2951041

Economic History Association
In the Absence of Domestic Currency: Debased European Coinage in the Seventeenth-Century

Ottoman Empire
Author(s): evket Pamuk
Source: The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 57, No. 2 (Jun., 1997), pp. 345-366
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Economic History Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2951041
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In the Absence of Domestic Currency.

Debased European Coinage in the
Seventeenth-CenturyOttomanEmpire
~EVKETPAMUK
The Near East was subject to many of the same fiscal and monetaryforces that
affectedEuropeand partsof Asia duringthe earlymodem era. For almost two decades duringthe seventeenthcentury,debasedEuropeancoinage circulatedwidely
in Ottomanmarketsat valuesfarabovetheirspecie content.This articleprovidesan
explanationin tenmsof Ottomanfiscal deficits,currencyinstability,currencysubstitution,anddeclinein local silvermines all of which led to the closureof mints. The
reasons behind the conspicuousabsence of Ottomancopper coinage duringthis
period are also explored.
Foralmost two decades duringthe middle of the seventeenthcentury,

French,Italian,andDutchmerchantsmintedin southernFrance,northern Italy, and elsewhere in Europe large amountsof Europeancoinage
whose specie contenthad been reducedto mostly copperwith a thin silver
coating. These coins were then transportedacross the Mediterraneanand
used as paymentfor Ottomangoods or even sold wholesale to local merchantsandmoneychangers.
Initiallytheyfetchedpricesfarabovetheirmetal
content,but thesepremiumsdeclinedover time with the increasingvolume
of tradethateventuallyinvolvedhundredsof shipsandclose to 200 million
pieces of coin. The gross revenuesof the Europeanmerchantshave been
estimatedat more thanten million Spanishpieces of eight or somewhere
between six to eight million Venetiangold ducats.
This episode has been describedin detailby at least half a dozen Europeantravelersincludingthe authorsof well-knownvolumessuchas Chevalier Chardin,J. B. Tavernier,andPaul Rycaut.'Publisheddocumentsfrom
the archivesof mints in northernItalyalso confirmthe productionof these
coins.2In addition,the numismaticsliteratureprovidesa detailedinventory
and descriptionof these coins, includingtheir inscriptionsand dates of
The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 57, No. 2 (June 1997). C The Economic History
Association.All rightsreserved.ISSN 0022-0507.
aevketPamukis Professor,Department
of Economics,Bogazi9iUniversity,Bebek,Istanbul80815,
Turkey.
He wouldlike to thankEmreAlper,CihanBilginsoy,MuratCizak9a,HasanErsel,MehmetGen9,
Halil Sahillioglu,OsmanSan, two anonymousrefereesof this JOURNAL,
andJoel Mokyrfor valuable
commentson earlierversions.He is also indebtedto Re?atKasabafor help with sourcematerialsand
TurkanRadofor expertassistancewiththe Latininscriptionson Europeancoinage.Researchsupport
fromthe Academyof Sciencesof Turkeyis gratefullyacknowledged.
'Chardin,Voyages,pp. 7-22; Rycaut,History,pp. 258-68; andTavemier,New Relation,pp. 15-33.
2Hasluck,"LevantineCoinage",pp. 58-59.
345
346
Pamuk
Manyof these coins are now availablein numismaticscollecproduction.3

tions throughoutEurope.
ContemporaryEuropeanobserverswere incredulousthatdebasedcoins
couldbe so popularin the marketsof the Levant.Rycautlamentedthatthe
In an article
whatwas happening.4
Turks"hadno wit enoughto understand"
publishedin the earlypartof this century,F. W. Hasluckprovidedthe most
detailedtreatmentof the coins involvedandinsistedthat"theTurkishpublic
refusedto be undeceived."He concludedthat"in all times certainforeign
currencieshave had special vogue among alien, and especially illiterate
nations.... The scandalousexploitationof the Turkishmarketsby the importers of luigini was neitherthe first attemptof its kind nor the last. It
differedfromothersby the scale on whichit was carriedout, by the success
thatattendedit, in spiteof repeatedprotestandexposure,down to the final
abolitionof the traffic,andperhapsby the morethanordinaryshamelessness
Turkeyhave accepted
of those engagedin it."5Writersin twentieth-century
andarguedthatin this "biggestcounterfeitingscheme in
this interpretation
history,"the unscrupulousEuropeanmerchantsrobbedthe unsuspecting
Ottomans.6It is also interestingthatthe Ottomanarchives,which offer extensiverecordson a wide varietyof phenomenaaroundthe empire,have so
far revealedlittle aboutthis episode.7
There are two relatedpuzzles here. The first concernsthe popularityof
the Europeancoins. Attemptsat counterfeitingcoins arenot alwayssuccessful and rarelyat this scale. It was always easy for the local merchantsand
moneychangerswho initiallyacceptedthese coins fromthe Europeanmerchants to assay them, a practiceknown in the Near East for almost two
millennia.Even if the moneychangerswere reluctantto divulge theirtrade
secrets,the silver contentof these coins could not possibly have remained
hiddenfor so manyyears.Clearly,it remainsto be explainedwhy the Ottomanpublicwas willingto acceptthemat ratesfarabovetheirspecie content
at this particulartime.
I will providean explanationfromthe Ottomanside, in termsof the fiscal
andmonetaryconditionsprevailingin the OttomanEmpireat the time. I will
the periodfromthe 1560s
show thatat the easternend of the Mediterranean,
until late in the seventeenthcenturywas at least as turbulentfor state financesandmoneyas it was at the westernend. The Ottomansfaced severe
fiscal pressuresand struggledwith rising military expendituresand the
adverseconsequencesof the silverinflationduringthisperiod.Oneresponse
3Ibid,pp. 68-76.
4Rycaut,History,p. 258.
5Hasluck,"LevantineCoinage,"pp. 59, 63.
6Berkes,TurkiyeIktisatTarihi, vol. 2, pp. 183-91.
7RobertMantranis the firstto drawattentionto the silence of the Ottomanarchiveson this episode.
Mantran,Istanbul,book 2, chap.2 and"Politique,Economieet Monnaie."
Debased European Coinage in the OttomanEmpire 347

was currencydebasementsthat providedtemporaryfiscal relief but also
addednew momentumto priceincreases.ThemassiveOttomandebasement
of 1585 to 1586 was followed by a periodof wars, rebellions,fiscal crises,
and extremeinstabilityof the silver akSe,the leadingOttomanunit, lasting
until the middleof the seventeenthcentury.8
One importantquestionthese debasementsraise is whetherthe government employedthem as a long-termstrategyfor generatingrevenue.This
questionhas been debatedin some detailin the recentliteratureon the monetaryhistoryof the latemedievalandearlymodemperiods.On the one side,
HarryMiskiminhas arguedthatin fourteenth-andfifteenth-centuryFrance
debasementsreflected,morethananythingelse, the despairof the rulersand
did not help them fiscally.MichaelD. Bordohas questionedthis argument
andin recentcontributionspublishedin this JOURNAL,NathanSussmanand
AkiraMotomurahave arguedthatdebasementswere employedas a rational
and sometimes long-termstrategyfor raising fiscal revenue in fifteenthSpain.In his detailedstudyof the
centuryFranceand seventeenth-century
monetaryhistoryof medievalEurope,PeterSpuffordalso arguesthatcentral
governmentsbenefitedfromdebasementsduringthe fourteenthandfifteenth
centuries.9This articleprovidesevidence from the Ottomandebasements
thatsupportthe latterposition.
I will also show thatthis extendedperiodof monetaryvolatilityresulted
in considerableamountof currencysubstitution:loss of confidencein the
Ottomancurrencyand a shift by the publictowardsEuropeancoinage that
had always circulatedin Ottomanlands.Not coincidentally,this was a period when manyEuropeanstatesandeconomiesalso facedsilvershortages.
The flow of silverfromAmericaandEuropethroughthe NearEasttowards
Asia must have also contributedto this common pattern.When silver
stopped coming to the mints and the Ottomangovernmentwas unableto
acquire additionalsupplies most of the mints were closed down and the
productionof the silver ak!e came to a virtualhalt in the 1640s. It was in
this context that the debased European coinage found widespread
acceptance.This perspectiveis eithermissing altogetheror not adequately
8Twodecadesago, OmerLuitfiBarkanlinkedthesefiscal,economic,andmonetarydifficultiesto the

arrivalof Americansilverandthe PriceRevolutionof the sixteenthcentury.Labelingthe PriceRevolution "a turningpoint" in the historyof the Near East, he arguedthat the price increasesled to the
decline of industryfromwhich the empireneverrecovered.Barkan,"PriceRevolution."Recentresearchhas shown thatBarkan'sclaims aboutthe impactof inflationon the Ottomaneconomywere
of thecausesandconsequencesof the PriceRevolutionin the Ottoman
exaggerated.A reexamination
Empirefalls outsidethe scopeof thepresentarticle,however.A partialcritiqueof Barkanwas provided
by Sundhaussen,"Die Preisrevolution."
9Miskimin,
Money,p. 59; Bordo,"Money";Sussman,"Debasements";
Motomura,"Bestand Worst
of Currencies";
andSpufford,Money,pp. 289-318. CarloCipollahas also underlinedthe fiscal motive
in medievaland earlymodemdebasements.Cipolla,Money,p. 28 and "CurrencyDepreciation."
348
Pamuk
consideredin the writingsof contemporaryEuropeanobserversas well as

in more recentinterpretations
based on those accounts.
The second andrelatedpuzzle concernsthe absenceof Ottomancopper
coinage underthese circumstances.For most of the seventeenthcentury,
fiscal pressuresas well as the disappearanceof silver forced the governmentsin Spain,France,Sweden,Poland,Russia,and elsewherein Europe
to place greateremphasison coppercoinage both in orderto raise fiscal
revenueandalso providea mediumof exchange.'0In contrast,the Ottoman
governmentabandonedthe productionnot only of silver but also copper
coinagesome time duringthe secondquarterof the century.The absenceof
coppercoinagein the Ottomancase certainlycontributedto the sharpdifferences between the Europeanand Ottomanexperiencesduringthis period
despitethe apparentsimilarityof fiscalandmonetaryconditions.I will argue
that the governmentwas aware of the opportunitiesprovidedby copper
coinage,but due to a combinationof technologicaland organizationallimitations,it could not pursuethis alternative.
DEBASED COINS IN OTTOMAN MARKETS
It is well knownthatEuropeexperiencedlargetradedeficitstowardsAsia
duringthe sixteenthandseventeenthcenturies.Oftenunableto find a sufficientvolumeof goodsto sell to the marketsin the East,Europeanmerchants
paid the differencewith bullion and coinage importedfromthe Americas.
There are many accountsof Europeanships leaving for the Near East and
Asia loaded with cargoesof silver and silver coinage and, less frequently,
with gold. As a result, large silver coins minted in America and Europe
known as grosso or groschen,the most popularof which was the Spanish
piece of eight, circulatedextensively in Ottomanmarketsand Asia after
1550. A largepartof these coins continuedto move towardsIranandports
on the IndianOcean, however, since the Ottomaneconomy experienced
tradedeficitstowardsthe eastwhile it enjoyedsurplusestowardsthe west."
The episodeto be examinedherealso beganwith the effortsof European
merchantstryingto securecoinagebeforeanothertripto the Levantin 1653.
Fromthatpoint on, however,it unfoldedin a new direction;the tradebalancesbetweenthe westernandeasternends of the Mediterranean
ceased to
be the driving force for the ensuing monetaryflows. Instead,fiscal and
monetaryconditionsin the OttomanEmpireemergedas the primaryexplanationfor what happened,as I shall show.
?0Spooner,
InternationalEconomy,pp. 33-53, 171-96.
11Chaudhuri
relates,for example,how the shipsof the EastIndiaCompanyoccasionallyexperienced
forAsia. Chaudhuri,TradingWorldofAsia,
difficultyin securingsilvercoinagebeforetheirdeparture
p. 135; see also Attman,"Flow";Barrett,"WorldBullion Flows";and Gaastra,"Exports."

WhenFrenchmerchantscouldnot obtainthe Spanishpieces of eight due
to politicaltensionsbetweenSpainandFrance,theybroughtfromMarseilles
a five-sols piece originallyissued in 1641 for
to the easternMediterranean
Louis XIII. This was an attractivecoin, probablyone of the earliestexamples of milled coins to be seen in the Levant.In additionto serving as a
mediumof exchange,the coin was also used, at leastinitially,as ornamentation by peasantwomenwho couldnot affordthe more expensive silver and
gold pieces. 2
In France12 of these five-sols pieces exchangedfor one gold ecu or one

Spanishpiece of eight.Soon aftertheirarrivalin the Ottomanmarkets,eight
of these coins began to exchangefor one piece of eight.'3 At this rate,the
purchasingpowerof the five-solspiece was not at all small. If an unskilled
constructionworkerin Istanbulwas paidwith these coins, he would receive
approximatelytwo of them for one day's work.'4Given the substantial
differencein theirexchangeratesbetweenthe westernand easternends of
the Mediterranean,
the Frenchmerchantssoon beganto importthe five-sols
pieces in bulk.Aftera numberof years,they also beganto manufactureon
a largescale coins of identicalweightandappearancebutcontainingsmaller
amounts of silver and a largerpercentageof alloy. The Italiansand the
Dutch soon joined the trade.
The methodusedwas to approacha localpotentatein southernFranceor
northernItalywho possessedthe rightof coinageandcontracthim or her for
the use of the seignorialmintin orderto strike,with his knowledge,a large
numberof base coins bearinghis name."5Verysoon, debasedcoins minted
with the namesof the Princessof Trevoux,theprincesof Dombes,Oranges,
Monaco,Masse,Avignon,Genova,andotherswere circulatingin the Ottoman markets.16In his examinationof anotherepisode of tradein debased
coinage, CharlesKindlebergeremphasizesthat this was not an unusual
practicein Europe.Accordingto Kindleberger,
"manystatesin Europewere
interestedin raising seignioragewithin their boundaries,but it was soon
discoveredthat debasedmoney could be takenabroadand exchangedfor
'2Hasluck,"LevantineCoinage,"p. 56.
'3Chardin,Voyages,p. 7; and Hasluck"LevantineCoinage,"p. 56. In the Ottomanmarketsthese
coins were calledsumun(or tumn),which meantone-eighthin Arabic-Ottoman.
The standardak9e
exchanged at 80 to 90 for one piece of eight duringthis period(see Table2 below). The physical
appearanceof these coins may have contributedto but can not entirelyexplainthe higherratethey
fetchedin the Ottomanmarkets,as I will arguebelow. Similarly,the largedifferencesin the exchange
ratesof the five-solspiecebetweenwesternEuropeandthe easternMediterranean
cannot be explained
away by the east-westdifferencesin gold-silverratios.Recentresearchhas shown the differencesin
the gold-silverratiosbetweenthetwo endsof the Mediterranean
rarelyexceeded 10 percentduringthe
sixteenthand seventeenthcenturies.Pamuk,"Money,"tablesA-2, A-5.
'4Thiswagerateis takenfromconstructionaccountbooksin the Ottomanarchivesas partof a longtermprice andwage studybeing undertakenby the author.
'5Tavernier,
New Relation,pp.16-24.
'6For a full list, see the catalogueprovidedby Hasluck,"Levantine
Coinage,"pp. 65-71.
350
Pamuk
good money,whichcouldin turnbe broughtbackandrecoinedwith greater

seigniorage.""'7
Thiswas not a simplepropagationof a monetarycrisis from
one partof the Mediterranean
to the other,however.As far as I can determine, this substandardcoinagedid not circulatein any significantamount
in southernEuropeat this time.
As the silver contentof the coins began to fall, the inscriptionson the
coins began to change.Bonitatisunciarumsex (six-twelfths)gave way to
bonitatisunciarumquinque(five) andthen to bonitatisunciarumquatuor
(four) and even trium.In some cases, an Arabic numeralindicatingthe
finenesswas insertedat the end of the corresponding
legendin Latin.There
arealso examplesof coins on whichthe Arabicnumeralsarehigherthanthe
standardinscribedin Latin.18Withthe disappearanceof the silver and the
increasingvolumeof trade,the marketratesof the coins sunkas low as 20
for one Spanishpiece of eight, thus makingthem even more suitablefor
dailytransactions.In the meantime,the mintauthoritieswantedto prevent
the circulationof thesecoins in Europe.Onemethodwas to differentiatethe
coins from export from those circulatingin Europe.Inscriptionslike per
totamasiamcvrrens(currentin all of Asia) or VoluithancAsia mercemDe
proculpretiumeius (paymentfor goods in distantAsia) were addedto some
of the coins to warnEuropeansaboutthe boundariesof theircirculation.'9
The peak in the traffic was reached between 1656 and 1669. J. B.
Tavernierestimatesthe totalvolumeof Europeancoinagethatwent through
the Ottomancustoms at 180 million pieces, or at more than ten million
Spanishpieces of eight.In gold, this correspondedto morethansix million
Venetianducats.In addition,some unknownquantitywas smuggledinto
Ottomanterritoryin partby bribingcustomsofficials.Accordingto another
estimate,an averageof 22 shipsarrivedat the portof Izmirevery yearduring thisperiod,all loadedwiththesedebasedpieces.20Suchvolumessuggest
thattheremaininggood coins in the Ottomanmarketswerebeingtakenback
to southernEuropeand remintedas base luigini and re-importedto the
Ottomanmarkets.21
MONETARYAND FISCAL CONDITIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE
To understandthe willingness of the Ottomanpublic to accept the debasedcoins, it is essentialto examinethe fiscal andmonetaryconditionsin
the Ottomanempireduringthis period.Moregenerally,this episodeneeds
to be placedin the contextof deterioratingeconomic,fiscal, andmonetary
'7Kindleberger,
"EconomicCrisis,"p. 158.
'8Hasluck,"LevantineCoinage,"p. 59.
'9Ibid.,pp. 65-71, 86.
20Tavemier,
New Relation.
2'Hasluck,"LevantineCoinage,"p. 59.

conditionsin the coreregionsof the empirebeginningin the last quarterof
the sixteenthcentury.Manyof thesetrendswere quitesimilarto the difficulties experiencedin manypartsof EuropeandAsia. Locatedbetweenthese
two continents,the NearEastwas verymuchpartof the fiscal andmonetary
processesthataffectedthe Old Worldduringthe sixteenthand seventeenth
centuries.It still needs to be explained,however,why Ottomanmonetary
difficultiesunfoldedso differentlythanthose of Europeanstatesduringthe
same period.
Money
In andaroundthe Mediterranean
basin,the Ottomanswere influencedby
and becamethe carriersof the greatmonetarytraditionsof the Old World,
fromthe RomanandByzantineempiresto the medievalIslamicstates,to the
Mongolsof Persiaandthe Italiancity states.The Ottomanstateneededsome
formof moneyin orderto collect taxes andmakepaymentsto the soldiers,
andsuppliersof the armyandthe palace.Moreimportantly,
the
bureaucrats,
bureaucracywas very much awarethatthereexisted a stronglink between
the availabilityof moneyandthe prosperityof tradeandthe economy especially sincethe Ottomanstatehadbeen locatedon long-distancetraderoutes
ever since the earliestdays in the fourteenthcentury.
Recentresearchhas shownthatthe use of moneyin the Ottomaneconomy
was not limitedto narrowsegmentsof the urbanpopulation.Throughtheir
participationin marketsand because of state taxationof a wide range of
economic activities, large segments of the ruralpopulationcame to use
coinage,especiallythe smalldenominations,duringthe sixteenthcentury.22
A close examinationof the provincial legal codes (kanunname)of this
periodpointto an economywith strongurbanandrurallinkages,considerable marketorientationand frequentcollectionsof small amountsof taxes
in moneyfromthe artisansandmerchantsas well as the nomadsand sedentarypeasants.3 In addition,small-scalebut intensivenetworksof creditrelationsdevelopedin andaroundthe urbancenters.Peasantsas well as urban
A considerablepartof
residentstook partin these monetarytransactions.24
the Ottomaneconomyas well as statefinancesthusdependedon moneyand
monetarystability,andthe Ottomanadministrators
were well awareof that.
During the sixteenthcentury,the Ottomanmonetarysystem in the Balkans, Anatolia and, parts of Syria was based on gold, silver, and copper
coinage. The centralpiece was the silver akSe, the basic unit of account
datingbackto the fourteenthcentury.Formost of the sixteenthcentury,this
22Faroqhi,"EarlyHistory"and "SixteenthCenturyPeriodicMarkets";Jennings,"Loans";and
Inalclk, "Osmanli."
23Acompilationof theseprovincialcodes areavailablefromBarkan,ZiraiEkonomi.

24Pamuk,
"Money,"pp. 950-61.
Pamuk
352
was a small coin weighing about 0.7 grams.25The official standardsthat

were closely followedby the local mintsuntilthe 1570s,requiredthatak9es
be minted from "clean"silver without any alloy.26The gold sultani that
began to be minted in the 1470s with standardsidenticalto those of the
Venetianducatwas used in largetransactions,includinginternationaltrade
and also for storingwealth. The purchasingpower of these two coins was
determinedby their specie content, which remainedstable between the
1480s and the 1580s. At the bottomof the hierarchywere coppercoinage
called mangirorpul with nominalvalues and for small daily transactions.
During the sixteenthcentury,eight of the largecoppercoins and 24 of the
smallcoppercoins equaledone ak9ein value.The statedid not acceptcopper coinageas payment,however.One shortcomingof the Ottomancoinage
system was the absenceof largersilver coins for medium-sizedpayments.
Multiplesof the ak9e such as the ten-ak9epiece were occasionallyminted
but thesewere discontinued.Thus,thereexisteda largegap in the hierarchy
of coins between the gold sultani, whose exchangerateedged up from 55
to 65 ak9es duringthe sixteenthcenturyandthe small ak9e itself. As a result, the pressureon the sultani and the ducatpersisted.Whenevergold
coinagewas not availablein sufficientquantities,largerpaymentshad to be
made with piles of ak9es.27
Foreigncoins circulatedextensivelyandwithoutany formof government
intervention.In local markets,Ottomanandforeigncoins changedhandson
the basis of their marketrates of exchange, which closely reflectedtheir
specie content.For example,the Ottomansultani and the Venetianducat,
with identical gold contents,exchangedat par until late in the sixteenth
century.The governmentoften announcedthe official ratesat which gold
andsilvercoins, Ottomanas well as foreign,wouldbe acceptedas payment.
For the most part,the mints were kept open for the coinage of both silver
and gold subjectto seignioragepaymentsto the state.28
StateFinances
Until the last quarter,the sixteenthcenturywas a period of fiscal and
monetarystabilitycoupledwithdemographicandeconomicexpansionin the
OttomanEmpire.Duringthe earlierpartof the centurynew territoriesininto
cludingHungary,Syria,Mesopotamia,andEgypthadbeen incorporated
the empire.Statefinancesbenefitedfromthesesuccessfulcampaignsandthe
25SeeTable2 and Pamuk,"Money,"for greaterdetail.
261tis not clearwhat"clean"meantin practice.The specie contentof the availablecoins have not
been studiedin detail.Most specialistsassumethatstandardakes were mintedfromsilverapproximately90 percentpuresilver.
27Thisgap becomesmore evidentwhen comparedwith the coinage patternsof sixteenth-century
Europe,for example.Grierson,"MonetaryPattern."
"Money,"pp. 950-61; and Sahillioglu,"Role."
28Pamuk

inflows of annualremittancesfromtheseprovinces,most importantlyfrom
Egypt.Along with increasesin populationandlandundercultivation,internal and long-distancetrade expanded.With growing commercialization,
economic ties between the countrysideand urbanareasbecame stronger.
The increasingmonetaryneeds of this economywere met by the increased
availabilityof gold, primarilyfrom Egypt, and silver arrivingfrom the
Americasby way of Europe.
These favorablefiscal and economic trends were reversed, however,
duringthe lastquarterof the century.One importantchangewas the deteriorationof statefinances.As militarycampaignsagainstIranin the east and
the Habsburgsin the west turnedinto long, protractedaffairs,the budget
surplusesenjoyedin the earlierpartof the centurybeganto disappear.Since
some of the staterevenueswere fixed in nominalterms,the silver inflation
of the sixteenthcenturyalso had adverseconsequencesfor statefinances.29
A compilationof the availableimperialbudgetsas summarizedin Table 1
showsthatdeficitsbecamemoreor less permanentby the end of the century.
This new patternlasted for most of the seventeenthcentury,eventually
exhaustingthe reservesof the imperialtreasuryaccumulatedduringearlier
periods. The inflation-adjustedseries presentedin Table 1 indicates that
revenues enteringthe imperialtreasuryfailed to keep pace with inflation
while nominalexpendituresrose fasterthaninflationafterthe middle of the
sixteenthcentury.At the very least, it is clearthatexpendituresrose faster
thanrevenuesduringthis period.30
Social andpoliticalupheavalsknown as the Celali rebellionsthatbegan
latein the sixteenthandlastedwell intothe seventeenthcenturyonly exacerbated these fiscal difficulties.As the peasantstook flight or returnedto
nomadism, agriculture,especially commercialagriculture,was adversely
affected. Moreover,the discoveryof the sea routeto Asia finallybegan to
show its effectson the intercontinental
traderoutesduringthe earlydecades
of the seventeenthcentury.While the ocean triumphedover the mainland,
after a lag of one century,many towns of the Levantas well as Ottoman
statefinancesbeganto feel the decline in commercialactivity.31As a result
of these developments,it appearsthatin the BalkansandAnatoliaandperhaps even in Syria,the demographicand economic expansionof the sixteenth centurycame to an end in the 1580s or soon thereafter.Population
andeconomicactivitystagnatedandmay have even declinedin manyparts
of the empireduringthe seventeenthcentury.32
29Barkan,
"PriceRevolution";and Inalclk,"MilitaryandFiscal Transfonnation."
30SeeTable1, note 3.
3'Steensgaard, Asian TradeRevolution,p. 9.
32Faroqhi
andErder,"Population";
Inalclk,"MilitaryandFiscalTransformation";
and,mostrecently,
Faroqhi,"Crisis."
354
Pamuk
TABLE1
A COMPILATION
OF THEAVAILABLEBUDGETSOF THEOTTOMANCENTRAL
GOVERNMENT,1523-1688
Revenues
Year
CurrentAkfes
(millions)
1523-1524
1524-1525
1527-1528
116.9
141.3
221.6
1546-1547
1547-1548
1565-1566
1567-1568
241.7
198.9
183.1
348.5
1582-1583
1592-1593
1608
313.7
293.4
503.7
1643-1644
1650
1652-1653
1654
1661-1662
1666-1667
1669-1670
1687-1688
514.5
532.9
517.3
537.4
581.3
553.4
612.5
700.4
Expenditures
Indexin
ConstantAk!es
CurrentAk!es
(millions)
100.0
118.8
126.6
150.2
}
}
}
}
128.4
}
}
}
70.4
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
92.8
171.9
112.0
189.7
221.5
277.6
363.4
599.2
513.8
687.2
528.9
658.4
593.6
631.9
637.2
901.0
Balance
Indexin
ConstantAkes
CurrentAk!es
(millions)
100.0
-1.9
+14.7
+71.4
}
}
}
}
111.3
}
}
}
95.4
}
}
}
}
}
}
127.4
}
}
+69.8
+86.9
-6.6
+127.0
+36.1
-70.0
-95.5
+0.7
-154.3
-11.6
-21.0
-12.3
-78.5
-24.7
-200.6
Notes:Thesebudgetdocumentsdo not includeall revenuesandexpenditures

of the state.Mostnotably,
theyexcluderevenuesandexpenditures
collectedandspentin theprovincesincludingmostof thetaxes
in kindcollectedfromagriculturalproducersand spentto equipandtraina cavalry-basedprovincial
army.The provincialrevenuesthatdid not reachthe capitalwereroughlyequalin magnitudeto the
figuresappearingin thesebudgets.
The revenueandexpenditurefiguresgiven in currentakvesareadjustedfor inflationwith the help
of a foodpriceindexfortheIstanbulregionconstructedby Barkan.His index,which beginswith 100
for the base year 1489-1490, rose to 142 in 1555-1556, 180 in 1573, 182 in 1585-1586, 442 in
1595-1596, 630 in 1605-1606 andthendeclinedto 504 in 1632-1633, 470 in 1648-1649, and462
in 1655-1656. Since Barkan'spriceindexis availablefor selectedyearsonly, I chose to provide,for
the revenueandexpenditureindicesabove,averagevaluesonly for each of the subperiods.
It is well knownthatthe termsof trademovedin favorof agricultureduringthe sixteenth-century
PriceRevolutionin Europe.Availableevidencesuggeststhatthiswas thecase in the easternend of the
Mediterranean
as well. Barkan,"PriceRevolution";
andCizak9a,"PriceHistory."If so, thenthe foodpriceindex abovetendsto overstatethe extentof overallpriceincreases.
Sources: The budgetaryfiguresare takenfromTabakoglu,GerilemeDoneminde,pp. 14-15. For a
shorterlist of budgetsthatpointto the samepatternanda detaileddiscussionin English,see Barkan,
"PriceRevolution,"pp. 17-21. The food-priceindexfor Istanbulwas takenfromibid, pp. In 11.
Debasements
These adversetrendsculminatedin the debasementof 1585 or 1586,
whichreducedthe silvercontentof the Ottomanunitby 44 percentafterone
centuryof stability.33
This operationdid not end the fiscal and monetary
33Whereasthe mintsused to strike450 ak~esfrom 100 dirhamsof "clean"silver,they were now
instructedto mint 850 akes fromthe same amount.See Table2 and also Kafadar,"Les Troubles
Monetaires,"pp. 381-89. The exactdateof the debasementremainsunclear.

TABLE2
THE OTTOMANAKfE AND ITS EXCHANGERATEAT ISTANBUL,1500-1640
Years
1500
1550
1584
1586
1596
1600
1618
1620
1622
1623
1624
1624
1628
1634
1640
1641
1650
Ak9esminted
from 100
dirhamsof silver
Weightin
Grams
420
420
450
800
0.73
0.73
0.68
0.38
950
1,000
0.32
0.31
1,000
0.31
1,000
0.31
Venetian
Ducat
SpanishPiece
of Eight
54
60
65-70
120
220-230
125
150
160
180-210
210-280
330-420
130
190
230
270
168
175
40
40-42
80
78
100
100
120-150
120-170
170-320
100-110
110-120
125
80
90
Notes:The Ilkhaniddirhamof Tabrizusedby the Ottomansin monetarypracticesequaled3.072 grams.

Pamuk,"Money,"p. 954.
Until 1585 the standardake was mintedfrom"clean"silverwithoutany alloys. See note 26. For
this earlyperiod,the standardsof the ake areavailablefrommintrecordsand imperialordersto the
mints.
Afterthedebasementof 1585-1586, however,unknownamountsof copperbeganto be addedto the
silver.Forthis latterperiod,the standardsof the ak?eareavailablefromarchivalevidencefor the years
1600, 1618, 1624,and 1640 sincethesewereyearsof correctionof coinageoperations.Forotheryears
the silvercontentof theake canbe approximated
butnotdetermined
preciselyfromits exchangerates
against the Spanishpieces of eight since Europeancoins may have enjoyeda premiumagainstthe
Ottomanunit basedon respectivespecie contents.
Sources:Pamuk,"Money,"tablesA-2, A-3, A-5, and A-6; and Sahillioglu,"XVII.Asnn,"p. 233.
difficulties, however. The period until the 1640s was one of exceptional
instabilityfor theak!e; the fluctuationsof the currencycanbe followedfrom
a combinationof sources.As shown in Table2, the availablemint records
provideinformationaboutthe weightandsilvercontentof the standardak~e
only for selected years of this period.For most years of this period,however,ak!es producedby the mintsfell below those standards.Althoughthe
silvercontentof the substandard
or defective(hurde)coins can not be determined precisely, court recordsprovide detailed informationabout their
marketexchangeratesagainstthe stableducatand otherleadingEuropean
coins on a monthlybasis. Fromthese exchangerates, it is possible to approximatethe sharpfluctuationsin the silver contentof the Ottomanunit.
For example,fromthe last columnof Table2 it appearsthatduring1623 to
1624 the silver contentof the ak!e droppedto aboutone-thirdand during
1638 to 1640 to abouthalf of its standardlevels. Eachtime the deterioration
of the ak!e reachedcrisis proportions,the governmentattemptedto return
356
Pamuk
to the old standardor establisha new one. Theseoperations,called tashih-I

sikke (correctionof coinage), were carriedout in 1600, 1618, 1624, and
1640. Adding to the confusionwere the clipped versions of the standard
ak!es thatcirculatedtogetherwith the substandardversions.34
Two relatedquestionsthathave been debatedin the recentliteratureon
the monetaryhistory of the late medieval and early modem periods are
whethergovernmentsbenefitedfromdebasementsandwhetherdebasements
were used as a long-termstrategyfor generatingrevenue.35In the Ottoman
case, thereis overwhelmingevidencethatthe debasementswere the result
of fiscal difficultiesand that the state benefitedin the shortrun from the
productionof substandardcoinage. The availableevidence also indicates
that there did not exist such a long-termstrategyduring this particular
period.The frequencyof correctionof coinageoperationsthatincreasedthe
silvercontentof the ak!e also suggeststhatthe governmenttriedto maintain
the standardsof coinagebut was unableto do so.36
Perhapsthe most importantreason for the government'sstrugglefor a
stable currencyand the majorconstraintagainsta more systematicuse of
debasementas a fiscal tool was the oppositionof thejanissariesin Istanbul,
who werepaidwith this coinage.Afterthe debasementof 1585-1586, they
revolted,demanded,andobtainedthe executionof the vizierresponsiblefor
Thejanissariesremaineda force to be reckonedwith in the
the currency.37
turbulentpoliticsof the capitalcity duringthis period.They were involved
in the depositionof threesultansin 1618, 1622, and 1623.38 Thereis detailed evidence, at least for laterperiods, that guild membersjoined the
soldiers in oppositionto debasements.Of the four correction-of-coinage
operationsundertakenduringthis period,the last threetook place afterthe
accessionto the throneof new sultans.It is clearthatthese operationsrepre-
34Sahillioglu,"Role";and Gerber,"MonetarySystem,"pp. 310-14.These operationswere similar

to the reinforcements
of westernEurope.Munro,"Deflation,"pp. 392-93. Aftereach of these operations,the statefacedthetaskof forcingthepricesdown. Forthis purpose,local governmentsprepared
very detailed lists of price ceilings (narh) for hundredsof goods. These lists now constituteuseful
sourcesnot only for price historybut also for studyingthe rangeof economicactivity in the urban
centers.Kittiukoglu,
Osmanlilarda
Narh.Foran interestingaccountof the Ottomanperceptionsof these
monetarydifficulties,see Kafadar,"LesTroublesMonetaires."
35Seenote 9.
36Sincethe relevantmintrecordsarenot available,the volumeof coinproductionfor each subperiod
can notbe established.It appears,however,thatthemintvolumeremainedsporadicandthatcoins were
producedwheneverthe statewas ableto acquirespecie.Yearsof maximumdebasementoftencoincided
with the lack of specie and low outputand not vice versa.
37Knownas the "beylerbeyiincident,"this was only the second time in Ottomanhistorythat the
janissariesorganizedto protesta debasement.Thefirsthadoccurredin 1444andhadled to a pay raise.
The reason for the long interimwas the stabilityof the Ottomancurrency.The specie contentof the
akcechangedvery littlefromthe 1480s untilthe 1580s. See Table2.
38Shaw,History,pp. 193-94.

sentedattemptsby the sultansto win the good will of the soldiers,andmore
generally,of the urbanpopulation.39
CurrencySubstitution
In additionto the instability,the debasementsreducedthe ak!e into an
exceptionallysmall and thin coin. Its weight and silver content declined
fromabout0.7 gramsuntil the 1580s to 0.3 gramsin 1640. It thus became
very difficultto handle;largenumbersof ak!es were neededeven for small,
dailytransactions.Largersilver coins such as ten-ak!epieces were minted
only occasionallyand these disappearedquicklywhen substandardak!es
floodedthe markets.40
The governmentalso beganto minta new coin called
para, which was based on the monetaryunit in circulationin Egypt and
partsof Syriaandcarriedthreetimes as much silver as the akve.41The volume of para productionremainedlimited,however.
It appearsthathalf a centuryof instabilityandthe inconvenienceof using
ak!es in dailytransactionsled to a considerabledegreeof currencysubstitution. The publicbecameincreasinglyreluctantto hold the ak!e or take bullion andforeigncoins to local mints.Instead,thereemergedgreaterdemand
for the morestableEuropeancoinage,especiallythe well-knownand large
silver pieces of the seventeenthcentury.42It is possible that duringthese
extendedperiodsof deterioration
of the Ottomanunit,Europeancoins began
to circulateat a premiumover theirsmall Ottomancounterparts,measured
in termsof theirrespectivesilvercontent.Sincethe precisemintrecordsare
not available,however,exceptfor the yearsof correctionof coinage operations,the existenceandmagnitudeof thesepremiumscan not be established
from the availableevidence summarizedin Table2.
39Peter
Spuffordpointsoutto similarstrugglesin manypartsof westernEuropeduringthe fourteenth
andfifteenthcenturiesbetweenthemonarchswho stoodto gain andthe landedaristocracywith fixed
rentincomeswho stood to lose fromdebasements.Spufford,Money,pp. 289-318.
40Schaendlinger,
OsmanischeNumismatik,pp. 100-12.
41Itappearsthatthe firstmintingof para in Istanbulwas undertakenduringthe reignof MuradIV
(1623-1640). Schaendlinger,OsmanischeNumismatik,p. 110.
42Therearea numberof documentedepisodesof currencysubstitutionin late medievalEurope.For
a discussion of the consequencesof the recurrentdebasement-reinforcements
cycles observed in
fourteenth-andfifteenth-century
FranceandBurgundy,see Bordo,"Money,"pp. 344-45. Cipollahas
examined anotherepisode in the "Affairof the Quattrini,"which occurredin fourteenth-century
Florence.Cipolla,MonetaryPolicy, pp. 63-85.
43Until 1642 when its silvercontentwas reducedby 20 percent,the Spanishrealwas mintedat 67
permarcof 230.05 grams.The piece of eightthus contained27.46 gramsof silver.Motomura,"Best
andWorstof Currencies,"
pp. 106-07; and Shaw,Historyof Currency,pp. 340-41. Consideringthat
the akce was mintedfromapproximately90 percentpuresilver,the exchangeratesgiven in Table2
for the yearsof correctionof coinageoperationsdo not pointto the existenceof such premiums.
358
Pamuk
IntercontinentalMonetaryFlows
Another source of instabilityfor the ak!e was the decline of Ottoman
silvermines.Untilthe sixteenthcenturythe Ottomanmintshadreliedon the
state-operatedsilver mines of SerbiaandBosnia as the principalsourceof
specie.44The arrivalof largeamountsof silver fromthe New World,however, loweredthe relativeprice of thatmetal,leadingfirstto the decline of
theiroutputafterthe turnof the centuryandthento theirclosureduringthe
1640s.45Whenfiscalpressuresbeganto intensify,therefore,the statecould
not fall back on the earliersourcesto maintainsteadysuppliesof coinage.
It is also possible that intercontinentalmonetaryflows contributedto
Ottomanmonetarydifficultiesmoredirectly.Despitethe continuedflows of
silverfromthe Americas,Europebeganto experienceincreasingscarcities
of silver towardsthe end of the sixteenthcenturyand this tendencylasted
Recently,Dennis 0. Flynn and
throughmost of the seventeenthcentury.46
ArturoGiraldezand RichardVon Glahnhave put forwardthe thesis thata
large part of the output of the Americansilver mines was absorbedby
China,eitherby directshipmentsto Asia or via Europe.The increaseddemand in Chinawas due to the monetizationof silver in the 1570s.47The
Ottomanempirehappenedto be on the lattertraderoutes,and the growing
monetarydifficultiesexperiencedin the Ottomanlandsmay have been due
flows as well as the fiscal deficits.At the moment,
to these intercontinental
however, there is not sufficientevidence for or againstthis explanation.
Thereis a good dealof evidencethatthe Ottomangovernmentwelcomedthe
arrivalof silver and silver coinage from Europe,but it could not prevent
their outflow towardsIranand Indiaas the empirecontinuedto run trade
deficitstowardsthe east. This overlandtransittradeof goods fromAsia to
Europediminishedafterthe turnof the century,however.48Althoughit is
impossibleto establishempiricallythe overalltradebalancefor the Ottoman
Empireduringthe sixteenthandseventeenthcenturies,the continuedcirculationof Europeangroschen,especiallythe Spanishpieces of eight and the
Dutch thaler,throughoutthe empireconfirmsthatsilver did not disappear
from Ottomanmarkets.
44Sahillioglu,"Role."
BirAsirltk,p. 14; andMurphey,"SilverProduction."EventhoughRhoadsMurphey
45Sahillioglu,
arguesthat the outputof silvermines did not declineuntil afterthe 1630s, the considerabledropin
outputafterthe turnof the centuryis in fact clearfromthe tableshe provides.This is especiallytrue
of theminein Uskiip(Skopje),whichaccountedformorethanhalfof thetotaloutputof Ottomansilver
minesin Serbia.Ibid.,pp. 82-86. Fortheclosureof Europeanminesas a resultof the arrivalof American silver,see Spooner,InternationalEconomy,pp. 24-53.
46Ibid.,pp. 33-53.
47Flynnand Giraldez,"Bornwith a SilverSpoon";andVonGlahn,"Myth."
Asian TradeRevolution.
48Steensgaard,

Closureof the Mints
In additionto the problemsassociatedwith attractingsilver and foreign
coinageto the mints,the continuingfiscalpressuresandthe decline in mine
outputmade it increasinglydifficultfor the stateto supplythe mints itself,
thus leading to a deteriorationin the qualityof coinage, especially in the
provinces.As a resultof these difficulties,the governmentbegan to close
down the mints. In orders sent to provincial mints, the government
expressed its reluctanceto maintaintheir operationsin view of the poor
qualityof coinagebeingproduced.49
Evidencefromnumismaticcollections
andcataloguesalso indicatesthatthe numbersof provincialmintsproducing
the silver ak(e declined sharplyduringthe second quarterof the century,
especially in the 1640s.50The outputof the mint in Istanbulalso remained
sharplylower until the mid-1680s. The limitedvolume of gold and silver
coins producedin the capitalcity duringthis periodwere used primarilyas
paymentsto soldiersat war andby the sultanandhis retinuein ceremonial
occasions.51Both archivalandnumismaticevidencethuspoint to a decline
in the productionof silver and gold coinage for at least four decades.52
Whenthe Ottomangovernmentcouldnot or did not meet the economy's
demandfor money,this need was met increasinglyby Europeancoins, initially silverandgold. Althoughforeigncoins hadalwayscirculatedin Ottoman lands,theyplayeda qualitativelydifferentrole duringthe seventeenth
century.As Ottomancoinage disappeared,the ak(e was reducedto little
more than a unit of account. Gold and especially silver Europeancoins
becamethe leadingformsof actualmoneyfromthe BalkansandIstanbulto
Anatoliaand Syria.Localcourtrecordsandrecentstudiesby economic and
social historianson Ottomanprovincesprovideampleevidence in this respect.53The Ottomangovernmentdid not attemptto restrictthe circulation
49Sahillioglu,Bir Asirlik,pp. 18-37.
50SincemostOttomancoinscarriedthe nameof the sultan,theyearof his accession,andthe location

of the mint, it is possibleto follow fromthe availablecoins the decline in the numbersof provincial
mintsactive duringeach reign.At the sametime, since the coins of this perioddid not featureregnal
years,it is not possible fromthis evidenceto establishhow manymintswere activeduringany given
year.Mostof thisnumismaticevidenceis summarizedin Schaendlinger,OsmanischeNumismatik,pp.
102-13; and Eruireten,
"OsmanliAk9eleri,"pp. 18-19. RhoadsMurpheyalso considersthe reignof
IbrahimI (1640-1648) the criticalperiod for the cessation of activity in Ottomansilver mines.
Murphey,"SilverProduction,"pp. 76, 82-86.
5 Sahillioglu,Bir Astrlik,pp. 18-36.
52Formoredetail,see Pamuk"Disintegration,"
pp. 74-75.
53Tavemier,
New Relation;and Chardin,Voyages.RobertMantranwas one of the firstto point out
the declineof the akVein localmarkets.His accountis especiallystrikingsince it describesthe conditionsnot in the distantprovincesbut in the capitalcity. Mantran,Istanbul,book 2, chap.2. Withthe
appearanceduringthe lastdecadeof new studieson the economicand social historyof the provincial
citiesthatmakeextensiveuse of localcourtrecords,it is now possibleto get a geographicallydetailed
accountof the disappearanceof the ak!e and the spreadof Europeancoinage.See Masters,Origins;
Establetand Pascual,"DamasceneProbateInventories";
andZe'evi, OttomanCentury,pp. 143-45.
360
Pamuk
of these coins. In fact, it regularlyacceptedand sometimeseven demanded

paymentin Europeancoinage.54
WHY NOT COPPER COINAGE?
The popularityof debasedEuropeancoinage was, therefore,closely relatedto the inabilityof the Ottomanstateto supplysilvercoinageafter1640.
This raisesa secondpuzzle,namelythe cessationof the productionof copper coinagein additionto silver.Justas it was the case with silver and gold
coinage,the numismaticevidencepointsto an almostcompleteabsenceof
Ottomancoppercoinagefor almosthalf a century,fromthe 1630s until the
late 1680s.5 Thisis quiteintriguingsincemanystatesin Europe,fromSpain
andFranceto Germany,Sweden,Poland,andRussiareliedon coppercoinage duringthis periodboth as a mediumof exchangeandto raise seigniorage revenue.56
The absenceof coppercoinageis all the morepuzzlingbecausetowards
the end of the century,duringanotherfiscal crunchfrom 1689 to 1691, the
governmentdid exactly what it had failed to do earlier.It issued, within a
30-monthperiod,as manyas 600 millionpieces of coppermangirweighing
half dirhams(1.6 grams)each.57Initially,thesepieces were given the nominal value of one-halfake, but the govermnentquicklyraisedthat to one
ak(!e.Even thoughsome merchantsin the provincesrefusedto acceptthe
new coins, on the whole, this was a reasonablysuccessfuloperationfor the
shortperiodit was employed.It also providedthe statewith much needed
58
seignioragerevenue.
It appearsthatthe failureor inabilityof the centralgovernmentto issue
coppercoinageduringthe midcenturywas not due to one single reasonbut
to a combinationof factors. One possibility is that adequatesupplies of
540neof the moreprominentsilvercoins in circulationfromthe Balkansto Egyptwas the Dutch
thaler.Evenmoreimportant
was the Spanishpiece of eight(realesde a ocho). Therewere otherssuch
as the Austrianrix-thalerand the Polish isolette. Most of these Europeansilver coins were called
gurush, which was the local adaptationof groschen,a diminutivefor gross or grosso,termsused for
largesilvercoins in Europesincethethirteenthcentury.The Venetianducattogetherwith the Hungarianpiece in theBalkansremainedthemostimportant
goldcoins.Fractionsof thesecoins also circulated
but in a morelimitedfashion.Pamuk,"Money",pp. 950-66.
55Tavernier,
for example,is unequivocal:"In all the OttomanEmpire,there is not any money of
copper to be seen."Tavernier,New Relation,p. 15. For a summaryof the numismaticevidence on
coppercoinagein the seventeenthcentury,see SchaendlingerOsmanischeNumismatik,pp. 106-14.
56Spooner,
InternationalEconomy,pp. 10-86.
57Aboutone-thirdof this amountwas due to the remintingof the samecoins with the accessionof
a new sultan,AhmedII, in 1691.
58Thedetailedaccountbooksof the mintat Istanbulindicatethatafterall expenditures,includingthe
shareof the privateentrepreneurs
who managedthe mintaresubtracted,as muchas 70 percentof the
nominalvalue of the coins thus struckwas left as net revenuefor the state.Sahillioglu,"Bakir
Para,"
pp. 16-19. The seignioragerevenuesobtainedoverthistwo-and-a-half-year
periodexceeded10 percent
of thetotalrevenuesof the imperialtreasuryduringthe sameperiod.Thereis no doubtthatthis experimentprovideda significantboost to the hardpressedtreasury.

copper were simply not available. Of the two Anatolian mines in
GtimuhaneandKire, which were active duringthe 1690s and which supplied partof the copperfor thatexperiment,the latterwas not activein midcentury.The availabilityof copperwas not a significantbottleneck,however, since the governmentcould have acquired,at least in the shortrun,
substantialvolumes of used copperfrom the local marketsas it did in the
1690s.
andtechnologicalreasonswere probablymuch more
The organizational
to
important.The right issue coppercoinagein the provinceswere typically
as was the case for
auctionedoff by the governmentto privateentrepreneurs
value of the
nominal
the
Since
silver
coinage.
mints
producing
the
of
some
mangirhadalwaysbeen in fractionsof the ak!e, suchas one-eighthor onefourth,the decline in the value andpurchasingpower of the ak(e afterthe
debasementof 1585-1586 broughtthe costs of productionof coppercoinage
closer to theirnominalvalues andreducedthe marginfor seigniorage.The
private entrepreneurswere thus reluctantto purchasethe regionalmangir
monopoliesunderthose circumstances.This was probablythe most importantreasonfor the breakdownof the networkof provincialmintsproducing
coppercoinage.Onepossiblesolutionwouldhave been to raisethe nominal
value of coppercoins to at least one-halfak(e or even to one ak(e, which
was done in the 1690swhen the mintin Istanbuland not the regionalmints
issued the coppercoinage. The provincialmarketsmay not have accepted
locally producedcoppercoinagewith highernominalvalues, however.
Another importantshortcomingof the Ottomanmint system around
midcenturywas technological.Until the 1690s the Ottomanscontinuedto
use the traditionalhammerandproducedcoins of inferiorquality.Perhaps
more importantly,this technology limited the volume of productionand
dictateda more decentralizedapproachto the coin supply.Thereexisted a
network of coppermints in the provinces and these were able to supply
coppercoinage in sufficientquantitiesuntil the seventeenthcentury.After
the governmentdecided at the end of the 1680s to adopt the mechanical
technologyand build new mintingequipmentwith the help of a European
convert, it was possible to issue a much largervolume of higher-quality
coinagefromthe centralmintin Istanbul.The governmentwas able then to
raisethe nominalvalue of the coppercoins anddistributethem in the provinces as well as in the capital.59
Finally,the 1650s and 1660s,whenthis episodetook place, was an especially difflcultperiodfor the Ottomangovernmentbecauseit was engaged
in a long andprotractedwarwith Veniceoverthe islandof Crete.It is clear
couldnot bringtogetherthe time, energy,and
thatthe Ottomanbureaucracy
resourcesto devise a solutionto theirmonetaryproblemsduringtheseyears.
59Sahillioglu,"BakirPara."
362
Pamuk
The willingness of the Ottomanpublic to acceptthe debasedEuropean

coinage, then, can not be understoodwithout this context. The Ottoman
marketswere in needof money,especiallythe smalldenominationsfor daily
use. They were willing to pay a premiumfor these coins. The Ottoman
governmenthad earliersuppliedthis subsidiarycoinage and enjoyed the
seigniorage.When it could not or did not fulfill this function,European
entrepreneurswere only happyto serve as suppliersof money.
CONCLUSION
The arrivalof enormousvolumes of debasedcoinage eventuallyglutted

the Ottomanmarketsandcreatedadverseconsequencesforthe economyand
for Europeantrade.Europeanaccountsemphasizethatwhile merchantswho
brought debased coinage were willing to offer high prices for Ottoman
goods, thosethatdid not couldnot competefor Ottomanexports.The English merchantswho were prohibitedby the English consul in Izmir from
participatingin this tradewerethusdrivenout of Ottomanmarkets.In turn,
they andthe Englishrepresentatives
beganto pressurethe Ottomanauthorities to prohibitthe circulationof base coinage. Otherunfavorableconsequenceswere being felt in those regionsof southernEuropeexportingthe
base coinage.Facedwith a net outflowof silver,the parliamentof Provence
as well as the Chamberof Commerceof Marseillesattemptedto ban this
trafficin 1665.
The Ottomanauthoritieswere not necessarilypleasedwith the outcome,
buttheywere deeplyinvolvedin a long andprotractedwarwith Veniceover
Crete.As long as the warcontinued,the governmentcouldnot mobilize the
necessaryfinancialresourcesto stabilizeor reformthe currency.Until that
time debasedcoinage was betterthanno coinage. The economyhad come
to depend on the debasedcoinage for its daily functioning.Similarly,the
statecontinuedto receivetax revenuesandmakepaymentswith the debased
coins. This pragmatismmay help explainwhy so little materialhas so far
been locatedin the Ottomanarchivesaboutthe debasedcoins while European observerspaid so much attentionto the samephenomenon.Ottoman
authoritiesdid make several attemptsto restrictthe importationof these
coins and seized some of the cargoes.As long as the war continued,however, these half-heartedattemptsto ban base coinageprovedunsuccessful.
As the war came to an end, the governmentmoved to take more serious
action. In 1669 it was announcedthat base coinage would no longer be
acceptedin tax payments.The governmentalso demandedthatall debased
coinagebe broughtto the mintsandremintedat the earlierstandards.Later
in the sameyear,riotsbrokeout in BursaandAnkarawhen defaulterswho
couldnot find "good"moneyto paytheirtaxeswere imprisonedby the local
authorities."Thetorrentof the peoples' ragewas not appeasedwithoutthe
Debased EuropeanCoinage in the OttomanEmpire 363

bloodandlives of someof theirofficers,allegingwithgood reasonthattheir
ministers and governors, having introducedor permittedthis money
amongstthem,andallowedit as currentin thatmanner,as theyhadfor some
yearsknownno otherfor all the fruitsof theirlabourandtheirpossessions,
they oughtnot now refuseto receivethatwhich they themselveshad made
passable."60
The apparentreluctanceof the Ottomanadministrationto prohibitthe
circulationof debasedcoinageneed not imply thatthe decline and disappearanceof the ak!e did not pose seriouschallengesto them.Withoutcontrol overthe currency,theircontroloverthe economydiminishedconsiderably. In addition,withoutits own currencythe statecould not use debasement as a meansof obtainingfiscal revenuein times of difficulty.It is for
these reasonsas well as the moreobviousreasonof coinageas a symbolof
sovereigntythatthe Ottomangovernmentattemptedto establisha new currencyas the seriesof demandingwarsbeganto wind downtowardsthe end
of the century.Not surprisingly,this new unit was called the Ottoman
gurush,afterthe largeEuropeangroschenin circulation.The first Ottoman
gurushes, containingroughlythe same amountof silver as theirEuropean
beganto be mintedafter 1690. In financingthis majoreffort,
counterparts,
the governmentreceived considerablesupportfrom the large volume of
coppercoinageit issued duringthe years 1689 to 1691. In the earlypartof
the seventeenthcenturya new standardin which 1gurushequaled120akQes
was adopted.Fractionsof thenewgurushwerealso issuedto facilitatesmall
Becauseof fiscal andeconomicdifficulties,however,it took
transactions.6'
a long time for the new coinageto be establishedin the provinces.
The studyof this episodeshouldserve as a reminderthatthe easternend
was subjectto manyof the same fiscal andmonetary
of the Mediterranean
forces thataffectedEuropeandAsia duringthe sixteenthand seventeenth
centuries.Althoughthe underlyingforces were similar,however,the outcomeswereverydifferentin the Ottomancase.Theinvasionof the Ottoman
marketsby debasedEuropeancoinage,theirwidespreadacceptanceandthe
premiathey fetchedoverandabovetheirspeciecontentwere due to the absence of subsidiarycoinagefor the daily functioningof the economy.If the
governmenthadbeen able to issue coppercoinagein sufficientvolumes as
the silverak!e beganto disappearin the 1640s,it wouldhavemet the economy's demandfor a mediumof exchangeand,at the sametime, raisedsubstantialamountsof revenuefor the muchdeprivedimperialtreasury,especially duringthe war. In the absence of copper coinage, however, those
seignioragerevenueswere capturedby the mints and merchantsfrom the
otherend of the Mediterranean.
"LevantineCoinage,"p. 61, citingRycault,Historyof the TurkishEmpire,App. VIII.
60Hasluck,
61Sahillioglu, BirAsirlik,pp. 90-122 and "Role";and Pamuk,"Disintegration."
364
Pamuk
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Economic History Association

In the Absence of Domestic Currency: Debased European Coinage in the Seventeenth-Century

In the Absence of Domestic Currency.

Foralmost two decades duringthe middle of the seventeenthcentury,

Manyof these coins are now availablein numismaticscollecproduction.3

Debased European Coinage in the OttomanEmpire 347

8Twodecadesago, OmerLuitfiBarkanlinkedthesefiscal,economic,andmonetarydifficultiesto the

consideredin the writingsof contemporaryEuropeanobserversas well as

Debased European Coinage in the OttomanEmpire 349

In France12 of these five-sols pieces exchangedfor one gold ecu or one

good money,whichcouldin turnbe broughtbackandrecoinedwith greater

Debased European Coinage in the OttomanEmpire 351

23Acompilationof theseprovincialcodes areavailablefromBarkan,ZiraiEkonomi.

was a small coin weighing about 0.7 grams.25The official standardsthat

Debased European Coinage in the OttomanEmpire 353

Notes:Thesebudgetdocumentsdo not includeall revenuesandexpenditures

Debased European Coinage in the OttomanEmpire 355

THE OTTOMANAKfE AND ITS EXCHANGERATEAT ISTANBUL,1500-1640

Notes:The Ilkhaniddirhamof Tabrizusedby the Ottomansin monetarypracticesequaled3.072 grams.

to the old standardor establisha new one. Theseoperations,called tashih-I

34Sahillioglu,"Role";and Gerber,"MonetarySystem,"pp. 310-14.These operationswere similar

Debased European Coinage in the OttomanEmpire 357

Debased European Coinage in the OttomanEmpire 359

50SincemostOttomancoinscarriedthe nameof the sultan,theyearof his accession,andthe location

of these coins. In fact, it regularlyacceptedand sometimeseven demanded

Debased European Coinage in the OttomanEmpire 361

The willingness of the Ottomanpublic to acceptthe debasedEuropean

The arrivalof enormousvolumes of debasedcoinage eventuallyglutted

Debased EuropeanCoinage in the OttomanEmpire 363

Atman, Artur."TheFlow of PreciousMetalsalongthe TradeRoutesbetweenEuropeand

the Economicand Social Historyof the Orient22 (1979): 32-80.

Debased European Coinage in the OttomanEmpire 365

Shaw,StanfordJ. Historyof the OttomanEmpireandModernTurkey.Vol. 1. 1280-1808.

Ze'evi, Dror.An OttomanCentury,TheDistrict of Jerusalemin the 1600s . Albany: State

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