Kant - Kuno Fischer

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Cornell University Library
B2798 .F52 1888

Critique of Kant. Tr. from
ttie
German by
3 1924 029 023 137

olin
CRITIQUE OF KANT
KUNO
FISCHER,
PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG.
TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN

BY
W.
S.
HOUGH.
AUTHORISED ENGLISH EDITION.
LONDON
SWAN SONNENSCHEIN, LOWREY &
PATERNOSTER SQUARE.
iS88.
CO.,
Printed by Hazell, Watson,
&
Viney, Ld., London and Aylesbury.
FROM THE AUTHOR'S PREFACE

"COR
the New Edition of the fifth volume

Modem Philosophy, which comprises
forerunners,
of
my
The
publish separately.
my
his
first
four
herewith
chapters are entirely
the fifth gives in revised form the substance of the
chapter of the original volume on Fichte.
first
I
and
have written, as an " Introduction to Post-
Kantian Philosophy," a Critique of Kant, which
new
History of
Fichte
formerly thought
it
right, as well as suited to the plan of
work, to add a short critique of the Kantian' philosophy
to the history of the development of post- Kantian philosophy,
which
former, and
to reserve
of the whole,
when
in all its branches
with
all
an
grows out of a
criticism of the
exhaustive critique
till
the close
the reader will have become acquainted
the standpoints
which attempt a solution of the
Kantian problems, and which have thus exercised an influence
which
wish
and
upon the Kantian epoch.

is in
I still
hold this view,
keeping with the historic method.
my work
I
And
to serve the
But
also
needs of the immediate present,
have thought that a comprehensive and thorough
criticism of Kant's doctrines,
correct conception of his
which should be guided by a
whole system, might prove espe-
Author's Preface.
iv
cially
a propos at this time, and contribute something towards
many
correcting the
abroad
On
Kant which are spread
in the literature of the day.
number of
work, which
third
errors about
was
critical
questions relating to Kant's chief
obliged to investigate at the close of the
volume of my History of Modern Philosophy,
have met with some opposition

critics.
For that reason,
upon me again
to
if for
at the
no
my
views
hands of competent
other,
I felt
it
incumbent
take up those questions, and to carry
out the criticism there begun in the comprehensive manner

at
which
have aimed in the present work.
KUNO
Heidelberg,
1883.
FISCHER.
TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.
pROFESSOR
*
History of
FISCHER'S monumental work on The

Modem Philosophy * has been until a recent
date wholly inaccessible to

fore thought that his
main
results of the
EngUsh
Critique
readers.
of Kant,
if
two volumes on Kant
have there-
which gives the

in the
" History,"
together with the Author's criticism of the Kantian doctrines,
would be acceptable
in English dress, not
only as a valuable
and suggestive Essay on Kant, but as affording an Introduction to
the
point
Fischer's exposition of
The
of view
and method of Professor
Modern Philosophy.
distinguishing feature of the Critique of
K. Fischer
Bassermann.
Kant
is
Geschichte der modernen Philosophie, 6 Bde, Miinchen.
An
English version of the
School has appeared within this year.
its
Fr.
volume on Descartes and His

earnestly to be hoped that a vifork
first
It is
which would render such important service to philosophical culture in England

and America, as the translation of Professor Fischer's entire "History," may
be carried forward to completion.
Meanwhile, the present fragment, translated
nearly two years ago, before this larger undertaking was
not be valueless.
Certainly
it is
not a few to a study of the larger
t K. Fischer
1883.
As
made known, may

it may stimulate
the hope of the translator that
work
Kritik der kantischen Philosophies Wctachtn, Fr. Bassermann,
Prof. Fischer tells us in his Preface, this work, besides being
lished separately, also appears as part of the
fifth
pubvolume of the " History."
Translator's Preface.
vi
" Exposition of
comprehension of Kant's whole philosophy.
Kant," or "Criticism of Kant," too often means exposition

or criticism
of
the
of Pure Reason.
Critique
Prbfessor
Fischer everywhere emphasizes the importance of basing

criticism
all
of Kant
upon the whole of
" In criticising the Kantian philosophy," he

"
we should always remember
that
his philosophy.
tells
us
(p. 146),
by no means issued
it
from the Critique of Pure Reason as a finished system, but
on the contrary,
that,
results
it
continued to develop, and reached
which were not involved
not accord with
its
in
which do
fundamental principles, and cannot be
adjusted to them by any attempt at
Again, he says
etc.
that work,
(p.
artificial
symmetries,"
"If we now compare the
156),
foundation of the Kantian criticism with
its
completion, or
the Critique of Pure Reason with the Critique of Judgment,

it
clearly appears
how
the
work has progressed and been
transformed under the hands of the philosopher.
Neither
the doctrine of phenomena, nor that of things-in-themselves,
has remained the same,"
We
etc.
are familiar with
the
great transition which Kant's philosophic thinking under-
went when he turned his back upon the old metaphysics,

has not always been made sufficiently prominent that
but
it
his
mental attitude underwent important changes, and made
important advances, even after entering upon the Critical

period.
and
(Critical)
not,
It is
the merit of
illustrated so forcibly
Kuno
and
philosophy of Kant
Fischer to have emphasized
development in the
fully this
and
it
is
this, if
which especially commends his Critique
of philosophical students, and entitles
it
to
we mistake
to the attention
be considered
"
some
as in
vii
sense a contribution to
real
the
criticism
of
Kant.
It is also believed that the Critique will
be found a valu-
able General Introduction to the study of Kant.

Fischer's lucid and vigorous style
nowhere are these
is
than in the
better displayed
qualities
Professor
well-known, and perhaps
concise yet comprehensive statement of this epitome.
It is
thought that the clear exposition of "Transcendental Idealism," and the masterly discussion of the " Thing-in-itself
that
bugbear
of
Kantian
the
Philosophy
will
prove
especially helpful.
The
translation has
aimed
to
be exact, and has sought
something of the manner of the
to retain
notoriously troublesome
word
original.
The
Vorstellung has been uniformly
rendered "idea," this rendering being, perhaps, on the whole,

the most
The more
satisfactory.
"presentation,"
is
coming
nearly equivalent word,
into general use in psychological
discussions, but besides being often unwieldy,

is
too restricted to meet the
in the present work.
its
application
more general use of Vorstellung
The verb
vorzustellen has generally
been rendered " to conceive " or " mentally represent."
noun
verbal
Vorstellen, as in
has been uniformly rendered "thought."

tions, this
word
is
time,
thought, or,
all
reason.
The
with
as
designating
Critical point of view, as being
theoretical,
reader will
i.e.,
thought conditioned by space and
and hence, from the
co-extensive
In such connec-
used by Professor Fischer as compre-
hending perception and understanding,

all finite
The
" Gesetse unseres Vorstellens,"
or
scientific,
or
knowing
please carefully distinguish idea
viii
{Vorstellung) from Idea {Idee), which also frequently occurs.

It
thought that no especial apology
is
retention of the
word Aufkldrung.
Professor Fischer has
made use of
is
needed
for the
In quoting from Kant,

Hartenstein'sy?^s^ edition
(Leipzig, Leop. Voss. 1838).

I
am
indebted to Dr.
W.
T. Harris for
mission to republish this Critique from

lative
Philosophy,
where
it
first
th-e
appeared.
exception of a few unimportant omissions, and
of verbal changes,
Paris, Aug.
it
i\st, 1887.
kind per-
^& Journal of Specu-
appears here unaltered.
With
a
the
number
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER
I.
THE KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY AS DOCTRINE OF

KNOWLEDGE.
I.
The Doctrine of Phenomena.

1.
2.
II.
2.
2.
10
The Relative Validity of Geometrical Axioms.

Second Objection The Uncritical View of the World.
First Objection
The Doctrine of Things-in-themselves

1.
PAGE
2
The Origin of Phenomena.

The Ideality of Phenomena.
Objections to the Transcendental Esthetic

1.
III.
Transcendental Idealism
.20
The Sensuousness of Pure Reason.

The Thing-in-itself.
CHAPTER
II.
THE KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY AS DOCTRINE OF FREEDOM.

I.
II.
Kantian Realism and Idealism
The
^1:
Thing-in-itself as
Will
Intelligible Causality.
The Moral Order
of 4he World.
35
.
36
Contenls.
PAGE
III.
The Doctrine of God and Immortality

1.
Kantian Theism.
2.
The Kantian Doctrine
-4
of Immortality.
CHAPTER
III.
THE KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY AS DOCTRINE OF DEVELOPMENT.

I.
II.
Kant's Fundamental Problems
The World Viewed

1.
2.
3.
4.
III.
63
as an Historical Development
2.
3.
67
The Natural Development.

The Intellectual Development.
The Social Development and the Development
The Moral and Religious Development.
of Culture.
The Teleological View of the World

1.
.75
The World-development as Phenomenon.

The World-development as Teleological Phenomenon.
The World-development as TManifestation of Thing-in-itself.
CHAPTER
IV.
EXAMINATION OF KANT'S FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES.

I.
Examination of the Doctrine of Knowledge
3.
4.
Review of
2.
II.
The Contradiction in the Critique of Pure Reason.

The Origin of the Contradiction.
The Second Refutation of Idealism. Kant vs. Jacobi.
1.
.95
Objections.
Examination of the Doctrines of Freedom and Develop-
ment
121
1.
Schopenhauer's Critique of the Kantian Philosophy.
2.
The Correspondence between
the Doctrines of
Knowledge
and Freedom.
^
3.
4.
The
The
Contradiction in the Doctrine of Freedom.

Contradiction between the Doctrines of
Development.
Knowledge and
Contents.
III.
xi
Examination of the Doctrine of Phenomena and ThingsIN-THEMSELVES

I33
1
2.
The Knawableness of Human Reason,

The Knowableness of Natural Ends in Man and
of Blind
Intelligence.
3.
4.
The Knowableness
The Knowableness
of Life and of Beauty.

of Things-in-themselves.
CHAPTER
V.
THE PROBLEMS AND LINES OF DEVELOPMENT OF POSTKANTIAN PHILOSOPHY.

I.
The Fundamental Problems of Post-Kantian Philosophy

1.
2.
II.
The Lines of Development of Post-Kantian Philosophy

1.
2.
i6o
The Metaphysical Problem.

The Problem of Knowledge.
The
The
169
Re-establishment of the Doctrine of Knowledge.
Threefold
Antithesis
Fries,
Herbart, and Schopen-
hauer.
III.
The Course of Development of Post-Kantian Philosophy
179
1.
Metaphysical Idealism.
2.
The
Threefold Advance: Reinhold, Fichte, Schelling, and
Hegel.
3.
The Order
of Post-Kantian Systems.
CHAPTER
I.
THE KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY AS DOCTRINE OF KNOWLEDGE.
TN
undertaking a criticism of
be necessary,
will
first
of
all,
principles, in order to correct
the
Kantian philosophy,
to review briefly
any
critical
only what
we have
fundamental
false or distorted
view which
For we can
might destroy the conception of the system.

criticise
its
justlv
And from a
rightly understood.
knowledge of the system there follows the establishment
of those
new problems contained
in
it,
which determine the
course of the development of post-Kantian philosophy.

shall
it
proceed,
therefore,
Kantian doctrines to their
from the
criticism,
characterization
We
of the
and then deduce the pro-
blems which have led to their transformation and development.
The Kantian philosophy
as a
whole unites
in itself three
fundamental features, which must be rightly conceived, and

rightly combined, if
this philosophy
we
are to appreciate the
which swayed the
last
century
full peculiarity
of
they are Doctrine
of Knowledge, Doctrine of Freedom, and Doctrine of Development.

Its
new
doctrine of knowledge conditions
its
new
doctrine of
Critique of Kant.
freedom, and both of these condition
ment.
its
These themes are arranged
new
doctrine of develop-
in the order in
which they
follow one another in the course of the Critical investigation.
The
first
problem, and that which determines
mental questions of the Kantian inquiry,

origin of
human knowledge.
There
is
is
the funda-
all
concerned with the
no simpler expression
with which to designate Kant's fundamental problem, and at the
same time the
criterion
which guided him
also furnishes us the best
fairly
It
means of keeping our bearings
reference to the nature and
problem was never
in its solution.
method of
That
his system.
in
this
recognised, not to say solved, before
Kant, we have shown in our characterization of the epoch of
and the pre-Kantian standpoints
Critical philosophy
in detail to
sufficiently
be able to refer the reader to that earlier dis-
cussion.i
I.
The Doctrine of Phenomena. Transcendental

Idealism.
I
If light
is
to
The Origin of Phenomena.
be thrown upon the origin of human knowledge,
those conditions must be investigated which precede
it,
which,
consequently, must be contained in the faculties of our intel-
'
Vide Fischer
Geschichte der neuern Philosophic, vol.
iii.,
pp. 3-38.
Doctrine of Knowledge.
lectual nature, but
which are not yet knowledge
philosophers before Kant, some with
itself.
The
intention, others with
full
complete self-deception, presupposed these conditions, and thus

treated the explanation of
human knowledge
dogmatically.
They
consequently failed of the solution, and in the very matter of
Hence the problem had
importance attained nothing.
and so taken that the
restated,
ledge were sought by a

that path which
ledge
new
Kant
factors or conditions of
investigation of
This obvious proposition
is
its
be
know-
human reason along
Know-
called critical or transcendental.
unexplained as long as
is
to
remains obscure
origin
not only in reference to
valid
knowledge, but also in reference to every object of knowledge

for to
know an
origination.
object
Hence
means
as
much
to understand
as
its
there can be no talk about a knowledge of
objects as long as their origin remains
unknown.
The
inquiry
concerning the origin of human knowledge necessarily coincides,

therefore, with that concerning the origin of our objects of knowledge,
are,
or of things knowable to us.
and must
thought
be, phenomena,
nor does
it
here
All our objects of
knowledge
which we represent to ourselves
come immediately
whether the nature of things reveals

quately, or inadequately, or not at
itself in
all.
the origin of our objects of knowledge
The
is
into
in
question
phenomena ade-
inquiry concerning
accordingly identical
of Kant.
Critique
4
with
concerning
that
phenomenal world,
human
in a
origin
the
we
reason as such, or which
common
world of
The
way.
sense.
or of the
to the
phenomena which appear
,those
i.e.,
of phenomena,
conceive and experience
all
content of these
phenomena
is
our
That we have and conceive such a common
world of sense
may be
regarded as an established and uncon-
troverted fact
and
common
this
we were not compelled

or according to the
origin of
world would be impossible
to conceive things in a
same
laws.
human knowledge
is
The
if
common manner,
inquiry concerning the
thus seen, as soon as
it is
taken
up seriously and thoroughly, to involve the inquiry concerning

the origin
common
of the sense-world, or of that idea of the world
to us
all.
The problem of knowledge cannot be
and the conditions involved
in its process investigated, without
stating the question in the
we can
recast,
manner
rightly contemplate
the
Just developed.
stellar
world only
Just
as
after
we
have won that point of view from which the situation and
motion of our own earth become apparent, so we can rightly

r
apprehend and estimate the world of sense only when we

have attained
of our
of
an insight
knowing reason.
view
in
astronomy.
philosophy
into
The
the
Critical
corresponds
standpoint
and
activity
or Transcendental point
to
the
Copemican
in
If
we
ourselves create an object,
own
ble to us as our
activity,
completely knowable.
tained in the
something
If,
itself is
consequently
on the other hand, there
is
that con-
object which has and retains the character of
something which we cannot produce, or which
given,
come
origination is as intelligi-
its
and the object
cannot be reduced to our creative

will
at this point
then our knowledge
activity,
upon an impenetrable
The
barrier.
objects of our knowledge are, therefore, just as far completely
knowable as they are our
products,
i.e.,
just
as far as
we
are
capable of creating them and of making the process of this

creation clear to our consciousness
ableness of things extend.
only so far does the
know-
Accordingly, the inquiry concerning
the origin of our knowledge and
its
objects, the sum-total of
which constitutes our common world of sense,
is
more exactly
to be taken, so that under the term "origin" shall be under-
stood creation by the factors or capacities of our reason.
world of sense
is
the product of our reason,
pletely intelligible object of our reason
far as
it
is this
product.
it
is
it
is
If our
also the
com-
this object only so
" For one thoroughly comprehends
only what one can himself completely produce according to

notions."
'Kant: KfiHk der

Fischer
Urtheilskraft,
68.
{Werke,
Geschichte der neuern Philosofhie, vol.
iv.,
vol. vi., p. 258.)

p. 483.
Cf.
Critique of Kant.
2.
Now
The
Kant has shown
mena which
of Phenomena.
Ideality
that there
is
an
elevient in all
our pheno-
has and retains the character of something given
These, however, as such,
namely, our impressions or sensations.
phenomena, but only the material out of
are not yet objects or
which objects and phenomena
arise in
accordance with the laws
of our thought, or through the form-giving power of our perception
Thus the sense-world
and understanding.
originates from
the material of our impressions, which are so formed and

bined,
fulfilled
in
accordance with
necessary and
the
we
laws of our thought, that
The
natural order of things.
all
involuntarily
conceive the same
laws of thought are the funda-
space,
mental forms of perception and understanding
The
and the categories.
com-
time,
involuntary or unconscious fulfilment
of these laws takes place through the imagination, while the
knowledge of them
is
a matter of
Since the laws of thought

they must precede the
critical inquiry.
make phenomena and
latter,
and
are,
therefore,
experience,
not given
empirically and a posteriori, but a priori, or transcendentally
they are the forms, the sensations on the contrary, the stuff or
matter, of
it is
phenomena.
given to
it,
This matter
not produced by
it
is
received by our reason
therefore
it
is
not a priori.
Yet we may not say that our impressions are
but a posteriori.
given a posteriori or empirically.
This inexact and incorrect
expression utterly confounds the Kantian doctrine.
What we
draw from experience, or what
a posteriori or
is
is
given by experience
Kant expressly teaches
empirical.
borrowed merely from experience
or empirically."
stitute the
Now,
matter of
to the conditions
tained in
it,
all
it
phenomena and
and elements of experience, hence are con-
but not produced by
given to us through experience.
Kant
explicitly says
object through sensation
it
they do not result from
That
since
we
is
Sensations are the material
is
is
related to
Kritik der
If so, then
reitien
Id. Transc.
^sth., %
empirical object
is
self-evident,
Kant taught
Kant must have
Vernunft.
I (p.
an
it,
that the
given a priori, the matter a posteriori
is
59, et seq.).
contradictorily
given by experience
Introd. III., Note.
P- 39-)
''
An
not produced by
relation
this
taught that the matter for experience

:
empirical."
are so often compelled to hear
or empirically.
Kant
it,
very necessary to enforce the correct conception of
form of our knowledge
'
empirical which
is
" Perception which
Although
presupposes sensation.
it is still
only a posteriori
experience, they belong
of experience, and are, therefore, given for

it.
" That which
appears that since impressions con-
experience, but experience from them.

is
known
is
this is
(IVerke, vol.
ii.,
Critique
Then he has not explained

presupposed
it
in experience
mena
of Kant.
experience, but, like his predecessors,
then the ground of sensations must be sought
then the thing-in-itself
then the Kantian philosophy
is
lies
hidden
in
pheno-
turned completely upside
down.
Since our sense-world
ihroughoni phenomenal.
sists in sensations, their
consists only
in
Since the matter of
phenomena,
all
phenomena con-
form in perceptions and notions, the
elements of the same are through and through subjective

their material
is
it
both
and formal constituents are contained in our
knowing reason, and have the character of ideas (the word

taken in the broadest sense).
ideas
ideal.
Hence
all
they consist in being conceived,
This doctrine of the
their origination
ideality of all
from our sense
states
our
phenomena
is
are
and are throughout
phenomena, and of
and forms of reason,
is
called Transcendental Idealism.

All
space.
phenomena
are in time
objective
If they contained anything
phenomena
are also in
which was independent of
our ideas, and which was nevertheless in space and time, the
latter
could not be the fundamental forms of our ideas, hence
not pure perceptions.
Since, now, space
and time are pure
perceptions and nothing real in themselves, everything in space
and time must be through and through
ideal.
The being
of
all
objects
in
From
conceived.
space
phenomena
and time consists
the
in
their
being
of space and time
the Kantian doctrine
there follows, therefore,
doctrine of
the ideality of
all
the Transcendental Esthetic founds that Transcen-
dental idealism which characterizes Kant's entire
doctrine of
knowledge.
Because space and time are the forms of perception of our

reason, the pure magnitudes of space and time, and hence
since there are no other magnitudes
pure magnitudes
in general,
are the products of the perceptive or constructive activity of our
reason, and as such they are completely knowable.
The
doctrine
of magnitudes or pure mathematics has, therefore, before
all
other theoretical sciences, the character of a perfectly evident
and purely
Kant
rational
declare,
" that
in
much
exact
science
to
precisely as
mathematics."
knowledge.
It
each
was
of
this
the
fact
which led
sciences
natural
can be found as there
is
refutation of the Transcendental Esthetic
would
affect the
whole doctrine of Transcendental idealism, and thereby the

entire basis
and the
'
Kant
Werke,
and character of the Kantian doctrine of knowledge,
Critical
philosophy in general.
But a
false interpreta-
Metaphysische Anfangsgriinde der Naturwissenschaft.
vol. viii., p.
444)
Preface.
Critique of Kant.
10
tion
no
is
We
refutation.
have now to concern ourselves with
views which mistake the sense of the Kantian" doctrine and

thus attack
it
with arguments which necessarily prove ineffec-
tual..
Objections to the Transcendental Êsthetic.
II.
To
the Kantian doctrine of space and time, as the two funda-
mental forms of perception of our reason, two objections present

themselves, one calling in question the underived or a priori
(transcendental) character of these two ideas, the other their
anthropological character.
validity of mathematical,
The
first
denies the unconditional
and especially geometrical, axioms,
and makes the idea of space dependent upon empirical conditions
the
second
denies the anthropological
origin and
character of these fundamental perceptions, in order to be free

to maintain their cosmological
suffice,
in order to
and universal
meet these objectipns,
validity.
It will
to set the sense of
Kant's doctrine in a clear light.
First Objection
The Relative Validity of Geometrical

Axioms.
Kant by no means teaches the unconditional

metrical axioms, but one entirely dependent
validity of geo-
upon our idea of
Why we
space.
space
have
why our reason
and not some other perception of
this,
in general
Kant
otherwise, these questions
is
constituted as
leaves,
and uninvestigated, but yet unsolved

declares
them
doctrine,
we may regard
to be incapable of solution.
the perception of space
the constitution of
it
he
indeed,
and not
not untouched
true,
it is
it is,
explicitly
According to his
human
involves, as a primitive fact, but
not characterize this fact as empirical, since experience
product of reason, not
its
and
reason,
may
is
the
condition.
If there were beings possessing perception of space of only
two dimensions,
fact,
and
in
this perception
would be
consequence they would
destitute of the ideas of solids, as
those ideas.
is
If
it
for
them a
necessarily be
just as
we must
primitive
necessarily possess
be true of plane surfaces, that a straight line
the shortest distance between two points in the surface, that
between these two points there
is
only one such
line, that
two
straight lines cannot inclose space, etc., these propositions are
not nullified by the fact that they do not hold good respecting
the connection of two points upon the surface of a sphere,
e.
g.,
the extremities of a diameter.
of space
is
i.e.,
definite perception
the luminous ground of knowledge from which certain
insights follow,
ever,
That a
as,
which under
apodictically, yalid
this presupposition are
this
was the
fact
now and
for
which arrested
Critique
12
of Kant.
the attention of Kant, and which he was only able to explain by
regarding the original ground of
all
our ideas of space
space
itself as an underived form of our thought, or as a fundamental
perception of our reason.
The validity of our mathematical insights is, therefore, according

to the explicit teaching of our philosopher,
ditioned, but,
on the contrary, absolutely dependent upon our
perception of space and time.

is
apodictic in a
If
But under this presupposition
way which no other
character of knowledge
ditions.
by no means uncon-
we should
sort of
knowledge
is.
changes with the change of
its
it
The
con-
substitute for our discursive understanding
an intuitive one, and for our sensuous perception an intellectual

perception, knowledge would no longer follow the
way of
perience, but see and penetrate everything at a glance.'
should substitute for our external perception of space,
If
i.e.,
ex-
we
the
perception of space of three dimensions, some other, the character
and compass of our mathematical ideas would change accordingly,

but not the apodictical certitude of judgments based upon the
corresponding construction and perceptive insight.
This point
contains the fact which at once characterizes and explains the
nature of mathematics.
'
Hence those
objections which found
Cf. infra, pp. 20-26.
upon another perception of space some other

and
axioms are so
its
can be proved that 2 x 2
it
geometry
calculated to refute Kant's doctrine
much more may and should appeal
that they
If
little
sort of
is
not in
to
it.
equal to 4,
all cases
that in our perception of a plane surface a straight line does not

in all
instances
describe the
points, etc., then for the
To him
time
is
distance between two
Kant's doctrine refuted.
pure mathematics seemed the only science in which
knowing and
same.
first
shortest
creating, thought
and
object,
were one and the
Because pure magnitudes are constructions, or the pro-
ducts of perception, he regarded space and time as the perceptions of reason, or as the perceptive activity of reason
itself.
Because our notions of magnitude presuppose the perceptive or

sensible
knowledge of magnitude, he regarded space and time
as the fundamental forms of sense, not of understanding.
Even
if
these objections, which seek to base themselves upon
the empirical origin of geometry, were stronger than they are,

they would
still
ideality of all
If time
time.
in time
if
phenomena, since they

is
refer only to space, not to
a pure idea, or a form of perception,
can contain nothing independent of
phenomena
But
prove ineffectual against the doctrine of the
phenomena
all ideas.
Now,
all
are in time, the objective as well as the subjective.
objective
phenomena
are ideas, then space, since
it
con-
Crtttque of Kant.
14
tains all objective
phenomena, can be nothing
but
real in itself,
The
only the fundamental form of our external perception.
transcendental ideality of time establishes the ideality of all
phenomena, even that of objective phenomena, hence also that of

space.
Second Objection
2.
The
The Uncritical View of the World.
objections which our
common
consciousness opposes to
the systems of great thinkers are in their eyes generally the most
insignificant of
offer to the
all,
yet because of the constant obstruction they
comprehension and diffusion of their views, they
always prove themselves the most potent
for, like
our feelings
and sensations, they are not to be silenced with reasons, and

as Schiller says in Wallenstein, " like the
back to their
hours."
first
Such an
women who
always
come
word when one has preached reason
inflexible
always found the most
fault,
and
uncritical
among
for
way of thinking has
the doctrines of Kant,
all
with the Transcendental /Esthetic, since
are,
it
maintains that space
and time are mere perceptions of human reason, and nothing

apart from the latter.
must
first
Accordingly, as
it
seems, space and time
appear in the world with our reason, hence with the
existence of man, and can therefore neither exist before him,
nor endure after him.
Now, we
are obliged to conceive the
human
15
race as having originated and as perishable, and yet
cannot possibly conceive the universe, which contains in
we
itself
the conditions of the origin as well as the destruction of the

earth and
inhabitants, without space
its
and time.
It
seems
highly absurd, therefore, to seek to confine these two funda-
mental conditions of
and
limits of
human
introducing his
new
all
natural existence to the organization
reason.
Kant
himself,
indeed,
before
doctrine of the ideality of space and time,
taught the mechanical origin and development of the cosmos,
and the natural history of the heavens, and of the earth and.
organic
life.
But with
development the
to stand in the
it
view of the world as an historical
idealistic doctrine of
space and time appears

Surely
Kant could not
this contradiction, since
he has nowhere
most open opposition.
have been sensible of
made
this
the subject of especial discussion and explanation.
Meanwhile the natural consciousness, which, with
its
ideas of
space and time, finds the Kantian perfectly unintelligible,

disabused of
time
is
its
objections.
is
of the Critical philosophy

fact,
there
is
not
But Kant's doctrine of space and
the foundation of his doctrine of knowledge, and the
to his doctrine of freedom.
In
its
way
Nothing, therefore, would remain
if this
doctrine be rejected.
no contradiction between Kant's view of the
world as a natural development in time and his Critique of Pure
of Kant.
Critique
In the
Reason.
that of the
first
place, both have different subjects of inquiry
the explanation of the world, that of the second
first is
The problem
the explanation of knowledge.

of the world
is
How
did the world in which
according to natural and mechanical laws

Critique
is
How
of the explanation
we
live originate
The problem
did this our explanation of the world originate
according to the laws of our reason and thought

question
is
regarding the
phenomena of
intelligible
i.e.,
world would not
The
case, if the elements of
if
they were not
entire fact of our idea of the
exist, if natural objects
tained anything inconceivable.
There the
nature, here regarding
they would not appear to us,
and knowable.
These phenomena would not be
the knowableness of the same.
phenomena,
And
were inconceivable or con-
this
would necessarily be the
which they consisted were not deter-
mined by the character and conditions of our thought.

matter
we
of the
Their
determined by the manifold of our impressions, which
is
receive by
means of
sense,
and consequently regard
these impressions are the matter of phenomena.
as given
Their form
is
determined by the laws of our thought, which we regard as pure

forms of reason, and the content of which Kant called pure
reason
these laws constitute the form of
phenomena.
mena, therefore, are through and through

objects of experience,
ideas.
Pheno-
Phenomena,
and the progressive Science of Experience,
are
all
17
created from the matter of our sensations in accordance
with the rational laws of our thought, the latter having partly
the character of constitutive, partly that of regulative, principles.
These laws determine the world of phenomena, because they

constitute
it.
They
mena, world-conditions or world -principles.

entirely mistaken
realm of pheno-
are, therefore, within the
But their meaning
when only an anthropological
or psychological
validity is ascribed to them.
They cannot be
psychology, because they
make psychology
Kant's
first
Critique of Pure Reason
is
is
by
established
itself possible.
no anthropological inves-
tigation.
And
here those objections which our unscientific view of the
world oppose to the Critical philosopher and his doctrine of

space and time refute themselves.
Space and time are the laws
of perception imposed by our reason, and as such they determine

the entire world of sense, because they
possible.
Their cosmical or universal
natural sense so rightly

far
is,
first
demands and holds
make
it
in general
which
validity
fast
is
the
therefore so
from being disproved by the Critique of Pure Reason that

the rather, thereby
however, this validity

still
first
is
really established.
limited in such a
it
At the same time,
way
that there
may
be something independent of space and time, while the
common
consciousness, uncritical and thoughtless as
it is,
regards
2
of Kant.
Critique
space as the huge box, and time as the vast stream, in which
everything that
Man,
is
must be contained.
as a natural individual, or as anthropology regards him,
belongs to the phenomena of nature, and
He
sense.
is
is
a part of the world of
the result of a definite stage in the world's history
a stage which forms a
link in the chain of
which presupposes a succession of
cosmic changes, and
and development of man must be regarded and
origin
gated as natural, historical
facts,
Kant was so
that he rather proposed to himself that thesis
by
strated
conditions of our knowledge.
far
investi-
from denying
and he demon-
and more especially by
his criticism of reason,
doctrine of space and time, that
are not dependent

general,
is
man
Natural, historical
upon him, but
conditioned by them.
called the pure perceptions of
distinguish the sense in
is,
this
as the knowing subject, not as
ledge.
As the subject of
When
all
is
it
is
it
knowledge so
far
is
as
denotes
we
are
the con-
of
all
sense,
in
which in the course of time the natural
general,
in
one of the objects of know-
dition
in
they
important to
taken
capable of investigating the latter our reason

objects
space and time are
reason,
word
there-
phenomena
he, like all
human
which
his
necessity follows from the
its
by no means the sole proprietor of space and time
fore,
man
That the
earlier stages.
or of the entire world
of
human
19
race appears and develops itself in successive stages, each of
which
necessarily
stage.
For
originate
matter,
phenomena
before and
duration,
all
all
and
which
after
are
But
in time, but time in
it,
with the
succeeding
is
its
time-
since they
time,
exception of
single
knowing subject
the
for time
and a
time; each has
in
which there
pass away,
persists.
preceding
implies
not
is
the fundamental form of
is
sensuous thought.
If,
on the other hand, space and time be regarded, with
Schopenhauer, as the forms of perception of our

at the
same time be declared
brain, then there arises for the
and
to be animal functions of the
time that absurdity which
first
space and time are
obviously describes a circulus vitiosus
viz.,
made dependent upon a
which,
condition,
organism and the stages of nature and animal

is itself
intellect,
like
life
the
animal
preceding
it,
only possible under the conditions of space and time.
If the latter are, as
individuatioms"
i.e.,
Schopenhauer teaches, the " principium
the ground of
then they cannot possibly be,
all
as,
multiplicity
and
diversity,
notwithstanding, Schopen-
hauer also teaches, the products or functions of individual

organisms.
Nor was Schopenhauer
ever able successfully to
explain away or to solve this erroneous circle, grounded as

in a fundamental feature of his doctrine.
it
is
Critique oj Kant.
20
III.
The Doctrine of Things-in-themselves.

1
The knowing
it;
The Sensuousness of Pure Reason.

subject
is
not in space and time, but these in
hence the entire world in space and time
is
pure pheno-
through and through phenomenal and
menon
or idea;
ideal.
This doctrine constitutes the Transcendental Idealism,
which
founds
knowledge.
given,
but,
it
is
and
If,
characterizes
the
Kantian
of
now, in the knowing subject there was nothing
on the contrary, everything was
the world of
doctrine
phenomena would be
entirely
notions would be immediate perceptions,
its
ledge would consist in perceptive thought,
by
it,
product;
its
created
its
faculty of
in
i.e.,
an
know-
intuitive
understanding, or in an intellectual perception, to which every-
thing
it
creates
appears at once as object or thing.
knowing and creating would be completely

would
be
identical,
no difference between sense and
perception and thought, objects and notions,
Then
then there
understanding,
phenomena
'and
ihings-in-themselves.
Such a faculty of knowledge

inconceivable, but
it
is
not the
not in
itself
one we possess
create things, but develops itself

repeatedly,
is
and
its
objects.
impossible or
ours does not
Kant taught
and indeed always, with the utmost explicitness,
Doctrine oj Knowledge.
that our understanding
is discursive,
not
2i
intuitive,
our perception
Accordingly he carefully distinguished
sensuous, not intellectual.
between sense and understanding, and explained human knowledge in such a way that
is
it
from the matter of impressions
and sensations, which have and retain the character of something given, that we produce phenomena, and the knowledge of
phenomena, or experience.
Intuitive understanding
human understanding
to the character of
Critique,
human
reason, as
belongs sensuousness,
there
and therefore divine
creative,
not intuitive
and being sensible
ceiving,
of,
nor
Kant
i.e.,
is it
but
pure subject, for
investigates
it
in his
the capacity of re-
impressions, or of being affected
which are
its
medium, nor with the
definite sensations
they convey, since these belong to the constitution of the
Yet our sensations as such presuppose a
body.
Sense must not be identified with the organs of
by a manifold.
sense,
is
is
human
faculty
of
sense or receptivity, which enables us to be-affected by a variety

of impressions, and without which the matter of knowledge
would
fail, i.e.,
knowledge would remain empty, hence
in general
not exist at
all.
This sensuousness Kant ascribes to pure reason,
since
not,
in the
it
is
first
place, a question of the sort of
affections or the quality of impressions, but only of the capacity

itself
of receiving something given.
Our reason must form and
Critique of Kant.
22
material, according to the laws of
work up the given

tion
its
percep-
and thought, into phenomena, experience, and empirical
knowledge.
Our knowing reason would be

were not sensuous,
which
it
must
systematize.
knowledge, but
Since
it
receives
it
it
can only combine and
not generative of the matter of

not creative, but
iae.xe\y fo7'm-giving,
it,
it
receptive,
is
And
and productive
and
architectonic.
in this respect not original, but
the entire organization of
conditioned by
standing another
its
sensuousness.
Sense
its
knowing
one
is
faculty,
this is receptive of material, that
this is passive, that active
pressions, that creates notions.

is
if
does not make the matter of knowledge, but only
dependent.
is
and which
therefore
is
hence divine,
capable of being affected by impressions,
i.e.,
receive,
It
creative,
Hence our
faculty
under-
form-giving
this receives im-
perceptive faculty
not intellectual, but sensuous, our understanding not intuitive,
but discursive,
i.e.,
it
is
obliged to take up
its
by one, and proceed by connecting part with
perceptions one
part,
comparing
perception with perception, and by uniting these to pass from

perceptions to notions and judgments.
Consequently the objects
of our knowing reason are not entirely

are constructed out of matter and form
it,
the latter
is
given or added by
it.
its
own products
the former
is
they
given to
Our knowledge of things
Doctrine of Knowledge,
z^
a gradual experience
(objects), therefore, consists in
complete in an instant, but originates and develops
it
is
We
itself.
and hence also
are obliged to think objects in succession,
not
in co-
since nothing would persist in a mere succession, thus
existence ;
also nothing could
Space and time are therefore
be thought.
the fundamental conditions,
since nothing can be thought
or,
without them, the fundamental forms, of our thought; they are,

since every perception
must be combined part by
part,
the
fundamental forms of perception, and since our perceptive

faculty
not intellectual, but sensuous, the fundamental forms
is
of sense
in short, they are the
fundamental perceptions of our
reason.
With a
creative or divine reason,
knowing and
and thing, must be one and the same.
the divine by
its
sensuousness
necessary forms of
selves
all
with
it,
thought and of
is
distinguished from
space and time are the
all
is
only reason knowable to us
it
our-
we know.
human
for us equivalent to
thus, since sense belongs to the pure reason
investigated in his Critique,
We
knowledge.
are the only sensuous-rational beings which
Hence sensuous reason
And
could be conditioned
It
Our reason
by neither space nor time.
creating, idea
reason.
which Kant
although the
was called by him
human
capacity of receiving material,
is
reason.
Now
sense, as the
of a dependent and derived
Critique of Kant.
24
And
nature.
this
must be true of the entire organization and
knowing reason, since without sensuousness
constitution of our
it
would be an entirely different one from what
Quite at the beginning of the
Let us hear Kant himself.
Transcendental Esthetic, he says
manner
ideas in the
By means of
sense.
and
it
ever,
"
sentation
that
The
capacity of receiving
The
empirical.
is,
so far as
is
is
we
from the
latter that notions
upon the
faculty of repre-
are affected by
That
in
in certain relations
phenomena
call the
that,
On
itself
iv.,
form of the same.
again be sensation,^
pp. 494
so,
Kant reads Empfindiing
is
Since that
set in definite
although the matter
Gesch.
d. n.
498.
(sensation) here, not
as given in the text of Prof. Fischer.
ning "It
to
however, which
the discursive and intuitive understanding, Cf. Fischer
vol
is
phenomena be disposed
whereby sensations can alone be ordered and
'
is sensation.
phenomena which corresponds
possible that the manifold of
form cannot
it
indeterminate object of an empirical perception
phenomenon.
it
it
related to an object through sensation
sensation I call the matter of
Philos.,
I call
sense, therefore, objects are given to us,
action of an object
Perception which
makes
The
which we are affected by objects
in
by the understanding, and
call
"
alone furnishes us perceptions ; objects are thought, how-
arise."
it is.i
not necessary,"
etc.,
Erscheinung (phenomenon),
Also in the following quotation, begin-
the edition of
Benno Erdmann has been
of
phenomena
all
indeed^ given only a posteriori, the form of
is
the same must, on the contrary, already
wholly apart from sensation."
sidered
Transcendental Esthetic,
we
Kant
says
limit perception in space
may be
It
lie
a priori as an entirety
mind, and, consequently, must be capable of being con-
in the
that
2$
"
It is
At the close of the

not necessary, either,
and time to human
sensibility.
in this respect (although that cannot be determined), yet
not cease, even on account of this universality, to be
cause
man
that all finite thinking beings are necessarily like
it is
it
would
sense,
be-
a derived (intuitus derivatus), not an original {intuitus
originarius),
hence not
perception seems,
an
intellectual,
on the ground
just
Such a
perception.
brought
forward,
to
belong only to the Primitive Being, not, however, to a being
dependent as well in
existence as in
determines the relation of
latter
This
jects.
ever,
its
last
observation
in
its
its
perception, which
existence to
given ob-
how-
our Esthetic theory,
must be regarded merely as an explanation, not as any-
thing fundamental."^
followed, instead of reading in the affirmative (It
is
from which Prof. Fischer quotes (Vid. Preface.

edition also
makes
necessary) with the edition
Hartenstein in his second
the correction), as the sense certainly requires this reading.
Tr.
'
vol.
2
Kant
ii.,
Kritik
d. r.
Vernunft. Transc. Elementarlehre, Part
pp. 59, 60.)
Ibid
81. (vol.
iii ,
p. 86, et seq.)
I.,
I.
Werke,
Critique of Kant.
26
The
2.
Our knowing reason

matter of
to the
all
is
accordingly not creative in reference
phenomena and knowledge, but merely
It receives this
receptive.
hence the
Thing-in-itself.
matter in virtue of
dependent and conditioned.
latter is
its
sensuousness
And
here arises
the necessary inquiry concerning the origin of our impressions
Since these are the material which our faculties
or sensations.
of knowledge mould and form, they cannot themselves proceed
from the
latter,
but are rather the necessary conditions by which
And, since
these faculties are aroused and
set
they constitute the matter of
phenomena, we cannot derive
all
falling into the erroneous circle
them from phenomena, without

of
first
into activity.
deducing phenomena from impressions, and then im-
from
pressions
phenomena.
Indeed, they can
in
no way
originate from the world of sense, since the world of sense

arises
from them.
sensations
stitute
is
not
From
itself
but not that of knowledge.

all
appears that the origin of our
It is
the subject of necessary inquiry,
It is
something which precedes and
experience, but which itself can never be
ceived, nor experienced.

is
it
a phenomenon, and hence does not con-
a knowable object.
underlies
this
first
felt,
con-
This unknown and unknowable object
that transcendental Z' which the
Kantian doctrine must neces-
sarily
have met with in the course of
exactly, within the limits of
human
its
27
inquiry beyond, or,
more
reason.
There must be something which causes the impressions we

receive,
something which underlies our
sensibility,
and there-
with the whole constitution of our knowing reason, something

therefore which also underlies
sense-world.
But precisely on
all
phenomena and the
this
account
it
cannot
entire
itself
be
anything sensible, cannot be a phenomenon, cannot be an

object of knowledge.
calls Thing-in-itself,
This " supersensible substratum " Kant
designating thereby that transcendental
which the Critique of Pure Reason introduces, and which

itself,
on the grounds pointed
calculation.
phenomena.
sees
out, obliged to introduce into its
It is called thing-in-itself in distinction
from
all
If our reason were not sensuous, but divine, not
receptive, but creative, then

selves,
it
its
ideas would be things them-
then there would be no difference between phenomena
and things-in-themselves.
Since, however,
and time are the fundamental forms of
its
it is
sensuous, space
perception,
its
objects
of knowledge are phenomena, and these merely ideas, hence
not things-in-themselves.
gation of reason,
we must
Consequently, in the Critical investidistinguish between
phenomena and
things-in-themselves with the utmost precision, regarding every
attempt to unite the two as the cayse of irremediable confusion.
Critique of Kant.
28
Now, because the
which
objects
thing-in-itself, or the relations
numerous and so
unlike,
in Kant's teaching in so
it is
we
relate
which the
see
why
many and
themselves to the
latter sustains, are so
the thing-in-itself appears
For
different connections.
the supersensible substratum at once of our sensibility and
of the whole constitution of our
hidden ground of
subjective,
world.
all
knowing reason
hence
it is
phenomena, the objective as well
the
as the
and therefore the substratum of the entire sense
In reference to sense, which
matter of knowledge,
it
merely receptive of the
appears as the matter-giving principle,
In reference to the constitu-
or as the cause of our sensations.

tion of our
is
knowing reason
in general,
it
is
represented as the
hidden ground of our mode of perception and thought,
i.e.,
as
the cause of our perceiving and thinking, and mentally representing to ourselves objective and subjective phenomena.
phenomena
are in space and time,
Since
and hence consist throughout
in external relations, the thing-in-itself is called, in distinction
therefrom, "the inner, that which belongs to objects in themselves,"
an
expression which needs careful attention, lest the
radically false impression be received that the thing-in-itself lies
hidden somewhere
the thing-in-itself
in
is
phenomena.
The meaning
is rather,
that
not external, not related to another, hence
not in space and time at
all.
Since
all
phenomena
are empirical
objects, the thing-in-itself
transcendental object."
29
called in distinction therefrom "the
is
Since
all
phenomena
and not
are ideas,
objects external to and independent of thought, the thing-in-
" the true
called
itself is
phenomena alone
correlate
And, since
of our ideas."
are objects of knowledge, the thing-in-itself
denotes the bounds of our knowledge, or " the limiting notion of
our understanding.''
In
these manifold meanings
all
self-transforming Proteus, but one and the
the philosopher
is
same
He
Let us take Kant's own words.

"
The
see
thing,
no
which
obliged to exhibit from different points of
view according to the various relations which
space
we
transcendental notion of
it
sustains.
says in the doctrine of
phenomena
in space is
a reminder of the Critical philosophy that in general nothing
which
is
perceived in space
is
of things, which might be in
a thing-in-itself, nor space a form
itself in
some way
peculiar to them,
but that objects in themselves are for us, indeed, unknown, and
what we
call external objects are
of our sense, the form of which
which, however,
i.e.,
nor can be known

in experience."
'
Kant
Kr.
d. r.
nothing other than pure ideas

is
space, the true correlate of
the thing-in-itself,
and
for the latter
no
is
not thereby known,
quest, likewise,
is
made
" For the substantiation of this theory of the
Vemunft.
Tr.
Msth.
3.
{Werke,
vol.
ii.,
p. 68, seq)
Critique of Kant.
JO
ideality of external as well as internal sense,
hence of
of sense as pure phenomena, the observation
may be
service,
that
objects
all
of especial
which belongs to
everything in our knowledge
perception contains nothing except mere relations
namely, the
places in a perception (extension), change of place (motion),
and the laws according to which
mined (moving
this
What, however,
forces).
or what beyond the change of place

themselves,
is
not thereby given.
known through mere

noted
that, since
change of place
relations.
is
deter-
present in a place,
is
occasioned in the things
is
Now, a
thing-in-itself
Hence
it
is
is
not
to be carefully
nothing save pure ideas of relation are given
to us through external sense, this also can contain in
its
idea
only the relation of an object to the subject, and not the inner
nature,
that which belongs
to
in itself.
the object
With
internal
perception the conditions are the same."^
The
substratum of our external and internal perception
that of our external
tution of our
also
and internal phenomena, that of the consti-
knowing reason
and understanding
is
hence
as well as of our thought.
it
in general,
is
and of our
sensibility
the ground of our spatial ideas
Kant says
" That something which
underlies objective phenomena, and which so affects our sense
'
Kant
Kr.
d. r.
Vernunft.
Tr. jEsth. 8. (p. 83).
that
it
receives the ideas of space, matter, form, etc
regarded as
thing,
noumenon
as
better,
(or,
this
some-
transcendental
might also be
at the
same time the subject of thought
although, through the
mode
in
object),
affected,
we
receive
of space and
which our
no perception of
idea, will, etc., but only
This something, however,
determinations.
its
sensibility is thereby-
not "extended, not impenetrable, not composite, since

predicates belong only to sense and
are affected by such (otherwise
its
all
these
perceptions, so far as
unknown)
objects."
is
we
That we mentally represent objective and subjective phenomena, that we have

ceive
and think
We
reason.
as
"
and understanding, that we per-
herein consists the organization of our knowing
discover that, but not why, our reason
and not otherwise.
it is,
The
sensibility
To
take Kant's
cluded,
amount
to the following :
namely, that of space (a
filling
if
own words
again
everything imaginary be ex-
How
is
impossible to answer.
never be
Kant
filled,
Kr.
And
external perception
of the same, form and motion)
But
in a thinking subject in general possible ?
'
constituted
notorious question concerning the community of thought
and extension would consequently,
is
this
gap
in
this question
it is
our knowledge can
but only in so far characterised, that external
d. r.
Vernunft.
Tr. Dialektik ; Krit. 2 Paralog, (p. 667).
Critique of Kant.
32
ascribed to a transcendental object which
phenomena be
is
the
an object, however, which we by no
cause of this sort of ideas
means know, and of which we can never obtain a notion.
may
the problems that
all
treat these
arise in the field of experience,
In
we
as objects in themselves, without troub-
phenomena
ling ourselves about the original
ground of their
possibility (as
we go beyond
the limits of experi-
ence, the notion of a transcendental object
becomes necessary."^
phenomena).
however,
If,
The philosopher Eberhard,

Leibnitzian
doctrine
of knowledge
Kant's
Reason was unnecessary and superfluous,

the latter that
namely,
ing
without
sensations
which we
Kant
was not able
it
will,"
he
says,
" we
invalidates this stricture
He replies
it.
of Criticism
only
"
it
who
in Halle,
held that after the

Critique
made the
of Pure
criticism
upon
to explain the matter of sense
"Choose
things-in-themselves.
come upon
by
Now that is
at
things-in-themselves."
once admitting and correct-
precisely the constant assertion
does not set the ground of the matter of
sensuous ideas anew in things, as objects of sense, but in something supersensible, something which
lies at the basis
and of which we can have no knowledge.

'
of sense,
Criticism
says
Objects, as things-in-themselves, give the matter for empirical
'
Kant
lehre.
Kr.
Werke,
d. r.
vol.
Vernunft.
ii.,
Beirachiung
p. 696, seq.)
iiber d.
Summe
d.
rdnen
Seelen-
perceptions (they contain
ground
the
representative faculty according to
its
33
determining
for
the
sensuousness), but they
are not that matter.' "'
In order to a just estimate and criticism of the Kantian philosophy,
vital
scope.
It
too
to the objects of
them, as
shell,
if
in its origin
and development as well
commonly happens
when
sidedly taken, as
The
importance that the doctrine of the thing-in-
be understood
itself
its
of
it is
that
is
it
falsely
as in
and one-
things-in-themselves are referred merely
knowledge or phenomena, and transferred
to
they were contained in them, like the kernel in the
only that they remain hidden from us as sentient beings.
Empiricists, who, like
Bacon and Locke, granted the
validity
of no other than sensible knowledge, declared things-in-them-
be unknowable, while the Rationalists, as Descartes
selves to
and Leibnitz, held sense to be confused understanding;

and
distinct thinking,
clear
on the contrary, to be the true form of
knowledge, and therefore things-in-themselves to be the true
Then
objects of knowledge.
nomena
are the same objects
as they appear to us
'
Vide
Kant
Ueber eine
Vernunft durch eine

iii.,
things-in-themselves and phe-
when
when
perceived, they are things
clearly
and
distinctly thought.
Entdeckung nach der
dltere entbehrlich
gemacht werden
alle
soil
neue Kritik der

790).
Werke, vol.
p. 352.
3.
Critique of Kant.
34
on the contrary, they are things as they are
same thing
is,
therefore, according to
whether by sense or by
or distinctly phenomenon
in themselves.
the way in which
The
it
is
apprehended
understanding, whether
obscurely
or
precisely this confusion
to
especially that of
The thing-in-itself is the
of phenomena,
because
it is
that of our sensibility,
tions,
itself
its
metaphysics.
him, both the above notions are to be absolutely
distinguished.
is
In
Kant saw the fundamental error of the
Dogmatic philosophy, and

According
thing-in-itself.
that of our
which
supersensible substratum
knowing reason,
because
it
has, but does not create, sensa-
and receives impressions, which can be caused neither by

nor by one of
its
objects.
CHAPTER
II.
THE KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY AS DOCTRINE OF FREEDOM.

Kantian Realism and Idealism.
I.
T T is
not our purpose at this point to inquire whether the fun-
damental doctrines of Kant accord or discord with one

another, whether, and in
how
far,
they are uncontroverted, or
We
indeed recognized as incontrovertible.

to fix in
mind
themselves,
desire here simply
that the recognition of the reality of things-in-
and of
their distinction
essential part of those doctrines.
from phenomena,
This recognition
is
is
an
related to
the doctrine of the ideality of phenomena, as the thing-in-itself

to the latter,
at
and
it
thus forms in the doctrinal edifice of Kant
once the substructure and the
Transcendental idealism.
To deny
necessary
completion
of
or misapprehend the reality
of things-in-themselves and their distinction from phenomena
means
When
to
shake the foundations of the Critical philosophy.
the reality of things-in-themselves
is
indeed affirmed, but
yet they are not properly distinguished from

arises that confusion of both
phenomena, there
which constitutes the character
Critique
36
of Kant.
and fundamental error of the Dogmatic philosophy.

were merely things-in-themselves, and no phenomena,
all
know-
were merely phenomena
If there
ledge would be impossible.
If there
and no things-in-themselves, the sense-world we conceive would

be a dream z. dream
common to
us
all,
to be sure,
and harmonious
in itself, but yet
a purely subjective image without actual ground
or consistence.
The knowableness of
ideality,
i.e.,
in
its
the world consists in
its
being through and through capable of repre-
sentation in thought, and in
being so represented.
its
This
characteristic the Critical philosophy, as Transcendental idealism,
teaches and establishes.

that which underlies all
and
all
faculties of
The
phenomena
thought
Critique as "thing-in-itself."
nomena may be
world consists in
reality of the
and
-since
which
it
is
underlies
all
ideas
designated by the
In this sense the doctrine of phe-
called the Kantian Idealism, the doctrine of
things-in-themselves the Kantian Realism.
II.
The
1.
Thing-in-itself as Will.
Intelligible Causality.
Kant regards things-in-themselves as the supersensible substratum of our knowing reason and sense-world, as the mattergiving principle, or as the cause of our sensations.
to them, accordingly, a causality
which
is
to
He
ascribes
be taken in an
Doctrine of Freedom.
from that
sense
different
entirel;^
37
category of cause which
determines the succession of phenomena in time, and thereby
both renders our experience possible and creates

also,
the
precisely
account,
that
This notion
latter.
may be
on
has
but which
it,
only within
validity
a rule of the understanding, which
is
applied only to phenomena, hence not to things-in-
Kant knew
themselves.
this,
and taught
We
it.
assume that such a thinker has entangled himself

doctrines in so clumsy and apparent a
manner
as
must not
own
in his
composedly
to apply to things-in-themselves the very same notion which he
had shown
to be invalid for
Kant distinguishes two
them.
of causality, which are inherently and essentially unlike
conditioned or sensible," and " the unconditioned or

ble."
The former
of which in time
is
is
valid only for
determined and constituted by
Now, things-in-themselves
time.
hence their causality
is
the
"the
intelligi-
phenomena, the succession
not valid for phenomena, and
latter is
sorts
is
it
alone
independent of
are timeless
unconditioned
and
and
the
all
causal;
intelligible,
which, according to Kant's doctrine, consists in Freedom or in
pure
will
and
this constitutes the
2.
There
is
still
moral principle of the world.
The Moral Order of
the
World.
another world than the sensible and temporal
Critique
of Kant.
intelligible
world,
38
namely,
world,
an
which
a world which
completely
is
must not be thought
independent of the former
of and sought after as a heavenly world of spirits existing
somewhere beyond our common experience, yet of necessity
in space
and time
Mysticism
but
in
this
would be the way to Swedenborg's
one which we recognize as the moral world, that
which the laws of freedom
The
ment.
world
is
intelligible
world
the World as Idea
the thing-in-itself, and
is
But
independent of the
just as the sensible
faculty of
world
the former
phenomena
while this
is
is
Kant
latter.
in other words,
Herewith
is
it
is
hence
dependent upon
will, or,
to our practical reason
independent of the former, while the
upon the
related to
it.
related to the intelligible, so our
knowledge must be related to the
same thing, our theoretical
is
the basis of the sense-world
latter,
fulfil-
the World as Will, the sensible
Vorstellung)
lies at
and
find their recognition
the latter as thing-in-itself to
it is
still
former
what
is
the latter
He
is
dependent
is
that relation determined
called the " Primacy of Practical Reason."
the
which
saw himself
obliged to hold the reality and causality of things-in-themselves,
and to
identify the latter, as intelligible causality, with
freedom
or pure will, and thus to teach the primacy of practical reason.
In other words, the true or real principle of the world

ing to Kant, not knowing reason, but
will.
is,
accord-
Doctrine oj Freedom.
The
goal of our will
according to the law of freedom, the
This goal
purity of volition.
the endeavour finds
its
which constitutes the

Since,
is,
39
is
to be striven for
and attained
expression in the purification of the
real
will,
foundation-theme of the moral world.
now, without the sense-world no sensuous motives or
appetites could be operative in us, hence no material of purification
given,
it
becomes
unobstructed as to
its
own
clear
that
the
laws, constitutes a necessary
and an integral part of the moral world
and swayed by the
sense-world,
entire
latter;
that
it
is
member
compassed
and that the laws of nature are
subordinate to the laws of freedom, although they are thereby in
no way suspended or annulled.

sensible
life
As thus understood,
acquires a moral meaning, and becomes a moral
phenomenon, in which a definite disposition,

definite state of purity or impurity, reveals
The constancy of this

necessitated,
character.
our
i.e.,
the will in a
and manifests
itself.
makes our moral conduct seem
to be the consequence of our given empirical
But since
which appears
disposition
i.e.,
it is
the disposition, or tendency of the
in our empirical character
and forms
its
will,
principle,
the latter must be ?iphenomenon of will, or a willed phenomenon,

i.e.,
a phenomenon of the intelligible character or of freedom.
Here we
see
how
Kant's doctrine of intelligible and empirical
character necessarily follows from his doctrine of freedom and
Critique of Kant.
40
and space there
ideality of time
Without the
purification.
possibility of a sense-world, but also
no
Without a sense-world and freedom there
is
no
possibility of freedom.
is
no necessity
for the
no moral phenomena of a sensible and
purification of the will,
empirical sort, hence no empirical character as a manifestation of

the intelligible, and no
community of freedom and necessity
the conduct and characters of men.
Because Kant
first
made
in
this
unity of freedom and necessity intelligible, Schopenhauer was led

to call
And
it
" the greatest of
since the
way
all
the contributions of
human thought."
won
only through the
to this insight could be
doctrine of space and time, the

scendental .Esthetic
same
and the doctrine of
writer extolled the Tranintelligible
and empirical
character as " the two diamonds in the crown of Kantian fame."
III.
The Doctrine of God and Immortality.

I
The Idea and
Kantian Theism.
recognition of the moral order of the world
involves the question regarding the original ground of the same,

as
also that
regarding the attainability of
namely, the purity of the
will,
or moral perfection,
attainable in a temporal, but only in an eternal
the immortality of the soul.
highest
end,
The moral author of the world
will.
God, and the purity of the
its
is
is
not to be
life, i.e.,
through
According to Kant, the Ideas of
41
Freedom, God, and Immortality go hand

Critique
hand.
in
In the
of Pure Reason they are merely Ideas fideenj, but
in
the Critique of Practical Reason they have the value of realities

and, indeed,
it
is
only through the reality of freedom and the
moral order of the world that the other two Ideas also are
realized or
made morally
certain.
It is utterly
impossible, from
the point of view of the world of sense, to comprehend and
demonstrate the existence of freedom, God, and immortality.

Indeed,
all
proofs directed to that end with the means furnished
by our theoretical reason must necessarily
fail.
Critical inquiry
reveals the fact that these objects are incapable of demonstra

tion,
reality
while at the same time
leaves the question of their
it
Now, the doctrine of
untouched.
the ideality of time
and space, and of the sense-world, has already established the

possibility of freedom.
But since time
can distinguish ourselves from

then, something in us which
timeless something
under which the

activity of the
is
freedom
fact of
it,
is
is
and must do
independent of
and as
it
we
purely our idea,
is
so.
all
There
time
is,
this
the only condition
our moral self-consciousness and the
moral law within us can take place, not only the
possibility, but the actuality of
freedom
is
to be affirmed.
The
-moral order of the world consists in the fulfilment of the laws of
freedom.
Without
this
moral order they would remain empty
Critique of Kant,
42
they would not be laws, and freedom
There
fancy.
follows,
itself
from the moral order of the world, to

reality of the
moral
attainability of the
moral
which the sensible must be subordinate, the

ground of the world (God), and the
in itself the perfection of
end of the world, which includes

will,
would be a mere
and therefore immortality.
the
These are the so-called moral
arguments with which Kant sought to demonstrate, through

freedom, the primacy of practical reason and the necessary
fulfilment
of
its
postulates
the
existence
of
God and
the
immortality of the soul.
These moral proofs have won
for
Kant many adherents, on
account of their religious importance and the ease with which

they are comprehended
but,
owing to their apparent inconsis-
tency with the results of the

antagonists as well,
honest criticism,
Kant sought
first
Critique, they
who have made them
now
of ridicule.
in the Critique
It
have found
the subject
now
of
has been asserted that
of Practical Reason, but with weak
arguments, to raise up again as a makeshift for weak souls what
he had already destroyed, and with conclusive argument, in the

Critique of Pure Reason.
Among
the writers on the Critical
philosophy, Schopenhauer, in particular,

this
view,
theism.
and the most pronounced
is
the representative of
opponent of Kantian
The
43
doctrine of freedom and the absolute supremacy of the
moral order of the world, or the doctrine of the primacy of practical
reason, rests with
Kant upon
proof for the existence of
Regarding the
Kant held
inquiry.
God
firm ground.
stands or
falls
The moral
with this doctrine.
demonstrability of God's existence,
theoretical
different views at different stages of his philosophical
In his pre-Critical period he sought to restate these
proofs and give
them new cogency
in the
Critique of Pure
Reason he not only denied, but refuted them, or demonstrated

their impossibility
and
in the Critique of Practical Reason,
as
well as in that of Teleological fudgment, he neither abandons nor
modifies this last position, but, in perfect agreement with
deduces
using
the well-known and evident arguments
it,
from
the necessity of the moral order of the world, the necessity of
the moral ground of the world, or the existence
of
God.
Accordingly, in what concerns the question of the demonstrability

of the divine existence,
we
find
no contradiction
in the different
views of Kant, but a logically consistent advance.

differently
he may have thought on
knowableness of
God
there
this
point
was not a moment
the development of his philosophical
namely,
the
in the course of
convictions
denied, or even only doubted, the reality of God.

still
But, however
when he
And
there
is
a second and a third point which remained unquestionably
Critique
44
of Kant.
1
tendency,
and even
him,
certain _to
when he
at
the time of his most sceptical^
ridiculed Swedenborg's
world and of our intercourse with

that morality
is
it
dreams of a
mean
spirit-
his conviction!
independent of every sort of scientific knowledge,!

i
as well as of every doubt that
may shake
the spiritual world as well as spiritual
and that
intercourse
consists,
the latter
merely in a moral community, or in the moral order of the

world.^
The Kantian Doctrine of Immortality.
2.
On
the other hand, the
way
which the summum lonum
in
conceived in the Critique of Practical Reason
the
being produced with the aid of the Ideas of

tality
involves a
And
it
will
series of difficult
notion of
is
it
God and immor-
and doubtful conside^tjons.
be advisable, in order to gain a correct apprehension
of the matter, that
we
take up our criticism of this doctrine of
Kant's along with
its
characterization.
philosophy sees
entirely
itself necessitated
new view
For, since the Critical
from the standpoint of
of the world to affirm immortality,
it
its
is all-
important that this affirmation be properly understood.
The summum bonum
is
recognised by Kant as the unification
of virtue and happiness, as that state of blessedness which
'Cf.
K. Fischer
Gesch. d. n. Philos., vol.
iii.,
is
pp. 229, 230, 252-254, 264, 265.
45
merited by our worthiness, and appointed us by the justice of
God.
It is
because the purity of the
will
yet cannot be attained in this our present
of Practical Reason postulates a future
must be
attained,
and
that the Critique
life,
life, i.e.,
the continuance
and permanence of our personal existence, or the immortality of

the soul.
We
will test this
conception of the matter exactly
according to the canons which the Critical philosophy prescribes

for us.
In the
first
place,
it is
not at
all
clear
why
purity of disposi-
tion should be absolutely unattainable during our earthly exist-
In
ence.
Kant has himself contradicted
reality,
in his doctrine of religion.
conditions
this assertion
For he there exempts from these
not merely the ideal Saviour, but
the historical
person Jesus, expressly declaring that His example would not
be practical and
Him
effectual if this purity should
or ascribed to
Hence
Him
be either denied
as a supernatural, miraculous power.^
the proposition that the goal of our moral perfection can
be attained only in a future and eternal
This objection aside,
it
is
life
does not stand proof.
further not evident in what respect
Perma-
the permanence of our existence
is
to help the matter.
nence, like duration in general,
is
a time-determination, and as
'
Cf.
K. Fischer
Gesch. d. n. Philos., vol. iv., pp. 309, 310, 321, 322.
46
Critique of Kant.
such
within time and the sense-world.
it falls
perfection
is
now, moral
If,
not attainable in the present sense-world, owing to
the temporal and sensible nature of our existence, then
will
it
remain unattainable in the future sense-world, since the conditions of
its
impossibility are in
no way removed. The eternal
must be distinguished from the temporal

is
not to be regarded as eternal
gretted that
Kant
this distinction.
life.
even endless existence
And
it
is
much
to
in his doctrine of immortality did not
He demands
life
be
re-
make
" an existence and personality of
the same rational being enduring to infinity."
But
future
immortality
if
life,
is
we must ask
recognised as continued existence or
Hoiv can our personality
still
continue
within time and the sense-world after our bodily existence has
ceased
By a second
earthly birth (transmigration of souls),
or by removal to another, perhaps less dense, planet, as Jupiter,

for
example
possible
else
what
Kant himself
or by wandering
in
earlier
life
held to be
through the starry heavens, or
how
Such questions present themselves, and yet they admit of
no answer, or only a
fanciful
one
so that the doctrine of the
immortality of the soul, considered as a lasting duration of our

personal existence in time and in the sense-world,
'
Cf. Fischer
iii.,
is
p. 148.
degraded
from a postulate of
practical reason to
47
an object of imagination
and phantasy.
According to the demands of practical reason, our worthiness
is to
be the cause of our happiness, our purity that of our salvaIf
tion.
we have
and receive
it
attained the
first
we have merited the second,
from the hand of God.
Now, we
fail
from purity
sort of happiness that does not follow of itself

still
to be added.
Self-denial
complete,
is
all
love and self-seeking are subdued, and thus
make
us unhappy have vanished.
to see what
motives of
all
The pangs
still
lacks anything,
it
of an evil conIf this
can only be the fulness of
outward goods, as compensation for the outward

it
self-
the evils which
science have given place to the peace of a good one.
blessedness
is
evils suffered
seeming, perhaps, that after achieving the heaven of a good
conscience
we ought
Abraham's bosom
also,
It is
in his doctrine of morals
upon the most

happiness,
summum
rigid
speaking in
figure,
to
revel
not clear with what right Kant,
in
who
maintained and emphatically insisted
and even painful separation of morality and
now demands,
in
order to the production of the
honum, the necessary unification of the two under the
constant presupposition of their fundamentally
different origin.
Morality follows from the pure
happiness from
will, striving for
the empirical will or self-love, which desires everything that pro-
Critique of Kant.
48
motes
its
well-being.
Is,
and eternal
then, striving for future
happiness less eudsemonistic, less covetous and

striving for present happiness
selfish,
Kant's teaching says: Seek thou
before everything purity of disposition, and happiness
Thou
to thee of itself in virtue of divine justice.
this
hope were
and requisition
servants,
sliall fall
shalt not desire
and demand happiness, but thou mayst indeed hope

though
than
for
it.
,
As
not, too, a silent expectancy, covetousness,
(With such a hope we are much
who demand
like the polite
nothing, even assure you they will take
nothing, yet at the same time furtively open the hand. ^

All these
weak points
in the
Kantian doctrine of immortality,
as they present themselves to us in the postulates of practical
reason,
may be
xj/cvSoi lies
traced to one fundamental error.
in the fact that divine justice is
standard of temporal justice, and
made
The
apprehended
Trpwrov
after the
to consist in retribution.
Accordingly, the disproportion between virtue and happiness in
our present
be
first
life
demands an equalization which can and should
realised in a future state.
Kant established penal
justice,
the administration of which belongs to the power of the State,
on the notion of the necessity of

notion he
and
now founds a reward-dispensing
infallible administration
God, and
retribution.
first
of which
exercised in the
life
is
On
the same
justice, the perfect
only possible through
beyond.
He
thus degrades
eternal
to a future
life
makes
personality,
life,
49
immortality to a mere permanence of
purity tantamount to a goal
which
unattainable in the present, and the moral

states of perfection with
in hand.
which the
Following this view,
it
states of
life
is
absolutely
to a series of
recompense go hand
must be demanded, as Emil
Arnoldt has already aptly remarked,' that the degree of happiness
be adapted and proportioned to the moral quality of our
hence that the impurity of the

corresponding punishments.
purified has
still
will
will,
be accompanied with the
And, as a
will
not completely
the character of impurity, divine justice would
be compelled to exercise
its office
of retribution in the other
world chiefly by inflicting greater or less penalties, which would
be appointed us according to the greater or

impurity.
less
degree of
oilr
In this way we find ourselves in the midst of the
labyrinth of the Platonic doctrines of immortality and retributioUj
while following the threads of the Kantian.

It is further
God
not evident why, in our present
as granting rewards, and, in the future
penalties, should in each case cease or
are led to infer, since
Kant
doctrine of immortality.
'
E. Arnoldt
life,
life,
the justice of
as inflicting
be suspended, which we
scarcely mentions the latter in his
Why
Ueber Aant's Ideen
are the countless inequalities
vom
hSchsten Gut.
(Kbnigsberg, 1874),
PP' 7-I3-
go
of Kant.
Critique
between virtue and happiness permitted even
in this
world
if
they actually are, indeed, the inequalities which they seem to us

to be ?
omnipresence and justice of
If they are not, as the
compel us
to believe, then
which divine
justice
is
to
even those conditions disappear under
assume
and character of an equalizing
Kant wanted
to
God
first
in a future life the office
retribution.
harmonize his new doctrine of freedom with
the old doctrine of immortality and of retribution in a future

world, and he sought to do this by recognizing and defending
the latter as a necessary postulate of the former.
must necessarily have

by the principles of the
of
God remains
for us
failed,
This attempt
and, indeed, have been frustrated
Critical philosophy itself.
If the activity
an unsearchable mystery, as Kant taught
and must have taught, then he could not consistently have

attempted to unveil the mode of activity of the divine justice, and
have sought to determine
according to a standard that
it
subject to the conditions of time.
And even
saying nothing of
the fact that he unjustifiably apprehended this

as retribution,
hensible, he
and permitted
still
was not
it
to appear as
mode
of activity
something compre-
justified in representing this divine
retribution as inoperative in the present temporal state,

first
to be looked for in the future
Our aim
is
to
is
and as
life.
judge the Kantian doctrine of immortality
1;
according to the fundamental canons of the Critical philosophy,
and we
desire, therefore, to
not to reject
new
it
amend
doctrine of freedom
radically
and that the
scendental Idealism a
agreement with them,
For we certainly appreciate that the
altogether.
immortality also,
in
it
changes
latter
new stadium
the
enters
doctrine of
Tran-
through
Now, the
of affirmation.
apprehension as well as the determination of the problem pf

immortality depends upon the question whether we, with
that constitutes our being, are in time
If time
and space are
conditions of
all
of them, then
it
change
then
all
the
and space, or these
all-comprehensive,
all
in us.
fundamental
existence, so that nothing can be independent
matter alone which persists, while
is
particular things
its
forms
must originate and pass away
then no single being, no individual, hence also no person, can

perpetually endure
on the contrary, each one has a
duration in time which
is
so
bound up with
definite
his being that the
limits of this duration are the insurmountable limits of personal
existence.
Under
this presupposition,
according to which time
and space are things, or determinations of
things-in-themselves,
there remains nothing further for us than either, in agreement
with the above assumption, to deny every sort of individual (personal)
immortality, or, in
contradiction to
it,
to affirm
and
conceive of the latter in a wholly fanciful manner, merely to
Critique
52
satisfy certain
of Kant.
needs of the inner nature.
decay take place in time, aiid are only possible in time.

ever
is
can neither originate nor pass away
Since, now, time as such
eternal.
the necessary form of thought,
phenomena, which depend

they appear, or
being, however, since
nomena,
it
is itself
hence
It is
it is
no
upon a being
no phenomenon
all
it
time
is
This
not in time, but time in

i.e.,
timeless, or eternal.
phenomena should
impossible that certain
originate,
ad
infinitum.
and
It
phenomena should pass away,
of actually perishing, continue to exist in time
and the sense-world

in
to
constitutes the condition of all phe-
independent of
yet, instead
only
things in time are ideas or
conceives and knows them.
just as impossible that certain
and
this alone is
thing-in-itself, but
for their existence
who
it
all
is
then, instead of passing away, continue to exist

is
What-
wholly independent of time, or has the character of time-
less being,
whom
and
All origination
in
some
secret manner.
which the immortality of the human
Yet
this is the
soul
is
way
commonly
conceived
namely,
time
once aflSrmed and denied, and death thus regarded in
is
at
reality as
The
the perishableness of
human
existence in
a mere formality.
true notion of immortality coincides with that of eternity.
Such immortality the

through
its
new
Critical
philosophy affirms and establishes
doctrines of time and space, of the ideality of our
53
sense-world, and of the reality of that supersensible substratum
which
the basis of our theoretical reason and
lies at
nomena, and which Kant called "
objects of sense are throughout
life
entire sense-world
is
Now,
phenomenal so
has the character of a pure phenomenon
phe-
and exhibited
thing-in-itself,"
as the principle of the moral order of the world.

all
its
just as
also our sense-
and
just as the
the manifestation of the intelligible or moral
man
order of the world, so the empirical character of

manifestation of his intelligible character
transitory, this timeless
and
eternal.
The
that
is
is
the
temporal and
eternity of our intelli-
gible being must, like freedom, be affirmed, although immortality,

as thus truly apprehended, cannot be represented to the mind,
or drawn in the imagination, since to conceive
means
it
pictorially,
it
altogether.
to
make
it
it,
or to fashion
temporal and therewith to deny
Since without sensuous ideas there are no know-
able objects, the immortality of the soul can never be theoretically
demonstrated.
But since
condition of time, which
our being
is
all
sensuous ideas stand under the
is itself
merely the form of our thought,
timeless or eternal, and the immortality of the soul
can never be refuted
all
proofs directed against the doctrine are
just as futile as the theoretical
arguments for
the reality of time, and what
is
of our being, are
first
falsely
really
it.
On
either side,'
tantamount to the mortality
assumed
and then the one,
in
Critique
54
of Kant.
order to establish the immortality of the soul, demonstrates
its
immateriality and indestructibility, while the other, in order to

refute the
same proposition, proves the
opposite position with proofs which are equally invalid.
of immortality.
to
be driven out of the
their
by demonstrating the
impossibility, but they cannot be nullified
qpponents are not
and
materiality
may be confuted by showing
Invalid proofs
perishability.
soul's
Hence
by demonstrations
field
But one may, indeed, and without overstepping
the bounds of a proper use of reason, oppose to
which they cannot
refute,
and which
"
theoretically demonstrable.
itself
makes no claim
The Doctrine
Critique of Pure Reason contains, in
its
them an hypothesis
to
be
of Methods " in the
section
on the "Discipline
of Pure Reason in reference to Hypotheses," a most noteworthy
and
characteristic passage,
in
which Kant commends to
his
adherents the doctrine of immortality in just such an hypothetical

form, in order that they
antagonists.
may make
"If, then,"
he
says,
use of
it
in
opposing their
"as opposing
itself to
the
assumed
(in
as being
something immaterial and not subject to bodily trans-
any but a speculative connection) nature of the
soul,
formations, you should meet with the difficulty of the argument,

that
experience,
nevertheless,
seems to show that both the
increased capacity and the derangement of our mental powers

are merely different modifications of our organs,
you can weaken
the force of this proof by assuming that our bodies are nothing
but
\ki& fundamental phenomenon, to
and herewith
faculty of sense,
present state
The
(life).
which as condition the entire
all
thought, refers
separation from the
itself in
body
the
would
then be the end of this sensible use of your faculty of knowledge,
and the beginning of the
The body would
intellectual.
consequently not be the cause of thought, but merely an impeding condition of
it,
and hence to be regarded, indeed, as a
furthering of sensible and animal
life,
but yet just in such mea-
sure as also a hindrance to pure, spiritual
pendence of the animal
life
new
query,
it
The
fortuity of generation, for
does, with
man
has
life,
its
humours and
throws a great
caprices,
difficulty in the
and contingent circumstances.
little
example
as well as with the non-rational
the lasting existence of a creature whose

trifling
state of
upon circumstance, and even upon sustenance, upon
the conduct of
vice
upon the
which has been as yet either unsuggested or not
depending, as
upon
life
But you might go even farther and trace out some
sufficiently pursued.
creatures,
Thus the de-
upon the bodily constitution proves
nothing as to the dependence of the mental

our organs.
life.
to
and often indeed
way of the notion of
life
This
began under such

difficulty,
however,
do with the question of the permanence (here upon
earth) of the whole race, since the contingency in individual
$6
cases
But
of Kant.
Critique
is
nevertheless on that account subject to general rule.
to expect in reference to every individual
effect
such a far-reaching
from so insignificant conditions, seems certainly question-
But
able.
in
opposition to this query you
transcendental hypothesis, that

intelligible
that
is strictly
offer
speaking only
not subject to time-mutations
is
it
all life
could
that
it
neither has a beginning in birth, nor will find an end in death

that this life
is
nothing but a pure phenomenon
of the pure, spiritual
life
i.e.,
a sensuous idea
that the entire sense- wo rid
is
merely
an image, which hovers before us on account of our present
and which,
faculty of knowledge,
reality in itself; that if
as they are,
we were
we should
like
a dream, has no objective
to perceive ourselves
see ourselves
natures, our only true intercourse with

birth,
nor
will
nomenon).
all this
in
a world of spiritual
which neither began
Now, although we do not know the
which we here
it
offer as a
in earnest
least thing of
defence against our opponents,
it is all
by no means an Idea of
the reason, but merely a notion thought out as a
we
at
cease with the death of the body (as mere phe-
nor even maintain
defence
and things
are, nevertheless,
with reason, since
have exhausted
all
proceeding in
strict
weapon of
accordance
we only show the opponent, who thinks
to
the possibilities of the matter by erroneously
declaring that the want of
its
empirical conditions
is
a proof of
'
the perfect impossibility of what
can just as
span, by the
little
is
57
believed by us, that he
mere laws of experience, the
we
entire field of possible things considered in themselves, as
outside of experience can achieve anything in a well-founded
way
Whoever
our reason.
for
resorts
such hypothetical
to
remedies for the assumptions of an over-confident disputant
must not be held responsible

real opinions.
He
for them, as if they
were his own
abandons them as soon as he has silenced
the dogmatic presumption of his antagonist.
modest and moderate
certainly
it
is,
For,
when one merely
to or disagrees with the views of another,
however
objects
always becomes,
it
soon as one would have his objections recognized as
just as
proofs of the opposite, a no less arrogant and presuming claim
than
he had made a
if
direct attack
upon the position of the
affirmative party."
It will
not be
difficult to
ing immortality what
determine in this hj'pothesis regard-
to~be ascribed to the
is
theoretical
mode
of
conception and the method of Kant, and what to be regarded

as his
own most inward
conviction.
based upon the new doctrine of the

sense-world
'
Kant
that
Kr.
pp. 583-585.)
d. r.
Conviction
ideality of
plainly
it
is
time and the
our sense-life has the character of a mere
Vemunft.
Cf. Fischer
Methodenlehre, Part
I, sec. 3.
iii.,
Werke, vol.
pp. 530, 531.
ii.
Critique of Kant.
S8
phenomenon, and that our intelligible being
hence timeless and
time,
eternal
free,
sense- world were nothing but a
dream
is
independent of
and immortal.
all
If the
that floated before us, or
a scene which we contemplated like a theatrical performance,

then
it
self-evident that
is
of imagination
for the
we should
survive this passive state
end of the dream
not that of the
is
But the
dreamer, nor the end of the play that of the spectator.
matter
We
not so simple.
is
sense- world, but active in
it
theatre, but actors as well.
are not only perceptive of the
not merely spectators in the world's

In other words, the world has no
place for spectators but the stage

live
and
act,
where we appear
this is the
as performers,
time contemplate and recognize our
scene where
and
at the
own performance.
accordingly, actor and spectator are in so far one that,
looker-on ceases to be a performer,
With our existence
looker-on.
in the
we
same
Here;
when the
he also ceases to be a
world of sense, our con-
templation of things, and even the appearance of things, vanishes.
With our
with
it
sense-life our sensuous
that
and time.
thought perishes, and together
knowledge the fundamental forms of which are space

Corresponding to our timeless being there
state of timeless
is
the
knowing, or of that intellectual perception
which has immediate knowledge of the inner nature of things.

It is this
organ of knowledge which Kant means when, in the
59
passage cited above, he sanctions the assertion that " our body
is
nothing but the fundamental phenomenon, to which, as con-
dition,
the entire faculty of sense, and herewith
relates itself in the present state
the body
all
thinking,
" that " the separation
from
the end of the sensible use of our faculty of know-
is
ledge and the beginning of the intellectual " and that " If we
;
were to perceive ourselves and things as they

see ourselves in a world of spiritual natures.''
knowing can belong,
as
Kant elsewhere
are,
If,
we should
now, timeless
teaches,^ only to the
Primitive Being, then the end of our sensible existence
is
to be
regarded as a return to God, and our eternal or purely spiritual

life
as a
appetites
in
life
on account of which Kant
of immortality
all
sensuous
Then
rejects,
in his practical doctrine
demanded the endless duration of our personal

purity would not constitute the
goal, but the condition
hauer
With sensuous thought
must have disappeared, and thereby that need of
purification,
existence.
God.
and character of immortal
problem and
life.
Schopen-
along with the Kantian theism, the doctrine of im-
mortality which
is
expounded
in the Critique
of Practical Reason,
as coinciding with the doctrine of retribution.
He
affirms the
immortality of our being on the ground of the Transcendental
Cf. supra.
The
Thing-in-itself.
6o
Critique of Kant.
Esthetic.
He
says:
"Did one wish
demand, as has so often
to
happened, the permanence of individual consciousness, in order

to couple with
would
and
reward or punishment in a future world,
it
it
be only a question of the compatibility of virtue
in fact
But these two
selfishness.
never embrace each other
will
"
they are diametrical opposites."
The adequate answer
to the
question of the permanence of the individual after death lies in
Kant's great doctrine of the ideality of time, which proves

just here especially fruitful, since,
yet well elucidated insight,
it
itself
by a thoroughly theoretical,
makes compensation
dogmas,
for
which lead on the one hand as well as on the other to absurdities,
and thus
a stroke does away with the most prolific of
at
all
metaphysical questions. Beginning, end, permanence, are notions
which borrow their significance
from time, and conse-
solely
quently are valid only under the presupposition of the
But time has no absolute existence, nor
is it
the sort or
latter.
mode
of
being /^Tw of things, but merely the form of our knowledge of our
own
existence and of that of
count
it is
all
things
and precisely on that
very incomplete, and limited to
Since, now,
is
it
ac-
mere phenomena."*
absolutely impossible for our reason as at
present constituted to form for itself an idea of the state of
'
A. Schopenhauer
p. 564.
Cf. his
Die Weltals Wille und Vorstellung,
Parerga und Paralipomena,
vol.
ii.,
vol.
ii.,
fifth edition,
fourth edition, 137.
timeless being and knowing,
know anything
is
we must conclude
in the least of the
life after
dogma
not intended to defend the
that
death.
Kant chose,
that
as
desirable
that this hypo-
of immortality, but
only to combat the opponents of the dogma.

very noteworthy
we cannot
It is
Kant expressly declares
to note, therefore, that

thesis
6i
Yet
best
remains
it
the
illustrating
" hypotheses of pure reason " which he permitted and justified

for polemical use, precisely this doctrine
the doctrine, namely,
which exhibits our present existence as a mere phenomenon or

sensuous idea of our eternal and intelligible
If
life.
we compare
the Kantian doctrine of immortality as expressed in this hypothesis of pure reason with the
the practical reason,
we
see that eternal
as timeless, supersensible,
there
it is
life in
and purely
hence
contrary, as temporal,
same doctrine
sensible,
as a postulate of
life is
there conceived
spiritual
here,
and needing
God
first
and space.
purification
regarded as completion, which we are to conceive as

;
on the other hand, as an endless process
here,
of moral purification, subject to divine retribution.

to the
on the
conception, our eternal
What
is
life is
independent of time
called the state of the soul after death
for our present faculty of knowledge, mysterium
" the tiresome query
According
forever silenced, since
When
it
is
Where ? and
now
How
magnum.
?
"
is
is,
And
herewith
senseless and absurd, seeking
62
Critique of Kant.
But, accord-
timeless and spaceless existence in time
and space.
ing to the second conception, the soul
to continue
is
its
existence
to experience a series of progressive states of
after death,
is
purification,
hence
is
at a definite period of
to live
on in time and the sense-world
time
must leave the body, seek a new
place of abode, take on a
it
new form of
life
and since
all this
can only take place in space and time, in the everj'-day world
about
us,
might
it
not seem that, with ordinary sagacity,
ought to be able to detect

the great
us
is
its
hidden way
The
we
knowledge that
Beyond must ever remain an unfathomable mystery to
now no
longer our possession, and we- stand helpless, like
Mephistopheles before the corpse of Faust

" Und wenn ich Tag und Stunden mich zerplage,
Wann ? Wie ? und Wo? das ist die leidige Frage."
"And though I fret and worry till I'm weary.

When ? How ? and Where ? remains the fatal
query."
Taylor's Translation.
CHAPTER
III.
THE KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY AS DOCTRINE OF

DEVELOPMENT.
I.
npHE
Kant's Fundamental Problems.
fact that
first
problem
we conceive
its
solution
Kantian doctrine of knowledge.

completely phenomenal,
fact
i.e.,
common
world of sense
is
the
theme of the
constituted the
If this world of sense
were not
conceivable and conceived, that
would necessarily have been recognized as inexplicable.
Objects of sense are appearances or phenomena.

explain the
virtually
latter,
three questions have to be answered, which
involve Kant's fundamental problems.
must be a
subject, to
The
question
is
Who (what)
Secondly, there must be an
essence,
does not create out of
itself
in general
phenomenon would be
is
the knowing subject
.?
which constitutes the ground
of phenomena, and of the knowing subject

latter
Firstly, there
which anything objective could
appear, and without which no sort of

possible.
In order to
itself,
the things
it
provided the
conceives.
In
64
Critique
this case the
knowing subject would
ground of being of
case,
it
of Kant.
all
phenomena.
must be asked
What
is
same time be the
at the
But since
this is not the
the substratum which
is
the
ground of the knowing subject as well as of the entire phenomenal world
Thirdly,
everything based upon
between
it
substantial
this
ground and
there must subsist a relation
which
determines the nature of the forms and objects of knowledge
(phenomena) peculiar to
us,
prehension, explains them.
and which,
The
if it lie
question
is
within our com-
Why
the nature
of our knowledge, and the nature of things, are constituted as
they are,
and not otherwise
summarily designated by the
The
initial
three problems
words
Who
may be
What
.''
Why.?
The
first
through
its
through
its
question
is
solved by the Critique of Pure Reason
investigation of our faculties
of knowledge,
and
doctrine that the sense-world originates from the
material elements of our impressions and the formative elements
of our perceptions and notions.
The second
question Kant
answered by his differentiation of phenomena from things- inthemselves.
shows by
What
its
the latter are, the Critique of Practical Reason
doctrine of freedom and the moral order of the
world, and the cognate doctrines of

third question
is
God and
immortality.
The
regarded by Kant as incapable of solution,
Doctrine of Development.
owing
to the constitution of the
human
If the relation of things-in-themselves

intelligible relation, the first cause
65
faculties of
knowledge.
and phenomena were an
of things, and therefore their
primal origin, the timeless creation, would be known, and the

riddle of the world solved.
But
this relation
remains unknow-
able, the inner nature of things unsearchable, the mystery of the
world
three
Of
a mystery.
still
these unsolvable problems there are
the cosmological, the psychological, and the theological.
If the intelligible character of the world consists in freedom,
then
the Will which determines the peculiar constitution of
it is
our knowing sensuous reason, as well as the peculiar nature of
phenomena, and upon which they both depend.

possible
Kant
How
this is
the question which holds the secret of the world.
is
rightly grasped
declared an answer to
and
it
rightly stated this question, but
to be impossible.
he
Schopenhauer claims
the honour of having found the only true answer, and of having
solved by his
own
doctrine the problem which
Kant merely
discovered.
The
psychological and theological problems are subordinate
to, rather
than co-ordinate with, the cosmological, since they
contain the same problem applied in the one case to humari

reason, and in the other to
problem
is
human
character.
The
psychological
concerned with the nature of our knowing
faculties,
66
Critique
in the constitution of
which sense and understanding are
of Kant.
once distinguished and united, as

tion
in
"
How
is
is
external perception
indicated in Kant's ques-
namely,
a thinking subject in general possible
thinking subject " soul," and
its
at
that of space
If
"
we
call
the
outward manifestation " body,"
the psychological problem involves, in this
its
true conception,
the old inquiry concerning the relation of body and soul.
The
theological problem deals with the fact of our moral disposition,
with the relation of our intelligible to our empirical character,

or with the way in which freedom and necessity consist together
and are united

held that
it
moral conduct.
in our
All these questions
Kant
was impossible to answer with the means of our
theoretical or scientific
The fundamental
knowledge.
inquiry has to do with the relation between
things-in-themselves and phenomena, or, what
is
the same thing,
the relation between freedom and nature, between the intelligible
and the
sensible, the
moral and the material orders of the world,
or between the causality of will and mechanical causality.
The
unification of both lies in the principle of natural adaptation,
and the teleological view of the world based upon

which by no means
retical)
knowledge
a view
it
lays claim to the validity of scientific (theo-
yet
claims, nevertheless, the character of
necessary and indispensable principle of judgment.
But the idea
of immanent ends in nature
is
6j
so intimately connected with the
idea of natural development that the two are inseparable.
which develops
itself
must develop
itself to
something,
i.e.,
That
self-
development implies the necessary actualization of an inherent

end
and whatever has such an inherent end, or implanted
tendency, which strives for realization, must, in the very nature

of things, develop
therefore, final
In the notion of natural development,
itself.
and mechanical
causality, will
and mechanism,
freedom and nature, thing-in-itself and phenomenon, unite them-
We
selves.
accordingly take Kant's doctrine of development as
the unification of his doctrines of knowledge and freedom.
II.
The World Viewed

I.
If
as an Historical Development.
The Natural Development.
we compare the
pre-Critical inquiries of our philosopher
with the Critique of Pure Reason and with the views that grow out
of
it,
we
find
one fundamental thought running through the ideas
of both periods
development
it is
Kant's view of the world as an historical
a view which was by no means contradicted nor pre-
judiced by the Critique, but, in
had been possible before

world
is
it.
fact,
more firmly established than
Since the subject of this view of the
nothing other than the natural cosmic changes, or the
succession in time of the different states of the world (whicli are
Critique of Kant.
68
connected according to the law of causality, so that the later

necessarily follow from the earlier), the development of things
coincides with their natural history, which

different
itself
from the customary
with
artificially
classifying
with grouping their
things,
what they are
become what they
and transformations they have undergone
how and under what
it
knowledge he found
His short geological
He
may be regarded
races are rightly designed
"
to
Ka7U
himself led the
scientific
account of
together with his
contributions to the
as
two
treatises
on the human
be contributions to the natural
It is true philosophy,"
the diverse forms of a thing through

'
new
treatises,
natural history of the earth, while his
man.
hand, and
with his General Natural
History and Theory of the Heavens this
history of
at
be attempted as a new and bold problem,
own example, founding
Physical Geography,
what changes
in the course of time,
the solution of which must be ventured.
the world.
are,
Such a natural history of the world
in the scientific
he demanded that
his
in their
conditions the present states have grown
out of the previous ones.
way by
This contents
Natural history, on the other hand, explains how
things originated and have
Kant missed
something entirely
description of nature.
external attributes, and with describing
present state.
is
said Kant, " to trace
all its history."^
Physische Geographic, Introduction,
4.
Part II, Sec.
I.,
3.
The
2.
The
69
Intellectual Development.
Critique ofPure i?aw teaches
how phenomena,
the sense-
world, and experience originate from the conditions of our representative nature,
and how
tive
it
how
experience grows and becomes increased,
systematises
Ideas of reason
ledge, the final
it
itself,
strives
as in accordance with the regula-
toward a
goal of which, were
nothing other than the completely

ment of the world.
Critique in the
how
it
tions
scientific
If
we
system of know-
attainable,
could be
intelligible system
of develop-
it
follow out the investigations of the
development and progress of
its results,
and see
makes phenomena or objects originate from our sensa-
and the form-giving capacities of our perception and
thought, and experience originate from the synthesis of pheno-
mena, and systematised experience,

gressive development of
its
i.e.,
science in the pro-
various departments, or the history
of the sciences, originate from the co-ordination of experiences

in accordance with the regulative Ideas,
and
results of the Critique
summed up than
we
see that the problem
cannot be more concisely and aptly
in the designation
we have chosen
doctrine of the origin and development of
In every development the stadium reached
it
is
the
human knowledge.
is
always in
its
cdm-
pletion the condition, the material, the beginning of a higher
70
of Kant.
Critique
This
form.
is
also trae of our states of
sions are the material
phenomena the
knowledge.
phenomena
out of which
Impres-
are formed,
material for experience, completed experiences
the material of actual experimental knowledge.
Thus the
states
of knowledge, the origin of which the Critique teaches, are the
0/ development of knowledge.
states
The Social Development and
3.
The
natural history of
man
is
the
Development of Culture.
the condition and the material
The
of the history of his freedom.
natural
and
intellectual
development serves the moral, which does not merely, so to
say,
continue the former on a higher plane, but subordinates
and
makes
its
development subservient to
its
own.
The
it
progressive
development of our natural and intellectual capacities shows

itself,
in this service
history of culture
of freedom,'as
human
and the nature of
the view of Kant, such that
it
is
civilization
freedom
itself.
torical culture,
only
when
its
it
is
is,
or as the
according to
involuntarily impelled forward
from the natural ends and interests of

the law of freedom, but
civilization,
man
to the fulfilment of
completed only by the Idea of
Moral freedom can only develop
itself as his-
and the history of culture can complete
highest goal
ledge and purpose.
is
Then
striven for with the clearest
itself
know-
the laws of freedom will not be
blindly
but
fulfilled,
capacities of
human
with freedom.
fulfilled
nature receive
71
In order that the
development and attain
full
their natural ends, the antagonism of interests, the competition
of ability, the division of labour, discord and the struggle for

existence,
must enter into
from the isolated
be
more complex and more
For
tYie.
life,
security of life.
hence
is
is
only pos-
Security belongs
union and public law
social
and order must be sought and attained
That form
intense, but without
full unfolding of capacities
to the natural ends of
our
and the endangering of existence
under the condition of the
possible.
and from barbaric
freedom, where the conflict of
civil
that reciprocal destructiveness
sible
there must be an advancement
sure, continues, and, with the increase of
wants, becomes
and freedom.
state of life to the social,
freedom to social and

interests, to
life
in the
highest form
the constitutional government.
But even
the constitutional state remains insecure, as well as the existence
of
all
individuals
as long as states
and the development of
and peoples
still
all interests
of culture,
exist in a condition of barbaric
freedom, warring with each other to their mutual destruction.
Consequently the natural ends of
life,
has for security, demand not only a

the most secure form of which
is
or the needs which
civil,
but an international law,
a federation of
and constitutionally governed peoples.
man
free, civilised,
Critique
72
4.
The Moral and Religious Development.
But freedom
in a
of Kant.
is
only actualised and, as
moral state of the world, when
account of the security of
life,
not
the
"
striven for, not
factors of
mechanism of our
freedom
on
sake,
itself
but
inclinations,"
knowledge, and moral character.
conscious purpose,
ethical
Kant,
demanded
accordingly,
is
were, embodied
but for freedom's own
and with those means which are the

these are,
it
it
that
a con-
the necessity of
federation of nations, with a view to establishing lasting peace,
should not be urged merely in the interests of security and

civilisation,
but that
it
should be placed upon moral grounds,
and held up to view as the moral end of the world, and that
in this spirit of world-citizenship the universal history of
should be written.
In order to show that
man
"the evolution
of a form of government based upon natural right " lay in the
plan of the world's history, and that
its
time had come, Kant
appealed to the enthusiasm and intense interest with which

civilised
nations greeted the attempt of the French to found
a government of natural rights.
saw the
all
rise
And
in
his
own epoch he
of Individualism in thought and knowledge
age of enlightenment," the goal of which could be
" the
nothing
other than an intellectually and morally enlightened period.
whose
73
culture should be permeated through
and through with
the Idea of freedom.
But the moral development by no means goes hand
in
hand
with the progress of our culture and our external civilization.
On
the contrary, the more complex
more
suffers internal
it
human
disruption, the
society becomes, the
more
it
inequality of individuals in the circumstances of

it
develops the
life,
the
more
arouses and fosters motives of self-seeking, and allows conten-
tion and hateful

dispositions,"
to
enormous vices
these " offspring of lawless
evil passions,
grow without bounds.
as ingratitude
pleasure, ill-will
bosom of
and
It
is
because such
and hatred, jealousy and malicious
and calumny,
flourish
society, that the latter
and luxuriate
in the very
needs to be transformed and
purified in its very core, needs a complete regeneration,
which
not "the juridical," but only "the ethical state," hence not the
moral kingdom of
State, but only the Church, as the
Here the
earth,
is
capable of effecting.
which
all
those evils spring that
one another, are
to
order that good-will
be rooted
may
of such a kingdom of
out,
sinful natures, out of
intentionally bring
and men's hearts
reign in the world.
God upon
of that most important of

is
men
all
earth
is
God on
The
upon
purified, in
establishment
necessary for the solution
problems
man's salvation, and
it
consequently recognized by Kant as a duty of mankind to
Critique
74
itself,
and in
this respect as
of Kant.
The
su,i generis.
fulfilment of this
duty constitutes the special theme of the religious development,

the true problem and goal of which
first
found
its
historical
expression in the appearance of Christianity, and which needed

the growth of the visible
in
order that
Church constant
should not become
it
forms, and the real essence be
there belongs that
veracity
fixed
lost
which
in
rectification, in
outward,
To
sight of.
sincere
Nothing con-
conviction based upon moral self-knowledge.
with religious belief more than hypocrisy, and hypocrisy
flicts
is
true faith
with
identical
is
lifeless
the offspring and
Kant regarded the
companion of compulsory
religious Aufklarung,
owing
faith.
to
its
Hence
principle
of tolerance, as an essential feature of the Aufkldrung
and
epoch as a necessary stage of reform
its
itself,
in the history of
the Church.
The manner
religion
may
and
in
which Kant apprehended the relation of
revelation, of the invisible
and the
visible
Church,
serve as an excellent illustration of his doctrine of develop-
ment
in general.
He,
religious education of
like Lessing,
mankind, the
regarded revelation as the

visible
Church as the form
of manifestation and development of the invisible

great
stress
upon the
formative stages, since
it
just
is.
appreciation of
and he
laid
these historical,
quite as mistaken to consider
them
Dodnne
of Development.
worthless and superfluous as to hold

religion, or its
is
immutable forms.
them
And
freedom and the
to be the essence of
Church
just as the visible
related to the invisible, so our natural
related to
75
and
social history is
final
moral end of man, and our
sense-life to our intelligible being,
and the sensible world to the
moral.
The Teleological View of the World.
III.
I.
We
see
The World-development as Phenomenon.
how
the Kantian philosophy presents
itself,
entire view of the world, as Doctrine 0/ Development.
nature and freedom,
culture
and the
church, as historical developments
state,
It
religion
and, although
it
in its
regards
and the
has not
developed these subjects, but only sketched their main features
and general
outline, yet
it
had already seized upon the problem
of such a view of the world before the Critique of Pure Reason,
and has established
The
it
by means of the
latter.
laws of world-development are partly laws of nature,
partly laws of freedom.
The
first
consist in the laws of
motion
of the material world, in the causality of objective and subjective
changes, in the necessary succession in time of the different

states of
the world; the second consist in the moral end of
reason, from which follow those objective
and
subjective laws
^6
of Kant.
Critique
of freedom which are to be

culture
and of the
fulfilled
in
the development of
and of the Church.
State, of religion
In the pre-Critical period, Kant's views of development were

confined to natural history, and especially to the mechanical origin
Nevertheless, he declared
and transformations of the cosmos.
even at this time, that the origin of organic bodies could not be
comprehended
after
mere mechanical
laws.
The
inquiry con-
cerning the knowahleness of natural changes, or of the causal
nexus of things, lay
remote from him when, in his General
still
Natural History and Theory of
He
mechanical cosmogony.
given, and
known
to
left
us.
the
Heavens, he set forth his
took the world and
its
laws as
unconsidered the way in which they become
The thorough
investigation
of this question,
which concerns the causal nexus of things, necessitated him

to
abandon
and to
Reason.
rationalism,
set out
upon the
first
then also the old-school empiricism,
entirely
new path
This brought the solution
it
of the Critique of Pure
discovered how, in accord-
ance with the constitution of our reason, phenomena, and their

necessary synthesis
the
sense-world as constituted by natural
law (nature), originate out of the material of our impressions
and the laws of our thought (sense and understanding).
We
are
obliged by the nature and laws of our reason to conceive the

material universe in a mechanical development, the realm of
animal
life in
an organic development, and mankind
And, since
development.
tain nothing that
ideas of our reason
dom,
i.e.,
through and through phenomenal.
is
both are necessary
those condition the sensible, these the
Hence,
also, the history of nature
And what
else could
evolution, of whatever sort they
and
free-
may
it
be, since all stages of
be, are successive, or con-
a time-succession, hence must take place in time, which, as
stitute
form
pure
phenomena
2.
The
of thought,
can
itself
contain
only ideas or
The World-development as
Teleological
notion of phenomenon, however,
much more
is
Phenomenon.
necessarily grasped
adequately in the doctrine of development than in
doctrine of knowledge.
tific
the entire world-development, has the character of idea
or phenomenon.
moral
these orders of development con-
all
laws are laws of nature and of freedom
moral experience.
in a
might not be conceivable and conceived, the
entire world-development
Its
"jy
As objects of our experience or
knowledge, phenomena
may
scien-
not be referred to ends ; as
forms of development, on the contrary, they cannot be conceived

apart from ends.
something;
it
Whatever evolves
bears
its
itself
must evolve
own determination
within
itself into
itself,
manifests the character of self-determination and freedom.
and
If
78
Critique of Kant.
we compare phenomenon
menon
as
we
stage of development,
in the conception of
knowledge with pheno-
as object of
immanent
see that the difference lies
teleology,
former and comprehended in the
which
is
excluded in the
And, indeed, the idea
latter.
of inherent, final causes as operative in
phenomena must be
applied to the entire world-development
not merely to the
organic and moral development, but also to the mechanical.

the organic development the notion of ends
is
a necessary prin-
ciple of our judgment, since living bodies are
which develop or organize
themselves,
Iij
ipso facto
those
and are consequently
conceivable without the Idea of inherent ends.
in-
In the moral
development the notion of ends acts as the necessary principle,

not only of our judgment, but also of our conduct and the out-
ward manifestations of our character, since the
will acts
accordance with ends, and the moral character of

both determined and judged by the moral law.
world ends have
mechanical world
real,
in the organic,
they
are
to
and therefore only
nexus of
all
themselves to
phenomena.
is
validity;
in
the
whatever!
but one time and one
one sense-world, or
If,
acts is
In the moral
have no validity
According to the doctrine of Kant, there

space,
ideal,
its
in
one universal
now, some phenomena show
be determined by ends, and others must be
teleologically judged, there certainly can
be no phenomena that
Doctrine of Development,
are wholly without end.
kind
it
is
also organic,
79
For the moral development of man-
and without
would not be development
organic-sensuous character
its
at
all
material and mechanical as well.
and organic bodies are
Consequently the inorganic
bodies also, although they must be explained independently of

the notion of ends, cannot yet be without end, else there would
be no universal nexus of phenomena, no unity of the senseworld,
no unity of time and of space, by which we understand,
not a closed unity in the sense of
totality,
but a world-unity, as
opposed to those numberless independent worlds assumed by
and also accepted by Kant
Leibnitz,
his
in
first
studies
afterwards, however, reckoned, together with the Monadology,
among
" the legends from the Utopia of Metaphysics."
view of the world advances from the
lifeless
and from the living to the moral
that
realm to the
is,
organic world evolves from the inorganic, and
it
the
to
fall
first
to the
ground
if it
And
how
the
this
view
should deny the validity of ends in
stadium of evolution, and then in the second be obliged
acknowledge their necessary application, and,
third, discover their reality.
in the
living,
how humanity and
the moral world evolve from the organic world.
would
sees
Our
Kantian doctrine.
But
The
this is not the
latter denies,
finally, in
the
view expressed
not the validity of
ends, but their theoretical or scientific knowableness in both the
Critique of Kant.
8o
inorganic and organic worlds.
It affirms their
knowableness in
the moral world, because here the activity of ends
apparent from the will

the
will,
is
immediately
Matter renders ends unknowable
itself.
Ends
on the contrary, knowable.
but matter
is
spatial, and, like space,
are
immanent causes,
completely external
thing in space exists as externality, and consists
hence
relations;
This
causes,
is
contains
it
true of
no
sort
phenomena
in
in
ment.
outward
general
hence of
all
them
as
because they develop themselves.
i.e.,
unity of the world
also the unity of the world-develop-
is
Consequently the end that reveals
order of things and gives

also
every-
simply because they produce, form, and
reproduce themselves,
The
of knowable immanent
bodies, even the organic, which oblige us to consider
controlled by ends,
them
itself in
their intelligible
the moral
meaning must
be recognized as the principle that underlies the natural
order of things, but presents
phenomena.
That end
is
itself as
freedom.
knowable
in
Accordingly,
no natural
we must
consider the entire world-development as the manifestation of

freedom, and the sensible order of the world as the manifestation
of the moral.
We
thus rise to a point of view where the inner
nature of things, which ever remains hidden from our knowledge

in
its
exact sense,
the world
is
becomes unveiled, and where the mystery of
solved.
Dactrine of Development.
3.
The World-development as Manifestation of
Thus
in the
Thing-in-itself.
Kantian doctrine of development the two other
fundamental disciplines of the Critical philosophy

of knowledge and freedom,
notions of nature and freedom
or,
what
is
are united.
the doctrines
the same thing,
The
the
Critique of Pure
Reason culminates in the teleological point of view, and attains,
by working
clusions
doctrine,
this out, a systematic
we have drawn stand
Kant or
force
Kantian
directly in the line of the
and they are embodied
ascribe to
The con-
view of the world.
in expressions
upon him views
that
which
no way
in
he has not himself
For he held both to
expressed or sanctioned in his teaching.
the unity of the world and to evolution, both to the ideal validity
of design in the organic realm and to
its real
validity in the
moral realm, both to freedom as the moral end of the world and
to the intelligible character of freedom
intelligible character
of whatever sort
it
is
and he declared that
identical with thing-in-itself.
may
Adaptation,
be, consists in the correspondence of a
thing with an end or purpose.
This presupposes
activity
towards
an end, hence an end-active power and an end-positing faculty,

will
and freedom.
Such a correspondence
and exists in
thing
itself
that
must be present.
it
actuality, or
it
In the one case
is
i.e.,
either given in the
appears to our reason

it is factual
and
6
real,
82
Critique
in the other
it is
only a necessary idea, and therefore merely
Moral ends are of the
ideal.
Since, now, without
second.
of Kant.
first sort,
organic or natural of the
end or purpose,
i.e.,
without will or
freedom, adaptation in general can neither exist nor be conceived,
and
development must be considered as teleological, the
all
latter
must be recognized as the manifestation of freedom or of thingin-itself.
In other words, while the world-development consists
in the natural
and moral orders of things, the second
the highest stage of development of the
the sensible world
is
the moral, but also
is
its
phenomenon.
Critique
is
follows
Kant declared
primacy of practical reason, and confirmed
of fudgment.
" that supersensible

is
He
in
it
explained that that super-
and of
The
phenomena,
all
upon which we must base nature
identical with freedom.
as
phenome-
statement
literal
is
as
"There must, however, be a ground of the
unity of the
which underlies nature, with
which the
supersensible,
that
notion of freedom practically contains, and even

this
ground
the manifestation of freedom.
sensible substratum of our knowing reason
non,"
its
In short, the entire world-
in fact the truth of the matter
his doctrine of the

in the
but also
not merely the temporal presupposition of
development or world-order
That such
first,
not merely
is
if
the notion of
ground leads neither to a theoretical nor a practical know-
ledge of the same, and hence possesses no particular sphere, yet
makes possible the
it
transition
83
from the mode of thought
according to the principles of the one, to that according to the

"
principles of the other.''^

tically contains
is,
What
moral end.
moral end
''
itself,
What
the notion of freedom prac-
according to Kant, nothing other than
is
final
coincident or one with this can only be the
for this
only one with
is
When, con-
itself.
sequently, " the unity of the supersensible which underlies nature,
with what the notion of freedom practically contains,"

of,
is
spoken
that supersensible substratum can be nothing other than the
final
moral end
And when Kant
itself.
says " there
a ground of that unity," only the ground of the
can be understood by
it
but this
moral end
simply and solely will or
That " supersensible which underlies nature "
freedom.
fore, will or
freedom.
There
is,
as the spirit of Kant's doctrine,
as the
is
final
final
practical,
according to the
no other
is,
there-
letter as well
Now, of freedom
issue.
moral end we have no theoretical, but indeed a
knowledge.
substratum of
must be
all
But of freedom as the supersensible
phenomena we have
a practical knowledge,
i.e.,
neither a theoretical nor
we can form no
sort of
an idea of
the " ground of the unity of the supersensible which underlies
'
Id.
Kant
:
JCritik der Urtheilskraft, Introduction
ll.{Werke,
Dialectik der teleologischen Urtheilskraft, 78, p.
Gesch. d. n. Philos., vol. iv., pp. 397
and 497.
vol. vii., p. 14.)
231.
Cf. Fischer
Critique
84
of Kant.
nature, with
what the notion of freedom practically contains."
Hence Kant
says, there
must be such a ground, the character of
which permits us to unite the principles of nature with those of

freedom, although
practical
we can
knowledge of
and freedom consists

tion
mated
and
in
The
ground.
this
in the
organic
all
acquire neither a theoretical nor a

unification of nature
notion of natural freedom or adapta-
phenomena must be considered and
accordance with this principle as criterion.
necessity or the
mechanism of things we have a
esti-
Of natural
theoretical
knowledge, of moral freedom a practical knowledge, of natural
freedom no knowledge
is
unknowable
at all
that
is,
will or
natural ends or final causes
freedom in nature
must necessarily be
conceived, but they can never be known.

All the
phenomena of nature
are exertions of force
freedom consists in the freedom of force
phenomenon, or the phenomenon
in
freedom displays
its
it is
natural
the freedom of
freedom.
Within the
natural world
this
bodies,
such bodies as bring forth, shape, and reproduce
themselves
we
in
i.e.,
these are the living
itself
in
self-developing
phenomena of
nature,
which
are accordingly obliged to conceive of after the principle
of objective, immanent teleology.
The
necessity of regarding
organic nature in this way was the subject which Kant worked
out in his Critique of Teleological fudgment.
There
is
is
85
also the free contemplation of things,
not our object or problem, but our
state
where freedom
that
harmonious
condition of our powers of mind which does not seek to investigate and analyze phenomena, but leaves
them
in their freedom,
apprehending them with pure contemplative pleasure.

perfectly free attitude of mind, dependent
no
interests, there
phenomenon
in
pure pleasure
upon or
complete freedom.
we pronounce
it
theme of
his Critique
confined
itself to
the
i.e.,
the object of our
beautiful or sublime.
principle of the subjective fitness of

faculty of aesthetic judgment,
It is
this
restrained by
corresponds the free phenomenon,
its
To
phenomena
is
Upon
this
founded our
which furnished Kant with the
0/ the .Esthetic Judgment.
His investigation
the analysis of our aesthetic judgment, or of our
thought in the state of freedom.
mented by a discussion of the
This needed to be supple-
correlate of our aesthetic
plation, namely, the phenomenon in the state
contem-
of freedom, or by the
attempt to establish also the objectivity of aesthetic
fitness.
This
supplementary step was taken by Schiller, who, more than any

other
down to Schopenhauer,
furthered and extended the Kantian
Esthetics without abandoning the principles of the Critical

philosophy.
as such,
it
If
freedom
is
the highest law of reason, and
if,
determine the character of our knowledge, the laws
of which (the laws of the understanding) condition the sense-
86
Critique
world, then
also
necessarily conceive freedom in
we must
and phenomenon
of Kant.
in its
freedom
is
beauty.
phenomena
Schiller could
not have indicated his Kantian standpoint, and at the same time
his
advance within
done
in a
word
in
more
it,
one of those
chief aesthetic ideas in
all
and more forcibly than he has
aptly
Komer, which
letters to
Even these few words
their freshness.
show what a profound understanding of the

he possessed
thyself (which
is
'
Determine thyself out of
philosophy, 'Nature stands
This great Idea of
under the laws of the understanding.'

determination
We
and
shall
philosophy
once the content of his whole philosophy),
at
this other, of the theoretical
nature,
Critical
" Certainly no greater word has yet been spoken
by mortal man than the Kantian
and
give his
is
self-
mirrored back to us from certain phenomena of
this
we
not
now
call
Beauty."
ask whether the Kantian doctrines of know-
ledge and development conflict with one another, but only note
that,
in the
first,
things-in-themselves are absolutely unknow-
able and absolutely distinguished from phenomena, while in the
second the Phenomenon of Freedom shows
'
Schillers Briefwechsel
mit Korner, and
ed.,
edited
Letter of the 18th of February, 1793, pp. 18,
above are the following
five written in
Jena
itself.
19.
With End,
by Carl Goedeke, 1878.
The
letters referred to
that of January 25th,
of the 8th, l8th, 23rd, and 28th of February, 1793.
will
Vide pp. 5-51.
and those
enters the
phenomenal world
character,
or thing-in-itself,
more
things advances, the
world-development
is
87
with Will, freedom, intelligible
and the
distinctly
farther the evolution of
manifests
it
recognized by Kant as the manifesta-
and ever-increasing revelation of freedom.
tion
the mechanical world
hidden, forces
light
that
we
phenomena of
an end
present.
The
itself.
not at
is
all
That which
manifest or
is
in
completely
itself
already in the organic realm so far to the
are
not even able perfectly to experience the
life
without the idea of
and in the moral sphere
it
is
life's
inner adaptation to
completely manifest and
In the organic evolution of the world we take ends
into account
in the moral,
the thing
it is
itself.
Yet between the two doctrines, as they shaped themselves

the
mind of Kant,
there
is,
in the
but a deep underlying harmony.
first
place,
in
no contradiction,
Against the charge
that,
while
the doctrine of knowledge holds things-in-themselves to be forever absolutely hidden, the doctrine of development regards
them
as increasingly intelligible and knowable,
Kant
is
shielded
from the outset by his distinction of the sorts of knowledge.

such a stricture he would reply
Things-in-themselves are only
so far intelligible as they are practically knowable
knowable they never
are.
To
Every phenomenon
knowledge, a link in the nexus of things
theoretically
is,
as object of
each has
in our idea
88
Critique of Kant.
of the world
and place
fixed time
its
none
the thing-in-itself which underlies them

thing-in-itself knowable,
appears that
" There
it
is
across
analyze and dissect
it,
resolve
it
in our
none
in
all;
knowledge and
it
into its
knowable
then from these construct our knowledge of
factors,
Among
it.
all
phenomena,
appear, because
it
show
is
it
itself, either,
exhaust
itself
in
or the inherent end of

in the world.
life
It
can reveal
artist in his
itself,
it
is
to
Now, even
is
it is, i.e.,
does not
work, the will to live

exertion,
its
contained in an object in such a

it
will
be
hit
upon and
the most searching analysis of any pheno-
not able to discover the ground

to discover
like character in
appear means, in the exact
that in the analysis of the object
menon
it
does
but not appear.
in the organism, force in
For something
sense of the word, that
found.
such
any one form or stage of development, nor
conduct, the genius of the
way
No more
in the evolution of things, since
becomes manifest, yet ever remains hidden,
God
and
This does not
the cause of appearance.
consist in any transition.

It
not to be found.
is
say,
ground of
factors the thing-in-itself, the creative or originative
being of
this
never so
it
i.e.,
is
know a phenomenon we must
In order to
"
thinkable without
nowhere appears,
it
we could come
!
is
its
innermost being.
why and
To be
io
sure,
what end
one need
not necessarily trouble himself with this question, and, indeed,
in experimental
knowledge and the so-called exact
is
authorized to pay no heed to
if
he choose, banish
But
question.
also,
the mystery of the world rests as a burden,

distinction of things-in-them-
phenomena, as well as
selves from
he
profound thinkers among philosophers,
Thus the Kantian
can never do.
One may
whatever.
it
sciences,
completely from thought, as an idle
it
this the
whom
those upon
89
its
doctrine of the
unknow-
ableness of the former in the way of the scientific analysis of

the
latter, retains its
The
deep and abiding meaning.
question concerning the thing-in-itself as the ground of
being of
all
of things.
phenomena
carries us
back to the original ground
This, according to Kant,
from no phenomenon, of whatever

from the
final
reason, by
end of the world,
means of
tion of the will.

final
itself,
and
In this sense
end of the world.
sort
i.e.,
intelligible to us
may
it
be, but solely
from the end which our
freedom from the world we conceive
its
(sense-world), posits for
becomes
"
Hence
but not that which makes
realizes
through the purifica-
man may be
it is
recognized as the
only the faculty of desire
man dependent
(through sensuous
impulses) upon nature, not that in respect to which the worth
of his existence depends upon what he receives and enjoys.

is
It
rather that worth which he alone can give to himself, and
which consists
in
what he does, how and according
to
what
of Kant.
Critique
90
principles
he
acts,
and not as a part of nature, but in the freedom

That
of his appetitive faculties.
a good will
is,
that
is
whereby
alone his existence can have an absolute worth, and in relation
which the existence of the world can have a
to
Our philosopher judges
"The deed
like
everything,
is
our poet
"
final
"
Enjoyment debases
;
With
fame."
nothing the
Goethe's Faust rises to the point of
confession
end.'"
its
this
highest
morality.
end of our existence were mere happiness, or that
If the
enjoyment of the world which consists in continual amusement,

if
we came
farce,
into the world only in order, like the
make
to
pleasure,
it
"joke" of
in the
and to seek unmixed
ourselves,
would seem that modern Pessimism, inspired as
by the pleasure- seeking of our day,

this object
man
of
life
has proved a
right in declaring that
is
failure,
and
that
goal that has been reached, inasmuch as the

in reality far less than the
valent than amusement.
it is
the opposite
sum of pleasure
sum of pain, and ennui far more
Then
it is
the result of
buffoonery, would be truly a most sad "joke."
life,
is
pre-
as that of the
Nothing is more
genuine knowledge of man than this
foolish
and wanting
sort of
a debit-and-credit account of pleasure and pain, of joy
'
Kant
Fischer
in all
Kritik der Urtheilskraft, % 86.
Cesck
d. n. Philos. vol. iv.,
pp. 505
Werke, vol.
17.
vii.,
p. 326.)
Cf.
and sorrow, as
if
and the sum of
they could be added and subtracted like money,
life
figured out
same plane
to
The
by such a childish example.
pessimism and optimism of the ordinary

cisely the
91
sort stand
upon pre-
both are eudamonistic, and hold happiness
be the only desirable good.
The
pessimists,
on the one
hand, find the world so ill-conditioned that we can never attain
and enjoy
this good, but only
we
satisfied craving, so that
and ever chase
are thus
after
condemned
it
with un-
to a continual
Tantalus-torment, to the most intense misery conceivable.

optimists,
mind
on the other hand,
find
the world and the
The
human
so beneficently planned that, with the right knowledge and
a corresponding
perfectly
happy
As people
Kant, there
regulation of conduct,
are able to attain a
life.
are busying themselves a

is
we
good deal nowadays with
naturally considerable dispute, this
way and
that,
as to whether his teachings are to be taken in the sense of a
pessimistic or an optimistic view of

that such a question
shows
sufficiently
doctrine
is
But the simple
how
little
Kant
is
understood.
neither the one nor the other, since
of the object of
life
the happiness which
fact
debated, as answerable by yes or no,
is
well
life.
eudsemonistically at
we
all.
it
His
does not judge
Were
this object
necessarily craved, according to the
sensuous impulses of our nature, such a state of well-being, even
::
Critique of Kant.
92
if it
could be fully attained, would leave our moral nature empty
and
unsatisfied, since
human
or personal end of
only posited,
ence
we should thereby
willed,
i.e.,
the world
in
which cannot be given
life,
by ourselves.'
consists
in its very nature is
no
is
is
in
life,
lies in
it
man
of
life's
worth of human
'
who
no one moment, but
to free
Kant
A*?-,
solution.
for
yet
all
content-
but won
daily has to
win
"
it
in the entire fulness of
He who
traverses
moral energy alone
that she merely intensifies.

life
Kant judged
man from
it.
and
from the attacks of the monster Care, who robs
view of the world, as Goethe
magic
life
every gratifying enjoyment
she cannot stay
interests,
not to be found,
is
both the joys and sorrows of creating.
this path is free
wide
new problems
" Only he earns freedom as well as
Contentment
all its
only to be found in the way of this free
Indeed,
self-development.
exist-
moral self-development,
of complete contentment
ment worthy of man
human
of
which we are to enjoy with folded
idle bliss,
moment
hands, no
to us, but
an unceasing and endless progress.
Every solved problem presents
Here there
The end
man's
in
which comprehends culture as well as

which
utterly fail of the truly
Of
the end and
at the close of his teleological
at the
end of Faust.
It
needed no
care and the world's spirits of torment
Urtheilsltraft, 83.
(JVerke, vol.
vii., p.
311
et sej.)
"
Im
Welterschreiten find' er Qual and

"
!
Er, unbefriedigt jeden Augenblick
The
world.
goal of our moral self-development

If "
man under moral
laws "
is
is
93
Gliick,
'
freedom /raw/ the
recognised as the
final
end of the world, then these laws must be recognised as worldand the moral order of the world as the order of
laws,
all
things
then there must be also a moral author of the world, or an

original ground oi all things,
which can be nothing other than the
world-creating will or God.
Thus Kant's
teleological view of
the world culminates in the moral theology which furnishes the

basis for the only valid demonstration of the existence of God,
whose
bility
reality
Kant never doubted, whose
he denied and disproved
theoretical demonstra-
in his doctrine of
knowledge,
whose existence he affirmed with complete certitude

doctrine of freedom and faith.
ground of the world, there

final
is
Without
in
his
will as the original
in the latter neither freedom,
nor
end, nor development.
'
" In marching onward, bliss and torment find,

"
Though, every moment, with unsated mind
!
Taylor's
Faust, Part II.,
Ad
V., Scene 5.
Translation.
CHAPTER
IV.
EXAMINATION OF KANTS FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES.

T) Y
and uniting Kant's fundamental doctrines, we have
fixing
won
the right conception of the system, as
the mind of
its
author.
It
it
contains themes enough, which
has only sketched in outline, or not developed at
enough, which he partly

of solution.
of scholars
To
was present to
left
all
to
fill
its
principles.
On
hand, the attempt to extend the system beyond
the task
the other
its
original
and to advance where Kant remained stationary and
commanded philosophy
its
is
out and complete the work of the
master without touching upon
limits,
problems
unsolved, partly declared incapable
discover and supply the deficiencies
who wish
Kant
to halt,
solution to a transformation
doctrines.
is
a problem which leads for
and development of the Kantian
But, in order to determine such a problem,
we must
ascertain whether the principles of Kant's teaching, in their
authentic form, are permanent principles, and whether they are
Examination of
the
Kantian Doctrines.
95
fundamentally consistent in themselves and harmonious
with
one another.
Examination of the Doctrine of Knowledge.
I.
We
The Contradiction
our eyes,
fix
which constitutes
And
our
first
Idealism,
first
in the Critique
of
the- real
question
all,
upon the doctrine of knowledge,
theme of the
is
of Pure Reason.
Does Transcendental
the founding of which
won
for
or Critical
Kant the fame of
being the Copernicus of philosophy, stand uncontradicted in the

Critique of Pure Reason itself
.''
The fundamental
recognition of
,this doctrine of Idealism is unquestionably not the
as a logically consistent adherence to
student will at once notice,

involves the
it.
same thing
Here, as the special
we touch upon
the point which
much- controverted difference between the
first
and
second editions of the Critique of Pure Reason, a point which
we have
already
made
tive discussion, to
the subject of a very careful and exhaus-
which we here take occasion
present problem, which
is
to refer.^
The
concerned with the criticism of the
Kantian doctrine, obliges us to return to this very important

point.
Fischer: Gesch.
d. n. Philos., vol.
iii.,
pp. 558-576.

96
Critique of Kant.
be well
It will
Transcendental idealism teaches
as possible.
mena
to put the question itself as briefly
and precisely
all
our pheno-
or objects of experience are mere ideas, and nothing inde-
pendent of the
beyond question.
We
phenomena
objective
phenomena
in
That subjective phenomena are such,
latter.
are concerned, therefore, only with the
these are the things external to us, the
Kant must
hence bodies or matter.
space,
and has taught
necessarily have taught,
in the
manner
in the "
the
edition of the Critique, that matter
first
is
most unambiguous
Paralogisms of Pure Reason," as

is
it
appears in
a mere idea.
In
the second edition, he added a " Refutation of Idealism," in
which he declares that matter

point with which
we
contradiction, which
away from
In the
is
not a mere idea.
are here concerned.
We
This
is
the
have before us a
no ingenious interpretation can explain
either the spirit or letter of the original passages.
first
edition of the Critique
in the sections
entitled
to cite these passages
" Paralogisms of Pure Reason "
and
" Observations on the Result of the Pure Doctrine of the Soul,"
we read
the following
"
We
have undeniably shown in the
Transcendental Esthetic that bodies are
mere phenomena of our
external sense, and not things-in-themselves.''
under the Transcendental idealism of
all
" I understand,
phenomena,
that principle
according to which we regard phenomena as a whole as mere
Examination of
Transcendental
possibility,
idealist) recognizes matter,
merely as phenomenon, which
-our sensibility, matter is with
which are objective, not as
in themselves external, but
this
and indeed
he
(the
its
inner
nothing apart from
is
sort of ideas (percep-
they were related to objects
if
because they refer perceptions to space,
which everything external
in
him only a
97'
" Since
and not as things-in-themselves."
ideas,
tion)
Kantian Doctrines.
the
while space
is,
To
itself is in us.
Transcendental idealism we have already given our adherence
at the
beginning."
"Now,
external objects (bodies)- are merely
phenomena, hence nothing other than a
sort of
my
ideas, the
objects of which only have existence in virtue of these ideas
" It
apart from them, however, they are nothing."
shown
that
if I
clearly
is
should take away the thinking subject, the entire
material world would disappear,
since
it
nothing but the
is
appearance in the sensibility of the subject, and a sort of

ideas."
through
its
persistence,
phenomenon which
Now, the second
is
only knowable
and persistence only knowable
at all times
only knowable substance, since
Kant
its
'
According to Kant's doctrine, substance
'
fills
it
space.
alone
Hence
among
matter
in the
is
the
objects persists.
edition of the Critique of Pure Reason declares.
Kritik der reinen
Vernunft.
Werke, vol.
ii.,
pp. 667, 675, 676,
684.)
Critique of Kant.
98
in
its
disproof of idealism:
persistence
is
"Thus
the perception
of
this
only possible through a thing external to me, and
not through the mere idea of such a thing."
"^
Accordingly, as to what concerns things external to us,

bodies or matter, Kant teaches in the
i.e.,
edition of the Critique,
first
that external objects (bodies) only have existence in virtue of our ideas,
but apart from them they are nothing ; in the second edition,
the other hand, that the perception of matter
a thing external
to
me,
aud
is
on
only possible through
not through the mere idea
of such a
thing.
There he teaches that things external to us are mere ideas

here,
on the other hand, that they are not mere
There he
ideas.
teaches that things external to us have existence merely in virtue
of our ideas, but that they are nothing independent of the latter
here, that they have existence, by
ideas, but independently of
them.
no means
Hence our
in virtue of
our
ideas of things
external to us, and these things themselves are different from
one another, and external things must, consequently, be objects

independent of our ideas,
i.e.,
Since, now,
things external to us are in space, space also must be something
independent of our thought.
But
this
means
Transcendental idealism and to return under
Kant
Kr.
d. r.
Vernunft.
{Werke,
vol.
utterly to
full sail
ii.,
abandon
to the old
p. 224.)
Examination of
the
Kantian Doctrines.
gg
dogmatism.
In his establishment of Transcendental idealism,
Kant appears
as the
Copernicus of philosophy
of "psychological idealism,"
rather as
The
The
in his refutation
on the contrary, as Ptolemy, or
Tycho Brahe, who confounded both
inconsistency of the two editions
is
systems.
perfectly obvious.
second, in which the text of the Critique should presumably
have received
its definitive
form, contains the establishment of
Transcendental idealism and at the same time a disproof of
which
idealism,
directly
contradicts
the
original
doctrine.
Accordingly, the Kantian Critique of Pure Reason or doctrine of
knowledge,
is
here at variance with
itself,
and indeed
in literal
statement.
2.
The new
The Origin of the Contradiction.
refutation of idealism in the second edition of the
Critique, as well as the notes
was called
very
first
forth
and appendix to the Prolegomena,
by the misconceptions which arose with the
review of the Kantian masterpiece, the Transcendental
idealism of the
new
doctrine being confounded with the old
dogmatic idealism, and especially that of Berkeley.
Kant wished
to shield his
work from such misapprehensions,
and therefore undertook radically to distinguish the new idealism

from the old by a logical and convincing proof.
establishes
phenomena and
experience;
the
The former
latter,
on the
100
Critique of Kant.
contrary, bases itself
upon the
dogmatic idealism as the " empirical " or
Kant designates
this
"psychological''
He found
Upon
nothing but ideas in
developed in two principal forms.
which furnishes
empirical idealism had declared the
us,
of things external to
The former
impt)ssible.
latter
this
the ground of our inner experience,
existence
us
to
be either doubtful or
position was taken by Descartes, the
Hence Kant
by Berkeley.
Hence
facts of inner experience.
called the doctrine of the
one
the "problematic'' that of the other the " dogmatic idealism."
Berkeley had a radically false idea of space, which, like colour,
he ascribed
taste, etc.,
to our sensations, and, consequently, re-
garded an idea of space independent of impressions as something

impossible and wholly imaginary.
thought that which

the
existence
ground for
is
idealism
Transcendental Esthetic''
Thus
took as the matter of
Hence he denied
the form of thought.
of external things.
this
He
Kant
rightly said
"
The
has already been destroyed in our
only remained to disprove Descartes.
it
To do
this,
it
was necessary to show that our inner experience was only possible under the presupposition of outer experience,
in the idea of external things.
'
Kant
p. 223.
Kr.
Cf.
d.
r.
But since
all
ideas are in us, even
Vernunft, "Refutation of Idealism."
1st ed., pp. 67, 68.
Note.)
which consists
{Werke, vol.
ii.,
Examination of
the
those of things external to us,
it
Kantian Doctrines.
had
to
loi
be shown that these ideas
were only possible under the presupposition of the

things external to us, or that "the idea.of matter
is
existence of
only possible
through a thing external to me, and not through the mere

such a
son,
Precisely this course was taken, and for this rea-
thing.''
by the "Refutation of Idealism"
the Critique.
to us, Kant
idea o(
in the
second edition of
In order to prove the existence of things external
made
inner experience dependent upon outer, and
outer experience dependent upon the existence of external things;

that
he made the existence of external things independent of
is,
our thought, and the latter dependent upon the former
he thus
made
things external to us,
themselves.
And
so
i.e.,
bodies and matter, things-in-
Kant subverted,
in this particular, his
own
doctrine of Transcendental idealism, while seeking to vindicate

it,
and to secure
it
against confusion with empirical idealism.
In order fundamentally to differentiate the one from the other, he

tore
them asunder
in the very point in
they agree in holding
mena
all
which they agree
for
our objects of knowledge to be pheno-
or ideas, and as such in us.
In order, now, to show that
he could demonstrate what Descartes had been unable
to prove,
he brought forward a proof which Descartes had already made

use
of,
and, indeed, in the same way,
idea of bodies
is
that,
namely, that our
only possible under the condition of the
'
Critique of Kant.
102
existence of bodies independent of our ideas.
In like manner
Descartes had shown that matter or extended substance was a

thing-in-itself, entirely
was the
independent of thought, and that space
and likewise independent of
attribute of this thing,
thought.
of idealism
Certainly this refutation
example of how
easily, in
is
a very noteworthy
the vindication of his cause, even so
powerful a thinker as Kant could surrender his
own
position, in
order to avoid the mere appearance of agreement with certain
Kant and Berkeley both
related standpoints which he opposed.
teach that space
phenomena
in us,
is
and that things external to us are our
or ideas, and nothing independent of the latter.
spite of this agreement, however, their doctrines are
According
tally different.
colour and taste
independent of
all
it is
fundamen-
to Berkeley, space is a sensation, like
a perception which
is
According to Berkeley, space
is
according to Kant,
sensation.
a given material of thought, like

to Kant,
In
all
it
is
our impressions
according
a necessary form or fundamental law of thought.
Thus Berkeley's idealism was overthrown by Kant's Transcendental

Esthetic, and consequently the confusion of the two points of
view was utterly unjustifiable and
Ct
Fischer
Gesch. d. n.
I Alios.,
false.
vol.
i.
Kant
rightly appealed
(3rd ed.), pp. 324-26.
Examination of
to this refutation,
and ought
But he would have nothing

ism of Berkeley, and so
are by no
means mere
to
in
Kantian Doctrines.
have
common
thing-in-itself.
it
103
the matter rest there.
with the dogmatic idealthat external things
and that matter
is
something inde-
Berkeley had declared matter to be a
Kant now demonstrates
nonentity, so
let
now he demonstrates
ideas,
pendent of our thought.
proves that
the
its reality,
Berkeley had said. Space
is external to us.
is
in us
as if
;
so
it
were a
Kant now
1^
I
3.
TTie
Second Refutation of Idealism.
But Kant had not
satisfied
Kant
versus Jacobi.
himself with having disproved ideal-
ism in the text of the second edition of the Critique ; he

called
note,
upon
also
to furnish the preface to this edition with a long
which should renew and confirm most emphatically the
former refutation, and drive from the

but just appeared.
the
felt
field
an opponent who had
This opponent was Jacobi,
Doctrine of Spinoza,
and
his Talks on
in his Letters on
David Hume.
The
former appeared two years after the Prolegomena (17S5), the

latter in the
same year as the second edition of the
Pure Reason (1787), but some months
earlier.
Now
Critique
of
Jacobi had
maintained that we can never demonstrate the existence of external things, but only be certain of
it
through faith, since such
existence becomes apparent to us purely through
immediate
I04
Critique of Kant.
He
revelation.
but also to
opposed
this position not only to all
dogmatism,
philosophical idealism, since the latter
all
to hold external things to be
mere ideas
obliged
is
This criticism
in us.
also affects Transcendental idealism.
Of
course, Jacobi understands, under external things, things
independent of
Kant wants
all
our ideas,
prove the contrary
to
he wants to demonstrate the
existence of external things in the
maintains
he has inserted
will
abandpn
same sense
Thus
indemonstrability.
its
which Jacobi
which
sees in advance that he
second time
his standpoint a
In
originates the Note
One
in his preface.^
Now
i.e.,
he
will
show
that
external things are things-in-themselves.
Really, the attack of
Jacobi put Kant so beside himself, that he
let
He
a word.
be
says
(as in fact
physics, yet
it is
it
is
common human
"
idealism
with
fall
However innocent Idealism may be held
not) in respect to the essential
none the
less
to
aim of meta-
an abuse of philosophy and of
reason to be obliged to take the existence of
external things (from which
we
nevertheless receive the entire
material of knowledge, even for our inner sense) merely on faith,
and not to be
front
'
him with
Kant
3. 32
Kritik
able, if
any one
is
satisfactory proof."
d. r.
Vernunft.
inclined to doubt
He
it,
to con-
had, to be sure, already
Preface to 2nd ed.
Werke, vol.
ii.,
pp.
Examination of
the
Kantian Doctrines,
105
disproved idealism and cleared himself of the charge of
it,
but
"certain obscurities" were found in the expressions of the proof
And
which should now completely disappear.
refutation of idealism takes such a form that
time the
this
we can no longer
doubt that external things figure as things-in-themselves ; else
would be com-
also his disproof of Jacobi's philosophy of faith
pletely ineffectual.
We
know
according to the doctrine of Kant,
that,
all
the
material of our cognitions consists in our impressions or sensations,
which we do not make, but
receive,
which are given
and, indeed, through things-in-themselves.^
now
instructs
us that
is
it
The new "note"
external things " from
receive the entire material of knowledge, even
sense."
to us,
which we
for our inner
Accordingly, external things figure as things-in-them-
selves.
According to the doctrine of Kant,

objects of knowledge,
thing that persists
is
matter,
the only substance, since
and as that which
fills
other than external appearance or idea.^

the
'
" note " most expressly,
Vide supra, Chap.

Cf. supra,
Reason."
I.,
Chap. IV.,
and
Part III., Sec.

I.
among
I.
"The
2,
in
space,
We
italics,
it
it
are
is
is
all
our
the only
nothing
now
told in
the diametrical
on " The Thing-in-Itself."
Contradiction in the Critique of Pure
io6
Critique
opposite
of Kant.
" This persisting object, however, cannot be a per-
ception in me, for
can be found
in
all
determining grounds of
my
being, which
me, are ideas, and demand as such a persisting
object distinct from them, in relation to which their change, and
my
hence
existence in time, in which they change, can be deter-
There
mined."
is,
accordingly, no doubt that in this passage,
may be
in order that all idealism
disproved, and the existence of
external things demonstrated, matter must be taken as some-
thing independent of our ideas,

It is
as a thing-in-itself.
i.e.,
likewise pointed out to us anew, that inner experience
dependent upon outer, and that the

existence of external things.
remark may
this the
still
persistent in existence is
may be
this
all
(i)
idea
To
be added, that the idea of something
not tantamount to a persisting
very variable and inconstant, as

it
is
since
our ideas are,
all
related to
idea,
something per-
which must consequently be an external thing distinct
sistent,
be
dependent upon the
For, the " note " continues, "
even those of matter, and yet
from
latter is
is
our ideas,"
etc.
The Kantian
the sole persisting object

it
is
and
doctrine holds matter to

(2) a
accordingly the only persisting
mere appearance or
idea,
and, as such,
completely identical with the idea of something persistent in existence.
" note "
If,
now,
declares,
this
" an
persisting something
external
thing,
must
distinct
be,
from
as
the
all
our
Examination of
the
Kantian Doctrines.
ideas," then matter is a thing-in-itsel

shall
now be
obliged, in hartnony with
tinguish also space
107
And
if
the
" note,"
we
consistent,
and the idea of space, and
to
to
dis-
pronounce
space an object wholly independent of and distinct from our idea

of space,
itself.
i.e.,
And
a thing-in-itself, or the attribute of a thing-in-
thus space becomes, once more, with Kant what
it
was with Descartes.
When
thought
is
was done by Kant
distinguished from the object of thought, as
in his disproof of idealism
Transcendental idealism
is
and
in the "note,"
surrendered, and, at the
same
time,
the possibility of explaining the correspondence between idea and

object,
i.e.,
of explaining knowledge, and, as well, the possibility
of understanding the Critique 0/ Pure Reason.

insight that Sigismund
thought and
its
Beck declared such a
It
was with
distinction
between
object to imply a standpoint from which
it
impossible to understand or rightly estimate the Critique.
thought can only correspond with

thought.
thought,
its
object,
when
its
this
was
For
object
is
This point of view, which regards the object of

not as a thing independent of thought, but as
its
necessary product. Beck called " the only possible " one for
comprehending and
Reason.
From
rightly
this point of
appreciating the Critique of Pure
view he wrote a Commentary on
Kant's Works, and, indeed, as he expressly says on the title-page
Critique of Kant.
Io8
of his book, " With Kant's Approval."
worthy
fact,
This
is
a very note-
and one which must not be overlooked, when the
question of the real teaching of Kant, and of passages that

contradict
very well
explain
it,
knew of the
them away,
contradictions, but sought too lightly to
in permitting the
philosopher to assume at
times the language of dogmatism and the
common
ness for the sake of a pleasing intelligibility.
when Kant
talks
and setting of the sun
common
usage, without at
however,
that, in the
all
passages
his standpoint for that of the

teaches that the existence
e.g.,
as Copernicus
thinks that
might of the
he simply speaks according to the
We find,
changing his standpoint.
we have examined, Kant exchanges
common
consciousness, since he
of external things can be demonstrated
the sense in which such existence
in
He
conscious-
about the object of thought as a thing indepen-
dent of thought, he speaks,

rising
Beck
be investigated and decided upon.
to
is
idealism and presupposed by the
is
common
denied by dogmatic
understanding.
Kant had proved the existence of external things
in a
manner
perfectly consistent with Transcendental idealism, and, indeed,

in
such a way that the fact of the external world, as
the
common
appears to
consciousness, was completely explained.
pointed out, that

is
it
is,
He
had
that the existence of things external to us
immediately apparent to every
human consciousness
fact
Examination of
the
which would be impossible

other than
phenomena
my ideas,
109
external things were
if
He
or ideas.
objects (bodies) are merely
than a sort of
Kantian Doctrines.
Now
"
says,
anything
all
external
phenomena, hence nothing other
the objects of which only have existence
through these ideas, while apart from them they are nothing.
External things
just as really as I myself exist, and
on the immediate evidence of my self-conscious-
both, in truth,
ness,
exist, therefore,
only with the difference that the idea of myself as the
thinking subject
is
referred merely to the inner sense, while the
ideas which designate extended beings are also referred to the
outer sense.
axajust as
little
obliged to deduce the actuality of
external objects as the actuality of ,the
sense (my thought)
for they are
objects of
my
inner
on both sides nothing but
ideas, the
immediate perception (consciousness) of which
sufficient
proof of their actuality." ^
This
is
and highly
lucid
significant declaration stands in the first edition of the Critique
of Pure Reason
in the
observations that take

for
second edition
its
place
it
is
it is
and
left out,
in the
by no means compensated
by any equivalent statement, although, here
close of the criticism of rational psychology,
it
also,
is
at
the
noted that
outer and inner objects "are distinguished from one another
'
Kant
Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1st
Paralogism of Transcendental Psychology."
ed.).
{Werke,
"Critique of the Fourth

vol.
ii.,
p. 676.)
no
Critique of Kant.
only so far as the one appears external to the other, and that
thing-in-itself,
which underlies the phenomenon of matter, as
may perhaps
not be so unlike in kind."
As
if
totally
uncon-
scious that he had already explained from the Critical point of
view the existence of the external world, and shown with trans-
we
parent clearness that, and why,
are not obliged logically to
Kant now gives
deduce the actuality of external objects,
in the
second edition of the Critique a refutation of idealism in which

the existence of external things
is syllogistically
syllogism runs, in brief, as follows
dependent upon the outer
The
Our inner experience
outer experience
the existence of external things
proved.
is
is
dependent upon
therefore external things are
independent of our inner experience, and are not mere ideas.
4.
Review of
Objections.
Emil Arnoldt has shown himself, by a

quiries,
'
such a thorough and scholarly
Kant: Kr.
d.
r.
Vernunft (2nd
the Psychological Paralogism."

'^
By
faculty,
in
of both the
life
"Conclusion of the Solution of

ii.,
pp. 326, 327.)
he has, among other things, shown, for
social relations to the
Rautenburg and Konigsberg are
Jahre
critic
beyond doubt, that Kant was never enrolled
and that his pedagogical and
connections hitherto unknown.

ersten
ed.).
Werke, vol.
his recent biographical studies
the first time
House
series of instructive in-
to
in the theological
Count Kayserling's
be determined according to family
Vide E. Arnoldt
Kants Jugend und diefiinf
seiner Privatdxenlur (Konigsberg, 1882),
pp. 26,
and 54-57.
Examination of
the
Kantian Doctrines.
ill
and doctrines of Kant, that
his investigations are deserving of
the most careful attention.
In his commendatory review of
my
work, he has also brought forward the points in which he does

not share
my
contradiction
the
knowledge.
The most important arnong them concerns
views.
stated to
exist
the Kantian doctrine of
in
Respecting the character and fundamental import
of Transcendental idealism we are agreed.
Arnoldt, too,
is
"not
disposed to explain away the philosophical difference between

the two editions of the Critique of-Pure Reason."
He
grants
that the second edition might give rise to a false conception of
the Kantian doctrine, and indeed, as a matter of

so
and that the
first
edition,
in
material world,
be preferred to the second.
is
to
has done
owing to the energetic and un-
ambiguous manner
which
fact,
it
teaches the ideality of the
On
the other
hand, he contends that the difference between the two editions
does not
affect the
knowledge, and
fundamental principles of Kant's doctrine of

" Refutation of Idealism,"
that, in particular, the
which Kant developed in the second

with Transcendental idealism.
edition,
The
rather,
is
not inconsistent
Kant here sought
to show, as a refutation of Descartes only, that our inner ex-
mention
this incidentally, in
to Kant's theological studies.

p. 51.
Cf. Pref., p.
viii.
order to correct
Vide Fischer
my own
:
Gesch
exposition in reference
d.
Philos., vol.
iii.,
Critique
1 1
perience
is
of Kant.
dependent upon and mediated by the outer
suc-ceeded in proving
it,
and
this constituted the special service
rendered by his new " Refutation of Idealism."
'
must oppose
Arnoldt's pointed arguments for the following reasons
cendental idealism teaches the

inner and outer experience.
when
outer experience
it is
(i )
Trans-
and direct immediacy of
full
This doctrine
is
contradicted
regarded as the means and condition
Outer experience cannot be such a condition,
of the inner.
since
is
he had
itself also
inner experience
necessary sphere of inner experience,

inner experience
is
a part or special
it is
(z)
To show
that
and
our
dependent upon and mediated by the outer
was not the end of Kant's new " Refutation of Idealism," but
The
merely a stadium of the argument.

the dependence of outer experience
things, that
thought.
to
is,
Then
show
real
upon the
end was
existence
to
show
of external
that external things are independent of our
things external to us figure as things-in-them-
selves
then phenomena are confounded with things-in-them-
selves
then Transcendental idealism and Kant's whole doctrine
of knowledge are completely contradicted.

question.
in
maintain,
therefore,
that
This
is
the Transcendental
idealism expounded in both editions of the Critique,
'
E. Arnoldt
18S2), pp. 31-42.
Kant nach Kuno
Fischers neuer
the point
compared
Darstdlun^ (Kbnigsberg,
Examination of the Kantian Doctrines.

with the
new " Refutation of
preface of the second edition,
to non-A.
113
Idealism," and the Note to the

related to these latter positions,
is
Consequently, in order to disprove
this,
be shown that Kant has not denied throughout the
first
as
it
must
edition
of the Critique that external things (bodies) are independent of

our ideas, and that he has by no means affirmed and sought to
demonstrate the same in the passages
Arnoldt denies that there

editions,
and seeks
shows with greater
a contradiction
to graduate their
explicitness
explicitness that souls, are
ism.
is
cited.
The second shows
difference.
bodies,
that
phenomena
it
spiritualism,
the
two
"
The
first
but with less
approximates spiritual-
with greater explicitness that souls,
but with less that bodies, are phenomena;
opposed to
in
which
cation of materialism, which
it
it
it
vindicates, as
sets aside, the relative justifi-
likewise rejects."
If
one only
Jknew in each case the degree of "the greater" and "the

explicitness "
first
For Kant declared with
edition of the Critique, that bodies were
and denied with
all
explicitness,
the
mere phenomena,
in both editions, that souls
were phenomena or knowable objects

,
all explicitness, in
less
at all.^
In an excellent paper, evincing exact technical knowledge and
'
Id.
p. 32.
Critique
14
a penetrating judgment, written
and especially
upon the
is
of
second edition
first
edition,
by
Kant, Johann Witte has also touched
we
not to be regarded as a
it
are at present occu-
opinion, that the " altered exposition of the
change
for the better,''
contradicts the fundamental doctrine of the
and would
limit the difference of the
indistinctness."
two to the
idealistic character
"the second weakens the
.fact that
first
my
is
but denies that
upon my history of philosophy,
question with which
critical
He
pied.
my work on
of Kant.
must object to
of the
this expression
as
too indefinite, and to Witte's further explanation as incorrect.

seeks in the passages cited to show, as appears both
What Kant
from the passages and the context,
not, as Witte supposes,
is
that external things are independent of subjective or individual
thought, but of thought as such.

to the preface of the
Of
that, the
Note appended
which Kant
second edition
intended to
confirm the " Refutation of Idealism " to be found in the text
does not leave the least doubt.

tion "
itself,
tence
is
according to which " the perception of this persis-
only possible through a thing external to me, and not
through the mere
idea of
"the perception of
in time."
reasons
Nor, indeed, does the " Refuta-
such a thing."
Now, Witte
this persistence" as that
This interpretation seems to

because (i)
"my
me
interprets
"of my existence
impossible, for two
existence in time"
is
not persistent.
Examination of
arid
Kantian Doctrines.
the
because, (2) according to
existence,
among
no
Kant's express teaching,
knowable objects, persists, except matter.
all
as Witte holds, always understands by
If Kant,
115
"thing" an
" object thought," or the idea of a thing, then he in reality says

in the
above passage
" The perception of this persistence
only possible through a thing
{i.e.,
external to me, and not through

to me."
It is evident that
no
And
origin.
a. thing)
mere idea of a thing external
sort of skilful exegesis
away the contradiction which

its
through the idea of
is
can explain
have pointed out and traced to
ought certainly to be protected from the
supposition, which surely would not be entertained by so acute
and expert a
critic
as Witte,
that
any prepossession for the
doctrine of another philosopher, as Hegel, has exerted the least

influence
It is
upon
my estimate
of Kant.^
always a thankworthy and profitable experience to receive
the criticisms of thorough scholars, in order to be able either to

correct one's
own
views, or, as I
may have succeeded
the present important question, to confirm them.

disagreeable to be obliged to repel opponents
doing in
in
But
it is
most
who know nothing
whatever of the matter in question, or of the method in which
'
Joh. Witte
Kuno
Fischers
Behandlung der
sein Verhaltniss zur Kantphilologie.

esp. pp. 143-148.
Geschichte der Philosophie
AHpr. Monatsschr.,
yo\.
xv.., 'p^.
it
und
129-151,
ii6
is
of Kant.
Critique
treated, yet
who, with ignorant and over-confident loquacity,
take part in the
and
discussion,
affect
write a polemical
to
such as one of our weekly papers has granted an un-
treatise,
known author
It will
against me.^
by a striking
to point out,
suffice
what
illustration,
ignorance of the Critical philosophy, and what complete incapacity for a comprehension of
it,
our anonymous
with his empty bombastic phrases.

Critique
critic exhibits
Every one versed
in the
of Pure Reason knows that Kant regarded the stand-
points of transcendental idealism and empiri_cal realism on the
one hand, and those of transcendental realism and empirical

idealism on the other, as necessarily belonging together
he united the
that
first
two
in his
and claims to
doctrine,
have disproved the other two, which belong
to dogmatism.
Transcendental idealism teaches the origin of our
nomenal world
ingly,
common
phe-
empirical realism teaches that there are, accord-
no other objects of knowledge but phenomena, or sensible
things.
and
and
Therefore the two standpoints necessarily go together,
their
names merely denote
of thinking.
It is
precisely the
different sides of the
same way
same with the other two.
Trans-
cendental realism teaches that things external to us are in-
'
Die Grenzboten,
No 40
C1882)
Kant und A'uno
Fischer, pp. 10-17.
Examination of
the
Kantian Doctrines,
dependent of our thought, or are things-in-theraselves

idealism teaches that precisely on that account
117
empirical
we do not
conceive external things immediately, but only mediately,
by
logical inference,
and that therefore we can be
their existence than of our
own thought
or,
i.e.,
less certain of
what
is
thing, that the existence of our thinking being (soul)
the same
alone
is
certain, while the existence of external things is uncertain or
doubtful.
In other words, whoever
must also be an empirical
is
a transcendental
realist
These two standpoints are
idealist.
not at variance with one another, but identical, and their names
simply denote different sides of the same method of thought.

If
it is
as the transcendental realist maintains respecting the exis-
tence of external things,

idealist teaches
then
it
must be as the empirical
regarding our idea of things, and the certainty
The two
of their existence.
tion, since they
do not
points of view need no reconcilia-
conflict
with one another,
but are
complementary sides of the same thing, and together constitute

the character of that dogmatic rationalism which was founded
by Descartes, and overthrown by the

Kant.^
its
The matter
stands thus.
Critical investigations of
And now
the Grenzboten lets
philosopher announce the following nonsense, with that
Fischer
iii.
(3rd ed.), pp. 450-456.
Il8
Critique
of Kant.
ridiculous emphasis which delights

his whole prodigious
power
empty heads
to reconcile the contradiction
empirical idealism and transcendental realism,"
between
So Kant
etc.
two standpoints which, according to his view,
(i) reconciled
he (2) reconciled two points of
are completely harmonious;
which
view, both of
" Kant exerted
h.&
proved
to be
untenable
and, in order to
solve a contradiction which, according to his doctrine,
is
none,
nor ever was one, he (3) " exerted his prodigious power," and,
moreover, the " whole " of
nonsense
I
in
of
It is
impossible to utter more
fewer words.
come back
doctrine
it
to the result of
knowledge, and
my
examination of the Kantian
must
regard
it
as
sustained.
According to Kant's doctrine, things-in-themselves are to be

distinguished from phenomena, hence also from things external
to us, with the
is
to be
most
utmost precision, and every confusion of the two

carefully guarded against.
Notwithstanding, in
the text and in the preface of the second edition of the Critique
of Pure Reason, Kant has refuted idealism in such a way that

things external to us are
recognised as independent of our
thought, hence as things-in-themselves, and consequently the

latter are
confounded with phenomena.
'
It
Die Grenzboten" No. 40 (1882),
corresponds com-
p. i6.
Examination of
the
Kantian Doctrines
pletely to the Kantian doctrine, both in its spirit
ascribe reality
as
much
and
and causality to things-in-themselves.
contradicts this doctrine to attribute to
knowableness {empirical
reality)
and external
119
them
letter,
Yet
it
to
just
theoretical
They
causality.
are the causes of our sensible impressions, or of the empirical
material of our knowledge, but they are not external causes,

since these are external things or
phenomena, which originate
from sensations, hence cannot create the

ingly, a radically false
doctrine to regard
it
latter.
as holding things-in-themselves to be the
Such a conception
absolutely impossible with Transcendental
the later " Refutation of Idealism "

so far possible, that
it
Kantians of the ordinary
condemn
of
the
it is
idealism, but
not impossible
is
with
indeed,
soon became the customary one with

It is this
sort.
his opposition to the Kantians,
Critique
accord-
and inverted conception of the Kantian
external causes of our affections of sense.
it is
It is,
and
later
view which Fichte, in

Schopenhauer, in his
Kantian Philosophy, could not strongly enough
as anti-Kantian
and contradictory.
long as Kant did not expressly declare, that
Fichte said
" So
sensations are to he
explained in philosophy from an externally present, in itself transcendental

tell
object,
so long I shall not believe what these expounders
us about Kant.
But
if
he makes
this declaration, I shall
sooner hold the Critique of Pure Reason to be the product of
I20
Critique of Kant.
Yet
remarkable chance than that of a mind." '
it is
just as false
and inverted a view of the Kantian doctrine to hold that

denies
all reality
and causality whatever to things-in-themselves,
and
since they cannot be the external causes of our sensations,

that
it
recognises them as nothing further than mere inoperative
notions.
and
have already shown in
letter of the
causality not the sensible

intelligible
reality
both from the
and
is
not the empirical, and this
and
somehow not
activity 1
Is will
and freedom,
thing-in-itself,
and
according to Kant's explicit teaching,
is,
How
be the cause of our sensations, of our
and of the constitution of our reason
posjible.
Schopenhauer saw
which he sought
day's
'
vol.
J.
i.,
in general
Kant regarded an answer
the question.
to solve
in
\i
the
to
it
p. 486.
The
will.
sensibility,
How ?
.''
That
as for ever im-
enigma of the world,
by his doctrine of the
will.
history of organic development established
G. Fichte
at the
The thing-in-itself is, according
thjg-in-itself
will
and
external, but the supersensible
to Kant's explicit teaching, the cause of our sensations.
can
spirit
and causality of things-in-
namely, the causality olwill.
then, according to Kant,
same time
reality
only this reality
themselves,
detail,
Kantian system, that our philosopher taught,
and must have taught, the
is
it
Zweile EinltUmtg in die Wissenschaftslehre.
And
to-
by Darwin,
Vide
Werke,
Examination of
the
Kantian Doctrines.
implies, as appears from the intelligent
way
121
which
in
it
grasps
the relation of function and organ, this factor which Schopen-
hauer called the will

If
to live}
Kant had not maintained the
independent of
all
ideas and
pronounced opponent of
all
being of things-in-themselves
phenomena, a man
like Herbart, that
idealism and monism, would never
have called himself a " Kantian," and have been convinced that
"
Kant possessed the
notion of being."
true
He who
had
demonstrated the impossibility of the ontological proof for the

existence of God, as Kant had done in the Critique of Pure Reason,
was,
Herbart's
in
metaphysics."
II.
view,
" the
man
to
overthrow
the
old
^
,
Examination of the Doctrines of Freedom and

Development.
I.
Schopenhauer's Critique of the Kantian Philosophy.
In his Critique of the Kantian Philosophy (which

the second edition
of the
chief
work),
is
based upon
Schopenhauer
has
accounted the same the highest product which the history of philosophy has brought
forth.
It is related to
Part III., 2, and Chap. III., Part
'
Cf. supra,
Chap.
Cf. infra.
Chap. V., Part
I.,
the old metaphysics
II., 2.
I.
Critique of Kant.
122
of the nature of things (God, the world, and the soul) as the true
view of the world to the
And even
false,
or as the
new chemistry to alchemy
the profound idealistic systems of old time, which, as
the religion of India and the Platonic philosophy, had attained

the insight that our sense-world
is
only conceived and
phenome-
the Kantian doctrine as the incorrectly esta-
nal, are related to
blished truth to that which
correctly established, or as the
is
of a Pythagorean to that of
heliocentric view of the world
At the same time the Kantian philosophy wants
Copernicus.
both completeness and consistency.
accompanied by two chief

the " distinction of
Its
two chief merits are
Its greatest
errors.
phenomenon from
merit consists in
thing-in-itself,"
by which
" the complete diversity of the Real and the Ideal," and the
merely conceived or phenomenal (hence not real) being of our

sense-world,
become apparent.
Its
" knowledge of the undeniably moral

as entirely different
something that
is
meaning of human conduct,
from and not dependent upon the laws of
phenomena, nor even explicable

as
second merit consists in the
in
accordance with them, but
immediately connected with the thing-in-
itself." 1
The
'
first
of the two main errors of Kant, Schopenhauer finds
Schopenhauer
Die Welt
ed., 1879), pp. 494-500.
als Wille
und
Vorstelbtng, vol.
i.,
Appendix
(5th
Examination of
in the fact that
he has not
and abstract or
the
Kantian Doctrines.
clearly distinguished
knowledge.
reflective
mediable confusion, now by
falsely
123
between sensible
This has led to
now by
confounding,
irre-
falsely
Thus Kant has denied
opposing the two sorts of knowledge.
sensible knowledge to the understanding, as
a visible sense-world without understanding
if
there could be
and has treated
reasonj^not as the faculty of abstract or jreflective knowledge by
means ofgudgments and conclusions, but

and moral conduct, while,
in truth,
it
only determines the rules
according to which prudent conduct

virtuous,
mous
as that of principles
regulated.
is
Moral or
and reasonable or prudent, are by no means synony-
terms.
The Machiavelian
policy
is
not virtuous, but
it is,
indeed, clever and reasonable, while self-sacrificing generosity

quite as virtuous as
it is
From
unwise.
is
the sensible knowledge
of the understanding there arises the abstract, through the faculty

of reflection or thought (reason).
Hence
sensible perceptions
are related to notions, as sensible objects to thought-objects, or
as
"phenomena"
to
things-in-themselves
appearances.
Kant's
"noumena," but
not as
appearances to
for abstract notions represent nothing but
treatment
phenomena and noumena
as
of the
equivalent
difference
to
the
between appearances and things-in-themselves, and

sequent designation of the
latter as
between
difference
his
con^
noumena, has proved a
Critique
24
mischievous and
fatal error,
of Kant.
growing out of that
fundamental
first
one.''
The second main
error,
which seriously
conflicts with the
fundamentally idealistic view of the Critique of Pure Reason, consists in
the false introduction of the thing-in-itself as the external
cause of our sensations.

in-itself as related to
It is
not the recognition of a thing-
a given phenomenon that
but this method of deducing
it
and
it
is
this
is
which proved
troublesome to the second edition of the Critique in

tation
of Idealism."
Critique
"
No one
erroneous,
its
" Refu-
imagines that he knows the
of Pure Reason, and has a clear notion of Kant's doctrine,
when he has read
it
ing editions
is
that
only in the second or in one of the follow

absolutely impossible, for he has read only
a mutilated, corrupted, and in some measure spurious text."

It is
equivalent to a contradiction of the fundamental idealism
of the Kantian doctrine to regard the thing-it-itself, according

to the law of causality, as the external cause of our sensations.
And
it
is
equivalent to an utter misconstruction and denial of
the entire Kantian doctrine to reject the thing-in-itself altogether, or to
'
deny
Schopenhauer
Ibid.,
reality,
Die Welt
517. 563-566, 610-614.
it
pp. 515-517-
als
i.e.,
the character of original being,
Willi
und
Vorstellung, vol.
i.,
pp. 513
and
Examination of
as has recently
been done
Kantian Doctrines.
the
some of the
in
latest periodicals.
Schopenhauer unjustly attempted to ascribe

Kantian system
"
tattle
which he was
to Fichte, who,
wont
on the
125
this
view of the
to call " nonsensical tittle-
contrary,
had maintained,
like
Schopenhauer, that the logically consistent criticism of reason

could never teach the external existence and causality of thingsin themselves,^
and had,
like
him, denied the unknowableness of
the same, and held that the thing-in-itself
is
known
is
in our self-consciousness,
that
it
to
so
be immediately
known, and,
indeed, as will.
We
have here no interest in further pursuing Schopenhauer's
criticism of the Kantian doctrine of knowledge, since that
necessarily lead to an examination of his
saw
itself
obliged,
following
its
own
distinction
doctrine,
would
which
between under-
standing and reason, between the sensible knowledge of the one
and the abtsract knowledge of the
other,
to reject entirely
Kant's doctrine of the categories of the understanding and the

In the two chief points which constitute
postulates of reason.
the character of Kant's system,

ideality of all
phenomena
thing-in-itself,
which
is
'
viz.,
(objects),
in the
doctrines of the
and of the
reality
of the
completely independent of and different
Cf. supra, pp. 119, 120.
126
Critique of Kant.
from phenomena, Schopenhauer

sought to develop his
in
agreed with Kant, and has
is
The World as Will and Idea
own system
accordance with these principles.
In his view respecting the
groundwork of the Kantian philosophy we must concur

in his view that the confusion
of
phenomena and
themselves conflicts with this groundwork

things-in-themselves are confounded with
are recognized as things
causes of our sensations
also
things-in-
also in his view that
phenomena when they
external to us,
and as the external
also in his view that in the "Refutation
of Idealism," as developed in the second edition of the Critique,

things external to us do figure as something independent of
thought, and accordingly as things-in-themselves.

ever,
all
When, how-
Schopenhauer holds that not merely the external causality
of things-in-themselves, but their causality in general,

cilable with the
Kantian doctrine
(since,
the notion of causality in general

themselves),
is
free
from
latter,
inapplicable to things-in-
we cannot agree with him,
is
irrecon-
according to the
either that such a view
contains the contradiction he claims, or that the
the Critique
is
this contradiction, if
it
first
edition of
were one.
That
things-in-themselves are the supersensible substratum or hidden
ground of the constitution of our reason, hence also that of our

sensations and world of sense,
Kant himself declared
constant assertion of his criticism."
It
to
be " the
never occurred to
him
Examination of
the
Kantian Doctrines.
127
to apply temporal or sensible causality to things-in-themselves

their causality
is
is
the timeless or intelligible, just as their reality
not temporal, but timeless,
reality.^
If
Schopenhauer
recognise the validity of no other than time-causality, that
and the discussion of
affair,
criticism of his system, with
He
it
will
is
his
belongs to the exposition and
which we are. not now concerned.
censures Kant for ascribing causality to things-in-themselves.
Why
does he
commend
enough
been
difficult
futile
attempt withal,
his affirmation of their reality ?
in
has
Schopenhauer himself, and a wholly
for
to ascribe to the thing-in-itself (will) original
being, and at the same time to deny
shown
It
what points
it
causality.
After I have
agree with Schopenhauer concerning
the difference between the two editions of the Critique of Pure
Reason and the contradiction in the Kantian doctrine of knowledge, I must express the wish that, respecting this very question,
those points shall not be overlooked in which
The Correspondence between
2.
the
I differ
from him.
Doctrines of Knowledge
and
Freedom.
The Kantian
doctrine of knowledge, subject to the contradic-
tion pointed out, conflicts with the doctrine of freedom.
from
'
this contradiction,
Cf. supra,
Chap.
I.,
it
Free
establishes the possibility of freedom.
Part III., Sec. 2, and Chap.
II.,
Part
II.,
Sec
I.
Critique of Kant.
128
and, indeed,
that,
alone
it
of space and time,
We
or will.
length that
For there
systems.
all
is,
Reason in
will,
absolutely independent
phenomena and
and can
we here need only
three Critiques
intelligible
be, nothing other than
freedom
to refer to that earlier discussion.^
may be taken
The
documents
as the authentic
Critique of Pure Reason in
its
doctrine of
and empirical character, the Critique of Practical
its
doctrine of the reality of freedom and the primacy
and the Critique of Judgment
in its doctrine
adaptation and immanent natural ends, as well as

final
no doubt
is
have already enlarged upon this point at such
for the assertion:
of
all
according to this doctrine, the thing-in-itself, absolutely
distinguished from
The
among
its
of natural
doctrine of
moral ends and the original ground of the world.
Kant has shown with such
fulness
and clearness the connection
of his doctrines of knowledge and freedom,

thing, the identity
After
or,
between thing-in-itself and
what
will,
is
the same
we cannot
possibly think, with Schopenhauer, that the matter only hovered
dimly before him, like a presentiment
and that he recognised
the thing-in-itself as will, not with the conviction of a philosopher, but as
has
still
"A
good man, through obscurest
an instinct of the one true way."
Vide supra, Chap.

Faust.
Taylor's
11.,
tr.
"I
Part IX.
aspiration,
therefore venture
Exatntnatton of the Kanltan Doctrines.

to
assume,"
Schopenhauer,
said
" although
it
129
not to be
is
proved, that Kant, as often as he spoke of the thing-in-itself,
always thought in the obscurest depths of his mind indistinctly

of will." ^
But
" distinction
after
of
Schopenhauer himself has recognised the
phenomenon from
" knowledge of the undeniably moral meaning of

as something that
duct,
thing-in-itself," as the
is
and the
thing-in-itself,"
human con-
immediately connected with the
two greatest services of our philosopher,
and has extolled his doctrines of time and space, and of

gible and empirical character, as
intelli-
"the two diamonds
crown of Kantian fame," we are compelled
the
in
to regard the sen-
tence just cited, not only as an imperfect and less commendatory

estimate of the services of Kant, but as an obvious contradiction
of his
own
statement.
Kant must have been conscious of what
he taught, when he apprehended things-in-themselves as
Ideas,
these as ends, these as determinations of will, and the will itself

^^ freedom, which, although revealed to us with immediate
absolute certainty only in our
own moral
being,
is
and
nevertheless
" that supersensible which
we
are
obliged to posit as underlying nature as phenomenon,"
i.e.,
necessarily identical with
it
is
necessarily identical with the thing-in-itself.^
Schopenhauer
'
Die Welt ah Wille und Vorstellung,
Cf. supra,
Chap.
III.,
Part III., Sec.
vol.
i.,
p. 599.
3.
Critique of Kant.
130
3.
The Contradiction
Between the
is
harmony
have discovered and expounded
Kant's immortal service.
is
The doctrine
no contradiction, but the deepest
To
and most perfect harmony.
of freedom
demands a system of morals absolutely
from hedonism, elevated entirely above every eudaemonistic
free
view of
life,
and thus above
Kant
pessimism.
himself, in separating virtue from happiness,
summum bonum he
virtually
been
After
all
We
when
but
in his doctrine of
eudaemonistic aims in
utterly shut out in a system
purity of will, they should
soul.
united them, this high ethical ground was
abandoned.
doctrines of the
between optimism and
strife
all
developed such a system of ethics

the
of Freedom.
Kantian doctrines of know-
logically consistent
ledge and freedom, there
this
in the Doctrine
life
had
based upon freedom and the
not have been introduced by the
summum bonum and
of the immortality of the
were obliged earlier in the discussion, in order to set
forth clearly Kant's doctrine of immortality,
the true conception of

contradiction
in his
it
from the
false,
and to distinguish
to
doctrine of freedom, and
point out this
may
avoid
all
Die Welt
als
repetition by referring to those remarks. ^
'
Vide supra. Chap.
Wille
und
II.,
Part
Vorstellung, vol.
i.,
III., Sec. 2.
pp. 620-622.
Cf.
Schopenhauer
Examination of
The Contradiction between
4.
Kantian Doctrines.
the
131
of Knowledge and
the Doctrines
Development.
That Kant had already furthered the evolutionist view of
made
things before the Critique of Pure Reason, and had
working problem
that he
had established
of the Critique, and had developed

ol
both nature and
moral world
tion.
'^
We
civilization, or the
all this
world-development
its
is
revelation
that,
offreedom.^
view by means
principles in his treatment
whole organic,
social,
and
it
according to his doctrine, the
be apprehended as phenomenon, and
to
phenomenon
ultimate ground
his
has been pointed out in a previous sec-
have also shown
fact, as teleological
its
this
it
is
We
that in
its
in
unity as well as in
nothing other than the progressive

therefore regarded Kant's doctrine of
development as a unification of his doctrines of knowledge and

freedom, and the world-development
phenomenon and
thing-in-itself,
itself as
and
a unification of
such a unification
as
neither confounds both nor negates itself by holding the un-
knowableness of the
thing-in-itself,
immanent end of a thing,
it is
on the ground
that, as the
not to be found in the phenomenon,
as the object of our experience, by even the minutest analysis.
Vide supra. Chap. III., Parts
I.
and
Vide supra. Chap. III., Part III.
II.
Critique of Kant.
132
There
is,
accordingly, a point of view from which the Kantian
doctrine of development does
not, in
the
first
place, conflict with
the doctrine of knowledge.
We
and
must conceive the development of things as
We
as universal.
universe,
but
its
must extend
and the
will
application to the entire
knowableness must be limited to the moral
order of things, since

will,
its
teleological,
all
ends become known merely from the
only from one's
own
Conse-
practical reason.
quently, the development of things, like ends in general, remains

theoretically unknowable.
Since, now,
all
phenomena
are objects
of our experience or scientific (theoretical) knowledge,
development
is
of knowledge,
and
a phenomenon, and yet held not to be an object
we
are
here confronted with a contradiction
between the Kantian doctrines of knowledge and development,
which
affects the truth
of the
character of
phenomenon
denying
scientific
its
It consists in
latter.
to development,
knowableness.
and
ascribing the
at the
same time
The Kantian philosophy
teaches the unknowableness of thing-in- itself and the knowableness of

as
phenomenon
soon as
it
this, its
foundation doctrine,
is
shattered
sees itself obliged to recognise either the
ableness of the former or the unknowableness of the
such a recognition
it is
brought by
its
know-
latter.
To
doctrine of development.
Without the knowledge of the end, or of the
thing-in-itself,
Examination of
Kantian Doctrines.
the
which underlies the development of things,
133
development
this
is
an incomprehensible, unknowable phenomenon, and therefore,

in strictness, no
things
is
phenomenon
at all.
immanent end of
If the
not apparent to us, then certainly there appears to us
no development
in the nature
Hence
of things.
the Kantian
doctrine of development finds itself in the following dilemma

either the intelligible, knowable,
i.e.,
phenomenal, character of
development must be denied, or the knowableness of the thingin-itself affirmed
and, indeed, not merely
moral knowableness, but also
III.
its
and
theoretical
practical
its
and
scientific.
Examination of the Doctrine op Phenomena and

Things-in-themselves.
I.
The
The Knowableness of
Human
scientific validity of the doctrine of
this affirmation.
Reason.
development demands
Hence the Kantian doctrine of knowledge does
not admit of permanent acceptance in the form

Critique of Pure Reason, in accordance with
phenomena
ledge
is
while
all
are objects of knowledge, and
confined to the realm of

practical
all
theoretical
know-
or objects of sense,
restricted to the realm of
freedom or of Ideas, and any further knowledge

impossible.
received in the
which only sensuous
phenomena
knowledge remains
it
But the Critique of Pure Reason
is
held to be
itself contradicts this
Critique of Kant.
134
inasmuch as
result,
it is
of knowledge which
criticism
neither practical (moral), nor has sensible
is
phenomena
things or
itself,
obliged to admit the existence of a sort
This knowledge
for its objects.
so far as in
investigation
its
The
establishes the conditions of experience.

to have determined in
its
and
is
its
the
discovers and
it
Critique professes
Transcendental Esthetic and Analytic
human
the constitution or organization of
ledge
is
not a practical knowledge, for
its
This know-
reason.
subject
is
not freedom
objects are not phenomena, since according to the Critique
space and time are not phenomena, any more than productive
imagination, pure understanding, or pure consciousness.
knowledge
is
not experience, for
conditions which precede

All
knowledge which aims
all
its
is
objects are precisely those
experience and
theoretical
and
claim to the character of science
itself
it
would not
knowledge.
it is
it
possible.
It establishes
itself
and
Such
scientific.
and such as
it is
lays
the Doctrine of Knowledge
be, if its doctrine of
knowledge were not
the knowledge of experience by
showing how experience originates

entirely if
it
presented in the Critique of Pure Reason
.neither empirical nor practical, but theoretical,
and that
make
in the first place only at insights,
not at conduct, must be termed
a knowledge
This
were experience
and
it
for that
would
fail
of
its
end
would be tantamount
to establishing experience by experience, hence not establishing
Examination of
at all, but
it
And
done.
presupposing
it
the
it,
Kantian Doctrines.
135
as the dogmatic philosophy had
ought not to be objected here that Kantj there-
has used the inductive method of experimental science, in
fore,
establishing his doctrine of knowledge, so that the Critique of
Pure Reason
selves
itself rests
on experience.
Let us not deceive our-
by an ambiguous play with the word " experience."
strictness,
In
our philosopher recognises only the knowledge of
phenomena ; while, on the contrary, the Critique of Pure Reason

virtually leads to a sort of
knowledge the objects of which are
not
phenomena, but the subjective conditions of phenomena.
The
fact of experience is
Whatever
that,
is,
is
established
one thing,
by experience
establishment another.
empirically
is
on the contrary, by which experience
precisely
itself is
known
established
on that account, no object of empirical, but only of
Transcendental knowledge.
must have distinguished
These two
in the
knowledge has the character

tical,
its
way that he
oj"
did.
theoretical as
but not that of empirical, knowledge.
the Critique of Pure Reason transcends by
bounds which
it
had
set as the
knowledge Kant
sorts of
its
Transcendental
opposed to prac-
We
thus see
own
how
insights the
insurmountable limits of
all
theoretical knowledge.
The
insight into those subjective conditions from which phe-
nomena
(objects of experience)
and the knowledge of phenomena
Critique of Kant.
136
originate, constituted Transcendental Idealism
thereby gained, that
we can have no other
and the insight
objects of knowledge
We
than sensuous phenomena, constituted Empirical Realism.
know
the necessary connection that subsists between these two
doctrines
is
they are related as premise and conclusion.
therefore
more thoughtless
Nothing
in estimating the Critical philo-
sophy, than to leave the character of Transcendental idealism,
whether through ignorance or misconception, entirely out

sight,
of
and then to declare the Kantian doctrine to be Empiricism.
The
Critique of Pure Reason involves the
from the nature of our reason
which
problem of deducing
is
revealed to us only
through the most penetrating self-knowledge
the
conditions of
experience (" faculties of knowledge," Kant termed them), and

thus of developing the doctrine of knowledge into an actual
doctrine
of the process of knowledge.
This problem remains un-
solved in the Kantian philosophy itself; but
we have shown
that
the Critique of Pure Reason contains the data for such a solution,
and that
shows us
its
investigations are ordered in such a
in outline the course of
way
that
it
development of human know-
ledge from perception to scientific thought, and to the system-
Now, the doctrine of knowledge
atization of the sciences."
'
vol.
Vide supra, Chap.

iii.
III.,
(3rd ed.), p. 519
Part
et seq.
II.,
Sec.
2.'
Cf. Fischer
Gesck. d. n. Philos.,
Examination of
itself is scientific
founds
itself
knowledge
the
Kantian Doctrines.
and the doctrine of development
upon the notion of
development as such
is
137
end,
without which no sort of
Hence
intelligible.
this notion
may
not be regarded merely as a moral principle for the knowledge

"of the
moral order of things, and a maxim of reflection for
contemplating the organic world
which
is
valid for the entire
is
it
a principle of knowledge
knowable order of the world, the
natural as well as the moral.
2.
The Knowabkness of Natural Ends in
Man and
of Blind
Intelligence.
Let us examine the reason why Kant limited the knowableness

of ends to the moral, and excluded
why he saw himself obliged
to
it
from the natural world,
deny knowableness to the imma-
nent natural end, which he had introduced into his Critique of
Pure Reason as a necessary Idea in our contemplation of the

organic world, and as the principle of teleological judgment.
He
held that ends are only so far knowable as they are consciously
possessed and willed
ends and act
in
that only will and intelligence can posit
accordance with them
that consequently nature
or the material world has no ends (no knowable ones)

therefore also the ends, without which
we
and that
are unable to
prehend the organization and constitution of
com-
living bodies, are
Critique of Kant.
138
not forces operative in nature, not knowable objects, but mere
They
Ideas.
are,
however, necessary Ideas;
for,
although in
organized bodies the parts should be understood in the light of

the whole, we, with our discursive understanding, can only put
together and comprehend the whole from the parts, and as
are consequently incapable of perceiving
whole as the creative ground of

end.
The
whole, that
is,
which
we
perceive sensibly as object,
life,
and knowing such a
we must conceive
refuge, as
it
be,
its
it
needs
judgment
it
to
By
human
teleologically
faculty
it
out of
its
own
compensate, as well as
the
in general,
in particular, the latter presents itself as
velopment of
and
weakness our reason takes
for its native incapacity.
establishes the reflective
its
cannot
we should not need a
were, in this faculty, developing
primitive powers, because
may
In
as
are obliged to think as Idea,
intuitive understanding,
of teleological judgment.
it
we. are to conceive, but
hence we are compelled to consider living bodies
Had we an
we
way
in
which Kant
and the teleological
a necessary yorw of de-
reason, which seeks to solve a problem, to
supply a needed knowledge, and, under the peculiar constitution

of
its
intellectual faculties,
Ends
can attain
in nature, therefore,
Fischer
its
object in no other way.'
according to the Kantian teaching,
Gesch. d. n. Philos., vol. iv. (3rd ed.), pp. 492-498.
Examinatton of
the
Kantian Doctrines.
139
are unknowable and in effect impossible, since they require to
be posited by
and intelligence
will
and such an unconscious
intelligence, such an end-active yet blind force, contradicts the
Thus hylozoism, which teaches
notion of matter.
is
living
Kant
that matter
and energized by inherent causes, was regarded by
as the death of
all
Philosophy of Nature.
living organized matter exists,
Since, now,
and we cannot conceive of
it
except as adapted to ends, Kant was obliged to deduce the

end-active underlying force from the moral ground of things,
from the divine
will,
and of the world a
and thus to give
theistic basis.
i.e.
his teleological view of life
But the immanent natural ends,
the Idea of which rules and guides our teleological judgment,

are thereby transformed into divine purposes, and
life itself,
as
well as all natural development, remains unexplained and inexplicable.
The unknowableness
of natural ends
is
based by Kant upon
the impossibility of an unconscious intelligence or of a blind

will.
But the
reality
of such a blind intelligence had already
been shown by Leibnitz

imperceptible ideas
in his doctrine of the unconscious or
{^perceptions petites),
a doctrine which he
raised to fundamental importance in his theory of knowledge.
And,
in fact,
Kant
also
was obliged to recognize the knowable-
ness of natural ends and the unconscious activity of our intellec-
140
Critique
He
tual faculties.
had denied
of
life
it
recognized
of Kant.
human
in
it
in the organic world.
We
nature, though he
further the moral ends
as
Kant
without
being
by means of the "mechanism of instincts"
terms the impulses of our natural ends of

conscious of them and willing them.
create that struggle for existence,
life
Our
natural
interests
and that increasing complexity
of industrial society, from which issue, unconsciously and without volition, the moral orders of
life.
Wherever Kant
blished the necessity of the latter, he laid the greatest stress
esta-'-
upon
the reality and activity of our purely natural, and, at the same
time, intelligible ends of
world of sense
is
life.'
That we conceive a common
a fact that our reflective consciousness finds at
hand, but does not create, since
it is,
the rather, produced from
the material of our impressions by the systematizing representative
faculties
reflective
of reason,
and hence
and unconscious
arises
through the non-
activity of intellect.
Kant saw
in
the productive imagination this form-giving faculty, which acts
unconsciously in accordance with the laws of pure consciousness,
and constitutes the bond that unites sense and understanding.

" Synthesis in general
is
merely the work of the imagination, a
though indispensable function of the
soul,
Mind
without which we should
Vide supra. Chap. III., Part II.,
Sec
Examination of
âve
the
Kantian Doctrines.
no knowledge whatever, yet of which
But to bring
scious.
we
which the
sense."
are seldom even con-
that
this synthesis to notions
Which belongs to the understanding, and

latter first
141
in
is
a function
the exercise of
procures for us knowledge in the real
When,
accordingly,
in
especially organic nature,
and necessity to the
our
contemplation of nature, and
Kant
ascribes only subjective validity
notion
of
end,
conflicts with his theistic
it
doctrine, according to which the final

ticularly the origin of life, is
end of things, and par-
deduced from the original ground
of things, thus recognizing an end-active power, which
no means a mere
idea.
When Kant
inherent natural ends in general,

of the natural ends of
pletely
human
life,
it
denies the knowahleness of

conflicts with his doctrine
which he regarded as a com-
knowable and end-conformable mechanism of
by means of which the natural
historical progress of
forced to a moral development, and
its
instincts,
mankind
an unconscious
presupposed
'
Kant
possibility of
activity
in the
When
an unconscious intelligence and
toward an end
which
is
necessarily
conception of inherent natural ends
Kritik der reineit
Vernunft.
Fischer: Gesch. d. n. Philos., vol.
iii,
is
end unconsciously and
involuntarily promoted, though not of course attained.
Kant denies the
by
is
Transcend. Analyiik., 10.
(3rd ed.), p. 370.
this
Cf.
Critique of Kant.
142
assertion
is
contradicted not only by his doctrine of morals in
the points just mentioned, but also by his doctrine of knowledge
that
is,
by the Critique of Pure Reason
deduction
itself in its
of the pure notions of the understanding, and especially in
its
doctrine of the productive imagination, as being
"a blind but
pensable function of the soul, without which
we should have no
indis-
knowledge whatever."
TAe Knowableness of Life and of Beauty.
3.
When Kant
teaches that
all
phenomena
subjective conditions of our reason,
own
i.e.,
originate from the
from the material of our
impressions and the form-giving faculties or the laws of
our thought, this doctrine
phenomena.
According
is
contradicted by his view of organic
to these conditions, there
objects in the sense-world which are not

parts as precede the whole
can be no
composed of such
hence Kant also holds that
all
phenomena, especially bodies, are only mechanically knowable.

But, now, there are certain objects with
reversed.
whole which
differentiates,
Such phenomena are

its
this relation is
In this case, the whole does not result from the parts,
but the parts from the whole.
before
which
parts,
Every object of
articulates,
living bodies.
and derive the
latter
and
this sort is
develops
itself.
Could we perceive a whole

from the former, then also
Examination of
the
Kantian Doctrines.
143
an organism would be mechanically knowable, and hence an

object of scientific knowledge in the exact sense of the word.
But that we cannot do, because such a faculty of perception, such

an
intuitive understanding, is
wanting in
We are
us.
therefore
obliged to derive the constitution and parts of an organism from
of
Idea
the
the
and
whole,
consequently
to
consider
it
ieleologically.
The
character, then, of living bodies consists in their being
wholes which
Now,
let
it
articulate,
organize,
be carefully noted that
and develop themselves.
it is
not this character of the
organism, but only the teleological idea of the same, which comes
What, accordingly, characterizes
to the account of our reason.

living
phenomena, and makes them what they
are,
does not
permit of being determined from the subjective conditions of
our impressions and forms of thought, and

general, but in the
phenomena
specific
themselves.^
Ieleologically .
other words, that
If
there are living things,
'
Cf. Fischer
Kant ex
why we must conceive
of
That, however, there are living things, or, in

life
appears to us
in
the sense-world,
the
and Transcendental idealism do not give
(3rd ed.), pp. 403-406.
not founded in the
conformity to law or type of the
plains to us in his Critique ofJudgment
them
is
iii.
(3rd ed.), pp. 514-518
vol. iv.
Critique of Kant.
144
On
us to understand.
in
the contrary,
when we compare the way
which Kant explains phenomena with the way in which he
apprehends the character and
and inexplicable, that
We
at all.
per
se
life
fact of
life, it
remains unexplained
appears to us in the natural world
are therefore obliged to conclude either that life
does not belong in the phenomenal world, or that some-
thing appears in
from our
it,
which the criticism of reason cannot derive
faculties of
understanding,
phenomena,
Now, the
but which,
underlies
fact or
ground, since
knowledge, neither from sense, nor from
it
life
independently of our
and constitutes
phenomenon of
life is
and
ideas
phenomenon.
its
undeniable.
Its creative
subsists independently of our ideas
and pheno-
mena, belongs to things-in-themselves, which are to be thought

as Ideas
and ends, and
intelligible, or
are, in truth, will, the principle
moral order of the world.
conceive this creative ground of

i.e.,
as unconscious intelligence
life
as
We
are obliged to
immanent
and blind
will,
natural end,
and can now no
longer hold this conception to be a mere Idea,
superadd to the phenomenon of
life,
and
activity of inherent natural ends,
fact
and phenomenon of
life,
of the
which we
since, without the reality

i.e.,
would not
without blind
exist at
all,
will,
the
and every
addition from the side of our reason would be useless.
whole, which differentiates, articulates, and organizes
That
itself,
is
Examination of
the definite end of
itself
by
activity,
the
Kantain Doctrines.
or the will to
life,
live,
145
which must
and develop the necessary organs
assert
for the
fulfilment of its functions.
And what
is
true of living
That there
(Esthetic.
faculties of
terests of
is
phenomena must
state of
also be true of
harmony and freedom
mind, in which, independent of
all
desire
and
all in-
knowledge, we give ourselves to pure contemplation
and enjoyment, follows from the constitution of our

nature.
for our
Esthetic pleasure
is
a pure subjective
which there could be no talk about
state, apart
one object impresses us
as beautiful, another as ugly, a third as sublime,
must be condi-
tioned by the peculiar sort of the phenomena, and can as
the character of
be derived from the subjective
life
which are the ground of the phenomena and

conformity to law.
from
That, how-
aesthetic objects.
ever, in this state of free contemplation
intellectual
their
little
as
factors,
general
There must, accordingly, be something
independent of our faculties of reason, which underlies the
phenomena
themselves,
related to the given
makes them what they
phenomenon,
in us is related to the empirical.
thing becomes
known
to us
are,
and -which
is
as the intelligible character
We
must add, that
this
some-
from the phenomena themselves,
although we do not find the same in the analysis of the given

object.
Critique of Kant.
146
4.
The Knoivableness of Things-in-themselves.
This something
is
the thing-in-itself, the absolute unknowable-
ness of which Kant,
it
is true,
asserted
but in the progress of
he by no means adhered
his investigations
to this assertion.
On
the contrary, in the Critique of Practical Reason and the Critique
of fudgment light was thrown upon the subject

he had not foreseen
that he
still
in the Critique
in
a way which
of Pure Reason.
denied in the second edition of the
possibility of those principles
We know
latter
which he afterwards discovered to
be necessary, and made the basis of his criticism of the

judgment.^
And
This very noteworthy
in criticising
remember
that
it
fact
aesthetic
must not be overlooked.
the Kantian philosophy
we should always
by no means issued from the Critique of
Pure Reason as a finished system, but

it
the
unfolded and developed
itself,
that,
on the contrary,
and reached
results
which
were not involved in that work, which do not accord with

its
fundamental principles, and could not be adjusted to them
by any attempt
at artificial symmetries,
was so fond of applying.
such as the philosopher
The phenomena
to
which we add
the idea of beauty, of sublimity, or of inner adaptation, are not
included
'
among
Cf. Fischer
the
phenomena whose
Cesch. d. n. Philos., vol.
iv.
origin the Critique of
(3rd ed.), p, 408 JSf.
Examination of
the
Kantian Doctrines.
147
Pure Reason investigates; the former are sui generis, and include
more than
these.
According to the Critique of Pure Reason, things-in-themselves

are the substratum of the nature of our reason as well as of
They
phenomena.
are, therefore, to
be absolutely distinguished
from phenomena, never confounded with them, hence never

with things external to us, but always to be thought of as the
unknowable original ground of things.
This
is
the doctrine
which runs through the entire Critique of Pure Reason, and
it
is
difficult to
believe that any one having read this work would
dispute
Kantian character.
Kant
its
It
could not have occurred to
to hold the thing-in-itself to be a
thought- thing,
mena, as
it
that he did.
i.e.,
is
mere
idea, or
a mere
a cause ascribed by us in thought to pheno-
maintained in numerous recent publications
Were
and nothing more,
the thing-in-itself a mere thought-thing
it
would, as such, be completely knowable,
and not unknowable and
inscrutable, as
the Critique 'of Pure
Reason nevertheless teaches with the utmost explicitness.
If
the character of actuality or reality did not belong to things-in-
themselves, as the original ground of thinking and phenomenal

being, the doctrine of their unknowableness would be not only
meaningless, but absurd.
does not exist at
all,
but
is
How
can anything which
in reality
merely thought, be seriously regarded
Critique of Kant.
148
unknowable
as something
Whoever, then, thinks that accord-
ing to the Kantian teaching there
is
no such thing
of things-in-themselves, must also maintain that Kant
reality
But
has never spoken of their unknowableness.

actually thinks that, then
of Kant
critics
whom
as the
who
if
any one
he belongs to the already numerous
write
books on
the Critique of Pure Reason
is
his philosophy, yet for
to this day a thing-in-
itself.
Every one who has followed the fundamental investigations

in
this
will
work up
to
the close of the Transcendental Analytic,
have the impression, especially after the section
Ground of the Distinction of
mena and
Noumena,"
all
that
"
On
the
Objects whatsoever as Phenothings-in-themselves
are
and
remain unknowable, that they represent the insoluble mystery

of the world, and that our knowledge must confine itself to
sensible
objects and to sensible experience.
blishment of empiricism, which carries with

of
all
it
This new estathe destruction
metaphysics, often receives the distinction of being the
chief service
and
real
result of the
Kantian
criticism.
Thus
the Neo-Kantians of the day have stopped short under this

impression, and likewise
understand
him.
many
of our natural scientists,
who
the Konigsberg philosopher less than they praise
They overlook
the fact that the establishment of empiricisnj
Examination of
is
the
Kantian Doctrines.
not empiricism, and cannot be empiricism
trary,
it
consists
in the
that,
149
on the con-
investigation of the principles of
all
experience, and must therefore result in a Doctrine of Principles,

or a " Metaphysics of Phenomena," to have established which,
Kant regarded as the problem and performance of

of knowledge.
Prolegomena
he would
Otherwise
to every future
not
his doctrine
have written
Metaphysic which may claim a
his
Scientific
Character.
When, however, we have followed the course of the
Critique of
Pure Reason further, and reached the close of the Transcendental

Dialectic,
to
the darkness which obscured the thing-in-itself begins
disappear,
although
now confirmed by
are obliged
to
the unknowableness
objects of
necessary Ideas,
which have
are
of both thinking and
ground of
all
knowledge, they are
is
phenomenal
is
we
that while
nevertheless
ground
objects, as well as the original
We now
know,
to be thought under these original grounds
or unconditioned principles,
Among
for their subject the original
possible and actual existence.
furthermore, what
and God.
are taught that, and why,
conceive of things-in-themselves
not
they
We
proofs.
same
of the
viz.,
the soul, the world as totality,
the world-Ideas, Transcendental freedom
represented to us as the sole Idea, which, while
it
is
can never
yet be the conbe a phenomenon or object of knowledge, can
Critique of Kant.
ISO
ceivable original ground of all

as natural laws.
knowledge
Finally,
phenomena, and of their order
these ideas serve as a criterion of
they present themselves as regulative principles of
true,
can
never be attained, but yet are to be continually striven
for,
knowledge,
as goals of experience, which,
i.e.,
in order that our
so
combine
in
sciences shall
is
knowledge may become systematized, and may

the highest diversity with the highest
itself
that the
unity,
it
specific
results
of
the several
become more and more
unified,
experimental
and approxi-
mate a system of knowledge which forms a simple whole.
Were such a system
attainable,
all
the sciences would
ulti-
mately be members of one whole, and the order of the world
would become known to us as a genealogical system, in which

all
phenomena
primitive
Hence
in their various species
ground.
But
also the Ideas,
descend from one single
this primitive
since
ground
they prescribe
of homogeneity, specification, and continuity
is
unknowable.
" the principles

(affinity) " for
the
experimental sciences, should be recognised only as maxims

of our knowledge,
and not as principles of things.^
withstanding, in the Doctrine
have so
'
far
Not-
of Ideas, things-in-themselves
emerged from the obscurity which enveloped them
Cf. Fischer
iii.
(3rd ed.), pp. 514-518.
Examination of
the
Kantian Doctrines.
that they present themselves, not,
is true,
it
as objects of
know-
ledge, but as principles regulative of knowledge.
The
Doctrine of Methods in the Critique takes a step farther.
It reveals to
us in
its
things-in-themselves,
science, but
"
Canon"
the possibility of a knowledge of
not along the path of experience
and
on the ground of moral laws given by immediate
self-knowledge or moral certitude.
7/" there are
such laws, they
have an unconditional validitya validity independent of

experience, exalted above
all
knowledge, opinion, and doubt,
and possessing immediate axiomatic
certainty.
And
as certain
do they make to us the
as these laws themselves are, so certain

reality
all
of the moral order of the world and of those Ideas which
represent
its
power,
final
end, and original ground
Ideas of Freedom, Immortality, and Deity.
viz.,
Thus the
the
Critique
of Pure Reason leaves us with the possibility of a knowledge of

things-in-themselves in view, only
we
are forced to
take this
knowledge, not as theoretical, but as practical, to regard

cerlainty, not as objective, but as subjective or personal,
designate
The
it,
and to
not as science, but as belief.
Critique
of Practical Reason
realizes the possibility,
the Doctrine of Methods had held in prospect.

fact of the
its
moral law and discerns the
moral order of the world.
That the
which
It establishes
reality of
the
freedom and the
thing-in-itself underlies our
152
Critique
of Kant.
theoretical reason, the Critique of Pure Reason teaches
title
the knowledge of the thing-in-itself be
recognized, the important thing

circle of
that this
of Practical Reason teaches.
thing-in-itself is the will, the Critique
Under whatever
is
that
it
enters into the illumined
our reason, not only as Idea, but as reality and power
we know what
it
is,
and we know that the history of human
civilization consists in the fulfilment
of the laws of freedom and
the moral ends of reason, to which our natural ends of
subordinate and subservient.
life
are
Kant's Philosophy of the State
and Philosophy of Religion, together with the historico-philosophical treatises which

history of the
belong with them, reveal to us the
world as the necessary development and mani-
festation of freedom.
And
that not only the moral, but also the sensible or natural
order of the world, or, in other words, that the world-develop-
ment, not only as history of culture, but also as history of nature,

is
the manifestation of will and of freedom, our philosopher
taught in his Critique of fudgment.
The
will is that thing-in-
which underlies the constitution of our
itself
ledge,
which
makes
this subserve the moral.
is
faculties of
know-
the cause of our intellectual development, and
The
will is that thing-in-itself
which underlies phenomena, and determines their empirical

character in such a wa} that
we are obliged
to judge their forms
Examination of
(in the state of
teleologically.
the
Kantian Doctrines.
153
our free contemplation) msthetically and their

thus appears that there
It
something
is
life
in the
empirical character of things which does not admit of being
explained from our theoretical reason, nor of being discerned

in our experience or in the analysis of
is
involuntarily present,
something
is
the
phenomenon,
or,
there would be
phenomena, and yet which
and necessary to our thought.
phenomenon of freedom and

in
This
the freedom of
one word, natural freedom, without which
no development, no
life,
no beauty
without
which, therefore, our aesthetic as well as teleological judgment
would be without an
object.
That there must be a correspondence between the thing-initself
which underlies our
underlies
phenomena
faculties of
or the
knowledge and that which
Kant had already
sense-world,
intimated in (both editions of) his Critique of Pure Reason.

the Critique of fudgment he
same time
in
what
this
certain very noteworthy

will
have
left
now
asserts
it,
In
explaining at the
correspondence consists.
Herewith
sentences become intelligible, which
upon every penetrating
reader, after a thorough
study of the Critique of Pure Reason, the impression that the
philosopher says more than his doctrine of knowledge

It
declares
may
it
to be possible that
om and
the
justifies.
same thing-in-itself
underlie both objective and subjective phenomena, or, what
Critique of Kant.
54
is
own words
" That something which so affects our sense that;
receives the ideas of space, matter, form, etc.
it
Let us take his
the same thing, both matter and thought.
regarded as noumenon
might
(or, better,
same time the
also be at the
the way in which
that something,
as transcendental object),
of thought, although,
subject
our external sense
is
thereby affected,
receive no perception of ideas, will, etc., but only of space

its
determinations."
'
As long
as things-in-themselves
and
as soul
"
suggested this problem consists, as
is
we
and
and body were regarded
radically different substances,
impossible to explain their union.
in
The
well
it
was
difficulty
which has
known,
in the pre-
supposed dissimilarity of an object of the inner sense (soul) and

the objects of outer sense, since that depends only upon time,
these upon time and space, as the formal conditions of their
perception.
If
we remind
ourselves, however, that both sorts
of objects do not thereby distinguish themselves from
one
another inwardly, but only in so far as one seems external to the

other {hence that which underlies the phenomenon of matter as .thingin-itself
perhaps ought not
be
to
regarded as so dissimilar), the
difficulty vanishes," ^ etc.
'
Kant: Kritik
d.
r.
Zweiten Paratogismus.
Vernunft
Cf. Fischer
Transcd. Dialectik. Kritik der
(isted.)
:
Gesc/i.
d.
n. Philos.,
S70'
Kant
Kritik
d. r.
Vernunft (2nd ed.), pp. 326, 327.
voL
iii.,
pp. 447'
Examination of
If
we designate
Kantian Doctrines.
the
155
the thing-in-itself which underlies our
modes
of thought, or the constitution of our faculties of knowledge

(theoretical reason), as the
in-itself
unknown
quantity X, and the thing-
which underlies external phenomena, or the material
unknown
world, as the
quantity V, then the Critique of Pure
Reason has already pointed out to us in both
V=X.
possibility that
phenomena of matter
This
are
And
to assert
the possibility that
Now, the
unknowable as
Critique
it
yet, again,
it
do,
F=X,
if
it
since the
our
had no right
things-in-themselves
teaches.
of Practical Reason teaches, by establish-
ing the primacy of the practical reason, that this

itself
editions the
nothing other than
indeed
modes of thought.
really are as
was forced to
it
necessary
its
is
the thing-in-
which underlies and determines our theoretical reason
teaches that
X^will
or freedom; and
proposition with a " perhaps "
or "
it
it
does not state this
might be," but with
complete certitude.
If,
now,
F=X,
and Z'=will or freedom, then also F, the
supersensible substratum of the material world, must cease to
be a perfectly unknown and unknowable quantity; for F=vii\\

or freedom.
He
Our philosopher must advance
does so in the Introduction
the essential purpose of which
to
is
to this equation.
the Critique of fudgment,

to
show
that
the hidden
156
of Kant.
Critique
ground of nature or the material world
one with freedom
is
and freedom underlie also the sense-world,
that will
words, that the sense-world

manifestation of freedom.
self-developing bodies,
the
is
If
it
or, in
phenomenon of
were not
this there
no phenomenon of
other
will or
the
would be no
no objects of
life,
our aesthetic and teleological judgment, no theme of the faculty

of judgment, thus also no problem as the subject of a critique
of judgment.
duction
" There must, then,
of freedom practically
ground, although
practical
the above-named Intro-
a ground of the unity of the super-
contains.
the supersensible
And
with
knowledge of the same, and hence has no particular
makes possible the
transition
from the
of thought according to the principles of the one to
we now compare
of fudgment,
progressed
Kant
the foundation of the Kantian criticism
completion, or the Critique of Pure Reason with the
its
Critique
'
the
the notion of this
that according to the principles of the other."

If
which
does not afford us either a theoretical or a
it
sphere, nevertheless
mode
be
says in
which underlies nature, with
sensible
notion
Hence Kant
Cf. Fischer
it
clearly
appears
and been transformed under
Kritilt der Urtheilskraft, Introduction.

:
how
the
the hands
Vide Werke, vol.
Gesch. d. n. Philos., vol. iv. (3rd ed.), pp.

397, 497.
of the sentence quoted,
cf.
work has
supra. Chap. III., Part III., Sec.
3.
of the
vii.,
p. 14.
For elucidation
Examtnatton of
philosopher.
the
Kantian Doctrines.
157
Neither the doctrine of phenomena nor that of
things-in-themselves has remained the same.
Phenomena now
confront us with the character of individuality and freedom,

things-in-themselves with that of unity of essence and knowableness
for
the
correspondence between the supersensible
substratum of our sensuous reason and that of the sensible or

material world bases itself in the end
nature
they are will and freedom.
disappears, which
And
upon
their identity of
herewith the obscurity
had seemed to envelop things-in-themselves.
After the Critique of Practical Reason had established the reality

of freedom and the moral order of the world, and subordinated
our sensuous and theoretical reason to the practical, and the

sensible
and
material
world
entire order of the world
to
our theoretical reason, the
was recognised as the manifestation
of thing-in-itself, or as the
phenomenon of
will,
i.e.,
as
the
development and manifestation of freedom.
The
farther the
Kantian investigations advance, from the
doctrine of knowledge to the doctrine of Ideas, from this to
the doctrines of moral freedom and the moral order of the

world, from these to the philosophic doctrine of history, and
to the doctrine of the natural
which coincides with the

judgment
the
more
freedom of phenomena (bodies)
criticism of aesthetic
and teleological
distinctly things-in-themselves
come
into
158
Critique
And
view.
the
more
th,e
of Kant.
Kantian doctrine reveals things-in-
themselves in phenomena, and the latter win the character of
phenomena of
will,
so
much
the
more unmistakably does the
character of the doctrine of development imprint

the Kantian philosophy
does
prove
it
with so
itself to be, as
much
the
more
itself
upon
distinctness
the problem of Critical thought
demands, the philosophical establishment and unfolding of the

history
of
the development
of universal knowledge.
path which the Kantian

It is therefore
follows.
the
a very superficial and radically false
phenomena and things-in-themselves
for the
is
Doctrine of Ideas points out and
conception of the Kantian philosophy to understand

of
This
its
doctrine
as dividing the world
weal of mankind into science, and poetry, in the former
of which empiricism and materialism are sanctioned as the

only valid knowledge, while in the latter metaphysics
is
saddled
upon Pegasus, and the Doctrine of Ideas permitted or compelled to seek
way one
is
Materialism,
its
in
kingdom
danger,
in the land of dreams.
with the
In this
author of the History
of confounding Kant's
of
with Schiller's Partition of the Earth.
Our examination of Kant's fundamental doctrines has reached

the result, that his system received a development in the course
of the three
Critique^
which
the
first
groundwork neither
Examination of
counted upon nor was
the
Kantain Doctrines.
sufficient for.
159
After the second Critique
had made knowing reason dependent upon the law of moral freedom,
and the third Critique had discovered
well as the
life
new problems
of
phenomena the
arose,
in
the beauty as
character of natural freedom,
which could no longer pass
for insoluble
on the ground of the unknowableness of things-in-themselves.

These problems became the themes of post-Kantian philosophy.
CHAPTER
V.
THE PROBLEMS AND LINES OF DEVELOPMENT OF POST-
KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY.
I.
The Fundamental Problems of Post-Kantian

Philosophy.
I
SERIES
The Metaphysical Problem.
of distinct and historically important systems has
sprung, in the course of a few decades, from the roots of
the Kantian philosophy.
and
fruitful
This
fact alone
have been the influences,
shows how manifold
how deep and
far-reaching
the stimulus, which the philosophic spirit received through the

Perhaps no philosophical epoch since
the days of Socrates and the Attic philosophy has been so ripe
for great
New
and rapid advances as the epoch illuminated by Kant.
problems spring from his criticism
questions which
affect
the groundwork of philosophy, and which are seized from so
many and
variously
different sides, that
opposed points of view.
their
investigation calls
And
forth
the complicated course
Development of Post-Kantian Philosophy.
i6i
of development which the post- Kantian philosophy takes, branch-
ing as
it
does again and again, finds here
it
separating into a
number of
these dividing up into

into lesser contrasts.
onward movement
all
like a state of
explanation.
way
in the general course
Yet there
and
post-Kantian philosophy, extending

state of the
lines of
down
entire
theme of the
and
In order to find
development of
one
problems which resulted from the
latter consisted,
the doctrine of the origination of

tion
rules in these
to the present,
character and final form of the Kantian work
The
and
outward appearance looks almost
confusion and decline.
must know the
and these again
ever- increasing, variety of views, systems,

first
see
there arises a great, and with the
phenomena a necessary law of development.

one's
We
conflicting lines of development,
sorts of antitheses,
Thus
which on the
schools,
its
faculties of sensuous
itself.
on the one hand,
phenomena from
(=human)
in
the constitu-
reason,
and on the
other in the doctrine of the original ground of phenomena, or the

thing-in-itself,
world.
which underlies the knowing reason and
For since the knowing reason, according
fundamental doctrine,
sionable nature,
Since
it
phenomena
is
itself
arise
its
to
sense-
Kant's
of a sensuous or .receptive and impres-
cannot possibly be the original ground.
from the impressions or sensations of
sensuous reason as their material, sensations cannot possibly

II
Critique of Kant.
62
be explained from phenomena;
for our philosopher
was not
of the opinion that the earth rested upon the great elephant,
and the great elephant upon the
phenomena from
origination of
forms of) our reason
is
(the material
phenomena we have designated

to
phenomena)
of knowledge, but the

it,
The
as the
knowing reason and of
Kantian Realism, because
regards things external to us
{i.e.,
as things-in-themselves.'
Kant carried out the
in
and the thought-
have understood by Transcendental realism that
way of thinking which

external
doctrine of the
Transcendental or Kantian Idealism.
doctrine of the original ground of our
Kant wishes
The
earth.
idealistic establishment of his doctrine

realistic,
with
all
the questions involved
he declared to be impossible, owing to the unknowable-
The
ness of the thing-in-itself.
realistic
establishment would
have had to answer the question why our knowing reason has
these and not
some other thought-forms, why
otherwise constituted.
held
it
But an answer to
would be impossible
he- himself in so far
for
answered
intelligible in the " Reality
it,
it
thus and not
this question
any one to give.

that he
is
made
Nevertheless,
the thing-in-itself
of Freedom " or of pure
subordinated the theoretical to the practical reason.
"
Vide supra. Chap. II., Part
I.
Kant
will,
and
Distin-

guishing,
now, in the doctrine of knowledge, the question
concerning the
of
subjeclive origin
ing their real ground, the latter

metaphysical problem,
insoluble, but
He
so
let
163
phenomena from
may be
taken as constituting the
which Kant declared to be completely
which he by no means
much
that concern-
upon
light fall
left
completely unsolved.
that his successors were
it,
forced to seek for more, and to attempt the complete illumi-
nation of the thing-in-itself in distinction from
and
free
To
from
all
obviate
phenomena
confusion with them.
all
misconceptions,
distinguish, in connection with the
empirical realism
phenomena,
all
and
the
is
realism
that
concerns
Transcendental idealism
this things-in-themselves.
and
carefully
Kantian doctrine, between
metaphysical
establishes empirical realism,
reader will
itself established
by meta-
physical realism.
2.
The Kantian
The Problem of Knowledge.
doctrine of knowledge consisted, in the broadest
sense, in isolating, fixing,
and explaining the fundamental
of our rational knowledge.

retical
and a practical
These
(moral)
facts
sort.
facts
were of both a theo-
The
theoretical
facts
separated themselves into those of science, or knowledge in the
narrower sense, and those of our necessary contemplation or
Critique of Kant.
64
The two
judgment of things as guided by the Idea of end.
sense, theoretical
ground-facts of scientific and, in the exact
knowledge, were those of mathematical and natural science.

necessary ways of contemplating the adaptation of
The two
phenomena
were the
to ends,
view, while practical
aesthetic
and teleological points of
knowledge had the character,
position and moral worth, of our conduct for

facts of reason, unlike as
These
all
the dis-
object.
they are, agree in that they

validity,
which presents
the form of synthetic judgments d priori.
The problem
lay claim to a necessary
itself in
its
i.e.,
of Kant was
How
and universal
are these facts possible
one of determining their conditions or
The
factors.
sought and found along the path of inductive inquiry.

as these facts are, so certain are the conditions
And
follow.
must be
question
is
These were
As
certain
from which they
since they are facts of reason, their conditions
faculties
of
reason.
Just as
conditions precede that
conditioned, so these faculties must precede their pro-
which
is
ducts,
i.e.,
the facts of our knowledge and objects of knowledge,
hence also of our experience and objects of experience.

are, therefore, before all experience, or, as
priori (transcendental) "
that
is,
Kant expresses
They
it,
they are pure faculties of
reason, or such as belong to reason, not as resulting from
experiences, but as preceding
all
"a
experience.
its
We
see
165
how the
and
Critical philosophy proceeds.
determines the facts of reason
this
constitutes the putting of the question.
and finds by
this inductive
faculties of reason
its starting-point,
analyses these facts,
It
method the necessary and
which produce these
and
facts
original
this is its method.
wherein pure reason consists, or the content of what
It discerns
faculties constitute
one of the
standing,
is
It isolates
it
this
forms
faculties discovered,
Do away
its result.
as,
e.g.,
sensibility or under-
and you have done away with the
Hence
experience.
as, e.g.,
understanding, or a supersensible perception,
Hence such a
fact of
faculty
is
Critical
This
is
of
to the facts
an
intuitive
and you have
human knowledge and
impossible.
which Kant called the
possibility
Add
these facts are necessary.
discovered another that conflicts with them,
done away with the
with any
experience.
the method 0/ proof
or Transcendental.
By
his
process of induction, Kant claims to have discovered the constitution of
ledge,
our reason, and the laws of our thought and know-
with just as
much
logical consistency
and certainty as
Kepler did the harmony of the cosmos and the laws of planetary
motion.
tary
Suspend Kepler's laws, and the phenomena of plane-
motion became impossible.
Human
reason must combine in
itself as
many fundamental
faculties as there are conditions required for the fact of
human
Critique of Kant.
66
Thus the
knowledge.
by the
fact of
pure mathematics was established
space and time are the two fundamental forms
fact that
of our sensibility,
and hence pure perceptions
fact of
the
experimental knowledge or natural science was established by

the fact that the understanding, a faculty essentially unlike the
forms and combines phenomena by means of
sensibility,
irreducible notions.
synthetic,
its
pure
These notions are not representative, but
What
and of the nature of judgments.
they combine,
must be given, hence received, and of a sensuous nature.

this
account, our reason
only capable of knowing sensible
and not supersensible, such as things-in-themselves.
objects,
There
is
On
is
accordingly in the arrangement of our faculties of
knowledge no
intellectual perception or intuitive understanding,
to
which alone things-in-themselves could be given, and could
be
intelligible.
There
is
no object without subject, no thought
without thinking, no appearance without a being to

appears.
We
should have no
objective experience,
if
common
we were not
whom
world of sense,
it
no
able to arrange, connect,
and combine the given material of our impressions according to

the same universal laws of thought.
common
to
all,
there
is
To produce phenomena
required " the pure consciousness," and
"the productive imagination," which operates unconsciously

according to the laws of the former.
To
conceive the given
phenomena, there are required " the
167
faculties of apprehension,
of reproductive imagination, and of recognition in the notion,"

as
Kant designates them.
different
fundamental
Thus we
faculties,
see before us a series of
which, according to the calcula-
tion of the Critique, are necessary in order to create the facts of
our knowledge, and the sum-total of which constitutes the pro-
But
ductive capital of the theoretical reason.
this
sum has only
the character of a collective unity.
There
is still
which consists
in
be added the
fact
of practical knowledge,
the moral estimate of our dispositions and
This estimate necessarily involves the idea of an
conduct.
command, or of an unconditionally
absolute
law.
to
obligatory moral
But a law that prescribes the course of conduct
disposition,
and thus concerns our
truest
for our
and innermost being,
can only be given by ourselves, and consequently demands the

faculty of
autonomy or freedom, which
unconditioned or pure
from the
fact of our
of the moral law.
will.
consists in a completely
The moral law becomes apparent
moral judgment, and freedom from the fact
The moral law commands
"
unconditionally will and act so and not otherwise."
recognize the autonomy of our pure
freedom, which expresses

because
thou oughtest."
itself in
will,
shalt
In this we
or the reality of our
the declaration
Thus Kant
Thou
"
Thou
also brings us to the
canst,
know-
Critique of Kant.
68
ledge of our freedom by the analysis of a
fact,
i.e.,
by
induction,
while at the same time he expressly declares that this insight

is
not of an empirical character.
According to the
falls into
results of the Critique, the theoretical reason
of sense and understanding
the antithesis
poles of knowledge
theoretical
and
and the
entire
the
two
reason into the antithesis of
practical reason, or into that of the faculties of
knowledge and the pure
will.
To
these faculties of reason there
correspond the two realms of reason
the sensible and the moral
orders of the world, or nature and freedom.

causality rules, here teleological.
phenomena which appeal
Now,
it is
There mechanical
a fact that there are
to us involuntarily as adapted or as not
adapted to some end, and which we, therefore, judge as asthetic

or
teleological,
according as the character of their adaptation
referred merely to our contemplation of them, or to their

existence.
There thus adds
itself to
is
own
the theoretical and practical
fundamental faculties the reflective judgment, which takes

place between the other two, and itself
falls into
its
the two sorts
of aesthetic and teleological judgment.
Thus there
criticism,
by
results,
its
by the inductive method of the Kantian
analysis
practical knowledge,
of the facts of our theoretical and
and of our
aesthetic
and teleological con-
templation of things, a series of different original faculties, the

collective content of
which constitutes our pure reason.
These
The
question
faculties are related to those facts as their ground.
now arises
we cannot
is
By what
sum
or collective notion.
between phenomena
its
own
but systematic
is
Just as the connection
the work of reason, so the connection
faculties
sum- total of these
must be of the nature of reason.
faculties, therefore, is
The
not merely collective,
and the system of our faculties of reason must have
a determinable
common
investigation of this
nature of reason
root,
common
itself,
as primitive powers
world,
For
are the faculties themselves established?
possibly satisfy ourselves with the idea that reason
only their
between
169
of
all
from which
origin,
it
is
derived.
The
and the deduction from the
the faculties which
Kant represented
and made the substratum of the phenomenal
is \ki& fundamental problem
which presented
close of the Critical philosophy, as proceeding
itself after
from
its
the
results,
and as determining the direction of the investigations that

followed.
The Lines of Development of Post-Kantian
II.
Philosophy.
I.
The
The Re-establishment of the Doctrine of Knowledge.
question, therefore, in the development of the doctrine of
knowledge, and in the solution of
its
problem,
is
one of a
re-
70
of Kant.
Critique
establishment of the faculties of knowledge.
by the inductive method
The
is
What Kant found
now to be developed by the
possibility of such a deduction
deductive.
depends upon the knowledge
of a principle underlying our faculties of knowledge,
and hence
Kant had discovered the
the constitution of reason in general.
laws of our thought and of the process of our knowledge by

the observation and analysis of the facts of knowledge, just as
Kepler did the laws of planetary motion by the observation and

computation of
its
phenomena.
these laws inductively,
After Kepler had discovered
Newton appeared and deduced them
from one fundamental force and one fundamental law.

similarly as
Newton
is
related to Kepler in the establishment of
the laws of motion, the post-Kantian philosophy
Kant
in the establishment of the laws of thought.
parison
is
And
is
related to
But this com-
intended to have no further application than subserves
the apprehension of the problem, and
the deductive character of the
Kant himself had hinted
is
used simply to emphasize
latter.
at this deductive
development, not
only by the deductive or synthetic mode of exposition which he

followed in his chief work, but also by the arrangement of the
faculties of reason themselves.
These he not merely co-ordinated,
but sought persistently to systematize.

tion was to
The productive imagina-
him the uniting bond between sense and understand-

ing.
That these
faculties
had a
common
but this origin was unknowable.
\'j\
origin was possible,
The
practical
reason he
regarded as the superior faculty, the theoretical as subordinated

to
it
and dependent upon
uniting
bond of
both.
the reflective judgment as the
it,
Thus he had
himself, in effect, already
given a system of the faculties of reason, but

really such,
it
wanted, to be
a foundation-principle and unity.
This unity Kant declared to be unknowable, and hence a

thing-in-itself.
Should
it
become known,
then the solution
of the problem of knowledge would be also the solution of the
metaphysical problem.
It
thus appears
why
the post-Kantian
philosophy takes the metaphysical direction (in that

to establish the doctrine of
it
knowledge deductively), and
it
seeks
does
so by attaching itself immediately to the Kantian doctrine.
shapes
itself
in its
knowledge of the
progressive forms of development into a
thing-in-itself
in this progress the question
and their knowableness

decisive
importance.
remark on
ahle in
It
this point.
will
We
and
it
is
easy to foresee that
concerning things-in-themselves
be the theme of pre-eminent and
will
add
still
a second prefatory
If the thing-in-itself passes for
ôw-
the current academic sense of the Kantian doctrine,
especially as this is stated in the Critique of Pure Reason, then
the doctrine
of, its
knowableness becomes
at
once the doctrine
172
of
Critique
its
nothingness,
a stadium where
of Kant.
and the post-Kantian philosophy soon enters

to dispense with things-
becomes necessary
it
in-themselves altogether.
There thus
arises with the
and
important
of post-Kantian philosophy the
advance
penetrating
question whether the denial or affirmation of the reality of
things-in-themselves must go hand in hand with the knowledge

of them.
An
affirmative
answer virtually declares for
the
true realism involved in a right understanding of the Kantian
doctrine, in opposition to Transcendental idealism,
no
basis.
Thus
originates the conflict between Realism
post-Kantian
Idealism in the
extends
z.
down
to our
own
metaphysics
sophy seizes upon
is
then,
which the post- Kantian philo-
the establishment of a
has three characteristic features
it
is
System of Identity "
knowing reason
new
doctrine of
This movement
as doctrine of principles,
metaphysical ; as doctrine of unity,
the thinking
that
conflict
Fries, Herbart, Schopenhauer.
knowledge from a single principle of reason.
historical terms, "
and
day.
The Threefold Antithesis :
The immediate problem,
is
which has
itself,
it is
monistic, or, in current
and, since
it
is
its
principle
idealistic.
Each
of these characteristic developments calls forth an opposing
development, which likewise appeals to the Kantian doctrine,

and seeks to
tion
justify itself
by laying claim
and criticism of Kant.
Thus there
directions taken by post-Kantian
each
thesis,
standpoint
being
is
Critical
in the
the truth
work of Kant
The
first
arises in the principal
special
The
interpretation
question with each
and
is
what the deficiencies and errors of the
philosophy
to the true interpreta-
philosophy a threefold anti-
criticism of the Kantian doctrine.
What
173
what the permanent, what the perishable
antithesis
is
the most far-reaching.
It
aflHrms the
necessity of a re-establishment of the doctrine of knowledge,
but rejects the metaphysical, monistic, and idealistic {a priori)

line of
development, as not leading to a solution of the problem,
and demands the observation of our inner
life,
empirical
i.e.,
and psychological investigation, as the only means of determining the system of our faculties of reason.
The
true criticism
of reason could be nothing other than " subjective anthropo-
logy"; "theory of the inner life";
human mind."
Accordingly, not metaphysics,
phical anthropology "

it is
"natural doctrine of the

but '^philoso-
appears as the fundamental
discipline
along this line that the criticism of reason and the doctrine
of knowledge
is
to
be newly established.
this standpoint is Fries (1773-1843),
has had a lasting influence.
The
representative of
who founded
a school, and
His principal works are
System of
of Kant.
Critique
174
Philosophy as Exact Science
New
Presentiment (1805);
and
The
work.
latter is the chief
itself into
What
else
Knowledge,
(1804);
Belief,
and
Critique of the Reason (1807).
Post-Kantian philosophy separates
the metaphysical and the anthropological movements.
can the knowledge of human reason, hence the
criticism of reason, seek to be than subjective or philosophical
anthropology
So say Fries and
How
followers.
his
can
anthropology seek to be the fundamental philosophical discipline
when
like all
itself,
it
needs be established
The
experimental sciences whatsoever, must
So answer
second antithesis has
post-Kantian metaphysics.
its
It
their opponents.
origin
and application within
accepts the metaphysical esta-
blishment of the doctrine of knowledge, but utterly rejects the

monistic and idealistic features of the movement.
to
monism (System
which
which undertakes
to discern
truly is (=thing-in-itself) as
independent of
all
thought.
Kant had
ideas,
rightly grasped things-
phenomena
;
and
this
must be scrupulously retained, and the knowledge
them made a matter of earnest
idealistic
all
and as completely independent of them
their character
of
and recognize
something absolutely
in-themselves as the supersensible substratum of
and
opposes
of Identity) the plurality of principles, and
to idealism, a realism
that
It
pursuit.
Every monistic and
metaphysics rests upon the uncritical and radically false
175
presupposition that one and the same subject has diiferent

faculties or powers,
is
many.
i.e.,
upon the contradictory notion
Kant himself was under
since he regarded
and united
in
human
itself
His criticism of reason was

respects
mental
not
critical
essentially
in
this
And
enough.
It needs,
error.
this constant presupposition,
reason as of such a nature that
many and
one
that
different
respect
and
it
had
powersother
in
this constitutes its funda^
therefore, not only to
be completed,
but to be reconstructed and built anew from the foundation up

for
worked with notions that are
it
hence neither qualified
thing with
its
Accordingly,
it
attributes
These
first
for
contradictory
and changes,
must be the
of contradictions, and
knowledge nor
for
knowledge.
establishing
full
testing
notions
and
are
Ego.
causality, matter.
and fundamental problem of
philosophy to investigate and rectify our categories of knowledge.
new
This reconstruction and
rectification
metaphysics, which opposes
ism,
and,
itself to all
is
the theme of a
monism and
by the removal of the contradictions that
natural thinking and constitute
knowledge of true being,
in
its evil,
order,
ideal-
fill
our
prepares the way for a
from the point of view
of such knowledge, to explain the origin of
phenomena and
ideas.
The founder
of this standpoint
is
Herbart (1776-1841).
The
Critique of Kant.
176
Metaphysics (1808).
the Introduction
in
to
Points of
synopsis of the whole system was given
The
Philosophy (1813).
containing the completed system,
is
principal work,
General Metaphysics
the
In concluding the preface to this work, Herbart says:
(1829).
" Kant maintained that
'
our notion of an object
what and however much you

side of
is
Main
foundation-stone was laid by the work
first
it
that to
will
we must
in order to predicate existence of
is
a Kantian,
if
contain
nevertheless go out-
This
it.'
which the present work everywhere points
account the author
may
fact,
now,
and on
this
only from the year 1828, and
not from the days of categories and the Critique ofJudgment, as

the attentive reader will soon discover.
say
more
for the
shown
The
in advance.
chaotic
and
it
state
But
its
origin
It aflSrms
first
be
and application within the
the metaphysical and monistic
thing-in-itself as one original being underlying all
phenomena, and hence
all
knowledge
conception of this original being.
identifies original
'
one arm himself with patience,
can only be gradually brought to order." ^
monistic metaphysics.
idealistic
not necessary to
of previous metaphysics must
third antithesis has
knowledge of
let
It is
but
it
rejects
every
In consequence,
it
being (thing-in-itself) with thinking, knowing
Joh. Fr. Herbart
Allgemeine Metafhysik, Preface, p. xxviii.

reason, transforms
it
into an abstraction,
with ideas and phenomena.
and
to
it
177
and hence confounds
thus demands the realistic
It
individualistic apprehension of thing-in-itself, in opposition
the idealistic
being
is
and
The more
abstract.
thought, or the more
it
is
abstract
original
and designated
universalized
with such names as "Absolute Identity," " Absolute Reason,"
"the Absolute,"
etc.,
the
more exasperated the
representative
of this opposition to idealism becomes, although he
an offspring of the family of Identity-philosophers.
One cannot
possibly be the universal
derived, always derived,
more
universal
them from
it
ideals,
is.
that
is
and so much the more
Reason forms
its
is
himself
The
All-
original, this
derivative, the
notions by abstracting
which themselves are abstracted from sensible
perceptions, which latter are produced from the material of our
sense-impressions and the perception-forms (space, time, and

causality) of our intellect.
But these are functions of the brain,
which as such presuppose the bodily organism and

of development.
Nothing, therefore,
conception of the All-One which,
is
its
stages
more absurd than
that
turning the matter upside
down, seeks to have recognized as the Original, as the absolute
one of the
last links in
the chain of derived and dependent phenomena.
Since, now,
First, that
which
in reality constitutes
original being cannot be anything universal,
it
must be sought
Critique of Kant.
178
Since
in the essence of individuality.
it
does not admit of
being derived or of being known mediately,

discerned
immediately,
only to be
our
innermost
Now, the essence of our self-consciousness
being.
volition,
is
effort or
the will for this definite life-manifestation, this par-
ticular existence, this

will,
in
ourselves,
in
i.e.,
is
it
character.
individuality, this
not as consisting,
so to
It
impelling the consciousness on to a certain stage of

manifestation and organization, and hence
is
its
the unconscious
the essence or innermost being of our manifestation,
essence or being of
realm of things in
so,
is
is
all
perfectly
appears and objectifies
is will.
gradations
their
evident.
itself in
is
the
Hence the All-One, the
phenomena.
all
original being, or thing-in-itself,
it
bodily
But the very same principle which constitutes
or Uind will.
That
the
but as
consciousness,
say, in
is
The world and

are
its
the
phenomenon.
Why and hmo
the will
the phenomenal world, remains
inscrutable.
The founder
He
of this standpoint
is
Schopenhauer (1788-1860).
derives his doctrine immediately from the Kantian doctrine,
and claims to be the only philosopher who has thought out the
latter with logical consistency,
cian,
he
opposed
is
Herbart; as
realist
to
and
Fries
and completed
;
it.
As metaphysi-
as Transcendental idealist, to
individualist, to the
idealists
of the
He
System of Identity.
was fond of calling Fichte, Schelling,
and Hegel " the three great sophists,"
whom
he himself was the Philosopher
In his
work,
first
Sufficient
his
its
the
in
in the
comparison with
pre-eminent sense.
Fourfold Root of the Principle of
Reason (18 13), he established his point of view; and in
his chief work,
out to
On
179
The World as Will and Idea (1819), he carried
Schopenhauer
logical results.
growing fame
it
lived to see late in life
fame which has survived him, and
still
survives to-day.
III.
The Course of Development
of Post-Kantian
Philosophy.
1.
The
Metaphysical Idealism.
threefold antithesis which
we have
presupposes that the thesis to which

firmly adhered to, but
it
delineated necessarily
is
opposed
is
not only
wrought out into such comprehensive and
powerful forms that they represent the actual dominating course

of development of post-Kantian philosophy.
However
different
may
be, they
the opponents of the thesis and their lines of work

all
have one
common
metaphysical idealism,
object of attack
i. e.,
that
they reject in a body
movement which makes
Critical
or Transcendental idealism into metaphysics, or, what
same
thing,
which seeks
for the original
is
the
ground of phenomena
80
within knowing reason.

critical
the
of Kant.
Critique
idealism
is
knowledge
This
is
utterly false, says Fries, since
transcendental
our
of
of
transcendental
the
results
not Trans-
this erroneous
con-
and metaphysics, object
ception, which confounds psychology
mode
faculties
From
cendental fa priori), but empirical.
of knowledge and
anthropological, and
not metaphysical, but
of knowledge, by regarding knowledge
Transcendental
as
knowledge, there
"the unfounded assumption of the transcendental," "the
Kantian prejudice," which dominates the entire metaphysical

idealism.
This development
is
since the object of metaphysics

real
being per
is
independent of
se,
This development
utterly false, says also Herbart,
thinking and knowing.
all
utterly false, says also
is
the knowing reason
not the knowing reason, but
is
Schopenhauer, since
the subjective origin of phenomena, but
by no means their original ground.

Nevertheless, metaphysical idealism or the idealistic System
of Identity was the
first
and most
direct
development that
resulted from the Kantian criticism.
Kant himself had not only
indicated this development, but fixed
its
course.
that significant suggestion, that sensibility
He
had given
and understanding,
these two essentially different theoretical faculties, perhaps have

a
common, but
to us
unknown, root
he had made theoretical
reason dependent upon the practical, and mediated both by

the
judgment
reflective
intelligible
had designated
he
the unification of
and empirical character as the theme of the funda-
mental cosmological problem, and the
same
external preception in the
criticism the inquiry
raised
is
Everywhere
it
is
in
the
Kantian
concerning the principle and
unity of our faculties of reason.
unknowable,
thought and
unification of
subject, as that of the funda-
mental psychological problem.
for
i8i
And
since this unity passes
identified with the thing-in-itself,
and
hence with the subject of a metaphysical problem which Kant
The attempt
declared to be insoluble.
from the nature of reason
is
to solve this
of necessity the next
problem
step
in
advance.
2.
The Threefold Advance
The problem
reason.
is,
Reinhold, Fichte, Schelling,
and Hegel.
to solve a series of antitheses contained in our
these opposing
The deeper and more comprehensive
faculties are, the
common
deeper and more comprehensive
root from
which they spring.
is
the unity or
Consequently meta-
physical idealism passes through a series of stadia of develop-
ment, and increases or deepens and broadens with every step

grasp of the unity of reason.
discover
is
And
since what
we have here
its
to
the origination of our faculties of reason from one
'
Cf. stipra,
Chap. V., Part
II.,
Sec.
I.
Critique of Kant.
82
primitive ground, the constant
theme of metaphysical idealism
(which was already formulated in the Critique of Pure Reason)

is
the doctrine
of the development of reason.
Within the sphere of the knowing or theoretical faculties of

reason there
standing
antithesis
the antithesis between sensibility and under-
lies
within the sphere of
all
the faculties of reason, the
between theoretical and practical reason, or between
knowledge and
will
within the sphere of the entire world as
rational, the antithesis
between nature and freedom, or between
the sensible and moral orders of the world.
The
question, which
first
with the unity or

is
common
shown, as a solution,
from one and the same

attempt was
comprehends
least,
is
concerned
root of our theoretical faculties.
how
It
sense and understanding spring
faculty, that of representation.
made by Reinhold (1758-1823)
This
in his Elementar-
philosophie (1789).
The second
question,
more penetrating and
far-reaching, has
to do with all the faculties of reason, the theoretical

practical.
In answer,
self-consciousness or
it is
Ego
and the
shown how they spring from the pure

(the essence of
which
is
the will) in
accordance with the necessary law of development of the mind,

which, whatever
it is
and does,
it
must also perceive and know.
This highly important and decisive advance was
made by Fichte

(1762-1814) in his
183
Wissenschaftskhre (i794-i799),i the funda-
mental theme of which
nothing other than
is
the doctrine
of
the
development of mind.
The
third
and most comprehensive question deals with the
unity of the entire rational world, with the

sensible
The
common
and moral order of the world, or of nature and freedom.
antithesis
of nature and
spirit
absolute principle of unity, which

absolute identity or reason."
is
now
is
world-development,
is
the
designated as " the
This movement
tives in Schelling (1775-1854)
development of reason
be solved by the
to
preference " System of Identity," and finds
its
in the world, or the rationality
doctrine in which they both
The
'
1807-18 16.
all
which
it is
is
therefore thought best to retain.
so might be found in the fact that
it
fall
the
agree,
within the
latter, in
best
known by
A farther
the
the
it
is
German
reason for doing
has no good English equivalent.
context perhaps makes sufficiently plain,
of
other developments of post-
Fichte's chief work, the Wissenschaftslehre,
title,
The
principal works of
the two foundation-works of the
These, as
by
chief representa-
the former, so far as they concern this theme,

years 1797-1807
calls itself
and Hegel (1770-1831).
before their lines of thought diverge.
years
root of the
a Theory or Science of
As the
Know-
ledge.
Reinhold's Elemenlarphilosophie, which sought to supply the principle of

unity wanting in Kant's Critiqtte,
German
form.
It is
is
likewise perhaps best retained
a Philosophy of the First Principle.
Tr.
in
the
184
Critique
Kantian philosophy,
farther than
The
lies in
it
of Kant.
may be done by
hinting at their main features.
chief problem of this monistic and idealistic metaphysics
the solution of the antithesis of nature and
within the sphere of
reason
and human
life itself,
in opposition to the
intelligible natures
itself in
life,
as
human
divine.
consists
Beauty and Art.
limited and
The
is in
as
finite,
The
conflict with
it is,
and develops
unity of the divine and
human mind,
in the
religious feeling
and devout resignation.
Identity finds
its
representative
appears
unity of man's sensible and
in asthetic freedom,
and experienced
it is felt
or in
nature, then within the sphere
In the nature of man, sense
of the universe.
spirit,
This antithesis must be solved
the knowledge of their unity.

first
characterize
not here intended to
is
in
The
human
consists in
aesthetic aspect of
Schiller
the
(1759-1805),
religious in Schleiermacher (1768- 1834.)
In the universe, or in the nature of things as

thesis to
be solved
is
likewise two-fold
between the natural and
totality,
the more restricted one
intellectual worlds, the
deeper and
comprehensive one between the universe and God.

tion of the
first
is
the anti-
The
all-
solu-
attained by the notion of natural-rational
development, which Schelling grasped on the side of Philosophy

of Nature and
Theology.
The
^îlsthetics,
Hegel on the
solution of the second
is
side
of Logic and
effected
by a
theisti-

cally (as
opposed
of God, that
in
is,
to pantheism) conceived doctrine
standpoint
Von Baader
ally; Schelling,
(i
is
the world
revelation.
This
765-1 841) sought to carry out mystic-
in his later doctrine
(which claims the cha-
racter of positive philosophy), " historically,"
of Religion;
of development
by a theosophy, the theme of which
God, or the freedom and necessity of divine
185
Krause (1781-1832)
and
as Philosophy
and
rationalistically
onto-
logically.
The fundamental problem was
the re-establishment of the
Kantian principles of knowledge and freedom, or of the natural
and moral orders of the world.
The
the method of establishing these principles

or
anthropological
question dealt with
first
Was
it
metaphysical
Within the metaphysical development
there arose the question of the unity or plurality of principles,
of their reality or ideality.
Within the metaphysical System of
Identity there arose the question respecting the character of the
All-One, respecting
will }
God
universal will or
reality or
With the
ideality
individual will
in the world, or the
3.
is
its
world in
Was
God
.''
God
it
reason or
or blind will
.?
The Order of Post-Kantian Systems.
logical order of post-Kantian systems the historical
also given; the
first is
verified
by
its
agreement with the
Critique of Kant.
86
The
second.
first
development of the Critical philosophy must

the metaphysical and
necessarily have been
ment
must have developed
it
idealistic
move-
and Schelling
in Reinhold, Fichte,
the standpoints of the Elementarphilosophie and the Wissenschaftsthe Philosophy of Nature and
lehre,
before
could
Fries
The
critique."
The
1807.
reached
its
Fries' Neva
of
the
falls
within the
Reason appeared
monistic and idealistic metaphysics must have
culminating point in Schelling and Hegel before
new metaphysics.
his Logic in
" anthropological
his
standpoints
Critique
Herbart could appear and oppose

his
them
to
history of these
years 1789- 1800.

in
oppose
the System of Identity,
all
monism and
Hegel's Phenomenology
1812-1816.
Herbart's
followed in j8o8, his Introduction
to
same year appeared Schopenhauer's
Main
in 1807,
z.-^-^&'&x&A.
Points of Metaphysics
Philosophy
first
idealism with
work.
va.
1813.
When
In the
the latter
published his chief work (1819), Hegel had already made
known
the works which form the foundation of his system, and had
begun
his influential activity as professor in Berlin.
one of
his
Toward no
opponents did Schopenhauer show more hostility
than toward Hegel, since (apart from other grounds of animosity) he saw in him the culmination of that perverted develop-
ment
(the philosophy of identity)
which he called " nonsense."
In the short period of a generation (1790-1820) post-Kantian

philosophy fixed and wrought out
of development, and antitheses.
is
its
leading principles, lines
In this development one fact
very noteworthy and significant.
in the first place entirely
187
upon the
The new philosophy

authority of Kant, and
rests
still
seeks at the time of the appearance of the Wissenscha/lslehre io
be nothing more than the well-understood Kantian doctrine.
With Schelling, however,
it
begins to affect superiority, and
it
soon becomes fashionable to talk of " old Kant," as of past

greatness.
Then, on the other hand, as opposed to the three-
movement, there
fold idealistic
arises the threefold antithesis,
own way,
the representatives of which, each in his

to Kant.
point back
Fries wants to be a Kantian without sharing the errors
which resulted in " the Kantian assumption " of the
who preceded
him.
Herbart wants to
fulfil
idealists
the demands of the
Kantian criticism by applying them to the Kantian doctrine

itself,
and
calls
himself a Kantian from the year 1828.
Schopen-
hauer honours the founder of the Kantian philosophy as his

teacher and master, as the greatest of
all
claims to be the one genuine Kantian,

the problem of the master to
Thus the Kantian
doctrine
its
thinkers,
who
and himself
has thought out
end, and found the solution.
exercises
controlling
power
over the subsequent systems, which describe, so to say, their

orbits about
it,
as the centre of motion, and gravitate from
88
Critique
of Kant.
aphelion back again to perihelion.
Certainly the present bears
witness that in our time the writings of no philosopher are

so
zealously studied, as fountains
of living truth, as are the
works of Kant.
^^
.y'
\
Printed by Hazell, Watson,
&
Viney, Ld., London and Aylesbury.

Kant - Kuno Fischer

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CORNELL

Cornell University Library

B2798 .F52 1888

3 1924 029 023 137

PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN

AUTHORISED ENGLISH EDITION.

Printed by Hazell, Watson,

Viney, Ld., London and Aylesbury.

FROM THE AUTHOR'S PREFACE

the New Edition of the fifth volume

chapters are entirely

the fifth gives in revised form the substance of the

chapter of the original volume on Fichte.

have written, as an " Introduction to Post-

Kantian Philosophy," a Critique of Kant, which

right, as well as suited to the plan of

work, to add a short critique of the Kantian' philosophy

to the history of the development of post- Kantian philosophy,

in all its branches

the reader will have become acquainted

which attempt a solution of the

Kantian problems, and which have thus exercised an influence

upon the Kantian epoch.

hold this view,

keeping with the historic method.

needs of the immediate present,

have thought that a comprehensive and thorough

criticism of Kant's doctrines,

correct conception of his

which should be guided by a

whole system, might prove espe-

a propos at this time, and contribute something towards

Kant which are spread

in the literature of the day.

questions relating to Kant's chief

obliged to investigate at the close of the

volume of my History of Modern Philosophy,

have met with some opposition

For that reason,

take up those questions, and to carry

out the criticism there begun in the comprehensive manner

have aimed in the present work.

FISCHER'S monumental work on The

date wholly inaccessible to

two volumes on Kant

which gives the

together with the Author's criticism of the Kantian doctrines,

in English dress, not

and suggestive Essay on Kant, but as affording an Introduction to

and method of Professor

distinguishing feature of the Critique of

Geschichte der modernen Philosophie, 6 Bde, Miinchen.

English version of the

School has appeared within this year.

volume on Descartes and His

which would render such important service to philosophical culture in England

Meanwhile, the present fragment, translated

nearly two years ago, before this larger undertaking was

not a few to a study of the larger

made known, may

the hope of the translator that

Kritik der kantischen Philosophies Wctachtn, Fr. Bassermann,

Prof. Fischer tells us in his Preface, this work, besides being