o N F 0

VOL. 11, NO. 12

DECEMBER 1945

C.I.C.

thll tactical use and 0 p",ation of electronic and associated equipment.

4

Hamil 10 Mother

Blu~p,int of the Carrier Tmk Force GUTlnMY Idllnlifies lis Own Targets RADCM aVIlT Kyushs;

The Enemy Feared PT's with Radnr CIC in Anti-Submarine War/aTe PPI Mosaic

How Radio-Controlled Bombs Werll Jammed

Nancy Hanks

Recommended Redding tor New CIG Perso llfl el

37 Action Reports

10 13

16

21 25

26

30

35

• Published monthly by the Chillf of Naval Operations (CNC) lor the information oj Mililary personnel whose duties are connected with the tactical and operational aspects of electronic equipmellt.

• Include this publication with other Gonfidential material which is to TlICeil/~ emergllncy destruction. ill the el//I'II of possible loss Dr capture. "C. I. C." shall not be Carried tOT use in aircraft.

• Material and photographs fOT publication in "C. 1. C." should be submitled to Chief of Naval Operations, Editor of "C. I. C.", Washington 25, D. C. (Navy Deportment Telephone Exten.rions: 63334 and 62779.)

Editorial Office: CNC (OP-20-F-4)

Art and Layout: EXOS (Publica/,ions)

United States

CONFIDENTIAL

British

• This document contains informalion aDectilig the national defense of thl/. United States wit/lin the meaning 0/ the Espionage Act, 50 U. S. C.,31 and 32 as amended. Its transmission OT the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unaut horized person is prohibited by law.

An old sa ing among carrier pilots i to the eff, ect that any carrier landing from which th pilot an walk away is a good landing. However that mao be, e ery plane that take off for a flight out of actual ight of ship or hare base is a potential "lost plane." Weather, human errors the failure of equipment often unpredictable changes in a ship's course dog every avy pilot.

To eliminate or minimize these factors has been a constant and continuing research problem with the

avy. Mo t important mechanical means of aving pilots from their own navigational errors or to guide them back to a hip whose point option is nece arily changeable without notice are homing aids-de ices which spell out a lost or uncertain plane position guide returning trikes back to base, and in general, provide a link between plane and ship Of base ..

Of these devices there are- three system in general use:

I-The RDF s),stem--oldest of navigational and homing aid and limited in its use-by ships at ea because of the weakness in the system itself which requires two stations for a positive fix.

2-J E or YG equipment--d.evices whi h utilize the principle of ector identification by means of continuous high-frequency broadcast of a coded series of letters which the pilot picks up on his *AN/ARR-2() radio receiver.

3-Racon equipment-which utilizes radar by means of a beacon aboard ships or at shore stations and includes the principle, comparable to IFF, of a challenge from a plane which is automatically an wered by identifying signal from the beacon.

Like the Radio Range systems used by ommercial airlines in which the principle of varying strength in the broadcast of Morse letters provides a "beam' down which the airliner may coast from field to field, the RDF system is familiar to most CIC personnel. Since it usually involves shore-based RDF stationary direction Ending stations it is not particularly useful to ships far at sea. ot so familial', howe er are the YE and YG ystem usually maintained ervi ed and operated by Air Plot and the "racon ," latest and, in

orne respe ts, b t of the navigational and homing

devices. ollowing i a summary of the methods and

means and the po ibilities 01 these devic .

YE.

Briefly, the YE is a radio transmitter with directional antenna that .ia in continuous rotation. the antenna rotat through each of twelve 3D-degree sectors the transmitter is automatically keyed and an assigned letter is broad ast in International Morse

"Mother, In the fighter director vocabulary means a homing device or beacon.

CONFIDENTIAL

Code, twice to each ector. The rotation of the antenna i geared to the ship s gyro compass so that regardless of the heading of the ship the same letter' alwa '5 sent out in true direction. from the ship. In addition to these letters Identify the bearing of the hip two letter are also broadcast periodically in all directions to identify the ship which is transmitting.

Each aircraft in turn, is equipped with a pecial receiver which can be tuned to any YE or YG frequency. This receiver is known as the * ANI ARR-2 () . A pilot) lost or uncertain of the direction of his ship cuts hi earphones into the *AN/ARR-2() and listens for the broadca t letter. He hears for example the letter L dot dash dot dot broadcast twice. By referring to the ode data which he received before take off he can identify L sector 000 to 030 [sectors are divided OOO~030 030-060, etc.], and set hi course for the ship accordingly.

YG, similar in operation to the YE but maller in design with a considerably lower power and no hook-up to the ship's gyro output, is generally employed as an emergency tandby for YEo It is po ible to crank in bearing changes manually whenever the ship changes course to keep the letters in their true sectors; however, results are somewhat less reliable.

ince YE and YG give bearings only their usefulness, although manifestly great is somewhat limited. The fact that YE and YG transmit continuous! (as well as having a double modulation feature by which Y transmits in both high and medium frequency) renders the equipment Iess secure than the racon system in which the beacon responds only-to a specific challenge. YE and YG are nonethele reliable, relatively easy to maintain and are tandard equipment. Ranges like those of all radar-radio equipment, vary with atmospheric conditions; but the general average of 90 miles for an aircraft flying at 5000 feet is consistently achieved. Experiments 110W being conducted are designed to YE and YG with the means to transmit range information, a step which considerably enhance th ir value.

In .... en

BEACONS

Two general types of radar homing beacon equipments are in use: YJ-2 for planes equipped with ASB radar andYM (A IAPS-3) 4: and 6) for planes

equipped with A H, ASD-l and AIA First installed on U YORKTOW

in December, 1944, YM, or ANI AP series ha e now largely replaced YJ-2 and virtually all OV' and eVE's are now so equipped. The obvious advantage of YM over YJ-2 is the fad that it can respond to three radar types inseead of A B only. In addition it provide in tantaneous identification while YJ-2 takes 30 seconds to transmit its identification.

Th basic principle of the "racon" system is not dissimilar to that of IFF.

The beacon, mounted on the ship or ashore in trailer trucks, when interrogated by the airborne equipment automatically broadcasts a coded reply. Imilar to the YE and YG in that the .repl is in International [01 e Code, YJ and YM differ in that the reply is. received in the aircraft as a visual ignal on a scope

graduated for range and, with the YM. also for bearing. YJ yields approximate bearing information which can be used for homing· however, it does not provide the relatively accurate po ition bearing of YM. The visual r ponse recei ed from YJ' in o-called 'gap coding" in which the blip on the scope flashes on and off in the International 1"orse code letter of the transmitting beacon. With YM, so-called "range coding' . employed, and the response from the challenged beacon appears

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CONFIDENTIAL

the scope as a vertical ection of spaced blips. Th code is ontained in the umber of pips. Thus two pips cia e together, followed by a larger pace a pip rger space and a pip may be the identifying signal of one ship.

YJ-2

CONFIDENTIAL

fl o IT! n IT!

;!!: m IT! ;:0

3

Described as a "two-channel, automatic-responding radar beacon or racon , YJ-2 is the successor to YJ and YJ-l which were designed for shore use. It operates directly on 115 or 230 a-c, 50-60 cycles. YJ-2 replies to interrogating signals from aircraft which are equipped with ASB radar I-R, or IFF equipment. Planes or hip equipped to interrogate YJ can receive replie from any YJ beacon within range identifying th particular beacon by its code. In practice, however, only one YJ is normally kept in operation within a given task group in order to reduce the number of signals transmitted and to simplify matters for the pilot. YJ-2 utilizes two complete transponders to permit simultaneous operation in the 176 M or "A" band and the 515 Me or loB" band. ach include receiving and transmitting units. A single rectifier power unit supplies the power. The antenna assembly operates in a low frequency "A" band and a high frequency 'B" band, and is used in both transmitting and receiving.

AN/CPN-6 OR YM

lOP -6 (formerly YM) is "a heavy microwave radar beacon designed for ships, ground, or truck installation." Witb a reception of 9320 to 9430 Me, Y1vl operates directly on 115 volts a-c 50 to 70 cycle. Primary difference between YJ-2 and YM, as has been indicated is the ability of YM to operate with a wide series of airborne radar equipment. The complete list of these radars includ ,

morrg others, AlA, A D, AN/APS-3, AN/APS-4 AN/APS-6 AN/APS-IO,

lAPS-IS, ANI APQ:-13. Other' differences are the method 'Of presentation of a repl y to a challenge-the system of pip combinations of two to six pips separated by hort (15 microsecond) or long (35 microsecond)pa es, elected by switches .and giving 56 possible codes-s-and the fact that the airborne Radar interrogating the YM gives a relatively exact position bearing as well as range from the beacon. YM because of its complexity requires much more space and weighs much more than YJ-2 (1,100 versus 250 pounds). The increased complexity of YM presents the usual problem of increased difficulty of maintenance. However, careful maintenance can result in the sort of record which has been run up by some ships-l,OOO hours without re- tuning!

Ranges on both YJ-2 and YM run from 70 to 150 miles, depending, as in all radar reception, on the height of the aircraft. For example, a plane at 10,000 feet will normally be able to interrogate and receive a reply from a distance of 140 miles. Occasionally far greater ranges are achieved. A single aircraft trailing a returning strike, for example] has been known to receive signals from a beacon being activated by th main body of the strike at di tances of hom 200 0 250 miles. uch ranges are however, exceptional. Generally a cura y j excellent on both eqnipments: range for both YJ-2 and YM within one quarter of a mile and bearing for YM plus or minus five degrees ..

With Loran, which is reasonably accurate at long ranges of from 500 to 1,000 miles and th YE/YG and racon systems covering the area within a 5 to 150 mile radius, Navy pilots should barring mechanical failures, be able to get a reliable teer home between 90 and 100 percent of the time. And there i , of course, ys Cle giving steers DVe;: VHF, on information from the search radars when if the pilots need it

I

force

blueprint of the c

Figure 1

Figure 2

Figure 3

What is a task fO,rCe?, "hat i the organization of la's within a task force? , hal is the chain of command? What are the responsibilities of the Task For e 10 Officer, the Group CIC Officer and the ship's Ie Offi er?

. These questions are all answered authoritatively and definitely in, Chapter 26 of the forthcoming RADEIGHT, entitled 'The Control of Aircraft" and embodying CIe doctrine as it has developed during the war.

The following material, a conden ed version or Chapter 26 is presented in order to acquaint cr personnel with the latest concepts of crc Task Force organization. De troyer men amphibious personnel and those who have pent rna t of their sea time in convoy duty hunter-killer operations and other semi, detached" duty will find it useful as a picture of the organization and functioning of the large, multi-group fast carrier task forces.

In order to understand how I'C's function in a task force it is necessary first to review briefly the physical organization ol th force itself.

TYPES OF TASK FORCES

Ther are numerous types of task forces, of course which may be called upon to control aircraft. f the carrier grou ps-and they are essentially the types of task force in. which IC are most active as an integrated inter- hip organization-e-there are two general types: the fast carrier task forces and the eVE forces.

The fa t carrier task force consists of two or more task groups. Each group is made up of several CV's and NL a heavy support unit of BB's a light upport unit of CA's and CL s and a screen of destroyers whi h may include one OT two CLAA's. The size and composition of a ta k group is very flexible and changes constantly to conform with tactical requiremen and ship availability.

The CVE groups are similar in organization to the fast carrier groups with VEl substituted for: V's and CVL's. either heavy nor light upport units are pre ent, however and frequently DE' are used in place of DD's in the screen.

CARRIER TASK FORCE COMMAND

Iast carrier task force i under the ommand of an admiral who flies his flag on one of the C 's in the force. imilarly each Task Group Commander flie his flag on one of the carriers in hi group and is directly responsible to the task force commander.

Normally, the task force will be tactically oncen.ated in which case. all the task groops are formed in a single dispo ition cia e enough together to permit

CONFIDENTIAL 5

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VHF or visual communications. t other times the group may be widely separated, in which case the Task orce Commander will exercise only a broad

trategic command. ince the fast carrier force rep-

resents the major figh ring trength of a modern fleet, the Fleet Commander to whom the Task Force Cammander is ultimately responsible, is embarked in one of the vessels of this force. His flag is normally flown in one of the heavy ships of the line.

The term "Officer in Tactical ommand" (OTe) refers to the officer in direct command of a task organization. In order to exercise tactical command, it is necessary that all of th unit involved be within easy communication range. When a task force is tactically concentrat d, the Task Force Commander is QTC.

When a task grou.p is operating independently the Task Group Commander is the OTC. I£ everal task groups are operating together and 'the Task Force Commander i not "in one of the groups, the enior Task Group Commander is OTC. When it is .neces-

a: "Y to detach a part of a ta k group,the senior officer in the detached unit becomes OTC of the unit.

In carrier forces, the OTe will always be a carrier admiral. 'When a urface engagement is imminent, however, the carrier admiral may tum the tactical command over to the enior battleship or cruiser admiral present. The latter will then be OTC until the surface action is terminated.

Some of the special CIC assignments or ships in the force and groups should be noted.

CIC SHIPS

Ta k Force and Task Group Cl C ships are the flagships of the respective Force and Group Commanders. The force IC ship coordinates and the group Cle ships control all phases of aircraft control and CIC activities. The CIC ship are in effect eIC command ships gathering information for th OTe and supervising the execution of the OTC's orders. These orders generally include uch duties as the assignment of surface and air radar guards, fighter direction hips, jamming and radar picke as well as the designation of the conditions of radio, radar and FF silence. Other functions may be to direct the challenge of unidentified surface contacts and designate raid. In order to insure against confusion resulting from a casualty on the primary Ole hip an alternate 0.1' standby OIC ship is named. The standby Cle ship mu t be prepared to assume all the functions of the primary Cl C ship at a moment's noti e.

6 CONFIDENTIAL

FIGHTER DIRECTION SHIPS

their name implies, fighter direction ships are responsible for controlling fighters assigned to. them and intercepting enemy raids, They are not normally assigned radar guard duties but are free to use their equipment to best advantage for control of aircraft. Fighter direction ships are designated by the task group CIC Officers. orrnally the CIC of the carrier whose CAP is airborne will control the planes. When a raid appears, the interception will be assigned to the ship having the best information. Battleships, cruisers, and des royer are frequently assigned fighter direction duties for training' when operating independently-as pi kets or on bombardment missionsthey control both day and night CAP detailed for their protection.

everal fighter direction ships operate simultaneously in the same task group. When the need arises to shift control of an interception, the Task Group OIC Officer will do so and will &ive control to the ship having the best information at the time. It is therefore not necessary to designate a pecific standby fighter direction hip.

RADAR GUARD SHIPS

In order to obtain the maximum use of the radars and to insure total coverage, the ask Group CI Officer assigns certain ships to maintain a particular type of earch, For example ships are assigned to long range air search, medium range air search, short range air search low-flying air coverage long range surface search and short range surface search. hips are assigned further duty as IFF identification ship , jamming ships intercept ship which detect enemy radar transmissions, and as visual fighter direction ships. hips assigned pecial radar duties are alled radar guard ships. Any ship having special electronic gear aboard will be a igned the specific guard which utilizes that gear. The heavy work load carried by the group CIC may be spread more equitably by group CIa Officer assigning auxiliary resnonsibilif

•

uch as radar countermeasures to one of the battleship in the group.

KET VESSELS

Pickets ship, usually destroyers" function as advance warn.ing scouts for the other vessels of the Force (Graup). Pickets are stationed by the Task Force (Group) Commander according to standard plans set aut in the operation order. They are employed on occasion during the day, but their principal task is performed at night. It is customary to. tation pickets at ranges within hich VHF radio communications can always be heard. JI picket are deployed in a scout.ing line well ahead of the force linking vessels are stationed so that they can act as communications relay units. Usually one or t 0 destroyers of each destroyer division are specially equipped for aircraft control for du y as advance pickets.

procedure. Returning trike aircraft must follow prescribed paths (as illu trated in Figures 1 and 2) from the strike pickets to their parent Task Groups, thereby facilitating identification and keeping the radar screens relatively clear of miscellaneou and confusing track in the areas of most probable enemy air attacks. Sections or divisions of destroyers may also be employed as forward fighter direction hips within a prohibited approved sector for friendly aircraft. When engaged on this duty the pickets are known as Watchdog .

CIC CHAIN OF COMMAND

There is no specific IC chain of command apart from the established echelon of command within (be force and group organization. Task Far e Group and individual. ship CIC Officers are respon ible to their own respective' admirili and captains. Nevertheless, for the routine air control functions which come under the cognizance of OIC, there is a chain of tactical control which extend downward from the Force and Group CIC Officers as the representatives of th admirals. Even though many normal and routine actions may be ordered by a higher authority in the CIC chain of control the individual eIC is in no way relieved of the responsibility of keeping its cammand completely informed of all information passed and action taken.

THE. FORCE C[C OFFICER

a member of the staff and the repr entative of OTC,the Force CIC Officer acts as coordinator for all CIC' activities within the force. His primary concern :is with the Group CIC Officers and picket group CIC Officer and he normally works through and with them. Although he has hi battle tation in the ore of the CV in which the OTC is embarked, he has no. aircraft at his immediate disposal controls no radars directly, and, in general, exercises direct control only at night or when the situation of the force demands it and then only within the limits of his broad responsibility as representative of the OTC. When several task groups are operating together, he may be called upon to perform any of the following duties: i-Designate the number of division of CAP to be used over the force as a whole.

2-Designate force raid by number for all enemy contacts threatening the force, leaving the initiation and planning of the actual interception however to the Group crc Officers.

3-Coordinate the activity of Graup CIC Officers in

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APPROACH PICKETS

The function of approach pickets is imilar to that of night pickets. ' They are used as advance scouts for the Force during the critical period of the run-in toward the target. They are DD's designated by Task Group Commander and are stationed 50--60 miles

ead of the Force either on the line of bearing of the 'get or to each side of this line.

STRIKE PICKETS AND TOMCATS

On trike Days a definite plan for the stationing of picket vessels is followed. This plan will be selected from the several set forth in the Operation Order or in Fast Carrier Task Force Instructions. Two examples of such plans are set forth in Figures 1 and 3. (It should be noted that the terms" trike Picket" and "Tomcat" are synanymous.) The functions of such picket vessels are to provide advance warning (radar or visual) of approaching enemy aircraft, to act as advance fighter direction ships to assist in homing returning strike groups as necessary, to direct the visual inspection of returning strike groups in order to eliminate trailing enemy aircraft. and to rescue downed pilots. These pickets are generally stationed 40 to 60 miles from the center of the force approximately 6000 on either side of a designated target bearing line. A minimum of two, and D10re recently four, destroyers are as .. signed to each picket tation to provide mutual support and to facilitate rescue 0'£ downed pilots.

At least one destroyer in each strike picket station equipped with aircraft homing gear to assist restrike group in following proper approach

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controlling multiple raids, ad ising them of .interceptions in progress and counselling them,when necessat , on the be t mean of def nding the whole force. 4--Evaluate intelligence provided by the staff of OT and the Task GIOUp CIC Officers and hip's Ie Office. u h information may include the disposilion of friendly and enemy forces in the area' the possible composition of enemy attacks reported by intelligence or other sources' establishing the identity of Iriendly sear h plan encountered and maintaining up-to-date information on their whereabouts; and all other data vital either to the exercise of command or

to the functioning of the O' of the force.

5-Maintain as a responsibility to the OTe an accurate ummary of the availability of air and urface units of the force as well as .inforrnation regarding the progress of missions undertaken by the task: groups or units.

6 'oordinate all night fighter activity within th

force, pecifying the number of aircraft to be flown by each task group assigning their stations, and assigning d ck pots to allow for both scheduled and emergency landings.

7 -Collate all radar countermeasures information and in conjunction with the Force Radar Countermeasures Officer, recommend appropriate action to the OTe.

8-Disscminate vital information to Task Group eIC Officers, radar countermeasure ships, staff intelligence and other interested activitie .

9-Arrange the disposition of radar picket Ship . make provision for an adequate CAP for these ships; receive information from them On returning strikes, rescue mission; and all other activity affecting the Force .. 10- pecify the conditions of radar and IFF silenc and, at the direction of the OTC, designate the use to be made of radar countermeasur and deception.

he Force ele Officer in sub tanc may be aid to oordinate rather than control CIC activity in the Force. It is important to remember that as representati e of the OT he is responsible for the best and full t employment of the Cl facilities of the Force both defensively and offensively.

a::

UJ m

::E w u UJ o

U

THE GROUP CIC OFFICER

Th Group I Officer occupies the same position on the ta k group commander staff as the orce eIC Officer does on the task force commander's staff. The Group Cl C Officer, however, exercises a far greater degree of direct control over the radars, aircraft and

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CONFIDENTIAL

radio frequencies, than does the Fore Ie ffic r. Primarily, his function is to insure the execution of orders and directiv of the OT and his task gro commander. ince the duties of the task group are clearly defined in the operations plan his function in relation to the CIC's of the hip in the group i executive rather than advisory. In brief the Group Cle Officer is the officer charged with th defense of his group and the integration of all Cl activity in the group.

The Group CIC Officer normally maintains his battle tation in the I ,of the task group flagship. There he receives information from all th ship of his task group and is in a position to initiate action immediately. Although he utilizes the facilities and employs the personnel of the group flagship CIC, he is primarily concerned with the task group as a whole rather than the

hip. pecifically, the Group IC Officer-

l-Coordinat the air and urface radar search within the group insuring that conditions of radar and IFF silence set by the OT are maintained, designating radar guard ship and exe uting orders concerning jamming and deception.

2-Receives, plots evaluates and reports to OTC and, where necessary, disseminates to other hips in the group, all pertinent air and surfa e radar contac pilot report of interest, intercepted radio messages and enemy radar emanations reported by the ships of his group.

3-Maintains an airborne CAP according to the p cifrcations of the OTe in sufficient strength and at stations appropriate for the defense of the group. 4--Designates the ship which is to can rot an inter. eption shifting control (rom ship to ship as ne essary in term of available radar information and the tactical

ituation,

S-Provides for the overall employment of fighter aircraft in defense of the group. He arranges, lor example, for sufficient numbers of aircraft in conditions of readiness and provides for the launching or adequate relief. He al 0 maintains an accurate summary of th status of ·their fuel and ammunition and orders the scrambling of planes after consultation with the task group commander,

6-Arranges after consultation with the task group commander for th assignment of surfa e pickets, linking communication vessel, scouting forces radar pickets, jamming and intercept ships, and other detached missions and specifies the schedule of ings, landings and reliefs.

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7-Arranges fOT the execution of radar countermeasres plans specified by the OTC or task group

mmander,

8-Maintain an accurate information summary of the status of strikes sweep and search and attack planes in hi group informing Cle Officers of changes in target assignments weather over targets, and either makes recommendations or initiates action to counter jamming or to utilize deception against enemy radars. ~Maintains up-to-date information on the flight deck conditions of all carriers in the group.

10-Schedules and su pervises varied and complete training exercises for aircraft and ships in the group. ll-De ignates raids which approach his group when the Force ele Officer has not already done so. 12-Maintains liaison with the Force eIC Officer and the hip CIC Officers of hi group with the aim of keeping the OTe task group commander and the commands of the vessels of his group fully informed on all information derived from the CIC' of the force.

The Group Cle Officer should make ure that ne - essary information goes to the OTC and task group commander and also to the individual eIC Officers. He must be prompt, decisive, and fully informed. He must know the capabilities of the radars and the air-

aft ill his own group, and he must be letter-perfect in understanding both the broad outlines and the details of the operation plan.

rnander and for dispatching upward the information gathered by his CIC. Besides integrating Cle activity with the rest of the ship under cruising conditions or in action he or his representatives, the Cl C Watch o fficers, should:

l-&:a.rr-y:but the orders of the Group ere Officer in emp~oy,ing_ihe ship'S radars in air and surface search. 2-Intercept raids with fighter aircraft when directed to do 0 by the Group Cle Officer. 3-Handlevirtually all communications with his ship's planes whatever their mission, relaying pertinent data from the pilots to his own ship and to the Group CI e Officer whenever necessary.

4-Maintain accurate information summary on the status of fuel and ammunition in the aircraft from his ship and insure that the Group Cl O Officer is kept fully informed of their status.

5-Home lost planes notifying the Group OIC Office!' of all downed pilots and aircrewmen and conducting rescue missions as the Group ele Officer directs. 6-Maintaio accurate, up-to-the-minute information on the status of all aircraft airborne from his ship in

-CAP, strike, search and attack, rescue or other missions.

7-Exerci e fighter pilots and CIa personnel in problems in fighter direction and Cle operations to insure a continually high peak of fighting efficiency.

8-Brief pilots on the details of all patrols, frequently coaching them on details of R/T procedure, method of interception, and, in general, acquainting them with fighter direction and eIC procedures.

9-Maintain cia e liaison with all departments of the hip--notably gunnery, navigation, air and communications-c-whose operations concern CIC,

CONFIDENTIAL

SHIP CIC OFFICER

The hip's eIC Officer is the representative of the commanding officer of his ship. In the task force organization, be is responsible for the final execution of the order of the OTe and the task group C0111-

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10

CON F 1 DENTI AL

n the early da " hen bogey plots u uaIly bo cd straight course approaches at constant altitude the fire control problem of orting friendly from enemy was not particular} acute. Later, when the Kamikaze movement began a develop erratic maneuvers to confuse our radars enpny pilots utilized land as radar camouflage, and approaches were hidden by IFF responses of our own returning strikes, the fire controlmen's 'on target' assumed more and more the aspects of a dubious statement. Even with identification help coming from the Gunnery Liaison Officer in CIC the time lag involved in this procedure left the operators of Mark 4's and Mark 12'5 with something of the feeling of playing' blind man's buff." The need for identification equipment in the director became urgent.

Radar equipment Mark 32 Mod 1. an [FF system on fire control radars, was developed to satisfy this urgent need for a last minute identification when the parent fire control radar ' gated" a target. At night, with few planes in the air, identification wa relatively simple via CIC. During the day, .pecially on trike days, identification became a major problem hich the Mark 32 is destined to eliminate. Th Mark 32 uses the L-type of presentation. This is an A tra e rotated 90 degrees so that the trace appears on the sccpe ver-

.ally, The beginning of the trace is set so that the

eceived signal appears immediately above a horizontal reference line at the bottom edge of the scope. The trace is initiated by the leading edge of the range marker notch of the parent fire control radar indicator. A center verti al reference line drawn on the face of the scope coincide with the trace to aid the operator in interpreting the dual IFF pattern can ed by lobe switching, which appears on the Mark 32 scope.

BEARING ACCURACY OBTAINED

Lobe switching gi es th Mark 32 ex ellent bearing accuracy. The antenna radiation pattern is lobed right and left at 30 c. p. ., and the respon es from each lobe are returned through separate video channel . ach feeds one plate of the 2" Cathode Ray tube, producing a hack to back pattern of the receiver pulses along the vertical trace. If the target is in line with the crOSSover point of the lob patterns, both pul e on the cope will appear with the arne amplitude. If the target is to the right or to the left of this line (to ross-over point), th re ponse shown on the scope from the corresponding side increases, while that from th other decreases. Two vertical reference lines in addition to the center reference line are used to help the operator determine to what extent the target is to the right or left of the lobe pattern cross-over points.

At present the Mark 32 is operated by the raoge- finder operator. However following experimental exercises the Fleet Operational Development For e recommends that a separate operator be assigned the Mark 32-stationed in the left rear of" the director. They have found that neither the optical rangefinder operator .nor the radar operator can operate the Mark 32 effectively. Both are too busy with their primary assignment, while the Mark 32 demand full time attention for accurate identification checks. The rangefinder operator, after looking through his instrument at the bright sky is too light blinded to read the scope trace. The BUTeau of Ordnance nov has plan under study for relocation of h.rk 32 scope and controls in the left rear of the director.

These scope diagrams shou: what the Mark 32 opera/or sees when the associated parent radaf is all a "friendly' target. Wide m.d narroW code responses on easily distinguishable. Actually, lhl! trace travels tJerticaIlJ'. These diagrams are lunlet! 071 their side 10 demonstrate th« rdllt.ion betuieen the parent {ire conlrol radar's display twt! 'he idellt.ificatioll display.

!!ARROW CODE 1 IIIICROste

'--oJ \,----!RANCE SCOPE PlmAN ~

I RANCE MARKER

s~~r~ PIP

I ..

TIME LAC DUE fO ELEtTAICAl DELAVS IN TiWMISSION ~O IN Q,J:ClROMIC tlRCdlTS

ID£IITIFICAIiON I"OICllOH SCOPE SCREIft (Do I" ,lol.l

WIDE CODE 21 MICftOS(C

CONFI DEI'·mAL

11

OPERATION

Operation of the Mark 32 consists merely of (1) actuating the interrogation switch to send out challenge signals and (2) adjusting the gain control so that id ntification . gnals appear on the screen at optimum strength. If the target is friendly and is emitting proper identification signals from its transpondor unit, only the oded pattern of Mk III I F will appear on the Mark 32 indicator screen. The wide code signal covers % of the cope and the narrow code ~gnal covers Ys of the cope diameter. The emergency

signal appears a wide that it runs across the Mark 32's indicator screen. If the target does not return IFF signals from a transpondor unit no pattern will be visible on the vertical weep line.

L1MITATI~NS REQUIRE EXPERT OPERATORS

Interpretation of the Mark 32 identification indicator is not always irnple, Diffi wries are am times encountered, as when tw@ planes are within a mile or so of each other on the same bearing. It is possible that reception of the coded ignals from transpondors of both planes will overlap on the scope. This not only makes reading of the cope more difficult, but it becomes dangerous to assume that both targets arc friendly. Another difficult ometimes encountered is attributed to lobe switching. The Mark 32 sy tem will receive responses at a fairly large angle off the target bearing. The off-bearing response is displayed on the corresponding side of the scope's trace. If the respon e happens to come from a target near the range (but on a different bearing) that the notch of the controlling radar happens to b on, identification of a target in the notch becomes misleading, or the one side of the scope becomes cluttered beyond usefulness for on bearing targets, Proper interpretation of targe in certain situations demands expert operation and evaluation on the part of the Mark 32 operator. These operating techniques are thoroughly discussed and illustrated in BuOrd's Pamphlet 1300 a must for every operator.

CAPABILITIES

a:: w co ::E w U w c

U

The chara teristic of Radar Equipment Iark 32 Mod 1 which are given in the following table are useful in connection with operation of the equipment. This data gives an indication of the capabilities and th limitations of the equipment based upon the experience of early installations. It should be kept in mind that

....:

12 CONFIDENTIAL

the Mark 32 i capable of identifying air target out to the maximum pick-up range of the parent radar.

Maximum range (surface) 28000 yards

Adjustable sweep limits 30 to 50 micro-

Minimum detectable range Range accuracy

Range discrimination ( urface)

second 1500 yard 200 yards

600 yard (wide

respon e) I Y; degrees 4 degrees 46 degrees 70 degrees

7 to 9 microseconds

Bearing accuracy Bearing discrimination Horizontal beam width Vertical beam width Trail mitred pulse width

WARMLY WELCOMED BY FIRE CONTROL CREWS

The Mark 32 identification radar i as welcome a possession alnong fire control crews as a 'seeing eye • would be to a blind man tapping his way across curbstones and trolley tracks. With the Mark 32, gone are the days when the GLO must grind gears in CIC by halting the weep of an , K or R to identify a target in the "gate" of a Mark 4 or Mark 12 fire control radar. And gunnery officers need no longer teal' hair and bite nails in a last second effort to identify targets while time lag plays hob with CIG's LLl'-'<:A.'VI to distinguish friendlies from bogies. In fact, CJ will benefit from identification information running the Jv" circuits in rever e of its former flow (director to OLO).

TECHNICALLY SPEAKING

This equipment i made up or an Identification Indicator Mk 1 od 0, avy Model BN Radio Transmitting and Receiving equipment, Duplexer CTZ-50 ACW Radar Lober Mk I Mod 0, and a directional antenna that is attached to the lire control radar antenna (Mk 2 Mod 0 is attached to Radar Equipment Mark 4, Mk 3 Mod 0 is attached to Radar Equipment Mark 12) . The Mark 32 i designed to receive identification signals from these IFF equipments of the Mk

III group: avy Models BK,. ABK, ABK-l, Army's

SCR-595 CR-695, and the British IFF Mk Ill.

Early installations of the Mark 32 went to carriers

and picket destroyers. t pr ent, Navy Yard pool

are installing this equipment on all applicable 'leet units which meet allowance and requisition requirements, for the development and maintenance of perational techniques which should be perfected as a. part peac -time tactical training.

RADCM

over

KYUSHU

it helped lift veillrom enemy's fire control radar

RADCM strategy used in M(lTine pholo minion resembles footbo,ll 'TLQtleliller. DiveTsionary P-47Js skirt en d while B-24's hit cenie«, 180 lbs, rope, 400 lb •. window were expended.

It looked like a routine job as it came to the desk of the Operations Officer of Tactical Air Force, 10th Army, on Okinawa. TAFTen was to support two photo-recon Liberators 01 avy VD-l in photographing southern Kyushu,

Kyushu was, to some degree old stuff to T Ten, who e principal job was to gi e air support to the Okinawa operation. Some P-47s of the 318th Army Fighter Group of the 7th AF already had been sent there on heckler missions.

But, as it turned out this job was a little different. Enemy strength was not completely known to T FTen Intelligence. It was estimated that the J apanese could send up approximately 500 fighters from, widely scattered fields, among them Kogashima, Tojimbara, Ohiran, Byu Kanoya adohara and Omura. But a study of Japanese interception against aircraft of such commands as the 20th AF revealed no et pattern of procedure.

he problem of Japanese anti-aircraft marksmanship was an even greater guess. The Japanese were known" to have some gun-laying radar in the 75 and 200 Mc bands but how accurate they were had not been fully established. If the Japanese wanted a good target for continuously-pointed radar-controlled fire, the Liberators of VD--l would provide it. A photography plane mu t fly a traight and level cour e minute after minute when it seems like hour after how' to pilot and crew.

For a month prior to receiving the assignm nt, Operations had given Marine RADCM Unit :It I in the Communications S ction of TAFTen, a fairly free hand in finding out what the radar picture was, particularly up and down the ansei hoto chain.

Results from each of a score of fLigbt were the same: plenty of early warning radars very little fire control. Ack-ack was received on several occasions but apparently was not radar-controlled,

From T AFTen doubts of their e aluation of fire control was born a. double-barreled plan. First, send

RADCM personnel were busy during the last months of the war keeping tabs on fap radar ouer the home islands. Fire controi radar in particular needed I. atchine : rettLrning B-29 crews reported /lilat it was improving. On Okinawa a Marine officer, CaJJtain Arvid F. Jouppi, ueteran of 25 RADCM missions, wrote this report of RLJ.DCM ouer Kyusiiu. It is reprinted from RADAR magazine, NQ. 11, of 10 September 1945.

CONFIDENTIAL

eight P-47s in a diversionary raid against Sasebo naval base in northwestern Kyu hu to str w a path of rap (CHR-2) and thereby draw Japanese fighters away from the area to be photographed. econd, send avy RADCM personnel, with a wide variety of tuned window, in each of two B-24s guarded by four other P-47 of the 7th AF. Additionally, 24 P--47s were to attack any fighters encountered in Kyushu as a sort of free-lance protecting force. One of the B-2,!-'s was hastily equipped with search and analysis equipment so that on-the-spot-evaluation of Japanese fire control-s-if any--could b made and th proper countermeasure applied. Window cut for 150 200 and 300 megacycles was carried in each plane. It was up to the RADCM co-ordinator to determine for both crews, by observing frequency, pulsing rate and pulse width of received signals, just when and how each type should be used. Each Liberator also carried 24 packages of rope which would have a frequency coverage from 75 to 300 Mc.

It was riginally intended that two P-47's should be equipped with automatic rope dispensers each loaded with 120 rope targets. However because of the necessity of-carrying wing gas tanks it was decided to di ide up the 240 units of rope among all eight P-47's assigned to make the diversionary attack, Pilots would 'then discharge them manually.

Take ls1and, approximately 20 miles south of Kyushu was designated the coordinating point. Diver ionary fighter pilots were in tructed to leave immediately upon arrival on a cour e of 325 ° magnetic.

t the end of ten minutes they were to make a five mile orbit, dropping a rope target each ten econds. The fighters were to make two additional orbits while proceeding toward Sasebo.

The Liberators and their escort planes were to form an initial five mile orbit and discharge their ropes along with window of appropriate category. This was intended to hide from the Japanese the number of planes remaining over Take or, to be optimistic to deceive them into believing that the Take element was the tail end of a long raid against asebo. The Liberators were to hold their orbit for 15 minutes and then go in for their photographs, hoping that all available :fighters had gone out to intercept .the head of the spurious air annada apparently heading forasebo.

At 0100 on 7 June the photo-mission planes rendezvou ed above little Ie hima and headed out toward Kyushu. Even before the flight left Ie hima the

In ... en

'4 CONFIDENTIAL

{

search recei er showed that Japanese radars probably

from Okini Erabu, were tracking. That was to be expe ted.

The formation skimmed at 20,000 feet above the an ei hoto chain passing as if from hand-to-hand from the beam of one Japanese radar into the beam of another. It would be possible to navigate to the target simply by keeping tabs on Japanese radars.

When passing over Takara Gunto Jap radars at 73 86~ and 79 megacycles took their turn at tracking. By. this tim the enemy must have known the exact compo . tioo of the flight. The hope now was to deceiv the enem as to direction of the attack.

Take hima was reached just two hours after leaving Ie hima. True to briefing, eight P-47's left immediately on a course of 325°. They sowed their first rope between Shima-Koshiki- Jima and the south tip of Kyushu. The main. flight continued to orbit around Take. Radars which had previously been bearing on the main flight were.noted to rotate away, presumably to inv tigatc the deceptiv trail left by the P-47'8.

Jut 17 minutes after arriving at Take, the time was ripe. Th Liberators moved out under their cover of fighters. Four PBY's, serving for air-sea rescue, remained to orbit in the Take area, now completely infested with window and rope. The Liberators passe over the coastline into Kyu hu, The ack-ack waul begin bursting now or never.

Not altogether in keeping with ideal photographing conditions was the 5j10ths cloud over over most of the outhern area. But from the RADCM point of view this was the test. It would take radar-controlled ack-ack to reach the Liberator.

For three minutes there were nothing but early warning signals (a 157 megacycle signal had meanwhile come on, making four radars, all rotating). Then Irom somewhere came ack-ack, with still no fire control radar. However in keeping v ith a pre-arranged plan 28-inch window, for 200 megacycle radar, was dropped each five second. The fire, probably 75 millimeter was way off with orne bursts being 200 yard from the aircraft. The entire band from 40 megacycles to 3400 megacycles was hastily searched.

o signals. However, the 28-inch window was dropped for a period of 20 minutes. The photographing continued on schedule and there was no ~ore ackack, One of the Liberators continued to sow 28-inch window sporadically. Both planes sowed 37-inch window (for 150 Mc), at 10- econd intervals. This

to confuse any Jap fighters which might remain in the Kyushu area, and also to keep the earch radars nfused as to the true number of planes over Kyushu. Then some ack-ack hawed up again. The first burst was about 50 yards to starboard of the RAnC 1:

plane. It came within a minute after a 204 Me radar went on, indicating that it took about 40 seconds for the radar to pass data to a gun battery, allowing 2.0 seconds for the shell to climb to 20,000 feet. While this happened the window boys were busy. Within 20 seconds after the squeaky 2200 PRF ignal came in, 28-inch windov was floating down-two sleeves every three second. Both B-24s were tossing it out.

Other bursts aft were seen by the tail turret gunner and by a cameraman. The tail turret gunner reported he saw 40-foot puffs above the clouds about a half mile back. After seven minutes of operation the 204 megacycle radar gave up. If there was any more ack-ack it was too far away to be observed.

The anti-aircraft artillery had been beat. But what about all tho e aircraft from enemy airfield? When the story was told to intelligence officers that evening, the information was encouraging from the fact that it was largely negative. at one plane wa found over the area to be photographed.

The eightP-47s which weot on the diversionary raid

-ere not satisfied to go home once they had scattered their deception. They had orders not to tangle with any planes which might rise fOT the deception so they headed for central Kyushu, found no aircraft to fight on the western halI and pro eeded to the eastern ector. There, near the Japs' proud Miyakonojo airfield, 12 Zeke fighters rose to meet them. The P-47 got credit for two kills.

The four-fighter escort for the Liberators went out ahead and spotted nine J ap aircraft north of Kago Shima Wan. Either because the Kyushu area must have looked like a mass of planes as the result of window or for reasons of their own, the J apane e did not fight.

The 24 opportuni t fighters saw 15 Zekes near Sasebo (the di ersionary flight was de igned to feint a raid there). Th e 7th F fighters tangled and brought down two Japanese. But two P-47s were hit and had to head back for Okinawa.

That evening TAFT en intelligence relayed varying stories to operations officers. orne fighter pilots couldn't ee any ense to carrying Toll of hiny metalfoil instead of going out to blast -the enem. But the B-24 pilots, who had ac omplished their photo mission, were in agreement that the windov had helped ward off' Japanese AA fire.

"The tail tUTriJ/ gU1wcr reported he saw 40-/00t puffs .. about. n hall mile back."

CON FI DENTI Al

o o /TI n JTI 3:" ttl JTI ::tJ

...., ..,. en

..:

Looking tr/I at radar mast with 80-3 radar antellna and MaTk !II IFP antennas mounted. SO-3 radar transmitter uni; IS mounted (11 bas" of tile tripod mast,

16

CONFIDENTIAL

By Molar 'TorpeDO Boat Squadrons Training Center, Newport, R. 1.

was the most commonly u ed. With radar ranges and eatings the target's COUl'Se was plotted; and a course

d speed as selected to put the PT into an attack position. Frequently the final approach was made on a collision course; in this case the approach co old be checked direct! Irom the radar, since the only requisite was that the bearing of the target remained steady.

At the desired rang ,checked by radar, the torpedoes could be fired. However ince baring information received from the SO-3 radar is not precisely accurate, firing by radar alan was not used unless necessary the usual practice being to track and attain position by radar and hen to fire visually on the basis of radar data. In general, radar has changed PT torpedo firing from a close-range seaman's eye technique to a much more scientific torpedo fire control. There ha been a constant search for methods to improve the accuracy of torpedo firing by P'F's. Present development work is concerned with an electronic director to be mounted in the charthouse and to utilize range and bearing information directly from the radar,

Early in World War IT radar urfa e search equipment was installed on motor torpedo boats and greatly augmented their effectiveness. With the major tactical characteristic of stealth plus high speed, maneuverability and fire power a radar-equipped PT was a mo t effective weapon. Captured enemy document indicate the respect with which it was regarded in aU theaters of operation,

Most PT operations were carried out at night and close to the shoreline. Navigation by radar was sential for an effective blockade against enemy small craft and for the safety of the boat. kill in establishing position by ranging on known landmarks, mountain peaks and island contours contributed much to

uccessful patrols. Passage through. severely r tricted waters, while searching for the enemy or engaging him in a gunnery action sue eeded largely as the r ult of good radar performance ana of teamwork between the radar operator and the boat captain.

In Pacific areas P boats often operated with ina - curate charts and many missions could no have been accomplished without the usc of radar. On long run through heavy seas, when salt spray or rain obscured vision from be bridge radar was a decided aid. It was also invaluable for station-keeping. The boats often had to fight strong currents, and maintaining an efficient patrol or blockade would hav been impo - sible by dead-reckoning methods alone. Briefing instructions usually pecified a distan e to be maintained from the beach, and limits of the search area were des~ ignated by landmarks. Radar made it po ib1e to heck these position directly without relying on the accura y of dead reckoning.

SPOTTI NG SMALL CRAFT IN DARKN ESS

Operational use of radar by PT's to locate enemy mall raft was of paramount importance. Cruising lose to the beach the PT could detect small barg roving off shore where visual methods were not possi-

ble. The enemy u ually sought the cover of darkness for his mission, and he used shallow draft vessels which enabled him to crui e alma t under the protection ol overhanging bushes. eedless to say, if the PT's could dete t the enemy before being dete ted hemsel es, the attack had a much greater chance of being successful. The 0-3 radar could generally detect small craft within a radius of 3 miles and Irequentl could detect them traveling as cia e as 100 yards from the beach.

Many target would have lipped by unobserved were

COLLISION COURSE TORPEDO ATTACKS

Against large ships the PT of course used the torpedo.When a torpedo attack was anticipated, radar was utilized to obtain target information and to maneuver the PT into a favorable attack position. If visual firing of the torpedo was not practicable, the entire pro edure could be carried out with radar alone . Various systems were devised and used with some

ess to fire blind, and of these th maneuvering

's in th» familiar "Vu" [ormation. The SO-3 radar atll811na~ are th« old dome type.

it not for an alert radar watch. onta t with these light enemy forces was always at vel, close range where visual control of gunfire was possible. Present equipment on P'T's does not include fir control radar. But during a running fight between PT's and enemy small craft the radar was invaluable in keeping tb officer in tactical command informed, in keeping the boat clear of navigational hazards, and in ensuring that supporting enemy forces did not arrive unexpectedly. bould the boats have to retire to reload their guns the radarman, by onstant range and bearing information relayed to the bridge could do much to keep contact with. the enemy.

ROCKET FIRE BY RADAR

In rocket firing the radar was an essential. Due to the comparatively high trajectory of the rockets and the comparatively crude type of launcher and sights used by PT' ,apredeterminedrange had to be established; and the only method of checking accurately this range and so knowing when to fire, was by radar.

Only limited aircraft search is possible with the 50-3 radar due to the narrow vertical beam pattern on the antenna. Only an airplane flying low in the antenna beam can be detected but these can be racked in from over 20 miles away. Luckily the Japanese float plane, - the major enemy of PT s in certain Pa ific areas, g nerally flew low. On several occasions attacks by these aircraft were countered b PT , with a slightly modified radar, vectoring-our night fighters. Enemy bombers which flew high were difficult to detect becau e of the large cone of silence overhead. and a modification which allowed the antenna to be tilted above the horizontal plan was used with varying degrees of sue e .

ew developments are underway to improve PT radar

lor air search. .

CONFIDENTIAL

View looking aft in electronic compartmen! below deck. TCS power suppLy at lop left. Center Lop is model ABK IFF Transpander. Beneath on shelf is lhe powqr sllpply lor bendix gyrQ /lu.xgote compass.

Bottom is model BN IFF l nierrogator uni/. At far right is duple,reT 1mit fOT model BN Intsrrogator.

It> ... ."

TEAMING WITH DESTROYERS

The vectoring of P'F's by a DD or DE thus enlarging the PT's area of sear h and providing more accurate information, proved successful. The vectoring . ship detects and.tracks the enemy and gives the PT divisions or sections a course and speed to intercept the target or to reach the desired attack position. When the PT s reach the range of detection on their own radar, they are released to take tactical control of 'the attack, or they may even be given a base torpedo course by the vectoring ship, if she so desires. ince all such operations were at night or during poor visibility, the final attack was aided materially by radar information, although completely successful radar attacks have not yet been achieved. Occasionally the IT's were called upon to furnish further range and position information to the vectoring ship.

EXPERJMENTS PRODUCED A

SUCCESSFUL PT RADAR

The large equipment u ed for ship installations was too heavy and bulky for the mall 80-foot PT boat, The first radar set used .in a PT was a Canadian A. E aircraft model, which was installed informally n a

18

CONFIDENTIAL

View of electronic compa.rtment below deck looking forward. .'10-3 radar Rectifier power unit at top. Cente» left on bulkhead is voltage regulator ,.nit.-Bol/om is motor ge1ll<rator and modulator "",it for SO-.1 reilnr, Cerae» riglu is conoertet. unit [or 115 v a-c power.

boat early in 1942 and oon died a natural death due to the lack of spare parts, Later in the same year .several U. . Ann}' sets CR 517 A were adapted to PT u e and installed. Th e ets were used with on! a fair amount of success during the time in which a pecial equipment, Model 0, was being developed

for PT boats, which equipment was also adapted later for use on other types of small craft such as PC's,

C's, and PGM's. The original model SO was soon modified and improved with models Oa and 0-13' and the latest improvement appeared late in 1944 with. model SO-3 many ets of which were installed jn the field to improve the performance of operating quadrons,

The model 0-3 radar is X band equipment designed primarily for surface search. Only a five-inch PPI scope presentation is provided. The indicator unit contains all the usual controls for normal operation of the equipment and .is installed with th Accessory Control nit (for accurate ranging) in the

art house Iorward of and below the bridge. Th power supply and motor generator and modulat unit are located in a pecial compartment, as is l'

View in PT ah arthouse looking tOUiard POT! side. True befJring unit for SO-3 radar al top center. VJ~F . radio in center, TCS radio !I.e lower lett: SO--3 Radar In dieator and At;ceJsory COtltTO/ Uri it al right.

Looking [oruiar d in charthouse at 80-3 Radar Indicator (I,nd Auess·ory Control Unit. MaTk IiI r:ransl}(mdeT model ABK control box is at cellle~ kIt. TCS radio shown at louier left .

CONFIDENTIAL

19

other electronic equipment carried on board a PT. This other equipment consists of the Mark III IFF Transponder, model ABK, and Interrogator, model BN. The radar antenna is mounted on a tripod mast ·amidships, its height being 18 to 20 feet above the waterline. Communication equipment includes a VHF radio and model TCS radio; navigation equipment includes a Pioneer magnetic compass and a Bendix Gyro Fluxgate Compass.

Range scales on most SO-.3 indicators include 4·, 20·, and BO·rulle ranges, Range selection is made by a switch, and-depending upon the manual control of the sweep expansion-the scales may be reduced or expanded byalmost 50% of the selected range. The fixed range marks are one mile, five miles, and twenty miles apart respectively on the 4·, 20-, and SO-mile range selections. A movable range spot on the sweep, which makes a movable range ring on the scope, is controlled bya hand crank, Information from this is read on a fixed dial calibrated in thousands of yards, which makes accurate ranging possible up to a maximum of 40,000 yards.

. Antenna rotation speed is fixed at abou t lOR. P. M.

The direction of rotation is manually controlled, making it possible to sweep across any sector; and the antenna may be held in a stationary position if desired. Either true OT relative bearings may be obtained; when

J

The 50-3 radar anllmrul-, Q'~ the tripod mast, searches lor £argels.

2:0

CONFI DENTI AL

true bearing information from the Fluxgate compass is used,the PPI pictureis held stationary on the screen, unmarred by the yawing ci'f the boat. A ship's her flash device makes it possible to get relative bearing information with true bearing information on the PPL This is done by momentarily intensifying the sweep as the center of the antenna beam crosses the boat's bow.

MANNING 'THE EQUIPMENT

. .

The usual PT crew included a radarmaa, a radioman, and a quartermaster, all of whom were trained to be reliable and efficient radar operators as well as able to handle all communications. The long war patrols made it necessary to utilize as many men as possible to stand radar watches, and with the small PTcrew (10-14 men) this frequently was a serious problem. Usually one of the above-mentioned fates manned the radar; although sometimes In a gunneryengagemerit or melee torpedo engagement, when evaluation of the radar presentation was more important than routine range and bearing information, one of the officers would take over. While chart house organizations differed widely in PT operations, the most common was somewhat as follows. The Executive Officer wouldact as plotter and general supervisorythe radarman would man the radar and call out ranges all bearings when tracking, and the radioman would handle communications. Usually all information was relayed to the bridge via speaking tube, and the officer in tactical command remained topside.

OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS

Several limitations affect the operational use of radar on PT's. The high frequency of the equipment makes the detection of a target beyond the horizon impracticable, Since the antenna is located near the surface of the water, the maximum range of detection of a small boat without superstructure is less than 8 miles, The detection of a. larger vessel is possible at greater ranges, depending on the reflectiviry of the target and the materiel condition of the equipment.

The determination of range jg limited to about plus 01 minus 100 yards, using the Accessory Control Unit. The determination of bearing is limited to about plus or minus 3 degrees. This accuracy .is fair for firing torpedoes blind with radar 1fgreat care .is taken and if a base torpedo course for a number of boats firing spreads is the order ..

1

1 J.

If you fell overboard, th» pressing need [or ice cream, a better bltnk 01' thnt three-day- pas, would be subordinate io the ""1')1 important tilled lor 11 .rubsto.ntiollife·jacket; ycl, under <ll'dina.r,' ciTcumslanC8J 011 routine duty, the !.ife. jad;;et is [orgotten, and ice fir-earn predominates. So willi, Anli·Submarine WaTfare. Now lhal yo!). are Mfel" riding Ike peaae, Ihere is lil,/.I., or no immediate need tor ),OUT knowing what It> do in CaSe of a sub. marine attack; still, J'Oltr peacetime duly is /0 be prepared, ''jusl ill Cl/.$8." Thls art ide suggests the main [unctions ollhe GIG in shiJu .equipped with Sonar, It is not doctrine in all tl etails; si:JCIl it tries /;0 combine all I he bed f ea1ur,e$ as d escribed in FTP 223-A,!he monthly Anti·SII.hmarine Buitetins, Destroyer Tcetical Bt.lletiru, th« DesPat GIG Handbook, and uariOUf action re ports.

Assisting the Command in making successful attacks on submarines and regaining the contact once the original contact has been lost are among the most important [unctions of the CIO in a ship equipped with Sonar. Actually, in anti-submarine warfare, CIC does a slight about face, Instead of making the initial contact with the enemy and dissem inating this inform aCIC depends on Sonar to be "coached on the . , in most cases.

c :a

II I

C III

The exception to this is the detecting of surfaced and awash submarines and periscopes by radar in CIC.

SONAR IS THE KEY DETECTOR

.Although Sonar is the prime instrument in the detection of enemy submarine activity. usually CIC is responsible for determining course, speed and maneuvers of the submarine; for acting as a check on the correct attack course and dropping point for depth charge attack; fOT launching, monitoring and recoverJngeffective radio "Sono-buoy" patterns; for controlling cooperating aircraft in anti-submarine patrols and attacks; lor controlling coordinated anti-submarine .attacksjand for plotting submarine positions at all times. On ships eq nipped with the. Attack Plotter 1k 1 Mod 2 and the A/S Director Mk 4, most of these functions may be performed in the Sonar hut, but CIa is still responsible for checking all information.

In addition, CIC is responsible for initially stationing the screen, for checking the positions of au vessels, for ill forming the Command of Torpedo Danger Zones and on minimum depths. eIC must disseminate informa-

CONFIDENTIAL

o o /'11 n /'11 3: m !'I"I ::tI

Z.l

ion on possible locations and numbers of enemy ubmarines from intelligence reports and High and Medium Frequencies Direction Finders, ost reports for plotting submarine positions come Irom onar information; yet reports will filter through Cl C from aircraft in anti-submarine patrol from other ship from surface borne radar and from visual sightings,

The moo l valuable plots in CIC for anti- ubmarine warfa re are those on the Geographic plot or DR T. In submarine waters, scales of 200 Or 500 yards per inch are recommended when plotting sound contacts. This nece sitates onlj one adju tment for each component from the normal cruising scale of 2,000 yards pel' inch.

tandard plotting symbols mu. t be rigidly adhered to ill order to prevent confusion, The mechanics of changing scale are best described in the AR fainterrance and Operating I Ianual furnished with each DRT.

There are two general types of anti-submarine attacks: the ndividual and the Coordinated. Th Coordinated attack, which involv two ship attacking the same contac is divided into two categories: the attack on a su bmarine not known to be deep, and the attack on a submarine at a depth of 400 feet or more. Different procedures ar necessary in CIC for the various types of attacks.

ATTACK BY ONE SHIP

In the Individual hip Attack prior to a tual onar contact, the Geographic Plot should be set on either the 200 or 500 yard per inch cale, preferably the 200 yards per inch (with the Individual hip Attack) because it gr es a more expanded plot. Locations of all friendly vessels particularly at night or in low visibility, are kept up to date on the surface plot. navigational char showing possible sonar targets su ch as reefs wrecks and arious land masses must be availabl and it is the duty of GIG to a .. ssist the onar officer by checking periodically to see that his operator is searching the assigned ector.

D pon contact, the submarine's position is plot ed immediately on the Geographic Plot or DRT. Both the surface plot and the navigational chart are checked to be certain that the contact is not a friendly ship a reef or some other obstructions.

During the approach and attack phase, the target is tracked continually, and ranges and bearings are taken as often as possible. This information, along with suggested maneuvers, is passed on to the Command. While onar is the primary source of information for conning the attack the Geographic Plot Ire-

22

CONFIDENTIAL

quentl may be the first to reveal the maneuver of the target. It is nee ar)' to eck all onar elutions, and in the event of a Range Recorder casualty, to advi the ommand from the Geographic Plot of courses to steer and dropping time. Time of dropping and time of explosion of depth barges is carefully recorded. Whcm possible, CIe is expected to determine the depth of the enemy submarine by u e of the fathorneter when over the target.

THE TEAMWORK ATTACK

In a coordinated attack there are two types of ship the assisting ship and the attacking ship. Procedure within the CI of the assisting ship is essentially the

arne as that used in Individual hip .Attacks when the submarine is not known to be deep. The assi ring ship maintains tation ] 000 to 1500 yards from the submarine on the side toward which the submarine is as umed to be moving. The position of the attacking ship must be kept plotted on the surface plot at all times. It is the duty of the a isting ship's CIe to give ov r TES the range, bearing, course, peed, indicated maneuvers and approximate d pth of the ubmarine if available, to the attacking ship. On occasion, the as-

isting hip' ill alternate duti with the attacking ship.

The attacking ship when the submarine is not know to be deep, uses th ame pro edure prescribed for Individual ship attacks with the exception that information lrom the assisting ship should be check d with information from her 0'; n onar from lookouts and other observation. The attacking ship .is normally designated a the first ship to gain contact with the su bmarine regardless of seniority of command.

When the submarine is known to be deep, which means the submarine. i at a depth of 400 feet or more, the as isting ship must maintain station at a good ound range on the stern or quarter of the target. It

is extremely important that CI recommend cours and speeds to -Command in order to maintain this posrtion, In addition to the information normally given over voice radio to the attacking ship for the close-ro-th - urfac -submarine, th assisting hip must inform the attacking ship of courses to steer and when to drop depth charges.

ASSISTING SHIP CONTROLS THE ATTACKER

Inthe coordinated attack, the assisting ship actually control the attacking hip. The method of control, from IC, is to direct the attacking ship astern of the target into a tern-chas p sition. The attacking . is brought in at a speed of approximately five

greater than the submarine' speecl until about 1,000 ard from th ubrnarin . When the aUackinghip

wi thin the 1 000 yards she is slov ed down to a speed one to two knot greater than the submarine's speed. For the normal situation, the assisting ship directs the attacking ship to commence dropping charge just before the attacki ng ship passes over the submarine. The situation might rough1 be defined as "normal" when the submarine's speed is 3-4 knots, depth 500-600 feet, with the attacking ship s speed at 5-6 knots.

Then are certain special duties in the assisting ship's CIC during a coordinated atta k when the submarine is known to be deep. The evaluator, who is in general charge, evaluates the plot and actually 'dire 15" the attacking ship for the "interception." His orders go out over TB to the attacking ship. Tb assistant evaluator is responsible for recommending courses and speeds to ommand in order that his own ship can . tay in a good po ition to dire t th attack. He may, at

any time assume the valuator' duti . The geographic plotter plots both the ubmarine and attacking ship, It is advi able to ha e an assistant geographi plotter to divided these duti . The urface plotter also plots both subma.rine and attacking ship, while the surface re order, manning the 22) phones records bearings and ranges of attacking ship from surface search radar operator. During high visibility, pelorus bearings with radar ranges will, ill most cases, b more accurate. Other personnel required in the assisting ship CIC during the attack are the onar recorder, who records b arings and ranges of submarinereported by Sonar, the surface search radar operator, a radio recorder and possibly a surface statu board keeper.

ATTACKING SHIP MUST FOLLOW ORDERS

Lik a pilot ol an airplane being directed by the intercept officer during an air raid, the attacking ship

Gl Cos role if cru.cial.

GIG officers should kllOW these proced,uss.

Turn at least 200 in direction of Sub's mO'Vt!lment.

CO N 1'1 DENTIAL

must follow orders of the evaluator on the assisting ship if the coordinated attack is to b uccessful. All information received from the assi ting hip must be plotted in the attacking ship, and h must be ready to exchange duties if the tactics employed by the submarine warrant such a procedure. The attacking ship, during the run, listens only on the. onar gear.

Regaining contact as pointed out before, is one of CIC' D10st important function in anti-submarine warfare. The skillful use of the geographic plot is the best method of regaining Sonar contact once it bas been 10 t, Illustrating this article are diagrams hawing the current doctrine and instructions on the procedure for search to regain contact. CIC is responsible for advising the Command on courses to steer to regain contact as shown in these diagrams. Sonar search arcs (in true bearings) must be recommended, using circles of possible su bmarine position for each minute to estimate these arcs, If required by command, 01 must control other anti-submarine ship in the area for a coordinated search.

o.n ..,.

C"I

HOW TO REGAIN CONTACT

Three.types of planned searches may be used to regain contact: the Regain onta t Proc dure, the Operation "Observant" and the Retiring Search.

Immediately upon losing contact, the Regaining

. Conta t Procedure as illustrated in Figure 1 is used.

The time required for this operation is 10 minutes. If conta t i: not regained at the nd of at time, Operation Observant as hown in Figure 2 is to be u ed.

Operation "Observant is also followed, without a preliminary Regain Contact Procedure when a submarine i considered to be in the near vicinity of a torpedoed ship or when the Regaining Cobtact PI'Ocedure is not possible but the first attacking ship can reach the last estimated position of the submarine within 10 minutes.

The first anti-submarine (AI ) ship to arrive decid th Initial ours which i the probable submarin escape course and i respon ibl for advising all supporting ships of this deci ion. The first A/S ship is the guide and is responsible for dropping a marker over the Initial Point and carrying out the box search as illustrated. The second ship takes station as indicated in the diagram and maintains a position diagonally opposite the first ship on the quare. The third

hip circles the Initial Point or reinforces the square as dir cted by the enior Officer present. At night, or during reduced visibility wben more than three

...:

24

CONF I. DENTI AL

anti- ubmarine ships are in the ar a onsideration should be given to lea ing one to conduct a Sonar radar search within radar range of the Initial while the others condu t the earch plan selected from the search diagrams. If a complete sweep around the square by an anti-submarine hip does not produce a con tact and, incidentally) this does not necessaril y mean the same ship throughout, then the regular Retiring Search must be employed. The appropriate plan to follow will be found in FTP-223-A.

an aid to plotting during any of the planned earches, overlays should be made in advance for the Regaining ontact Procedure, Operation Observant' and for circles of possible submarine movement.

OTHER CIC RESPONSIBILlTIES

In the event that the first contact with a submarine is not Sonar but a radar contact, certain definite steps Il1U t b taken in CTO. Fir t if the radar contact i made on a target believed to be a submarine the possibilityof radar deception should be hecked immediately b an analysis of the character of the pips on the radars of the P band as well as the I or X band, and by comparison of track with true wind direction. In water where submarine attack is probable, the surface search radar antenna can be trained slowly through 360" [ possible periscope detection. Radar operators shoul be cautioned frequently that periscope exposures will be intermittent and that even the 'briefest of pips must be reported. Lookouts should be notified of any conta t and ionar, at the same time, must be notified of an pip that shows up on the radar. II a radar conta t disappears during the approach, the Command should be informed and C10 recommend the search plan and Sonar search arcs best suited to regain the contact. Whenever there is a possibility of acoustic type torpedoes being 'fired by the uhmarine, C 0 recommends the ev asive tactics according to current doctrine.

Th expendable radio 'sonobuoy" i the instrument designed to receive underwater orne noises and re-

tran mit them for radio reception aboard ship. I

may b responsible forth launching and monitoring of these onobuoys following patterns laid down in current doctrine. It is always the responsibility of CI to direct surface craft in recovering these instruments whenever possible.

And finally, it is erG's responsibility to control aircraft that are actually attacking ubmarines aircraft and surface craft delivering coordinated attack on submarines and the regular anti- ubmarine and patrols.

A PPT photo mO$flic ot southern Japall was made by filling together and, in some cases, overlappi1,g pictures of airborn/! radar scopes tllat were taken in high altitude reconnaissGTlce jJlan(J$. The PPI scopes weTII an. (I fzfty-mile scale.

In the preparation at the mosaic, prints were selected that gau« good land-tuater contrast to IAat it might be used JOT radar operators in identifying their ponlio'li upon a.pproaching th« coast of Japa,n. Wa/.er areas have been. blackened in order 10 clearly bring oul the cOllJl line conlours.

A comparison 0/ the PPI photo mosaic and Ihe map of th« same area shows Ihe fidelity of these scope pictures. This mosaic was compiled by the Office of the ACAS, Lntelligence, Washing/on., D. C., and is reprinted (rom IntelLigellce Su.mmary o. 284.

CONFIDENTIAL

..... ..,.

en

German planes cQ,rried tile radio-guided missile.! under their wings.

Ir: w CD ~ W U w a

U

26

CONFIDENTIAL

The long, violent history of this war saw the rise of many new or Lam ally improved weapons from the magnetic mine in the early day to the "pe sonnel-controlled bomb" (suicide plane) of recent fame. The story of Allied countermeasures to the

hreat of xis weapons is in many cases as dramatic as the weapons themselves.

For instance, take the ca e of the German radiocontrolled bomb. As early a 1941 British Intelligence began receiving reports that th Germans were developing a bomb which could be remotely controlled from a parent aircraft. Development and operational u e, however, are two different things, and it was not until Augu t 1943, that the Luftwaffe was ready to unveil it. A group of corvettes on anti-submarine patrol in the Bay of Biscay were attacked by what was identified as a remotely controlled bomb-a missile resembling a small fighter plane-+capable of radical maneuvering both in azimuth and elevation. The parent aircraft were D02J7 twin-engined bombers. One of the corvettes was sunk, another damaged. Later in ugust further highly successful attacks were made against shipping in the Mediterranean and Bay of Biscay. The bomb (designated HS293) was released by the parent plane at altitudes of 3000-5000 feet and ranges of till to five miles hom the target. The missile was jet-

, assisted shortly after its release: its peed, variously estimated at the time, i now known to have been about 325 knots. The controlling operator in the plane was able to follow the bomb visually by observing a light in the tail.

During and immediately following the Salerno landings the German guided missile program moved into high gear. The enemy introduced another type of controlled missile, the FX a radio-corrected 4400 pound bomb of tremendous power and accuracy, as anyone present in Salerno Gulf at that time will testify. The Luftwaffe caught units of the Italian Fleet racing to reach Allied ports and cored heavily with both HS293 and FX bomb. They attacked Allied shipping in alerno Gulf, sinking and damaging several British and United States war hips, large and small. It was estimated that nearly 50ro of the bombs launched were hits or damaging ncar misses.

At that time radio control was suspected (on the basis of prisoner-of-war reports) but was by no means confirmed. The control band was supposed to lie . the 20 Me region, and desperate, hastily

jamming effort \ as concentrated in thi band, which seemed to Imprcve morale without affecting the actu:acy of the missiles.

TWO DE's SEEK THE ANSWER

!£eanwhile two . destroyer escorts were fitted

out with pecial earch receivers covering the entire radio spectrum from L5 kc. to 3000 Me panoramic adaptors recording and photographi equipment, and jammers (constructed 9Y the Naval Research Laboratory) to operate from 10-35 Me,

The mission of the 1:\¥0 DE's was two-fold: (a) to find and record the freq uencies and modulation for control of the bomb, and (b) to jam them.

The ship sele t d for this ticklish a ignment were the U FREDERI K . DA I ( 136) and the USS HERBERT C. JO ES (DE 137). ReM teams, specially trained at the Special Project School, Radio Material School Anacostia, D. C., were placed on board each ship. The teams consisted of one officer, two technicians, twa operators, and two photographers,

The two ship crossed the Atlantic at high peed holding frequent interc pt training chills on the way, d reported to Commander U. S_ Eighth Fleet on 15 tober 1943. The hip were formed into a special

task group and ordered to escort duty along the irequently attacked Gibraltar-Naples convoy lane, the most vulnerable stretch of whim ran along the> orth African Coast between Oran, and Bizerte, within easy range of aircraft operating from bases in outhern France.

German aircraft, using torpedoes and radio ontroUed bomb, atta ked a convoy off the Algerian coast at dusk November 6. The F. C. DAVIS and H. C. JONES, present in the screen, logged transmissions in the 48-50 Me band coincident with visual observations of guided missiles being launched. On November 26, during a two-hour attack, reportedly one of the heaviest ever launched against an Allied convoy in the i(editerranean, about 20 control ignal were .heard, Both ship, having rebuilt their jammers to cover the 48-50 Mc range jammed many of the signals, and top ide personnel stated positively that several bomb we.nt out of control when jamming was applied. The H. C. JONES postponed jamming long enough to record one control signal, and from information obtained the laboratories were able to design suitable modulators for the high-powered jammers then being ru hed to completion at the Na al Research Laboratory.

Two of th e transmitters=-one kw. output-were flown to th Mediterranean and in tall d in the .two

CONFI. DENTIAL

f'I o ", n ,..,

:l: aJ ", ;;0

... .... ......

Z7

DE' prior to the Anzio landings in late January, 1944. At Anzio the Luftwaffe struck and truck hard. with glider bombs as well as high le el and di e bombing attack. The DE s, the only ship then fitted with effective jammers, were necessarily retained in the assault area through the long weeks over which the attacks continued. As Task Group 80.2 the ships underwent more than seventy-five air attacks in forty-eight day, earning official commendation in dispatches Irom

om.inCh and Commander Eighth Fleet. During this period more than one hundred guided missile signals were intercepted and jammed-not with complete success apparently, for several ship were hit by these bomb. No U. . warship was hit, however, and the percentage of hits was sharply reduced.

By the early spring of 194:4 six more high-powered jammers had been completed in the United States, and 1\YO had been constructed by ROM personnel of the Eighth Fleet. These jammers together with intercept r ceivers, were installed in four Eighth Fleet destroyer and minesweepers. All guided missile countermeasures personnel w ere organized into a single or-

M edi1jm /lowered jammer lor guided missiles, with RBK receiver and R.BW panoramic adopt or.

--=

28

CONFIDENTIAL

ganization OM nit Z comprising twelve officers and about Iorty technicians and operators. From this unit small teams of officers and men were placed on bo the jammer equipped ships. uch snips were designated by the Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, as , J" ships and from one to three "J" ships were ordered as additional jammer escorts for all important convoys through the Mediterranean.

JAMMING STOPS THE BOMBS

From the time the "J" hip escort system was placed in effect no ship was hit by radio controlled bombs in convoy guarded by '1' hip although many con 0 were attacked during the spring and early summer of last year. One 'J' ship was sunk by torpedoes in April and another damaged by mines during the invasion oi outhern France.

The design of suitable jammers and jamming techniques was greatly assisted by the capture of several unexploded HS293 and FX bomb, in various tage of repair. Investigation under battle conditions was continued, however. Becau e of the difficulties of

Guided missiles eM imtalla(ion with MAS transmitter, RBK receiver, and RBW panoramic ado ptor.

jamming and investigating simultaneously, a rrune-

weeper, U TAT (M 119) was equipped

th monitoring and analyzing equipment and accompanied convoy likely to be attacked and all invasion forces. Considerable additional information was obtained in the form of recordings and photographs which were analyzed by the Naval Research Laboratory. In addition, Countermeasures Unit Z maintained a laboratory and workshop in Oran, Algeria, from which installation, repair, and training were onducted.

In preparation for the great assault on ormandy more than forty hip were equipped with guided missile jamming equipment-some of the larger units with high-powered equipmen and other ships with smaller jammers capable of protecting the ship on which installed. The Germans used radio-controlled bombsboth HS293 and FX-against forces off the ormandy beaches, although not in the quantity expected. In the several attack which did take place-rna tly at night--one hip a U. S. destroyer, was reported hit by radio-controlled missiles,

For the invasion of outhern France it was realized that an enormous amount of Allied shipping would be operating Iiterall y under the noses of the air bases

_ glider bomb squadrons. Until these bases were captured or neutralized the danger of .attack would be considerable. For tha reason more than sixty United States and Briti h ships p'articipating in. the assault were jammer equipped. Extensive training exercises were conducted prior to D day, and pe ific instructions for monitoring jamming and alerting were incorporated in the operation plan.

Four attack were made against the Southern France beachhead during the first four days after the landings. Of approximately twenty bombs launched one hit a U .. L T.

The battered Luftwaffe did not use the radio-controlled bomb after August 19, 1944, probably for a combination of r ason that include its vulnerability to jamming. V-I and V-2 bombs incidentall ere not radio-controlled so there was no jamming problem or po ibility on that score.

SUCCESSFUL JAMMING ISN'T EASY

Make. no mistake about it, the FX and H 293 bombs-which incidentally used the same receiving and transmitting ontrol equipment-r-were extraordinary pieces of equipment, The radio control mechan-

5 were extremely well designed. Jamming was not easy. The receiving antenna on the bomb was 0

L$T, hit by radio-controlled bO'1TJ.b", is hopelessly wrecked.

loaded as to discriminate sharply against signals hom surface transmitters (enemy)' and in Iavor of signals from above its own level (position of the controlling plane). at only muSt the jammer be operated very nearly exactly on the carrier frequency of the control transmitter but also the jammer modulation must be set to within 2 ~ of one of the control modulating frequencies. The time of flight of the bomb was usually less than a minute; jammer operators were trained to intercept and jam within fifteen second after the signal appeared.

Although a careful watch was kept for a shift in operating frequencies, there is no evidence of frequencies having been ued outside of the 48-50 Mc band. A complete et of captured transmitter cry tal showed

weary operating frequencies spaced 100 kc apart from 48.1 to 50 Mc. In an ordinary VHF re eiver capabl of covering this band the signal received is a turdy 8-5 if the attacking plane is anywhere above the horizon (in fact, control signals have been heard over distances greater than 100 miles) . The control signal is modulated by two pairs of tones, 1000 and 1500 cycles for horizontal control, and 8 and 12 kc. for elevation control. The 8 and 12 kc, tones will not of COUTSe, be heard in th ordinary receiver. The 1000 and 1500

ycle tone alternate at a rate of about 10 time per second, onc OT the other dominatinz depending on whether the missile is being turned to the left or right.

The possibility that the J aps might u e radio-controlled bombs was provided Ior, although no operational use was reported. Three Pacific destroyer (";SCOTts were fitted with investigational and jamming gear as a precautionary measure.

Meanwhile research is still being conducted on countermeasures to protect the Fleet against any guided missiles which any future enemy might attempt to use.

CON FI DENTI Al

Nancy Hanks

This article, ba ed upon the lectures and demon tration presented by the aney chool, Oahu, gives as much practical knowledge and technical background ancy as can be explained without creating confusion. For those interested

a more theoretical and scientifi approach to the Nancy equipment, attention is invited to "Ship 13," The General Nan Manual.

.... ... 0>

When we speak of "Nancy, we are ~ot using the initials of a five-word name as an abbreviation but merely a code word which has been selected to designate aU types of equipment using infra-red light for night visual signaling, identification, recognition, and other similar uses, The equipment which makes this night vi ual signaling possible utilizes infra-red rays generally employed in night photography. Tills phenomenon has been known to science Ior many years but only in recent years has intensive research resulted in: it~ present application.

The first instruments designed by the avy employing the use of infra-red for signaling were u ed in the invasion of North Africa in 1942 and met with very limited success. ince that time, however, great strides have been made in its development, until oday it can be u ed successfully by the entire Fleet during

lear weather, affording 24 hours of vi ual signaling (with Nancy at night and ordinary signal lights in daytime).

One immediately apparent advantage of a secure means of night signaling is that a tremendous load is taken off the overworked TB , Becau e of the securif of the TB it was heretofore used for all types of traffic notwithstanding that it was originally designed for tactical purposes only. A consequence of such indiscriminate u e was often a regrettable confusion in the handling of tactical maneu ers,

The principle of the use of infra-red for signaling is not difficult, Infra-red the longest light wave, is situated below the red end of the visible pectrum and is

0:::

IJ.! 10 ::E w U w o

U

30

CON FI DENT! AL

therefore invisible to the human eye. Infra-red is radiated from every incandescent source of light. For example, it is radiated from the electric light bulb or hom the flame of a lighted match. To utilize infra-red rays for signaling, scientists have treated chemically or dyed a piece of glass, or superimposed achemicaIly treated piece of cellophane on glass. This cally treated glass, or filter, creens out all visible liaht but is transparent to infra-red, On e ecure radiation was obtained the next problem was to devise an instrument which would be able to pick up these invisible rays and convert them to a visible response. For this purpose, the Navy has constructed vera} typ of receivers which will be discussed in the latter part of this article.

WATCH SECURITY!

This new method of night signaling is free from detection only 0 long a our security is maintained. Up to till time we are reasonably certain that we have been able to keep information concerning our use of Nancy from the enemy. inee the uccess of an eperation largely depends upon the success of communications, it i e pecially important that as little as possible be said concerning N ancy signaling. Since cientists the world over are familiar with the existence of infrared light, infra-red" should never be mentioned in connection with ancy gear. When it is nece ary to discu the system or equipment, alway refer to it as "Nancy."

1 A small amount of Ted. light is visible, but for onJy a sITI distance, insufficient to impair the security of the system.

The Na bas designed various aney sources for urposes of communication and identification, and for e in amphibious operations. The sources used for communi ations and identification are:

I-The tandard 12-in. earchlight fitted with a type H hood.

2-X2A beacon.

3-X3A beacon, al 0 called a point of tum light.

The mo t powerful light being u ed for visual signaling is the ordinary 12-inch searchlight fitted with a Nancy type H hood. The component part<> of the type H hood include a ancy filter, a spread or control len , and a flange for mounting the hood. The filter screens off all,1j ible light, allowing only theinfra-red, Of invisible light, to pass through. The control lens spreads the infra-red beam 21 degrees vertically and 13 degrees horizontally in order that it may be picked up without difficulty. The 12-mch light without a spread lens is too highly directional. The greater vertical spread permits uninterrupted signaling despite the rolling of the ship. As is true with any open face light, the main beam is trained in on direction, bu t there is also a small amount of light lost on the sides. This side light is commonly referred to as "spills," or econdary light.

_'henever there i~ any ~oisture in the a~ these "spills" will reflect off this moisture and back mto the ancy receiver causing a flareback and interfering with reception. The type H hood, containing the filter and lens, was designed to eliminate the objectionable condition caused by these spills, as well as to utilize the secondary light by concentrating it into the main beam. Complete directions for eliminating light leaks in 12- inch search lights are contained in Bu hips ltr. 45-382, Navy Department Bulletinof 15 April 1945 .

For normal directional Nancy signaling, the searchlight equipped with a type H hood i used in conjunction with the point-of-tram light in accordance with standard procedure,

The 12-mch searchlight equipped with a type H hood has also been used successfully for floodlighting objects clo e aboard. For example, recently it was necessary to transfer personnel from one ship to another in complete darkness, and by means of Nancy illumination the task was greatly facilitated. From time to time it has become necessary to fuel ships at night. By u ing _ ancy illumination, lines can b handled with greater facility shortening the time of the

eration and at the same time maintaining security. .0 r possible uses to which the Nancy searchlight can be put for illumination are: Facilita ing anchoring at

night, identifying mall boats clo e aboard, or even picking up buoys should it become necessary to enter or leave port at night.

THE X2A SYSTEM (INSTALLED ON LARGE SHIPS ONLY)

The X2A N allcy broadcast beacon is the strongest Nancy ource in use for "all ships" signaling. Although originally de igned for recognition purposes, it was found that by eliminating the automatic keying system it could be used effectively for broadcast purposes within a task group.

The X2A equipment includes two beacons, a spare parts box a relay and control box, and a manual key for encoding signals. Each beacon utilizes ix ancy units 0 arranged as to cover 180 degrees of azimuth. Each Nancy unit contains a 300 watt sealbearn light, a Nancy filter, and a spread len . ach unit has an independent wiring system, so that failure of one unit will not interfere with the operation of the others. When properly mounted, the X2A system will give a coverage of 360 degrees of azimuth and a vertical coverage of 15 degrees (-7Y2 to + 7 ~). Best results will be obtained by installing the beacons as high as po ible. Due to the unusual weight of this y tem (over 250 pounds) it is being installed only on larger type ships.

The control box contains "on" and 'off') witches for each beacon a master switch for both beacons a deieer witch (redesignated 'point of tram' witch m later models) and pilot lights 'for each Nancy unit.

Each indicator light (12 in all, numbered from 1 to 6 on each side) is wired in series with its carr ponding Nancy unit in the beacon. If a ancy unit fails to light its corresponding pilot light will also fail to light. In most cases, a dark pilot light will indicate the failure of the corresponding Taney unit. However, it is po ible tha the pilot light ha burned out and therefore it should be tested first.

BROADCAST BEACON

The X2A beacon has been used primarily tor broadcast purpo CS; that is for sending messages to all ships simultaneously. It has a signaling range or approximately five miles, but can be picked up at a greater range for identification. The procedure used with the X2A is outlined in chapter 24: of Pac 70 (B) which also contains all ancy doctrine. In order to a oid making ancy watch standing tedious, signalmen should not be required to stand a continuous watch beyond the minimum length of time consistent with do trine, except when actually handling traffic.

CONFIDENTIAL

31

POINT OF TRAIN

The X2A system rna be u ed as a point of train, but onl in the following manner. To maintain a teady light, the manual key hould EVER be used.

In tead, the deicer switch should be placed in the "on' position. The beacons are not designed for constant burning at full power, but when the deicing switch is on, it utilizes only approximately half of the power, thus permitting its use as a steady light. It is obvious that th range of these beacons will be reduced considerably while being used in the deicer position. In the e ent of casualty to the X2A system, the hooded

archlight may be used for point of train. The receiving ship will keep the shutters of its light open so that the sending ship can find a definite place to train its light, Consequently, the receiving ship, in order to acknowledge receipt of each word, will have to deviate from the normal procedure of dashing," and will break the dash or steady light being used for a point of train, and transmit the Morse equivalent of '1" (Item) to ignify receipt of the word or group and then resume the steady dash. This procedure will be used until the complete message is received. 'Rogering" for the message will be made in the customary manner.

In the use of the X2A system, signaling is accomplished by the flashes from the sealbeam lamp, rather than by use of shutters. Consequently he signals must be keyed at a considerably lower rate of speed to avoid confu ion in reception. It is suggested that the speed of tran mission not exceed 8 words per minute.

A manual on the operation maintenance and installation of the X2A system, published by the electrical section of the Bureau of hips, is issued with each system and should be referred to as necessary in order to assure the proper operation and maintenance of the system.

X3A NANCY SYSTEM

The X12 system has been superseded and will be replaced by the X3A ystem. The primary difference between the e two system is that the X12 utilizes a single 3600 beacon rated at 500 watts while the X3A uses two 1800 beacons of 300 watts each. The principal objection to the X12 is the occlusion of a portion of its beam by mast rigging.

The X3A while different in de ign from the X2 ,

an be u ed for like purpo ,but at a redu ed range.

Its primary purpose is to serve a a point of train for inter-ship signaling. The suggested current procedure in onforman I". with Pac 70 (B) is as follows: hip

32

CONFIDENTIAL

I A" desires to send a message to ship 'B." Ship "A I calls ship "B" on an appropriate radio circuit transmits> 'Nancy Hank ," which means' ancy

age for you, prepar to recei e." Simultaneousl with this transmission ship , AU will turn on her X3A as a point of train. pan receipt 0"£ this transmission, ship 'B" will also turn on its point of train light, This will enable the ships to obtain Nancy contact easily and quickly. Once contact i made normal signaling procedure can be followed,

While the X3A beacon may be used for broadcast purpo es it must b remembered that it has quite a limited range, probably not more than 4000 yard for signaling. With this limited operating range, the X3A is obviously unsatisfactory for use by large ships, but should be very satisfactory for LCI or LSM groups, or other ships of like size. The procedure used should be the same as that described for the X2A System.

NANCY FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

There are three sour e of ancy light required a an aid to small boats in making night landings still permitting them to maintain the necessary security. The Medium-power Beacon, the Portable Beacon, and the Beachmarker. Each has it definite use in an operation, and the followingirrformation is presented demonstrate the application of each SOU-fee to su operations. Z

The Medium-pourer Beacon: It is used in the ordinary landing boat and consists of a Nancy filter (dome

haped) housing lamp, a manual signaling key, and a spare bQX kit. It operates from a 12 or 24 volt battery. The range is approximately one mile with the small type receiver and approximately three miles with the larger type receiver, covering an azimuth of 360 degrees, and visible from the air. The beacon is fitted to a collapsible mas about six feet long; and is mounted in the stern sheets of the landing boat in the manner of a mail boat running light.

Each wave commander will be provided with an automatic keyer for u e in conjunction with the ystem. The autornati key r i equipped to key any letter of the alphabet by changing fiber disks to make and break the circuit. set of the di k is included as part of the spare parts kit issued with the automatic keyer.

When the landing operation is about to commence, the wave commander, having been assigned a specific letter, will approach a prearranged area designated as

, OTE: The following paragraphs are not set forth as urrenr operating doctrin in u c by the amphibious U. . Pacific Fleet, but rather as a description of pos~ib.lc employment of Nanty equipment in amphibious operation s.

"rendezvous circle," and commence to circle this area, constantly keying this prearranged letter. Other small boats assigned to this wave will thus be able to readily identify th ir v ave, proceed to the area, fall in a tern of the wave commander, and follov him in the cir Ie until all m mbers of the wave have joined. At the completion of this phase, boat waves are form cd at the line of departure preparatory to making the actual landing. The line of departure is marked by a control craft, usually a PC, PCS, PCE or SC. 111 the initial landings, one of the above-mentioned control craft will lead the first few waves into the bea h in oiar as practicable. With the use of the next aney sources X8 and X beachmarker, the u ceding landing hould be able to find their way to the bea h as will be explained in the following paragraph .

The Portable Beacon: In about the third or fourth wave, the communication teams land with the two other an y QUICeS to be used in facilitating the landing of the succeeding waves. The first of these two sour es to be u ed i the portable bea on. This beacon usually v vill mark the center ol th beachhead and when

et up can replace the function of the control craft insofar as I ading the small boats into the beach is concerned, as the landing boats will be able to view the beam of the portable. beacon from the line of departure. The portable beacon has a key for signaling, when necessary, as well as the steady witch for use when marking the beach.

The Beachmarker: Once the beachh ad is ecured various portion of the beach will be designated as landing points for supplies, troops ammunition Iuel,

CON F I DENTIAL

etc. As an aid in marking these various beach sec tors, enabling the landing boats to advance quickly and easily, the fourth source of amphibious Nancy Light is used, namely, the beachmarker, This unit can also be used for designating the external ends of a beach by arranging the beachmarkers in ill vertical row, one above the other, in a cluster of three, Different beach sectors may be identified by various patterns of beachmarkers. Red Beach, for example, may be identified by arranging the lights in the shape of a triangle, Green Beach may be indicated by forming the lights in the shape of a diamond. Blue Beach may be recognized by a horizontal line of three markets. As to the spacing of these beachmarkers, experience has taught that they should be placed at least 25 feet apart,

The beachmarker utilizes a lens which spreads the beam horizontally and vertically, permitting facility of pick-up in the horizontal plane, and allowing the beam to show only at the necessary angle inthe vertical plane. It contains a Nancy filter, which is located just behind the lens. A signaling key is provided foremergency identification or communication, and the steady switch is used when marking a portion of the, beach. A level indicator is mounted on the hood to permit accurate positioning of the narrow (vertical) beam, The head holding the lamp and hood is adjustable through a vertical angle,

When all Nancy amphibious equipment Is set up on the beach, landing boats leaving the line of departure can easily locate their destination and proceed thereto

with a minimum of confusion. In case the markers on the beachhead are beyond the range of the small boats, the latter may be pu on their proper course the control boat,equipped with. a large receiver, until they come within the range of their own receiver.

NANCY RECEIVERS

The Navy originally designed t''10 types of receivers, the "A.H and "B" types. Type <l N' has been recalled and replaced by the AM receiver. Type "B" was found to be unsatisfactory) and has also been recalled. More powerful receivers, types "0-1" and "C-S,." are now being used with great success.

The AM is an optical device like. half of a set of binoculars, through which the N aIlCY signals from other ships may be read, The <'0-1 " and "0-3" receivers weigh about eight pounds, each and must be mounted on top of tfie 12" searchlight for practical operation .. Their use is simplicity itself, once the signaling source has been located, by me,am; of the broadcast point-oftrain light. However, care must be exercised -in chargingand .handling them.

Officers drawing Nancy equipment for their-ships should check to see that copies of instruction books for each piece of gear are drawn either with thegear, from Registered Publication Issuing Offices, and fro Electronics Officers in Navy Yards (only source ofth most recent instruction manuals). It is important that these publications relating to Nancy be held by all ships which have the gear.

REQUESTS FOR 'IC. I. C," should be addrm,d:

(iimes prior 10 Jugr 1944 arena /ol',gu (JDllilable)

....:

34

CON FlDENTI A L

NAVY-Tk Chi4 !if Naval OperIJ#ons, Editor of "c. t. C,", W,uM>1gl&1l 25, D, G,

AR MY-Adju/alll' Gentral's OffiCi, Opmljions Branc!!, Room 2B939, Pel,lagon Building; Washington 25, D. G.

recommended reoding

lor .oew CIC personnel

In the months ahead, all; almost complete change-over in CIC personnel will 'be taking place on most ships In the .Fleer, New commanding officerS and executives will also be taking overofficers who, in many cases, were busy with phases of the war that did not include the workings and problem. of GIC, For new cro personnel=-fcr officers and men who in the future will be closely allied with. CIG activity-"C, I. C." magazine sugg<;:st$ the~e articles from past issues M a helpful introduction to CJ C tactics and operations. This listing, of'course, is .not allinclusive and it .is recommended that all articles ill all issues be read eventually, The articles, in mcstcascs, are listed in the preferred order of reading to gCI an understanding o[ tile com-

.k,t .. e C. IC se,t.up b! . easy. st .. age,s., Most of these, a.re gc.ncral .,tldes-specrfic articles on specific _problems peetairung to only one type or CIC have been purposely omitted. A cross-index of all subieets which have appeared in "0, I. C," from January 1945 through Ju.n.e 1945 appears in the July 1945 issue, page 52. A similar lis.ting for March ~944 through December 1944 appears in the Jarn,I'al")' 1945 issue, page 60, The first JOUI issues of "C. 1. C," were deveted to "shore-based" operations exclusively and are not referred to in the following list .of recommended arlicle~,

THE ABC'S OF CIC

Nov. '45-pg,: Cle Y~sle,da"(lnd T odajl

"The -development of CIC from its beginning as Radar Plot, A three- dimen sional diagram of a typical cruiser CIC Shows the positions of all CIe personnel during GQ,"

July '4'4-pg, 18; Some Shipboard CIC> s

"Three pages of labeled photographs showing various types of CTC'r."

July '45-pg, 2.0, More GIG Plan View:!'

"A companion piece to the above article, Excellent perspcctived!'awing~ of the CIC in the IOWA, BLOCK ISLAND, QUINCY and the APD BARBER,. all labeled.'

May'45-pg. 24; The ChangiJlg Cle

"More photogtaphs and diagrams of CIC'.s ;with recent

• ~ .. I~

innovations, .

Jan, '45-P8. 43: Go/l"1> Poll of Radar 194:5

·"dluollologkal excerpts from Naval Research Laboratory reports,"

'oje5-pg, 9: Pho/.ograph 01 ShipbO(l.rd Arlt~II'la$

"A labeled photograph shewing most of the frequently seen antennas."

PERFORM INGCIC FU NCTlONS

Oct. '44-pg. 12; Whe,n Wauh Is Relieved in crc

«A suggested checkout list fcrnfflcers relieving the watch in CIC, Tile veteran may find it too exacting, but the n~1Y GIG ·o.fficer will find it extremely useful for learning what essential information he must have for any situation that may arise."

Jan. '45-])g. 34: Eliminate theW ail

"If you would keep in. the good graces of the Captain, you will want to read and re-read the 'wait eliminator' stressing the oft- quoted 'the most important faculty to becultivated by the efficer-of-the-deck is that of forehandedness'."

Oct, '45-pg,. 22: Slatus Boards

''What those blackboards mean on the bulkheads, The , ABC's of status board keeping:'

Oct. '45-pg,. 2;6: The Searet of Good Air Plof!ing

"A fulle:xplanation of air plotting. Serves- as a guide for teaching radarmcn strikers the art of good air plotting and also is valuable as a refresher (or seasoned hairds."

Feb, '45-pg, 2l: VHF-Key To Instantaneous Commtmica'tlons

"Explanation of the Very High Frequency system-the channels, equipment, propagation, ranges."

Mar_ '45-pg, 32: How To Use Thl! Summary Plot

"Closely allied- to 'Eliminate. the Wait' this article tells the uses of the summary plot and. how to keep it up-to-theminute."

Sept, '44-pg, 47: RllpOfl.itlg on SOll'na Pown and Intercom "Proper procedure in reporting !le3;ring, Target Angle, Position and Range,"

May '45-pg. 7; LO(JJ.outs Look i'l on GrC "Relationship between. CIC and visual Lookouts.'

OCt, '45,-pg, 1; CIG 10 NOII.iga/oT

"Valuable article on what to do for the navigator,"

Oct. '45-pg, 49: Conversion Plotting

"One page article on quick conversion without formulas."

Oct. '4S-pg. 34; CIC·RADCM Coordination P.ay~ Dividendi "A summary of Radar Countermeasures activity, For the complete story on various types of counterrneasures, check the cress-Indexes in the J anuary and Juty issues of CIG."

FOR READY REFERENCE April '45-pg, 55; Part 6 of USF-JO

. "This is CIe doctrine and should be studied .morecarefully than any article in the magazine."

June '45-pg, 45; The RAD P"blicatio1!s ill Reuieu:

"The RAD series has been promulgated for the purpose of making available the current best practices in the arts associated .with the elC doctrine, This is a careful description and review of these OIC 'Bibles'," ,

Jul'y '45-pg. 27: RAD Pu.blicationsto Come "Continuation oI the reviewon the &AD series,"

Mal', '45-pg. 59: Cle ai/mary

"The literal meaning of those strange combinarions of letters, such as 'CIO'."

CONF1 DENTIAL

Dec. '44------pg. 24; Removing th e MYIte.-y from "AN" Nomen. claiure

"Complete dope on designations for electronic equipment. Tells you what A IAPS-2 actually means. '

Dec, '44---pg. 48; Earth. Cu!'ual .. re Nomograph

"An earth curvature graph corrected for refraction of the radar waves."

Sept. '45-pg. 30: CIC Library and POL

"List of publications you should haw at your fingertips at all times to be a successful CIC man."

OCl. '44------'Pg. 30: Fads CJuL,15 Wi/hou! Mathematics "How to make fade charts."

FOR PERSONNEL INTERESTED IN FIGHTER DIREGTION July'44-pg. 11: This Is Fighter Direetia«

"Pictorial digest of the. training film of the same name."

Oct. '4+--pg. 18: Revised Fighter Director Vocab1~lar" "When to usc 'Roger' and 'Wileo'. This article should always be handy for reference. Subsequently revised in CCBP11-2."

S pt. '45-pg. 1 : New [nlercepl Techniques

"Pros and Oons on different intercept techniques. This article is of special interest to fighter directors."

Dec .. '44-pg. ]6: A Pilot s Advice to Fighter Directors

'The man en the other end of the channel tells what the FDO can do to make a pilot's lot easier."

Feb. ·45~pg. 1: GIG Opera.tions 011 a Night Carrier

"Night Fighter Direction on the USS INDEPENDE CE."

June '45-pg. 20: Night Centro! b" CIG

"A practical discussion of the problems of the night fighter director."

Feb. '45-pg. 4: Fighter Direetion in an Amphibiol!> Op. eration

"Dulle of the FDO in the Amphibs."

June '45-pg. 10: Tomcat, Problems 0/

"For information only. Station keeping, fighter direction and communication problems on a DD or DE,"

COMMUNICA.TIONS

Mar. '45-pg. 1: Break the RIT Bottleneck

"How to keep from Violating the rules of good R/T procedure, This might be titled 'How To Get Along with CIC Personnel in Other Ships'."

July '45-pg. 22: Irresponsibility on the Air "A companion piece to the ahove article."

Apr. ·45-pg. 11: GIG-Pirst Lieu/ella"l of the Air Lanes "More on this all important subj .cr of k ping the airways clew'."

FOR THE TECHNICALLY MINDED Mar. '45-pg. 37:Radar Recognition Systems-IFF

"A somewhat technical article but important to all CIa personnel. Explains the oIten.coniusing rFF system,"

June '45-pg. 36: Mjust Your PPl

• Practical uggestion on adjustments of PPI bias intensity, video and gain controls giving step-by-step procedure On each type of PPI."

36

CONF'IDENTIAl

Mar. '45-pg. 22: The Standou} T'argat Is Debu.nlf.lui

"Written by the Radiation Laboratory, M. I. T. An excellent article on targer interpretation tha requires

than a quick reading,"

Sept. '44--pg. 20: Meet the Modernized sa

"The standard surface search radar is explained"

S pt. '44------pg. 22: New Precision PP/ Repeater-Ihe VF

"No longer 'new' gear, but an article that should be read by those who are being iJ1 troduccd for the first time to the VF."

Aug. '45-pg. 22: VF lOT Channel Navigation

,. A report from the MOOSEHEAD shows the value of the VF in close navigation."

Oct. '44-pg. 34: .i\1ap in Motion-PPI Re/JeatllT, VG "Introduction to the VG."

Aug.'45---pg. 29: PTa's ano COli'S ollh~ VG

"A general but pointed discussion of the abilities and limitations of the VG projection PPL"

Jan. '45-pg. 26: S.uccesifu! VG Operation

"How to get more out of the VG."

Jan. '45-pg. 49: Standardization Starts with the SR

"This long-range aircraft search radar is the beginning of a plan for standardization of all radar gear."

Aug. '45-pg. 42: What.Are ih e SP's Limitations "Practical and mechanical limitations of th SP."

Nov. '45-pg.; R.PD and VPR-Di/fercnces i71 Use

"Description of the uses 01 the radar planning device in siting shore-based radars and predicting PPI pictures, and of th VPR. a an aid to the navigator in piloting by radar."

Oct. '44-pg. 1: Loran th« Electronic Navigator "An introduction to Loran."

Aug .. '45-pg. 34; Loran World Cooerag« Today

"Of interest to ships equipped with Loran, this is a map of the world showing Loran coverage.'

CtC AND GUNNERY

Ma.y 45-pg. 46; Remme 0/ Shipboard. Fire Co"ITQI Radar

" n exccll nt article by the Bureau of Ordnance giving a comprehensive picture of avy's array of fire control radar."

June '45-pg. 1: 'Target Lnformation from CIC

"Digest of report and statements discussing ways in which CIC can facilitate target designation."

July'45-pg. lO: CIG Organization. lor Nigh: .dA Defense "Practical suggestions off red by CIC personnel with long combat xperience-c--a supplement to the June· article on Ta:rget Information ....

o t, 44--pg. 36: The Mark 8 Is Deadly

"Rather t .chnical article of special interest to gulmCI)' liaison officers."

Feb. '45~pg. 37: X Will M.ark th« Spot tor the Fleet's Big Guns

"Tne story of the Mark B Mod 3."

Mal'. '45-pg. 26; CIG Helps G1JIm~ry Call the Shots "Gunner), problems in CIC."

Oct. '45-pg. 41: GIC and Shore Bombardment "Description of (be range tangent method."

CIC

•

THE VF AS A MECHANICAL EVALUATOR

SS NORTH CAROL! A (B~J5):

"The VG equipment proved itself of great value. as 3, summary plot. The VG operating 011 the lO·mil range scale, gave all xcellcnt picture of the formation including the picket destroyers. The names and voice calls of all ships wen: printed in grease penoil near their radar pips on the scope. Relative motion could he detected immediately by the trail lelt by the pip. This is one advantage over the VC summary plet, .previously used by till ship, There was no difficulty rn keeping track of aU ships when the formation wa chang d from cruising disposition to the bombardment disposition and vice versa. It is considered that

_is equipment .is excellent for use in 1IIIIIII'ght action,

"This ship had 3 VF units installed; (lOC on the bridge, one in flag plot, and one in CIC. During it night's bornbardmcnt, the VF unit on tht: bridge was u ed elusively for giving the Cornmanding OfficeI' in Conn I"apge and bearings to thl' guide and to the other snips in the formation. This pro· cedure allowed CIa to u e i SG and VE for surface search and radar navigarion, and kept the communication channels to and hom CIC clear for enemy air and nemy surface informa-

lion. his ship heartily endorses the VF equipment. However, at present it is djf!i.cul t to get range and bearing in quick succession on two or more targets or navigational points widely separated in either range and bearing. The present solution is to usc VF on one point and the SG on the remaining points or targets, VF is valuable in pip analysis, many times correctly proving 'surface targets' on the SG to be land cohoes."

•

SM-SP SEARCH PLAN

CrG 58.2: "Close liaison between CIC and the Gunnery D partm nt wa maintained. The operation and performance of fire control radar was COIlsidered excellent. The vi remote PPI is excellent for Gunnery liaison. When it is used with a 12" VC on the. 20-mile scale, it provides the gunner)' department with quick, accurate information on close-in targets.

"In general, during an attack SM~SP radars are used for composition, altitude determination and track. ing close-in raids. However, during the balance of the time it is f It that special guards should be established to insure full coverage and no duplication. With this in mind, each SM and SP radar was assigned a specific 360 degree elevation angle search, Su fficient overlap was provided so that fun coverage was assured, and each radar

EXCERPTS FROM RECENT

REPORTS

was ordered to make its designated sweep at least two out of very five minutes, The results were considered satisfactory and this practice will be continued.

"It is believed that greater use should be made of battleships in in. tercept work, The performance of the SK radars on board BB's seems to be much. supe rior to rbe cOl'responding sets aboard carriers of the Ess\!!,< type. It is the intent oJ: this group to experiment further by having BB's make night interceptions with VF ( ), In the fu rue a night controller officer can be placed aboard a BB far this pUJ'pose, if practicable. The altitude information will be supplied by SMSP equipped ships"

•

SUGGESTED BOGEY D~ILL

GTG 38.4: "The 'Bogey Drill' de. scribed here has been received in an enthusiastic manner. From the CIC and AA Coordination viewpoint this drill is particularly valuable. Over an hour's period many of these single attacks can be made and all develop quickly so that valuable practice is obtained in coordinating the Groups' radar in 'holding' and 'calling' a raid until gunnery can take over. The necessi ty of handling the many attacks that developaimultaneously, the presence of great quantities of window, and the shadowing of the dispersed AP by the exercise planes required great effort on the part or C1C and gunnery in rracki ng.

"The 'Bogey Drill' is an exercise for training lookouts, gun and control crews, and CIC persouuel=-with partieular emphasis on AA Coordination. It is designed to simulate as closely as possible the final phases of enemy suicide tactics, where single planes take adva ntage of very low alrito de approaches, cloud cover, and mingle with returning friendlies' in order to escape radar detection. The attacking unit consists of (our or more planes of a. distinctive type, usually S)32C's, operating singly. When launcbed, planes will retire on various bearings

CONFIDENTIAL

:-

37

to a distance of 30 to 40 mil s, At the time sch duled for the xercisc, the first plane will commence an approach for an attack on the formation. Other planes commence approach at 5 minu te intervals lor initial attacks.

"Each plane will make a _glide or dive run on One of the ships of the formation, then retire to a distance of from '20 to 25 miles and start another approach. Planes will continue attacks until the end of the exercise. When so ordered, the attacking planes will use window and will tum off IFF during attacks. Wheels will be lowered until dear of so en and IFF will be turned on during retirement between runs.

"The Combat Air Patrol will be disposed around the formation in order 10 complicate the radar problem. Ole crews will participate in the exercise, making t1i.c usual reports on the IFD circuit, but interceptions wi.!1 not be made. The success of this drill depends on the briefing of the drill pilots by the CIC Officer in the effective use that can be made of window, and in the proper shadowing of friendly planes o th re is no radar discrimination."

•

A CVE'S AIR PLOTTING SYSTEM

1JSS NA.TOMA BAY (GVE-62):

"This OIC has continued to use a different system of plotting than is ordinarily in use. A plexiglass cover has been placed on the PPI repeater (12" scope). There is a compass rose etch don th cover and an ann swinging from the center which is calibrated in miles lor a 75-miJe range. All contacts axe plotted Oil -this scope by the watch officers. This gives a constant, up-to-the-second plot that can be gained in no other way.. O{liy bogey and intercept plots are placed on the main display board. It is .felt that

'" ....

en

....:

38

CONFIDENTIAL

plotting all contacts on the display board results in poor operation and .inaccurate plots. This is esp cially true in GVB operation in which the air traffic frequently resembles Main Street on Saturday night. When a contact is made on a congested screen showing no previous track, It is called to the attention of the operator and an IFF check is made immediately. Using this system, bogies are picked up as soon as they appear on the screen . .jt

•

COMMUNICATIONS

•

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Comlreslri» 64: ;'The present and vastly complex communications system has been beautifully worked out.

, The material .insralled in our ships is of the best. The communication personnel in the Fleet are able and experienced. There can be no Legitimate complaint of any basic flaws in the system or the manner in which jt was used. This ... is in sharp and pleasantcontrast to that which existed ten years ago. The Communkation Service ba come a long way In that length. of time.

"However, somechanges and innovations which warrant consideration are indicated below:

"i-Further extension of the chain-ofcommand channel system.

"2-The establishment of definite and well set-up geographical communication channels on the VHF circuits by means -of relay stations.

"1-Greater use of plain language CW on thc various common and broadcast circuits. Security would admi ttedl y be sacrificed toa certain extent, but anything said on any voice circuit will normally be avail-

able to th enemy in the area if he chooses to use .it. In actual fact the long range benefit to hi of any such interceptions is 'pr ticaUy negligible.

"4--lntelligent supervision at each individual station can be much improved, particularly duri ng emergency periods.

"5-By aU means available, stress the value of in\) lligent talking. There is needles spelling, repeating and use of the phonetic alphabet."

•

FIGHTER DIRECTORS TAKE A BOW LSM 82: "The efficiency of voice radio communications varies direct1y with the degree of training and dis. cipline, In spite of a high proportion or inexperienced operators in smaller amphibious vessels, a surprisingly large amount of traffic is cleared by those who have taken their Stateside schooling seriously. The degree of efficiency which can be reached by constant practice is exemplified in the InterFighter-Director er, which appeal'S to be manned by the Navy's topnotch communicators. After listening in on this circuit, the radio operators On this ship have improved their own performance immeasurably,"

•

LITTLE HINTS THAT HELP Comlreslsiu 110; "Il is believed that voice communications, especially TBS, could be impro ed jf ships brief their recorders as to probable nature of type of messages concerned and probable operations. Even brief instructions should prevent needless request for repetition, such as requiring' , ancy Hanks' being repeated and spelled as occurred one night."

•

TRANSFER PANEL EASES VOICE CIRCUIT TRAFFIC

USS PRESTON (lJD795): "IC communications were at all times good although the multiplicilY of circuits guarded at times created some confusion. The Receiver Transfer Panel assisted materially in rectif)·in.g thl difficulty. Due to the man)' voice radio circuits monitored in CIC a twen ty-rhree ou tIet receiver transfer panel has been .installcd. This panel is located just fonvani of the evaluator's jack-box support and is convenie-v to the tatus board keeper and r: of th assistant plotters. All \

radio circuits aboard ship have been wired into the tran fer panel. At time following circui IS are in: TBS, MN MAN, ARC 5, ARC 4, SCR 609A, RBH, TCS, and RCK. Provisions are made to 'patch' any of 10Llowing voic circuits from Radio Central: REA, RBB, RBC, RAK, and RAL. .

''Th ere are six lis tenin g stations with two outlets each located in various parts of Cld. These stations are wired into the. transfer panel so that any of the outlets can be used for any of the voice radio circuits. Each listening station has independent volume control. Position number five of the amplifier can also be used as a sepa,ate station if speaker is desired, There are two amplifiers in CIC and one in tn pilot house. - By paralleling jacks, two listening stations may monitOT One piece of equipment at he same time.

"Results of this .installation have been excellent. Th confusion which had resulted in the pa t from monito r - ing s veral circuits at onetim in CIC has been eliminated, and the information from our voice circuits gets to the evaluator without delay."

•

TALKER TRAINING

USB PA.UL RAM~1..TON (DD590):

"CIC int raal communications were excellent. However, th ne d for COntinuous training of telephone talkers js still apparent. External communicanons presented a more difficult problem. The D troyer CIC has no provisions for radio/telephone recorders .. During shore bombardment exercises Cle guarded TBS, MN, Naval Gunfire Control Net, Assig'ned Spotting Frequency, and either an 'inter CIC' circuit or local air warning net. Withno provisions far seating recording personnel and no provisions for space (the DRT and air plot must be kept clear), recording becomes inefficient. All circuits ext pt the spotting irequency.must be guarded by earphones, and the CIC Wtltcli Officer Il)USl depend on accurate recording for information. Provisions should be made for the recorders to have a small 'position 1 an d seat.

"The idea of using the Baker series TBS crystals for FS ships was indeed a good one. On the few occasions it was neces ary to shift to A-3 one wondered whether it would possible to transmit tactical It was noted that much of

the traffic was administrative, On one occasion this COIDn13nd went to treme -pains and through a long wait to ensure transmission of one bit of administrative traffic on Fleet Common only to hear it relayed to another command Ier information 011 TBS."

• GUNNERY

•

GET THE POINT

USS SOUTH DAKOTA (BB57):

"The target area was low ground with high, prominent land masses Iurther inland. 'Because of this topography the charts showed Iew likely radar tracking points, andit was anticipated that difliculty would be encountered in getting good radar targets for tracking in the target area itself. This assumption at first appeared to be correct, for a the range continued to close to 26,000 yards the only contacts made by the SG radar wer high points of land to the north and inland of the target area. However, at 2248, when the range had closed to 26,000 yards, the first contact which could be identified as part of the ShOfC Iine appeared on the SG. Almost i1l1lIll!diately after the appearance of this first contact the whole outline of the shore bounding the target area appeared on the SG PPI and on the Mark 8 radars.

"Prior to this time tracking had be n maintained by means of a plexiglass overlay with 100 bearing lines and oncentric range circles. During the 'next few minutes, as the radar picture of the shore line became more eli tinct, CIa studied the shore outline as it appeared on both the 'A' scope and PPI of the sa for the purpose of determining the best available tracking poin]. This information was relayed to the Main Battery directors and at 2255 (I) the directors picked up and identifi d point 'N.' This point was then tracked by both main battery directors, and the ship's position was obtained thereafter by Main Battery Plot, the Navigator, and Flag Plot using information from these directors,

"In CIa a continuous track was maintained by plots On point 'N' taken from the VF, the SG antenna being maintained in constant rotation. As a check against the track being maintained on point' • this procedur Was followed in CIC: A griddcd chart of the area, showing all pre-designated tracking points, inscribed on a clear sheet of photo film and prepar d in

advance o( th bombardment, was placed over the VD-2 PPI and constanrly positioned to match or conform to the Indications on the RPPI. his made possible the location and idenrification of pre-designated tracking points other than. point' .' Occasional plots from the VF were takcn by CIC en such other tracking points as showed the track on point 'N' to be accurate. In this manner CIC was in a position at any time to coach the main battery directors on to other tracking points should point 'N' have failed for any reason as a reliable point. This never became necessary, however, as point 'gave strong and accurate echoes on all radars during the balance of the approach, throughout the actual bombardment and during the early stages of red remenr."

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MAKING THE DRT A "SWITCH HITTER"

USS RINGGOLD (DD500): ''For the bombardment of Shimizu Town, HO.lIshu, the Special Provisional Bombardment Chart Able, Interpron. Two e. 439.1 was first placed on the DRT. Over this chart was the chart of Suruga Wan, H. O. Misc. #11,300-90 (Jap. No.3). Both charts were originally aligned with the DRT bug, The scale of the DRT was the scale of the HO chart. The bug was originally positioned by radar .flx s on the prominen t landmarks at th entrance of the bay. In this connection it may be added that the conditions for radar navigation within th bay w re excellent. The sh er cliffs and prominent points were easS\y picked lip by the VF. Owing to the small scale of the HO chart used for navigation it was necessary to shirt the scale of the DR T when ver a surIace contact was made. The slti:ft caused only a short delay since the tracking was don on the chart, Upon. completion of the surface tracking, the bug was set by the Latitude and Longitude reading of th dials and checked with another radar fix. In this manner an accurate, up-ro-th ~ minute navigational track was kept with little delay in shifting to a sueface tra.cking problem.

"The submarine type DRT installed on the Bridge was also set up, and aided considerably in keeping the Captain and Division Oommander iu· formed On the navigational position of the ship without interfering with the already overburdened CIa. Tw'O minutes before the turn to the bombardment COUI' e the navigational

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chart wa removed and in a matter of seconds the DRT scale and bug were reset. By placing the. I:W9 charts used during the operation on the DRT at the same time and shifting the scale settings, the on' DRT wa used to perform three Iunctions, navigation, share bombardment, and surface tracking."

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IF YOU'RE EVER PASSING SHIONO MISAKI

U$S PASADENA (GU5)' "All firing was controlled from plotting rooms, using indirect fire and generated solutions based 011 navigational track established by the Mark 8 and

G-2 radars. The rugged topography of the coastline with several offshore rocky i k"ts, provided a nurnber of excellent target£ fOI' the Mark 8 radars, the principal ones being Okikuro Shima, Esusaki Shima, and Shiono Misaki. A master plot was maintained in CIC, and range and bearings DC reference points and targets were transmitted to main and sk)' prot, both, of which maintained navigational plots to assist in orientation and to ch ek generated tars' t solutions. The avigator maintained a separate plot in the Obarr House and exchanged navigational data with Ole. The accuracy or the Mark 8 on small roch' Islands and steep-tocliffs left very little to be desired."

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40 CONFIDENTIAL

OR KAMAISHI

CTU 34.8.]2: "CIO operations for the bombardment of Kamaishi, Honhu, consisted initially of fixing ship's

position navigationally by search radar with subsequent shift to Mark 8 fire control radar bearings and ranges to the established. reference point for accurate gunnery .navigarienal fix,

"Because of the well defined coastal area and sharp promontories, no trouble was experienced in orienting the PPI presentation to the coastal chart at 25-miIe approach range. Sangaa Shima Island high point was designated lor referenc point, with observed ranges from Mark 8 radar taken to the wat r's age. Observed readings from Mark 8 radar were commenced at approximately lfi-mile approach distance. From coastal data a southerly set and drift of· one kno~ was expected and set up initially, Half way through the first gunn ry leg, set and drift was computed by CIa to have a direction 170· T, 2Y~ to J knots, without variartce throughout the problem. This information was furrushed main battery plot in addition ·to continuous target bearings and ranges for their comparison.

, All Mark a bearing-range data was reported to ore and main battery plot via the 31-32 JS phones, with target bearing-range data Iurnished by eIC

to main battery plot via the J circuit. This enabled a clear line on the 10 circui t for control of battery, batter)" plot controlled VHF channel with a receiver set up in CI .'

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THREE-WAY COOROINATION

P~OVEO NECESSARY

ComB4lDiu 6: "Under the difficult conditions of Phases r and II during bombardment of Hitachi, five battleships. each took three targers under fire. Three of the ships failed to hit any of their target. The two remaining ships hit only One apiece of the three targets they fired at. One ship made a very pronounced rror in that the principal points en whish the Mark 8 radars were taking the fix were misinterpreted. The CIa, Plotting Room and avigator must each fix the ship's position and close liaison rnusr be maintained between. them. The Navigator, in this bad weather, had no independent data of sufficient accuraey to check the Mark 8 on the proper point as distinguished from a imilar object nearby. At this range and on this difficult coast elC apparently didn't either. As a result, when Mark B trained on the wrong neither the Navigator nor CIC object d. Tb s two must use all data from whatever source, each must arrive at the best position possible, and both. must check Plot, Liaison by Plot wi th other ships should also be carried out. This bombardment ha been a valuable lesson in this respect.

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NAVIGATION

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SURF TROUBLE

USS HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS (DD~63): "Considerable r a dar navigation was necessitated during OUI" numerous fir support mission. Th e olily difficulty enco,,"fet{Jd i" obtaining aeeurat e navigational fixes was occa.,riQne4 by tAl' [alse echoes obtained from Slut breaking a/ th« edge 0; a reef off shore from a prominent radar navigo:lio'iol point. A striking tf".'fam· pie is radar nauigatiosi using KEZ SAKI O~ (l primar), fi<t point. Ln this particular case it Uitll found I hal II usual methods of radarrarlging (1 eraj points, the radar fi:( was ai

500 10 1,000 yards closer to KEZU SAKI lhan was a pU:Tfect uisua! (u and

.. I. he MrM was greale.t at low tide morc reef edge and consequently surf was visible 10 the sa radar,

[Italics b)' "C. 1. C."] :By judicious ranging and indoctrination of all per~ sonne! ass.ignc9 to the SG radar in discriminating between true land echoes and the false surf return, it was found that-consistent radar fixes within 100 yard of a visual fix could readily be obtained."

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VPR NAVIGATION

ass INDIANA (B8-58) f "During bombardment.of Hamamatsu, Honshu, Japan, fire con trol radars were not effective due to the contours of the shore Iinc and the lack of suitable tracking points. The ship's track was established by means of the VPR in CIC, which gave excellent .results. Had the ship .not h~d the Vl'R, the track could ptobably have been established by means of SG radar ranges and bearings on inland peaks, but the accuracy of such a track- would have been ·questionable. Mark 8 radar

_ ranges and bearings were obtained at ...-- &';ular intervals, and these checked _in 2 OT 3 degrees and 300 yards of the WR fixes, but they were not ob-

tained with sufficient frequency to establish the ship's track.

"The employment. of search radar was as follows:

(a) SK-Short and medium range air search.

(b) S.P-Altitude determination and low altitude air search.

(c) SG--.Forward, continuous sweep sboLCt range surface search and station keeping.

(d) SG-Aftcr, continuous sweep long range surface search and VPR navigation.

"VPR navigation \va~ employed, utilizing the alter SG radar and the VC in OIC. The resulting VPR track, though not as satisfactory as in two pc vious bombardments, wasnevertbeless adequate in supplying main battery plot with Ij. dependable bombardDient track. The Bat coast line was CSpecially difficult tD orient on both the 20-mile and 4-mile ve seale. In the constTllction of the. WR charts, the

lack of elevated contour in the vicinthe beach made it necessary to eavil.y on structure of the river mouth for orlentation.

During the bombardment thi topographical feature proved the most reliable landmark for tracking. Two large sandbars at the river mouth, not anticipated in the chart construction also stood out clearly lor trackin~ purpose."

RADAR PERFORMANCE

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CLEAN GEAR IMPROVES PERFORMANCE

USS PtlUL H.AMILTON (DD- 590) .- "Radar performance throughout the operation is considered exceptionally good. Ranges were average, but the continued uninterrupted performance of all radar equipment was exceptional considering the length of the operation. At no time did any of the equipment fail despite the fact that time for maintenance was very limited. It is felt that one of the contributing factors to such fine performance is the practice of thoroughly cleaning the gear at every opportunity. In most instruction books and maintenance instructions emphasis on this most important item is lacking. '

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FIRE C::ONTROL RAOAR SUPPLEMENTS

SEARCH .

USS BARTON (D~722): "The proximity of land lessened the effectiveness of the radars, but contacts were tracked in to land, lost over it and regained on the near side. Although theoretically possible, little success was had in tracking aircraft through land on any r-adar. The SO again proved a valuable instrument for detecting low-flying planes, and the Mk 12, swinging at 4:1i° elevation, was !!fI'ective as air search when aircraft were suspected overhead. The.fire control radar has proved valuable both in determining accurate altitude and in augmenting the SC when planes ate close overhead."

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VPR WITH THE SU

USS SCRlBNER (APD-l2"2): "The advent of the use of VPR for navigation has indicated the desirability oL (a) PPI scales of 6, 12, 30, and 80 miles' (the SU is now provided with scales of 4, 20, and 80 miles). The 6 and 12 mile scales arc ideal for use with the VPR, and a 30-miIe scale is more satisfactory for normal search at sea than the 20 or 80-mile scale. Maximum initial contact range for SU type gear with its limited (45 foot) antenna height runs slightly in excess of 20 miles.

"(b) Provision of vernier adj ustroc.nt of PPI scale from the front panel. Thi.s adjustment must be checked periodicall l' as the setting changes slightly with temperature and voltage fluctuations introducing errors as high as 500 yards at 6000 yards.

"( c) Provision of more linear timebase sweeps fOl the PPI scope. With tin: SU radar, the ranges are compressed by 20% or more on the PPI scope at range inside of one quarter full scale value, giving rise to attendant great errors in VPR navigation at close range."

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41 CONF~DENTIAl