Korzeniewicz - The Labor Politics of Radicalism: The Santa Fe Crisis of 1928

The Labor Politics of Radicalism: The Santa Fe Crisis of 1928
Author(s): Roberto P. Korzeniewicz

Source: The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 73, No. 1 (Feb., 1993), pp. 1-32
Published by: Duke University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2517628
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Hispanic Amiiericatn
Historical Revietw73: 1
Copyright (C 1993 by Duke University Press
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The Labor Politics of Radicalism:

The Santa Fe Crisis of 1928
ROBERTO P. KORZENIEWICZ
December4,
1928,
PresidentHipolitoYrigoyenof
Argentina ordered federal troops into Santa Fe province to put an end to a major wave of labor unrest.
The historical literature makes little or no mention of this federal intervention and its surrounding events, treating the Santa Fe crisis as a minor
footnote to the last Yrigoyen administration.'This essay will demonstrate
that the 1928 events warrantgreater analytical inquiry.
This article has benefited from comments by Len Berkey, Elizabeth Bruimfiel, Ann Forsythe, David Rock, Mark D. Szuchman, Norma Wolff, anidan anoniymiious
reviewer for the
HAHR. The research for this study was made possible in part by a grant from the Program
for Inter-Institutional Collaboration in Area Studies (Uniiversityof Michigan) and a Faculty
Development Grant from Albion College. I would also like to thanikthe Fundaci6n Simn6
Rodriguez (Buenos Aires) for providinigeasy access to its archival hioldinlgs.
Citations refer to the following periodicals, all from Buenos Aires except as noted: La
Antorcha (LA), Bandera Proletaria (BP), Boletin de Ser-viciosde la Asociaci6ni del Tiabajo
(BSAT), Buenos Aires Herald (BAH), La Capital, Rosario (LC), El Diario (ED), La Internacional (LI), La Naci6n (LN), El Obrero Mtunicipal(EOM), La Prensa (LP), Revietv of tlle
River Plate (RRP), the Standard (TS), La Vangitardia(LV).
1. Evein David Rock clharacterizesthese evenits as "a peripheral labour issue." By the
early 1920S the Radicals had abandoned their efforts to develop close ties to labor, anidYrianidbtuttress
goyen's decision to send troops to Santa Fe was imiade"to appease the armyiv
its confidence in the government." David Rock, Politics i71 Argentina, 1890-1930: The Rise
and Fall of Radicalism (London: CambridgeUniv. Press, 1975), 244. Virtuallyno ilmenltion of the 1928 events can be found in the following works: Char-lesBergquist, Labor in
Latin America: Comparative Essays on Chile, Argentitna,Veniezuela,atndColomrlbia(Staniford: Stanford Uniiv.Press, 1986); Gabriel del Mazo, "La segunda presidencia de Yrigoyeni,"
and Roberto Etchepareborda, "Antecedentes de la crisis de 1930," both in La segunda presidencia de Yrigoyen, ed. del Mazo anidEtchepareborda (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de
Am6ricaLatina,1986), 5-105, 107-58; JulioGodio,El movimiento obrero argentino (19101930) (Buenos Aires: Legasa, 1988); Rubens Iscaro, Origen y desarrollo del nouvirniento
sindical argentino (Buenos Aires: Anteo, 1958); Sebastian Mai-otta,El mrlovimnienlto
sindical
argentino, vol. 3 (BueniosAires: Calomino, 1970). A brief paragraphon these evenltsappears
in Carl Solberg, "Rural Unrest and Agrarian Policy in Argentina, 1912-1930," Jornal of
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 13:1 (Jani.1971), 18-52.
| HAHR I FEBRUARY
I ROBERTO P. KORZENIEWICZ
Between May and December of 1928, Radical provincial officials in

Santa Fe implemented a series of policies designed to develop closer ties
between their party and the labor movement. These labor policies were
attacked by business organizations, conservative political leaders, and the
mainstream or nonlabor press, which accused the provincial authorities
of inciting labor unrest and undermining social stability. Even the labor
press joined conservative commentatorsin portraying the Radical officials
as demagogic political leaders manipulating labor issues to advance their
own careers. Yrigoyen's decision to send troops to the province of Santa
Fe was primarily a response to pressure from business and conservative
groups. But in a larger context, the Santa Fe events illustrate the social
pressures and institutional tensions that characterized Radical efforts to
develop a viable political strategy toward labor. The 1928 crisis can serve
as a guide for examining in greater detail the relationship between provincial and national labor politics during the interwarperiod, and for tracing
the early development of a populist discourse in Argentina.
The May Strikes
In 1928, labor conflict spread through the province of Santa Fe and the
city of Rosario, the most important economic region of Argentina after
Buenos Aires. Rosario had always been an epicenter of labor ferment in
Argentina, but these strikes were broadly perceived as the first resurgence
of labor organizing in the city since 1923.2
The strikes began among Rosario dockworkers demanding higher

wages. Conforming to national trends, labor organizing at the port had
been undermined since the early 1920S by business discrimination against
unionized workers. But in 1928, falling wages and "unspeakable abuses"
provoked a series of small strikes by dockworkerswho handled grain and
cement. Although trade unions in the port were virtually absent during
the early stages, informal networks strengthened the workers' bargaining
power. The strikers were also abetted by a strong harvest: "The docks
are crowded with steamers, and there is a great quantity of wagons ready
to be loaded and unloaded." Furthermore, the demand for higher pay
caught some steamship companies in a bind: the shippers had sold for
April transport, and May contracts called for six hundred thousand tons
of grain to be loaded in Rosario.4The success of these initial strikes en2. See BP, Mar. lo, 1928, p. 2, Aug. 11, p. 3; BAH, May 11, p. 6; LP, July 29, p. 20;
LN, May 18, p. 5; TS, May 20, p. 4.
3. LN, May 18, 1928, p. 5. See also BP, May 8, p. 5, May 19, p. i, aindJune 2, p. 3;
and LA, May 26, p. 1.
4. BAH, May 8, 1928, p. 5, May 9, p. 5.
THE SANTA FE CRISIS OF 1928
couraged workers in other ports to raise their own demands, and labor
conflicts soon involved more than seven thousand dockworkers along the
river border of Santa Fe province.
Employers initially expected the Rosario strike to be quickly resolved
in their favor. But unrest intensified on May 8 when Luisa Lallana, a young
woman distributing pamphlets supporting the port strike, was killed at
the entrance to the waterfrontin a confrontationinvolving picketers and
nonstriking workers.5 The mainstream press reported her death as an
accident, but labor sympathizers branded it a "barbaric assassination"
committed by a member of the Liga de Trabajadores,an organization of
nonunion workers supported by employers and conservatives.6The death
of Luisa Lallana was followed on May 9 by a 24-hour citywide general
strike that affected factories, transportation,businesses, and schools. The
general strike was strongly condemned by business organizations.
Rosario'sFederacion Obrera Local organized a demonstration of seven
thousand to accompany Luisa Lallana'sbody to the cemetery. The general
strike itself was accompanied by violent confrontations. Demonstrators
stoned public buildings and vehicles, and the police arrested dozens of
people. In one particularly violent clash, the police forcibly dispersed
hundreds of strikers who had tried to burn a streetcar after forcing its
passengers off The strikers reportedly stoned the police, who responded
with a barrage of gunfire that seriously wounded a striker and a young
boy. The youth died soon afterward.7
Even after the general strike ended, violent clashes continued at the
port between strikers and nonstriking workers, who were protected by
federal security forces provided by the navy. Solidarity strikes spread
throughout the province, often giving local workers an opportunity to
press their own demands. On May 15, railroadengineers decided to stop
bringing trains to the port, claiming that their lives were in danger. Employers perceived this action as a grave escalation of the conflict.8
5. The picket lines were characterized as composed of "loquacious or pathetically unlappealing women anidchildren." BAH, May lo, 1928, p. 1. On female participation see BP,
June 2, p. 3; LI, Oct. 13, p. 2.
6. BAH, May lo, 1928, p. 1; LN, May 9, p. 13. This and several other violent events
undermined the prestige of the Asociaci6n del Trabajoin the late 192os. See LN, May 21,
1928, p. 1, and May 25, p. 13; and Argentine Republic, Congreso Nacional, Diario de sesiones de la Cainara de Diputados, 5 July-Aug. 1928, tomo 2 (Buenos Aires, 1928), 214-37.
For an alternative perspective, see BSAT, May 20, 1928, pp. 217-19. On the events that
followed the death of Luisa Lallana, see LV, May lo, p. 3; BP, May 19, p. 1; EOM 9:log
(May 1928), 1; TS, May lo, p. lo; BAH, May lo, p. 1, and May 11, p. 6; LN, May lo, p. 1,
and May 14, p. 3; LA, May 26, p. 1; BSAT, Nov. s, p. 483.
7. LV, May lo, 1928, p. 3, and May 25, p. 1. See also LP, May lo, p. 21; LN, May lo,
p. 1; and BAH, May lo, p. 1.
8. LN, May 16, 1928, p. 5, May 17, p. 1, May 19, p. 1, and May 20, p. 1.
I HAHR I FEBRUARY
On May 20, Rosario's labor federations rallied in solidarity with the

dockworkers and in protest against the violence. At one of these rallies,
union members declared a new general strike for the following day. This
strike paralyzed the city and brought violence to the streets as groups of
strikers reportedly attacked shops, factories, caf6s, and schools.9 Automobiles and streetcars were stoned and burned, and several individuals were
beaten. In one widely reported instance,
several large gangs of workers, including many women and children,
set forth in search of provisionsfor their homes. Marching in ranks like
soldiers, and armed with sticks and iron bars, they advanced in three
columns from separate directions toward the Urquiza Market. The stall
holders were given the opportunity of getting out as quickly as they
could, and, after a lapse of five minutes provided for the evacuation,
the raiders poured into the building and stripped it bare of fruit, meat,
and vegetables. The raiders then visited two of the other principal
markets and repeated their wholesale holdup.'0
Employers and a number of newspapers complained that the lack of
adequate protection had allowed "several raging crowds" to demonstrate,
carrying sticks and improvised red flags that had been stolen from construction sites. "On the improvised red banners, knives had been fixed
in the manner of spears, and the men who formed the rear guard shot
their guns into the air."11According to the Buenos Aires Herald, the strike
was characterized by "mob law.
. . .
Matters grew so serious during the
weekend that the police had to raise barricadesin the streets to hold back
armies of desperate strikers bent on gaining the city."The port strike was
developing "into what may almost be termed the forerunner of a national
industrial crisis."12
The Union Obrera Local (affiliatedwith the syndicalist Union Sindical Argentina, or USA) extended the general strike for another 24 hours.
The city was again brought to a halt. "The few automobiles that could
be seen on the streets carried small flags with the green cross and were
driven by their owners, for the most part doctors."13 Most of Rosario was
in the dark, for three thousand street lamps had been destroyed during
the first day of the strike; but observers noted that the absence of poten9. The strikers were join-ed by "other elements and youths." LP, May 22, p. 20. The
de
of maleantes, rateros, y elemrlentos
labor press attributed violent acts to "numerousgrouLps
la escoria politica de comite, who [took advanitageof] police indifference." BP, JuLne2, p. 3.
See also LN, May 2o, p. 1, and May 21, p. 1.
lo. BAH, May 22, p. 1.
12.
LN, May 22, p. 1.

BAH, May 22, p. 1; see also BSAT, June 5, pp.
13.
LP, May 22,
11.
p.
241-43.
15.
tial victims resulted in fewer muggings than usual. Strikebreakers were

again attacked, reportedly by groups of youths. La Nacion complained
that banks had been forced to close by threats from "a band of [about
four hundred] types, with wild appearance and revolutionary demeanor,
among whom young men predominated and women were not lacking,
carrying improvised weapons."14
Exporters hitherto had been unwilling to negotiate with the striking
dockworkers, arguing that "there was no guarantee that the union would
carry out any arrangement or agreement that might be entered into."'5
But in the midst of the general strike, dockworkers notified employers
that the Union Sindical Argentinawas willing to declare a national general
strike in their support. Faced with this threat, port employers agreed to
provide a 12 percent wage increase to their striking dockworkers. Employers and labor representatives met on May 22 at the Bolsa de Comercio
(stock exchange) and reached a preliminary agreement, bringing the port
strike to an end.'6
The labor press applauded this outcome as a major defeat for employers who had sought to divide and undermine labor organizations.'7
The mainstreampress, on the other hand, reacted with dismay. Earlier in
the month, the Buenos Aires Herald had warned that the labor movement
could threaten the existing social order by replacing "capitaltyranny with
labor domination." The outcome of the port strike discouraged the Herald's editors, for "the laboring man has suddenly arrived at the conclusion
that the capitalistic camp has lost its power and force. The agitators are
cock-a-hoop. . . . We are much afraid that this country is to see worse
before it sees better."18
Radical Labor Policies in Santa Fe
The strikes had begun to reveal a rift between employers and a new provincial administrationheaded by SantaFe's Radicals. The strikes escalated
immediately after the inauguration of the new governor, Miguel Go6mez
Cello, on May 9, and followed Yrigoyen's election to the presidency in
April. Labor sympathizers acknowledged that the transition between administrations was "complicating the existing situation, for many police
officers are not in the mood to keep order, knowing they will be reLN, May 22, pp. 1, 9; see also LP, May 23, p. 15; LA, May 26, p. 1.
BAH, May 11, p. 1.
16. LN, May 23, p. 1.
17. BP, May 26, p. 1, and June 30, p. 1; LV, May 25, p. 1.
i8. BAH, NMay11, p. 6; May 25, p. 6.
14.
15.
I HAHR
I FEBRUARY
moved at any moment."'9 Some strikers attributed the conflicts directly

to the situation that "the rulers who took over the provincial government
on May 9 had committed themselves to help, but now in power were
not keeping their word."20The strikes quickly came to be perceived as a
litmus test of the Radicals'friturelabor policies.
In a series of provincial and national elections in early 1928, Radical supporters (Personalistas)of Yrigoyen did markedly better than his
opponents (Antipersonalistas)in the party. The success of the Personalistas in Santa Fe's February gubernatorialelections was particularly significant, for the Antipersonalistashad controlled the province throughout
the 1920S. Gomez Cello was a longtime Radical party member who had
been mayor of the city of Santa Fe early in that decade. As mayor he
had developed a reputation for an efficient and honest administration that
had eradicated deficits from the city's budget. Building on this reputation
in a province characterized by recurrent fiscal deficits and overbearing
taxation, Gomez Cello forged a strong political alliance among contending personalistic factions in the province.2' The strength of this alliance
assured Gomez Cello's election, but its heterogeneity all but guaranteed
more political friction after his inauguration, particularly over labor policies.
During the first decades of the twentieth century, electoral competition with the Socialists and government control led Radical leaders nationally to seek closer ties with urban workers and labor groups in order to
appeal to labor as a constituency. But even in the late l910S and early
1920S, the first Yrigoyen administration(1916-22)
was responding to escalating labor unrest with repressive measures, undermining its own efforts
at alliance. The rift between the Radical party and the trade unions
widened during Marcelo T. Alvear's administration (1922-28).
But many
provincial and national party leaders continued to perceive the establishment of close ties with labor as crucial to the very survival of the Radical
party. This was clearly the case among top Radical leaders in Santa Fe
province.
More generally, labor support was crucial to the success of Yrigoyen's
supporters in the 1928 elections. David Rock contends that workers voted
for the Personalistas in response to propaganda that romanticized Yri19.
20.
LV, May io, 1928, p. 3; TS, May io, p. io.

LP, May 22, p. 14. See also LP, July 9, 1928, p. 9; BAH, May 8, p. 5, and May 1i,
p. 6.
21. The Santa Fe factions are briefly discussed in Leoncio Gianello, "Santa Fe (18621930),"in Historia argentina contemporanea 1862-1930, Academia Nacional de la Historia,
vol. 4, sec. 1 (Buenos Aires: El Ateneo,
1967), 143-90;
Mantiel Goldstraj, Anos y errores
(Buenos Aires: Sophos, 1957); Hector J. Iniigo Carrera, La experiencia radical,

(Buenos Aires: La Bastilla, 1980). See also LP, May ii,
1928, p. 13.
vols.
goyen's personal role in improving working conditions during his first administration.22Other analysts suggest that Radical party members viewed
the 1928 elections as a potential turning point that would transform radicalism into a "new Left" that in turn would create "a social democracy
with a clearly nationalistic character."23The course of events discussed
in this essay tends to support this interpretation. The Radical party had
won electoral support by advocating greater social justice and promising
profound institutional reforms. For this reason, the labor policies of the
newly elected authorities were scrutinized by all interested parties (including workers and employers) as a key indicator of future developments.
The interested parties, furthermore, recognized that their ability to shape
the direction of those policies early in the game would significantly affect
their long-term bargaining power under a Radical administration.
Gomez Cello emphasized in his inaugural speech that future policies would be guided by "the great enterprises of social, political, and
economic reparation espoused by radicalism," and that he would seek
"the faithful execution of the laws protecting workers, projecting into
these ideas new norms that can ensure a healthy environment, equitable
salaries, and comfortable housing." More directly, immediately on taking
office the new governor ordered police to restore calm and avoid bloodshed.24Despite these gestures, some mainstreamperiodicals briefly hoped
that the new Radical authorities would abandon their reformist rhetoric.
After all, during his first administration, Yrigoyen had not tolerated disruptive strikes: "The outcome of [his] volte-face was the SemnanaTragica,
which at least served to clarify the atmosphere and to encourage business to hold on for better times, which eventually arrived with the Alvear
administration."25
Once Gomez Cello's administration had taken office, however, employers charged that the new authorities were failing to maintain law and
order. In the early stages of the port strike, exporters complained that despite effective federal protection inside the port area, strikers could take
advantage of less restrictive conditions along the access routes. The press
commented that in surrounding neighborhoods, "andin the cosmopolitan
coffee shops scattered along the Avenida Belgrano and adjacent streets,"
there was virtually no police presence to enforce order among the large
crowds of workers.26
Rock, Politics in A -gentina, 234.
23. Roberto Etchepareborda, "La segunda presidencia de Hip6lito Yrigoyen y la crisis
de 1930," in Historia argentina contemporanea, vol. 1, sec. 2 (1965), 355.
24. LN, May lo, 1928, p. 5.
25. BAH, May 18, 1928, p. 6. See also BAH, May 11, p. 6.
26. LN, May 14, 1928, p. 3.
22.
| HAHR I FEBRUARY
To address these concerns, Rosario'smain business organizations met

with the incoming chief of police to inquire how his administration intended to protect "the interests of capital"and particularly the "freedom
of work," or the right of nonstriking workers to cross picket lines.27The
business groups portrayed labor unrest as a challenge to basic constitutional rights, and called for the state to defend those rights. This important
feature in their political discourse was accompanied by a second dominant
theme: labor unrest was caused not by true workers but by professional
agitatorsand extremist ideologies foreign to the workplace and the pueblo.
Mainstream newspapers attacked "the revulsive action"of these "enemies
of our nation" and called for unions to rid themselves of these "parasites
of social dissidence," for "they persist in making every strike action a
revolutionary event; from every spark they want a social bonfire."28These
images were invoked to delegitimate the actions and demands of labor
organizations, and to justify the call for state action against "subversive"
forces.
The new police chief, Ricardo Caballero, was a political appointee of
the new governor. His conduct during the strikes had disturbed the business community. One newspaper complained that police commanders had
ordered officers not to intervene in strikes, and reported that Caballero
had been seen enthusiastically greeting a group of strikers and ordering
nearby police forces "to be very careful not to proceed," a comment that
brought "warmapplause from the striking elements."29
Caballero had provided crucial support for Gomez Cello's election, so
much support that throughout 1928 his opponents asserted that Caballero
had become de facto governor of the province. He had joined the Union
Civica Radical as a teenager in the early 189os, and had been briefly arrested during the unsuccessful Radical uprising of 1905. He was elected
lieutenant governor of Santa Fe in the crucial elections of 1912, a year
in which he mediated conflicts involving Santa Fe's tenant farmers. He
served repeatedly in both chambers of the Argentine Congress during the
late l910S and 1920S. He enjoyed a personal relationship with Yrigoyen,
though it was briefly strained in 1916 over internal party disputes. Since
1916, the Radicals of Santa Fe had experienced a growing rift between
northern and southern caudillos, and Caballero was among the strongest of the latter. According to Gabriel del Mazo, his Senate speeches
27. LV, May io, 1928, p. 3; BAH, May 9, p. 5; TS, May io, p. 1o; and LN, May 14,
p. 1, and May 15, p. 5. See also LN, May 21, p. 1, and May 22, p. 9; and LP, May 22, p. 20.
28. LP, June 5, 1928, p. 14. Also, LN, May 15, p. 5; BAH, May 23, p. 6; LP, June 17,
p. 20, and July 20, p. 19; RRP, Nov. 2, p. 5; and LC, Nov. 23, p. 4, and Dec. 1, p. 5.
29.
LN, May 22, pp. 1, 9, and May 23, p. i; and BP, June 2, p. 3.
represented "the most vigorous expression of Radical thought on social

relations." 30
For Caballero, the ultimate objective of democracy was "the conquest
of economic freedom for the working masses," or "social justice, within
the limits and nature of our nationality."Labor was to become a crucial
source of future support for the Radical party. Caballero urged political
authorities to maintaintheir independence in the face of capital-laborconflicts, and spoke against employer organizationsthat believed themselves
to be "owners of elements of the state" and opposed "the political and
economic redemption of the pueblo."3' Economic freedom would allow
workers to "realize their destiny in all walks of life and reach all the
summits of the spirit";by eliminating social problems, this "last stage of
democracy"would permit workers "the real exercise of freedom." Social
reforms would also transformworkers into a middle class. This was important, for the social upheaval that had followed World War I had produced
"momentsof real terror among government representatives and the ruling
and historical classes of almost all countries," but "currentcivilization has
found in the middle class . . . the conditions of intelligence, valor, and
discipline that it has needed to save itself." These views were compatible
with the predominant Radical doctrine.32
The imperative of social renovationand solidaritycould be met through
state action and law, preventing both the merciless exploitation of materialistic society and the brutal violence of sectarian revolutions. Caballero
took pains to distinguish himself from both communism and "Cesarismo,"
emphasizing his strong belief in "the idea of nationality and patria" as
well as private property and traditionalfamily structures.33He argued that
the Santa Fe administration represented a socially conscious Radicalismo
oriented toward "the protection of the dispossessed classes," and that this
orientation distinguished "the economic faction of the party" from others
30. For biographical details, see Ricardo Caballero, Yrigoyen, la conspiraci6n civil y
militar del 4 defebrero de 1905 (Buenos Aires: Raigal, 1951);idem, Discursos y docutmlentos
politicos del Ricardo Caballero, ed. Roberto A. Ortelli (BtuenosAires: Sociedad de Ptiblicaciones El Inca, 1929); Roberto Etchepareborda, "Aspectos politicos de la crisis de 1930,"
in La crisis de 1930, ed. Etchepareborda, Ricardo Ortiz, and JtuanOrona (Buenos Aires:
Centro Editor de America Latina, 1986), 15-60; Gabriel del Mazo, La primera presidencia
de Yrigoyen (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de America Latina, 1986), 112; and LV, May 0o,
1928, p. 3. See also LP, May 9, p. 19, and May 13, p. 21.
31. Caballero,Discursos, i6, ii6, io8, 243; idem., i6, 265.
32. For the quotations, see Caballero, Discursos, 23, 27-28, 30, 44. For Radical doctrine see also Rock, Politics in Argentina, 127.
33. Caballero also attacked "determinist materialism," Einstein's theories, and foreigners ("theylack love for the country, its traditions, and its history"). Caballero, Discursos,
17, 31, 87, 94, 117, 127, 314, 551.
10
I HAHR I FEBRUARY
that "pretend to transform this force into an exclusively political group,

without any ultimate objectives on behalf of the welfare of the people."34
Given Caballero'sphilosophy, it is not surprising that the May events
triggered an onslaught of protest from employers and the mainstream
press. Rosario'sBolsa de Comercio complained about the strikes not only
to Gomez Cello and Caballero but also to the federal minister of the
interior, "in case the ultimate outcome of these events requires the intervention of the Superior Government of the Nation."35La Nacion asserted
in an editorial that Rosario'sstrikes threatened a strategic economic sector and thereby required federal action to ensure "both public peace
under the rule of law, and individual and collective rights."36Rosario's
Federacion Gremial del Comercio e Industrias called for Caballero's dismissal, charging that he had failed to guarantee that he could "contain
the overflow of suppressed passions" that accompanied demonstrations.37
Rosario's merchants and other employers began calling for a 24- or 48hour lockout in protest against the police chief. Caballero left Rosario to
meet with Yrigoyen and Alvear in Buenos Aires, forcing Gomez Cello to
deny rumors that these meetings presaged the police chief's resignation.
Business did not yet have a united front against Caballero, however. The
chamber of commerce stopped short of demanding his resignation. Political sympathies were rumored to exist between Caballero and the chamber
president, who defended the police chief while denying the existence of
"personal or political compromises."38
On the provincial level, conflicts among the Personalistas had intensified after the inauguration of the new administration. Dickering over
the distribution of state resources, the Personalista faction split into two
main groups: Caballeristas, who shared the police chief's labor policies,
and a group of "intransigentYoung Turks,"who eventually ended up with
little of the provincial budget. Conflicts were also reported between Caballero and the province's vice governor, but not just over the distribution
of public jobs and political appointments. They involved a substantial dispute over the future direction of the Radical party's labor strategy.39In
these terms, the provincial debate was bound to reach national proportions. Principally, conservatives hoped to persuade Yrigoyen publicly to
34. Ibid.,
18-21, 266, 453-54.

35. LN, May 23, 1928, p. 5; and LP, May 23, p. 15.
36. LN, May 22, p. 6; see also May 23, pp. 1, 6, and May 28, p. 4; and LP, May 23,
p. 12.
37. LN, May 29, p. 5, and May 31, p. 5.
38. LN, May 31, p. 5. See also May 27, p. i6.

39. On the "Young Turks," see BP, Aug. 4, 1928, p. 4; also LC, Nov. 27, p. 4; LN,
Dec. 5, p. 1. On the vice governor, see LV, July 5, p. 6; LN, May 5, p. 8. On the strategy
dispute, see BP, Aug. 4, p. 4.
11
disapprove of Caballero's labor policies. Furthermore, Santa Fe's new

legislature was widely expected to impeach the provincial mninistrode
gobierno for failing to counteract local authorities' passivity during the
Rosariostrikes.
The provinciallegislature, however, failed to meet, due to an effort by
the provincial executive to force new elections to achieve "the necessary
majority to develop harrmonicallythe duties of government."40 In a few
weeks Gomez Cello closed the legislature and asked the national congress
to order a new provincial election. Many provincial legislators condemned
this action as arbitraryand called on the federal government to ensure "the
constitutional exercise of our legislative functions." 4' The broader conflict
between Personalistasand Antipersonalistas,however, made it difficult for
either Alvear or President-elect Yrigoyen to take any immediate action.
For the time being, political conditions at the national level strengthened the power of the provincial authorities. In his successful campaign,
candidate Yrigoyenhad built an effective nationalcoalition of forces against
his Radical opponents. During the transition period between the April
election and the October inaugurationof the new administration, relations
grew tense between the outgoing Alvear administration and the newly
elected candidate. Alvear briefly considered the possibility of intervening
in SantaFe province, as Rosario'sexporters demanded, and he sent federal
troops to the city's port during the May strikes. But he was unable actually
to replace Santa Fe's provincial authorities. Because of the overwhelming
defeat of Antipersonalista candidates, Alvear lacked the political capital
necessary to take any actions that could be construed as an attack on the
Personalistas. Yrigoyen, on the other hand, was concerned with ensuring
a smooth transition to his own administrationand was unlikely to support
any drastic measures that could alienate his supporters, particularly in a
key province such as Santa Fe. These dynamics enhanced the autonomy
of provincial leaders in relation to both the national government and party
authorities in Buenos Aires.
Labor's Response to Caballerismo
The new political climate also enhanced the bargaining power of workers,
who exploited the opportunity to raise a broad range of demands. Labor
unrest in Rosario virtually exploded after early May 1928, and organized
political factions in the labor movement found themselves struggling to
provide leadership to a militant rank and file. At the same time, these fac40.
41.
LV, June 8, p. 1.
LV, June 21, p. 6.
I HAHR I FEBRUARY
12
tions searched for an appropriateresponse to the labor policies of the new

provincial administration. In particular, they came to perceive Caballero
as a political threat, vying for the electoral support of the working class and
undermining the labor movement's independence in the process. Their
antagonism toward Caballero was significant, for it limited their willingness to support the provincial administrationin a potential confrontation
with national authorities.
Between the inaugurationof the Radical provincial authorities in May
and Yrigoyen's deployment of federal troops in December, specific and
general strikes spread throughout Santa Fe province. The number and
scale of these conflicts generated a growing sense of empowerment and exceptionality among Rosario'sworkers. Both the press and activists across
the political spectrum frequently observed that working-class neighborhoods in the city were developing a sense of virtual autonomy. The reaction these trends provoked from business, the mainstream press, and
conservatives became a fundamental influence on Yrigoyen's decision to
terminate Caballero's labor policies by force.
Strikers repeatedly brought transportationto a halt. For example, a
streetcar strike began on July 3, and was highly disruptive: "Many employees and workers who live in the suburban neighborhoods are opting
to miss work rather than face the possibility of . . . spending the night in
the city center."42The press noted that the few working buses were overloaded: "The public has traveled on the front fenders, on the hood, hanging from side windows and in clusters from both running boards and the
rear platform, exposed to all the dangers of traffic. Happily, no accidents
have been recorded."43Strikes also interrupted the city's public services,
contributing further to "an atmosphere of malaise and justified fear that
keeps neighbors nervous and withdrawn in their homes."44A telephone
strike forced many banks, offices, and factories to rely on bicycle messengers to deliver urgent communications;even the police had to deploy 50
mounted officers to relay messages between downtown Rosario and the
suburbs.45These labor conflicts were magnified by at least seven general
strikes in Rosario during the same eight-month period.
Sabotage and violence were constant features of these conflicts, although strikers complained that employers themselves were committing
the illegal acts to frame workers.46The strikes involved a broad range of
42. LP, July 4, 1928, p. 20, and Jtlly 5, p. 19.
43. LP, July 14, p. 19. See also LV, July 12, p. 3; LP, July 6, p. 21, and July i8, p. 19.
44. LP, July 25, p. 19. See also LP, July 29, p. 29, Oct. 15, p. 29, aild Nov. 9, p. 14.
45. LP, Jtlly 26, p. i8; LV, July 25, p. 3I
46. LP, July 14, p. 19. See also July 25, p. 19, aind Oct. 7, p. 22; RRP, Jtuly 13, p. 11,
July 27, p. ii, and Oct. 12, p. 5; LN, Nov. 17, p. 5; LV, July 29, p. 3, Sept. 27, p. 3, aind
Nov. 6, p. 3.
13
demands, including recognition of labor organizations, wage increases,

union regulation of employment, paid sick leave, and enforcement of
union-negotiated contracts. Carpenters struck to improve working conditions and reduce hours, but also to reduce the unemployment that resulted from technological innovations. Textile workers demanded an end
to "the vexations they must endure," and the elimination of "petty despots
who even threaten the honor of the poor women exploited by capitalist
selfishness."47
What caused employers even greater concern was that the strikes
stimulated new patterns of government intervention in labor conflicts. In
mid-July, city officials warned the streetcar company that it would face
daily fines unless it restored services. The firm nevertheless would not
recognize a union. Its board of directors in Brussels would agree to a
10 percent wage increase only if city authorities reciprocated by lowering municipal taxes from 8 to 4 percent.48Angrily, the city council suspended its efforts to mediate the strike, while the mayor warned the company to restore services or face the punishment of having the city seize
all its equipment and facilities.49The mayor subsequently presented the
city council with a plan for the municipalizacion of the company, which
was approved on July 30 with broad political support, including that of
both the Progressive Democrats and the Communists. The streetcar firm's
management capitulated with greater flexibility in labor negotiations and
eventually reached a final agreement (with the help of the Belgian consul)
that provided an eight-hour workday and a 13 percent wage increase.50
The city took similar action during a strike at the telephone company, also in July, once again pressing the employer to meet the strikers'
demands. Management in turn demanded greater protection; but Police
Chief Caballero replied that it was impossible to "place an officer behind
each employee who comes to work" and criticized the firm for paying
"hunger wages." Once again, city officials pressured the firm by threatening to impose daily fines unless services were immediately restored. In
another case, the city ultimately intervened with the Sociedad de Electricidad to restore services, after threatening fines and other measures.5'
47. LV, Nov. 6, p. 3. See also July 24, p. 3, July 29, p. 3, and Auig.24, p. 3; LP, July 25,
p. 19, Sept. 9, p. 21, and Sept. 13, p. 18.
48. LV, July 12, p. 3, and July 25, p. 3; LP, July 18, p. 19, and July 23, p. 19.
49. LP, July 25, pp. 3, 19, and July 26, p. 18; LV, July 25, p. 3.
50. LP, July 13, p. 14, July 14, p.
19,
July 27, p. 18, July 30, p.
21,
July 31, p.
20,
anid
Aug. 3, p. 21; LV, July 27, p. 3, and Aug. 3, p. 1.

51. LP, July 25, p. 19. For more on this strike and Caballero'sresponse, see LP, July 6,
p. 21, July 8, p. 20, July 28, p. 19, and July 29, p. 20. For the city's action, see LP, July 26,
p. 18, and July 29, p. 20. On the electric company, see LV, Nov. 6, p. 3; also LV, Oct. 7,
p. 23, and Oct. 25, p. 4.
14
I HAHR I FEBRUARY
In all these cases, the attitude of municipal authorities strengthened the

bargaining power of workers.
What's more, at times strikers and city authorities openly demonstrated considerable sympathy for each other. For example, a delegation
of workers was on its way to announce the start of the streetcar strike; "as
they passed the police station, located three blocks from the union hall,
many insistently cheered the chief of police, Caballero."52Some anecdotal
evidence also suggests close ties between the Santa Fe Radicals and anarchist sympathizers, but greater research is needed to ascertain the actual
extent of these contacts.53
Beyond these occasional expressions of sympathy by the rank and file,
however, support for Caballero from the leaders of organized labor was
less forthcoming. The established political factions in the labor movement
all took an ambivalent stance toward the new provincial administration,
dealing pragmatically with Radical authorities over strike-related issues
and seeking to take advantage of the new opportunities provided by the
favorable labor policies.
The different labor factions strove to adapt their language to the new
political opportunities by portraying employers as the subjects of foreign
capital, and labor demands as the embodiment of the true national interest. Thus the Socialists emphasized that "thousandsof proletarian households suffer the African tyranny of foreign capital,"which showed nothing
but "insolence" and "contempt for this country."They defended the new
patterns of state regulation emerging in Santa Fe as "contributingperhaps
to greater respect for the country by foreign capitalism."54The Communists raised similar arguments: "The axis of our future activity must be
the struggle against imperialism." The Commiiunistsaccused Yrigoyen of
developing close ties with "imperialistsharks."
The Socialists also endorsed state regulation by asserting that it was
needed to protect the interests of both workers and consumers.56Government had the responsibility to ensure the availabilityof services; it would
thereby demonstrate that "until the time comes to establish more normal
relations between the state and the companies that own and exploit public
services, there are many ways of letting foreign capital know that it cannot use the country as a colony from which to extract excessive profits."57
52. LP, July 4, p.
20.
53. Ifigo Carrera, La experiencia radical, 308. For some of this anecdotal evidence,
see Rock, Politics in Argentina, 120-21; LV, May 25, 1928, p. 1; LI, Jan. 12, 1929, p. 6.
54. LV, July 26, 1928, p. 1, July 31, p. 1, and Sept. 18, p. 3. See also LP, July 30, p. 21;
and LV, Nov. 23, p. 1.
55. LI, Oct. 20, p. 5, and Oct. 27, p. 1. See also LP, July 30, p, 21.
56. LV, Aug. 3, p. 1, and Sept. 18, p. 3.
57. LV, July 26, p. 1, July 31, p. 1, anidAug. 3, p. 1.
15
Furthermore, the Socialists used the example of the United States to argue
that rural workers should receive higher wages so as to strengthen Argentina's internal market. According to the Socialists, employers in Argentina
failed to understand that the nation'sprogress could be measured only by
general welfare, not by the wealth of employers.58
Caballero himself elicited a more confrontational attitude from the
different labor factions, which perceived him as a demagogue and an opportunist seeking to make inroads into their constituency. They initially
hesitated about whether to respond to Caballero as a political challenge or
to support his initiatives. Although the Socialists stopped short of openly
endorsing the police chief, at times they acknowledged that "Rosario's
police generally observed during this strike a conciliatory attitude that has
precedents in countries such as France." They attributed this to an effort
by the new provincial authorities to protect the strong popular support
they had received in the election.59
For the syndicalists, the police chief had "embarkedon the same current of ideas that inspired them," although they had neither spoken directly with him nor had felt obliged to follow his pronouncements. It was
"not the purpose of workers to meddle in matters that were more likely
to be of interest to politicians than to workers."60On the other hand, they
acknowledged that the burgueses were strongly against the police chief,
"who this time did not want to be Falcon and did not want there to be
a Radowitzky."6' The syndicalists ultimately characterized Caballero as
a politician who only pursues electoral ends," seeking labor support in
response to "the imperative needs of Caballerismo, which faces the danger of losing forever its current status through a lack of support from the
'high[est] Partyauthority."'However, "Thebourgeois state, responding to
the inflexible laws of the capitalist machine, cannot serve the ends of the
revolutionarycause of labor even if one hundred Chiefs of Police honestly
pursue these goals."62Despite these criticisms, the syndicalists accepted
and actively pursued government mediation in labor conflicts.63
For the Communists, Caballero represented a version of Radical ideology: "While there are relatively peaceful relations between proletarians
and the bourgeoisie, Yrigoyenismo can successfully carry out its dema58. LV, Nov. 27, p. 2, aindNov. 30, p. 1.
59. LV, July 24, p. 3. See also LV, Jtuly11, p. 6, Jully 13, p. 3, JuIly 25, p. 3, JVly 27.
p. 3, and July 29, p. 3.
6o. LN, May 22, p. 1.
61. BP, June 2, p. 4. Buenos Aires police chief Ram6n Falcon repressed strikers in the
early l900S and was killed in revenge by the anarclhistSim6n Radowitzky ini 9gog. See also
BP, May 26, p. 3.
62. BP, Aug. 4, p. 4. See also BP, Aug. 11, p. 3.
63. LN, May 18, p. 5, and May 20, p. 1; BP, June 2, p. 3.
16
| HAHR I FEBRUARY
goguery; but when class struggle assumes vast proportions and deepens,
Yrigoyenismoshows its true face in the bloodiest repressions. 64The Communists ridiculed Governor Go6mezCello as a tool of Caballero and insisted that "bourgeois rulers, although they may sometimes look like antiimperialists and fancy themselves to be laborites, act like what they are
as soon as they come together as a cartel: servants of national exploiters
and foreign imperialists."65The principles and actions of Caballero, an
"ex-anarchistleader," corrupted the labor movement by deceiving "more
effectively than the politics of social democracy. It is the American type
adapted to South America, more agile and cunning....
Our party and all
class-conscious workers must carry out an energetic offensive to lay bare

the nature of Caballerismo, its petty-bourgeois essence. 66
Similarly, the anarchists applauded the labor upsurge in Rosario but
cautioned about Caballero. On a self-critical note, they acknowledged
that traditional politicians had trumpeted more effective nationalist slogans to labor, strengthening the "demagogic politics of Peludismo" and
the personal standing of leaders such as Caballero.67But the anarchists
attacked workers who sympathized with the police chief, charging that
such sympathy revealed "how terribly naive the proletariat is in trusting
the promises of a government that, like all governments, will distribute
sablazos and bullets when this is convenient to its plans."68
Each faction deplored the political strategy represented by the police
chief and attacked the competing factions for negotiating with Caballero.
The syndicalists and Socialists published repeated diatribes against the
anarchists, who in turn criticized the syndicalists for seeking official mediation in strikes and playing to the labor strategies of the Santa Fe Radicals. The Communists attacked the Socialists for divorcing themaselves
from labor and the anarchists for supporting bombings that played to
"reaction."The anarchists themselves were divided.69
These different factions all feared Caballero'spotential impact because
they suspected that Rosario'sworkers, despite their militancy, remained
uncommitted to the specific ideologies or programsof the Left. Evaluating
the city's labor unrest, an anonymous militant declared that despite the
intensity of the strikes, "the norms of the ongoing and disciplined action
of the proletariat, based on stable organization and firm and methodical
64. LI, Oct. 20, p. 5.
65. LI, Jan. 5, 1929, p. 7.
66. LI, Jan. 19, 1929, p. 4.
67. LA, Oct. 27, 1928, p. 2.
68. LA, July 6, p. 4, July 27, pp. 2-3, and Sept. 21, p. 4.
69. For various examiiplesof these accusatioins, see BP, June 30, 1928, p. 4; LA, Sept. 9,
p. 2; LI, Oct. 27, p. 5, anid Nov. 17, p. 3; LV, Oct. 13, p. 5, anid Nov. 20, p. 4. On the
anarchists'
divisioins,
see LA, May 26, p. 2, June 9, p. 4, and Nov. 30, p. 1.
17
procedures, have not yet taken root in the labor movement." The strikes
had responded to economic conditions but also to "politicalcircumstances
that have allowed the free exercise of strikes."70The Left saw most local
trade union leaders as responding to general actions rather than promoting
them. According to the syndicalists, labor organizations needed to keep
up with a militant labor movement "both so that [the movement] does not
wane, and so that it is not depicted [by political cartoonists] with a lion's
body and a mouse's head."7'
While the established political factions in organized labor feared for
their shallow roots among the rank and file, Caballero apparently never
could build, or even attempt to build, institutionalized mechanisms of
political support among Rosario's trade unions. The Radical leaders in
Santa Fe remained committed to mobilizing popular support through the
electoral process, and to using their party structure as the most important
organizationalframework.This strategy had served as the basis of electoral
success in early 1928, but it came to represent a political vulnerability
later in the year.
The Escalating Offensive
As labor unrest intensified, business organizations and the mainstream
press pressured federal authorities to assume responsibility for ensuring
public safety and the right to work in Santa Fe. Business leaders not
only criticized the passive attitude of the police but openly accused the
police chief of directly promoting unrest.72Business and the press also
complained that labor unrest in Rosario was undermining the national
economy and "our credit as an exporting country in the international markets."73Rosario'sFederacion Gremial del Comercio e Industrias and principal business organizations met in July to criticize the police chief and
the governor. After agitated debates, the group declared a citywide lockout beginning July 12, to protest the lack of security and attract federal
attention.7'
The lockout lasted 48 hours. Grain merchants and wholesalers handed
out signs announcing "closed due to the lack of guarantees," which merchants were to place in shop windows; but police ordered them removed.
The Socialists claimed that the lockout was effective among wholesalers
LV, Nov. 13, p. 4.
71. BP, June 2, p. 1. See also May 26, p.
70.
72.
2,
and Jtunie9, p. 4; LP, Jully 4, p.
20.
For example, LP, Jully5, p. 13, and July 9, p. 9. See also LV, Jtly 8, p. 3, and
July 27, p. 3; LP, May 11, p. 14, July 18, p. 19, and July 25, p. 19.
73. LP, July 6, p. 21. See also July 27, p. 18, Aug. 3, p. 14, and Aug.
74. LP, Jtuly12, p. 20; LV, July 12, p. 3.
21, p. 13.
18
| HAHR I FEBRUARY
but not in retail shops, and accused wholesalers of threatening nonstriking

merchants with commercial retaliation to enforce the lockout. The labor
press reported that some supporters of Caballero "refused to close their
establishments, arguing that they were not members of either the Bolsa or
the Camara Sindical and that, in addition, they disagreed with the lockout. " 75The syndicalists pointed out that the shops of these dissidents were
attacked by demonstrators, showing that employers applied the concept
of "freedom of work" only to labor. The press reported that the lockout
was very effective; nevertheless, the action clearly contributed to a sense
of crisis, a "state of disorientationin public opinion."76Following the lockout, Rosario'sFederacion Gremial del Comercio e Industrias declared that
all legal means had been exhausted in the province and beseeched the
protection of national authorities. A few days later, the same organization
all but explicitly called for federal intervention.77
Governor Gomez Cello countered that employers were being inflexible in their negotiations with strikers. Force by the police was not an
acceptable course of action: the real root of labor unrest was the "economic malaise of the workers,"and the use of force would only aggravate
matters.78The president of the Bolsa de Comercio responded that business organizations were calling not for the use of force against strikers but
for protection against violent acts.79Public authorities were being called
on to ensure social peace, "markingthe true road of collective and individual prosperity, which does not reside in the blind struggle of interests
but in their harmony; nor in a routine and frequent leisure that consumes
without creating, but in the labor that produces comfort and wealth."80
As labor unrest continued, the political offensive against the police
chief intensified.8' Caballero frequently reiterated that by intervening, the
city sought to "promote faithful understanding between the parties, so
there would be neither vencidos ni vencedores, nor injuries to any dignity,
for [the last] is equal among workers and patrones." Accordingly, "the
forces of the province will not be at the service of privilege, and the police
will not be transformed into persecutors of workers, either of those who
75. BP, Aug. 4, p. 4.
76. LV, Julv
12,
p. 3. See also July 13, p. 3; LP, July 13, pp.
12,
19, and July 14,
p. 19. The niationalcongress debated whether to lau-nchan official investigatioll of the Salnta
Fe cIisis, but Personalista representatives argued that aniinternal party dispute was drivinig
political evenitsand that provinicialauthorlitieshad sufficient conitrolover these imiatters.This
ended the official debate oni the events. See LV, July 13, pp. 1-2; and Congreso Nacional,
Diario de Sesiones, 214-37.
77. LP, July 14, p. 19. See also July 11, p. 18; July 16, p. 8; aindJuly 27, p. 18.
78. LP, July 13, p. 19. See also July 8, p. 20; aindLV, Jtuly9, p. 3.
79. See LP, July 14, p. 19.
8o. LP, July 18, p. 19.
81. LP, Aug. 3, p. 14, Aug. 21, p. 13, anidOct. 7, p. 23.
19
strike or of those who serve."82Furthermore, "Radicalismdoes not accept

class struggle. To the contrary, it endeavors to avoid it.
. .
. We conceive
of the state as an indispensable instrument for maintaining social equilibrium, contemplating all interests . . . but serving in particular to protect
the helpless and the weak from the selfishness of the strong."83The duties
of the police as an institution were to "keep order, to guarantee lives and
property, but not to lend their assistance so that powerful enterprises can
exploit their workers with hunger wages."84
The situation remained a virtual stalemate until November. Despite
strong pressure from employers and the mainstream press, both the outgoing Alvear administrationand the incoming Yrigoyen government hesitated to send troops to Santa Fe. But by the end of November, two new
developments had shifted the balance of power. First, Rosario held municipal elections, and the results were widely perceived as a major defeat
for the police chief. This lowered the potential political cost to the federal
administration of launching an official offensive against Caballero. About
the same time, massive labor unrest spread rapidly to agricultural areas
in southern Santa Fe province. Business and the press stepped up the
pressure.
In the municipal elections of November 11 the Radicals aligned with
Caballero won 11,718 votes out of a total of 42, 145, compared to 12,830 for
the opposing Radical factions and 10,431 for the Progressive Democrats.
Although these returns produced only minor political realignments in the
city council, the mainstream press hailed the election as a major defeat
for Caballero. La Nacion reported that the citizens had voted against "a
state of anarchy,"and that the results made it imperative for the provincial
governor to dismiss Caballero.85For the Buenos Aires Herald, "Lincoln's
aphorism that you cannot fool all of the people all of the time has been
amply proved in Rosario,"for the laboring class "has expressed its disapproval of the chief of police-a pleasing proof that, at heart, Argentine
labor is sound enough and that noisy demagogues in no way represent it." 86
These interpretations of the elections bore a measure of truth. The
results represented a major setback for Caballero'spolitical strategy. The
disruption of daily life that resulted from heightened labor unrest had con82. LP, Sept. 23, p. 20, and Oct 6, p. 19.
83. LP, Oct. 6, p. 19. See also Aug. 13, p. 20, and Oct. 7, p. 8.
84. LV, Sept. 24, p. lo. For more on Caballero'sresponise,see LP, Sept. 25, p. 19, anid
Oct. 6, p. 19.
that the governlor'sdis85. LN, Nov. 17, p. 5, and Nov. 18, p. 8. El Diario comiiplainied
missal of Caballero was improbable; "the chief of police is the oinlyone who rules in Rosario
and in the provinice."ED, Nov. 22, p. 3. See also Nov. 17, p. 3.
86. BAH, Nov. 20, p. 6. See also Nov. 23, p. 6, and Nov. 28, p. 6; and ED, Nov. 14,
p. 1.
20
| HAHR I FEBRUARY
siderably eroded Caballero'ssupport among the voters (although how this

erosion varied across the social spectrum must be learned from further
research). Even among workers, the political capital Caballero accrued
from his labor policies was probably limited, principally because the gains
workers made still seemed to result from labor conflicts and trade union
activities in which other political factions predominated. From this point
of view, the election results exposed the vulnerability of Caballero's labor
policies.
The elections represented a turning point in the business offensive
against Caballero. Drawing new strength from the results, the Federacion
Gremial protested to the federal interior ministry, criticizing the "lack of
guarantees"of order in the city and pointing out "the uselessness of its previous protests before municipal authorities."According to the federation,
Caballero was "instigator and solely responsible" for labor unruliness in
the province, warrantinghis removal from office. Rosario'smajor business
organizations agreed to call for Caballero'sdismissal and to send a delegation to Yrigoyen to request that "he use the means that the Constitution
puts at his disposal to reestablish the guaranteeswe are currently deprived
of."Joining the chorus, a group of dissatisfied RosarioRadicalspublished a
manifesto denouncing the provincial administrationand calling for federal
intervention.87
By late November federal authorities found these demands more compelling as labor unrest spread to the southern agricultural areas. There
had already been a brief spurt of rural labor conflicts in July, and Rosario's Sociedad Rural had called on the provincial governor to intervene.
Gomez Cello had responded that resolution efforts were under way and
that reinforcements would be provided to protect "free workers." Rural
organizing was led by the carters (conductores de carros) in protest against
the increasing use of trucks to transportgrain. Complaining that "gasoline
threatens to triumph over blood," they demanded that loads be allocated
equally to trucks and horse-drawn wagons and that truck-owning farmers
not be allowed to transport their neighbors' harvest.88
The new rural unions included other agriculturalwage workers, both
men and women. The unions called for better wages, union regulation
of employment, and improved working conditions. In one strike, workers
demanded that employers justify all firings before the union; other stipulations included "good food in abundance, including half a liter of wine
87. For the federation'sprotest, see LP, Nov. 18, p. 22; LN, Nov. 18, p. 5; ED, Nov. 21,
p. 1; TS, Nov. 22, p. 4. On the delegation, LN, Nov. 22, p. 7, and Nov. 24, p. 4. On the
Radicals' ml-anifesto,ED, Nov. 21, p. 3.
88. For the governor'sstatemiient,see LP, July 4, p. 20, July 5, pp. 13, 19, anld Jully 11,
p. 18. For the carters' demands, see BAH, Nov. 23, p. 6; see also BP, Jain.21, 1929, p. 1.
21
per meal to each worker, and clean, fresh water. The workers will have
40 minutes for breakfast, an hour and a half for lunch, and half an hour
for the afternoon snack." Syndicalists and Communists both were active
among these rural trade unions, and the mainstream press suggested that
competition between the factions aggravatedlabor unrest.89
As the new strikes spread, the Sociedad Rural told Go6mezCello that
the approachingharvest demanded measures to "broadlyensure the freedom of work." It also informed the federal minister of agriculture of its
appeal.90The Federacion AgrariaArgentina said that tenant farmers were
being squeezed between the grain prices offered by merchants and the
wage demands of the workers, and alleged that groups of workers were
threatening employers who wanted to hire nonunion personnel. Delegates
from this group and the Fraternidad Agrariamet with Yrigoyen to press
the need to investigate rural labor unrest.9' Rosario's chamber of commerce urged the provincial governors of Santa Fe and Cordoba to deploy
the rural police to "protect the freedom of work and energetically persecute the hotheads (exaltados) who are wiping out individual rights and
property."92
Observers reported that the countryside was overwhelmed by chaos.
The Liga Patriotica Argentina denounced local authorities and called on
Yrigoyen to take appropriate measures, declaring, "fear spreads everywhere. During the night, bands of ruffiansin automobiles travel the roads,
howling, shooting off their guns, and burning the fields wherever they
can. God help us!" Similar pleas were made by the Sociedad Rural and by
local tenant farmers, who announced that they had decided "to cross their
arms and wait for government intervention and the effective guarantee of
the freedom of work."93Rumors circulated that farmers had been killed
by strikers. The harvest was in danger; as La Nacion warned, "almost the
whole south of the province will be left in a state of pure misery if the
conflict is not resolved in the coming week."94
Not all press reports confirmed this situation, however. As late as
89. On the rural unions, see BP, Dec. 29, 1928, p. 1. On their demanids, LN, Nov. 25,
1928, p. 7. On factional inivolvement, BP, Jan. 14, 1928, p. 2, Jan. 21, p. 1, May 12, p. 5,
Aug. 11, p. 2, Oct. 20, p. 2, and Nov. 17, p. 3; LI, Oct. 20, pp. 2, 7; LP, Jtly 4, p. 20,
Aug. 21, p. 13, Sept. 21, p. 19, Oct. 15, p. 20, Nov. 27, p. 18, and Dec. 4, p. 16; LV, Jan. 1,
p. 23, Oct. 8, p. 8, Oct. 20, p. 4, Oct. 24, p. 1, Oct. 31, p. 4, Nov. 1, p. 4, Nov. 2, p. 3,
Nov. 8, p. 3, and Nov. 19, p. 32.
go. LP, Nov. 22, p. 14. See also LN, Nov. 21, p. 3.
91. LN, Nov. 27, p. 4; see also Nov. 23, pp. 1, 11.
92. LP, Nov. 22, p. 19, and Nov. 23, p. 22. See also LN, Nov. 23, p. 11, Nov. 25, p. 8,
and Nov. 26, p. 6.
93. On the tenant farmers, see LN, Nov. 25, p. 1. On the Liga's statement, LP, Nov. 22,
p. 17; and BAH, Nov. 23, p. 6.
94. LN, Nov. 26, p. 1.
| HAHR I FEBRUARY
22
November 22, even conservative La Prensa saw no signs that force was
warranted:workerswere seeking to organize legally, and employers' alarm
was typical during the labor shortages that accompanied each harvest.
Within a few days, however, the same newspaper called for public authorities to "repress with energy any act that implies a limitation on the
freedom of work."95Reports on the extent of the rural violence remained
contradictoryeven on the eve of the military intervention. In spite of these
ambiguities, late November and early December witnessed an intensified
campaign by business and the mainstream press for federal action to curb
labor unrest in Santa Fe.96
The campaign was not without contention. The business organizations
and their sympathizers in the press portrayed the strikers and their demands as illegitimate, but the labor press responded with a similar attack
on employers. The Socialists applauded provincial authorities for their restraint in placing "the welfare of the native population before the bastard
interests of foreign speculation. At stake is a principle of good and healthy
nationalism, linked to the situation of our rural peonadas." They attributed the business attack to "the grain speculators of Rosario, effectively
aided by the Yrigoyenist anti-Caballeristasof Santa Fe," and blamed those
factions for introducing "creole politics" into the efforts of ruralworkers.97
Communist writers complained that tenant farmers were calling for police
action against strikers despite having experienced repression themselves
during their conflicts with landowners over rents. "The colonos must fight
against their exploiters and not against their exploited."98
Responding to the pressure from business, the federal department of
labor sent an inspector to Santa Fe in late November. The inspector attributed much of the unrest to syndicalist militants, and observed that the
sons of tenant farmers were being forced to join the rural unions. The
farmers protested that "they wished to have the freedom of choosing their
peones, particularly because, in this line of work, el peon hace vida en
familia con el colono, and they could not allow in their houses persons
who did not enjoy their confidence." Moreover, the rural unions intended
to maintain a high level of unrest "once the current conflict is resolved."
Tenant farmers and merchants urged the federal administration to "guarantee the freedom of work on the basis of justice and harmony between
capital and labor."99
95. LP, Nov. 22, p. 14; ibid., Nov. 24, p. 20, and Nov. 26, p. 12.
96. LN, Nov. 30, p. 1, and Dec. 2, p. 3; LP, Nov. 27, p. 18, and Dec. 1, p. 21; ED,
Nov. 29, p. 1; and BAH, Nov. 23, p. 6.
97. On the peonadais, see LV, Nov. 25, p. 1; see also ED, Nov. 26, p. 3. Oin "creole
politics," LV, Nov. 30, p. 1; and LP, Dec. lo, p. 12.
98. LI, Dec. 1, pp. 1, 6.

99. LP, Dec. 4, p. l6; BSAT, Dec. 20, pp. 557-59.
See also LP, Nov. 24, p. 20.
23
In the face of these escalating pressures, SantaFe provincial authorities

portrayed themselves as caught in the middle. The ministro de gobierno
argued that his administrationwas already mediating and controlling labor
unrest. Caballero assured the Sociedad Rural that the authorities would
protect the harvest, for "the conditions of rural work do not allow the
presentation of lists of demiandsat mom-ientswhen reaping the harvest
is urgent." The Sociedad Rural broadcast Caballero's statement on radio.
Police reinforcemientswere sent from Rosarioto troubled rural areas.'00
But these conciliatory measures did not satisfy the principal business
organizations. A delegation fronmthe Federacion Gremial met with Yrigoyen on November 26 to declare that Rosario'slabor problems involved
"continuous and systematic subversive acts that local authorities are incapable of repressing" and that "all the malaise of the working class is
the work of professional agitatorswho act with the authorities' tolerance."
The federation therefore requested federal protection "to reestablish public calm." 101
Yrigoyenreceived a second delegation of employers from Santa Fe two

days later. They reiterated the complaints about the inaction of the provincial authorities, who "stimulate strikes and consent with their passivity to
attacks on property, persons, and institutions."This delegation explained
that labor demands in the rural areas were difficult to meet, given the
competitive pressures faced by local producers in foreign markets. They
were not calling for outright violence against strikers, the delegation said,
but given "that the intensity and extension of the [strikes] already exceed
local and provincialjurisdictions to encompass much larger areas that appear like a stain over the Argentine map," they asked for "an extreme but
certain recourse that can restore peace." The demands were endorsed by
the national Sociedad Rural in Buenos Aires.102
Yrigoyenassured these groups that the federal government would not
allow these events to continue because he understood that "in all areas of
the country, the action of the central power must procure the harmony
and welfare of society in general," and his administrationwould therefore
adopt "the necessary measures to remedy that state of affairs, in defense
of the trabajo nacional" and "the tranquility of society."103 In a few days,
the interior minister sent Go6iez Cello a telegram calling on provincial
authoritiesto "reestablish the routine of work,"and warning, "if Your Excellency does not feel capable of dealing with the situation, or if you are
ioo. LN, Nov. 25, p. 4, and Nov. 26, p. 1; and LP, Nov. 26, p. i6.
lol. LP, Nov. 27, pp. 1, 16; ED, Nov. 25, p. i, and Nov. 26, p. 1; and BAH, Nov. 28,
p. 6.
LN, Nov. 9, p. 1; BSAT, Dec. 5, PP. 529-34.
LP, Nov. 27, P. 16, anid Nov. 2-9, p. 17.
102.
LP, Nov. 29, pp. 1-18;
103.
LN, Nov. 29, p.
1;
| HAHR I FEBRUARY
24
of the opinion that you have not sufficient means to do so, kindly inform
this government of the fact so that it may take the measures it deems
necessary."104
La Prensa applauded the presidential statement for rebutting the

political doctrine of Caballero, reestablishing an appropriate role for
state agencies, and signaling a "healthy evolution" in the labor policies
of the national administration. El Diario made similar points, referring
to Caballero and fellow leaders as "provincial caudillejos with Communist pretensions," and declaring that "order,discipline, and liberty are the
bywords of the healthy population of the countryside, and the national
executive power must intervene so that these bywords do not become a
myth. . . . In the last elections, the pueblo rosarino already signaled the
road to follow: War on anarchy, war on bolshevism." Observed the Buenos
Aires Herald: "Affairsare no longer within the political arena. The men
who are protesting most vehemently are not politicians and never have
been. They are the businessmen, producers, and traders of the province.
No government can affordto close its ears to clamorfrom such a source."105
The provincial nministrode gobierno again responded that the instances
of labor unrest "lack the overriding importance given to them by alarmist indicators, and cannot be reasonably or justifiably attributed to the
conduct of the government." Discontent among workers was ultimately
the result of the situation inherited by the current administration. Employer organizations should act at times of "public tranquility"to promote
national policies aimed at resolving economic problems, rather than falling into "the uncertainty brought by labor agitations, under the mistaken
assumption that they will immediately cease by the simple virtue of intervention by the authorities."'06Santa Fe's governor earlier had given a
similar response to the Interior Ministry, suggesting that "lowly motives"
were responsible for making labor unrest a central political issue.'07 But
these attempts at dissuasion failed to reverse the course of events.
The Federal Response
Finally, on December 2, 1928, Yrigoyen ordered a regiment of mounted
infantry to Santa Fe. He justified his action by declaring that provincial authorities had failed to protect employers, and society in general,
104.
105.
p. 1; see
Nov. 30,
1o6.
LP, Dec. 1, p. 16; BAH, Dec. 2, p. 3; TS, Dec. 2, p. 4; LN, Dec. 4, p. 2.

LP, Nov. 28, p. 16; RRP, Nov. 30, p. 7, made similar commllents.ED, Nov.
27,
also Nov. 29, p. 3, and Nov. 30, p. 3; LN, Nov. 27, p. 8, and Dec. 6, p. 8. BAH,
p. 6; see also LN, Nov. 30, p. 7.
LP, Dec. 2, p. 9.
107. LN, Dec. 2, pp. 1, 8; LP, Dec. 2, p. 9.
25
from "disruptive elements that are alien to the agriculturalactivities of the

province." According to the text of Yrigoyen'sorder, "the whole pueblo,
[which is] cultured, healthy, and aware of the importance of the existing circumstances, wished to obtain immediate guarantees and reassurances, depositing all this trust in the action of the executive power of the
nation."'08 The next day, the Tenth Cavalrywas sent to Rosario to coordinate the federal forces and to help "maintain order and the freedom of
work."The troops were housed at the headquartersof the Sociedad Rural.
Small military units and representatives from the ministry of agriculture
were dispatched to areas of labor unrest, where they were "very well received by rural commerce and the farmers."The arrival of the army had
dampened the rural strikes, allowing employers to hire nonunion workers
and forcing many organizers to abandon their efforts.'09
The startled provincial authorities responded with alarm. Caballero
rushed back from the city of Santa Fe to meet with federal representatives. Caballero, Gomez Cello, and other officials met frequently over the
next few days; it was rumored that the provincialministers, at great effort,
had finally persuaded the governor not to resign in protest. On the other
hand, the vice governor, Elias de la Puente, publicly criticized Gomez
Cello, complaining that "the situation in which the province finds itself is
a consequence of having ignored my loyal advice." The intervention was
also supported by Santa Fe senator Armando Antille, who called for new
provincial elections: "The permanence of sefior Gomez Cello in the government represents a danger to party unity and institutional stability." 0
The stock and grain exchanges were also satisfied with the executive measures "to safeguard the agricultural wealth of the region," and
applauded the troops' arrival in a special letter to Yrigoyen."'1The Federacion Gremial hailed "the measures adopted to ensure tranquility and
trust for the hardworking pueblo of the second province of the republic," and other business organizations were equally enthusiastic."12 In a
few days, the minister of agriculture announced that "since the arrival of
the national troops, the rural strike has become completely paralyzed."113
Nevertheless, the Federacion Gremial complained that strikes continued
to hurt businesses in Rosario. General Marcilesi, commander of the troops
1o8. LP, Dec. 3, p. 9. For additional reports, see LN, Dec. 3, p. 1.
109. LP, Dec. 4, 1928, p. 16, Dec. 6, p. 22, and Mar. 8, 1929, p. 21; LN, Dec. 4, 1928,
pp. 1, 2.
lo. De la Puente was quoted in LP, Dec. 4, p. 21; Antille in LC, Dec. 7, p. 5. See also
LN, Dec. 3, p. 5, and Dec. 4, p. 2; LP, Dec. 5, p. 18, and Dec. 6, p. 22; LC, Dec. 9, p. 5.
ill. Bolsa de Cereales, Memnoriae informe (1928-29)
(BulenosAires, 1929), 65; LP,
Dec. 4, p. 16.
112. LN, Dec. 4, p. 2; anidRRP, Dec. 7, p. 7.
113. LP, Dec. 5, p. 18.
2-6
| HAHR I FEBRUARY
in Rosario, responded that he had "received instructionsfrom the national

government to intervene in any conflict where guarantees are lacking."
Businesses needed only to request his protection for the troops to be mobilized "to guarantee the freedom of work."The press reported that these
declarations stimulated commercial and stock market operations."14
Most of the mainstreampress also responded with enthusiasm. A frontpage editorial in El Diario challenged Gomez Cello's assertions that there
were no major disorders in the province: "That attitude is so improbable
that one wonders whether sefior Go6mezCello is the [governor] of the
province of Santa Fe or a delegate of Moscow's Third International." A
subsequent editorial declared that a preferable solution would have been
for the governor to fire Caballero, for the federal forces were likely to
"leave the governor under the thumb of Rosario's chief of police, the
official [responsible for this problem] who espouses revolutionary communism." El Diario urged a broader action to ensure "the regular functioning
of permanent institutions," but continued to support the military intervention: "We applaud any measure taken by the government to prevent
discord, anarchy, terror, and bolshevism from ruling in our country, a
country of liberty, of work, and of respect." La Nacion and the Buenos
Aires Herald also hailed the federal action."5
Other newspapers dissented. La Prensa had already stated its opinion
that the strikes fell under the jurisdiction of provincial authorities: the stability of elected authorities had never been endangered, the situation in
rural areas had greatly improved over the past few days, and the Rosario
strikes had been virtually settled. The provincial authorities had failed to
safeguard the freedom of work, but this did not allow the federal administration to "reach beyond its constitutional limits." The authorities of Santa
Fe had been freely elected, and could only be sanctioned by ballots. The
affair, said La Prensa, reflected a split among the Radicals over the closing
of the provincial legislature and over the provincial administration's endorsement of "the doctrinaire anarchismof Rosario'spolice chief . .. and
his ambiguous theories about the attitude befitting public authority when
struggles between patrones and asalariados explode." Yet these internal
party disputes over appropriate labor strategies failed to justify the federal action. In Rosario, La Capital raised similar reservations."16 But the
reservations were ridiculed by the Buenos Aires Herald.
114. For Marcilesi's statement, see LP, Dec. 6, p. 22. See also LN, Dec. 7, p. 6.
115. ED, Dec. 3, p. 1, Dec. 4, p. 3, Dec. 5, p. 1, and Dec. 7, p. 1; LN, Dec. 3, p. 6;
BAH, Dec. 4, p. 6.
116. LP, Nov. 30, p. 11, Dec. 3, p. 13, Dec. 4, p.
21,
and Dec. 6, p.
22;
LC, Dec. 3,
P. 3.
27
If ever a government merited presidential censure, it is that of Santa

Fe, yet some of our contemporaries see a violation of provincial autonomy! Possibly, by a strict interpretation of the letter of the Constitution without regard for its spirit, they can make up an argument in
support of their case, but we should be sorryto see such a thesis generally adopted. What it means, in reality, is that local authorities would
have the right, in any circumstance, to do exactly as they pleased.
Property might be destroyed and even human life sacrificed without
the victims' having any chance of redress.117
The Review of the River Plate commneintedthat the federal action hadl
saved the province's harvest, and "there could be no greater immorality
than allowing the bread grain that God has made to grow in this bounteous season to fall to the ground and rot for want of the right of way to
"8 La Nacion's correspondent even remarked
go ahead with the harvest.""
that the troops should have been accompanied by arimiyplanes, for their
patrols over rural areas would have brought "tranquilityto homes in the
couintryside."
119
Even La Capital soon shifted from a critical to an openly suLpportive

position. In an editorial published a few days after the troops arrived, it
explained that although it still suspected constitutional violations in the
action, "the inefficiency or passivity of the provincial governmeintin repressing the excesses that came to characterizethe rural strike in Santa Fe
undoubtedly imposed this position on the national executive in the face
of the imperative and unavoidable duty to guarantee public and private
interests." Although the measure may have been excessive, "the fact is
that it has produced an undeniable feeling of relief among the agriculturalists, industrialists, and merchants of the province," improving conditions
for "cooperationand harmony between capital and labor"by "suppressing
the causes of the disturbances and disorders that have diverted the rural
120
workers' movement."
The syndicalist press referred to the troops as malo'nblanco and compared the intervention in Santa Fe to the repression of strikes in Patagonia
earlier in the decade: "We had supposed that the Argentine army was destined for greater missions, and that conscripts, largely sons of the pueblo,
would not be placed in the situation of having to fire at their own fathers
or brothers."121 It attacked the Federaci6n AgrariaArgentina as "reaction117. BAH, Dec. 4, p. 6. Along similar linies, see Dec. 5, p. 6.
ii8. RRP, Dec. 7, p. 9.
119.
LN, Dec. 4, p. 9, Dec. 5, p. 1.
LC, Dec. 5, p. 4.
EOM 9:123 (Dec. i6,
Also, BP, Dec. 12, p. 1.
120.
121.
1928),
1.
For the synidicalistr-esponise,see BP, Dec.
22,
p. 3.
| HAHR I FEBRUARY
28
ary and bourgeois" and accused "the bourgeois press" of carrying out
an offensive against strikers "by order of foreign capitalists." The capitalists in question were the "grain sharks" "speculators sitting in Holland,
France, North America, etc., and with branches in Buenios Aires, Rosario,
and other cities, who through scandalous and criminal maneuvers fix the
price of grain in all countries of the world according to their wishes." 122
The Socialists condemned the use of the army in labor conflicts and characterized the intervention as an "armed invasion of the province." 12:3
Some sectors of the labor press remained optimistic about the future
of the movement. The syndicalists themselves declared that "the reactionary sirens of capitalism can blast, inciting a response. But this no longer
matters, nor does it scare anyone; their screams are like smoke, which
vanishes in the air." 124 But the swift effect of repression on the rural and
urban labor organizations dispelled that optimism. Soon after the intervention, the Union Sindical Argentina held a rally in Rosario to protest the
army's presence; although it was a Sunday, only 150 people attended.'25
Recognizing the impact of the intervention, the anarchists offered a more
pessimistic prognosis: "It is the beginning of a repression that will not take
long to be savagely unleashed over the entire movement. Rosario's current situation should teach us to struggle against it in its true spheres: . . .
the high spheres of the national government, a government of despotism,
cowardice, and dictatorial excess." 126
Although the labor press criticized the federal measures, labor organizations failed to raise a strong response to the intervention. This was
partly because of continuing factional struggles. The syndicalists met with
Yrigoyen within days of the event and reportedly blamed most of the
rural disruptions on "the subversive action" of elements from outside the
syndicalist labor federation. They also informed the president that they
were stopping their organizational drive in the province.'17 The Socialists and anarchists denounced syndicalist union members for obtaining
credentials from the army that allowed them to organize in the Santa Fe
area. The syndicalists first called these accusations falsehoods, but later
argued that such negotiations with the military were necessary to continue
an effective struggle.'28 These factional divisions further undermined the
labor movement's bargaining power. Even the anarchists recognized that
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
BP, Dec. i, p. i, anidDec. 12, p. 4.

EOM 9:124 (Jani.1, 1929), 1; LP, Dec.
BP, Dec. 1, p. 1.
LP, Dec. 17, p. 21.
LA, Mar. i6, 1929, p. 4.
LP, Dec. 5, 1928, p. 18.
LP, Dec. 9, p. 7. See also BP, Dec. 12,
11,
pp.
1928, p.
1,
21.
3-4, aindDec.
29,
p.
1.
29
unions were fighting among themselves in Rosario rather than promoting

solidarity with the ruralworkers.'29
The leading labor periodicals likewise failed to keep the focus on the
Santa Fe events. By mid-December, the Communist press was giving
priority coverage to police repression of the rally held to protest President Hoover's visit to Buenos Aires. The anarchistpaper was following the
arrest of two anarchist militants whom the police had accused of terrorist
activities. If these sectors of the press touched on the Santa Fe events, it
was to condemn the Yrigoyen administration as a bourgeois dictatorship
that served imperialism and capitalist reaction. Conflicts between the federal administrationand provincial authorities, as well as ongoing disputes
in the Radicalparty, were perceived by most labor organizationsto involve
an internal struggle in the bourgeoisie, and participation in this struggle
was not viewed as a viable or promising course of action for labor.'30
In the second week of December, Caballero issued a lengthy document announcing his resignation as Rosario'spolice chief. After reviewing
the events that had taken place in Santa Fe since May, Caballero accused
employers of conducting a repressive offensive against labor.'3'La Prensa
criticized his statement, noting that the police chief had been well aware
of the political consequences of allowing labor unrest to continue. La
Nacion declared that the social policies of Rosario'spolice chief were incompatible with the national constitution, and characterized Caballero as
a desorbitado. The Buenos Aires Herald sneered, "Rosariomust be a very
wicked city indeed, for apparently there is only one truthful man in it....
[The] press, Bolsa de Comercio, Sociedad Rural, Bolsa de Cereales [grain
exchange], and private individuals . .. are unmitigated liars . .. joined in
an unholy conspiracy to make the virtues of the chief of police appear as
vices." By the middle of December, Caballero was reportedly attempting
to meet with federal officials in Buenos Aires, but public authorities were
avoiding him, reportedly under instructions "fromsefior Yrigoyen . . . so
as not to receive the document of resignation he had brought."132
Yrigoyen'sresponse to the SantaFe events was undoubtedly influenced
by the personal challenge represented by Caballero, who had designed his
own labor strategy to assert himself as the leader of a new Radical faction.
But Caballero's efforts to implement this strategy at the provincial level
were greatly constrained by the tensions they generated on both a local
LA, Jan. 12, 1929, p. 4.
130. LI, Dec. 15, 1928, p. 6, and Jani.1,
131. Caballero, Discursos, 513.
129.
1929,
p. 1; LA, Jani.12,
1929,
p. 4.
132. LP, Dec. 12, 1928, p. 20, anidDec. 13, p. 15; LN, Dec. 4, p. 9, anidD)ec. 14, p. 6;
BAH, Dec. 13, p. 6; LC, Dec. 15, p. 5; see also Dec. 10, p. 5.
| HAHR I FEBRUARY
30
and national scale. Caballero continued to pursue some of his tactics after
the 1930 coup that unseated Yrigoyen. His subsequent political career,
however, was not based on the type of alliances and discourse that he cultivated in L928.133 The Radicalparty continued to lack a strong and coherent
labor strategy, remaining "indecisive, moderate, and contradictory"in its
policies toward labor.'34
Despite the federal intervention in Santa Fe, business organizations
and the mainstream press continued to criticize the Yrigoyen administration for lacking stable labor policies. After the December events, the
newspapers began to complain that strikes had not been totally eradicated in the province, and there was a persistent perception that the Yrigoyen administrationwas associated with rising conflict and uncontrollable
violence throughout the country.'35Furthermore, Yrigoyen continued to
make gestures designed to promote labor support; for example, declaring May 1 a national holiday in L929.136 These activities raised doubts
about the Radical administration'strue sympatlhies.Also criticized was the
highly personal manner in whiclh Yrigoyen sought to intervene in labor
conflicts. Such a strategy, critics complained, distracted his administration
from other important matters.
Political opposition to the Yrigoven administration among these sectors, however, remained moderate. For business and the mainstream
press, the federal intervention bode well for the country'sfuture. No major
labor conflicts obstructed the next harvest, and labor unrest declined,
except for a brief upsurge in August 1929. Noting that Argentina was enjoying high rates of growth in agriculture, industry, foreign investment,
and immigration, the Buenos Aires Herald declared, "It is our conviction
that Argentina is on the verge of a great industrial and commllercialboom.
All is bright and healthy in our particular garden. Let others dream of
133. In October 1930, for examiiple,the press r-eportedthat Caballero was cr-eatinlga
new political agruipaci6no called Radical Sudista. Dturinigthe regimiieof Agustini P. Jtusto,
Caballero was appointed pr-esidentof the Caja Nacional de Ahorro Postal (1932-36). He onice
againibecame a niationialseniatorfor SanitaFe in 1937-43 and vice presidenltof the Seniatefor1941-43.
See LP, Oct. 17, 1930, p. 20; Qtuient es qtuien eni la Ar-gentinla, 1958-59 (Btlenlos
Aires: Kraft, 1959), 150.
134. This characterizationiof the Radicals'labor policies belongs to Jos6 Luis Romero,
A History of Argentine Political Thotight (Stainford:Stanifor-d
Univ. Press, 1963), 224.
135. LP, Dec. 24, 1928, p. 9, Jani. 27, 1929, p. 18, aiid Fel. 8, 1929, p. 22.
136. LP, May i, 1929, p. 15. The admiiniistr-ation
even forced the Jockey Clib to canlcel
its scheduled r-aces,saying that the holiday was initenidedas a day of r-estin all activities.
137. LP, Aug. 4, 1929, p. 14. Diego Abad de Sanitillain
suggests that "due to his whole
upbr-iniging,[Yirigoyeil]could niotbe a i-ulerwho had clear-lythought about social pr-oblems,
but his patriarchalismcould compenisatein part for this deficiencv." Abad de Sanitillhin,"El
anite el golpe de estado del 6 de setieimbre de 1930," in La
movimienitoobrero ar-genitinio
crisis de 1930. 2: Memorias, ed. Federico Pinedo et al. (BtuenosAires: Cenitr-oEditor de
Am6rica Latina, 1986),
209-22,
214.
31
war and military power. Our future, in all its greatness and brightness,
depends on peace and work. There is no reason why Argentina should
not have an abundance of both."138The reversal of these expectations with
the onset of the depression in 1929, of course, led directly to the military
coup of 1930.
Conclusions
In all likelihood, the federal intervention in Santa Fe not only showed
the limits of Caballero's labor strategy and political discourse, but also
undermined the long-term stability of the Yrigoyenadministration. Strong
pressures from business and the mainstream press lowered the government's threshold of tolerance for labor unrest and pushed the administration into a repressive posture, more moderate than but similar to the one
adopted by the first Yrigoyen regime in the late l910S and early 1920S.
The action also undermined popular support for Yrigoyen, which partially
explains why the labor movement did not actively defend his administration at the time of the 1930 coup. The administration'snational legitimacy
was eroded by its use of federal intervention to resolve political disputes
with provincial governments it did not like. Moreover, this use of force
helped erode the legitimacy of democratic processes, fortifying a political
language that justified the use of coercive measures as necessary for the
defense of national interests and the defeat of subversion.
Labor unrest played an importantrole in shaping the political language
of powerful elites, conservatives, and labor organizations. The provincial
authorities in Santa Fe, for example, promulgated a political rhetoric that
called for the state to assume a more active role in mediating conflicts between workers and employers. This notion was not terribly innovative, for
business and the mainstream press were also asking state authorities to increase their regulation of labor-capitalconflicts. But the political discourse
of Radical leaders such as Caballero went beyond the defense of these
regulating functions to call, in the name of social justice and economic
freedom, for the active defense of labor interests against capitalist exploitation. In an attempt to broaden the appeal of this discourse, provincial
authorities also advocated the protection of consumers from unscrupulous private enterprise, and national interests from the ravages of foreign
speculation.
Beyond the insights they provide into the relationship between the
Radical party and the labor movement and the evolution of state regulation of capital-labor conflicts, the 1928 events in Santa Fe illuminate
138. BAH, Dec.
11,
1928, p. 6.
32
| HAHR I FEBRUARY
the ongoing formation of labor identity in Argentina. For example, many

elements of the political images, rhetoric, and alliances that emerged at
this time reappeared later in the interwar period, particularly after the
1943 coup. In this sense, these earlier attempts to develop a closer institutional relationship between the labor movement and political parties
provide a sound basis on which to evaluate the fundamental continuities
and discontinuities in the origins of populism.

Korzeniewicz - The Labor Politics of Radicalism: The Santa Fe Crisis of 1928

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Korzeniewicz - The Labor Politics of Radicalism: The Santa Fe Crisis of 1928

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The Labor Politics of Radicalism: The Santa Fe Crisis of 1928

Author(s): Roberto P. Korzeniewicz

The Labor Politics of Radicalism:

Between May and December of 1928, Radical provincial officials in

The strikes began among Rosario dockworkers demanding higher

4. BAH, May 8, 1928, p. 5, May 9, p. 5.

THE SANTA FE CRISIS OF 1928

On May 20, Rosario's labor federations rallied in solidarity with the

Matters grew so serious during the

LN, May 22, p. 1.

LP, May 22,

THE SANTA FE CRISIS OF 1928

tial victims resulted in fewer muggings than usual. Strikebreakers were

moved at any moment."'9 Some strikers attributed the conflicts directly

LV, May io, 1928, p. 3; TS, May io, p. io.

vol. 4, sec. 1 (Buenos Aires: El Ateneo,

Mantiel Goldstraj, Anos y errores

(Buenos Aires: Sophos, 1957); Hector J. Iniigo Carrera, La experiencia radical,

THE SANTA FE CRISIS OF 1928

To address these concerns, Rosario'smain business organizations met

THE SANTA FE CRISIS OF 1928

represented "the most vigorous expression of Radical thought on social

that "pretend to transform this force into an exclusively political group,

18-21, 266, 453-54.

38. LN, May 31, p. 5. See also May 27, p. i6.

THE SANTA FE CRISIS OF 1928

disapprove of Caballero's labor policies. Furthermore, Santa Fe's new

tions searched for an appropriateresponse to the labor policies of the new

THE SANTA FE CRISIS OF 1928

demands, including recognition of labor organizations, wage increases,

July 27, p. 18, July 30, p.

Aug. 3, p. 21; LV, July 27, p. 3, and Aug. 3, p. 1.

In all these cases, the attitude of municipal authorities strengthened the

THE SANTA FE CRISIS OF 1928

Our party and all

class-conscious workers must carry out an energetic offensive to lay bare

see LA, May 26, p. 2, June 9, p. 4, and Nov. 30, p. 1.

THE SANTA FE CRISIS OF 1928

and Jtunie9, p. 4; LP, Jully 4, p.

but not in retail shops, and accused wholesalers of threatening nonstriking

p. 3. See also July 13, p. 3; LP, July 13, pp.

19, and July 14,

THE SANTA FE CRISIS OF 1928

strike or of those who serve."82Furthermore, "Radicalismdoes not accept

siderably eroded Caballero'ssupport among the voters (although how this

THE SANTA FE CRISIS OF 1928

98. LI, Dec. 1, pp. 1, 6.

See also LP, Nov. 24, p. 20.

THE SANTA FE CRISIS OF 1928

In the face of these escalating pressures, SantaFe provincial authorities

Yrigoyenreceived a second delegation of employers from Santa Fe two

LP, Nov. 29, pp. 1-18;

LN, Nov. 29, p.

La Prensa applauded the presidential statement for rebutting the

LP, Dec. 1, p. 16; BAH, Dec. 2, p. 3; TS, Dec. 2, p. 4; LN, Dec. 4, p. 2.

THE SANTA FE CRISIS OF 1928

from "disruptive elements that are alien to the agriculturalactivities of the

in Rosario, responded that he had "received instructionsfrom the national

THE SANTA FE CRISIS OF 1928

If ever a government merited presidential censure, it is that of Santa

Even La Capital soon shifted from a critical to an openly suLpportive

For the synidicalistr-esponise,see BP, Dec.

BP, Dec. i, p. i, anidDec. 12, p. 4.

THE SANTA FE CRISIS OF 1928