BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs.

THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and

ZSHORNACK
G.R. No. L-66826 August 19, 1988
CORTES, J.:
Facts:
Rizaldy Zshornack and his wife, Shirley Gorospe, maintained in COMTRUST, Quezon
City Branch, a dollar savings account and a peso current account. On October 27, 1975, an
application for a dollar draft was accomplished by Virgilio V. Garcia, Assistant Branch Manager
of COMTRUST Quezon City, payable to a certain Leovigilda D. Dizon in the amount of
$1,000.00. In the application, Garcia indicated that the amount was to be charged to Dollar
Savings Acct. No. 25-4109, the savings account of the Zshornacks. There was no indication of
the name of the purchaser of the dollar draft.
On the same date, October 27,1975, COMTRUST, under the signature of Virgilio V.
Garcia, issued a check payable to the order of Leovigilda D. Dizon in the sum of US $1,000
drawn on the Chase Manhattan Bank, New York, with an indication that it was to be charged to
Dollar Savings Acct. No. 25-4109.
When Zshornack noticed the withdrawal of US$1,000.00 from his account, he demanded
an explanation from the bank. In answer, COMTRUST claimed that the peso value of the
withdrawal was given to Atty. Ernesto Zshornack, Jr., brother of Rizaldy, on October 27, 1975
when he (Ernesto) encashed with COMTRUST a cashier's check for P8,450.00 issued by the
Manila Banking Corporation payable to Ernesto.
As for the second cause of action, the complaint filed with the trial court alleged that on
December 8, 1975, Zshornack entrusted to COMTRUST, thru Garcia, US
$3,000.00 cash (popularly known as greenbacks) for safekeeping, and that the agreement was
embodied in a document, a copy of which was attached to and made part of the complaint. It
was also alleged in the complaint that despite demands, the bank refused to return the money.
In its answer, COMTRUST averred that the US$3,000 was credited to Zshornack's peso current
account at prevailing conversion rates.
Issue:
Whether the contract between petitioner and respondent bank is a deposit?
Held:
Yes. The document which embodies the contract states that the US$3,000.00 was
received by the bank for safekeeping. The subsequent acts of the parties also show that the

intent of the parties was really for the bank to safely keep the dollars and to return it to
Zshornack at a later time. Thus, Zshornack demanded the return of the money on May 10,
1976, or over five months later.
The above arrangement is that contract defined under Article 1962, New Civil Code,
which reads: Art. 1962. A deposit is constituted from the moment a person receives a thing
belonging to another, with the obligation of safely keeping it and of returning the same. If the
safekeeping of the thing delivered is not the principal purpose of the contract, there is no deposit
but some other contract.

V Food Services, Inc. v. Filipino Merchants Insurance Company, Inc.,

G.R. No. 160544. February 21, 2005

Facts:

On March 2, 1997, at around 2:15 o'clock in the afternoon, a certain Mary Jo-Anne De
Asis (De Asis) dined at petitioner's Kamayan Restaurant at 15 West Avenue, Quezon City. De
Asis was using a Mitsubishi Galant Super Saloon Model 1995 with plate number UBU 955,
assigned to her by her employer Crispa Textile Inc. (Crispa). On said date, De Asis availed of
the valet parking service of petitioner and entrusted her car key to petitioner's valet counter. A
corresponding parking ticket was issued as receipt for the car. The car was then parked by
petitioner's valet attendant, a certain Madridano, at the designated parking area. Few minutes
later, Madridano noticed that the car was not in its parking slot and its key no longer in the box
where valet attendants usually keep the keys of cars entrusted to them. The car was never
recovered. Thereafter, Crispa filed a claim against its insurer, herein respondent Filipino
Merchants Insurance Company, Inc. (FMICI). Having indemnified Crispa in the amount of
P669.500 for the loss of the subject vehicle, FMICI, as subrogee to Crispa's rights, filed with the
RTC at Makati City an action for damages against petitioner Triple-V Food Services, Inc.
In its answer, petitioner argued that the complaint failed to aver facts to support the
allegations of recklessness and negligence committed in the safekeeping and custody of the
subject vehicle, claiming that it and its employees wasted no time in ascertaining the loss of the
car and in informing De Asis of the discovery of the loss. Petitioner further argued that in
accepting the complimentary valet parking service, De Asis received a parking ticket
whereunder it is so provided that "[Management and staff will not be responsible for any loss of
or damage incurred on the vehicle nor of valuables contained therein", a provision which, to
petitioner's mind, is an explicit waiver of any right to claim indemnity for the loss of the car; and
that De Asis knowingly assumed the risk of loss when she allowed petitioner to park her vehicle,
adding that its valet parking service did not include extending a contract of insurance or
warranty for the loss of the vehicle.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a contract of depost?
Held:

Yes. When De Asis entrusted the car in question to petitioners valet attendant while
eating at petitioner's Kamayan Restaurant, the former expected the car's safe return at the end
of her meal. Thus, petitioner was constituted as a depositary of the same car. Petitioner cannot
evade liability by arguing that neither a contract of deposit nor that of insurance, guaranty or
surety for the loss of the car was constituted when De Asis availed of its free valet parking
service.
In a contract of deposit, a person receives an object belonging to another with the
obligation of safely keeping it and returning the same. A deposit may be constituted even
without any consideration. It is not necessary that the depositary receives a fee before it
becomes obligated to keep the item entrusted for safekeeping and to return it later to the
depositor.
The parking claim stub embodying the terms and conditions of the parking, including that
of relieving petitioner from any loss or damage to the car, is essentially a contract of adhesion,
drafted and prepared as it is by the petitioner alone with no participation whatsoever on the part
of the customers, like De Asis, who merely adheres to the printed stipulations therein appearing.
While contracts of adhesion are not void in themselves, yet this Court will not hesitate to rule out
blind adherence thereto if they prove to be one-sided under the attendant facts and
circumstances.
Hence, and as aptly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, petitioner must not be allowed
to use its parking claim stub's exclusionary stipulation as a shield from any responsibility for any
loss or damage to vehicles or to the valuables contained therein. Here, it is evident that De Asis
deposited the car in question with the petitioner as part of the latter's enticement for customers
by providing them a safe parking space within the vicinity of its restaurant. In a very real sense,
a safe parking space is an added attraction to petitioner's restaurant business because
customers are thereby somehow assured that their vehicle are safely kept, rather than parking
them elsewhere at their own risk. Having entrusted the subject car to petitioner's valet
attendant, customer De Asis, like all of petitioner's customers, fully expects the security of her
car while at petitioner's premises/designated parking areas and its safe return at the end of her
visit at petitioner's restaurant.