What Communist Guerrillas Teach - CVE Journal 282 PDF

21
August 2015 ISSUE 28
CVE JOURNAL
ACTIONABLE * PRACTICAL * INTREPID

Scope: Articles are intended to be immediately
operational and relevant to the stability and
counterterrorism professional.

Feedback/submissions:
clark@thestabilityinstitute.com
Contents:
What Communist Guerrillas Teach...................p. 1
Revolt Against Violent Extremists, part XII.......p. 5
Human Trafficking Signs....................................p. 8
Indonesias Minorities.....................................p. 10

What Communist Guerillas Teach

by Howard Gambrill Clark, Ph.D.

Lessons learned from past guerrilla movements may inform todays strategies against violent extremists.

Directing government apparatus to leverage bottom-up grassroots revolts against violent extremists appears to
continue to be a likely effective strategy and policy to undermine radical presence, incursion, and influence. The
phenomenon challenges analysts to consider the study of insurgency vice counterinsurgencythe latter often
tending to focus on civilian militias only as government-selected and trained auxiliaries (thus not indigenous in
composition, not self-initiated, and not a central priority). Studies of guerrilla tactics and revolution often
conclude that indigenous peoples forces are the nucleus of the efforts.

This idea of empowering peoples
movements against Islamic State and
al-Qaìda, when violent extremists act
as an insurrection, has historical
precedent: [t]he tactics of guerillas
must be used against the guerillas
themselves.1

More importantly to many areas of
Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan, the idea of
empowering grassroots movements
against violent extremist groups, when
these radical organizations are acting as
oppressive governments, also has
historical precedentmost peoples
IS militants
movements appear to be against a
seeming illegitimate and repressive regime or foreign power. Recently, an al-Qaìda spokesperson admitted
about its one-time ally:

Frankly, all of us used to be sympathetic to varying degrees towards the Islamic
State of Iraqdespite its mistakeswhen it was seen as a weak and oppressed
force valiantly fighting brutal tyrannies. But now that it has become clear that it
hasunfortunatelyadopted some of the traits, methods and tactics of those
same tyrannies, it no longer holds the same place in our hearts that it did once
upon a time.2

21 August 2015 ISSUE 28

As analysts, security force advisors, development officers, and diplomats look to undermine Islamic State, al-
Qaìda branches, and similar organizations, it may be helpful to look for historical lessons on guerilla warfare as
a tool to be used against violent extremists.

This article will offer a simple summary of proposed tenets by three successful (success here judged merely by
eventually gaining power) twentieth-century movements. Lessons from the Chinese Communist Revolution,
Vietminh, and Cuban revolutionaries offer thought provoking tenets that may, surprisingly, directly apply to
indigenous efforts (and how governments can identify and leverage these efforts) to undermine contemporary
violent extremist organizations.

Before delving into a basic summary of these self-proclaimed anti-imperialist and nationalist revolutionary
tenets, it may be helpful to briefly review some assumptions made by these movement leaders and theorists:

Social, political, cultural, and geographic conditions in each area must determine the strategy, tactics,
composition, disposition, and command structure to employ. 3 Nevertheless there may be general
themes that may apply to all scenarios.4 It also can be assumed that guerilla warfare can occur in any
terrain or climate anywhere in the world.5
Guerilla warfare is a human endeavor. There are no mechanical panaceas.6 It can be said that guerilla
warfare is one of the most complex types because [i]ts basic element is man, and man is more complex
than any of his machines.7
Insurrection and counterrevolution is as old as humankind. Although policies to leverage insurgencies

change with developments of industry, media, and weaponry, guerilla tactics and terrorism are
generally used because a force is martially inferior to another.8
Insurrection against violent oppressors can and sometimes must be a regional policy, national policy,
war strategy, and political strategy in addition to tactical action.9 The desired effects on the ground
shape these strategies and policies. In addition, a whole-of-nation approach is necessary to support
martial, development, and institutional elements of a peoples movement.
There are many types of insurgency to include secessionist, reformist, conservative, religious,
liberal/pluralist, egalitarian/socialist, and anarchist.10 Neither a so-called communist movement nor a
counter-violent-extremist effort will fit perfectly into a narrow category. For example, a movement may
be simultaneously religious, conservative (a desire to maintain some recently lost golden age, for
example), and nationalist in nature.

The following are some general tenets that were common to self-proclaimed peoples movements. The lessons
learned refer only to the movements as insurgencies and never to what the movement did once they held
power:

Common Motivation: Liberation Against Oppressors

Nationalism was an underlying motivation and narrative initially and throughout the movements. It was
the foundational belief.11
All saw their effort as primarily one for freedom from oppression.12 This translates directly into a war of
liberationa common theme claimed among all forces and supporting civilians as well as found in all
strategies and during all stages of waragainst outside imperial or perceived colonial forces.13
Oppressors composition may very well involve a professional military, well-armed security forces,
bureaucracies, and sometimes most importantly foreign aid and support.14 All is revolted against.
The oppressorsthrough their very being as a governing force that people do not supporthave
breached peace and begun war sometimes before a shot is fired.15 People and insurgents view the


oppressors as illegitimate.16
The anti-outsider mentality also allows groups that otherwise may not have much in common or that
may be at odds with one another to temporarily unite for a larger common cause.17

How to Identity a Successful Movement: Uncommon Self Determination, Self Sufficiency, Sacrifice

Effective militiamen and their supporters already exhibit the will to suffer and sacrifice without material
gain. Promising revolts cannot be bought.18 The early fighters will be found already willing to die to
materialize their vision of liberation19even when faced with an overwhelming force20 (eventually a
more mature peoples movement will generally be more decisive with regards to where and how to
fight to maintain strength).
Inflexibilitywithout giving in to compromise, fatigue, or briberydefines the fighter and the fight.21
She or he is absolutely confident in the end state and process, resolute and loyal almost to a fault.22
Perfect consistency has been used to define some guerillas.23
There is no place for a defeatist attitude.24
A successful movement will not await favorable conditions but may make the conditions favorable.25
Sacrifice can come in the form of blood and sweat: physical danger to the fighters as well as the risks
civilians assume by offering food, shelter, intelligence, and logistical help.26
As the movement continues, superior morale and will play key roles in success.27
Beyond steadfast loyalty and dedication, guerilla fighters generally will show political or social alertness
throughout the fight. Her or his intensity is multifaceted and informed.28
Impoverished peoplecitizens that cannot subsist on their owngenerally do not necessarily have the
luxury of revolt.29

Center of Gravity: The Population

Peoples support (as well as acting always as representatives of a population) is the center of gravity.30
Guerillas become the nucleus of a popular movement. Ultimately, it is a peoples war.31 Mao Zedong
proposed the metaphor that guerillas were fish and population the water.32
Support of the people for the militiamen is a continued necessity. Otherwise, if the security arm of any
movement fails to maintain popular backing, they may become destabilizing bandits.33 The moment
that guerilla forces leave the support and sympathy of the people the campaign diesnot to mention
no longer being a true peoples nationalist movement.34
Guerilla and village forces are not auxiliary assets for a campaignlike Russia and the United States
have often viewed thembut instead the main effort on which others rely.35
Village militiamen and civilian resistance are the basis for all security, all types of guerrilla warfare, and
all stages in a war in both secure and enemy-held areas. When other, more conventional, forces falter
civilian fighters can maintain a foundation of security especially in rural areas.36
People and their villages are the literal base of operations throughout the campaign.37 The rear
becomes those areas where militiamen can find continuous and generous support among peoplea
very different meaning than found in much of Western military doctrine.38 The need for a literal fortress
or base is a cause and sign of weakness.39
Because rural areas are often key in guerrilla warfare, agriculture and an understanding of farming and
herding are central to an insurrections success.40 However, the same tenets of guerrilla warfare can
also be executed in urban terrain.41

While Western governments generally look at insurgency and counterinsurgency in terms of population
centersvery often urban areasrural areas are normally favorable because they are often out of
reach of the oppressors. And often a symbiosis can exist between farmers/herders and the core of a
guerilla movement.42
Some theorists go so far as to propose that once guerillas gain (or perhaps had from the beginning)
popular support, there is little chance of their defeat.43

It Takes a NationSecurity is Just One Aspect of Support

To attain victory, guerilla action requires economic, political, and social input. It is vital that outside
support come in the form of diplomacy, aid, and development as the situation and mission may
require.44 Guerrilla warfare is not just for a few specialized security experts but has vital roles for
experts on civil institutions, policies, and strategiesafter all it is a movement that must be of the
people and by the people and not just a band of outsider-selected recruits.45
Day to day there may in fact be more work in the information, governance, and development realms
than kinetic activity.46
Defining and refining political goals often become as important to the process as to the fighting itself.47

Eventually Guerrilla War Becomes an All-Out War of Attrition

Each side is attempting to annihilate the other completely.48
All economic, diplomatic, logistical, ideological, and agricultural strength must translate into martial
victory over an enemy in guerrilla warfare.49 Ultimately all strength can be measured in the effect of
security forces.50 This may seem to contradict the It Takes a Nation description above, but this idea of
attrition is one of end state as opposed to means.
When it comes to an insurrection, it often faces, seemingly paradoxically, a war of attrition with a ruling
forcewearing down an enemy to deny that enemy influence and presence person by person and
square mile by square mile.51 At the end of the day the war may be about gaining territories.52
A guerilla force then is forced to use all assets, any tactic, and any trick to defeat the enemy
enduringly.53 It will withdraw and advance, surge and dissipate as neededcontinually morphing.54
It will use whatever outside forces available. Marriages of convenience with outside groups or
governments of ideologically different stripes may often be necessary.55
Guerrilla actions will take advantage of international circumstances some of which may have direct
effect on the campaign.56
Guerilla and village militias should generally avoid direct, formal battles.57 After initial revolt, it is wise
for an insurrection to pick and choose places and times for battles that will translate directly into tactical
victory leading directly to strategic progress.58 The end state of complete defeat of an enemy will
determine the tactics.

Information Operations is a Priority

Information operations is not just essentialit is a central strategy that must be coordinated and
employed robustly in both friendly and enemy-held territories by any means of distribution possible
simultaneously at both the tactical and strategic level.59
Political repercussions of a single battle or single eventas perhaps a symbol of the struggle to the
world and enemymay grow a modest operational win into a disproportionately favorable strategic


victory.60

***

Revolt Against Violent Extremists, part XII
by Howard Gambrill Clark, Ph.D.

This is the twelfth article in a series of counter-violent-extremist narratives. Below are quotes from clergy,
political leaders, social groups, fighters, and/or citizens. If republished, translated, and marketed aggressively
through third parties, these messages could potentially help to:
Force violent extremist spokesmen further on the rhetorical defensive.
Perhaps dissuade some who may be susceptible to radicalization/mobilization.
Bolster the will of those already fighting Islamic State and other violent extremist organizations.
Perhaps compel otherwise apathetic
citizens to action against violent extremists
and their influence.

Each message should appeal to targeted
communities with a local hook as al-Qaìda and
similar groups do successfully; be free of any
semblance of government involvement when
appropriate (even if the narrative originated from a
government official); offer sound bites; explain
truthfully the credentials, inadequacies, and
agendas of the messenger; and be translated into
every language violent extremists use to recruit.

Any counter or master messaging campaign should
IS militant
be considered within a greater strategy to
undermine violent extremism. It should also be considered as an alternative to shutting down websites and
social media accounts after which violent extremist spokespeople often move to other accounts and/or
decentralized messaging networks.61

On Child Soldiers

From the observation of a Kurdish child (non-combatant):62
Even if you put a Quran in front of [Islamic State supporters], they wouldnt read
it. They would just parrot their stupid ideologythey were very harmful to
Islam

Syrian Observatory for Human Rights:63
ISIS is believed to have recruited more than 1,100 children.

UN Committee on the Rights of the Child:64
In 77 per cent of the cases, children were armed or used in combat and almost
one fifth were under 15 years of age. Boys associated with armed groups were
commonly between 14 and 17 years of age, with 17 verified cases under the age
of 15. In many cases, children were paid to fight for salaries of up to $400 per
monthThe payment of relatively large salaries created an incentive for children
and their parents under difficult economic circumstance.

Renate Winter, international judicial monitor and member of UN Committee on the Rights of the Child:65


This is one of the worst cases I've been involved in. [Islamic States] cruelty is a
war tool to terrorize children living in the area, terrorize their families into
obedience and impress the youth of other regions.

Psychiatry professor Steven Weine:66
What especially frightens me is the combination of emerging state structures,
extremist ideology, atrocities on a mass scale, and a willingness to involve
children.

Not only does the military and political conflict need to be settled. We need to
face the consequences of what ISIS has done to childrentraumatizing and
indoctrinating a whole future generation.

It will create enormous problems down the line that are hard to even fathom.

Terrorism analyst John Horgan:67
I don't think we're remotely ready for the challenge of de-radicalization, let
alone re-integration of these kids. It's absurd how behind we are in planning for
this.

They've clearly been seduced and groomed by these jihadists. But are we going
to think of them as victims in need of saving? Or as fully-fledged militants,
fighters and suicide bombers?

UNICEF spokeswoman Juliette Touma:68
As long as the conflict in Syria continues we're going to continue seeing children
recruited in that form.

From Disenchanted Militant

24-year-old single father (U.S. person), who joined and then left Islamic State:69
They burn your life. They leave nothing. I can't do anything now. If I go to them,
they will kill me. If I go to Turkey, they will arrest me. If I stay here, I will go to
prison. I have nothing. The only escape for me is death.

They told us, When you capture someone, you will behead them. [I was]
instructed to throw homosexuals off of tall buildings and kill female adulterers.

On Sexual Slavery

12-year-old victim of sexual slavery:70
I kept telling him it hurtsplease stop. He told me that according to Islam he is
allowed to rape an unbeliever. He said that by raping me, he is drawing closer to
God.

Former enslaved 34-year-old Yazidi woman on another 12-year-old slave:71
He destroyed her body. She was badly infected. The fighter kept coming and
asking me, Why does she smell so bad? And I said, she has an infection on the
inside, you need to take care of her.

Unmoved, he ignored the girls agony, continuing the ritual of praying before
and after raping the child.


I said to him, Shes just a little girl. And he answered, No. Shes not a little
girl. Shes a slave. And she knows exactly how to have sex. And having sex with
her pleases God.

15-year-old victim of sexual slavery:72
Every time that he came to rape me, he would pray. He kept telling me this is
[worship].

He said that raping me is his prayer to God. I said to him, What youre doing to
me is wrong, and it will not bring you closer to God. And he said, No, its
allowed. Its halal.

Right away, the fighters separated the men from the womenthey separated
me from my mom. The young, unmarried girls were forced to get into buses.

They laughed and jeered at us, saying You are our sabaya [slave]. I didnt know
what that word meant.

He told us that Taus Malik [an angel to whom the Yazidis pray is not God. He
said that Taus Malik is the devil and that because you worship the devil, you
belong to us. We can sell you and use you as we see fit.

19-year-old victim of slavery:73
When they put us in the building, they said we had arrived at the Sabaya
Market. I understood we were now in a slave market.

Unnamed Female Victim:74
The emirs sat against the wall and called us by name. We had to sit in a chair
facing them. You had to look at them, and before you went in, they took away
our scarves and anything we could have used to cover ourselves.

When it was my turn, they made me stand four times. They made me turn
around.

New York Times journalist Rukmini Callimachi:75
The systematic rape of women and girls from the Yazidi religious minority has
become deeply enmeshed in the organization and the radical theology of the
Islamic State in the year since the group announced it was reviving slavery as an
institution. Interviews with 21 women and girls who recently escaped the Islamic
State, as well as an examination of the groups official communications,
illuminate how the practice has been enshrined in the groups core tenets.

The trade in Yazidi women and girls has created a persistent infrastructure, with
a network of warehouses where the victims are held, viewing rooms where they
are inspected and marketed, and a dedicated fleet of buses used to transport
them.

A total of 5,270 Yazidis were abducted last year, and at least 3,144 are still being
held, according to community leaders. To handle them, the Islamic State has
developed a detailed bureaucracy of sex slavery, including sales contracts
notarized by the ISIS-run Islamic courts. And the practice has become an

established recruiting tool to lure men from deeply conservative Muslim
societies, where casual sex is taboo and dating is forbidden.

A growing body of internal policy memos and theological discussions has
established guidelines for slavery, including a lengthy how-to manual issued by
the Islamic State Research and Fatwa Department just last month. Repeatedly,
the ISIS leadership has emphasized a narrow and selective reading of the Quran
and other religious rulings to not only justify violence, but also to elevate and
celebrate each sexual assault as spiritually beneficial, even virtuous.

Yazidi studies scholar Matthew Barber:76
The offensive on the mountain [Sinjar] was as much a sexual conquest as it was
for territorial gain.

Yazidi community activist Khider Domle:77
It was 100 percent preplanned. I spoke by telephone to the first family who
arrived at the Directory of Youth in Mosul, and the hall was already prepared for
them. They had mattresses, plates and utensils, food and water for hundreds of
people.

Islamic States Online Article The Revival of Slavery Before the Hour:78
Prior to the taking of Sinjar, Shariah students in the Islamic State were tasked to
research the Yazidis.

After capture, the Yazidi women and children were then divided according to the
Shariah amongst the fighters of the Islamic State who participated in the Sinjar
operations, after one fifth of the slaves were transferred to the Islamic States
authority to be divided.

***

Human Trafficking Signs
by Airline Ambassadors International, Polaris, Free the Slaves, and International Justice Mission

Airline Ambassadors International, Polaris, Free the Slaves, and International Justice Mission created a list of
warning signs of possible human trafficking. Human traffickingin addition to alone being a criminal
enterpriseis a business for violent extremist organizations, drug trafficking organizations, and other malign
actors. Security force advisors and law enforcement trainers may wish to discuss techniques to identify human
traffickingeven if it is not a primary missionbecause individuals may spot criminal activity during off-hours
and personal travel.79

It's important to remember that even if you spot a number of these signs, it
doesn't necessarily mean someone is being trafficked. But if you do suspect
someone is being trafficked, do not confront suspected traffickers or attempt to
rescue suspected victimsinstead, call emergency services or alert the airport
authorities.

Warning signs:

1A traveler is not dressed appropriately for their route of travel.

You might notice right away that a traveler has few or no personal items.


Victims may be less well dressed than their companions. They may be wearing
clothes that are the wrong size, or are not appropriate for the weather on their
route of travel.

2They have a tattoo with a bar code, the word "Daddy."

Many people have tattoos, so a tattoo in itself is obviously not an indicator, but
traffickers or pimps feel they own their victims and a barcode tattoo, or a tattoo
with "Daddy" or even a man's name could be a red flag that the person is a
victim.

3 They can't provide details of their departure location, destination, or flight
information.

Traffickers employ a number of tools to avoid raising suspicion about their crime
and to keep victims enslaved. Some traffickers won't tell their victims where they
are located, being taken, or even what job they will have.

Because victims don't have the means to get home or pay for things like food,
they must rely on traffickers in order to get by, forcing them to stay in their
situation.

4Their communication seems scripted, or there are inconsistencies with their
story.

Sometimes traffickers will coach their victims to say certain things in public to
avoid suspicion. A traveler whose story seems inconsistent or too scripted might
be trying to hide the real reason for their travel and merely reciting what a
trafficker has told them to say.

5They can't move freely in an airport or on a plane, or they are being
controlled, closely watched or followed.

People being trafficked into slavery are sometimes guarded in transit. A
trafficker will try to ensure that the victim does not escape, or reach out to
authorities for help.

6They are afraid to discuss themselves around others, deferring any attempts
at conversation to someone who appears to be controlling them.

Fear and intimidation are two of the tools that traffickers use to control people
in slavery. Traffickers often prevent victims from interacting with the public
because the victim might say something that raises suspicions about their safety
and freedom.

7Child trafficking.

A child being trafficked for sexual exploitation may be dressed in a sexualized
manner, or seem to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol.

A child may appear to be malnourished and/or shows signs of physical or sexual
abuse, such as bruises, scars, or cigarette burns.


***

Indonesias Minorities
by Utsav Yadav

The phenomenon of Indonesias cultural and religious inclusiveness challenges Islamic States bent on seeking to
eliminate many minorities and their religious traditions. The worlds most populous Muslim-majority country
officially recognizes six religions including Hinduism. Before Islam became the dominant faith in the worlds
largest archipelago, Hinduism influenced Indonesian culture. Although Hinduism had a huge following in the 5th
century, today Hindus make up less than 2% of the population. Despite the small numbers, Hindu culture
continues to thrive. Temples that honor Vishnu and Shiva dot
the entire country, the national language Bahasa Indonesian
contains vocabulary influenced by Sanskrit, and Hindu epics
Mahabharata and Ramayana remain broadly popular.

Indonesias unique, syncretic form of Islam celebrates certain
strains of Hindu culture and other indigenous traditions. When
Islam started to spread across the archipelago, it did so while
blending and adapting local cultures and customs. 80 Scholar
Michael Buehler claims, The diversity of Indonesian Islam is
usually seen as a result of the way the Islamic conversion
occurred in the archipelago. Due to the absence of an
overarching kingdom with centralized authority, the Islamization
of the population was subject to various kinds of influences and
accommodations with pre-Islamic beliefs and practices in the
different parts of the country.81

For example, the Hindu epic-based Ramayana ballet in Java continues to reportedly to be the longest running
play in the world:
In Java, Islam is very blended, Muslims are Muslims with Hindu influence. performer Damar Kasyiyadi
Java culture is not possible without Ramayana and Mahabharata, these are not only Hindu stories.
Indonesia has many cultures, all existing in harmony. play manager Sumardi
We are people of Java. Here we learn Hindu and Buddhist stories, too. performer Sotya
Although far from free of cultural clashes and violence and although unique in its history, geography, and
politics, discussion of Indonesias mainstream approaches to interacting with minorities may inform
conversations with partners abroad about Islamic State. Likewise amplifying social leaders messages in
Indonesia about fair treatment of minorities may force some violent extremist spokesmen on the rhetorical
defensive.

10
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2
11

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August 2015 ISSUE 28

ACTIONABLE * PRACTICAL * INTREPID

21 August 2015 ISSUE 28

Insurrection and counterrevolution is as old as humankind. Although policies to leverage insurgencies

21 August 2015 ISSUE 28

There is no place for a defeatist attitude.24

21 August 2015 ISSUE 28

Each side is attempting to annihilate the other completely.48

Information Operations is a Priority

21 August 2015 ISSUE 28

21 August 2015 ISSUE 28

21 August 2015 ISSUE 28

21 August 2015 ISSUE 28

21 August 2015 ISSUE 28

21 August 2015 ISSUE 28

21 August 2015 ISSUE 28

21 August 2015 ISSUE 28

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