epublic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-630
November 15, 1947
ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, CITY OF MANILA, respondent and appellee.
Gibbs, Gibbs, Chuidian and Quasha of petitioner-appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Carreon for respondent-appellee.
Marcelino Lontok appeared as amicus curies.
MORAN, C.J.:
Alenxander A. Kriventor alien, bought a residential lot from the Magdalena Estate, Inc., in December of
1941, the registration of which was interrupted by the war. In May, 1945, he sought to accomplish said
registration but was denied by the register of deeds of Manila on the ground that, being an alien, he cannot
acquire land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko then brought the case to the fourth branch of the Court of First
Instance of Manila by means of a consulta, and that court rendered judgment sustaining the refusal of the
register of deeds, from which Krivenko appealed to this Court.
There is no dispute as to these facts. The real point in issue is whether or not an alien under our
Constitution may acquire residential land.
It is said that the decision of the case on the merits is unnecessary, there being a motion to withdraw the
appeal which should have been granted outright, and reference is made to the ruling laid down by this
Court in another case to the effect that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question if its
judgment may be made to rest upon other grounds. There is, we believe, a confusion of ideas in this
reasoning. It cannot be denied that the constitutional question is unavoidable if we choose to decide this
case upon the merits. Our judgment cannot to be made to rest upon other grounds if we have to render any
judgment at all. And we cannot avoid our judgment simply because we have to avoid a constitutional
question. We cannot, for instance, grant the motion withdrawing the appeal only because we wish to evade
the constitutional; issue. Whether the motion should be, or should not be, granted, is a question involving
different considerations now to be stated.
According to Rule 52, section 4, of the Rules of Court, it is discretionary upon this Court to grant a
withdrawal of appeal after the briefs have been presented. At the time the motion for withdrawal was filed in
this case, not only had the briefs been prensented, but the case had already been voted and the majority
decision was being prepared. The motion for withdrawal stated no reason whatsoever, and the Solicitor
General was agreeable to it. While the motion was pending in this Court, came the new circular of the
Department of Justice, instructing all register of deeds to accept for registration all transfers of residential
lots to aliens. The herein respondent-appellee was naturally one of the registers of deeds to obey the new
circular, as against his own stand in this case which had been maintained by the trial court and firmly
defended in this Court by the Solicitor General. If we grant the withdrawal, the the result would be that
petitioner-appellant Alexander A. Krivenko wins his case, not by a decision of this Court, but by the decision
or circular of the Department of Justice, issued while this case was pending before this Court. Whether or
not this is the reason why appellant seeks the withdrawal of his appeal and why the Solicitor General
readily agrees to that withdrawal, is now immaterial. What is material and indeed very important, is whether
or not we should allow interference with the regular and complete exercise by this Court of its constitutional
functions, and whether or not after having held long deliberations and after having reached a clear and
positive conviction as to what the constitutional mandate is, we may still allow our conviction to be silenced,
and the constitutional mandate to be ignored or misconceived, with all the harmful consequences that
might be brought upon the national patromony. For it is but natural that the new circular be taken full
advantage of by many, with the circumstance that perhaps the constitutional question may never come up
again before this court, because both vendors and vendees will have no interest but to uphold the validity
of their transactions, and very unlikely will the register of deeds venture to disobey the orders of their

superior. Thus, the possibility for this court to voice its conviction in a future case may be remote, with the
result that our indifference of today might signify a permanent offense to the Constitution.
All thse circumstances were thoroughly considered and weighted by this Court for a number of days and
the legal result of the last vote was a denial of the motion withdrawing the appeal. We are thus confronted,
at this stage of the proceedings, with our duty, the constitutional question becomes unavoidable. We shall
then proceed to decide that question.
Article XIII, section 1, of the Constitutional is as follows:
Article XIII. Conservation and utilization of natural resources.
SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, water, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall
be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant,
lease, or concession at the time of the inaguration of the Government established uunder this
Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be
alienated, and no licence, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of
any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable
for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or
industrial uses other than the development of water "power" in which cases beneficial use may be
the measure and the limit of the grant.
The scope of this constitutional provision, according to its heading and its language, embraces all lands of
any kind of the public domain, its purpose being to establish a permanent and fundamental policy for the
conservation and utilization of all natural resources of the Nation. When, therefore, this provision, with
reference to lands of the public domain, makes mention of only agricultural, timber and mineral lands, it
means that all lands of the public domain are classified into said three groups, namely, agricultural, timber
and mineral. And this classification finds corroboration in the circumstance that at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution, that was the basic classification existing in the public laws and judicial decisions in the
Philippines, and the term "public agricultural lands" under said classification had then acquired a technical
meaning that was well-known to the members of the Constitutional Convention who were mostly members
of the legal profession.
As early as 1908, in the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil., 175, 182), this Court said that the
phrase "agricultural public lands" as defined in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, which phrase is also to
be found in several sections of the Public Land Act (No. 926), means "those public lands acquired from
Spain which are neither mineral for timber lands." This definition has been followed in long line of decisions
of this Court. (SeeMontano vs. Insular Government, 12 Phil., 593; Ibaez de Aldecoa vs. Insular
Government, 13 Phil., 159; Ramosvs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil., 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39
Phil., 560; Ankron vs. Government of the Philippines, 40 Phil., 10.) And with respect to residential lands, it
has been held that since they are neither mineral nor timber lands, of necessity they must be classified as
agricultural. In Ibaez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government (13 Phil., 159, 163), this Court said:
Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of cultivation, and may be converted into a
field, and planted with all kinds of vegetation; for this reason, where land is not mining or forestal
in its nature, it must necessarily be included within the classification of agricultural land, not
because it is actually used for the purposes of agriculture, but because it was originally
agricultural and may again become so under other circumstances; besides, the Act of Congress
contains only three classification, and makes no special provision with respect to building lots or
urban lands that have ceased to be agricultural land.
In other words, the Court ruled that in determining whether a parcel of land is agricultural, the test is not
only whether it is actually agricultural, but also its susceptibility to cultivation for agricultural purposes. But
whatever the test might be, the fact remains that at the time the Constitution was adopted, lands of the
public domain were classified in our laws and jurisprudence into agricultural, mineral, and timber, and that
the term "public agricultural lands" was construed as referring to those lands that were not timber or
mineral, and as including residential lands. It may safely be presumed, therefore, that what the members of

the Constitutional Convention had in mind when they drafted the Constitution was this well-known
classification and its technical meaning then prevailing.
Certain expressions which appear in Constitutions, . . . are obviously technical; and where such
words have been in use prior to the adoption of a Constitution, it is presumed that its framers and
the people who ratified it have used such expressions in accordance with their technical meaning.
(11 Am. Jur., sec. 66, p. 683.) Also Calder vs. Bull, 3 Dall. [U.S.], 386; 1 Law. ed., 648;
Bronson vs. Syverson, 88 Wash., 264; 152 P., 1039.)
It is a fundamental rule that, in construing constitutions, terms employed therein shall be given the
meaning which had been put upon them, and which they possessed, at the time of the framing
and adoption of the instrument. If a word has acquired a fixed, technical meaning in legal and
constitutional history, it will be presumed to have been employed in that sense in a written
Constitution. (McKinney vs. Barker, 180 Ky., 526; 203 S.W., 303; L.R.A., 1918 E, 581.)
Where words have been long used in a technical sense and have been judicially construed to
have a certain meaning, and have been adopted by the legislature as having a certain meaning
prior to a particular statute in which they are used, the rule of construction requires that the words
used in such statute should be construed according to the sense in which they have been so
previously used, although the sense may vary from strict literal meaning of the words. (II
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 758.)
Therefore, the phrase "public agricultural lands" appearing in section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution
must be construed as including residential lands, and this is in conformity with a legislative interpretation
given after the adoption of the Constitution. Well known is the rule that "where the Legislature has revised a
statute after a Constitution has been adopted, such a revision is to be regarded as a legislative
construction that the statute so revised conforms to the Constitution." (59 C.J., 1102.) Soon after the
Constitution was adopted, the National Assembly revised the Public Land Law and passed Commonwealth
Act No. 141, and sections 58, 59 and 60 thereof permit the sale of residential lots to Filipino citizens or to
associations or corporations controlled by such citizens, which is equivalent to a solemn declaration that
residential lots are considered as agricultural lands, for, under the Constitution, only agricultural lands may
be alienated.
It is true that in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No. 141, "alienable or disposable public lands" which
are the same "public agriculture lands" under the Constitution, are classified into agricultural, residential,
commercial, industrial and for other puposes. This simply means that the term "public agricultural lands"
has both a broad and a particular meaning. Under its broad or general meaning, as used in the
Constitution, it embraces all lands that are neither timber nor mineral. This broad meaning is particularized
in section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which classifies "public agricultural lands" for purposes of
alienation or disposition, into lands that are stricly agricultural or actually devoted to cultivation for
agricultural puposes; lands that are residential; commercial; industrial; or lands for other purposes. The fact
that these lands are made alienable or disposable under Commonwealth Act No. 141, in favor of Filipino
citizens, is a conclusive indication of their character as public agricultural lands under said statute and
under the Constitution.
It must be observed, in this connection that prior to the Constitution, under section 24 of Public Land Act
No. 2874, aliens could acquire public agricultural lands used for industrial or residential puposes, but after
the Constitution and under section 23 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the right of aliens to acquire such
kind of lands is completely stricken out, undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional limitation. And,
again, prior to the Constitution, under section 57 of Public Land Act No. 2874, land of the public domain
suitable for residence or industrial purposes could be sold or leased to aliens, but after the Constitution and
under section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, such land may only be leased, but not sold, to aliens, and
the lease granted shall only be valid while the land is used for the purposes referred to. The exclusion of
sale in the new Act is undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional limitation, and this again is another
legislative construction that the term "public agricultural land" includes land for residence purposes.
Such legislative interpretation is also in harmony with the interpretation given by the Executive Department
of the Government. Way back in 1939, Secretary of Justice Jose Abad Santos, in answer to a query as to
"whether or not the phrase 'public agricultural lands' in section 1 of Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution

may be interpreted to include residential, commercial, and industrial lands for purposes of their disposition,"
rendered the following short, sharp and crystal-clear opinion:
Section 1, Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution classifies lands of the public domain in the
Philippines into agricultural, timber and mineral. This is the basic classification adopted since the
enactment of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill. At the time of the
adoption of the Constitution of the Philippines, the term 'agricultural public lands' and, therefore,
acquired a technical meaning in our public laws. The Supreme Court of the Philippines in the
leading case of Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil., 175, held that the phrase 'agricultural
public lands' means those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither timber nor mineral
lands. This definition has been followed by our Supreme Court in many subsequent case. . . .
Residential commercial, or industrial lots forming part of the public domain must have to be
included in one or more of these classes. Clearly, they are neither timber nor mineral, of
necessity, therefore, they must be classified as agricultural.
Viewed from another angle, it has been held that in determining whether lands are agricultural or
not, the character of the land is the test (Odell vs. Durant, 62 N.W., 524; Lorch vs. Missoula Brick
and Tile Co., 123 p.25). In other words, it is the susceptibility of the land to cultivation for
agricultural purposes by ordinary farming methods which determines whether it is agricultural or
not (State vs. Stewart, 190 p. 129).
Furthermore, as said by the Director of Lands, no reason is seen why a piece of land, which may
be sold to a person if he is to devote it to agricultural, cannot be sold to him if he intends to use it
as a site for his home.
This opinion is important not alone because it comes from a Secratary of Justice who later became the
Chief Justice of this Court, but also because it was rendered by a member of the cabinet of the late
President Quezon who actively participated in the drafting of the constitutional provision under
consideration. (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p. 598.) And the opinion of the Quezon
administration was reiterated by the Secretary of Justice under the Osmea administration, and it was
firmly maintained in this Court by the Solicitor General of both administrations.
It is thus clear that the three great departments of the Government judicial, legislative and executive
have always maintained that lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, mineral and timber,
and that agricultural lands include residential lots.
Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, shall not be aliented," and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is
limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands of
Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their
agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this result that section 5 is included in Article XIII,
and it reads as follows:
Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred or
assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of
the public domain in the Philippines.
This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may
leak into aliens' hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to
aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the
hands of Filipino citizens. Undoubtedly, as above indicated, section 5 is intended to insure the policy of
nationalization contained in section 1. Both sections must, therefore, be read together for they have the
same purpose and the same subject matter. It must be noticed that the persons against whom the
prohibition is directed in section 5 are the very same persons who under section 1 are disqualified "to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines." And the subject matter of both sections is the
same, namely, the non-transferability of "agricultural land" to aliens. Since "agricultural land" under section
1 includes residential lots, the same technical meaning should be attached to "agricultural land under
section 5. It is a rule of statutory construction that "a word or phrase repeated in a statute will bear the
same meaning throughout the statute, unless a different intention appears." (II Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, p. 758.) The only difference between "agricultural land" under section 5, is that the former is

public and the latter private. But such difference refers to ownership and not to the class of land. The lands
are the same in both sections, and, for the conservation of the national patrimony, what is important is the
nature or class of the property regardless of whether it is owned by the State or by its citizens.
Reference is made to an opinion rendered on September 19, 1941, by the Hon. Teofilo Sison, then
Secretary of Justice, to the effect that residential lands of the public domain may be considered as
agricultural lands, whereas residential lands of private ownership cannot be so considered. No reason
whatsoever is given in the opinion for such a distinction, and no valid reason can be adduced for such a
discriminatory view, particularly having in mind that the purpose of the constitutional provision is the
conservation of the national patrimony, and private residential lands are as much an integral part of the
national patrimony as the residential lands of the public domain. Specially is this so where, as indicated
above, the prohibition as to the alienable of public residential lots would become superflous if the same
prohibition is not equally applied to private residential lots. Indeed, the prohibition as to private residential
lands will eventually become more important, for time will come when, in view of the constant disposition of
public lands in favor of private individuals, almost all, if not all, the residential lands of the public domain
shall have become private residential lands.
It is maintained that in the first draft of section 5, the words "no land of private ownership" were used and
later changed into "no agricultural land of private ownership," and lastly into "no private agricultural land"
and from these changes it is argued that the word "agricultural" introduced in the second and final drafts
was intended to limit the meaning of the word "land" to land actually used for agricultural purposes. The
implication is not accurate. The wording of the first draft was amended for no other purpose than to clarify
concepts and avoid uncertainties. The words "no land" of the first draft, unqualified by the word
"agricultural," may be mistaken to include timber and mineral lands, and since under section 1, this kind of
lands can never be private, the prohibition to transfer the same would be superfluous. Upon the other hand,
section 5 had to be drafted in harmony with section 1 to which it is supplementary, as above indicated.
Inasmuch as under section 1, timber and mineral lands can never be private, and the only lands that may
become private are agricultural lands, the words "no land of private ownership" of the first draft can have
no other meaning than "private agricultural land." And thus the change in the final draft is merely one of
words in order to make its subject matter more specific with a view to avoiding the possible confusion of
ideas that could have arisen from the first draft.
If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands not strictly
agricultural, the result would be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots and
houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities," and that "they may validly buy
and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries,
hatcheries, schools, health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host
of other uses and purposes that are not, in appellant's words, strictly agricultural." (Solicitor General's Brief,
p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to the conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond question.
One of the fundamental principles underlying the provision of Article XIII of the Constitution and which was
embodied in the report of the Committee on Nationalization and Preservation of Lands and other Natural
Resources of the Constitutional Convention, is "that lands, minerals, forests, and other natural resources
constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino nation. They should, therefore, be preserved for those under
the sovereign authority of that nation and for their posterity." (2 Aruego, Framing of the Filipino Constitution,
p. 595.) Delegate Ledesma, Chairman of the Committee on Agricultural Development of the Constitutional
Convention, in a speech delivered in connection with the national policy on agricultural lands, said: "The
exclusion of aliens from the privilege of acquiring public agricultural lands and of owning real estate is a
necessary part of the Public Land Laws of the Philippines to keep pace with the idea of preserving the
Philippines for the Filipinos." (Emphasis ours.) And, of the same tenor was the speech of Delegate Montilla
who said: "With the complete nationalization of our lands and natural resources it is to be understood that
our God-given birthright should be one hundred per cent in Filipino hands . . .. Lands and natural resources
are immovables and as such can be compared to the vital organs of a person's body, the lack of
possession of which may cause instant death or the shortening of life. If we do not completely antionalize
these two of our most important belongings, I am afraid that the time will come when we shall be sorry for
the time we were born. Our independence will be just a mockery, for what kind of independence are we
going to have if a part of our country is not in our hands but in those of foreigners?" (Emphasis ours.)

Professor Aruego says that since the opening days of the Constitutional Convention one of its fixed and
dominating objectives was the conservation and nationalization of the natural resources of the country. (2
Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p 592.) This is ratified by the members of the Constitutional
Convention who are now members of this Court, namely, Mr. Justice Perfecto, Mr. Justice Briones, and Mr.
Justice Hontiveros. And, indeed, if under Article XIV, section 8, of the Constitution, an alien may not even
operate a small jitney for hire, it is certainly not hard to understand that neither is he allowed to own a
pieace of land.
This constitutional intent is made more patent and is strongly implemented by an act of the National
Assembly passed soon after the Constitution was approved. We are referring again to Commonwealth Act
No. 141. Prior to the Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act No. 2874 sections 120 and 121 which
granted aliens the right to acquire private only by way of reciprocity. Said section reads as follows:
SEC. 120. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any
permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred, except to
persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the public domain
under this Act; to corporations organized in the Philippine Islands authorized therefor by their
charters, and, upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of countries
the laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease,
encumber, dispose of, or alienate land, or permanent improvements thereon, or any interest
therein, as to their own citizens, only in the manner and to the extent specified in such laws, and
while the same are in force but not thereafter.
SEC. 121. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of the former Public
Land Act or of any other Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law
formerly in force in the Philippine Islands with regard to public lands, terrenos baldios y
realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public
domain or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any permanent improvement on such land,
shall be encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations, or associations
who may acquire land of the public domain under this Act; to corporate bodies organized in the
Philippine Islands whose charters may authorize them to do so, and, upon express authorization
by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of the countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the
Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land or
pemanent improvements thereon or any interest therein, as to their own citizens, and only in the
manner and to the extent specified in such laws, and while the same are in force, but not
thereafter:Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not be applicable to the conveyance or
acquisition by reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized by competent
courts, nor to lands and improvements acquired or held for industrial or residence purposes, while
used for such purposes:Provided, further, That in the event of the ownership of the lands and
improvements mentioned in this section and in the last preceding section being transferred by
judicial decree to persons,corporations or associations not legally capacitated to acquire the
same under the provisions of this Act, such persons, corporations, or associations shall be
obliged to alienate said lands or improvements to others so capacitated within the precise period
of five years, under the penalty of such property reverting to the Government in the contrary
case." (Public Land Act, No. 2874.)
It is to be observed that the pharase "no land" used in these section refers to all private lands, whether
strictly agricultural, residential or otherwise, there being practically no private land which had not been
acquired by any of the means provided in said two sections. Therefore, the prohibition contained in these
two provisions was, in effect, that no private land could be transferred to aliens except "upon express
authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold,
lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land." In other words, aliens were granted the right to acquire
private land merely by way of reciprocity. Then came the Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 141 was
passed, sections 122 and 123 of which read as follows:
SEC. 122. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any
permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred, except to

persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the public domain
under this Act or to corporations organized in the Philippines authorized thereof by their charters.
SEC. 123. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any previous Act,
ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the
Philippines with regard to public lands terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other
denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain, or by royal grant or in any
other form, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or
conveyed, except to persons, corporations or associations who may acquire land of the public
domain under this Act or to corporate bodies organized in the Philippines whose charters
authorize them to do so: Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not be applicable to the
conveyance or acquisition by reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized
by competent courts: Provided, further, That in the event of the ownership of the lands and
improvements mentioned in this section and in the last preceding section being transferred by
judicial decree to persons, corporations or associations not legally capacitated to acquire the
same under the provisions of this Act, such persons, corporations, or associations shall be
obliged to alienate said lands or improvements to others so capacitated within the precise period
of five years; otherwise, such property shall revert to the Government.
These two sections are almost literally the same as sections 120 and 121 of Act No. 2874, the only
difference being that in the new provisions, the right to reciprocity granted to aliens is completely stricken
out. This, undoubtedly, is to conform to the absolute policy contained in section 5 of Article XIII of the
Constitution which, in prohibiting the alienation of private agricultural lands to aliens, grants them no right of
reciprocity. This legislative construction carries exceptional weight, for prominent members of the National
Assembly who approved the new Act had been members of the Constitutional Convention.
It is said that the lot question does not come within the purview of sections 122 and 123 of Commonwealth
Act No. 141, there being no proof that the same had been acquired by one of the means provided in said
provisions. We are not, however, diciding the instant case under the provisions of the Public Land Act,
which have to refer to land that had been formerly of the public domain, otherwise their constitutionality
may be doubtful. We are deciding the instant case under section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution which is
more comprehensive and more absolute in the sense that it prohibits the transfer to alien of any private
agricultural land including residential land whatever its origin might have been.
And, finally, on June 14, 1947, the Congress approved Republic Act No. 133 which allows mortgage of
"private real property" of any kind in favor of aliens but with a qualification consisting of expressly
prohibiting aliens to bid or take part in any sale of such real property as a consequence of the mortgage.
This prohibition makes no distinction between private lands that are strictly agricultural and private lands
that are residental or commercial. The prohibition embraces the sale of private lands of any kind in favor of
aliens, which is again a clear implementation and a legislative interpretation of the constitutional prohibition.
Had the Congress been of opinion that private residential lands may be sold to aliens under the
Constitution, no legislative measure would have been found necessary to authorize mortgage which would
have been deemed also permissible under the Constitution. But clearly it was the opinion of the Congress
that such sale is forbidden by the Constitution and it was such opinion that prompted the legislative
measure intended to clarify that mortgage is not within the constitutional prohibition.
It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case we have no choice. We are construing the
Constitution as it is and not as we may desire it to be. Perhaps the effect of our construction is to preclude
aliens, admitted freely into the Philippines from owning sites where they may build their homes. But if this is
the solemn mandate of the Constitution, we will not attempt to compromise it even in the name of amity or
equity. We are satisfied, however, that aliens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from the use
of lands for residential purposes. Since their residence in the Philippines is temporary, they may be granted
temporary rights such as a lease contract which is not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire to
remain here forever and share our fortunes and misfortunes, Filipino citizenship is not impossible to
acquire.
For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or public
agricultural lands, including residential lands, and, accordingly, judgment is affirmed, without costs.

Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, and Briones, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 74833
January 21, 1991
THOMAS C. CHEESMAN, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ESTELITA PADILLA, respondents.
Estanislao L. Cesa, Jr. for petitioner.
Benjamin I. Fernandez for private respondent.

NARVASA, J.:
This appeal concerns the attempt by an American citizen (petitioner Thomas Cheesman) to annul for
lack of consent on his part the sale by his Filipino wife (Criselda) of a residential lot and building to
Estelita Padilla, also a Filipino.
Thomas Cheesman and Criselda P. Cheesman were married on December 4, 1970 but have been
separated since February 15,1981. 1
On June 4, 1974, a "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights" was executed by Armando Altares
conveying a parcel of unregistered land and the house thereon (at No. 7 Neptune Street, Gordon Heights,
Olongapo City) in favor of "Criselda P. Cheesman, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Thomas
Cheesman, and residing at Lot No. 1, Blk. 8, Filtration Road, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City . . ." 2 Thomas
Cheesman, although aware of the deed, did not object to the transfer being made only to his wife.3
Thereafterand again with the knowledge of Thomas Cheesman and also without any protest by himtax
declarations for the property purchased were issued in the name only of Criselda Cheesman and Criselda
assumed exclusive management and administration of said property, leasing it to tenants. 4
On July 1, 1981, Criselda Cheesman sold the property to Estelita M. Padilla, without the knowledge or
consent of Thomas Cheesman. 5 The deed described Criselda as being" . . . of legal age, married to an
American citizen,. . ."6
Thirty days later, or on July 31, 1981, Thomas Cheesman brought suit in the Court of First Instance at
Olongapo City against his wife, Criselda, and Estelita Padilla, praying for the annulment of the sale on the
ground that the transaction had been executed without his knowledge and consent. 7 An answer was filed
in the names of both defendants, alleging that (1) the property sold was paraphernal, having been
purchased by Criselda with funds exclusively belonging to her ("her own separate money"); (2) Thomas
Cheesman, being an American, was disqualified to have any interest or right of ownership in the land; and
(3) Estelita Padilla was a buyer in good faith.8
During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed upon certain facts which were subsequently set out in a
pre-trial Order dated October 22, 1981, 9 as follows:
1. Both parties recognize the existence of the Deed of Sale over the residential house located at
No. 7 Granada St., Gordon Heights, Olongapo City, which was acquired from Armando Altares on
June 4, 1974 and sold by defendant Criselda Cheesman to Estelita Padilla on July 12, 1981; and
2. That the transaction regarding the transfer of their property took place during the existence of
their marriage as the couple were married on December 4, 1970 and the questioned property was
acquired sometime on June 4,1974.
The action resulted in a judgment dated June 24, 1982, 10 declaring void ab initio the sale executed by
Criselda Cheesman in favor of Estelita M. Padilla, and ordering the delivery of the property to Thomas
Cheesman as administrator of the conjugal partnership property, and the payment to him of P5,000.00 as
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.11
The judgment was however set aside as regards Estelita Padilla on a petition for relief filed by the latter,
grounded on "fraud, mistake and/or excusable negligence" which had seriously impaired her right to

present her case adequately. 12 "After the petition for relief from judgment was given due course,"
according to petitioner, "a new judge presided over the case." 13
Estelita Padilla filed a supplemental pleading on December 20, 1982 as her own answer to the complaint,
and a motion for summary judgment on May 17, 1983. Although there was initial opposition by Thomas
Cheesman to the motion, the parties ultimately agreed on the rendition by the court of a summary judgment
after entering into a stipulation of facts, at the hearing of the motion on June 21, 1983, the stipulation being
of the following tenor: 14
(1) that the property in question was bought during the existence of the marriage between the
plaintiff and the defendant Criselda P. Cheesman;
(2) that the property bought during the marriage was registered in the name of Criselda
Cheesman and that the Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights executed by the former
owner-vendor Armando Altares in favor of Criselda Cheesman made no mention of the plaintiff;
(3) that the property, subject of the proceedings, was sold by defendant Criselda Cheesman in
favor of the other defendant Estelita M. Padilla, without the written consent of the plaintiff.
Obviously upon the theory that no genuine issue existed any longer and there was hence no need of a trial,
the parties having in fact submitted, as also stipulated, their respective memoranda each praying for a
favorable verdict, the Trial Court 15 rendered a "Summary Judgment" dated August 3, 1982 declaring "the
sale executed by . . . Criselda Cheesman in favor of . . . Estelita Padilla to be valid," dismissing Thomas
Cheesman's complaint and ordering him "to immediately turn over the possession of the house and lot
subject of . . . (the) case to . . . Estelita Padilla . . ." 16
The Trial Court found that
1) the evidence on record satisfactorily overcame the disputable presumption in Article 160 of the
Civil Codethat all property of the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership "unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife"and that the immovable in
question was in truth Criselda's paraphernal property;
2) that moreover, said legal presumption in Article 160 could not apply "inasmuch as the
husband-plaintiff is an American citizen and therefore disqualified under the Constitution to
acquire and own real properties; and
3) that the exercise by Criselda of exclusive acts of dominion with the knowledge of her husband
"had led . . . Estelita Padilla to believe that the properties were the exclusive properties of
Criselda Cheesman and on the faith of such a belief she bought the properties from her and for
value," and therefore, Thomas Cheesman was, under Article 1473 of the Civil Code, estopped to
impugn the transfer to Estelita Padilla.
Thomas Cheesman appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court. There he assailed the Trial Court acts
(1) of granting Estelita Padilla's petition for relief, and its resolution of matters not subject of said petition;
(2) of declaring valid the sale to Estelita Padilla despite the lack of consent thereto by him, and the
presumption of the conjugal character of the property in question pursuant to Article 160 of the Civil Code;
(3) of disregarding the judgment of June 24, 1982 which, not having been set aside as against Criselda
Cheesman, continued to be binding on her; and (4) of making findings of fact not supported by evidence.
All of these contentions were found to be without merit by the Appellate Tribunal which, on January 7,
1986, promulgated a decision (erroneously denominated, "Report")17 affirming the "Summary Judgment
complained of," "having found no reversible error" therein.
Once more, Thomas Cheesman availed of the remedy of appeal, this time to this Court. Here, he argues
that it was reversible error for the Intermediate Appellate Court
1) to find that the presumption that the property in question is conjugal in accordance with Article 160 had
been satisfactorily overcome by Estelita Padilla; 18
2) to rule that Estelita Padilla was a purchaser of said property in good faith, it appearing:
a) that the deed by which the property was conveyed to Criselda Cheesman described
her as "married to Thomas C. Cheesman," as well as the deed by which the property
was later conveyed to Estelita Padilla by Criselda Cheesman also described her as

"married to an American citizen," and both said descriptions had thus "placed Estelita
on knowledge of the conjugal nature of the property;" and
b) that furthermore, Estelita had admitted to stating in the deed by which she acquired
the property a price much lower than that actually paid "in order to avoid payment of
more obligation to the government;"19
3) to decline to declare that the evidence did not warrant the grant of Estelita Padilla's petition for relief on
the ground of "fraud, mistake and/or excusable negligence;" 20
4) to hold that Thomas Cheesman had waived his objection to Estelita's petition for relief by failing to
appeal from the order granting the same;
5) to accord to Estelita Padilla a relief other than that she had specifically prayed for in her petition for
relief, ie., "the restoration of the purchase price which Estelita allegedly paid to Criselda;" 21 and
6) to fail to declare that Thomas Cheesman's citizenship is not a bar to his action to recover the lot and
house for the conjugal partnership.22
Such conclusions as that (1) fraud, mistake or excusable negligence existed in the premises justifying relief
to Estelita Padilla under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, or (2) that Criselda Cheesman had used money she
had brought into her marriage to Thomas Cheesman to purchase the lot and house in question, or (3) that
Estelita Padilla believed in good faith that Criselda Cheesman was the exclusive owner of the property that
she (Estelita) intended to and did in fact buyderived from the evidence adduced by the parties, the facts
set out in the pleadings or otherwise appearing on recordare conclusions or findings of fact. As
distinguished from a question of lawwhich exists "when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law
is on a certain state of facts" "there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the
truth or the falsehood of alleged facts;"23 or when the "query necessarily invites calibration of the whole
evidence considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding
circumstances, their relation; to each other and to the whole and the probabilities of the situation." 24
Now, it is axiomatic that only questions of law, distinctly set forth, may be raised in a petition for the review
oncertiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals presented to this Court. 25 As everyone knows or ought to
know, the appellate jurisdiction of this Court is limited to reviewing errors of law, accepting as conclusive
the factual findings of the lower court upon its own assessment of the evidence. 26 The creation of the
Court of Appeals was precisely intended to take away from the Supreme Court the work of examining the
evidence, and confine its task to the determination of questions which do not call for the reading and study
of transcripts containing the testimony of witnesses.27 The rule of conclusiveness of the factual findings or
conclusions of the Court of Appeals is, to be sure, subject to certain exceptions, 28 none of which however
obtains in the case at bar.
It is noteworthy that both the Trial Court and the Intermediate Appellate Court reached the same
conclusions on the three (3) factual matters above set forth, after assessment of the evidence and
determination of the probative value thereof. Both Courts found that the facts on record adequately proved
fraud, mistake or excusable negligence by which Estelita Padilla's rights had been substantially impaired;
that the funds used by Criselda Cheesman was money she had earned and saved prior to her marriage to
Thomas Cheesman, and that Estelita Padilla did believe in good faith that Criselda Cheesman was the sole
owner of the property in question. Consequently, these determinations of fact will not be here disturbed,
this Court having been cited to no reason for doing so.
These considerations dispose of the first three (3) points that petitioner Cheesman seeks to make in his
appeal.1wphi1They also make unnecessary an extended discussion of the other issues raised by him. As
to them, it should suffice to restate certain fundamental propositions.
An order of a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) granting a petition for relief under Rule 38
is interlocutory and is not appealable. Hence, the failure of the party who opposed the petition to appeal
from said order, or his participation in the proceedings subsequently had, cannot be construed as a waiver
of his objection to the petition for relief so as to preclude his raising the same question on appeal from the
judgment on the merits of the main case. Such a party need not repeat his objections to the petition for
relief, or perform any act thereafter (e.g., take formal exception) in order to preserve his right to question
the same eventually, on appeal, it being sufficient for this purpose that he has made of record "the action
which he desires the court to take or his objection to the action of the court and his grounds therefor." 29

Again, the prayer in a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 is not necessarily the same prayer in
the petitioner's complaint, answer or other basic pleading. This should be obvious. Equally obvious is that
once a petition for relief is granted and the judgment subject thereof set aside, and further proceedings are
thereafter had, the Court in its judgment on the merits may properly grant the relief sought in the
petitioner's basic pleadings, although different from that stated in his petition for relief.
Finally, the fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Section 14, Article XIV of the
1973 Constitution ordains that, "Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain." 30 Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was, of course, charged with knowledge of
this prohibition. Thus, assuming that it was his intention that the lot in question be purchased by him and
his wife, he acquired no right whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to
acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution; the
sale as to him was null and void. 31 In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the
subsequent sale of the same property by his wife on the theory that in so doing he is merely exercising the
prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would permit indirect
controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would
accord to the alien husband a not insubstantial interest and right over land, as he would then have a
decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to
have.
As already observed, the finding that his wife had used her own money to purchase the property cannot,
and will not, at this stage of the proceedings be reviewed and overturned. But even if it were a fact that said
wife had used conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the considerations just set out militate, on high
constitutional grounds, against his recovering and holding the property so acquired or any part thereof. And
whether in such an event, he may recover from his wife any share of the money used for the purchase or
charge her with unauthorized disposition or expenditure of conjugal funds is not now inquired into; that
would be, in the premises, a purely academic exercise. An equally decisive consideration is that Estelita
Padilla is a purchaser in good faith, both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court having found that
Cheesman's own conduct had led her to believe the property to be exclusive property of the latter's wife,
freely disposable by her without his consent or intervention. An innocent buyer for value, she is entitled to
the protection of the law in her purchase, particularly as against Cheesman, who would assert rights to the
property denied him by both letter and spirit of the Constitution itself.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 167707
October 8, 2008
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION VI, REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR
LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO, AKLAN, REGISTER OF DEEDS, DIRECTOR OF LAND
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF PHILIPPINE
TOURISM AUTHORITY, petitioners,
vs.
MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and ANICETO YAP, in their behalf
and in behalf of all those similarly situated, respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. G.R. No. 173775
October 8, 2008
DR. ORLANDO SACAY and WILFREDO GELITO, joined by THE LANDOWNERS OF BORACAY
SIMILARLY SITUATED NAMED IN A LIST, ANNEX "A" OF THIS PETITION, petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI,
PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO, AKLAN, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants of Boracay Island to secure titles
over their occupied lands.
There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan,
which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and
ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes. The second is G.R. No. 173775, a petition for
prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 10645">[3] issued by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo classifying Boracay into reserved forest and agricultural land.
The Antecedents
G.R. No. 167707
Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white sand beaches and warm
crystalline waters, is reputedly a premier Philippine tourist destination. The island is also home to 12,003
inhabitants4 who live in the bone-shaped islands three barangays.5
On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) approved the National
Reservation Survey of Boracay
Island,6 which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named persons.7
On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 18018 declaring
Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and
marine reservesunder the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later
approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-829 dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No.
1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an application
for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants

Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed a petition for declaratory
relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82
raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves,
or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They
declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them.10
Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place
Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible
of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise known as the
Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their names through judicial confirmation of
imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition for declaratory relief.
The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of
the mass of lands classified as "public forest," which was not available for disposition pursuant to Section
3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code,11 as amended.
The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was
misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by CA No. 141 and PD No. 705. Since
Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot
ripen into ownership.
During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the following facts: (1) respondentsclaimants were presently in possession of parcels of land in Boracay Island; (2) these parcels of land were
planted with coconut trees and other natural growing trees; (3) the coconut trees had heights of more or
less twenty (20) meters and were planted more or less fifty (50) years ago; and (4) respondents-claimants
declared the land they were occupying for tax purposes.12
The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely legal: whether Proclamation No.
1801 posed any legal hindrance or impediment to the titling of the lands in Boracay. They decided to forego
with the trial and to submit the case for resolution upon submission of their respective memoranda.13
The RTC took judicial notice14 that certain parcels of land in Boracay Island, more particularly Lots 1 and
30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the name of the
Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots were involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262 filed before the RTC of
Kalibo, Aklan.15 The titles were issued on
August 7, 1933.16
RTC and CA Dispositions
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, with a fallo reading:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular
No. 3-82 pose no legal obstacle to the petitioners and those similarly situated to acquire title to their lands
in Boracay, in accordance with the applicable laws and in the manner prescribed therein; and to have their
lands surveyed and approved by respondent Regional Technical Director of Lands as the approved survey
does not in itself constitute a title to the land.
SO ORDERED.17
The RTC upheld respondents-claimants right to have their occupied lands titled in their name. It ruled that
neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in Boracay were inalienable
or could not be the subject of disposition.18 The Circular itself recognized private ownership of lands.19 The
trial court cited Sections 8720 and 5321 of the Public Land Act as basis for acknowledging private ownership
of lands in Boracay and that only those forested areas in public lands were declared as part of the forest
reserve.22
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.23 The Republic then appealed to the CA.
On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING the appeal
filed in this case and AFFIRMING the decision of the lower court.24
The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration that the lands they
occupied since time immemorial were part of a forest reserve.
Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied.25 Hence, the present petition under
Rule 45.
G.R. No. 173775
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Proclamation No. 106426 classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest
land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land
(alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side
of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and which shall form part of the area reserved
for forest land protection purposes.
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay,27 Wilfredo Gelito,28 and other
landowners29 in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification
of Proclamation No. 1064.30 They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their "prior vested rights" over
portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time
immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos in developing their lands and building internationally
renowned first class resorts on their lots.31
Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying Boracay into
agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the island is deemed agricultural
pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first Public Land Act.32 Thus, their
possession in the concept of owner for the required period entitled them to judicial confirmation of imperfect
title.
Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not have a vested right over their
occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD
No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be the subject of
judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the courts, which has
authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable lands. There is a need for a
positive government act in order to release the lots for disposition.
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions as they principally involve
the same issues on the land classification of Boracay Island.33
Issues
G.R. No. 167707
The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any
legal obstacle for respondents, and all those similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied lands in
Boracay Island.34
G.R. No. 173775
Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:
I.
AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS IN CONCEPT OF OWNER
OVER THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY, SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL OR AT THE LATEST
SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF ON NOV. 19,
1997, WERE THE AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LANDS AS DEFINED BY
LAWS THEN ON JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLES OR PUBLIC FOREST AS
DEFINED BY SEC. 3a, PD 705?
II.
HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED RIGHT OF PRIVATE
OWNERSHIPOVER THEIR OCCUPIED PORTIONS OF BORACAY LAND, DESPITE THE FACT THAT
THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE?

III.
IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC
6, CA 141 [AN] INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE FOR PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN TITLEUNDER THE
TORRENS SYSTEM?
IV.
IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006, VIOLATIVE OF THE PRIOR VESTED
RIGHTS TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER THEIR LANDS IN BORACAY,
PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION OR IS PROCLAMATION 1064
CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, CA 141, OR SEC. 4(a) OF RA 6657.
V.
CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE SURVEY AND TO APPROVE
THE SURVEY PLANS FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF THE LANDS OF
PETITIONERS IN BORACAY?35 (Underscoring supplied)
In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R. No. 167707 and
petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in
Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to their right, if any, to judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA
No. 141, as amended. They do not involve their right to secure title under other pertinent laws.
Our Ruling
Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive
to reclassify lands of the public domain
Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title, namely: (a) Philippine Bill of 190236 in relation to Act No. 926, later amended and/or superseded by
Act No. 2874 and CA No. 141;37 (b) Proclamation No. 180138 issued by then President Marcos; and (c)
Proclamation No. 106439 issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall proceed to determine
their rights to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under these laws and executive acts.
But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to reclassify lands of the public
domain.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber.40 Meanwhile,
the 1973 Constitution provided the following divisions: agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential,
resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and grazing lands, and such other classes as may be provided by
law,41 giving the government great leeway for classification.42 Then the 1987 Constitution reverted to the
1935 Constitution classification with one addition: national parks.43 Of these, only agricultural lands may be
alienated.44 Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly
and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the
public domain.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the
source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.
45 The doctrine has been consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions.46
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State.47Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.48 Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine
if lands of the public domain will be disposed of for private ownership. The government, as the agent of the
state, is possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to determine who shall be the favored
recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege, not excluding
the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership.
49

Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish conquest of the
Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in the Philippines passed to the Spanish
Crown.50 The Regalian doctrine was first introduced in the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and
the Royal Cedulas,which laid the foundation that "all lands that were not acquired from the Government,
either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain."51

The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish
Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims.52
The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law53 partly amended the Spanish Mortgage Law and the Laws of
the Indies. It established possessory information as the method of legalizing possession of vacant Crown
land, under certain conditions which were set forth in said decree.54 Under Section 393 of the Maura Law,
an informacion posesoria or possessory information title,55 when duly inscribed in the Registry of Property,
is converted into a title of ownership only after the lapse of twenty (20) years of uninterrupted possession
which must be actual, public, and adverse,56 from the date of its inscription.57 However, possessory
information title had to be perfected one year after the promulgation of the Maura Law, or until April 17,
1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert to the State.58
In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be founded on royal concessions
which took various forms, namely: (1) titulo real or royal grant; (2) concesion especial or special grant;
(3) composicion con el estado or adjustment title; (4) titulo de compra or title by purchase; and
(5) informacion posesoria or possessory information title.59>
The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the Philippines under American rule was
embodied in the Philippine Bill of 1902.60 By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands
were classified into three (3) grand divisions, to wit: agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest lands.61 The
act provided for, among others, the disposal of mineral lands by means of absolute grant (freehold system)
and by lease (leasehold system).62 It also provided the definition by exclusion of "agricultural public
lands."63 Interpreting the meaning of "agricultural lands" under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Court
declared in Mapa v. Insular Government:64
x x x In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No. 926 means those public
lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. x x x65 (Emphasis Ours)
On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Act. The act established a system of registration by which recorded title becomes absolute,
indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is known as the Torrens system.66
Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act No. 926, which was the first
Public Land Act. The Act introduced the homestead system and made provisions for judicial and
administrative confirmation of imperfect titles and for the sale or lease of public lands. It permitted
corporations regardless of the nationality of persons owning the controlling stock to lease or purchase
lands of the public domain.67 Under the Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands for the next ten (10) years preceding July 26, 1904 was sufficient for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title.68
On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No. 2874, otherwise known as the second
Public Land Act. This new, more comprehensive law limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos
and Americans and citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges. For judicial
confirmation of title, possession and occupation en concepto dueo since time immemorial, or since July
26, 1894, was required.69
After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No. 2874 on December 1, 1936. To
this day, CA No. 141, as amended, remains as the existing general law governing the classification and
disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral lands,70 and privately owned lands
which reverted to the State.71
Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874 of possession and occupation of
lands of the public domain since time immemorial or since July 26, 1894. However, this provision was
superseded by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942,72 which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The provision was last amended by PD No. 1073,73 which now
provides for possession and occupation of the land applied for since June 12, 1945, or earlier.74
The issuance of PD No. 89275 on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of Spanish titles as evidence in
land registration proceedings.76 Under the decree, all holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for
registration of their lands under Act No. 496 within six (6) months from the effectivity of the decree on
February 16, 1976. Thereafter, the recording of all unregistered lands77 shall be governed by Section 194
of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344.

On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529, known as the Property
Registration Decree. It was enacted to codify the various laws relative to registration of property.78 It
governs registration of lands under the Torrens system as well as unregistered lands, including chattel
mortgages.79
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption
of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the
government, such as an official proclamation,80 declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land
for agricultural or other purposes.81 In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands
only to those lands which have been "officially delimited and classified."82
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is
on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable.83 To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.84 There must still
be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land
subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive
act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.85 The applicant
may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the
required number of years is alienable and disposable.86
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or
certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the
portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land
is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the
submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters
of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.87
Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or portions of it, agricultural
lands.Private claimants posit that Boracay was already an agricultural land pursuant to the old
cases Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands (1919)88 and De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government
(1909).89 These cases were decided under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926.
There is a statement in these old cases that "in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case
the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown."90
Private claimants reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. These cases did not have the effect of
converting the whole of Boracay Island or portions of it into agricultural lands. It should be stressed that the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 merely provided the manner through which land registration courts
would classify lands of the public domain. Whether the land would be classified as timber, mineral, or
agricultural depended on proof presented in each case.
Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the Philippines had no power to
classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts were free to
make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so,
depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.91 This was the Courts ruling in Heirs of the Late
Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca v. Republic,92 in which it stated,
through Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.:
x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be formally released by an act of the
Executive before it can be deemed open to private ownership, citing the cases of Ramos v. Director of
Lands and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands.
xxxx
Petitioners reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government is misplaced. These
cases were decided under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by the
Philippine Commission on October 7, 1926, under which there was no legal provision vesting in the Chief
Executive or President of the Philippines the power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral,
timber and agricultural so that the courts then were free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable
cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.93

To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926, it was then necessary to devise a
presumption on land classification. Thus evolved the dictum in Ankron that "the courts have a right to
presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until
the contrary is shown."94
But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa to an argument that all lands of
the public domain had been automatically reclassified as disposable and alienable agricultural lands. By no
stretch of imagination did the presumption convert all lands of the public domain into agricultural lands.
If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 would have
automatically made all lands in the Philippines, except those already classified as timber or mineral land,
alienable and disposable lands. That would take these lands out of State ownership and worse, would be
utterly inconsistent with and totally repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian doctrine.
The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land registration cases brought under the
provisions of Act No. 926, or more specifically those cases dealing with judicial and administrative
confirmation of imperfect titles. The presumption applies to an applicant for judicial or administrative
conformation of imperfect title under Act No. 926. It certainly cannot apply to landowners, such as private
claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, who failed to avail themselves of the benefits of Act No. 926. As
to them, their land remained unclassified and, by virtue of the Regalian doctrine, continued to be owned by
the State.
In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not absolute. Land classification was, in the
end, dependent on proof. If there was proof that the land was better suited for non-agricultural uses, the
courts could adjudge it as a mineral or timber land despite the presumption. In Ankron, this Court stated:
In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-General admitted in effect that whether
the particular land in question belongs to one class or another is a question of fact. The mere fact that a
tract of land has trees upon it or has mineral within it is not of itself sufficient to declare that one is forestry
land and the other, mineral land. There must be some proof of the extent and present or future value of the
forestry and of the minerals. While, as we have just said, many definitions have been given for
"agriculture," "forestry," and "mineral" lands, and that in each case it is a question of fact, we think it is safe
to say that in order to be forestry or mineral land the proof must show that it is more valuable for the
forestry or the mineral which it contains than it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not
sufficient to show that there exists some trees upon the land or that it bears some mineral. Land may be
classified as forestry or mineral today, and, by reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be
classified as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid growth of timber or the
discovery of valuable minerals, lands classified as agricultural today may be differently classified
tomorrow. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that particular case, having regard for its
present or future value for one or the other purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it
is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands
that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the
lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular land
registration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior value
for one purpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in each particular
case. The fact that the land is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the courts to decide
whether it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance belong to one or the other of said
classes of land. The Government, in the first instance, under the provisions of Act No. 1148, may, by
reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be considered forestry land, unless private
interests have intervened before such reservation is made. In the latter case, whether the land is
agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private interests have intervened, the
Government, by virtue of the terms of said Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself what portions of the "public
domain" shall be set aside and reserved as forestry or mineral land. (Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil.
175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, supra)95 (Emphasis ours)
Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of lands from the facts of each case,
except those that have already became private lands.96 Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced
in Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave the Executive Department, through the President,

the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or
forest.96-a Since then, courts no longer had the authority, whether express or implied, to determine the
classification of lands of the public domain.97
Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were issued their title in 1933,98 did not
present a justiciable case for determination by the land registration court of the propertys land
classification. Simply put, there was no opportunity for the courts then to resolve if the land the Boracay
occupants are now claiming were agricultural lands. When Act No. 926 was supplanted by Act No. 2874 in
1919, without an application for judicial confirmation having been filed by private claimants or their
predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no longer authorized to determine the propertys land
classification. Hence, private claimants cannot bank on Act No. 926.
We note that the RTC decision99 in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of Manila,
100 which was decided in 1947 when CA No. 141, vesting the Executive with the sole power to classify
lands of the public domain was already in effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v. Insular Government,
101 De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government,102 and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands.103
Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally different issue. The pertinent issue
inKrivenko was whether residential lots were included in the general classification of agricultural lands; and
if so, whether an alien could acquire a residential lot. This Court ruled that as an alien, Krivenko was
prohibited by the 1935 Constitution104 from acquiring agricultural land, which included residential lots. Here,
the issue is whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed agricultural.
Notably, the definition of "agricultural public lands" mentioned in Krivenko relied on the old cases decided
prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874, including Ankron and De Aldecoa.105 As We have already stated,
those cases cannot apply here, since they were decided when the Executive did not have the authority to
classify lands as agricultural, timber, or mineral.
Private claimants continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a presumption that the
land is alienable. Private claimants also contend that their continued possession of portions of Boracay
Island for the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926106 ipso facto converted the island into
private ownership. Hence, they may apply for a title in their name.
A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court of Appeals.107 Collado, citing the
separate opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources,107-a ruled:
"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of
1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations
for the homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and
prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It
also provided for the "issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands," for the establishment
of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or
confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on
the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government; and that the
governments title to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between
Spain and the United States. The term "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain whose title
still remained in the government and are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and
excluded the patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands."
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land
Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the
lands are alienable and disposable.108 (Emphasis Ours)
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public
domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under
PD No. 705. The DENR109 and the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority110 certify that
Boracay Island is an unclassified land of the public domain.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain as public
forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as "a mass of lands of the public domain
which has not been the subject of the present system of classification for the determination of which lands

are needed for forest purpose and which are not." Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including
those in Boracay Island, are ipso factoconsidered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles
already existing prior to its effectivity.
The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD No. 705 may seem to be out of
touch with the present realities in the island. Boracay, no doubt, has been partly stripped of its forest cover
to pave the way for commercial developments. As a premier tourist destination for local and foreign
tourists, Boracay appears more of a commercial island resort, rather than a forest land.
Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso beach resorts on the island;
111 that the island has already been stripped of its forest cover; or that the implementation of Proclamation
No. 1064 will destroy the islands tourism industry, do not negate its character as public forest.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution112 classifying lands of the public
domain into "agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks," do not necessarily refer to
large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushes.113 The
discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry114 is particularly instructive:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply
because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land
may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest
lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove
trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest
land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is
released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands
of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.115 (Emphasis supplied)
There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in a dictionary and "forest or timber land" as a
classification of lands of the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what appears
on the land while the other is a legal status, a classification for legal purposes.116 At any rate, the Court is
tasked to determine thelegal status of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical layout. Hence, even if
its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and other commercial establishments, it
has not been automatically converted from public forest to alienable agricultural land.
Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. The proclamation did not convert Boracay into an agricultural land. However, private
claimants argue that Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President Marcos in 1978 entitles them to
judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The Proclamation classified Boracay, among other islands, as a
tourist zone. Private claimants assert that, as a tourist spot, the island is susceptible of private ownership.
Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole of Boracay into an agricultural
land. There is nothing in the law or the Circular which made Boracay Island an agricultural land. The
reference in Circular No. 3-82 to "private lands"117 and "areas declared as alienable and
disposable"118 does not by itself classify the entire island as agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes
reference not only to private lands and areas but also to public forested lands. Rule VIII, Section 3
provides:
No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority from the PTA. All forested areas in
public lands are declared forest reserves. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands merely recognizes that the island can
be classified by the Executive department pursuant to its powers under CA No. 141. In fact, Section 5 of
the Circular recognizes the then Bureau of Forest Developments authority to declare areas in the island as
alienable and disposable when it provides:
Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development.
Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as
alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and
disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in
Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.

The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale behind the declaration of
Boracay Island, together with other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as a tourist zone and
marine reserve to be administered by the PTA to ensure the concentrated efforts of the public and private
sectors in the development of the areas tourism potential with due regard for ecological balance in the
marine environment. Simply put, the proclamation is aimed at administering the islands for tourism and
ecological purposes. It does not address the areas alienability.119
More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay Island, but sixty-four (64) other islands,
coves, and peninsulas in the Philippines, such as Fortune and Verde Islands in Batangas, Port Galera in
Oriental Mindoro, Panglao and Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto Princesa and surrounding
areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island in Cagayan de Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to name a few. If the
designation of Boracay Island as tourist zone makes it alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation
No. 1801, all the other areas mentioned would likewise be declared wide open for private disposition. That
could not have been, and is clearly beyond, the intent of the proclamation.
It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of Boracay as alienable and
opened the same to private ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141120 provide that it is only the
President, upon the recommendation of the proper department head, who has the authority to classify the
lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands.121
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely exercised the authority
granted to her to classify lands of the public domain, presumably subject to existing vested rights.
Classification of public lands is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through the Office of
the President. Courts have no authority to do so.122 Absent such classification, the land remains
unclassified until released and rendered open to disposition.123
Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved forest land and 628.96 hectares of
agricultural land. The Proclamation likewise provides for a 15-meter buffer zone on each side of the center
line of roads and trails, which are reserved for right of way and which shall form part of the area reserved
for forest land protection purposes.
Contrary to private claimants argument, there was nothing invalid or irregular, much less unconstitutional,
about the classification of Boracay Island made by the President through Proclamation No. 1064. It was
within her authority to make such classification, subject to existing vested rights.
Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Private claimants
further assert that Proclamation No. 1064 violates the provision of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law (CARL) or RA No. 6657 barring conversion of public forests into agricultural lands. They claim that
since Boracay is a public forest under PD No. 705, President Arroyo can no longer convert it into an
agricultural land without running afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No. 6657, thus:
SEC. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation
No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture.
No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of
this Act until Congress, taking into account ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall have
determined by law, the specific limits of the public domain.
That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did not bar the Executive from later
converting it into agricultural land. Boracay Island still remained an unclassified land of the public domain
despite PD No. 705.
In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v. Republic,124 the Court stated that
unclassified lands are public forests.
While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state that the islands are
public forests, the fact that they were unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the absence of
the classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains unclassified land until released and rendered
open to disposition.125 (Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a "reclassification" of land. If the land had never
been previously classified, as in the case of Boracay, there can be no prohibited reclassification under the
agrarian law. We agree with the opinion of the Department of Justice126 on this point:
Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition in Section 4(a) is the word
"reclassification." Where there has been no previous classification of public forest [referring, we repeat, to
the mass of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of classification for
purposes of determining which are needed for forest purposes and which are not] into permanent forest or
forest reserves or some other forest uses under the Revised Forestry Code, there can be no
"reclassification of forest lands" to speak of within the meaning of Section 4(a).
Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against the reclassification of forest lands to
agricultural lands without a prior law delimiting the limits of the public domain, does not, and cannot, apply
to those lands of the public domain, denominated as "public forest" under the Revised Forestry Code,
which have not been previously determined, or classified, as needed for forest purposes in accordance
with the provisions of the Revised Forestry Code.127
Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No.
141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied lands under the said law. There are two
requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or through
his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12,
1945; and (2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.128
As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801 did not convert portions
of Boracay Island into an agricultural land. The island remained an unclassified land of the public domain
and, applying the Regalian doctrine, is considered State property.
Private claimants bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act
No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of the absence of the second element of alienable
and disposable land. Their entitlement to a government grant under our present Public Land Act
presupposes that the land possessed and applied for is already alienable and disposable. This is clear
from the wording of the law itself.129Where the land is not alienable and disposable, possession of the land,
no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights.130
Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Proclamation No. 1064,
with respect to those lands which were classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to prove the
first element of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands in Boracay since June
12, 1945.
We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for declaratory relief that private claimants
complied with the requisite period of possession.
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the first element of
possession. We note that the earliest of the tax declarations in the name of private claimants were issued
in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax declarations are not sufficient to convince this Court that the period
of possession and occupation commenced on June 12, 1945.
Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been in possession of the island for
a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in developing the island into a tourist spot. They say their
continued possession and investments give them a vested right which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by
Proclamation No. 1064.
The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not automatically give them
a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply for a title to the land they are presently
occupying. This Court is constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the evidence presented and the
laws applicable. As the law and jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible to apply for a judicial
confirmation of title over their occupied portions in Boracay even with their continued possession and
considerable investment in the island.

One Last Note

The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the development of Boracay Island,
making it a by-word in the local and international tourism industry. The Court also notes that for a number
of years, thousands of people have called the island their home. While the Court commiserates with private
claimants plight, We are bound to apply the law strictly and judiciously. This is the law and it should
prevail. Ito ang batas at ito ang dapat umiral.
All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible to apply for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does not denote their
automatic ouster from the residential, commercial, and other areas they possess now classified as
agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial investments on their occupied alienable
lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to possess.
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of improvements. They can
take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For another, they may look into other modes of applying
for original registration of title, such as by homestead131 or sales patent,132 subject to the conditions
imposed by law.
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire title to their occupied
lots or to exempt them from certain requirements under the present land laws. There is one such bill133 now
pending in the House of Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar bill will become a law is for
Congress to decide.
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step necessary to open up the island to
private ownership. This gesture may not be sufficient to appease some sectors which view the
classification of the island partially into a forest reserve as absurd. That the island is no longer overrun by
trees, however, does not becloud the vision to protect its remaining forest cover and to strike a healthy
balance between progress and ecology. Ecological conservation is as important as economic progress.
To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nations survival. Their promotion and protection are not
just fancy rhetoric for politicians and activists. These are needs that become more urgent as destruction of
our environment gets prevalent and difficult to control. As aptly observed by Justice Conrado Sanchez in
1968 in Director of Forestry v. Munoz:134
The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public policy that should be followed
with respect to forest lands. Many have written much, and many more have spoken, and quite often, about
the pressing need for forest preservation, conservation, protection, development and reforestation. Not
without justification. For, forests constitute a vital segment of any country's natural resources. It is of
common knowledge by now that absence of the necessary green cover on our lands produces a number of
adverse or ill effects of serious proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes which
they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish disappear. Denuded areas become dust bowls. As
waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away;
geological erosion results. With erosion come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction to
property crops, livestock, houses, and highways not to mention precious human lives. Indeed, the
foregoing observations should be written down in a lumbermans decalogue.135
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the Court of Appeals Decision in CAG.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-52518 August 13, 1991
INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD AND VENEER COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES and JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR., respondents-appellants.
Taada, Vivo & Tan for petitioner-appellee.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:p
From an adverse decision of the then Court of First Instance (now RTC) Laguna dated 3 June 1968 in a
special civil action for declaratory relief with injunction, Civil Case No. SC-650 entitled International
Hardwood and Veneer Company of the Philippines vs. University of the Philippines and Jose Campos, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of petitioner and against the
respondents:
(a) Declaring that Rep. Act No. 3990 does not empower the University of the
Philippines, in lieu of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Bureau of Forestry, to scale,
measure and seal the timber cut by the petitioner within the tract of land referred to in
said Act, and collect the corresponding forest charges prescribed by the National
Internal Revenue Code therefor; and
(b) Dismissing the respondents' counterclaim.
respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was docketed as C.A.-G.R. No. 49409-R.
After the parties filed their respective Briefs in 1971, the Court of Appeals (Sixth Division) promulgated on
28 December 1979 a resolution elevating the case to this Court as the "entire case hinges on the
interpretation and construction of Republic Act 3990 as it applies to a set of facts which are not disputed by
the parties and therefore, is a legal question. 1
Civil Case No. SC-650 was filed by petitioner Hardwood before the trial court on 28 June 1966. 2 Petitioner
seeks therein a declaration that respondent University of the Philippines (hereafter referred to as UP) does
not have the right to supervise and regulate the cutting and removal of timber and other forest products, to
scale, measure and seal the timber cut and/or to collect forest charges, reforestation fees and royalties
from petitioner and/or impose any other duty or burden upon the latter in that portion of its concession,
covered by License Agreement No. 27-A issued on 1 February 1963, ceded in full ownership to the UP by
Republic Act No. 3990; asks that respondents be enjoined from committing the acts complained of and
prays that respondents be required to pay petitioner the sum of P100,000.00 as damages and costs of the
suit.
Its motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue having been unfavorably acted upon, and pursuant
to the order of the trial court of 26 August 1967, respondents filed their Answer on 13 September
1987, 3 wherein they interpose the affirmative defenses of, among others, improper venue and that the
petition states no cause of action; they further set up a counterclaim for the payment of it by petitioner of
forest charges on the forest products cut and felled within the area ceded to UP under R.A. No. 3990 from
18 June 1964, with surcharges and interests as provided in the National Internal Revenue Code.
Petitioner filed a Reply and Answer to Counterclaim. 4
On 18 October 1967, the parties submitted a Joint Stipulation of Facts and Joint Submission of the Case
for Judgment, 5 which reads as follows:
COME NOW the parties in the above entitled case by the undersigned counsel, and
respectfully submit the following JOINT STIPULATION OF FACTS AND JOINT

SUBMISSION OF THE CASE FOR JUDGMENT, without prejudice to the presentation

of evidence by either party:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Plaintiff is, among others, engaged in the manufacture, processing and exportation of
plywood and was, for said purpose, granted by the Government an exclusive license for
a period of 25 years expiring on February 1, 1985, to cut, collect and remove timber
from that portion of timber land located in the Municipalities of Infanta, Mauban and
Sampaloc Province of Quezon and in the Municipalities of Siniloan, Pangil, Paete,
Cavite and Calauan, Province of Laguna under License Agreement No. 27-A
(Amendment) issued and promulgated by the Government through the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources on January 11, 1960. ... ;
3. That aforementioned Timber License No. 27-A (Amendment) is a renewal of the
Timber License Agreement No. 27-A previously granted by the Government to the
plaintiff on June 4, 1953 to February 1, 1963. ... ;
4. Plaintiff, since June 4, 1953, continuously up to the present, has been in peaceful
possession of said timber concession and had been felling cutting and removing timber
therefrom pursuant to the aforementioned Timber License Agreement No. 27-A
(Amendment) of January 11, 1960;
5. Plaintiff, on the strength of the License Agreement executed by the Government on
June 4,1953 (License Agreement No. 27-A) and of the License Agreement No. 27-A
(Amendment) of January 11, 1960, has constructed roads and other improvements and
installations of the aforementioned area subject to the grant and purchased equipment
in implementation of the conditions contained in the aforementioned License Agreement
and has in connection therewith spent more than P7,000,000.00 as follows: ... ;
6. Sometime on September 25, 1961, during the effectivity of License Agreement No.
27-A (Amendment) of January 11, 1960, the President of the Philippines issued
Executive Proclamation No. 791 which reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
RESERVING FOR THE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE,
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, AS EXPERIMENT STATION
FOR THE PROPOSED DAIRY RESEARCH AND TRAINING
INSTITUTE AND FOR AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH AND
PRODUCTION STUDIES OF THIS COLLEGE A CERTAIN PARCEL
OF LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, SITUATED PARTLY IN THE
MUNICIPALITIES OF PAETE AND PAKIL ,PROVINCE OF LAGUNA,
AND PARTLY IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF INFANTA, PROVINCE OF
QUEZON, ISLAND OF LUZON.
Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, I, Carlos P. Garcia, President of the
Philippines, do hereby withdraw from sale or settlement and reserve for the College of
Agriculture, University of the Philippines, as experiment station for the proposed Dairy
Research and production studies of this College, a certain parcel of land of the Public
domain situated partly in the municipalities of Paete and Pakil province of Laguna, and
partly in the municipality of Infants, Province of Quezon, Island of Luzon, subject to
private rights, if any there be, and to the condition that the disposition of timber and
other forest products found therein shall be subject to the forestry laws and regulations,
which parcel of land is more particularly described as follows, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the
Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.

Done in the City of Manila this 25th day of September, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and sixty-one, and of the Independence of the Philippines, the sixteenth.
(SGD.) CARLOS P. GARCIA President of the Philippines
xxx xxx xxx
7. That on or about June 18, 1964, during the effectivity of the aforementioned License
Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) of July 11, 1960, Republic Act No. 3990 was
enacted by the Congress of the Philippines and approved by the President of the
Philippines, which Republic Act provides as follows:
AN ACT TO ESTABLISH A CENTRAL EXPERIMENT STATION FOR
THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES.
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. There is hereby established a central experiment
station for the use of the University of the Philippines in connection
with its research and extension functions, particularly by the College
of Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine and College of Arts
and Sciences.
SEC. 2. For this purpose, the parcel of the public domain consisting
of three thousand hectares, more or less, located in the Municipality
of Paete, Province of Laguna, the precise boundaries of which are
stated in Executive Proclamation 791, Series of 1961, is hereby
ceded and transferred in full ownership to the University of the
Philippines, subject to any existing concessions, if any.
SEC. 3. All operations and activities carried on in the central
experiment station shall be exempt from taxation, local or general,
any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, and any
incidental receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to the general
fund of the University of the Philippines.
SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. Approved, June
18, 1964.
8. That on the strength of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3990, and prior to the
institution of the present suit, defendants have demanded, verbally as well as in writing
to plaintiff-.
(a) That the forest charges due and payable by plaintiff under the
License Agreement 27-A (Amendment) referred to in paragraph 2
hereof be paid to the University of the Philippines, instead of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue; and
(b) That the selling of any timber felled or cut by plaintiff within the
boundaries of the Central Experiment Station as defined in Republic
Act No. 3990 be performed by personnel of the University of the
Philippines.
9. That the position of the plaintiff oil the demand of the defendants was fully discussed
in the letter dated April 29, 1966 of plaintiffs lawyer addressed to the President of the
University of the Philippines, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "A" hereof.
10. That in line with its position as stated in paragraph thereof, plaintiff has refused to
allow entry to personnel of the University of the Philippines to the Central Experiment
Station area assigned thereto for the purpose of supervising the felling cutting and
removal of timber therein and scaling any such timber cut and felled prior to removal
11. That in view of the stand taken by plaintiff and in Relation to the implemetation of
Republic Act No. 3990 the defendant Business Executive sent the letter quoted below to
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue:

xxx xxx xxx

Febr
uary
8,
196
6
Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Manila
Re: Forest Charges of U.P. Paete Land Grant
Dear Sir:
Under Republic Act 3990 approved in June, 1964 a parcel of forest land approximately 3,500 hectares in
area was ceded in full ownership by the government to the University of the Philippines. This area is known
as Paete Land Grant, the title to which is presently issued in the name of the University of the Philippines.
The law transferring the ownership to the University of the Philippines gives the university full rights of
dominion and ownership, subject to the existing concession of International Hardwood and Veneer
Company of the Philippines. Under the terms of this law all forest charges due from the concessionaire
should now be paid to the University of the Philippines. The purpose of giving this land grant to the
University is to enable us to generate income out of the land grant and establish a research and
experimental station for the Colleges of Agriculture, Forestry, Arts and Sciences and Veterinary Medicine.
I would like, therefore, to inform you and to secure your approval of the following matters:
1. All forest charges paid by Interwood to the District Forester of Laguna from June,
1964 up to the present should be remitted in favor of the University of the Philippines
pines;
2. All forest charges presently due from Interwood shall hereafter be paid to the
University of the Philippines and lastly
3. Hereafter the University of the Philippines shall receive all forest charges and
royalties due from any logging concession at the land grant.
May we request that proper instructions be issued by the district Forester of Laguna about this matter.
Thank you.
Very truly yours,
Sgd.) JOSE C. CAMPOS JR.
e
12. That in reply to the above letter of defendant Business Executive dated February 8,
1966, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued the following letter-ruling dated
March 11, 1966:
xxx xxx xxx
, 1966
U.P. Paete Land Grant
University of the Philippines
Diliman, Quezon City
Attn: Jose C. Campos, Jr.
Business Executive
Gentlemen:
This has reference to your letter dated February 8, 1966 stating as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
In reply thereto, I have the honor to inform you as follows:
In accordance with Section 266 of the Tax Code as amplified by Section 15(a) of
Revenue Regulations No. 85, the Forest Products Regulations, forest products, cut,

gathered and removed from registered private woodlands are not subject to forest
charges, but they must be invoiced when removed to another municipality or for
commercial purposes in the manner prescribed by the regulations. As the Paete Land
Grant was ceded by law to the U.P. in full private ownership and as the grant is
manifestly to be considered registered, no forest charges are actually due and payable
on the timber cut and removed therefrom. The forest charges purportedly to be paid by
any concessionaire under any licensing agreement entered or to be entered into by the
U.P. are, therefore, to be considered not as the charges contemplated by the National
Internal Revenue Code but as part of the royalties payable by the concessionaires for
the exploitation of the timber resources of the land grant.
Accordingly, you queries are answered viz:
1. The University may directly collect the supposed forest charges
payable by concessionaires of the land grant.
2. The forest charges paid by International Hardwood and Veneer
Company of the Philippines may be refunded provided that a formal
claim for the refund thereof is made within two years from the date of
payment. The proper claimant shall be International Hardwood and
not the University.
13. That subsequently, defendant Business Executive sent the letter quoted below to
the District Forester of the province of Laguna una dated April 18, 1 966:
a pril 18, 1966
The District Forester
Bureau of Forestry
Sta. Cruz, Laguna
Dear Sir:
Enclosed is a copy of a letter to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue concerning the
right of the University of the Philippines to collect forest charges from the existing
logging concessionaire at the Laguna Land Grant (formerly Paete Land Grant). This
tract of forest land containing some 3,500 hectares was ceded to the University of the
Philippines in full ownership by Republic Act No. 3990, approved in June, 1964. In view
thereof, the University of the Philippines requested that its authority over said land be
recognized and that the existing concessionaire, International Hardwood and Veneer
Company of the Philippines, in turn pay its forest charges directly to the University
instead of to the national government.
Please take note of page "2" of the enclosed letter of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue on the official ruling of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to the following points
raised by the University:
1. That the University of the Philippines may now directly collect
forest charges from INTERWOOD, the existing logging
concessionaire.
2. That forest charges paid by INTERWOOD to the Bureau of
Forestry from June, 1964 up to April, 1966 shall be refunded to the
University of the Philippines. In this manner, INTERWOOD is
requested to file a claim for the refund in the amount heretofore paid
by it to be remitted to the University of the Philippines.
On the basis of this letter to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, it is understood that
forest charges on timber cut from the Laguna Land Grant as scaled by scalers of the
University of the Philippines shall now be paid directly to the University of the
Philippines. In another ruling by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the University,

particularly the Laguna Land Grant, is exempted from all kinds of Internal Revenue
taxes.
yours,
(Sgd.) Jose C. Campos, Jr.
Business Executive
14. That the above quoted letter of defendant Business Executive dated April 18, 1966
was duly endorsed by the District Forester of the province of Laguna to the Director of
Forestry.
15. That on or about June 7, 19667 the Assistant Director of Forestry addressed to
plaintiff the letter dated June 7, 1966, which states as follows:
Sirs:
This is in connection with your request for this Office to comment on
your reply to the letter of Mr. Jose C. Campos, Jr. of the University of
the Philippines.
In your reply to the letter of Mr. Campos, it is stated that the
University of the Philippines is claiming the right:
(a) To scale, measure and seal the timber cut
inside the area covered by the U.P. Land Grant at
Paete, Laguna;
(b) To collect the corresponding forest charges;
(c) To collect royalties aside from the forest
charges; and
(d) To exercise in effect all the authority vested by
law upon the Bureau of Forestry in the cutting,
removal and disposition of the timber from said
area, and the authority of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue respecting the measurement and
scaling of the logs and the collection of the
corresponding forest charges and other fees in
connection therewith.
This office is in full accord with your arguments against the claim of
the University of the Philippines to have acquired the above rights.
We believe that the right vested the INTERWOOD by virtue of
number License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) to utilize the
timber inside subject area is still binding and should therefore, be
respected. It is on the basis of this acknowledgment that we sent
your client our letter of November 4,1965 requesting him to comment
on the application of the State University for a Special Timber
License over the said area.
16. That acting on the endorsement referred to in paragraph l4, the Director of Bureau
of Forestry issued the letter ruling quoted below, dated June 30,1966:
xxx xxx xxx
District Forester
Sta. Cruz, Laguna
(Thru the Regional Director of Forestry, Manila)
Sir:
This concerns your inquiry contained in the 3rd paragraph of your letter dated April 26,
1966, designated as above, as to whether or not you shall turn over the scaling work for
logs cut from the area of the International Hardwood & Veneer Company of the
Philippines in the Pacto Land Grant to Scalers of the University of the Philippines.

In view of the ruling of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that the Paete Land
Grant, which embraces the area of the International Hardwood & Veneer Company of
the Philippines, is considered a registered private woodland of the University of the
Philippines and therefore no forest charges are actually due and payable on the timber
cut and removed therefrom, and in view further of the ruling of said Commissioner that
the forest charges purportedly to be paid by any concessionaire under any licensing
agreement entered or to be entered into by the U.P. are to be considered not as the
charged contemplated by the National Internal Revenue Code but as part of the
royalties payable by the concessionaires for the exploitation of the timber resources of
the land grant, you may turn over the scaling work therein to the scalers of the U.P.
However, you should guard against the use of such licensing agreements entered or to
be entered into by the U.P. as a means of smuggling forest products from the
neighboring public forests.
xxx xxx xxx
On the basis of the above JOINT STIPULATION OF FACTS, the pleadings filed in the
case, and whatever additional evidence may be presented by the parties, the parties
hereto, through counsel, jointly move and pray of this Honorable Court that judgment be
rendered granting full and appropriate relief, on the following issues:
1. Whether plaintiff, as of the date of present case was filed, should
pay forest charges due and payable under its timber License
Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) as set forth in paragraph 2
hereof', to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, or to the University of the
Philippines; and
2. In the event that it be found by this Honorable Court that said
forest charges are to be paid to the University of the Philippines,
whether or not the University of the Philippines is entitled to
supervise, through its duly appointed personnel, the logging, telling
and removal of timber within the Central Experiment Station area as
described in Republic Act No. 3990, and to scale the timber thus
felled and cut.
Manila for Laguna, September 29,1967.
Upon the foregoing Stipulation of Facts, the trial court rendered its judgment on 3 June 1968 in favor of the
petitioner, the dispositive portion of which is quoted at the beginning of this decision. In deciding the case
against UP, it held:
... the court finds that the respondents' demand on the petitioner has no legal basis. In
the first place, the cession in full ownership of the tract of land referred to in the Act was
expressly made 'subject to any existing concessions.' Inasmuch as at the time of the
enactment of the Act, the petitioner's timber concession over the tract of land was
existing and would continue to exist until February 1, 1985, the University of the
Philippines will acquire full ownership' and exclusive jurisdiction to control and
administer the property only after February 1, 1985. The cession of the property to the
University of the Philippines is akin to the donation of a parcel of land, subject to
usufruct. The donee acquires full ownership thereof only upon the termination of the
usufruct. At the time of the donation, all what the donee acquires is the 'naked'
ownership of the property donated. In the second place, the respondents' demand
cannot be valid unless the provisions of Sees. 262 to 276 of the National Internal
Revenue Code regarding the measuring of timber cut from the forest and the collection
of the prescribed forest charges by the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Bureau of
Forestry are first amended. In their arguments, the respondents tried to stretch the
scope of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3990 in order to include therein such
amendment of the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code and Revised

Administrative Code, but they failed to convince the Court, not only because of the first
reason above stated, but also because it clearly appears that such amendment is not
intended in Republic Act No. 3990, which does not contain even a remote allusion
thereto in its title or a general amendatory provision at the end. In the third place, under
Republic Act No. 3990, the University of the Philippines cannot legally use the tract of
land ceded to it for purposes other than those therein expressly provided, namely, 'for
the use of the University of the Philippines in connection with its research and extension
functions, particularly by the College of Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine and
College of Arts and Sciences.' Hence, upon the expiration of the petitioner's timber
concession, the University of the Philippines cannot even legally renew it or grant timber
concession over the whole tract of land or over portions thereof to other private
individuals and exercise the functions of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Bureau of
Forestry by scaling and measuring the timber cut within the area and collecting from
them the forest charges prescribed by the National Internal Revenue Code.
Respondents claim in their Brief that the trial court erred:
I
... WHEN IT DID NOT DISMISS THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF WITH
INJUNCTION INSPITE OF ITS INHERENT JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS THAT
SHOULD WARRANT A DISMISSAL.
II
... WHEN IT DECLARED THAT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3990 DOES NOT EMPOWER
THE RESPONDENT UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, IN LIEU OF THE BUREAU
OF INTERNAL REVENUE AND BUREAU OF FORESTRY, TO SCALE, MEASURE
AND SEAL THE TIMBER CUT BY THE PETITIONER WITHIN THE TRACT OF LAND
REFERRED TO IN SAID ACT, AND COLLECT THE CORRESPONDING FOREST
CHARGES PRESCRIBED BY THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE.
1. The first assigned error is without merit. In the Joint Stipulation of Facts, the parties jointly move and
pray that the trial court render judgment granting full and appropriate remedy on the following issues:
l. Whether plaintiff, as of the date of present case was filed, should pay forest charges
due and payable under its Timber License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) as set
forth in paragraph 2 hereof, to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, or to the University of
the Philippines; and
2. In the event that it be found by this Honorable Court that said forest charges are to be
paid to the University of the Philippines, whether or not the University of the Philippines
is entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed personnel, the logging, felling and
removal of timber within the Central Experiment Station area as described in Republic
Act No. 3990, and to scale the timber thus felled
These issues bring the matter within the scope of an action for declaratory relief under Section 1, Rule 64
of the Rules of Court and render meaningless the appeal to the rule laid down in Sarmiento, et al. vs.
Caparas, et al. 6that declaratory relief cannot be joined by injunction, because herein petitioner, for all legal
intents and purposes, abandoned it by its failure to raise it in the Stipulation of Facts. Thus, what attains is
an amendment to both pleadings (the complaint and the answer), which is authorized by Section 5, Rule 10
of the Rules of Court. Said section pertinently provides:
SEC. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. When
issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties,
they shall be treated in all respect, as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such
amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the
evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time,
even after judgment; but failure to so amend does not affect the result of the trial by
these issues. ...

The stipulation of facts and the agreement as to the issues unquestionably satisfy the requisites for
declaratory relief. (a) there must be a justiciable controversy; (b) the controversy must be between persons
whose interests are adverse; (c) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the
controversy; and (d) the issue invoked must be ape for judicial determination. 7
There is a justiciable controversy where there is an actual controversy, or the ripening seeds of one
existsbetween the parties, all of whom are sui juris and before the court, and that the declaration sought
will help in ending the controversy. A doubt becomes a justiciable controversy when it is translated into a
claim of right which is actually contested. 8
2. On the second assigned error, respondents assert that: (a) Under R.A. No. 3990, the Republic of the
Philippines may effect collection of forest charges through the University of the Philippines because the
License Agreement does not expressly provide that the forest charges shall be paid to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue; in the absence of a specific contractual provision limiting it to a particular agency in
collecting forest charges owing to it, the Republic may effect such collection through another agency. (b)
Having been vested with administrative jurisdiction over and being the owner of the tract of land in
question, the UP acquired full control and benefit of the timber and other resources within the area. Timber
areas within the ceded property but outside the concession of petitioner can be fully exploited by UP.
However, in respect to timber areas within the ceded property but covered by the concession of petitioner,
only forest charges (or more appropriately, royalties) may be enjoyed by UP until the expiration of
petitioner's license. To deny it such charges would render its "full ownership" empty and futile. (c) The UP is
clearly entitled to the income derived from the tract of land ceded to it, for Section 3 of R.A. No. 3990
expressly provides:
All operations and activities carried on in the central experiment station shall be exempt
from taxation, local or general, any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, and
any incidental receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to the general fund of the
University of the Philippines. (emphasis supplied for emphasis).
(d) As provided by R.A. No. 3990, the UP is duty bound to operate and maintain a central experiment
station; since this law does not provide for appropriations for such purpose, it is clearly the legislative
intention that the establishment and maintenance thereof must be financed by the earnings or income from
the area, which can only come from the timber and the royalties or charges payable therefrom. This is in
accordance with the general principle that a grant of authority or jurisdiction extends to all incidents that
may arise in connection with the matter over which jurisdiction is exercised. (e) Supervision of the License
Agreement in favor of petitioner by UP was intended by R.A. No. 3990. (f) Finally, the two government
agencies affected by R.A. No. 3990 have issued specific rulings recognizing the authority of UP to collect
royalties or charges and to supervise petitioner's logging operations.
Petitioner refutes the foregoing arguments of respondents by asserting that: (a) The UP has not been
granted by R.A. No. 3990 the authority to collect forest charges or the authority to supervise the operation
by the petitioner of the timber concession affected by said Act.
The rule is well-settled that legislative grants must be construed strictly in favor of the public and most
strongly against the grantee, and nothing will be included in the grant except that which is granted
expressly or by clear implication. Under Section 262 of the Tax Code, as amended, the duties incident to
the measuring of forest products and the collection of the charges thereon shall be discharged by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue under the regulations of the Department of Finance. The reforestation fee shall
be collected by the Bureau of Forestry. 9The supervision and regulation of the use of forest products and of
the cutting and removal of forest products are vested upon the Bureau of Forestry. 10 R.A. No. 3990 does
not expressly, or even impliedly, grant the UP any authority to collect from the holders of timber
concessions on the area ceded to it forest charges due and payable to the Government under the Tax
Code, or to enforce its provisions relating to charges on forest products or to supervise the operations of
the concessions by the holders thereof; (b) The cession in full ownership of the land in question was
expressly made "subject to any concession, if any", and that petitioner's concession would continue until 1
February 1985; the UP then would acquire full ownership and exclusive jurisdiction to control and
administer the property only after 1 February 1985. The position of UP is akin to that of a donee of a parcel
of land subject to usufruct. (c) The rulings of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Acting Director

of the Bureau of Forestry are patently incorrect; moreover, said agencies do not have the power to interpret
the law, which is primarily a function of the judiciary. (d) Finally, it has acquired a vested right to operate the
timber concession under the supervision and control of the Bureau of Forestry.
There is merit in the second assigned error.
Under Proclamation No. 791, dated 25 September 1961, a parcel of land of the public domain described
therein, with an area of 3,500 hectares, which is the very parcel of land subject of R.A. No. 3990, was
withdrawn from sale or settlement and was reserved for the College of Agriculture of the UP as experiment
station for the proposed Dairy Research and Training Institute and for research and production studies of
said college, subject however to private rights, if any, and to the condition that the disposition of timber and
other forest products found thereon shall be subject to forestry laws and regulations.
The above reservation is within the area covered by petitioner's timber license.
Pursuant, however, to R.A. No. 3990 which establishes a central experiment station for the use of the UP in
connection with its research and extension functions, particularly by the College of Agriculture, College of
Veterinary Medicine and College of Arts and Sciences, the above "reserved" area was "ceded and
transferred in full ownership to the University of the Philippines subject to any existing concessions, if any."
When it ceded and transferred the property to UP, the Republic of the Philippines completely removed it
from the public domain and, more specifically, in respect to the areas covered by the timber license of
petitioner, removed and segregated it from a public forest; it divested itself of its rights and title thereto and
relinquished and conveyed the same to the UP; and made the latter the absolute owner thereof, subject
only to the existing concession. That the law intended a transfer of the absolute ownership is unequivocally
evidenced by its use of the word "full" to describe it. Full means entire, complete, or possessing all
particulars, or not wanting in any essential quality. 11The proviso regarding existing concessions refers to
the timber license of petitioner. All that it means, however, is that the right of petitioner as a timber licensee
must not be affected, impaired or diminished; it must be respected. But, insofar as the Republic of the
Philippines is concerned, all its rights as grantor of the license were effectively assigned, ceded and
conveyed to UP as a consequence of the above transfer of full ownership. This is further home out by
Section 3 of R.A. No. 3990 which provides, inter alia, that "any incidental receipts or income therefrom shall
pertain to the general fund of the University of the Philippines. Having been effectively segregated and
removed from the public domain or from a public forest and, in effect, converted into a registered private
woodland, the authority and jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry over it were likewise terminated. This is
obvious from the fact that the condition in Proclamation No. 971 to the effect that the disposition of timber
shall be subject to forestry laws and regulations is not reproduced iii R.A. No. 3990. The latter does not
likewise provide that it is subject to the conditions set forth in the proclamation. An owner has the right to
enjoy and dispose of a thing without other limitations than those established by law. 12 The right to enjoy
includes the jus utendi or the right to receive from the thing what it produces, and the jus abutendi or the
right to consume the thing by its use. 13 As provided for in Article 441 of the Civil Code, to the owner
belongs the natural fruits, the industrial fruits and the civil fruits. There are, however, exceptions to this
rules, as where the property is subject to a usufruct, in which case the usufructuary gets the fruits. 14 In the
instant case, that exception is made for the petitioner as licensee or grantee of the concession, which has
been given the license to cut, collect, and remove timber from the area ceded and transferred to UP until I
February 1985. However, it has the correlative duty and obligation to pay the forest charges, or royalties, to
the new owner, the UP, at the same rate as provided for in the Agreement. The charges should not be paid
anymore to the Republic of the Philippines through the Bureau of Internal Revenue because of the very
nature of the transfer as aforestated. Consequently, even the Bureau of Internal Revenue automatically lost
its authority and jurisdiction to measure the timber cut from the subject area and to collect forestry charges
and other fees due thereon.
The foregoing disposes of the contention of petitioner that R.A. No. 3990 does not grant the UP the
authority to collect forest charges and to supervise the operations of its concession insofar as the property
of the UP within it is concerned. Its argument that it has acquired vested rights to operate its concession
under the supervision and control of the Bureau of Forestry is preposterous. The grantor, Republic of the
Philippines, was by no means bound under the License to perpetuate the Bureau as its agent. Neither is
there force to its contention that legislative grants must be construed strictly in favor of the public and most

strongly against the grantee. The grant under R.A. No. 3990 is transfer of absolute, full and entire
ownership which leaves no room for a strict interpretation against the grantee, the UP. The reservation
therein made is in favor of the private party pursuant to the license, which is nevertheless protected. It is
the concession in favor of the petitioner which should, on the contrary, be bound by the rule.
It follows then that respondent UP is entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed personnel, the
logging, felling and removal of timber within the area covered by R.A. No. 3990.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the decision of the
trial court in Civil Case No. C-650, rendered on 3 June 1968; DECLARING that forest charges due from
and payable by petitioner for timber cut pursuant to its License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) within
the area ceded and transferred to the University of the Philippine pursuant to R.A. No. 3990 shall be paid to
the University of the Philippines; DECLARING that the University of the Philippines is entitled to supervise,
through its duly appointed personnel, the logging, felling and removal of timber within the aforesaid area
covered by R.A. No. 3990.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.