For in the ultimate analysis, the freedom
of the citizen and the State's power to regulate should not be
antagonistic. There can be no free and honest elections if, in the efforts
to maintain them, the freedom to speak and the right to know are unduly
curtailed.
Exit polls do not constitute clear and present danger of destroying the
credibility and integrity of the electoral process. The Comelec justifies its
assailed Resolution as having been issued pursuant to its constitutional
mandate to ensure a free, orderly, honest, credible and peaceful
election. It contends that "an exit poll has the tendency to sow confusion
considering the randomness of selecting interviewees, which further
make[s] the exit poll highly unreliable. The probability that the results of
such exit poll may not be in harmony with the official count made by the
Comelec is ever present. In other words, the exit poll has a clear and
present danger of destroying the credibility and integrity of the electoral
process." Such arguments are purely speculative and clearly untenable.
First, by the very nature of a survey, the interviewees or participants are
selected at random, so that the results will as much as possible be
representative or reflective of the general sentiment or view of the
community or group polled. Second, the survey result is not meant to
replace or be at par with the official Comelec count. It consists merely of
the opinion of the polling group as to who the electorate in general has
probably voted for, based on the limited data gathered from polled
individuals. Finally, not at stake here are the credibility and the integrity
of the elections, which are exercises that are separate and independent
from the exit polls. If at all, the outcome of one can only be indicative of
the other.
15. CASE NO. 15 KABATAAN PARTYLIST vs. COMELEC

FACTS:
On November 12, 2008, respondent, COMELEC
issued
Resolution No. 8514. which, among other things, set December 2,
2008 to December 15, 2009 as the period of continuing voter
registration using the biometrics process in all areas nationwide, except
in the ARMM. Subsequently, the COMELEC issued Resolution No.
8585adjusting the deadline of voter registration for the May 10,
2010 national and local elections to October 31, 2009, instead
of December 15, 2009 as previously fixed by Resolution No. 8514.
The intense public clamor for an extension of the October 31,
2009 deadline notwithstanding, the COMELEC stood firm in its decision
not to extend it, arguing mainly that it needs ample time to prepare for
the automated elections.
Petitioner Raymond V. Palatino, a youth sectoral representative
under the Kabataan Party-list, sues as a member of the House of
Representatives and a concerned citizen, while the rest of petitioners
sue as concerned citizens.
Petitioners contend that the serious questions involved in this
case and potential disenfranchisement of millions of Filipino voters
justify resort to this Court in the first instance, claiming that based on
National Statistics Office (NSO) data, the projected voting population for
the May 10, 2010 elections is 3,758,964 for the age group 18-19 and
8,756,981 for the age group 20-24, or a total of 12,515,945.
Petitioners further contend that COMELEC Resolution No. 8585
is an unconstitutional encroachment on the legislative power of
Congress as it amends the system of continuing voter registration under
Section 8 of RA 8189, otherwise known as The Voters Registration Act
of 1996.
The COMELEC maintains in its Comment filed that, among other
things, the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code confer upon it
the power to promulgate rules and regulations in order to ensure free,
orderly and honest elections; that Section 29 of RA 6646 and Section 28
of Republic Act No. 8436 authorize it to fix other dates for pre-election
acts which include voter registration; and that its schedule of preelection acts shows that the October 31, 2009 deadline of voter
registration was impelled by operational and pragmatic considerations,
citingAkbayan-Youth v. COMELEC wherein the Court denied a similar
prayer for an extension of the December 27, 2000 deadline of voter
registration for the May 14, 2001 elections.
ISSUE:
WON the COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 be declared null and void,
and that the COMELEC be accordingly required to extend the voter
registration until January 9, 2010 which is the day before the 120-day
prohibitive period starting on January 10, 2010.
HELD: AFFIRMATIVE.The right of suffrage lies at the heart of
our constitutional democracy. The right of every Filipino to choose the
leaders who will lead the country and participate, to the fullest extent
possible, in every national and local election is so zealously guarded by
the fundamental law that it devoted an entire article solely therefor
which Article V Sections 1 and 2.
It is against this backdrop that Congress mandated a system of
continuing voter registration in Section 8 of RA 8189 which provides:
Section 8. System of Continuing Registration of
Voters. The personal filing of application of registration
of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the
Election Officer during regular office hours. No
registration shall, however, be conducted during the
period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a
regular electionand ninety (90) days before a special
election. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The clear text of the law thus decrees that voters be allowed to
register daily during regular offices hours, except during the period
starting 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a special
election.
By the above provision, Congress itself has determined that the
period of 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a
special election is enough time for the COMELEC to make ALL the
necessary preparations with respect to the coming elections including:
(1) completion of project precincts, which is necessary for the proper
allocation of official ballots, election returns and other election forms and
paraphernalia; (2) constitution of the Board of Election Inspectors,
including the determination of the precincts to which they shall be
assigned; (3) finalizing the Computerized Voters List; (4) supervision of
the campaign period; and (5) preparation, bidding, printing and
distribution of Voters Information Sheet. Such determination of
Congress is well within the ambit of its legislative power, which this
Court is bound to respect. And the COMELECs rule-making power
should be exercised in accordance with the prevailing law
R.A. 6646 and R.A. 8436 is not in conflict with the mandate of
continuing voter's registration under R.A. 8189. R.A. 6646 and R.A.
8436 both grant COMELEC the power to fix other period for pre-election
activities only if the same cannot be reasonable held within the period
provided by law. However, this grant of power, is for the purpose of
enabling the people to exercise the right of suffrage -- the common
underlying policy under R.A. 8189, R.A. 6646 and R.A. 8436.
In the case at bar, the Court did not find any ground to hold that
continuing voter's registration cannot be reasonably held within the
period provided by R.A. 8189.
With regard to the Court's ruling in Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC, The
court explained that if the petitioners had only filed their petition, and
sought extension, before the 120 day prohibitive period, the prayer
would have been granted pursuant to the mandate of R.A. 8189.
As a result, the petition was granted and the COMELEC resolution fixing
voters registration for the May 10, 2010 national and local elections on
October 31, 2009 was declared null and void.
16. TUPAY T. LOONG vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

ABDUSAKUR TAN
G.R. No. 133676
April 14, 1999
FACTS:
Automated elections systems was used for the May 11, 1998 regular
elections held in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
which includes the Province of Sulu. Atty. Jose Tolentino, Jr. headed the
COMELEC Task Force to have administrative oversight of the elections
in Sulu.
On May 12, 1998, some election inspectors and watchers informed Atty.
Tolentino, Jr. of discrepancies between the election returns and the
votes cast for the mayoralty candidates in the municipality of Pata. To
avoid a situation where proceeding with automation will result in an
erroneous count, he suspended the automated counting of ballots in
Pata and immediately communicated the problem to the technical
experts of COMELEC and the suppliers of the automated machine. After
the consultations, the experts told him that the problem was caused by
misalignment of the ovals opposite the names of candidates in the local
ballots. They found nothing wrong with the automated machines. The
error was in the printing of the local ballots, as a consequence of which,
the automated machines failed to read them correctly. Atty. Tolentino, Jr.
called for an emergency meeting of the local candidates and the
military-police officials overseeing the Sulu elections. Among those who
attended were petitioner Tupay Loong and private respondent

Abdusakar Tan and intervenor Yusop Jikiri (candidates for governor.)
The meeting discussed how the ballots in Pata should be counted in
light of the misaligned ovals. There was lack of agreement. Some
recommended a shift to manual count while the others insisted on
automated counting (Loong AND Jikiri).
Reports that the automated counting of ballots in other municipalities in
Sulu was not working well were received by the COMELEC Task Force.
Local ballots in five (5) municipalities were rejected by the automated
machines. These municipalities were Talipao, Siasi, Tudanan, Tapul and
Jolo. The ballots were rejected because they had the wrong sequence
code.
Before midnight of May 12, 1998, Atty. Tolentino, Jr. was able to send to
the COMELEC en banc his report and recommendation, urging the use
of the manual count in the entire Province of Sulu. 6 On the same day,
COMELEC issued Minute Resolution No. 98-1747 ordering a manual
count but only in the municipality of Pata.. The next day, May 13, 1998,
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 98-1750 approving, Atty. Tolentino,
Jr.'s recommendation and the manner of its implementation. On May 15,
1998, the COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. 98-1796
laying down the rules for the manual count. Minute Resolution 98-1798
laid down the procedure for the counting of votes for Sulu at the PICC.
COMELEC started the manual count on May 18, 1998.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court is the appropriate remedy to invalidate the
disputed COMELEC resolutions.
2. Assuming the appropriateness of the remedy, whether or not
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in ordering a manual count. (The main issue in the case at
bar)
2.a. Is there a legal basis for the manual count?
2.b. Are its factual bases reasonable?
2.c. Were the petitioner and the intervenor denied due process by the
COMELEC when it ordered a manual count?
3. Assuming the manual count is illegal and that its result is unreliable,
whether or not it is proper to call for a special election for the position of
governor of Sulu.
HELD:
The petition of Tupay Loong and the petition in intervention of Yusop
Jikiri are dismissed, there being no showing that public respondent
gravely abused its discretion in issuing Minute Resolution Nos. 98-1748,
98-1750, 98-1796 and 98-1798. Our status quo order of June 23, 1998
is lifted.
(1.) Certiorari is the proper remedy of the petitioner. The issue is not
only legal but one of first impression and undoubtedly suffered with
significance to the entire nation. It is adjudicatory of the right of the
petitioner, the private respondents and the intervenor to the position of
governor of Sulu. These are enough considerations to call for an
exercise of the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court.
(2a). A resolution of the issue will involve an interpretation of R.A. No.
8436 on automated election in relation to the broad power of the
COMELEC under Section 2(1), Article IX(C) of the Constitution "to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of an election , plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall."
Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this provision is to give COMELEC all
the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of
holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
The order for a manual count cannot be characterized as arbitrary,
capricious or whimsical. It is well established that the automated
machines failed to read correctly the ballots in the municipality of Pata.
The technical experts of COMELEC and the supplier of the automated
machines found nothing wrong the automated machines. They traced
the problem to the printing of local ballots by the National Printing Office.
It is plain that to continue with the automated count would result in a
grossly erroneous count. An automated count of the local votes in Sulu
would have resulted in a wrong count, a travesty of the sovereignty of
the electorate
In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviously failed to provide a
remedy where the error in counting is not machine-related for human
foresight is not all-seeing. We hold, however, that the vacuum in the law
cannot prevent the COMELEC from levitating above the problem. . We
cannot kick away the will of the people by giving a literal interpretation to
R.A. 8436. R.A. 8436 did not prohibit manual counting when machine
count does not work. Counting is part and parcel of the conduct of an
election which is under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. It
ought to be self-evident that the Constitution did not envision a
COMELEC that cannot count the result of an election.
It is also important to consider that the failures of automated counting
created post election tension in Sulu, a province with a history of violent
elections. COMELEC had to act decesively in view of the fast
deteriorating peace and order situation caused by the delay in the
counting of votes
(2c) Petitioner Loong and intervenor Jikiri were not denied process. The
Tolentino memorandum clearly shows that they were given every
opportunity to oppose the manual count of the local ballots in Sulu. They
were orally heard. They later submitted written position papers. Their
representatives escorted the transfer of the ballots and the automated
machines from Sulu to Manila. Their watchers observed the manual
count from beginning to end.
3. The plea for this Court to call a special election for the governorship
of Sulu is completely off-line. The plea can only be grounded on failure
of election. Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code tells us when there
is a failure of election, viz:
There is another reason why a special election cannot be ordered by

this Court. To hold a special election only for the position of Governor
will be discriminatory and will violate the right of private respondent to
equal protection of the law. The records show that all elected officials in
Sulu have been proclaimed and are now discharging their powers and
duties. These officials were proclaimed on the basis of the same
manually counted votes of Sulu. If manual counting is illegal, their
assumption of office cannot also be countenanced. Private respondent's
election cannot be singled out as invalid for alikes cannot be treated
unalikes.
The plea for a special election must be addressed to the COMELEC
and not to this Court.
17. G.R. No. 147066| 26 March 2001 | AKBAYAN vs COMMISSION
ON ELECTION | BUENA, J.:
FACTS: Invoking their right of suffrage, AKBAYAN-Youth seeks to direct

the COMELEC to conduct a special registration before the May 14,
2001 General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21. According to
AKBAYAN, around 4 million youth failed to register on or before the
December 27, 2000 deadline. Acting on this, Senator Raul Roco,
Chairman of the Committee on Electoral Reforms, Suffrage, and
People's Participation, invited the COMELEC to a public hearing for the
purpose of discussing the extension of the registration of voters to
Sec. 6. Failure of election. If, on account of force majeure, terrorism, accommodate those who were not able to register before the
fraud, or other analogous causes, the election in any polling place has
COMELEC deadline. After the said hearing, COMELEC disapproved the
not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour request on the ground that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 explicitly provides
fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during
that no registration shall be conducted during the period starting 120
the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the
days before a regular election and that the Commission has no more
custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect,
time left to accomplish all pre-election activities.
and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would
affect the result of the election, the Commission shall on the basis of a
Aggrieved, AKBAYAN filed before this Court the instant Petition
verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and
for Certiorari and Mandamus to nullify COMELECs decision and/or to
hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election, not held,
declare Section 8 of R.A. 8189 unconstitutional insofar as said provision
suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty effectively causes the disenfranchisement of petitioners and others
days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or
similarly situated. Likewise, AKBAYAN prays for the issuance of a writ of
suspension of the election or failure to elect.
mandamus directing COMELEC to conduct a special registration of new
voters. Michelle Betito likewise filed a Petition for Mandamus, praying
that this Court direct the COMELEC to provide for another special
registration day under the continuing registration provision
ISSUE: WON the Court can compel COMELEC to conduct a special
registration of new voters during the period between the COMELECs
imposed December 27, 2000 deadline and the May 14, 2001 general
elections.
HELD: NO. The right to suffrage is not absolute. The exercise of which,
as in the enjoyment of all other rights, is subject to existing substantive
and procedural requirements embodied in our Constitution (Section 1,
Article V), statute books and other repositories of law. As to the
procedural limitation, the right of a citizen to vote is necessarily
conditioned upon certain procedural requirements he must undergo:
among others, the process of registration. The act of registration is an
indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage. The State
undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact
laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voter's registration for the
ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election.
Thus, contrary to petitioners' argument, registration cannot and should
not be put down to the lowly standing of a mere statutory requirement.
Here, petitioners failed to register, thus missed their chance.
18. G.R. No. 161434
March 3, 2004
FPJ and VICTORINO X. FORNIER,
Facts:
Petitioners sought for respondent Poes disqualification in the
presidential elections for having allegedly misrepresented material facts
in his (Poes) certificate of candidacy by claiming that he is a natural
Filipino citizen despite his parents both being foreigners. Comelec
dismissed the petition, holding that Poe was a Filipino Citizen.
Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Comelec, contending that only
the Supreme Court may resolve the basic issue on the case under
Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding
that Poe was a Filipino citizen.
Ruling:
1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding

qualification of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency
before the elections are held.
"Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" in connection with Section
4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, refers to contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "VicePresident", of the Philippines which the Supreme Court may take
cognizance, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President
before the elections.
established paternal filiation evidenced by the public documents

presented.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence
on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he
cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section
74 of the Omnibus Election Code.
2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as

a Filipino Citizen.
The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on 19. BENGSON VS HRET
respondents birth, provided that among the citizens of the Philippines
are "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines."
FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in
view of the constitutional requirement that no person shall be a
Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born
Tracing respondents paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as
citizen.
evidenced by the latters death certificate was identified as a Filipino
Citizen. His citizenship was also drawn from the presumption that
having died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo would have been born in Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac
in 1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US
1870. In the absence of any other evidence, Lorenzos place of
Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines,
residence upon his death in 1954 was presumed to be the place of
residence prior his death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited took an oath of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his
from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing for the Ways
1902. Being so, Lorenzos citizenship would have extended to his son,
in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)]
Allan---respondents father.
section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other,
rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a
foreign country. Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of
Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allans son to Bessie,
Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen
though an American citizen, was a Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal
in 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
filiation as evidenced by the respondents birth certificate. The 1935
Constitution on citizenship did not make a distinction on the legitimacy
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation
or illegitimacy of the child, thus, the allegation of bigamous marriage
under RA 2630 [(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine
and the allegation that respondent was born only before the assailed
marriage had no bearing on respondents citizenship in view of the
Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering
Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United
States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the
2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner
Bengson who was then running for reelection.
No. 63.16 Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to
reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications and
none of the disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by
those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces;
services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3)
service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time, (4)
marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political economic
necessity.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam

with respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a
member of the HOR since he is not a natural-born citizen as required
under
Article
VI,
section
6
of
the
Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation
declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative in the said election.
simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the
ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American place where the person concerned resides or last resided.Moreover,
citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means
that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship,
HELD: YES.Natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his
Philippine citezenship." On the other hand, naturalized citizens are In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he
those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he
generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No.
2630.Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic
Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem,
Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.11 To be naturalized, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent
an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications12 and Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born
citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father.
none of the disqualification.
It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship
the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A.
No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship
may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by
repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.
Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine
citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473,
as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for
reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act
20. MAYOR JOSE UGDORACION, JR., VS COMELEC AND

EPHRAIM M. TUNGOL
GR NO. 179851, APRIL 18, 2008
Facts:
1.
Ugdoracion and Tungol were rival mayoralty candidates in the
municipality of Albuquerque province of Bohol.
2. Tungol filed a petition to deny due course or cancel the certificate of
candidacy of Ugdoracion, contending that Ugdoracion's declaration of
eligibility for mayor constituted material misrepresentation because he is
actually a green card holder or a permanent resident of USA.
3. He stated in his COC that he resided in Albuquerque for forty one
years before May 14, 2007 and he is not a permanent resident or an
immigrant to a foreign country.
4.
It appears that Ugdoracion became a permanent resident in USA
on September 26, 2001.
5.
Ugdoracion alleged that he retained his domicile of origin origin
notwithstanding his ostensible acquisition of permanent residency in the
3. Domicile by operation of law - which the law attributes to a person
USA.
independently of his residence or intention.
6. COMELEC cancelled Ugdoracion's COC - material representation
Three basic rules
1.
A man must have a residence or domicile somewhere
Issue:
2.
Domicile, once established, remains until a new one is validly
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in acquired
cancelling Ugdoracion's COC for material representation
3. A man can have but one residence or domicile at any given time.
Ruling:No grave abuse of discretion.
Section 74, in relation to section 78 of the omnibus election code,
requires that the facts stated In the COC must be true, and any false
representation therein of a material fact shall be a ground for
cancellation thereof. A material fact refers to a candidate's qualification
for elective office such as one's citizenship and residence. It is the
deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible.
The general rule is that domicile of origin is not easily lost, it is only
when there is actual removal or change of domicile, Nona dude
intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new
one, and acts which correspond with such purpose. In the instant case
however Ugdoracion's acquisition of lawful permanent resident status in
the USA amounted to an abandonment and renunciation of his status as
a resident of the Philippines
Political Law
Caasi vs Court of Appeals - that a Filipino citizen's acquisition of a
permanent resident status abroad constitutes an abandonment of his The constitutional grant of prosecutorial power in the COMELEC finds
domicile and residence in the Philippines. A green card status in the statutoryexpression under Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881,
otherwise known asthe Omnibus Election Code. The task of the
USA is a renunciation of one's status as a resident of the Philippines.
COMELEC whenever any electionoffense charge is filed before it is to
Residence, In contemplation of election laws, is synonymous to conduct the preliminary investigation of thecase, and make a
domicile. Domicile is the place where one actually or constructively has determination of probable cause. Under Section 8 (b), Rule 34of the
his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the investigating officer makes
any given time, eventually intends to return (animus revertendi ) and adetermination of whether there is a reasonable ground to believe that a
remain (animus manendi). It consists not only in the intention to reside crimehas been committed.It is also well-settled that the finding of
in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with probable cause in the prosecution of election offenses rests in the
conduct indicative of such intention.
COMELEC's sound discretion
Domicile is classified into
1.
2.
.(Emphasis supplied) The COMELEC exercises the constitutional

authority to investigate and, whereappropriate, prosecute cases for
Domicile of origin - acquired by every person at birth
violation of election laws, including acts oromissions constituting
election frauds, offense and malpractices. Generally, theCourt will not
Domicile of choice - acquired upon abandonment of the domicile of interfere with such finding of the COMELEC absent a clear showingof
grave abuse of discretion. This principle emanates from the

COMELEC'sexclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all
election offensespunishable under the election laws and to prosecute
the same, except as mayotherwise be provided by law.As structured,
Section 45 of Republic Act No. 8189 makes a recital of electionoffenses
under the same Act. Section 45 (j) is, without doubt, crystal in
itsspecification that a violation of any of the provisions of Republic Act
No. 8189 isan election offense. The language of Section 45 (j) is
precise. The challengedprovision renders itself to no other
interpretation. A reading of the challengedprovision involves no
guesswork. The evident intent of the legislature is clear; violation of any
provisions of theRepublic Act No.8189 is punishable. The law articulates
the policy of the State tosystematize the present method of registration
in order to establish a clean,complete, permanent and updated list of
voters. A reading of Section 45 (j)conjointly with the provisions upon
which petitioners are charged, i.e., Sections10 (g) and (j) would reveal
that the matters that are required to be set forthunder the aforesaid
sections are crucial to the achievement of a clean, complete,permanent
and updated list of voters. The factual information required by thelaw is
sought not for mere embellishment n
Crame, Quezon City, and registered voters of Barangay BagongLipunan

ng Crame, District IV, Quezon City, Precinct No. 4419-A, as evidenced
byVoter Registration Record Nos. 26195824 and 26195823; and that
petitioners,knowing fully well said truth, intentionally and willfully, did not
fill the blankspaces in said applications corresponding to the length of
time which they haveresided in Burauen, Leyte.
ISSUES
Petitioners come via the instant Petition, submitted the following
arguments:1. Respondent COMELEC gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack of orin excess of its jurisdiction; and
2. Vagueness of Section 45 (j) of the Voter's Registration Act as it does
not referto a definite provision of the law, the violation of which would
constitute anelection offense; hence, it runs contrary to Section 14 (1)
25 and Section 14(2), 26 Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
RULING
REMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is
Violation of Section 10 (g) and (j) in relation to Section 45 (j) of Republic lack of merit
Act No. 8189, otherwise known as The Voter's Registration Act of 1996
and exercise of Commission on Electionsprosecutorial power
FACTS
On 9 May 2000 and 11 May 2000, petitioners Carlos S. Romualdez and
Erlinda R.Romualdez, applied for registration as new voters with the
Office of the ElectionOfficer of Burauen, Leyte, as evidenced by Voter
Registration Record Nos.42454095 and 07902952, respectively.On 12
July 2000, private respondent Dennis Garay, along with Angelino
Apostolfiled a Complaint-Affidavit with the COMELEC thru the Office of
the ElectionOfficer in Burauen, Leyte, charging petitioners with violation
of Section 261 (y)(2) and Section 261 (y) (5) of the Omnibus Election
Code, similarly referred to asBatas Pambansa Blg. 881; and Section 12
of Republic Act No. 8189.Respondent alleged petitioners made false
and untruthful representations inviolation of Section 10 of Republic Act
No. 8189, by indicating therein that theyare residents of 935 San Jose
Street, Burauen, Leyte, when in truth and in fact,they were and still are
residents of 113 Mariposa Loop, Mariposa Street, BagongLipunan ng
UGDORACION V. COMELEC (ELECTION)
We find no grave abuse of discretion in the COMELEC's cancellation of

Ugdoracion's certificate of candidacy for material misrepresentation.
Accordingly, the petition must fail.
Section 74, in relation to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code

requires that the facts in the COC must be true, and any false
representation therein of a material fact shall be a ground for
cancellation thereof, thus:
Section 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy - The certificate of
candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his

candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said
office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including
its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he
seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status;
his date of birth; residence; post office address for all election purposes;
profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the
Constitution and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he
will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant
to a foreign country that the obligation assumes by his oath is assumed
voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that
the facts stated in the COC are true to the best of his knowledge.
renunciation of one's status as a resident of the Philippines.

Ugdogracion's acquisition of a lawful permanent resident status in the
US amounted to an abandonment and renunciation of his status as a
resident of the Philippines; it constituted a change from his domicile of
origin, which is Bohol, to a new domicile of choice, which is the USA.
Section 78. Petitioner to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of

candidacy- A verified petition to deny due course or to cancel a COC
may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is
false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than 25 days from
21. Marcos vs comelec. 248 s 300
the time of the filing of the COC and shall be decided after due notice
and hearing not later than 15 days before the election.
FACTS:
The false representation contemplated by Section 78 of the Code

pertains to material fact, and is not simply innocuous mistake. A material
fact refers to a candidate's qualification for elective office such as one's
citizenship and residence.
Ugdogracion argued that his supposed involuntary acquisition of a

permanent resident status in the USA which he insists did not result in
the loss of his domicile of origin.
We are not convinced. A Filipino's acquisition of a permanent resident

status abroad constituted an abandonment of his domicile and
residence in the Philippines. In short, "green card" status in the USA is a
Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her

domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and graduated high
school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then
pursued her college degree, education, in St. Pauls College now Divine
Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte
Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to
work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in
the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late President
Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and
was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as
Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she
registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived
in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila.
She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of
Metro Manila during 1978.
of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence

and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin
Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo should be deemed to continue.
Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte
and also a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for
Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections
alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for 3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because
residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven the term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in
months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she
words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not
Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained domicilium necessarium.
Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven
months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the
Municipality of Tolosa in said months.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and
acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos,
her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To
requirement to be eligible in running as representative of the First add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in
Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers house, an act, which
District of Leyte.
supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept
close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her
birthdays and other important milestones.
HELD:
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes.

The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoners claim of
legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own
declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following
reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas

domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought them to
Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the

necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of
Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's
questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25,
1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby
directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim
petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of
Leyte.
oath in his COC that he was a natural-born citizen should be a sufficient

act of repatriation. Additionally, his active participation in the 1987
congressional elections had divested him of American citizenship under
the laws of the US, thus restoring his Philippine citizenship.
The Solicitor General contends that petitioner was not a citizen of the
Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as an
American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified for public office in the
Philippines. His election did not cure of this defect because the
electorate could not amend the Constitution, the Local Government
Code and the Omnibus Election Code.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was qualified to run for public office.
Held: No. First, petitioners loss of his naturalized American citizenship
did not and could not have the effect of automatic restoration of his
Philippine citizenship.
22. Frivaldo vs COMELEC [174 SCRA 245]
Facts: Petitioner was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of
Sorsogon on January 22, 1988. On October 27, 1988, respondents The
League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for the
annulment of petitioners election and proclamation on the ground that
he was a naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine
citizenship on the day of the election on January 18, 1988. He was
therefore not qualified to run for and be elected governor.
Petitioner insisted that he was a citizen of the Philippines because his
naturalization as an American citizen was not impressed with
voluntariness"; that he was naturalized as American citizen only to
protect himself against President Marcos during the Martial Law era. His
Second, the mere filing of COC wherein petitioner claimed that he is a

natural born Filipino citizen, is not a sufficient act of repatriation.
Third, qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and
must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or
assumption of office but during the officers entire tenure. Once any of
the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged

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ADMIN | Election Law | 1

1. [G.R. No. 139357. May 5, 2000]

Revision Committee was created and its membership were duly

ADMIN | Election Law | 2

We cannot kick away the will of the people by giving aliteral

the issues through a judicial revision and recounting of the ballots

Our elections are not conducted underlaboratory

ADMIN | Election Law | 3

replace the candidate. Private respondent argues that inasmuch as the

Petitioners letter-request was considered a certificate of candidacy

ADMIN | Election Law | 4

3. G.R. No. 123169 November 4, 1996: PARAS VS COMELEC

HELD: Under SEC74, an elective local official may be subjected to a

COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled the recall election an

Finally, the purposes of the prohibition against the conduct of recall

ADMIN | Election Law | 5

charge of the same. Should there be in such municipality one or more

ISSUE: a. WON the 1923 special election should be the basis to

ADMIN | Election Law | 6

before the electorate. It was in the nature of a formal manifestation to

ADMIN | Election Law | 7

The Sangguniang Bayan ngMorong acted upon the petition

On February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation No. 532

ADMIN | Election Law | 8

fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the footnote

Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there isreally no decision or action made

ADMIN | Election Law | 9

total number of registered voters as required by Section 69[d] of the

1. NO. The recall election scheduled on 02 December 1996 is not

G. R. No. 126576 (March 5, 1997) This is a petition for certiorari to

ADMIN | Election Law | 10

7. Nicolas lewis vs comelec aug.4,2006

Facts: Petitioners, who reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No.

ADMIN | Election Law | 11

4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if

8. Barangay Association for National Advancement and

BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it

districts, while the remaining 20% shall come from

ADMIN | Election Law | 12

III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.

III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no

*To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats.

ADMIN | Election Law | 13

Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining

ADMIN | Election Law | 14

participate in the party-list elections provided that they establish a

. 9.) BARRO vs COMELEC

ADMIN | Election Law | 15

resolution, order or ruling of a Division, the Clerk of Court

Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion

ADMIN | Election Law | 16

10. Baytan vs Comelec Feb 4, 2003

Upon realizing that their residence is situated within the jurisdiction of

ADMIN | Election Law | 17

Subsequently, petitioners sent a letter to former COMELEC Assistant

Petitioners Voters Registration Records were forwarded to the

Hence, this petition.

ADMIN | Election Law | 18

G.R. No. 118702

FACTS:Petitioner Cirilo Montejo, representing the First District of Leyte,

ADMIN | Election Law | 19

ADMIN | Election Law | 20

Issue:Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is constitutional.

14. Abscbn vs comelec jan 28, 2000