EN BANC

STANDARD CHARTERED BANK

(Philippine Branch), PAUL
SIMON MORRIS, SUNDARA
RAMESH, OWEN BELMAN, SANJAY
AGGARWAL, RAJAMANI
CHANDRASHEKAR, MARIVEL
GONZALES, MA. ELLEN VICTOR,
CHONA G. REYES, ZENAIDA
IGLESIAS, RAMONA BERNAD,
MICHAELANGELO AGUILAR, and
FERNAND TANSINGCO,
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 167173

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,

- versus -

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,

SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKS,

FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND
CURRENCIES, as represented
by its Chairperson, HON.
EDGARDO J. ANGARA,
Respondent.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES, and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

Promulgated:

December 27, 2007

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
NACHURA, J .:

Before us is a Petition for Prohibition (With Prayer for Issuance of Temporary

Restraining Order and/or Injunction) dated and filed on March 11, 2005 by petitioners
against respondent Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, as
represented by its Chairperson Edgardo J. Angara (respondent).

Petitioner Standard Chartered Bank (SCB)-Philippines is an institution incorporated

in England with limited liability and is licensed to engage in banking, trust, and other
related operations in the Philippines.Petitioners Paul Simon Morris, Sundara Ramesh,
Owen Belman, Sanjay Aggarwal, Rajamani Chandrashekar, Marivel Gonzales, Ma. Ellen
Victor, Chona G. Reyes, Zenaida Iglesias, Ramona Bernad, Michaelangelo Aguilar, and
Fernand Tansingco are the Chief Executive Officer, Chief Operations Officer, Country

Head of Consumer Banking, General Manager for Credit Card and Personal Loans, Chief
Financial Officer, Legal and Compliance Officer, former Trust and Investment Services
Head, Country Tax Officer, Head of Corporate Affairs, Head of Banking Services, Head
of Client Relationships, and the Head of Global Markets of SCB-Philippines,
respectively.Respondent, on the other hand, is one of the permanent committees of the
Senate of the Philippines.

The petition seeks the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) to enjoin
respondent from (1) proceeding with its inquiry pursuant to Philippine Senate (P.S.)
Resolution No. 166; (2) compelling petitioners who are officers of petitioner SCBPhilippines to attend and testify before any further hearing to be conducted by
respondent, particularly that set on March 15, 2005; and (3) enforcing any hold-departure
order (HDO) and/or putting the petitioners on the Watch List. It also prays that judgment
be rendered (1) annulling the subpoenae ad testificandum and duces tecum issued to
petitioners, and (2) prohibiting the respondent from compelling petitioners to appear and
testify in the inquiry being conducted pursuant to P.S. Resolution No. 166.

The facts are as follows:

On February 1, 2005, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, Vice Chairperson of respondent,

delivered a privilege speech entitled Arrogance of Wealth[1] before the Senate based on
a letter from Atty. Mark R. Bocobo denouncing SCB-Philippines for selling unregistered
foreign securities in violation of the Securities Regulation Code (R.A. No. 8799) and
urging the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, to prevent the
occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the future.Upon motion of Senator Francis
Pangilinan, the speech was referred to respondent. Prior to the privilege speech, Senator
Enrile had introduced P.S. Resolution No. 166,[2] to wit:

RESOLUTION

DIRECTING THE COMMITTEE ON BANKS, FINANCIAL

INSTITUTIONS AND CURRENCIES, TO CONDUCT AN
INQUIRY, IN AID OF LEGISLATION, INTO THE ILLEGAL
SALEOF UNREGISTERED AND HIGH-RISK SECURITIES BY
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK, WHICH RESULTED IN
BILLIONS OF PESOS OF LOSSES TO THE INVESTING PUBLIC
WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7721, otherwise known as the "Law
Liberalizing the Entry and Scope of Operations of Foreign Banks in the
Philippines, was approved on May 18, 1994 to promote greater
participation of foreign banks in the Philippine Banking Industry that will
stimulate economic growth and serve as a channel for the flow of funds
into the economy;
WHEREAS, to promote greater competition in the Philippine Banking
Industry, foreign banks were accorded the same privileges, allowed to
perform the same functions and subjected to the same limitations under
relevant banking laws imposed upon domestic banks;
WHEREAS, Standard Chartered Bank was among the foreign banks
granted the privilege to do business in our country under Republic Act No.
7721;
WHEREAS, there are complaints against Standard Chartered Bank
whose actions have reportedly defrauded hundreds of Filipino investors of
billions of pesos through the sale of unregistered securities in the form of
high-risk mutual funds falsely advertised and marketed as safe investment
havens;
WHEREAS, there are reports that Standard Chartered Bank clearly knew
that its actions were violative of Philippine banking and securities laws but
cleverly disguised its illegal acts through the use of pro-forma agreements
containing waivers of liability in favor of the bank;
WHEREAS, there are reports that in the early stages of conducting these
questionable activities, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas warned and
eventually fined Standard Chartered Bank a measly P30,000 for violating
Philippine banking laws;
WHEREAS, the particular operations of Standard Chartered Bank may

constitute "conducting business in an unsafe and unsound manner,

punishable under Section 37 of Republic Act No. 7653 and should have
drawn the higher penalty of revocation of its quasi-banking license;
WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 8791 or the "General Banking Act of
2000" deems a particular act or omission as conducting business in an
unsafe and unsound manner as follows:
"Section 56.2
The act or omission has resulted or
may result in material loss or damage or abnormal risk to
the institution's depositors, creditors, investors,
stockholders or to the Bangko Sentral or to the public in
general."
WHEREAS, the sale of unregistered securities is also a clear violation of
Republic Act No. 8799 or "The Securities Regulation Code of 2000"
which states:
"Section 8.1 Securities shall not be sold or offered for
sale or distribution within the Philippines, without a
registration statement duly filed with and approved by the
Commission. Prior to such sale, information on the
securities, in such form and with such substance as the
Commission may prescribe, shall be made available to
each prospective purchaser."
WHEREAS, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reportedly
issued a Cease-and-Desist Order (CDO) against Standard Chartered Bank
for the sale of these unregistered securities but the case was reportedly
settled administratively and dismissed after Standard Chartered Bank paid
a fine of P7 Million;
WHEREAS, the SEC reportedly made an official finding that Standard
Chartered Bank actively engaged in promoting and marketing the socalled "Global Third Party Mutual Funds to the investing public and even
set revenue quotas for the sale of these funds;
WHEREAS, existing laws including the Securities Regulation Code
seem to be inadequate in preventing the sale of unregistered securities and
in effectively enforcing the registration rules intended to protect the
investing public from fraudulent practices;
WHEREAS, the regulatory intervention by the SEC and BSP likewise
appears inadequate in preventing the conduct of proscribed activities in a
manner that would protect the investing public;

WHEREAS, there is a need for remedial legislation to address the

situation, having in mind the imposition of proportionate penalties to
offending entities and their directors, officers and representatives among
other additional regulatory measures;
Now, therefore, BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED,
to direct the Committee on Banks, Currencies, and Financial Institutions,
to conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, into the reported sale of
unregistered and high-risk securities by Standard Chartered Bank which
resulted in billions of losses to the investing public.

Acting on the referral, respondent, through its Chairperson, Senator Edgardo J.

Angara, set the initial hearing on February 28, 2005 to investigate, in aid of legislation,
the subject matter of the speech and resolution filed by Senator Enrile.

Respondent invited petitioners, among others, to attend the hearing, requesting them
to submit their written position paper. Petitioners, through counsel, submitted to
respondent a letter[3] dated February 24, 2005 presenting their position, particularly
stressing that there were cases pending in court allegedly involving the same issues
subject of the legislative inquiry, thereby posing a challenge to the jurisdiction of
respondent to continue with the inquiry.

On February 28, 2005, respondent commenced the investigation. Senator Enrile

inquired who among those invited as resource persons were present and who were absent.
Thereafter, Senator Enrile moved that subpoenae be issued to those who did not attend
the hearing and that the Senate request the Department of Justice, through the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation, to issue an HDO against them and/or include them in the
Bureaus Watch List. Senator Juan Flavier seconded the motion and the motion was
approved.

Respondent then proceeded with the investigation proper. Towards the end of the
hearing, petitioners, through counsel, made an Opening Statement[4] that brought to the
attention of respondent the lack of proper authorization from affected clients for the bank
to make disclosures of their accounts and the lack of copies of the accusing documents
mentioned in Senator Enrile's privilege speech, and reiterated that there were pending
court cases regarding the alleged sale in the Philippines by SCB-Philippines of
unregistered foreign securities.

The February 28, 2005hearing was adjourned without the setting of the next hearing
date. However, petitioners were later served by respondent with subpoenae ad
testificandumand duces tecum to compel them to attend and testify at the hearing set on
March 15, 2005.Hence, this petition.

The grounds relied upon by petitioners are as follows:

I.
THE COMMITTEE ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND/OR
ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION IN CONDUCTING AN INVESTIGATION,
PURPORTEDLY IN AID OF LEGISLATION, BUT IN REALITY
PROBING INTO THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE STANDARD
CHARTERED BANK HAD SOLD UNREGISTERED FOREIGN
SECURITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES.SAID ISSUE HAS LONG BEEN
THE SUBJECT OF CRIMINAL AND CIVIL ACTIONS NOW
PENDING BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF PASIG CITY, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF
MAKATI CITY AND THE PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE OF MAKATI
CITY.
II.
THE COMMITTEE ACTED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION BY CONDUCTING AN

INVESTIGATION, PURPORTEDLY IN AID OF LEGISLATION, BUT
IN REALITY IN AID OF COLLECTION BY A HANDFUL OF TWO (2)
CLIENTS OF STANDARD CHARTERED BANK OF LOSSES WHICH
WERE FOR THEIR ACCOUNT AND RISK. AT ANY RATE, SUCH
COLLECTION IS WITHIN THE PROVINCE OF THE COURT
RATHER THAN OF THE LEGISLATURE.
III.
THE COMMITTEE ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND/OR
ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION IN COMPELLING PETITIONERS, SOME
OF WHOM ARE RESPONDENTS IN THE PENDING CRIMINAL AND
CIVIL ACTIONS BROUGHT BY SAID CLIENTS, IN VIOLATION OF
PETITIONERS RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION AND
RIGHT TO PURSUE AND DEFEND THEIR CAUSE IN COURT
RATHER THAN ENGAGE IN TRIAL BY PUBLICITY A CLEAR
VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS, RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND TO
TRAVEL.
IV.
THE COMMITTEE ACTED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION BY DISREGARDING
ITS OWN RULES.[5]

Petitioners argue that respondent has no jurisdiction to conduct the inquiry because
its subject matter is the very same subject matter of the following cases, to wit:

(a) CA-G.R. SP No. 85078, entitled Manuel V. Baviera vs. Hon.

Esperanza P. Rosario, et al.,pending before the 9th Division of the Court of
Appeals. In the petition, Mr. Baviera seeks to annul and set aside the
dismissal by the Department of Justice of his complaint against Standard
Chartered Bank and its officers accusing them of SELLING
UNREGISTERED FOREIGN SECURITIES IN VIOLATION OF
P.D. NO. 1869 (SYNDICATED ESTAFA) AND ARTICLE 315 OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
(b) CA-G.R. SP No. 86200, entitled Manuel V. Baviera vs. Hon. Rafael
Buenaventura, et al., pending before the 15th Division of the Court of

Appeals. In the petition, Mr. Baviera seeks to annul and set aside the
termination for lack of probable cause by the Anti-Money Laundering
Council (AMLC) of the investigation of Standard Chartered Bank for
money laundering activities BY SELLING UNREGISTERED
FOREIGN SECURITIES.
(c) CA-G.R. SP No. 87328, entitled Manuel V. Baviera vs. Hon.
Esperanza Paglinawan Rozario, et al., pending before the 16th Division of
the Court of Appeals. The petition seeks to annul and set aside the
dismissal by the Department of Justice of Mr. Baviera's complaint
accusing SCB and its officers of violation of the Securities Regulation
Code by SELLING UNREGISTERED FOREIGN SECURITIES.
(d) Civil Case No. 70173, entitled Mr. Noel G. Sanchez, et al. vs. Standard
Chartered Bank, pending before Branch 155 of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City. Plaintiff seeks damages and recovery of their investment
accusing the bank of SELLING UNREGISTERED FOREIGN
SECURITIES.
(e) Criminal Case No. 332034, entitled People of thePhilippinesvs.
Manuel V. Baviera, pending before Branch 64 of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Makati City. Petitioner Morris is the private complainant in this
information for extortion or blackmail against Mr. Baviera for demanding
the payment of US$2 Million with the threat to EXPOSE THE BANK'S
LARGE SCALE SCAM CONSISTING [OF] ILLEGAL SELLING
OF UNREGISTERED FOREIGN SECURITIES BY THE BANK,
before various government offices, such as the Department of Justice, the
BIR, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, Regional Trial Courts, and both houses
of Congress.
(f) Criminal Case No. 331395, entitled People of thePhilippinesvs.
Manuel V. Baviera, pending before Branch 64 of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Makati City. Petitioners Victor and Chona Reyes are the private
complainants in this information for perjury committed by Mr. Baviera in
securing a hold departure order against the petitioners herein from the
Department of Justice for their alleged involvement in syndicated estafa
and swindling BY SELLING UNREGISTERED FOREIGN
SECURITIES.
(g) I.S. No. 2004-B-2279-80, entitled Aurelio Litonjua III and Aurelio
Litonjua, Jr. vs. Antonette de los Reyes, et al.,pending before the Office of
the Prosecutor, Makati City. This is a criminal complaint accusing SCB
and its officers of estafa for SELLING UNREGISTERED FOREIGN
SECURITIES.[6]

Citing Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,[7] the petitioners claim
that since the issue of whether or not SCB-Philippines illegally sold unregistered foreign
securities is already preempted by the courts that took cognizance of the foregoing cases,
the respondent, by this investigation, would encroach upon the judicial powers vested
solely in these courts.

The argument is misplaced. Bengzondoes not apply squarely to petitioners case.

It is true that in Bengzon, the Court declared that the issue to be investigated was one
over which jurisdiction had already been acquired by the Sandiganbayan, and to allow the
[Senate Blue Ribbon] Committee to investigate the matter would create the possibility of
conflicting judgments; and that the inquiry into the same justiciable controversy would be
an encroachment on the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had set in much
earlier.

To the extent that, in the case at bench, there are a number of cases already pending
in various courts and administrative bodies involving the petitioners, relative to the
alleged sale of unregistered foreign securities, there is a resemblance between this case
and Bengzon. However, the similarity ends there.

Central to the Courts ruling in Bengzon -- that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
was without any constitutional mooring to conduct the legislative investigation -- was the
Courts determination that the intended inquiry was not in aid of legislation. The Court
found that the speech of Senator Enrile, which sought such investigation contained no
suggestion of any contemplated legislation; it merely called upon the Senate to look into
possible violations of Section 5, Republic Act No. 3019. Thus, the Court held that the

requested probe failed to comply with a fundamental requirement of Section 21, Article
VI of the Constitution, which states:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its

respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

Accordingly, we stopped the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee from proceeding with the
legislative investigation in that case.

Unfortunately for the petitioners, this distinguishing factual milieu in Bengzondoes

not obtain in the instant case.P.S. Resolution No. 166 is explicit on the subject and nature
of the inquiry to be (and already being) conducted by the respondent Committee, as found
in the last three Whereas clauses thereof, viz.:

WHEREAS, existing laws including the Securities Regulation Code

seem to be inadequate in preventing the sale of unregistered securities
and in effectively enforcing the registration rules intended to protect the
investing public from fraudulent practices;
WHEREAS, the regulatory intervention by the SEC and BSP likewise
appears inadequate in preventing the conduct of proscribed activities in a
manner that would protect the investing public;
WHEREAS, there is a need for remedial legislation to address the
situation, having in mind the imposition of proportionate penalties to
offending entities and their directors, officers and representatives among
other additional regulatory measures; (emphasis supplied)

The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the said

resolution, exposes the error in petitioners allegation that the inquiry, as initiated in a
privilege speech by the very same Senator Enrile, was simply to denounce the illegal
practice committed by a foreign bank in selling unregistered foreign securities x x x. This
fallacy is made more glaring when we consider that, at the conclusion of his privilege
speech, Senator Enrile urged the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of
legislation, so as to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the
future.

Indeed, the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court

or a quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative
investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by
Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative
complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of
legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or
an administrative investigation.

As succinctly stated in the landmark case Arnault v. Nazareno[8]

[T]he power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and

appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the
conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where
the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which
is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who possess it.

Neither can the petitioners claim that they were singled out by the respondent
Committee. The Court notes that among those invited as resource persons were officials
of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas

(BSP). These officials were subjected to the same critical scrutiny by the respondent
relative to their separate findings on the illegal sale of unregistered foreign securities by
SCB-Philippines. It is obvious that the objective of the investigation was the quest for
remedies, in terms of legislation, to prevent the recurrence of the allegedly fraudulent
activity.

Still, petitioners insist that the inquiry conducted by respondent was, in fact, in aid
of collection. They claim that Atty. Bocobo and Manuel Baviera, the latter a party to the
pending court cases cited by petitioners, were only seeking a friendly forum so that they
could recover their investments from SCB-Philippines; and that the respondent has
allowed itself to be used as the conveniently available vehicle to effect this purpose.

However, as correctly pointed out by respondent in its Comment on the petition,

Atty. Bocobo did not file a complaint before the Senate for the purpose of recovering his
investment. On the contrary, and as confirmed during the initial hearing on February 28,
2005, his letter-complaint humbly requested the Senate to conduct an inquiry into the
purportedly illegal activities of SCB-Philippines, with the end view of preventing the
future occurrence of any similar fraudulent activity by the banks in general.[9] Baviera,
on the other hand, was not a complainant but merely a witness in the investigation,
invited to testify on the alleged illegal sale of unregistered foreign securities by SCBPhilippines, being one of the supposed victims thereof.

The Court further notes that when it denied petitioners prayer for the issuance of a
TRO to restrain the hearing set on March 15, 2005,[10] respondent proceeded with the
investigation.On the said date, outraged by petitioners imputation that it was conducting
the investigation in aid of collection, respondent held petitioners, together with their
counsel, Atty. Reynaldo Geronimo, in contempt and ordered their detention for six hours.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of this Courts Resolution

dated March 14, 2005 only with respect to the denial of the prayer for the issuance of a
TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction, alleging that their being held in contempt was
without legal basis, as the phrase in aid of collection partakes of an absolutely privileged
allegation in the petition.

We do not agree. The Court has already expounded on the essence of the contempt
power of Congress and its committees in this wise

The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to
punish recalcitrant witnesses is founded upon reason and policy. Said
power must be considered implied or incidental to the exercise of
legislative power. How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge and
information on which to base intended legislation if it cannot require and
compel the disclosure of such knowledge and information, if it is impotent
to punish a defiance of its power and authority? When the framers of the
Constitution adopted the principle of separation of powers, making each
branch supreme within the realm of its respective authority, it must have
intended each departments authority to be full and complete,
independently of each others authority or power. And how could the
authority and power become complete if for every act of refusal, every act
of defiance, every act of contumacy against it, the legislative body must
resort to the judicial department for the appropriate remedy, because it is
impotent by itself to punish or deal therewith, with affronts committed
against its authority or dignity.[11]

The exercise by Congress or by any of its committees of the power to punish

contempt is based on the principle of self-preservation.As the branch of the government
vested with the legislative power, independently of the judicial branch, it can assert its
authority and punish contumacious acts against it. Such power is sui generis,as it attaches
not to the discharge of legislative functions per se, but to the sovereign character of the

legislature as one of the three independent and coordinate branches of government.[12]

In this case, petitioners imputation that the investigation was in aid of collection is
a direct challenge against the authority of the Senate Committee, as it ascribes ill motive
to the latter. In this light, we find the contempt citation against the petitioners reasonable
and justified.

Furthermore, it is axiomatic that the power of legislative investigation includes the

power to compel the attendance of witnesses. Corollary to the power to compel the
attendance of witnesses is the power to ensure that said witnesses would be available to
testify in the legislative investigation. In the case at bench, considering that most of the
officers of SCB-Philippines are not Filipino nationals who may easily evade the
compulsive character of respondents summons by leaving the country, it was reasonable
for the respondent to request the assistance of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
to prevent said witnesses from evading the inquiry and defeating its purpose. In any
event, no HDO was issued by a court. The BID instead included them only in the Watch
List, which had the effect of merely delaying petitioners intended travel abroad for five
(5) days, provided no HDO is issued against them.[13]

With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has
violated, suffice it to state that privacy is not an absolute right. While it is true that
Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, guarantees respect for the rights of persons
affected by the legislative investigation, not every invocation of the right to privacy
should be allowed to thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry. In Sabio v. Gordon,[14]
we have held that the right of the people to access information on matters of public
concern generally prevails over the right to privacy of ordinary financial transactions. In
that case, we declared that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding

compelling state interest. Employing the rational basis relationship test, as laid down in
Morfe v. Mutuc,[15] there is no infringement of the individuals right to privacy as the
requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose, in this case, to ensure that
the government agencies involved in regulating banking transactions adequately protect
the public who invest in foreign securities. Suffice it to state that this purpose constitutes
a reason compelling enough to proceed with the assailed legislative investigation.[16]

As regards the issue of self-incrimination, the petitioners, officers of SCBPhilippines, are not being indicted as accused in a criminal proceeding. They were
summoned by respondent merely as resource persons, or as witnesses, in a legislative
inquiry. As distinguished by this Court

[An] accused occupies a different tier of protection from an

ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to take
the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an
incriminating answer is shot at him, an accused may altogether refuse to
take the witness stand and refuse to answer any and all questions.[17]

Concededly, this right of the accused against self-incrimination is extended to

respondents in administrative investigations that partake of the nature of or are analogous
to criminal proceedings. The privilege has consistently been held to extend to all
proceedings sanctioned by law; and to all cases in which punishment is sought to be
visited upon a witness, whether a party or not.[18]

However, in this case, petitioners neither stand as accused in a criminal case nor
will they be subjected by the respondent to any penalty by reason of their testimonies.
Hence, they cannot altogether decline appearing before respondent, although they may
invoke the privilege when a question calling for an incriminating answer is propounded.

[19]

Petitioners argument, that the investigation before respondent may result in a

recommendation for their prosecution by the appropriate government agencies, such as
the Department of Justice or the Office of the Ombudsman, does not persuade.

As held in Sinclair v. United States[20] --

It may be conceded that Congress is without authority to compel

disclosures for the purpose of aiding the prosecution of pending suits; but
the authority of that body, directly or through its Committees, to require
pertinent disclosures in aid of its own constitutional power is not abridged
because the information sought to be elicited may also be of use in such
suits. x x x It is plain that investigation of the matters involved in suits
brought or to be commenced under the Senate resolution directing the
institution of suits for the cancellation of the leases might directly aid in
respect of legislative action.

The prosecution of offenders by the prosecutorial agencies and the trial before the courts
is for the punishment of persons who transgress the law. The intent of legislative
inquiries, on the other hand, is to arrive at a policy determination, which may or may not
be enacted into law.

Except only when it exercises the power to punish for contempt, the respondent, as
with the other Committees of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, cannot
penalize violators even if there is overwhelming evidence of criminal culpability. Other
than proposing or initiating amendatory or remedial legislation, respondent can only
recommend measures to address or remedy whatever irregularities may be unearthed

during the investigation, although it may include in its Report a recommendation for the
criminal indictment of persons who may appear liable.At best, the recommendation,
along with the evidence, contained in such a Report would be persuasive, but it is still up
to the prosecutorial agencies and the courts to determine the liabilities of the offender.

Finally, petitioners sought anew, in their Manifestation and Motion[21] dated

June 21, 2006, the issuance by this Court of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction
to prevent respondent from submitting its Committee Report No. 75 to the Senate in
plenary for approval. However, 16 days prior to the filing of the Manifestation and
Motion, or on June 5, 2006, respondent had already submitted the report to the Senate in
plenary. While there is no showing that the said report has been approved by the Senate,
the subject of the Manifestation and Motion has inescapably become moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Prohibition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Manifestation and Motion dated June 21, 2006 is, likewise, DENIED for being moot and
academic.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

On leave
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

RUBEN T. REYES

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,

I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been

reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1]

Rollo, pp. 63-72.

[2]

Id. at 59-60.

[3]

Id. at 73-83.

[4]

Id. at 86-90.

[5]

Id. at 15-16.

[6]

Id. at 18-19.

[7]

G.R. No. 89914, November 20, 1991, 203 SCRA 767, 784.

[8]
87 Phil. 29, 45 (1950), citing McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S.
135; 71 L. ed. 580, 50 A.L.R. 1 [1927].

[9]

Rollo, p. 1064.

[10]

Per the Resolution dated March 14, 2005.

[11] Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Sangguniang

Panlungsod of Dumaguete,No. L-72492, November 5, 1987, 155 SCRA 421,
429, citing Arnault v. Balagtas, 97 Phil. 358, 370 (1955).

[12]

Id. at 430.

[13] Under the BIDs Rules and Guideline In Handling Travelers

Under Watchlist (November 19, 1999):

[14]

1.

A passenger whose name is in the Bureaus Watchlist shall be

allowed to depart after the lapse of five (5) days from his
first attempt, provided no Hold Departure Order is issued;

2.

The head Supervisor and/or Alien Control Officer shall

immediately notify the requesting person/agency of the attempt
to leave by the person whose name appears in the watchlist and
the said requesting person/agency has only five (5) days to
secure a Hold Departure Order (HDO) from the Department of
Justice or the Courts; otherwise, after five (5) days and there
is no HDO issued, the passenger shall be allowed to leave.

G.R. Nos. 174340, 174318, 174177, October 16, 2006, 504 SCRA 704.

[15] No. L-20387, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 424, citing Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589 (1977).
[16]

Supra note 14 at 738.

[17]

Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 133 Phil. 661, 679 (1968).

[18] Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee , supra note 7, at

786, citing Galman v. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 294 (1985).
[19] Senate Rules of
Legislation, Sec. 19.

Procedure

Governing

[20]

279 U.S. 263, 73 L ed. 692, 698 (1928).

[21]

Rollo, pp. 1152-1177.

Inquiries

in

Aid

of

EN BANC

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF G.R. No. 174340

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF CAMILO L. SABIO,
Petitioner,

J. ERMIN ERNEST LOUIE R. MIGUEL,

Petitioner-Relator,

- versus -

HONORABLE SENATOR RICHARD GORDON, in his

capacity as Chairman, and the HONORABLE
MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT
CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISES and THE
COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SERVICES of the Senate,
HONORABLE SENATOR JUAN PONCE-ENRILE, in his
official capacity as Member, HONORABLE MANUEL
VILLAR, Senate President, SENATE SERGEANT-ATARMS, and the SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondents.
x
-----------------------------------------------x
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT
(PCGG) and CAMILO L. SABIO, Chairman, NARCISO
S. NARIO, RICARDO M. ABCEDE, TERESO L. JAVIER
and NICASIO A. CONTI, Commissioners, MANUEL
ANDAL and JULIO JALANDONI, PCGG nominees to
Philcomsat Holdings Corporation,
Petitioners,

- versus RICHARD GORDON, in his capacity as Chairman,

and MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT
CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, MEMBERS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SERVICES, SENATOR
JUAN PONCE-ENRILE, in his capacity as member
of both said Committees, MANUEL VILLAR,
Senate President, THE SENATE SERGEANT-ATARMS, and SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
x-------------------------------------------------x
PHILCOMSAT HOLDINGS CORPORATIONS, PHILIP G.
BRODETT, LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., ROBERTO V. SAN JOSE,
DELFIN P. ANGCAO, ROBERTO L. ABAD, ALMA KRISTINA
ALOBBA, and JOHNNY TAN,
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 174318

- versus -

SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS

and PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, its MEMBERS and
CHAIRMAN, the HONORABLE SENATOR RICHARD
GORDON and SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC
SERVICES, its Members and Chairman, the
HONORABLE SENATOR JOKER P. ARROYO,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 174177

Present:

PANGANIBAN, C.J.
PUNO,

QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
NAZARIO,
GARCIA, and
VELASCO,JJ.

Promulgated:

October 17, 2006

x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Two decades ago, on February 28, 1986, former President

Corazon C.

Aquino installed her regime by issuing Executive Order (E.O.)

No. 1,[1]

creating the Presidential Commission on Good

Government (PCGG). She entrusted upon this Commission the

herculean

task

of

recovering

the

ill-gotten

wealth

accumulated by the deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his

family, relatives, subordinates and close associates.[2]
Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 provides that: No member or
staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or
produce

evidence

in

any

judicial,

legislative

or

administrative proceeding concerning matters within its

official cognizance. Apparently, the purpose is to ensure
PCGGs unhampered performance of its task.[3]

Today, the constitutionality of Section 4(b) is being

questioned on the ground that it tramples upon the Senates
power

to

conduct

legislative

inquiry

under

Article

VI,

Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any

its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected
such inquiries shall be respected.

of
of
of
by

The facts are undisputed.

On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago

introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No. 455 (Senate Res.

No. 455),[4] directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the
anomalous

losses

Telecommunications
Communications

incurred

by

Corporation

Satellite

the

Philippines
(POTC),

Corporation

Overseas
Philippine

(PHILCOMSAT),

and

PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged

improprieties in their operations by their respective Board
of Directors.
The pertinent portions of the Resolution read:

WHEREAS, in the last quarter of 2005, the

representation and entertainment expense of the PHC
skyrocketed to P4.3 million, as compared to the previous
years mere P106 thousand;
WHEREAS, some board members established wholly owned
PHC subsidiary called Telecommunications Center, Inc. (TCI),
where PHC funds are allegedly siphoned; in 18 months, over
P73 million had been allegedly advanced to TCI without any
accountability report given to PHC and PHILCOMSAT;
WHEREAS, the Philippine Star, in its 12 February 2002
issue reported that the executive committee of Philcomsat
has precipitately released P265 million and granted P125
million loan to a relative of an executive committee member;
to date there have been no payments given, subjecting the
company to an estimated interest income loss of P11.25
million in 2004;
WHEREAS, there is an urgent need to protect the
interest of the Republic of the Philippines in the PHC,
PHILCOMSAT, and POTC from any anomalous transaction, and to
conserve or salvage any remaining value of the governments
equity position in these corporations from any abuses of
power done by their respective board of directors;
WHEREFORE, be it resolved that the proper Senate
Committee shall conduct an inquiry in aid of
legislation, on the anomalous losses incurred by the
Philippine
Overseas
Telecommunications
Corporation
(POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation

(PHILCOMSAT), and Philcomsat Holdings Corporations

(PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in the
operations by their respective board of directors.
Adopted.
(Sgd) MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO

On the same date, February 20, 2006, Senate Res. No. 455
was submitted to the Senate and referred to the Committee on

Accountability

of

Public

Officers

and

Investigationsand

Committee on Public Services. However, on March 28, 2006,

upon

motion

of

Senator

Francis

N.

Pangilinan,

it

was

transferred to the Committee on Government Corporations and

Public Enterprises.[5]

On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under

the authority of Senator Richard J. Gordon, wrote Chairman
Camilo L. Sabio of the PCGG, one of the herein petitioners,
inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public
meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government

Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public

Services. The purpose of the public meeting was to deliberate
on Senate Res. No. 455.[6]

On May 9, 2006, Chairman Sabio declined the invitation

because of prior commitment.[7] At the same time, he invoked
Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1earlier quoted.

On August 10, 2006, Senator Gordon issued a Subpoena Ad

Testificandum,[8] approved by Senate President Manuel Villar,

requiring

Chairman

Sabio

and

PCGG

Commissioners

Ricardo

Abcede, NicasioConti, Tereso Javier and Narciso Nario to

appear in the public hearing scheduled on August 23, 2006 and
testify on what they know relative to the matters specified
in Senate Res. No. 455. Similar subpoenae were issued against
the

directors

and

officers

of

Philcomsat

Holdings

Corporation, namely: Benito V. Araneta, Philip J. Brodett,

Enrique L. Locsin, Manuel D. Andal, Roberto L. Abad, Luis K.
Lokin, Jr., Julio J. Jalandoni, Roberto V. San Jose, Delfin
P. Angcao, Alma Kristina Alloba and Johnny Tan.[9]

Again, Chairman Sabio refused to appear. In his letter

to Senator Gordon dated August 18, 2006, he reiterated his
earlier position, invoking Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1. On the
other hand, the directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings
Corporation relied on the position paper they previously
filed, which raised issues on the propriety of legislative
inquiry.

Thereafter, Chief of Staff Ma. Carissa O. Coscolluela,

under the authority of Senator Gordon, sent another notice[10]
to Chairman Sabio requiring him to appear and testify on the
same subject matter set on September 6, 2006. The notice was
issued

under

the

same

authority

of

the

Subpoena

Ad

Testificandum previously served upon (him) last 16 August

2006.

Once more, Chairman Sabio did not comply with the

notice. He sent a letter[11]

dated September 4, 2006 to

Senator Gordon reiterating his reason for declining to appear

in the public hearing.

This prompted Senator Gordon to issue an Order dated

September 7, 2006 requiring Chairman Sabio and Commissioners
Abcede, Conti, Javier and Nario to show cause why they should
not be cited in contempt of the Senate. On September 11,
2006, they submitted to the Senate their Compliance and
Explanation,[12] which partly reads:

Doubtless, there are laudable intentions of the

subject inquiry in aid of legislation. But the rule of
law requires that even the best intentions must be carried
out within the parameters of the Constitution and the law.
Verily, laudable purposes must be carried out by legal
methods. (Brillantes, Jr., et al. v. Commission on
Elections, En Banc[G.R. No. 163193, June 15, 2004])
On this score, Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 should not
be ignored as it explicitly provides:
No member or staff of the Commission
shall be required to testify or produce
evidence in any judicial legislative or
administrative proceeding concerning matters
within its official cognizance.
With all due respect, Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1
constitutes a limitation on the power of legislative
inquiry, and a recognition by the State of the need to
provide protection to the PCGG in order to ensure the
unhampered performance of its duties under its charter. E.O.
No. 1 is a law, Section 4(b) of which had not been amended,
repealed or revised in any way.
To say the least, it would require both Houses of
Congress and Presidential fiat to amend or repeal the

provision in controversy. Until then, it stands to be

respected as part of the legal system in this jurisdiction.
(As held in People v. Veneracion, G.R. Nos. 119987-88,
October 12, 1995: Obedience to the rule of law forms the
bedrock of our system of justice. If judges, under the
guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to
roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are
required by law to exercise the duties of their office,
then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of
men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by
those acting under its authority. Under this system, judges
are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought to protect and
enforce it without fear or favor, 4 [Act of Athens(1955)]
resist encroachments by governments, political parties, or
even the interference of their own personal beliefs.)
x x xx x x
Relevantly, Chairman Sabios letter to Sen. Gordon
dated August 19, 2006 pointed out that the anomalous
transactions referred to in the P.S. Resolution No. 455 are
subject of pending cases before the regular courts, the
Sandiganbayan and the Supreme Court (Pending cases include:
a. Samuel Divina v. Manuel Nieto, Jr., et al. , CA-G.R. No.
89102; b. Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
v. Manuel Nieto, et al.; c. Philippine Communications
Satellite Corporation v. Manuel D. Andal, Civil Case No. 06095, RTC, Branch 61, Makati City; d. Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation v. PHILCOMSAT Holdings
Corporation, et al., Civil Case No. 04-1049) for which
reason they may not be able to testify thereon under the
principle of sub judice. The laudable objectives of the
PCGGs functions, recognized in several cases decided by the
Supreme Court, of the PCGG will be put to naught if its
recovery efforts will be unduly impeded by a legislative
investigation of cases that are already pending before the
Sandiganbayan and trial courts.
In Bengzonv. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, (203
SCRA 767, 784 [1991]) the Honorable Supreme Court held:
[T]he issues sought to be investigated by
the respondent Committee is one over which
jurisdiction
had
been
acquired
by
the
Sandiganbayan. In short, the issue has been preempted by that court. To allow the respondent
Committee to conduct its own investigation of an
issue already before the Sandigabayan would not
only pose the possibility of conflicting
judgments between a legislative committee and a
judicial tribunal, but if the Committees

judgment were to be reached before that of the

Sandiganbayan, the possibility of its influence
being made to bear on the ultimate judgment of
the Sandiganbayan can not be discounted.

x x xx x x

IT IS IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS that

the Commission decided not to attend the Senate inquiry to
testify and produce evidence thereat.

Unconvinced with the above Compliance and Explanation, the

Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises

and the Committee on Public Services issued an Order[13]
directing

Major

Sergeant-At-Arms,

General
to

Jose

place

Balajadia
Chairman

(Ret.),
Sabio

and

Senate
his

Commissioners under arrest for contempt of the Senate. The

Order bears the approval of Senate President Villar and
the majority of the Committees members.

On September 12, 2006, at around 10:45 a.m., Major

General Balajadia arrested Chairman Sabio in his office at
IRC Building, No. 82 EDSA, Mandaluyong City and brought him to
the Senate premises where he was detained.

Hence, Chairman Sabio filed with this Court a petition

for habeas corpus against the Senate Committee on Government

Corporations and Public Enterprisesand Committee on Public

Services, their Chairmen, Senators Richard Gordon and Joker
P. Arroyo and Members. The case was docketed as G.R. No.

174340.

Chairman

Sabio,

Commissioners

Abcede,

Conti,Nario,

andJavier, and the PCGGs nominees to Philcomsat Holdings

Corporation, Manuel Andal and Julio Jalandoni, likewise filed
a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the same
respondents, and also against Senate President Manuel Villar,
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, the Sergeant-at-Arms, and the
entire Senate. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 174318.

Meanwhile,

Philcomsat

Holdings

Corporation

and

its

officers and directors, namely: Philip G. Brodett, Luis K.

Lokin, Jr., Roberto V. San Jose, Delfin P. Angcao, Roberto L.
Abad, Alma Kristina Alobba and Johnny Tan filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition against the Senate Committees

on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Public

Services, their Chairmen, Senators Gordon and Arroyo, and
Members. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 174177.

In G.R. No. 174340 (for habeas corpus) and G.R. No.

174318

(for

certiorari

and

prohibition)

Chairman

Sabio,

Commissioners Abcede, Conti, Nario, and Javier; and the PCGGs

nominees Andal and Jalandoni alleged: first,respondent Senate
Committees disregarded Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 without any
justifiable

reason;

second,

the

inquiries

conducted

by

respondent Senate Committees are not in aid of legislation;

third, the inquiries were conducted in the absence of duly

published Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in

Aid of Legislation; and fourth, respondent Senate Committees

are not vested with the power of contempt.

In G.R. No. 174177, petitioners Philcomsat Holdings

Corporation

and

its

directors

and

officers

alleged:

first,respondent Senate Committees have no jurisdiction over

the subject matter stated in Senate Res. No. 455; second,the
same inquiry is not in accordance with the Senates Rules of

Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation; third,

the subpoenae against the individual petitioners are void for
having been issued without authority; fourth, the conduct of
legislative

inquiry

constitutes

undue

justiciable

pursuant

to

encroachment

controversies

over

Senate
by

which

Res.

No.

respondents
several

courts

455
into
and

tribunals have already acquired jurisdiction; and fifth, the

subpoenae violated petitioners rights to privacy and against
self-incrimination.
In their Consolidated Comment, the above-named respondents
countered: first, the issues raised in the petitions involve
political

questions

over

which

this

Court

has

no

jurisdiction; second, Section 4(b) has been repealed by the

Constitution; third, respondent Senate Committees are vested
with contempt power; fourth, Senates Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation have been duly
published; fifth, respondents have not violated any civil
right of the individual petitioners, such as their (a) right
to privacy; and (b) right against self-incrimination; and

sixth, the inquiry does not constitute undue encroachment

into justiciable controversies.

During the oral arguments held on September 21, 2006,

the parties were directed to submit simultaneously their
respective

memoranda

within

non-extendible

period

of

fifteen (15) days from date. In the meantime, per agreement

of the parties, petitioner Chairman Sabio was allowed to go
home. Thus, his petition for habeas corpushas become moot.
The parties also agreed that the service of the arrest
warrants issued against all petitioners and the proceedings
before the respondent Senate Committees are suspended during
the pendency of the instant cases.[14]

Crucial to the resolution of the present petitions is

the fundamental issue of whether Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1
is repealed by the 1987 Constitution.On this lone issue
hinges the merit of the contention of Chairman Sabio and his
Commissioners that their refusal to appear before respondent
Senate Committees is justified. With the resolution of this
issue, all the other issues raised by the parties have become
inconsequential.

Perched on one arm of the scale of justice is Article

VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution granting respondent
Senate Committees the power of legislative inquiry. It reads:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any

of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in

aid of legislation in accordance with its duly

published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.

On the other arm of the scale is Section 4(b) of E.O.

No.1 limiting such power of legislative inquiry by exempting
all PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial,
legislative or administrative proceeding, thus:

No member or staff of the Commission shall be

required to testify or produce evidence in any
judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding
concerning matters within its official cognizance.

To

determine

whether

there

exists

clear

and

unequivocal repugnancy between the two quoted provisions that

warrants a declaration that Section 4(b) has been repealed by
the 1987 Constitution, a brief consideration of the Congress
power of inquiry is imperative.

The Congress power of inquiry has been recognized in

foreign jurisdictions long before it reached our shores
through

McGrain v. Daugherty,[15]

Nazareno.[16]

In

those

earlier

cited
days,

in

Arnault v.

American

courts

considered the power of inquiry as inherent in the power to

legislate. The 1864 case of Briggs v. MacKellar[17] explains

the breath and basis of the power, thus:

Where no constitutional limitation or restriction
exists, it is competent for either of the two bodies
composing the legislature to do, in their separate
capacity, whatever may be essential to enable them to
legislate.It is well-established principle of this
parliamentary law, that either house may institute any
investigation having reference to its own organization,
the conduct or qualification of its members, its
proceedings, rights, or privileges or any matter affecting
the public interest upon which it may be important that
it should have exact information, and in respect to
which it would be competent for it to legislate. The
right to pass laws, necessarily implies the right to
obtain information upon any matter which may become the
subject of a law. It is essential to the full and
intelligent exercise of the legislative function.In
American legislatures the investigation of public
matters before committees, preliminary to legislation,
or with the view of advising the house appointing the
committee
is,
as
a
parliamentary
usage,
well
established as it is in England, and the right of either
house to compel witnesses to appear and testify before its
committee, and to punish for disobedience has been
frequently enforced.The right of inquiry, I think,
extends to other matters, in respect to which it may be
necessary, or may be deemed advisable to apply for
legislative aid.

Remarkably, in Arnault, this Court adhered to a similar

theory. Citing McGrain, it recognized that the power of
inquiry is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function, thus:
Although there is no provision in the Constitution
expressly investing either House of Congress with power to
make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it
may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and
effectively, such power is so far incidental to the
legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the
power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an
essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting

the conditions which the legislation is intended to

affect or change; and where the legislation body does
not itself possess the requisite information which is
not infrequently true recourse must be had to others
who possess it.

Dispelling any doubt as to the Philippine Congress

power of inquiry, provisions on such power made their
maiden appearance in Article VIII, Section 12 of the
1973 Constitution.[18] Then came the 1987 Constitution
incorporating the present Article VI, Section 12. What
was therefore implicit under the 1935 Constitution, as
influenced by American jurisprudence, became explicit
under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.[19]

Notably, the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of

investigation, not just of Congress, but also of any of its
committee. This is significant because it constitutes a
direct

conferral

of

investigatory

power

upon

the

committees and it means that the mechanisms which the Houses

can take in order to effectively perform its investigative
function are also available to the committees.[20]

It can be said that the Congress power of inquiry has

gained more solid existence and expansive construal. The
Courts high regard to such power is rendered more evident in

Senate v. Ermita,[21] where it categorically ruled that the

power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of
the

executive

branch. Verily, the Court reinforced the

doctrine in Arnault that the

operation

of

government,

being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper

subject for investigation and that the power of inquiry
is co-extensive with the power to legislate.

Considering these jurisprudential instructions, we find

Section 4(b) directly repugnant with Article VI, Section 21.
Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the
Congress power of inquiry. This cannot be countenanced.
Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such
exemption.

The

Congress

power

of

inquiry,

being

broad,

encompasses everything that concerns the administration of

existing

laws

as

well

as

proposed

statutes.[22]

It

even

extends

to

or

possibly

government

needed

agencies

created by Congress and officers whose positions are

within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish.
[23] PCGG belongs to this class.

Certainly,

mere

provision

of

law

cannot

pose

limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the absence of

any constitutional basis.

Furthermore, Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with

Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution stating that:

Public

office

is

public

trust.

Public

officers

and

employees must at all times be accountable to the people,

serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty,
and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead
modest lives.

The provision presupposes that since an incumbent of a

public office is invested with certain powers and charged
with certain duties pertinent to sovereignty, the powers so
delegated

to

the

officer

are

held

in

trust

for

the

peopleand are to be exercised in behalf of the government

or of all citizens who may need the intervention of the
officers. Such trust extends to all matters within the
range of duties pertaining to the office. In other words,
public officers are but the servants of the people, and
not their rulers. [24]

Section 4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, is

inconsistent with the principle of public accountability.
It places the PCGG members and staff beyond the reach of
courts, Congress and other administrative bodies. Instead of
encouraging
only

public

accountability,

institutionalizes

accountability.

In

same

irresponsibility

Presidential

Government v. Pea,[25]

the

Justice

provision
and

Commission
Florentino

P.

on

non-

Good

Feliciano

characterized as obiter the portion of the majority opinion

barring, on the basis of Sections 4(a) and (b) of E.O. No. 1,
a civil case for damages filed against the PCGG and its
Commissioners. He eloquently opined:

The above underscored portions are, it is respectfully

submitted, clearly obiter.It is important to make clear
that the Court is not here interpreting, much less
upholding as valid and constitutional, the literal
terms of Section 4 (a), (b) of Executive Order No.1. If
Section 4 (a) were given its literal import as immunizing
the PCGG or any member thereof from civil liability for

anything done or omitted in the discharge of the task

contemplated by this Order, the constitutionality of Section
4 (a) would, in my submission, be open to most serious
doubt. For so viewed, Section 4 (a) would institutionalize
the irresponsibility and non-accountability of members and
staff of the PCGG, a notion that is clearly repugnant to
both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution and a privileged status
not claimed by any other official of the Republic under the
1987 Constitution. x xx.
x xx x xx
It would seem constitutionally
that a member or staff member of
required to testify before the
such members were exempted from
of this Court.

offensive to suppose
the PCGG could not be
Sandiganbayan or that
complying with orders

Chavez v. Sandiganbayan[26] reiterates the same view.

Indeed, Section 4(b) has been frowned upon by this Court even
before the filing of the present petitions.

Corollarily, Section 4(b) also runs counter to the

following

constitutional

provisions

ensuring

the

peoples

access to information:

Article II, Section 28

Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law,
the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest.

Article III, Section 7

The right of the people to information on matters of

public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official

acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government

research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.

These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policymaking and in the operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient
information to enable them to exercise effectively their constitutional rights. Armed with
the right information, citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the
formulation of government policies and their effective implementation. In Valmontev.
Belmonte, Jr.[27] the Court explained that an informed citizenry is essential to the
existence and proper functioning of any democracy, thus:
An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a
continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government
and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free
political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may
perceive and be responsive to the peoples will. Yet, this open dialogue can
be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able
to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the
discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating
thereto can such bear fruit.

Consequently, the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation is not only intended to

benefit Congress but also the citizenry. The people are equally concerned with this
proceeding and have the right to participate therein in order to protect their interests. The
extent of their participation will largely depend on the information gathered and made
known to them. In other words, the right to information really goes hand-in-hand with the
constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the public service. It is
meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in governmental decision-making as
well as in checking abuse in the government.[28] The cases of

Taada v.

Tuvera[29] and Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission[30] have

recognized a citizens interest and personality to enforce a

public duty and to bring an action to compel public officials

and employees to perform that duty.

Section 4(b) limits or obstructs the power of Congress

to secure from PCGG members and staff information and other
data in aid of its power to legislate. Again, this must not
be countenanced. In Senate v. Ermita,[31] this Court stressed:

To the extent that investigations in aid of

legislation are generally conducted in public, however, any
executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures
of information in such investigations necessarily
deprives the people of information which, being
presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be
a matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby
denied access to information which they can use in
formulating their own opinions on the matter before Congress
opinions which they can then communicate to their
representatives and other government officials through the
various legal means allowed by their freedom of expression.

A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is

not within the legislative power to enact; or it creates
or establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional
principles;

or

its

purpose

or

effect

violates

the

Constitution or its basic principles. [32] As shown in the

above discussion, Section 4(b) is inconsistent with Article
VI, Section 21 (Congress power of inquiry), Article XI,
Section 1 (principle of public accountability), Article II,
Section 28 (policy of full disclosure) and Article III,
Section 7(right to public information).

Significantly,

Article

XVIII,

Section

of

the

Constitution provides:

All existing laws, decrees, executive orders,

proclamations, letters of instructions, and other executive
issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall
remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked.

The clear import of this provision is that all existing

laws,

executive

orders,

proclamations,

letters

of

instructions and other executive issuances inconsistent or

repugnant to the Constitution are repealed.

Jurisprudence is replete with decisions invalidating

laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of
instructions and other executive issuances inconsistent with
the Constitution. In Pelaez v. Auditor General,[33] the Court
considered repealed Section 68 of the Revised Administrative
Code of 1917 authorizing the Executive to change the seat of
the government of any subdivision of local governments, upon
the

approval

adjudged

of

the

1935

incompatible

Constitution.

and

Section

inconsistent

68

with

was
the

Constitutional grant of limited executive supervision over

local

governments.

In

Islamic

Dawah

Council

of

the

Philippines, Inc., v. Office of the Executive Secretary, [34]

the

Court

Authorizing

declared

the

Executive

Office

on

Order

Muslim

No.

Affairs

46,

to

entitled

Undertake

Philippine Halal Certification, void for encroaching on the

religious freedom of Muslims. In The Province of Batangas v.

Romulo,[35] the Court declared some provisions of the General

Appropriations Acts of 1999, 2000 and 2001 unconstitutional

for violating the Constitutional precept on local autonomy.

And

in

Oplev. Torres,[36]

unconstitutional

the

Administrative

Court
Order

likewise
No.

308,

declared
entitled

Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference

System, for being violative of the right to privacy protected
by the Constitution.

These Decisions, and many others, highlight that the

Constitution is the highest law of the land. It is the basic
and paramount law to which all other laws must conform
and to which all persons, including the highest officials
of the land, must defer. No act shall be valid, however
noble

its

intentions,

if

it

conflicts

with

the

Constitution. [37] Consequently, this Court has no recourse

but to declare Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 repealed by the
1987 Constitution.

Significantly, during the oral arguments on September 21,

2006, Chairman Sabio admitted that should this Court rule
that Section 4(b) is unconstitutional or that it does not
apply to the Senate, he will answer the questions of the
Senators, thus:

CHIEF JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

Okay. Now, if the Supreme Court rules that Sec. 4(b)
is unconstitutional or that it does not apply to the
Senate, will you answer the questions of the Senators?

CHAIRMAN SABIO:
Your Honor, my father was a judge, died being a
judge. I was here in the Supreme Court as Chief of
Staff of Justice Feria. I would definitely honor the
Supreme Court and the rule of law.
CHIEF JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
You will answer the questions of the Senators if we
say that?
CHAIRMAN SABIO:
Yes, Your Honor. That is the law already as far as I
am concerned.

With his admission, Chairman Sabio is not fully convinced

that he and his Commissioners are shielded from testifying
before respondent Senate Committees by Section 4(b) of E.O.
No. 1. In effect, his argument that the said provision
exempts

him

and

his

co-respondent

Commissioners

from

testifying before respondent Senate Committees concerning

Senate Res. No. 455 utterly lacks merit.

Incidentally, an argument repeated by Chairman Sabio is

that respondent Senate Committees have no power to punish him
and his Commissioners for contempt of the Senate.

The argument is misleading.

Article VI, Section 21 provides:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any

of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.

It must be stressed that the Order of Arrest for

contempt of Senate Committees and the Philippine Senate was
approved by Senate President Villar and signed by fifteen
(15) Senators. From this, it can be concluded that the Order
is under the authority, not only of the respondent Senate
Committees, but of the entire Senate.

At any rate, Article VI, Section 21 grants the power of

inquiry

not

only

Representatives,

but

to

the

also

to

Senate
any

and
of

the

their

House

of

respective

committees.Clearly, there is a direct conferral of power

to the committees. Father Bernas, in his Commentary on the
1987 Constitution, correctly pointed out its significance:

It should also be noted that the Constitution

explicitly recognizes the power of investigation not just of
Congress but also of any of its committees. This is
significant because it constitutes a direct conferral
of investigatory power upon the committees and it means
that the means which the Houses can take in order to
effectively perform its investigative function are also
available to the Committees.[38]

This is a reasonable conclusion. The conferral of the

legislative power of inquiry upon any committee of Congress
must carry with it all powers necessary and proper for its
effective discharge. Otherwise, Article VI, Section 21 will
be meaningless. The indispensability and usefulness of the
power of contempt in a legislative inquiry is underscored in
a catena of cases, foreign and local.

In the 1821 case of Anderson v. Dunn,[39] the function of

the Houses of Congress with respect to the contempt power was
likened to that of a court, thus:
But the court in its reasoning goes beyond this, and
though the grounds of the decision are not very clearly
stated, we take them to be: that there is in some cases a
power in each House of Congress to punish for contempt;
that this power is analogous to that exercised by
courts of justice, and that it being the well
established doctrine that when it appears that a
prisoner is held under the order of a court of general
jurisdiction for a contempt of its authority, no other
court will discharge the prisoner or make further
inquiry into the cause of his commitment.That this is
the general ruleas regards the relation of one court to
another must be conceded.

In McGrain,[40] the U.S. Supreme Court held: Experience

has shown that mere requests for such information are
often unavailing, and also that information which is
volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some
means

of

compulsion

is

essential

to

obtain

what

is

needed. The Court, in Arnaultv. Nazareno,[41] sustained the

Congress power of contempt on the basis of this observation.

In Arnaultv. Balagtas,[42] the Court further explained

that the contempt power of Congress is founded upon reason
and policy and that the power of inquiry will not be complete
if for every contumacious act, Congress has to resort to
judicial interference, thus:

The principle that Congress or any of its bodies

has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses is founded
upon reason and policy.Said power must be considered implied
or incidental to the exercise of legislative power. How
could a legislative body obtain the knowledge and
information on which to base intended legislation if it
cannot require and compel the disclosure of such
knowledge and information if it is impotent to punish a
defiance of its power and authority? When the framers
of the Constitution adopted the principle of separation
of powers, making each branch supreme within the realm
of its respective authority, it must have intended each
departments authority to be full and complete,
independently of the others authority or power. And how
could the authority and power become complete if for
every act of refusal, every act of defiance, every act
of contumacy against it, the legislative body must
resort to the judicial department for the appropriate
remedy, because it is impotent by itself to punish or
deal therewith, with the affronts committed against its
authority or dignity.[43]

In Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc. v.

Sangguniang
characterized

Panlungsod
contempt

of

Dumaguete,[44]

power

as

matter

the

Court

of

self-

preservation, thus:

The exercise by the legislature of the contempt power

is a matter of self-preservation as that branch of the
government vested with the legislative power, independently

of the judicial branch, asserts its authority and punishes

contempts thereof. The contempt power of the legislature is,
therefore, sui generis x x x.

Meanwhile, with respect to G.R. No. 174177, the petition

of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation and its directors and
officers,

this

Court

holds

that

the

respondent

Senate

Committees inquiry does not violate their right to privacy

and right against self-incrimination.

One

important

limitation

on

the

Congress

power

of

inquiry is that the rights of persons appearing in or

affected by such inquiries shall be respected. This is
just another way of saying that the power of inquiry must be
subject to the limitations placed by the Constitution on
government action. As held in Barenblattv. United States,[45]
the Congress, in common with all the other branches of

the Government, must exercise its powers subject to the

limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental
action, more particularly in the context of this case,
the relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights.

First is the right to privacy.

Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our

laws.[46] Within these zones, any form of intrusion is

impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with

customary legal process. The meticulous regard we accord to
these zones arises not only from our conviction that the
right to privacy is a constitutional right and the right most

valued by civilized men,[47] but also from our adherence to

the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates
that, no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference

with his privacy and everyone has the right to the protection
of the law against such interference or attacks.[48]

Our Bill of Rights, enshrined in Article III of the

Constitution,

provides

at

least

two

guarantees

that

explicitly create zones of privacy. It highlights a persons

right to be let alone or the right to determine what, how

much, to whom and when information about himself shall be
disclosed.[49] Section 2guarantees the rightof the peopleto
be secure in their persons,houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose. Section 3 rendersinviolable
the

privacy

ofcommunication

and

correspondence

and

furthercautions that any evidence obtained in violation of

this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.

In evaluating a claim for violation of the right to

privacy,

court

must

determine

whether

person

has

exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so,

whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable

government intrusion.[50] Applying this determination to these

cases, the important inquiries are: first, did the directors

and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation exhibit a

reasonable expectation of privacy?; and second, did the
government violatesuch expectation?

The

answers

are

in

the

negative.

Petitioners

were

invited in the Senates public hearing to deliberate on Senate

Res. No. 455, particularly on the anomalous losses incurred
by the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation
(POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT), and Philcomsat Holdings Corporations (PHC)
due to the alleged improprieties in the operations by
their

respective

board

of

directors.

Obviously,

the

inquiry focus on petitioners acts committed in the discharge

of their duties as officers and directors of the said
corporations, particularly Philcomsat Holdings Corporation.
Consequently,

they

privacy

matters

over

have

no

reasonable

involving

their

expectation
offices

in

of
a

corporation where the government has interest. Certainly,

such matters are of public concern and over which the
people have the right to information.

This goes to show that the right to privacy is not

absolute where there is an overriding compelling

state

interest. In Morfev. Mutuc,[51] the Court, in line with

Whalen v. Roe,[52] employed the rational basis relationship

test when it held that there was no infringement of the

individuals right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure

information is for a valid purpose, i.e., to curtail and
minimize the opportunities for official corruption, maintain
a standard of honesty in public service, and promote morality
in public administration.[53] In Valmonte v. Belmonte,[54] the
Court remarked that as public figures, the Members of the
former Batasang Pambansa enjoy a more limited right to
privacy

as

compared

to

ordinary

individuals,

and

their

actions are subject to closer scrutiny. Taking this into

consideration, the Court ruled that the right of the people
to access information on matters of public concern prevails
over the right to privacy of financial transactions.

Under the present circumstances, the alleged anomalies

in the PHILCOMSAT, PHC and POTC, ranging in millions of
pesos, and the conspiratorial participation of the PCGG and
its officials are compelling reasonsfor the Senate to exact
vital

information

from

the

directors

and

officers

of

Philcomsat Holdings Corporations, as well as from Chairman

Sabio and his Commissioners to aid it in crafting the
necessary legislation to prevent corruption and formulate
remedial measures and policy determination regarding PCGGs
efficacy. There being no reasonable expectation of privacy on
the part of those directors and officers over the subject
covered by Senate Res. No. 455, it follows that their right
to

privacy

Committees.

has

not

been

violated

by

respondent

Senate

Anent the right against self-incrimination, it must be

emphasized

that

this

right

maybe

invoked

by

the

said

directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation

only when the incriminating question is being asked,
since they have no way of knowing in advance the nature
or effect of the questions to be asked of them.[55] That
this right may possibly be violated or abused is no ground
for denying respondent Senate Committees their power of
inquiry. The consolation is that when this power is abused,
such issue may be presented before the courts. At this
juncture,

what

is

important

is

that

respondent

Senate

Committees have sufficient Rulesto guide them when the right

against self-incrimination is invoked. Sec. 19 reads:
Sec. 19. Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
A witness can invoke his right against selfincrimination only when a question tends to elicit an answer
that will incriminate him is propounded to him. However, he
may offer to answer any question in an executive session.
No person can refuse to testify or be placed under
oath or affirmation or answer questions before an
incriminatory question is asked. His invocation of such
right does not by itself excuse him from his duty to give
testimony.
In such a case, the Committee, by a majority vote of
the members present there being a quorum, shall determine
whether the right has been properly invoked. If the
Committee decides
otherwise,
it shall
resume its
investigation and the question or questions previously
refused to be answered shall be repeated to the witness. If
the latter continues to refuse to answer the question, the
Committee may punish him for contempt for contumacious
conduct.

The same directors and officers contend that the Senate

is barred from inquiring into the same issues being litigated

before the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan.Suffice it
to

state

that

the

Senate

Rules

of

Procedure

Governing

Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provide that the filing or

pendency of any prosecution of criminal or administrative
action should not stop or abate any inquiry to carry out a
legislative purpose.

Let it be stressed at this point that so long as the

constitutional rights of witnesses, like Chairman Sabio and
his Commissioners, will be respected by respondent Senate
Committees, it their duty to cooperate with them in their
efforts

to

legislative

obtain
action.

the
The

facts

needed

unremitting

for

obligation

intelligent
of

every

citizen is to respond to subpoenae, to respect the dignity of

the Congress and its Committees, and to testify fully with
respect to matters within the realm of proper investigation.

In fine, PCGG Chairman Camilo Sabio and Commissioners

Ricardo Abcede, Narciso Nario, Nicasio Conti, and Tereso
Javier; and Manuel Andal and Julio Jalandoni, PCGGs nominees
to Philcomsat Holdings Corporation, as well as its directors
and

officers,

must

comply

with

the

Subpoenae

Ad

Testificandumissued by respondent Senate Committees directing

them to appear and testify in public hearings relative to
Senate Resolution No. 455.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 174340 for habeas

corpus is DISMISSED, for being moot.The petitions in G.R Nos.

174318 and 174177 are likewise DISMISSED.

Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 is declared REPEALED by the

1987 Constitution. Respondent Senate Committees power of
inquiry relative to Senate Resolution 455 is upheld. PCGG
Chairman Camilo L. Sabio and Commissioners Ricardo Abcede,
Narciso Nario, Nicasio Conti and Tereso Javier; and Manuel
Andal and Julio Jalandoni, PCGGs nominees to Philcomsat
Holdings Corporation, as well as its directors and officers,
petitioners in G.R. No. 174177, are ordered to comply with
the Subpoenae Ad Testificandumissued by respondent Senate
Committees directing them to appear and testify in public
hearings relative to Senate Resolution No. 455.

SO ORDERED.

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

REYNATO S. PUNO

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

MINITA CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA

CANCIO C. GARCIA

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

Chief Justice

[1]

E.O. No. 1 was issued by Former President Aquino in the exercise of her legislative
power under the Provisional (Freedom) Constitution. Thus, it is of the same category and
has the same binding force as a statute. (Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1998 citing
Legaspi v. Ministry of Finance, 115 SCRA 418 [1982]; Garcia-Padilla v. Ponce Enrile,
G.R. No. 61388, April 20, 1983; Aquino v. Commission on Elections, 62 SCRA 275 [1975] )

[2]

Section 2 (a), Executive Order No.1.

[3]

See Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Pena, April 12,

1988, 159 SCRA 558

[4]

Annex E of the Petition in G.R. No. 174318.

[5] Id.
[6]

Annex F of the Petition in G.R. No. 174318.

[7]

Annex G of the Petition in G.R. No. 174318.

[8]

Annex A of the Petition in G.R. No. 174318.

[9] Petition in G.R. No. 174177 at p. 15.

[10]

Annex B of the Petition in G.R. No. 174318.

[11]

Annex I of the Petition in G.R. No. 174318.

[12]

Annex J of the Petition in G.R. No. 174318.

[13]

Annex D of the petition in G.R. No. 174318.

[14]

En Banc Resolution dated September 21, 2006.

[15]

273 U.S. 135, 47 S. Ct. 319, 71 L. Ed. 580, 50 A.L.R. 1 (1927).

[16]

No. L- 3820, 87 Phil. 29 (1950).

[17]

2 Abb. Pr. 30 (N.Y. 1864).

[18]

Puno, Lecture on Legislative Investigations and the Right to

Privacy, at p. 22.
[19]

Bernas S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the

Philippines, 2003 Ed. at p.737.

[20]

Bernas S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the

Philippines, 2003 Ed. at p.739.

[21]

G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006.

[22]

Watkins v.United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957), pp. 194-195.

[23]

Senate v.Ermita,Id.

[24]

De Leon, De Leon, Jr. The Law on Public Officers and Election

Law,p. 2.
[25]

No. L-77663, April 12, 1988, 159 SCRA 558.

[26]

193 SCRA 282 (1991).

[27]

G.R. No. 74930, February 13, 1989, 170 SCRA 256.

[28]

Valmontev. Belmonte, Jr., supra.

[29]

136 SCRA 27.

[30]

150 SCRA 530.

[31]

Supra.

[32]

Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1998 citing In re Cunanan, 94

Phil. 534 (1954).

[33]

No. L-23825, December 24, 1965, 15 SCRA 569.

[34]

G.R. No. 153888, July 9, 2003, 405 SCRA 497.

[35]

G.R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 736.

[36]

293 SCRA 141 (1998).

[37]

Cruz, Constitutional Law, 2003, p. 4.

[38] Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the

Philippines A Commentary, p. 678.

[39] 19 U.S. [6 Wheat.] 204 (1821) cited in Justice Puno, Legislative

Investigations and Right to Privacy.

[40]

Supra.

[41]

Supra.

[42]

97 Phil. 358 [1955].

[43]

Id.

[44]

No. L-72492, November 5, 1987, 155 SCRA 421.

[45]

360 U.S. 109 (1959).

[46]

Marquez v. Desierto, G.R. No. 135882, June 27, 2001, 359 SCRA

772.
[47]

See Morfev. MutucNo. L-20387, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 424.

[48] Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See also

Article 17 (1) and (2) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.

[49] Constitutional and Legal Systems of ASEAN Countries, Sison,

Academy of ASEAN Law and Jurisprudence, 1990, at 221, citing I.R.
Cortes, The Constitutional Foundations of Privacy, 7 (1970).
[50] Burrows v.SuperiorCourtofSan Bernardino County, 13 Cal. 3d 238,
529 P 2d 590 (1974). See Katz v. United states(1967), 389 U.S.
347, 350-352, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576; People v.
Krivda(1971) 5 Cal. 3d 357, 364, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62, 486 P. 2d 1262;
8 Cal. 3d 623-624,105 Cal. Rptr. 521, 504 P. 2d 457. INSERT
Herreras Handbook on Arrest, Search and Seizure.
[51]

Supra.

[52]

429 U.S. 589 (1977).

[53]

Justice Puno, Lecture on Legislative Inquiry and Right to

Privacy,p. 60.
[54]

170 SCRA 256 (1989)

[55]

Cruz, Constitutional Law, 2003, p. 307.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 89914 November 20, 1991

JOSE F.S. BENGZON JR., ABELARDO TERMULO, JOSE MANTECON, VICENTE
MILLS JR., LEONARDO GAMBOA, KURT BACHMANN JR., JOSE V.E. JIMENEZ,
ERNESTO CALUYA, AGERICO UNGSON, SUSAN ROXAS, ELVIE CASTILLO, and
CYNTHIA SABIDO LIMJAP,petitioners,
vs.
THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE AND ITS MEMBERS, represented by
and through the CHAIRMAN, HON. WIGBERTO TAADA, respondents, JOSE S.
SANDEJAS,intervenor.

Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Cudala, Pecson & Bengson for petitioners.

Balgos & Perez for intervening petitioner.
Eddie Tamondong and Antonio T. Tagaro for respondents.

PADILLA, J.:p

This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or injuective relief, to enjoin the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon committee
from requiring the petitioners to testify and produce evidence at its inquiry into the
alleged sale of the equity of Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group in thirtysix (36) or thirty-nine (39) corporations.
On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), assisted by the
Solicitor General, filed with the Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0035
(PCGG Case No. 35) entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Benjamin
"Kokoy" Romualdez, et al.", for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution and damages.
The complaint was amended several times by impleading new defendants
and/or amplifying the allegations therein. Under the Second Amended
Complaint, 1 the herein petitioners were impleaded as party defendants.
The complaint insofar as pertinent to herein petitioners, as defendants, alleges among
others that:
14. Defendants Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez and Juliette Gomez
Romualdez, acting by themselves and/or in unlawful concert with
Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, and taking
undue advantage of their relationship, influence and connection
with the latter Defendant spouses, engaged in devices, schemes

and strategems to unjuestly enrigh themselves at the expense of

Plaintiff and the Filipino people, among others:
(a) Obatained, with the active collaboration of Defendants
Sene J. Gabaldon, Mario D. Camacho, Mamerto Nepomuceno,
Carlos J. Valdez, Cesar C. Zalamea and Francisco Tantuico,
Atty. Jose Bengzon, Jr. and his law partners, namely:
Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., Jose Vicente E. Jimenez, Amando
V. Faustino, Jr., and Leonardo C. Cruz; Jose S. Sandejas
and his fellow senior managers of FMMC/PNI Holdings groups
of companies such as Leonardo Gamboa, Vicente T. Mills,
Jr., Jose M. Mantecon, Abelardo S. Termulo, Rex C. Drilon
II and Kurt Bachmann, Jr., control of some of the biggest
business enterprises in the Philippines, such as the
Manila Corporation (MERALCO), Benguet Consolidated and the
Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCI Bank) by
employing devious financial schemes and techniques
calculated to require the massive infusion and hemorrhage
of government funds with minimum or negligible "cashout"
from Defendant Benjamin Romualdez...
xxx xxx xxx
(m) manipulated, with the support, assistance and
collaboration of Philgurantee officials led by chairman
Cesar E.A. Virata and the Senior managers of FMMC/PNI
Holdings, Inc. led by Jose S. Sandejas, Jr., Jose M.
Mantecom and Kurt S. Bachmann, Jr., among others, the
formation of Erectors Holdings, Inc. without infusing
additional capital solely for the purpose of Erectors
Incorporated with Philguarantee in the amount of
P527,387,440.71 with insufficient securities/collaterals
just to enable Erectors Inc, to appear viable and to
borrow more capitals, so much so that its obligation with
Philgurantee has reached a total of more than P2 Billion
as of June 30, 1987.
(n) at the onset of the present Administration and/or
within the week following the February 1986 People's
Revolution, in conspiracy with, supoort, assistance and
collaboration of the abovenamed lawyers of the Bengzon Law
Offices, or specifically Defendants Jose F.S. Bengzon,
Jr., V.E. Jimenez, Amando V. Faustino, Jr., and Edilberto
S. Narciso, Jr., manipulated, shcemed, and/or executed a
series of devices intended to conceal and place, and/or
for the purpose of concealing and placing, beyond the
inquiry and jurisdiction of the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) herein Defendant's individual and
collective funds, properties, and assets subject of and/or
suited int he instant Complaint.

(o) manuevered, with the technical know-how and legalitic

talents of the FMMC senior manager and some of the Bengzon
law partners, such as Attys. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr.,
Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., Amando V. Faustino, Jose
Vicente E. Jimenez and Leonardo C. Cruz, the purported
sale of defendant Benjamin Romualdez's interests in the
(i) Professional Managers, (ii) A & E International
Corporation (A & E), (iii) First Manila Managerment
Corporation (FMMC), (iv) Philippine World Travel Inc.
(PWTI) and its subsidiaries consisting of 36 corporations
in all, to PNI Holdings, Inc. (wjose purported
incorporations are all members of Atty. Jose F.S.
Bengzon's law firm) for only P5 million on March 3, 1986
or three days after the creation of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government on February 28, 1986, for
the sole purpose of deceiving and preempting the
Government, particularly the PCGG, and making it appear
that defendant Benjamin Romualdez had already divested
himself of his ownership of the same when in truth and in
fact, his interests are well intact and being protected by
Atty. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. and some of his law partners,
together with the FMMC senior managers who still control
and run the affiars of said corporations, and in order to
entice the PCGG to approve the said fictitious sale, the
above-named defendants offered P20 million as "donation"
to the Government;
(p) misused, with the connivance, support and technical
assitance of the Bengzon law firm represented by Atty.
Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. as legal counsel, together with
defendants Cesar Zalamea, Antonio Ozaeta, Mario D. Camacho
amd Senen J. Gabaldon as members of the Board of Directors
of the Philippine Commercial International bank (PCIB),
the Meralco Pension Fund (Fund, for short) in the amount
of P25 million by cuasing it to be invested in the PCIB
and through the Bank's TSG, assigned to PCI Development
and PCI Equity at 50% each, the Fund's (a) 8,028.011
common shares in the Bank and (b) "Deposit in
Subscription" in the amount of P4,929.972.50 but of the
agreed consideration of P28 million for the said
assignment, PCI Development and PCI Equity were able to
pay only P5,500.00 downpayment and the first amortization
of P3,937,500.00 thus prompting the Fund to rescind its
assignment, and the consequent reversion of the assigned
brought the total shareholding of the Fund to 11,470,555
voting shares or 36.8% of the voting stock of the PCIB,
and this development (which the defendants themselves
orchestrated or allowed to happen) was used by them as an
excuse for the unlawful dismantling or cancellation of the
Fund's 10 million shares for allegedly exceeding the 30percent ceiling prescribed by Section 12-B of the General

Banking Act, although they know for a fact that what the
law declares as unlawful and void ab initio are the
subscriptions in excess of the 30% ceiling "to the extent
of the excess over any of the ceilings prescribed ..." and
not the whole or entire stockholding which they allowed to
stay for six years (from June 30, 1980 to March 24, 1986);
(q) cleverly hid behind the veil of corporate entity,
through the use of the names and managerial expertise of
the FMMC senior manager and lawyers identified as Jose B.
Sandejas, Leonardo Gamboa, Vicente T. Mills, Abelardo S,
Termulo, Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., Jose M. Mantecon, Rex
C. Drilon II, Kurt Bachmann, Jr. together with the legal
talents of corporate lawyers, such as Attys. Jose F.S.
Bengzon, Jr., Jose V.E. Jimenez, Amando V. Faustino, Jr.,
and Leonardo C. Cruz, the ill-gotten wealth of Benjamin T.
Romualdez including, among others, the 6,229,177 shares in
PCIB registered in the names of Trans Middle East Phils.
Equities, Inc. and Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr. which they
refused to surrender to PCGG despite their disclosure as
they tried and continue to exert efforts in getting hold
of the same as well as the shares in Benguet registered in
the names of Palm Avenue Holdings and Palm Avenue Realty
Development Corp. purportedly to be applied as payment for
the claim of P70 million of a "merger company of the First
Manila Managerment Corp. group" supposedly owned by them
although the truth is that all the said firms are still
beneficially owned by defendants Benjamin Romualdez.
xxx xxx xxx
On 28 September 1988, petitioner (as defendants) filed their respective answers. 2
Meanwhile, from 2 to 6 August 1988, conflicting reports on the disposition by the PCGG
of the "Romualdez corporations" were carried in various metropolitan newspapers. Thus,
one newspaper reported that the Romuladez firms had not been sequestered because of
the opposition of certain PCGG officials who "had worked prviously as lawyers of the
Marcos crony firms." Another daily reported otherwise, while others declared that on 3
March 1986, or shortly after the EDSA February 1986 revolution, the Romualdez
companies" were sold for P5 million, without PCGG approval, to a holding company
controlled by Romualdez, and that Ricardo Lopa, the President's brother-in-law, had
effectively taken over the firms, even pending negotiations for the purchase of the
corporations, for the same price of P5 million which was reportedly way below the fair
value of their assets. 3

On 13 September 1988, the Senate Minority Floor Leader, Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile
delivered a speech "on a matter of personal privilege" before the Senate on the alleged
"take-over personal privilege" before the Senate on the alleged "take-over of SOLOIL

Incorporated, the flaship of the First Manila Management of Companies (FMMC) by

Ricardo Lopa" and called upon "the Senate to look into the possible violation of the law
in the case, particularly with regard to Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act." 4

On motion of Senator Orlando Mercado, the matter was referred by the Senate to the
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers (Blue Ribbon Committee). 5 Thereafter,
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee started its investigation on the matter. Petitioners and
Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before it and testify on "what
they know" regarding the "sale of thirty-six (36) corporations belonging to Benjamin
"Kokoy" Romualdez."
At the hearing held on 23 May 1989, Ricardo Lopa declined to testify on the ground that
his testimony may "unduly prejudice" the defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. likewise refused to testify involing his
constitutional right to due process, and averring that the publicity generated by
respondents Committee's inquiry could adversely affect his rights as well as those of the
other petitioners who are his co-defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the
Sandiganbayan.
The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, thereupon, suspended its inquiry and
directed the petitioners to file their memorandum on the constitutional
issues raised, after which, it issued a resolution 6 dated 5 June 1989
rejecting the petitioner's plea to be excused from testifying, and the Committee voted to
pursue and continue its investigation of the matter. Senator Neptali Gonzales dissented. 7

Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and
required their attendance and testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess
of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of their
constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damager, prejudice and injury, and
that there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, the petitioners filed the present petition for prohibition with a prayer for
temporary restraning order and/or injunctive relief.
Meanwhile, one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the
Sandiganbayan, Jose S. Sandejas, filed with the Court of motion for
intervention, 8 which the Court granted in the resolution 9 of 21 December 1989, and
required the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to comment on the petition in
intervention. In compliance, therewith, respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee filed
its comment 10 thereon.
Before discussing the issues raised by petitioner and intervenor, we will first tackle the
jurisdictional question raised by the respondent Committee.

In its comment, respondent Committee claims that this court cannot

properly inquire into the motives of the lawmakers in conducting
legislative investigations, much less cna it enjoin the Congress or any
its regular and special commitees like what petitioners seek from
making inquiries in aid of legislation, under the doctrine of separation
of powers, which obtaines in our present system of government.
The contention is untenable. In Angara vs. Electoral Commission,11 the
Court held:
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of
government. It obtains not hrough express provision but by actual division in our
Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of
matters wihtin its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does
not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct
that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and
independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system
of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government...

xxx xxx xxx

But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft
strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive,
the legislative and the judicial departments of the government.
The ovelapping and interlacing of funcstions and duties between
the several deaprtments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say
just where the political excitement, the great landmarks of the
Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely
obliterated, in cases of conflict, the judicial departments is
the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to
determine the proper allocation of powers between the several
departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who
is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The
Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the
judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries; it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not inr eality
nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts
the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by tyhe
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under
the Constitution and to established for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and

guarantess to them. This is in thruth all that is involved in

what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power
of judicial review under the Constitution. Even the, this power
of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies
to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the
parties, and limited further to the constitutional question
raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction
could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to
sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its
function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More
thatn that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to
legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is
presumed to abide by the Constitution but also becuase the
judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies
must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed
through their representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the government.
The "allocation of constituional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perfomr under
the Constitution. Moreowever, as held in a recent case, 12 "(t)he political question
doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The
jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot
abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by
no means does away with kthe applicability of the principle in appropriate cases." 13

The Court is thus of the considered view that it has jurisdiction over the present
controversy for the purpose of determining the scope and extent of the power of the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct inquiries into private affirs in purported aid of
legislation.
Coming to the specific issues raised in this case, petitioners contend
that (1) the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee's inquiry has no valid
legislative purpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of legislation; (2) the
sale or disposition of hte Romualdez corporations is a "purely private
transaction" which is beyond the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee to inquire into; and (3) the inquiry violates their right to
due process.
The 1987 Constition expressly recognizes the power of both houses of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. 14 Thus, Section 21,
Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committee
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected. 15

The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not,
therefore, absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted
provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid
of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows
then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the
right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one's self.
The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations in specifically
provided for in Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation.Such inquiries may refer to the
implementation or re-examination of any law or in connection with any
proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation. They may
also extend to any and all matters vested by the Constitution in
Congress and/or in the Seante alone.
As held in Jean L. Arnault vs. Leon Nazareno, et al., 16 the inquiry, to be
within the jurisdiction of the legislative body making it, must be material or necessary to
the exervise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate or to expel a
member.
Under Sec. 4 of the aforementioned Rules, the Senate may refer to any committee or
committees any speech or resolution filed by any Senator which in tis judgment requires
an appropriate inquiry in aid of legislation. In order therefore to ascertain the character or
nature of an inquiry, resort must be had to the speech or resolution under which such an
inquiry is proposed to be made.
A perusal of the speech of Senator Enrile reveals that he (Senator
Enrile) made a statement which was published in various newspapers on 2
September 1988 accusing Mr. Ricardo "Baby" Lopa of "having taken over
the FMMC Group of Companies." As a consequence thereof, Mr. Lopa wrote a
letter to Senator Enrile on 4 September 1988 categorically denying that
he had "taken over " the FMMC Group of Companies; that former PCGG
Chairman Ramon Diaz himself categorically stated in a telecast interview
by Mr. Luis Beltran on Channel 7 on 31 August 1988 that there has been
no takeover by him (Lopa); and that theses repeated allegations of a
"takeover" on his (Lopa's) part of FMMC are baseless as they are
malicious.
The Lopa reply prompted Senator Enrile, during the session of the Senate
on 13 September 1988, to avail of the privilege hour, 17 so that he could
repond to the said Lopa letter, and also to vindicate his reputation as a Member of the
Senate of the Philippines, considering the claim of Mr. Lopa that his (Enrile's) charges
that he (Lopa) had taken over the FMMC Group of Companies are "baseless" and

"malicious." Thus, in his speech, 18 Senator Enrile said, among others, as follows:
Mr. President, I rise this afternnon on a matter of personal privilege; the privilege
being that I received, Mr. President, a letter dated September 4, 1988, signed by
Mr. ricardo A. Lopa, a.k.a. or Baby Lopa, wherein he denied categorically that
he has taken over the First Manila Management Group of Companies which
includes SOLOIL Incorporated.
xxx xxxx xxx
In answer to Mr. Lopa, I will quote pertinent portions from an
Official Memorandum to the Presidential Commission of Good
Government written and signed by former Governor, now Congressman
Jose Ramirez, in his capacity as head of the PCGG Task Force for
Region VIII. In his memorandum dated July 3, 1986, then Governor
Ramirez stated that when he and the members of his task force
sought to serve a sequestration order on the management of SOLOIL
in Tanauan, Leyte, management officials assured him that
relatives of the President of the Philippines were personally
discussing and representing SOLOIL so that the order of
sequestration would be lifted and that the new owner was Mr.
Ricardo A. Lopa.
I will quote the pertinent portions in the Ramire's memorandum.
The first paragraph of the memorandum reads as follows and I
quote, Mr. President:
"Our sequestration work of SOLOIL in Tanauan, Leyte was
not heeded by management because they said another
representation was being made to this Commission for the
ventual lifting of our sequestrationorder. They even
assured us that Mr. Ricardo Lopa and Peping Cojunangco
were personally discussing and representing SOLOIL, so the
order of sequestration will finally be lifted. While we
attempted to carry on our order, management refused to
cooperate and vehemently turned down our request to make
available to us the records of the company. In fact it was
obviously clear that they will meet us with forcethe
moment we insist on doing normally our assigned task. In
view of the impending threat, and to avoid any untoward
incident we decided to temporarily suspend our work until
there is a more categorical stand of this Commission in
view of the seemingly influential represetation being made
by SOLOIL for us not to continue our work."
Another pertinent portion of the same memorandum is paragraph
five, which reads as follows, and I quote Mr. President:

"The President, Mr. Gamboa, this is, I understand, the

President of SOLOIL, and the Plant Superintendent, Mr.
Jimenez including their chief counsel, Atty. Mandong
Mendiola are now saying that there have been divestment,
and that the new owner is now Mr. Ricardo Lopa who
according to them, is the brother-in-law of the President.
They even went further by telling us that even Peping
Cojuangco who we know is the brother of her excellency is
also interested in the ownership and management of SOLOIL.
When he demanded for supporting papers which will indicate
aforesaid divestment, Messrs. Gamboa, Jimenez and Mendiola
refused vehemently to submit these papers to us, instead
they said it will be submitted directly to this
Commission. To our mind their continuous dropping of names
is not good for this Commission and even to the President
if our dersire is to achieve respectability and stability
of the government."
The contents of the memorandum of then Governor and now
Congressman Jose Ramirez were personally confirmed by him in a
news interview last September 7, 1988.
xxx xxxx xxx
Also relevant to this case, Mr. President, is a letter of Mr.
Ricardo Lopa himself in August 11, 1988 issue of the newspaper
Malayaheadlined "On Alleged Takeover of Romualdez Firms."
Mr. Lopa states in the last paragraph of the published letter and
I quote him:
12. As of this writing, the sales agreement is under
review by the PCGG solely to determine the appropriate
price. The sale of these companies and our prior rigtht to
requires them have never been at issue.
Perhaps I could not make it any clearer to Mr. Lopa that I was
not really making baseless and malicious statements.

Senator Enrile concluded his privilege speech in the following tenor:

Mr. President, it may be worthwhile for the Senate to look into
the possible violation of the law in the case particularly with
regard to Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Section 5 of which reads as follows and I quote:
Sec. 5. Prohibition on certain relatives. It shall be
unlawful for the spouse or for nay relative, by

consanguinity or affinity, within the third civil degree,

of the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President of
the Philippines, the President of the Senate, or the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, to intervene
directly or indirectly, in any business, transaction,
contract or application with the Government: Provided,
that this section shall not apply to any person who prior
to the assumption of office of any of the above officials
to whom he is related, has been already dealing with the
Government along the same line of business, nor to any
transaction, contract or application filed by him for
approval of which is not discretionary on the part of the
officials concerned but depends upon compliance with
requisites provided by law, nor to any act lawfully
performed in an official capacity or in the exercise of a
profession.
Mr. President, I have done duty to this Senate and to myself. I
leave it to this august Body to make its own conclusion.
Verily, the speech of Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation;
he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No.
3019, otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." I other words, the
purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by respondent Blue Ribbon commitee was to find
out whether or not the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Mr. ricardo Lopa, had
violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations
belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopaa Group. There appears to be,
therefore, no intended legislation involved.
The Court is also not impressed with the respondent Committee's argument
that the questioned inquiry is to be conducted pursuant to Senate
Resolution No. 212. The said resolution was introduced by Senator Jose
D. Lina in view of the representaions made by leaders of school youth,
community groups and youth of non-governmental organizations to the
Senate Committee on Youth and Sports Development, to look into the
charges against the PCGG filed by three (3) stockholders of Oriental
petroleum, i.e., that it has adopted a "get-rich-quick scheme" for its
nominee-directors in a sequestered oil exploration firm.The pertinent
portion of Senate Resolution No. 212 reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, recent developments have shown that no less than the
Solicitor-General has stated that the PCGG Chairman and at least
three Commissioners should resign and that the agency should rid
itself of "ineptness, incompetence and corruption" and that the
Sandiganbayan has reportedly ordered the PCGG to answer charges
filed by three stockholders of Oriental Petroleum that it has
adopted a "get-rich-quick scheme" for its nominee-directors in a
sequestered oil exploration firm;

WHEREAS, leaders of school youth, community groups and youth of

non-governmental organization had made representations to the
Senate Committee on Youth and Sports Development to look into the
charges against the PCGG since said agency is a symbol of the
changes expected by the people when the EDSA revolution took
place and that the ill-gotten wealth to be recovered will fund
priority projects which will benefit our people such as CARP,
free education in the elementary and secondary levels
reforestration, and employment generation for rural and urban
workers;
WHEREAS, the government and the present leadeship must
demonstrate in their public and private lives integrity, honor
and efficient management of government services lest our youth
become disillusioned and lose hope and return to an Idelogy and
form of government which is repugnant to true freedom, democratic
participation and human rights: Now, therefore, be it.
Resolved by the Senate, That the activities of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government be investigated by the appropriate
Committee in connection with the implementation of Section 26,
Article XVIII of the Constitution. 19

Thus, the inquiry under Senate Resolution No. 212 is to look into the charges against the
PCGG filed by the three (3) stockholders of Oriental Petroleum in connection with the
implementation of Section 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution.
It cannot, therefore, be said that the contemplated inquiry on the
subject of the privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, i.e., the
alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin
"Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group is to be conducted pursuant to
Senate Resolution No. 212 because, firstly, Senator Enrile did not
indict the PCGG, and, secondly, neither Mr. Ricardo Lopa nor the herein
petitioners are connected with the government but are private citizens.
It appeals, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent
Committee is not really "in aid of legislation" becuase it is not
related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim
of the investigation is to find out whether or not the ralatives of the
President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 RA No. 3019, the
"Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a matter that appears more
within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature.
Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died
during the pendency of this case. In John T. Watkins vs. United
States,20 it was held held:

... The power of congress to conduct investigations in inherent in the legislative

process. That power is broad. it encompasses inquiries concerning the
administration of existing laws as well as proposed, or possibly needed statutes.
It includes surveys of defects in our social,economic, or political system for the
purpose of enabling Congress to remedy them. It comprehends probes into
departments of the Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or
waste. But broad asis this power ofinquiry, it is not unlimited. There is no
general authority to expose the private affairs ofindividuals without justification
in terms of the functions of congress. This was freely conceded by Solicitor
General in his argument in this case. Nor is the Congress a law enforcement or
trial agency. These are functions of the executive and judicial departments of
government. No inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to and in
furtherance of a legitimate task of Congress. Investigations conducted soly for
the personal aggrandizement of the investigators or to "punish" those
investigated are indefensible. (emphasis supplied)

It can not be overlooked that when respondent Committee decide to conduct its
investigation of the petitioners, the complaint in Civil No. 0035 had already been filed
with the Sandiganbayan. A perusal of that complaint shows that one of its principal
causes of action against herein petitioners, as defendants therein, is the alleged sale of the
36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez. Since the issues in
said complaint had long been joined by the filing of petitioner's respective answers
thereto, the issue sought to be investigated by the respondent Commitee is one over
which jurisdiction had been acquired by the Sandiganbayan. In short, the issue had been
pre-empted by that court. To allow the respondent Committee to conduct its own
investigation of an issue already before the Sandiganbayan would not only pose the
possibility of conflicting judgments betweena legislative commitee and a judicial
tribunal, but if the Committee's judgment were to be reached before that of the
Sandiganbayan, the possibility of its influence being made to bear on the ultimate
judgment of the Sandiganbayan can not be discounted.
In fine, for the rspondent Committee to probe and inquire into the same
justiciable controversy already before the Sandiganbayan, would be an
encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had
much earlier set in. In Baremblatt vs. United States, 21 it was held that:
Broad as it is, the power is not, howevern, without limitations. Since congress
may only investigate into those areas in which it may potentially legislate or
appropriate, it cannot inquire into matters which are within the exclusive
province of one of the other branches of the government. Lacking the judicial
power given to the Judiciary, it cannot inquire into mattes that are exclusively
the concern of the Judiciary. Neither can it suplant the Executive in what
exclusively belongs to the Executive. ...

Now to another matter. It has been held that "a congressional committee's right to inquire
is 'subject to all relevant limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action,'
including "'the relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights'." 22

In another case
... the mere semblance of legislative purpose would not justify
an inquiry in the face of the Bill of Rights. The critical
element is the exeistence of, and the weight to be ascribed to,
the interest of the Congress in demanding disclosures from an
unwilling witness. We cannot simply assume, however, that every
congressional investigation is justified by a public need that
over-balances any private rights affected. To do so would be to
abdicate the responsibility placed by the Constitution upon the
judiciary to insure that the Congress does not unjustifiably
encroah upon an individual's right to privacy nor abridge his
liberty of speech, press, religion or assembly. 23

One of the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution to an individual is the right against
self-incrimination. 24 Thir right constured as the right to remain completely silent may be
availed of by the accused in a criminal case; but kit may be invoked by other witnesses
only as questions are asked of them.
This distinction was enunciated by the Court in Romeo Chavez vs. The Honorable Court
of Appeals, et al.25 thus
Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary
witness. Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness
stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating answer
is hot at him, an accused may altother refuse to take the witness stand and refuse
to answer any all questions.

Moreover, this right of the accused is extended to respondents in administrative

investigations but only if they partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous
to a criminal proceeding. In Galman vs. Pamaran,26 the Court reiterated the doctrine in
Cabal vs. Kapuanan(6 SCRA 1059) to illustrate the right of witnesses to invoke the right
against self-incrimination not only in criminal proceedings but also in all other types of
suit

It was held that:

We did not therein state that since he is not an accused and the
case is not a criminal case, Cabal cannot refuse to take the
witness stand and testify, and that he can invoke his right
against self-incrimination only when a question which tends to
elicit an answer that will incriminate him is propounded to him.
Clearly then, it is not the characeter of the suit involved but
the nature of the proceedings that controls. The privilege has
consistenly been held to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by
law and to all cases in which punishment is sought to be visited
upon a witness, whether a party or not.
We do not here modify these doctrines. If we presently rule that petitioners may not be
compelled by the respondent Committee to appear, testify and produce evidenc before it,
it is only becuase we hold that the questioned inquiry is not in aid of legislation and, if
pursued, would be violative of the principle of separation of powers between the
legislative and the judicial departments of government, ordained by the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court holds that, under the
facts, including the circumtance that petitioners are presently
impleaded as defendants in a case before the Sandiganbayan, which
involves issues intimately related to the subject of contemplated
inquiry before the respondet Committee, the respondent Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee is hereby enjoined from compelling the petitioners and
intervenor to testify before it and produce evidence at the said
inquiry.
SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino,

Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PARAS, J., concurring:

I concur principally because any decision of the respondent committee
may unduly influence the Sandiganbayan
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
I regret that I must express a strong dissent the Court's opinion in

this case.
The Court is asserting a power which I believe we do not possess. We are
encroaching on the turf of Congress. We are prohibiting the Senate from
proceeding with a consitutionally vested function. We are stopping the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee from exercising a legislative prerogative
investigations in aid of legislation. We do so becuase we somehow
feel that the purported aim is not the real purpose.
The Court has no power to second guess the motives behind an act of a
House of Congress. Neither can we substitute our judgment for its
judgment on a matter specifically given to it by the Constitution. The
scope of the legislative power is broad. it emcompasses practically
every aspect of human or corporate behavior capable of regulation. How
can this Court say that unraveling the tangled and secret skeins behind
the acquisition by Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez of 39 corporations under
the past regime and their sudden sale to the Lopa Group at the outset of
the new dispensation will not result in useful legislation?
The power of either House of Congress to conduct investigations is
inherent. It needs no textual grant. As stated in Arnault v. Nazareno,
87 Phil. 29 (1950)
Our form of government being patterned after the American system
the framers of our Constitution having drawn largely from
American institutions and practices we can, in this case,
properly draw also from American precedents in interpreting
analogous provisions of our Constitution, as we have done in
other cases in the past.
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly
investing either House of Congress with power to make
investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may
exercise its legislative functions advisely and effectively, such
power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be
implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process to
enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely
or effectively in the absence of information respecting the
conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change:
and where the legislative body does not itself possess the
requisite information which is not infrequently true
recourse must be had to others who do possess it. ... (At p. 45)
The framers of the present Constitution were not content to leave the power inherent,
incidental or implied. The power is now expressed as follows:
Sec. 21 The Senate or the House of Representatives or may of
its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legialtion in accordance with its duly published rules of

precedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such

inquiries shall be respected.
Apart from the formal requirement of publishing the rules of procedure, I agree that there
are three queries which, if answered in the affirmative, may give us cause to intervene.
First, is the matter being investigated
legislation could possibly be enacted?

one

on

which

no

valid

Second, is Congress encroaching on terrain which the Constitution has

reserved as the exclusive domain of another branch of government?
And third, is Congress violating the basic liberties of an individual?
The classic formulation of the power of the Court to interpret the
meaning of "in aid of legislation" is expressed in Kilbourn v. Thompson,
103 U.S. 168 (1880).
The House of Representatives passed a resolution creating a committee to
investigate the financial relations between Jay Cooke and Co., a
depositary of federal funds and a real estate pool. A debtor of Jay
Cooke and Co, Kilbourn, general manager of the pool refused to answer
questions put to him by the Committee and to produce certain book sna
papers. Consequently, he was ordered jailed for forty-five days. He
brought an action for false imprisonment and the Supreme Court decided
in his favor.
Speaking through Justice Miller, the Court ruled:
The resolution adopted as a sequence of this preamble contains no
hint of any intention of final action by Congress on the subject,
In all the argument of the case no suggestion has been made of
what the House of Respresentatives or the Congress could have
done in the way of remedying the wrong or securing the creditors
of Jay Cooke and Co., or even the United States. Was it to be
simply a fruitless investigation into the personal affiars of
individuals? If so the House of Representatives had no power or
authority in the matter more than any other equal number of
gentlemen interested for the government of their country. By
fruitless we mean that it could result in no valid legislation on
the subject to which the inquiry referrred. (Kilbourn v.
Thompson, Id. at page 388)
The Kilbourndecision is, however, crica 1880. The world has turned over many times
since that era. The same court which validated separate but equal facilities against of
racial discrimination and ruled that a private contract may bar improved labor standards
and social justice legislation has reversed itslef on these and many other questions.
In McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135; 71 L. Ed. 580 [1927], the court

went beyond the express terms of the Senate resolution directing the
investigation of a former Attorney General for non-feasance,
misfeasance, and malfeasance in office. It presumed that the action of
the Senate was with a legitimate object.
... Plainly the subject was one on which legislation could be had
and would be materially aided by the information which the
investigation was calculated to elicit. This becomes manifest
when it is reflected that the functions of the Department of
Justice, the powers and duties of the Attorney-General and the
duties of his assitants, are all subject to regulation by
congressional legislation, and that the department is maintained
and its activitites are carried on under such appropriations as
in the judgment of Congress are needed from year to year.
The only legitimate object the Senate could have in ordering the
investigation was to aid it in legislating, and we think the
subject was the real object. An express avowal of the object
would have been better; but in view of the particular subject
matter was not indispenable. In People ex rel. Mc Donald v.
Keeler, 99, N.Y. 463, 52 Am. Rep. 49, 2 N.E. 615, where the Court
of Appeals of New york sustained an investigation order by the
House of Representatives of that state where the resolution
contained no avowal, but disclosed that it definitely related to
the administrative of public office the duties of which were
subject to legislative regulation, the court said (pp. 485, 487):
Where public institutions under the control of the State are
ordered to be investigated, it is generally with the view of some
legislative action respecting them, and the same may be said in
respect of public officers,' And again "We are bound to presume
that the action of the legislative body was with a legitimate
object if it is capable of being so construed,and we have no
right to assume that the contrary was intended." (McGrain v.
Daugherty Id., at page 594-595, Emphasis supplied)
The American Court was more categorical in United States v. Josephson, 333 U.S. 858
(1938). It declared that declaration of legislative purpose was conclusive on the Courts:
Whatever may be said of the Committee on the un-American
activities, its authorizing resolution recites it is in aid of
legislation and that fact is establshed for courts.
And since the matter before us in somethingwe inherited from the American
constitutional system, rulings from the decision of federal courts may be apropos.
(Stamler v. Willis, 287 F. Supp. 734 [1968]
The Court cannot probe into the motives of the members of the
Congress.

Barsky v. United States, 167 F. 2d 241 [1948]

The measure of the power of inquiry is the potentiality that
constitutional legislation might ensue from information derived
from such inquiry.
The possibility that invalid as well as valid legislation might
ensue from an inquiry does not limit the power of inquiry, since
invalid legislation might ensue from any inquiry.

United States v. Shelton, 148 F. Supp. 926 [1957]

The contention of the defendant that the hearing at which he
testified and from which the indictment arose was not in
furtherance og a legislative purpose proceeds on the assumption
that a failure to have specific legislation in contemplation, or
a failure to show that legislation was in fact enacted,
estabished an absence of legislative purpose. This argument is
patently unsound. The investigative power of Congress is not
subject to the limitation that hearings must result in
legislation or recommendations for legislation.

United States v. Deutch (147 F. Supp. 89 (1956)

Under the Constitution of the U.S., the Federal Government is a
government of limited powers. The Congress, being the legislative
branch of the Federal Government, is also clothed with limited
legislative powers. In orders, however, to carry its legislative
powers into effect successfully, it has always been held that
Congress has the power to secure information concerning matters
in respect to which it has the authority to legislate. In fact,
it would seem that Congress must secure information in order to
legislate intelligently. Beyond that, the Congress has the right
secure information in order to determine whether or not to
legislate on a particular subject matter on which it is within
its constitutional powers to act. (Emphasis Supplied)
The even broader scope of legislative investigation in the Philippine context is explained
by a member of the Constitutional Commission.
The requirement that the investigation be "in aid of legislation"
is an essential element for establishing the jurisdiction of the
legislative body. It is, however, a requirement which is not

difficult to satisfy becuase, unlike in the United States, where

legislative power is shared by the United State Congress and the
states legislatures, the totality of legislative power is
possessed by the Congress nad its legislative field is well-nigh
unlimited. "It would be difficult to define any limits by which
the subject matter of its inquiry can be bounded." ( Supra, at p.
46) Moreover, it is not necessary that every question propounded
to a witness must be material to a proposed legislation. "In
other words, the materiality of the question must be determined
by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by
its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation.
The reason is that the necessity or lack of necessity for
legislative action and form and character of the action itself
are determined by the sum total of the information to be gathered
as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction to be
gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction
of such information elicited from a single question. (Id., at 48)
On the basis of this interpretation of what "in aid of
legislation" means, it can readily be seen that the phrase
contributes practically nothing towards protecting witnesses.
Practically any investigation can be in aid of the broad
legislative power of Congress. The limitation, therefore cannot
effectively prevent what Kilbourn v. Thompson (103 U.S. 168
[1880]) characterized as "roving commissions" or what Watkins v.
United States (354 U.S. 178, 200 [1957] labeled as exposure for
the sake of exposure. (Bernas, Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines, Vol. II, 1st Ed., page 132).
Applying the above principles to the present casem, it can readily be seen that the Senate
is investigating an area where it may potentially legislate. The ease with which relatives
of the President were allegedly able to amass great wealth under the past regime is a
legitimate area of inquiry. And if we tack on the alleged attempts o f relatives of a
succeeding adminsitration to duplicate the feat, the need for remedial legislation becomes
more imperative.
Our second area of concern is congressional encroachment on matters
reserved by the Constitution for the Executive or the Judiciary.
The majority opinion cites the decision in Angara v. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936) explaining our power to determined
conflicting claims of authority. It is indeed the function on this Court
to allocate constitutional boundaries but in the exercise of this
"umpire" function we have to take care that we do not keep any of the
three great departments of government from performing functions peculiar
to each department or specifically vested to it sby the Constitution.
When a power is vested, ti carries with is everything legitimately neede
to exercise it.
It may be argued that the investigation into the Romualdez Lopa

transactions is more appropriate for the Department of Justice and the

judiciary. This argument misses the point of legislative inquiry.
The prosecution of offenders by the Department of Justice or the
Ombudsman and their trial before courts of justice is intended to punish
persons who violate the law. Legislative investigations go further. The
aim is to arrive at policy determinations which may or may not be
enacted into legislation. Referral to prosecutors or courts of justice
is an added bonus. For sure, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee knows it
cannot sentence any offender, no matter how overwhelming the proof that
it may gatherm to a jail term. But certainly, the Committee can
recommend to Congress how the situation which enabled get-rich-quick
schemes to flourish may be remedied. The fact that the subject of the
investigation may currently be undergoing trial does not restrict the
power of Congress to investigate for its own purposes. The legislative
purpose is distinctly different from the judicial purpose.
In Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 73 L ed. 692 (1928), leases
of naval reservations to oil companies were investigated by the United
States Senate. On a finding that certain leases were fraudulent, court
action was recommended. In other words, court action on one hand and
legislation on the other, are not mutually exclusive. They may
complement each other.
... It may be conceded that Congress is without authority to
compel disclosyres for the purpose of aiding the prosecution of
pending suits; but the authority of that body, directly or
through it Committees, to require pertinent disclosures in aid of
its own consitutional power is not abridged because the
information sought to be elicited may also be of use in such
suits... It is plain that investigation of the matters involved
in suits brought or to be commenced under the Senate resolution
directing the institution of suits for the cancellation of the
leases might directly aid in respect of legislative action...
(Sinclair v. United States, Id.at page 698).
In United States v. Orman, 207 F. 2d Ed. 148 (1953), the court declared that it was
pertinent for a legislative committee to seek facts indicating that a witness was linked to
unlawful intestate gambling.
The power of a congressional committee to investigate matters
cannot be challenged on the ground that the Committee went beyond
the scope of any contemplated legislative and assumed the
functions of a grand jury. Whre the genral subject of
investigation is one concerning which Congress can legislate, and
the information sought might aid the congressional consideration,
in such a situation a legitimate legislative purpose must be
presumed...

I submit that the filing of indictments or informations or the trial of certain persons
cannot, by themselves, half the intitiation or stop the progress of legislative
investigations.
The other ground which I consider the more important one is where the
legislative investigation violates the liberties of the witnesses.
The Constitution expressly provides that "the rights of
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

persons

It should be emphasized that the constitutional restriction does not

call for the banning or prohibition of investigations where a violation
of a basis rights is claimed. It only requires that in the course of the
proceedings, the right of persons should be respected.
What the majority opinion mandates is a blanket prohibition against a
witness testifying at all, simply because he is already facing charges
before the Sandiganbayan. To my mind, the Consitution allows him to
interpose objections whenever an incriminating question is posed or when
he is compelled to reveal his ocurt defenses, but not ot refuse to take
the witness stand completely.

Arnault v. Nazareno, supra, illustrates the reticence, with which the

court views petitions to curtail legislative investigations even where
an invocation of individual liberties is made.
In Arnault,the entire country already knew the name of the presidential
realtive whom the Sentate was trying to link to the Tambobong-Buenavista
estate anomalies. Still, the Court did not interfere when Arnault
refused to answer specific questions directed at him and he was punished
for hir refusal. The Court did not restrain the Senate when Arnault was
sent o the national penitentiary for an indefinite visit until the name
which the Senate wanted him to utter was extracted. Only when the
imprisonment became ureasonably prolonged and the situation in Congress
had changed was he released.
As pointed out by the respondents, not one question has been asked
requiring an answer that would incriminate the petitioners. The
allegation that their basic rights are vilolated is not only without
basis but is also premature.
I agree with the respondents that the slae of 39 Romualdez corporations
to Mr. Lopa is not a purely private transaction into which the Senate
may not inquire. if this were so, much of the work of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) as it seeks to recover illegally
acquired wealth would be negated. Much of what PCGG is trying to recover
is the product of arrangements which are not only private but also
secret and hidden.
I therefore, vote to DISMISS the petition.

Narvasa, J., dissents.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I regret I am unable to give my concurrence, I do not agree that the
investigation being conducted by the Blue Ribbon Committee is not in aid
of legislation.
In Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29, this Court observed that "we are
bound to presume that the action of the legislative body was with a
legitimate object if it is capable of being so construed, and we have no
right ot assume that the contrary was intended." (People ex rel.Mc
Donald vs. Keeler, 99 N.Y. 463; 52 Am. Rep., 49; 2 N.E., 615, quoted
with approval by the U.S. Supreme Court in McGrain vs. Daugherty, 273
U.S. 135). As far as I know, that is still the rule today.
More importantly, the presumption is supported by the established facts.
The inquiry is sustainable as an implied of power the legislature and
even as expressly limited by the Constitution.
The inquiry deals with alleged manipulations of public funds and illicit
acquisitions of properties now being claimed by the PCGG for the
Republic of the Philippines. The purpose of the Committee is to
ascertain if and how such anomalies have been committed. It is settled
that the legislature has a right to investigate the disposition of the
public funds it has appropriated; indeed, "an inquiry into the
expenditure of all public money is na indispensable duty of the
legislature." Moreover, an investigation of a possible violation of a
law may be useful in the drafting of amendatory legislation to correct
or strengthen that law.
The ponenciaquotes lengthily from Senator Enrile's speech and concludes
that it "contained no suggestions of contemplated legislation; he merely
called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of section 5 of
R.A. No. 3019." However, according to McGrain v. Daugherty, supra:
Primarily, the purpose for which legislative inquiry and
investigation is pursued is to serve as an aid in legislation.
Through it, the legislature is able to obtain facts or data in
aid fo proposed legislation. However, it is not necessary that
the resolution ordering an investigation should in terms
expressly state that the object of the inquiry is to obtain data
in aid of proposed legislation.It is enough that such purpose
appears from a consideration of the entire proceedings or one in
which legislation could be had and would be materially aided by
the information which the investigation was calculated to elicit.
An express avowal of the object would be better, but such is not
indispensable.(Emphasis supplied).
The petitioner's contention that the questioned investigation would compel them to reveal

their defense in the cases now pending against them in the Sandigangbayan is untenable.
They know or should know that they cannot be compelled to answer incriminating
questions. The case of Chavez v. Court of Appeals,24 SCRA 663, where we held that an
accused may refuse at the outset to take the stand on the ground that the questions to be
put by the prosecutor will tend to incriminate him is, of course, not applicable to them.
They are not facing criminal charges before the Blue Ribbon Committee. Like any
ordinary witness, they can invoke the right against self-incrimination only when and as
the incriminating question is propounded.
While it is true that the Court is now allowed more leeway in reviewing
the traditionally political acts of the legislative and executive
departments, the power must be exercised with the utmost circumspection
lest we unduly trench on their prerogatives and disarrange the
constitutional separation of powers. That power is available to us only
if there is a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion, which I do
not see in the case at bar.
Guided by the presumption and the facts, I vote to DISMISS the petition.

Narvasa, J., dissents.

# Separate Opinions
PARAS, J.,concurring:
I concur principally because any decision of the respondent committee
may unduly influence the Sandiganbayan
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
I regret that I must express a strong dissent the Court's opinion in
this case.
The Court is asserting a power which I believe we do not possess. We are
encroaching on the turf of Congress. We are prohibiting the Senate from
proceeding with a consitutionally vested function. We are stopping the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee from exercising a legislative prerogative
investigations in aid of legislation. We do so becuase we somehow
feel that the purported aim is not the real purpose.
The Court has no power to second guess the motives behind an act of a
House of Congress. Neither can we substitute our judgment for its
judgment on a matter specifically given to it by the Constitution. The
scope of the legislative power is broad. it emcompasses practically
every aspect of human or corporate behavior capable of regulation. How

can
the
the
the

this Court say that unraveling the tangled and secret skeins behind
acquisition by Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez of 39 corporations under
past regime and their sudden sale to the Lopa Group at the outset of
new dispensation will not result in useful legislation?

The power of either House of Congress to conduct investigations is

inherent. It needs no textual grant. As stated in Arnault v. Nazareno,
87 Phil. 29 (1950)
Our form of government being patterned after the American system
the framers of our Constitution having drawn largely from
American institutions and practices we can, in this case,
properly draw also from American precedents in interpreting
analogous provisions of our Constitution, as we have done in
other cases in the past.
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly
investing either House of Congress with power to make
investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may
exercise its legislative functions advisely and effectively, such
power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be
implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process to
enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely
or effectively in the absence of information respecting the
conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change:
and where the legislative body does not itself possess the
requisite information which is not infrequently true
recourse must be had to others who do possess it. ... (At p. 45)
The framers of the present Constitution were not content to leave the power inherent,
incidental or implied. The power is now expressed as follows:
Sec. 21 The Senate or the House of Representatives or may of
its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legialtion in accordance with its duly published rules of
precedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected.
Apart from the formal requirement of publishing the rules of procedure, I agree that there
are three queries which, if answered in the affirmative, may give us cause to intervene.
First, is the matter being investigated one on which no valid
legislation could possibly be enacted?
Second, is Congress encroaching on terrain which the Constitution has
reserved as the exclusive domain of another branch of government?
And third, is Congress violating the basic liberties of an individual?

The classic formulation of the power of the Court to interpret the

meaning of "in aid of legislation" is expressed in Kilbourn v. Thompson,
103 U.S. 168 (1880).
The House of Representatives passed a resolution creating a committee to
investigate the financial relations between Jay Cooke and Co., a
depositary of federal funds and a real estate pool. A debtor of Jay
Cooke and Co, Kilbourn, general manager of the pool refused to answer
questions put to him by the Committee and to produce certain book sna
papers. Consequently, he was ordered jailed for forty-five days. He
brought an action for false imprisonment and the Supreme Court decided
in his favor.
Speaking through Justice Miller, the Court ruled:
The resolution adopted as a sequence of this preamble contains no
hint of any intention of final action by Congress on the subject,
In all the argument of the case no suggestion has been made of
what the House of Respresentatives or the Congress could have
done in the way of remedying the wrong or securing the creditors
of Jay Cooke and Co., or even the United States. Was it to be
simply a fruitless investigation into the personal affiars of
individuals? If so the House of Representatives had no power or
authority in the matter more than any other equal number of
gentlemen interested for the government of their country. By
fruitless we mean that it could result in no valid legislation on
the subject to which the inquiry referrred. (Kilbourn v.
Thompson, Id. at page 388)
The Kilbourndecision is, however, crica 1880. The world has turned over many times
since that era. The same court which validated separate but equal facilities against of
racial discrimination and ruled that a private contract may bar improved labor standards
and social justice legislation has reversed itslef on these and many other questions.
In McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135; 71 L. Ed. 580 [1927], the court
went beyond the express terms of the Senate resolution directing the
investigation of a former Attorney General for non-feasance,
misfeasance, and malfeasance in office. It presumed that the action of
the Senate was with a legitimate object.
... Plainly the subject was one on which legislation could be had
and would be materially aided by the information which the
investigation was calculated to elicit. This becomes manifest
when it is reflected that the functions of the Department of
Justice, the powers and duties of the Attorney-General and the
duties of his assitants, are all subject to regulation by
congressional legislation, and that the department is maintained
and its activitites are carried on under such appropriations as
in the judgment of Congress are needed from year to year.

The only legitimate object the Senate could have in ordering the
investigation was to aid it in legislating, and we think the
subject was the real object. An express avowal of the object
would have been better; but in view of the particular subject
matter was not indispenable. In People ex rel. Mc Donald v.
Keeler, 99, N.Y. 463, 52 Am. Rep. 49, 2 N.E. 615, where the Court
of Appeals of New york sustained an investigation order by the
House of Representatives of that state where the resolution
contained no avowal, but disclosed that it definitely related to
the administrative of public office the duties of which were
subject to legislative regulation, the court said (pp. 485, 487):
Where public institutions under the control of the State are
ordered to be investigated, it is generally with the view of some
legislative action respecting them, and the same may be said in
respect of public officers,' And again "We are bound to presume
that the action of the legislative body was with a legitimate
object if it is capable of being so construed,and we have no
right to assume that the contrary was intended." (McGrain v.
Daugherty Id., at page 594-595, Emphasis supplied)
The American Court was more categorical in United States v. Josephson, 333 U.S. 858
(1938). It declared that declaration of legislative purpose was conclusive on the Courts:
Whatever may be said of the Committee on the un-American
activities, its authorizing resolution recites it is in aid of
legislation and that fact is establshed for courts.
And since the matter before us in somethingwe inherited from the American
constitutional system, rulings from the decision of federal courts may be apropos.
(Stamler v. Willis, 287 F. Supp. 734 [1968]
The Court cannot probe into the motives of the members of the
Congress.

Barsky v. United States, 167 F. 2d 241 [1948]

The measure of the power of inquiry is the potentiality that
constitutional legislation might ensue from information derived
from such inquiry.
The possibility that invalid as well as valid legislation might
ensue from an inquiry does not limit the power of inquiry, since
invalid legislation might ensue from any inquiry.

United States v. Shelton, 148 F. Supp. 926 [1957]

The contention of the defendant that the hearing at which he

testified and from which the indictment arose was not in
furtherance og a legislative purpose proceeds on the assumption
that a failure to have specific legislation in contemplation, or
a failure to show that legislation was in fact enacted,
estabished an absence of legislative purpose. This argument is
patently unsound. The investigative power of Congress is not
subject to the limitation that hearings must result in
legislation or recommendations for legislation.

United States v. Deutch (147 F. Supp. 89 (1956)

Under the Constitution of the U.S., the Federal Government is a
government of limited powers. The Congress, being the legislative
branch of the Federal Government, is also clothed with limited
legislative powers. In orders, however, to carry its legislative
powers into effect successfully, it has always been held that
Congress has the power to secure information concerning matters
in respect to which it has the authority to legislate. In fact,
it would seem that Congress must secure information in order to
legislate intelligently. Beyond that, the Congress has the right
secure information in order to determine whether or not to
legislate on a particular subject matter on which it is within
its constitutional powers to act. (Emphasis Supplied)
The even broader scope of legislative investigation in the Philippine context is explained
by a member of the Constitutional Commission.
The requirement that the investigation be "in aid of legislation"
is an essential element for establishing the jurisdiction of the
legislative body. It is, however, a requirement which is not
difficult to satisfy becuase, unlike in the United States, where
legislative power is shared by the United State Congress and the
states legislatures, the totality of legislative power is
possessed by the Congress nad its legislative field is well-nigh
unlimited. "It would be difficult to define any limits by which
the subject matter of its inquiry can be bounded." (Supra, at p.
46) Moreover, it is not necessary that every question propounded
to a witness must be material to a proposed legislation. "In
other words, the materiality of the question must be determined
by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by
its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation.
The reason is that the necessity or lack of necessity for
legislative action and form and character of the action itself
are determined by the sum total of the information to be gathered
as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction to be

gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction

of such information elicited from a single question. (Id., at 48)
On the basis of this interpretation of what "in aid of
legislation" means, it can readily be seen that the phrase
contributes practically nothing towards protecting witnesses.
Practically any investigation can be in aid of the broad
legislative power of Congress. The limitation, therefore cannot
effectively prevent what Kilbourn v. Thompson (103 U.S. 168
[1880]) characterized as "roving commissions" or what Watkins v.
United States (354 U.S. 178, 200 [1957] labeled as exposure for
the sake of exposure. (Bernas, Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines, Vol. II, 1st Ed., page 132).
Applying the above principles to the present casem, it can readily be seen that the Senate
is investigating an area where it may potentially legislate. The ease with which relatives
of the President were allegedly able to amass great wealth under the past regime is a
legitimate area of inquiry. And if we tack on the alleged attempts o f relatives of a
succeeding adminsitration to duplicate the feat, the need for remedial legislation becomes
more imperative.
Our second area of concern is congressional encroachment on matters
reserved by the Constitution for the Executive or the Judiciary.
The majority opinion cites the decision in Angara v. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936) explaining our power to determined
conflicting claims of authority. It is indeed the function on this Court
to allocate constitutional boundaries but in the exercise of this
"umpire" function we have to take care that we do not keep any of the
three great departments of government from performing functions peculiar
to each department or specifically vested to it sby the Constitution.
When a power is vested, ti carries with is everything legitimately neede
to exercise it.
It may be argued that the investigation into the Romualdez Lopa
transactions is more appropriate for the Department of Justice and the
judiciary. This argument misses the point of legislative inquiry.
The prosecution of offenders by the Department of Justice or the
Ombudsman and their trial before courts of justice is intended to punish
persons who violate the law. Legislative investigations go further. The
aim is to arrive at policy determinations which may or may not be
enacted into legislation. Referral to prosecutors or courts of justice
is an added bonus. For sure, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee knows it
cannot sentence any offender, no matter how overwhelming the proof that
it may gatherm to a jail term. But certainly, the Committee can
recommend to Congress how the situation which enabled get-rich-quick
schemes to flourish may be remedied. The fact that the subject of the
investigation may currently be undergoing trial does not restrict the
power of Congress to investigate for its own purposes. The legislative

purpose is distinctly different from the judicial purpose.

In Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 73 L ed. 692 (1928), leases
of naval reservations to oil companies were investigated by the United
States Senate. On a finding that certain leases were fraudulent, court
action was recommended. In other words, court action on one hand and
legislation on the other, are not mutually exclusive. They may
complement each other.
... It may be conceded that Congress is without authority to
compel disclosyres for the purpose of aiding the prosecution of
pending suits; but the authority of that body, directly or
through it Committees, to require pertinent disclosures in aid of
its own consitutional power is not abridged because the
information sought to be elicited may also be of use in such
suits... It is plain that investigation of the matters involved
in suits brought or to be commenced under the Senate resolution
directing the institution of suits for the cancellation of the
leases might directly aid in respect of legislative action...
(Sinclair v. United States, Id.at page 698).
In United States v. Orman, 207 F. 2d Ed. 148 (1953), the court declared that it was
pertinent for a legislative committee to seek facts indicating that a witness was linked to
unlawful intestate gambling.
The power of a congressional committee to investigate matters
cannot be challenged on the ground that the Committee went beyond
the scope of any contemplated legislative and assumed the
functions of a grand jury. Whre the genral subject of
investigation is one concerning which Congress can legislate, and
the information sought might aid the congressional consideration,
in such a situation a legitimate legislative purpose must be
presumed...

I submit that the filing of indictments or informations or the trial of certain persons
cannot, by themselves, half the intitiation or stop the progress of legislative
investigations.
The other ground which I consider the more important one is where the
legislative investigation violates the liberties of the witnesses.
The Constitution expressly provides that "the rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
It should be emphasized that the constitutional restriction does not
call for the banning or prohibition of investigations where a violation
of a basis rights is claimed. It only requires that in the course of the

proceedings, the right of persons should be respected.

What the majority opinion mandates is a blanket prohibition against a
witness testifying at all, simply because he is already facing charges
before the Sandiganbayan. To my mind, the Consitution allows him to
interpose objections whenever an incriminating question is posed or when
he is compelled to reveal his ocurt defenses, but not ot refuse to take
the witness stand completely.

Arnault v. Nazareno, supra, illustrates the reticence, with which the

court views petitions to curtail legislative investigations even where
an invocation of individual liberties is made.
In Arnault,the entire country already knew the name of the presidential
realtive whom the Sentate was trying to link to the Tambobong-Buenavista
estate anomalies. Still, the Court did not interfere when Arnault
refused to answer specific questions directed at him and he was punished
for hir refusal. The Court did not restrain the Senate when Arnault was
sent o the national penitentiary for an indefinite visit until the name
which the Senate wanted him to utter was extracted. Only when the
imprisonment became ureasonably prolonged and the situation in Congress
had changed was he released.
As pointed out by the respondents, not one question has been asked
requiring an answer that would incriminate the petitioners. The
allegation that their basic rights are vilolated is not only without
basis but is also premature.
I agree with the respondents that the slae of 39 Romualdez corporations
to Mr. Lopa is not a purely private transaction into which the Senate
may not inquire. if this were so, much of the work of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) as it seeks to recover illegally
acquired wealth would be negated. Much of what PCGG is trying to recover
is the product of arrangements which are not only private but also
secret and hidden.
I therefore, vote to DISMISS the petition.

Narvasa, J., dissents.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I regret I am unable to give my concurrence, I do not agree that the
investigation being conducted by the Blue Ribbon Committee is not in aid
of legislation.
In Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29, this Court observed that "we are
bound to presume that the action of the legislative body was with a
legitimate object if it is capable of being so construed, and we have no
right ot assume that the contrary was intended." (People ex rel.Mc

Donald vs. Keeler, 99 N.Y. 463; 52 Am. Rep., 49; 2 N.E., 615, quoted
with approval by the U.S. Supreme Court in McGrain vs. Daugherty, 273
U.S. 135). As far as I know, that is still the rule today.
More importantly, the presumption is supported by the established facts.
The inquiry is sustainable as an implied of power the legislature and
even as expressly limited by the Constitution.
The inquiry deals with alleged manipulations of public funds and illicit
acquisitions of properties now being claimed by the PCGG for the
Republic of the Philippines. The purpose of the Committee is to
ascertain if and how such anomalies have been committed. It is settled
that the legislature has a right to investigate the disposition of the
public funds it has appropriated; indeed, "an inquiry into the
expenditure of all public money is na indispensable duty of the
legislature." Moreover, an investigation of a possible violation of a
law may be useful in the drafting of amendatory legislation to correct
or strengthen that law.
The ponenciaquotes lengthily from Senator Enrile's speech and concludes
that it "contained no suggestions of contemplated legislation; he merely
called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of section 5 of
R.A. No. 3019." However, according to McGrain v. Daugherty, supra:
Primarily, the purpose for which legislative inquiry and
investigation is pursued is to serve as an aid in legislation.
Through it, the legislature is able to obtain facts or data in
aid fo proposed legislation. However, it is not necessary that
the resolution ordering an investigation should in terms
expressly state that the object of the inquiry is to obtain data
in aid of proposed legislation.It is enough that such purpose
appears from a consideration of the entire proceedings or one in
which legislation could be had and would be materially aided by
the information which the investigation was calculated to elicit.
An express avowal of the object would be better, but such is not
indispensable.(Emphasis supplied).
The petitioner's contention that the questioned investigation would compel them to reveal
their defense in the cases now pending against them in the Sandigangbayan is untenable.
They know or should know that they cannot be compelled to answer incriminating
questions. The case of Chavez v. Court of Appeals,24 SCRA 663, where we held that an
accused may refuse at the outset to take the stand on the ground that the questions to be
put by the prosecutor will tend to incriminate him is, of course, not applicable to them.
They are not facing criminal charges before the Blue Ribbon Committee. Like any
ordinary witness, they can invoke the right against self-incrimination only when and as
the incriminating question is propounded.
While it is true that the Court is now allowed more leeway in reviewing
the traditionally political acts of the legislative and executive

departments, the power must be exercised with the utmost circumspection

lest we unduly trench on their prerogatives and disarrange the
constitutional separation of powers. That power is available to us only
if there is a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion, which I do
not see in the case at bar.
Guided by the presumption and the facts, I vote to DISMISS the petition.

Narvasa, J., dissents.

# Footnotes