SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION

Very truly yours,

[A.C. No. 6854 [Formerly CBD Case No. 04-1380] : April 15, 2009]
JUAN D. DULALIA, JR. V. ATTY. PABLO C. CRUZ

(Sgd.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG

Clerk of Court
Endnotes:

Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 15 April 2009:
G.R. No. 80718

January 29, 1988

A.C. No. 6854 [Formerly CBD Case No. 04-1380] - Juan D. Dulalia, Jr. v. Atty. Pablo C. Cruz
By Resolution of November 10, 2008,[1] this Court, upon the recommendation of the Office of the Bar
Confidant, and after considering the Certifications of Atty. Pedro S. Principe of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Bulacan Chapter and of Judge Thelma R. Pinero-Cruz, 3rd Vice Executive Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Bulacan, to the effect that respondent stopped from the practice of law since June 16, 2007,
lifted the one-year suspension from the practice of law of Atty. Pablo C. Cruz (respondent) and allowed
him to resume his practice of law.
Complainant, Juan D. Dulalia, Jr., by Manifestation and Motion[2] filed on November 21, 2008 submits
that respondent's suspension should be reckoned from October 18,. 2007, the day he (respondent)
received a copy of the Court's August 1, 2007 Resolution which denied with finality his motion for
reconsideration of the Court's April 27, 2007 Decision suspending him for one year. He thus prays that
respondent be sanctioned or that his suspension be extended as respondent continued to practice law
even before his suspension was lifted.
In support of his contention that respondent has been practicing before October 18, 2007, complainant
attached (1) a copy of Transcript of Stenographic Notes taken on June 25, 2008[3] showing
respondent's appearance as private prosecutor in Criminal Case "No. 97-21576 to 97-21585; (2) a copy
of a Motion for Reconsideration[4] dated August 22, 2008 by respondent before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 12, Malolos City, stating that he had resumed the practice of law after he had completely
served the one-year suspension reckoned from June 16, 2007; and (3) a copy of Order dated
September 16, 2008[5] of the said court denying a motion of respondent.
The rollo shows that respondent filed a Manifestation of October 1, 2007[6] informing the Court that he,
upon receipt of the Decision on June 16, 2007, stopped engaging in the practice of law, albeit he earlier
filed on June 14, 2007 a motion for reconsideration which this Court noted by Resolution of February 6,
2008.[7]
A copy of respondent's above-said Manifestation of October L, 2007 was furnished complainant's
counsel, Atty. Melanie U. Arellano, per Registry Receipt No. 2021 dated October 3, 2007. A copy of this
Court's above-said Resolution of February 6, 2008 was received by Attv. Arellano on March 10, 2008
per Registry Return Receipt No. 22299. Nothing, however, was heard from complainant until the Court
received his November 20, 2008 Manifestation and Motion - subject of the present Resolution.
Complainant's motion to reckon respondent's suspension from October 18, 2007 must perforce be
denied.
WHEREFORE, complainant's motion is DENIED. This case is now CLOSED and TERMINATED.
WITNESS the Honorable Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Chairperson, Honorable Antonio T. Carpio,
Conchita Carpio Morales, Dante O. Tinga and Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Members, Special Second
Division, this 15th day of April, 2009.

FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR., HEIRS OF
MARISSA BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS BERNAL, SR.,
respondents.
RESOLUTION

CORTES, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void two (2) resolutions of the Special
First Division of the Court of Appeals in the case of Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Felisa Perdosa De Roy, et
al., CA-G.R. CV No. 07286. The first resolution promulgated on 30 September 1987 denied petitioners'
motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration and directed entry of judgment since the
decision in said case had become final; and the second Resolution dated 27 October 1987 denied
petitioners' motion for reconsideration for having been filed out of time.
At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for not being verified as required by
Rule 65 section 1 of the Rules of Court. However, even if the instant petition did not suffer from this
defect, this Court, on procedural and substantive grounds, would still resolve to deny it.
The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners
collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in
injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had
been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the
former failed to do so. On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Regional Trial Court. First Judicial
Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided by the Hon. Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment finding petitioners
guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal, the decision of
the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on August 17,
1987, a copy of which was received by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the last
day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a
motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the appellate court in the Resolution of
September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this
was denied in the Resolution of October 27, 1987.
This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied
petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, directed entry of judgment
and denied their motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas
Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461, that the fifteen-day period

for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. In its Resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration, promulgated on July 30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208), this Court en banc restated
and clarified the rule, to wit:
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no
motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or
Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion
may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its
sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested. (at p. 212)
Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 73146-53,
August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643], reiterated the rule and went further to restate and clarify the modes
and periods of appeal.
Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept. 15, 1986,144 SCRA 161],stressed the
prospective application of said rule, and explained the operation of the grace period, to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to DENY the instant petition for lack of
merit.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 116049 July 13, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. EUSTAQUIO Z. GACOTT, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 47, Puerto Princesa City,
ARNE STROM and GRACE REYES, respondents.

In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the promulgation on May 30, 1986 of the Court's
Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30, 1986, within which the rule barring
extensions of time to file motions for new trial or reconsideration is, as yet, not strictly enforceable.

RESOLUTION

Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on February 27, 1986, it is still within the grace
period, which expired on June 30, 1986, and may still be allowed.

REGALADO, J.:

This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No. 73669, October
28, 1986, 145 SCRA 306].]

Rebuffed by this Court through the annulment of his order dismissing Criminal Case No. 11529 of the
court a quo, complemented with a reprimand and a fine of P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law,
respondent Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. has filed a motion for reconsideration dated April 1, 1995,
and a supplemental motion for reconsideration dated April 26, 1995.

In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for extension of time was filed on September 9, 1987,
more than a year after the expiration of the grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no longer within
the coverage of the grace period. Considering the length of time from the expiration of the grace period
to the promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals on August 25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek
refuge in the ignorance of their counsel regarding said rule for their failure to file a motion for
reconsideration within the reglementary period.
Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to the
case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of the time
the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated. Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no
law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be
binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in
active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have
been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions
(G. R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in affirming
the trial court's decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides
that "the proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damage resulting from its total or
partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.
Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private respondents had the "last clear
chance" to avoid the accident if only they heeded the. warning to vacate the tailoring shop and ,
therefore, petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine of "last clear chance,"
which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.

For reasons of his own but the purposes of which can easily be deduced, separate copies of the basic
motion were furnished the Chief Justice, Judicial and Bar Council, Solicitor General, Bar Confidant,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Court Administrator and his deputies, Secretary of Justice, and
Ombudsman. Copies of the supplemental motion were also furnished by him to the same officials or
entities and, additionally, to the individual members of this Court.
In the judgment now sought to be reconsidered, the Second Division of the Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Abdulwahid A. Bidin, specified that the only issue to be resolved in this case was whether or not
respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in granting the motion to quash the aforementioned
criminal case. We quote the pertinent portions of his ponencia not only for easy reference but to serve
as a basis for determining whether the sanctions imposed were commensurate to the administrative
offense, to wit:
The error committed by respondent judge in dismissing the case is quite obvious in the light of P.D. No.
1, LOI No. 2 and P.D. No. 1275 aforementioned. The intent to abolish the Anti-Dummy Board could not
have been expressed more clearly than in the aforequoted LOI. Even assuming that the City Fiscal of
Puerto Princesa failed to cite P.D. No. 1 in his opposition to the Motion to Quash, a mere perusal of the
text of LOI No. 2 would have immediately apprised the respondent judge of the fact that LOI No. 2 was
issued in implementation of P.D. No. 1. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Obviously, respondent judge did not even bother to read the text of the cited LOI; otherwise, he would
have readily acknowledged the validity of the argument advanced by the prosecution. As correctly

observed by the Solicitor General, Presidential Decrees, such as P.D. No. 1, issued by the former
President Marcos under his martial law powers have the same force and effect as the laws enacted by
Congress. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of Aquino vs. Comelec (62 SCRA 275 [1975]), all
proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions and acts promulgated, issued or done by the former
President are part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and effective, unless
modified, revoked or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other
acts of the President. LOI No. 2 is one such legal order issued by former President Marcos in the
exercise of his martial law powers to implement P.D. No. 1. Inasmuch as neither P.D. No. 1 nor LOI No.
2 has been expressly or impliedly revoked or repealed, both continue to have the force and effect of law
(Rollo, pp. 7-8).
xxx xxx xxx
But even more glaring than respondent judge's utter inexcusable neglect to check the citations of the
prosecution is the mistaken belief that the duty to inform the court on the applicable law to a particular
case devolves solely upon the prosecution or whoever may be the advocate before the court.
Respondent judge should be reminded that courts are duty bound to take judicial notice of all the laws
of the land (Sec. 1, Rule 129, Rules of Court). Being the trier of facts, judges are presumed to be wellinformed of the existing laws, recent enactments and jurisprudence, in keeping with their sworn duty as
members of the bar (and bench) to keep abreast of legal developments. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The court is fully aware that not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his duties is
subject to censure. But where, as in the present case, the error could have been entirely avoided were
it not for the public respondent's irresponsibility in the performance of his duties, it is but proper that
respondent judge be reprimanded and his order of dismissal set aside for grave ignorance of the law.
For, respondent judge's error is not a simple error in judgment but one amounting to gross ignorance of
the law which could easily undermine the public's perception of the court's competence.
We could stop here, since the rehashed arguments raised by respondent judge in his aforesaid original
and supplemental motions are completely refuted by the foregoing discussion demonstrative not only of
his adjudicatory error but also of judicial incompetence. In fact, just to cite a few representative cases, it
may be worthwhile for respondent judge to ponder upon the Court's observations in Aducayan vs.
Flores, etc., et al., 1 Ajeno vs. Inserto, 2 Libarios vs. Dabalos, 3 and Estoya, et al. vs. Singson, etc., 4
which would put his asseverations at rest.
Respondent judge, however, would want this Court to pass upon his other supplications, arguments,
and even his insinuations for that matter, which although born more of fecundity in formulation and less
of bases in law, we have decided to anatomize even with some expense of prolixity.
Respondent judge prefaces his remedial approach with the assurance that "(t)he only purpose of (h)is
motion is to plead with bended knees and with all humility for the kind reconsideration" of the decision
in this case, specifically the findings that he is "grossly ignorant of the law and as such, (he) was
reprimanded and fined in the amount of P10,000.00; and that the aforesaid decision is to be spread on
(his) personal records." 5
He adverts to his good conduct as a person and as a judge, reiterates that the error primarily stemmed
from the shortcomings of the public prosecutor and, on a personal note, he expresses this concern: ". . .
I am again begging with humility that the spreading of the aforesaid Decision on my personal records
be reconsidered because doing so will foreclose any chance for me to aspire for promotion in the
judiciary in the future. This is very painful. I will agonize up to my last day and my last breath in life." 6

The Court assures respondent judge that it has taken all the aforesaid matters into consideration and is
not insensitive thereto, including his argumentum ad misericordiam. It feels, however, that there is more
than ample substantiation for the findings of the ponente in the main case, and compelling legal warrant
for the administrative penalties imposed which are even milder than those meted by it under similar and
comparable situations.
The spreading of the decision on the personal record of a respondent is an official procedure and
requirement which, incredibly, respondent judge would want this very Court to violate and forego, in
suppression of facts which must appear in official documents. His further argument that
The spreading of such decision on my personal records will not only open criticisms on my private
qualifications as a minister in the temple of justice but will open more comments on my official acts,
competence and credibility as a judge that might undermine the people's faith in the judicial system in
the Province of Palawan, in Puerto Princesa City and in the entire country because it is always difficult
to disassociate my private credential from that of my public qualifications. 7
is, to put it mildly, a mite too exaggerated and a tad too melodramatic. The Court regrets that
respondent judge appears unaware that he is actually the recipient of uncommon sympathetic
consideration in this case.
Administrative penalties do not play the final strains of the valkyrian chant to a public career, judicial or
otherwise. It is for respondent judge, by subsequently demonstrating his true worth through observance
of judicial standards, to vindicate himself from a misjudgment which is the heritage of the heedless and
to rise to higher levels which is the destiny of the deserving. Besides, it is a curious fact that assuming
as valid his meticulosity on the confidential nature of disciplinary cases, he nevertheless sent copies of
his motions to all the persons enumerated at the start of this resolution. It is elementary that copies of
such motions are merely filed with the court and furnished only to the adverse party. Here, he wants us
to keep sub rosa what he himself publicizes.
From his initial exhibition of humility and penitential pose, respondent judge then goes into a critical
second gear by rhetorically wondering aloud in this fashion:
On July 27, 1994, the Third Division of the Honorable Supreme Court required me to comment on the
above-entitled petition. On August 23, 1994 I filed my comment thereto and on October 24, 1994, in a
Resolution the Third Division of the Supreme Court resolved to note my Comment. When the Third
Division of the Honorable Court required me to comment in G.R. No. 116049, the supposition is that a
valid raffle of said case to that Division had already been made. That was my thinking and impression
for, why would the case go to that Division except thru a valid raffle. I am now in quandary, however, as
to why all of a sudden, G.R. No. 116049 was transferred to the Second Division of the Supreme Court
without us or any party being informed by the Honorable Supreme Court about it. In our level at the
Regional Trial Court in Palawan, we observe the raffle of cases with solemnity and abide by the result
of the raffle faithfully. And the said Second Division meted me out excessive penalties when it was the
Third Division that required me to comment. Why did this happen? (Emphasis supplied.) 8
Since this was obviously spoken with the ascriptive courage of the uninformed, we assure His Honor
that the Supreme Court also conducts "a valid raffle," observes such raffle of its cases "with solemnity,"
and abides by the result thereof "faithfully." This case was validly and solemnly raffled to Mr. Justice
Bidin who was then with the Third Division of the Court. On January 23, 1995, he was transferred to the
Second Division where he served as working chairman until his retirement on April 7, 1995. In
accordance with the internal rules of the Court, this case remained with him as the original ponente and
he accordingly penned the decision therein for and as a member of the Second Division. There is no
rule in the Court that the parties be informed that a case has been transferred to another division, as

respondent judge would want or expect. To do so would easily be revelatory of the identity of the
ponente which is precisely what some litigants used to, and still, watch for and speculate upon.
In anticipation of a similar insinuendo, respondent judge is further informed that because of the
retirement of Mr. Justice Bidin and the uncertainty of the date when his replacement could act upon his
unfinished cases and the subsequent proceedings therein, after its summer session and working
recess the Court en banc, after due deliberation on respondent judge's successive motions, decided to
assign the preparation of this resolution to the present writer thereof, he having been and still is with the
Second Division. Respondent judge, with his claim of extensive magisterial experience, should have
verified all the foregoing facts from the records of this Court, instead of proceeding upon speculations.
Finally, shifting to what he obviously fancies to be high gear on a constitutional basis, respondent judge
questions the competence of the Second Division of this Court to administratively discipline him.
Exordially, a mere allegatio nudus does not create a constitutional issue as to require the referral of this
case, or at least the disciplinary aspect thereof, to the Court en banc. The disposition of that matter
merely involves a clarification of the misconception of respondent judge thereon, presumably because
of his unfamiliarity with circulars adopted and followed by this Court, some of them being on internal
procedure. Be that as it may, since all the members of this Court are aware of the submissions of
respondent judge on this point through the copies of the motions which he furnished them, and he
insistently harps on constitutional grounds therein, the Court en banc resolved to accept this aspect of
the case from the Second Division.
His Honor relies on the second sentence of Section 11, Article VIII of the present Constitution which
reads: "The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order
their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the
issues in the case and voted thereon." This provision is an expansion of and was taken from the
second sentence of Section 7, Article X of the 1973 Constitution which provided: "The Supreme Court
shall have the power to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight Members,
order their dismissal."
Stress is apparently laid by respondent judge on the inclusion of the adverbial phrase "en banc" in
referring to this Court in the quoted provision of the 1987 Constitution and, from this, he argues that it is
only the full Court, not a division thereof, that can administratively punish him.
Fortuitously, the writer of this resolution, as a member of the Committee on the Judiciary of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, had the opportunity to take up that precise matter with the committee
chairman, retired Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, by pointing out the equivalent provision in the
1973 Constitution, hereinbefore quoted, which merely referred to the "Court," without qualification. It
was accordingly explained and agreed that insofar as the power to discipline is concerned, the
qualification was not intended to make a difference, as a reference to the Court by itself necessarily
means the Court en banc. It was only decided to state "en banc" there because all internal procedural
and administrative matters, as well as ceremonial functions, are always decided by or conducted in the
Court en banc. On the other hand, where the reference is to the Court acting through its divisions, it
would necessarily be so specified. For lack of transcription of the proceedings of the committees of said
Commission, the writer has perforce to rely on his recollection and notes, but he assures this Court of
the foregoing facts as they transpired.
At any rate, the very text of the present Section 11 of Article VIII clearly shows that there are actually
two situations envisaged therein. The first clause which states that "the Supreme Court en banc shall
have the power to discipline judges of lower courts," is a declaration of the grant of that disciplinary
power to, and the determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by, the Court en banc. It was
not therein intended that all administrative disciplinary cases should be heard and decided by the whole
Court since it would result in an absurdity, as will hereafter be explained.

The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated therein and is intentionally
separated from the first by a comma, declares on the other hand that the Court en banc can "order their
dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the
issues in the case and voted therein." Evidently, in this instance, the administrative case must be
deliberated upon and decided by the full Court itself.
Pursuant to the first clause which confers administrative disciplinary power to the Court en banc, on
February 9, 1993 a Court En Banc resolution was adopted, entitled "Bar Matter No. 209. In the
Matter of the Amendment and/or Clarification of Various Supreme Court Rules and Resolutions," and
providing inter alia:
For said purpose, the following are considered en banc cases:
xxx xxx xxx
6.
Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the
Judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period of more than one
(1) year or a fine exceeding P10,000.00, or both.
xxx xxx xxx
This resolution was amended on March 16, 1993 and November 23, 1993, but the aforequoted
provision was maintained.
Indeed, to require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all administrative matters or
cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed, would result in a congested docket and
undue delay in the adjudication of cases in the Court, especially in administrative matters, since even
cases involving the penalty of reprimand would require action by the Court en banc. This would subvert
the constitutional injunction for the Court to adopt a systematic plan to expedite the decision or
resolution of cases or matters pending in the Supreme Court or the lower courts, 9 and the very
purpose of authorizing the Court to sit en banc or in divisions of three, five, or seven members. 10
Yet, although as thus demonstrated, only cases involving dismissal of judges of lower courts are
specifically required to be decided by the Court en banc, in cognizance of the need for a thorough and
judicious evaluation of serious charges against members of the judiciary, it is only when the penalty
imposed does not exceed suspension of more than one year or a fine of P10,000.00, or both, that the
administrative matter may be decided in division.
It must not also be overlooked that as early as February 7, 1989, the Court promulgated Circular No. 289 which clarifies that:
xxx xxx xxx
2.
A decision or resolution of a Division of the Court, when concurred in by a majority of its
members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in a case and voted thereon, and in
no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members, is a decision or resolution of the
Supreme Court (Section 4[3], Article VIII, 1987 Constitution).
That guideline or rule in the referral to the Court en banc of cases assigned to a division thereof rests
on the same rationale and applies with equal force to confute the antithetical theory of respondent
Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. Apropos thereto, it would indeed be desirable for said respondent to

hereafter deal with situations like the one subject of this resolution with more perspicacity and
circumspection.
WHEREFORE, the basic and supplemental motions for reconsideration of the judgment in the case at
bar are hereby DENIED. This resolution is immediately final and executory.SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

Although V & G complied with the desired requirements, respondent Renomeron suspended the
registration of the documents pending compliance by V & G with a certain "special arrangement"
between them, which was that V & G should provide him with a weekly round trip ticket from Tacloban
to Manila plus P2,000.00 as pocket money per trip, or, in lieu thereof, the sale of respondent's Quezon
City house and lot by V & G or GSIS representatives.

A.C. No. 3056

On May 19, 1987, respondent confided to the complainant that he would act favorably on the 163
registrable documents of V & G if the latter would execute clarificatory affidavits and send money for a
round trip plane ticket for him.

August 16, 1991

FERNANDO T. COLLANTES, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. VICENTE C. RENOMERON respondent.

PER CURIAM:p
This complaint for disbarment is related to the administrative case which complainant Attorney
Fernando T. Collantes, house counsel for V & G Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V & G for short), filed
against Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron, Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, for the latter's irregular
actuations with regard to the application of V & G for registration of 163 pro forma Deeds of Absolute
Sale with Assignment of lots in its subdivision. The present complaint charges the respondent with the
following offenses:
1.
Neglecting or refusing inspite (sic) repeated requests and without sufficient justification, to act
within reasonable time (sic) the registration of 163 Deeds of Absolute Sale with Assignment and the
eventual issuance and transfer of the corresponding 163 transfer certificates of titles to the GSIS, for
the purpose of obtaining some pecuniary or material benefit from the person or persons interested
therein.
2. Conduct unbecoming of public official.
3. Dishonesty.
4. Extortion.
5. Directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with pending official
transaction before him.
6.
Causing undue injury to a party, the GSIS [or] Government through manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
7.

Gross ignorance of the law and procedure. (p. 10, Rollo.)

As early as January 15, 1987, V & G had requested the respondent Register of Deeds to register some
163 deeds of sale with assignment (in favor of the GSIS) of lots of the V & G mortgaged to GSIS by the
lot buyers. There was no action from the respondent.
Another request was made on February 16, 1987 for him to approve or deny registration of the uniform
deeds of absolute sale with assignment. Still no action except to require V & G to submit proof of real
estate tax payment and to clarify certain details about the transactions.

The plane fare amounting to P800 (without the pocket money of P2,000) was sent to respondent
through his niece.
Because of V & G's failure to give him pocket money in addition to plane fare, respondent imposed
additional registration requirements. Fed up with the respondent's extortionate tactics, the complainant
wrote him a letter on May 20, 1987 challenging him to act on all pending applications for registration of
V & G within twenty-four (24) hours.
On May 22, 1987, respondent formally denied registration of the transfer of 163 certificates of title to the
GSIS on the uniform ground that the deeds of absolute sale with assignment were ambiguous as to
parties and subject matter. On May 26, 1987, Attorney Collantes moved for a reconsideration of said
denial, stressing that:
... since the year 1973 continuously up to December 1986 for a period of nearly fifteen (15) years or for
a sum total of more than 2,000 same set of documents which have been repeatedly and uniformly
registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City under Attys. Modesto Garcia and
Pablo Amascual Jr., it is only during the incumbency of Atty. Vicente C. Renomeron, that the very same
documents of the same tenor have been refused or denied registration ... (p. 15, Rollo.)
On May 27, 1987, respondent elevated the matter en consulta to the Administrator, National Land Titles
and Deeds Registration Administration (NLTDRA) (now the Land Registration Authority [LRA]). In a
Resolution dated July 27,1987 (Consulta No. 1579), the NLTDRA ruled that the questioned documents
were registrable. Heedless of the NLTDRA's opinion, respondent continued to sit on V & Gs 163 deeds
of sale with assignment.
Exasperated by respondent's conduct, the complainant filed with the NLTDRA on June 4, 1987
administrative charges (docketed as Adm. Case No. 87-15), against respondent Register of Deeds.
Upon receipt of the charges, NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio directed respondent to
explain in writing why no administrative disciplinary action should be taken against him. Respondent
was further asked whether he would submit his case on the basis of his answer, or be heard in a formal
investigation.
In his answer dated July 9, 1987, respondent denied the charges of extortion and of directly receiving
pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with the official transactions awaiting his action.
Although an investigator was appointed by NLTDRA Administrator Bonifacio to hear Attorney Collantes'
charges against him, Attorney Renomeron waived his right to a formal investigation. Both parties
submitted the case for resolution based on the pleadings.
The investigator, Attorney Leonardo Da Jose, recommended dropping the charges of: (1) dishonesty;
(2) causing undue injury to a party through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence; and (3) gross ignorance of the law and procedure. He opined that the charge of neglecting

or refusing, in spite repeated requests and without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time
on the registration of the documents involved, in order to extort some pecuniary or material benefit from
the interested party, absorbed the charges of conduct unbecoming of a public official, extortion, and
directly receiving some pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with pending official
transactions before him.
Brushing aside the investigator's recommendation, NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio on
February 22, 1988, recommended to Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoez that the respondent: (1)
be found guilty of simple neglect of duty: (2) be reprimanded to act with dispatch on documents
presented to him for registration; and (3) be warned that a repetition of similar infraction will be dealt
with more severely.
After due investigation of the charges, Secretary Ordoez found respondent guilty of grave misconduct.
Our study and consideration of the records of the case indicate that ample evidence supports the
Investigating Officer's findings that the respondent committed grave misconduct.
The respondent unreasonably delayed action on the documents presented to him for registration and,
notwithstanding representations by the parties interested for expeditious action on the said documents,
he continued with his inaction.
The records indicate that the respondent eventually formally denied the registration of the documents
involved; that he himself elevated the question on the registrability of the said documents to
Administrator Bonifacio after he formally denied the registration thereof, that the Administrator then
resolved in favor of the registrability of the said documents in question; and that, such resolution of the
Administrator notwithstanding, the respondent still refused the registration thereof but demanded from
the parties interested the submission of additional requirements not adverted to in his previous denial.
xxx xxx xxx
In relation to the alleged 'special arrangement,' although the respondent claims that he neither touched
nor received the money sent to him, on record remains uncontroverted the circumstance that his niece,
Ms. de la Cruz, retrieved from him the amount of P800.00 earlier sent to him as plane fare, not in the
original denomination of P100.00 bills but in P50.00 bills. The respondent had ample opportunity to
clarify or to countervail this related incident in his letter dated 5 September 1987 to Administrator
Bonifacio but he never did so.
... We believe that, in this case, the respondent's being new in office cannot serve to mitigate his
liability. His being so should have motivated him to be more aware of applicable laws, rules and
regulations and should have prompted him to do his best in the discharge of his duties. (pp. 17-18,
Rollo.)
Secretary Ordoez recommended to President Corazon C. Aquino that Renomeron be dismissed from
the service, with forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and with prejudice to re-employment
in the government service, effective immediately.
As recommended by the Secretary of Justice, the President of the Philippines, by Adm. Order No. 165
dated May 3, 1990, dismissed the respondent from the government service (pp. 1419, Rollo).
Less than two weeks after filing his complaint against Renomeron in the NLTDRA, Attorney Collantes
also filed in this Court on June 16, 1987, a disbarment complaint against said respondent.

The issue in this disbarment proceeding is whether the respondent register of deeds, as a lawyer, may
also be disciplined by this Court for his malfeasances as a public official. The answer is yes, for his
misconduct as a public official also constituted a violation of his oath as a lawyer.
The lawyer's oath (Rule 138, Section 17, Rules of Court; People vs. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968), imposes
upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer's oath is a source of his
obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action
(Legal Ethics, Ruben E. Agpalo, 1983 Edition, pp. 66-67).
As the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro said:
A person takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar which is designed to impress upon him his
responsibilities. He thereby becomes an "officer of the court" on whose shoulders rests the grave
responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper. fair, speedy, and efficient administration of justice. As
an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that demands that in his every exertion the only
criterion he that truth and justice triumph. This discipline is what as given the law profession its nobility,
its prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected
those qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty, and the
strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility all of which, throughout the centuries, have been
compendiously described as moral character.
Membership in the Bar is in the category of a mandate to public service of the highest order. A lawyer is
an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and
ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest of truth and justice, for which he has
sworn to be a fearless crusader. (Apostacy in the Legal Profession, 64 SCRA 784, 789- 790; emphasis
supplied.)
The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in government service in the discharge of
their official tasks (Canon 6). Just as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
requires public officials and employees to process documents and papers expeditiously (Sec. 5,
subpars. [c] and [d] and prohibits them from directly or indirectly having a financial or material interest in
any transaction requiring the approval of their office, and likewise bars them from soliciting gifts or
anything of monetary value in the course of any transaction which may be affected by the functions of
their office (See. 7, subpars. [a] and [d]), the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids a lawyer to
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional
Responsibility), or delay any man's cause "for any corrupt motive or interest" (Rule 103).
A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
(Rule 7.03, Code of Professional Responsibility.)
This Court has ordered that only those who are "competent, honorable, and reliable" may practice the
profession of law (Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293) for every lawyer must pursue "only the highest
standards in the practice of his calling" (Court Administrator vs. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269, 278).
The acts of dishonesty and oppression which Attorney Renomeron committed as a public official have
demonstrated his unfitness to practice the high and noble calling of the law (Bautista vs. Judge
Guevarra, 142 SCRA 632; Court Administrator vs. Rodolfo G. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269). He should
therefore be disbarred.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron be disbarred from the practice
of law in the Philippines, and that his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys

SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Sarmiento, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., complainant, vs. ATTYS. ANTONIO M. LLORENTE and LIGAYA P.
SALAYON, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment against respondents Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon for
gross misconduct, serious breach of trust, and violation of the lawyers oath in connection with the
discharge of their duties as members of the Pasig City Board of Canvassers in the May 8, 1995
elections. Salayon, then election officer of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), was designated
chairman of said Board, while Llorente, who was then City Prosecutor of Pasig City, served as its ex
oficio vice-chairman as provided by law.[1] Complainant, now a senator, was also a candidate for the
Senate in that election.

First. Respondent Llorente seeks the dismissal of the present petition on the ground that it was filed
late. He contends that a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under Rule 139-B, 12(c)[5]
and, therefore, the filing of such motion before the IBP Board of Governors did not toll the running of the
period of appeal. Respondent further contends that, assuming such motion can be filed, petitioner
nevertheless failed to indicate the date of his receipt of the April 22, 1999 resolution of the IBP denying
his motion for reconsideration so that it cannot be ascertained whether his petition was filed within the
15-day period under Rule 139-B, 12(c).
The contention has no merit. The question of whether a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited
pleading or not under Rule 139-B, 12(c) has been settled in Halimao v. Villanueva,[6] in which this
Court held:
Although Rule 139-B, 12(c) makes no mention of a motion for reconsideration, nothing in its text or in
its history suggests that such motion is prohibited. It may therefore be filed within 15 days from notice to
a party. Indeed, the filing of such motion should be encouraged before resort is made to this Court as a
matter of exhaustion of administrative remedies, to afford the agency rendering the judgment an
opportunity to correct any error it may have committed through a misapprehension of facts or
misappreciation of the evidence.[7]

Complainant alleges that, in violation of R.A. No. 6646, 27(b),[2]respondents tampered with the votes
received by him, with the result that, as shown in the Statements of Votes (SoVs) and Certificate of
Canvass (CoC) pertaining to 1,263 precincts of Pasig City, (1) senatorial candidates Juan Ponce Enrile,
Anna Dominique Coseteng, Gregorio Honasan, Marcelo Fernan, Ramon Mitra, and Rodolfo Biazon
were credited with votes which were above the number of votes they actually received while, on the
other hand, petitioners votes were reduced; (2) in 101 precincts, Enriles votes were in excess of the
total number of voters who actually voted therein; and (3) the votes from 22 precincts were twice
recorded in 18 SoVs. Complainant maintains that, by signing the SoVs and CoC despite respondents
knowledge that some of the entries therein were false, the latter committed a serious breach of public
trust and of their lawyers oath.

On the question whether petitioners present petition was filed within the 15-day period provided under
Rule 139-B, 12(c), although the records show that it was filed on June 4, 1999, respondent has not
shown when petitioner received a copy of the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors denying his
motion for reconsideration. It would appear, however, that the petition was filed on time because a copy
of the resolution personally served on the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court was received by it on
May 18, 1999. Since copies of IBP resolutions are sent to the parties by mail, it is possible that the copy
sent to petitioner was received by him later than May 18, 1999. Hence, it may be assumed that his
present petition was filed within 15 days from his receipt of the IBP resolution. In any event, the burden
was on respondent, as the moving party, to show that the petition in this case was filed beyond the 15day period for filing it.

Respondents denied the allegations against them. They alleged that the preparation of the SoVs was
made by the 12 canvassing committees which the Board had constituted to assist in the canvassing.
They claimed that the errors pointed out by complainant could be attributed to honest mistake,
oversight, and/or fatigue.

Even assuming that petitioner received the IBP resolution in question on May 18, 1999, i.e., on the
same date a copy of the same was received by the Office of the Bar Confidant, the delay would only be
two days.[8] The delay may be overlooked, considering the merit of this case. Disbarment proceedings
are undertaken solely for public welfare. The sole question for determination is whether a member of
the bar is fit to be allowed the privileges as such or not. The complainant or the person who called the
attention of the Court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and generally has no
interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.[9]
For this reason, laws dealing with double jeopardy[10] or prescription[11] or with procedure like
verification of pleadings[12] and prejudicial questions[13] have no application to disbarment
proceedings.

In his Consolidated Reply, complainant counters that respondents should be held responsible for the
illegal padding of the votes considering the nature and extent of the irregularities and the fact that the
canvassing of the election returns was done under their control and supervision.
On December 4, 1998, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, to which this matter had been referred
pursuant to Rule 139-B, 13, in relation to 20 of the Rules of Court, recommended the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of merit.[3] Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on March 11, 1999, but his
motion was denied in a resolution of the IBP Board of Governors dated April 22, 1999. On June 4,
1999, he filed this petition pursuant to Rule 139-B, 12(c).
It appears that complainant likewise filed criminal charges against respondents before the COMELEC
(E.O. Case No. 96-1132) for violation of R.A. No. 6646, 27(b). In its resolution dated January 8, 1998,
the COMELEC dismissed complainants charges for insufficiency of evidence. However, on a petition for
certiorari filed by complainant,[4] this Court set aside the resolution and directed the COMELEC to file
appropriate criminal charges against respondents. Reconsideration was denied on August 15, 2000.
Considering the foregoing facts, we hold that respondents are guilty of misconduct.

Even in ordinary civil actions, the period for perfecting appeals is relaxed in the interest of justice and
equity where the appealed case is clearly meritorious. Thus, we have given due course to appeals even
though filed six,[14] four,[15] and three[16] days late. In this case, the petition is clearly meritorious.
Second. The IBP recommends the dismissal of petitioners complaint on the basis of the following: (1)
respondents had no involvement in the tabulation of the election returns, because when the Statements
of Votes (SoVs) were given to them, such had already been accomplished and only needed their
respective signatures; (2) the canvassing was done in the presence of watchers, representatives of the
political parties, the media, and the general public so that respondents would not have risked the
commission of any irregularity; and (3) the acts dealt with in R.A. No. 6646, 27(b) are mala in se and
not mala prohibita, and petitioner failed to establish criminal intent on the part of respondents.[17]

The recommendation is unacceptable. In disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar, only
clear preponderance of evidence is required to establish liability.[18] As long as the evidence presented
by complainant or that taken judicial notice of by the Court[19] is more convincing and worthy of belief
than that which is offered in opposition thereto,[20] the imposition of disciplinary sanction is justified.

Here, by certifying as true and correct the SoVs in question, respondents committed a breach of Rule
1.01 of the Code which stipulates that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. By express provision of Canon 6, this is made applicable to lawyers in the
government service. In addition, they likewise violated their oath of office as lawyers to do no falsehood.

In this case, respondents do not dispute the fact that massive irregularities attended the canvassing of
the Pasig City election returns. The only explanation they could offer for such irregularities is that the
same could be due to honest mistake, human error, and/or fatigue on the part of the members of the
canvassing committees who prepared the SoVs.

Nowhere is the need for lawyers to observe honesty both in their private and in their public dealings
better expressed in Sabayle v. Tandayag[27] in which this Court said:

This is the same allegation made in Pimentel v. Commission on Elections.[21] In rejecting this allegation
and ordering respondents prosecuted for violation of R.A. No. 6646, 27(b), this Court said:
There is a limit, We believe, to what can be construed as an honest mistake or oversight due to fatigue,
in the performance of official duty. The sheer magnitude of the error, not only in the total number of
votes garnered by the aforementioned candidates as reflected in the CoC and the SoVs, which did not
tally with that reflected in the election returns, but also in the total number of votes credited for
senatorial candidate Enrile which exceeded the total number of voters who actually voted in those
precincts during the May 8, 1995 elections, renders the defense of honest mistake or oversight due to
fatigue, as incredible and simply unacceptable.[22]
Indeed, what is involved here is not just a case of mathematical error in the tabulation of votes per
precinct as reflected in the election returns and the subsequent entry of the erroneous figures in one or
two SoVs[23] but a systematic scheme to pad the votes of certain senatorial candidates at the expense
of petitioner in complete disregard of the tabulation in the election returns. A cursory look at the
evidence submitted by petitioner reveals that, in at least 24 SoVs involving 101 precincts, the votes for
candidate Enrile exceeded the number of voters who actually voted in the said precincts and, in 18
SoVs, returns from 22 precincts were tabulated twice. In addition, as the Court noted in Pimentel, the
total number of votes credited to each of the seven senatorial candidates in question, as reflected in the
CoC, markedly differ from those indicated in the SoVs.[24]Despite the fact that these discrepancies,
especially the double recording of the returns from 22 precincts and the variation in the tabulation of
votes as reflected in the SoVs and CoC, were apparent on the face of these documents and that the
variation involves substantial number of votes, respondents nevertheless certified the SoVs as true and
correct. Their acts constitute misconduct.
Respondent Llorentes contention that he merely certified the genuineness and due execution of the
SoVs but not their correctness is belied by the certification which reads:

There is a strong public interest involved in requiring lawyers . . . to behave at all times in a manner
consistent with truth and honor. It is important that the common caricature that lawyers by and large do
not feel compelled to speak the truth and to act honestly, should not become a common reality. . . .[28]
It may be added that, as lawyers in the government service, respondents were under greater obligation
to observe this basic tenet of the profession because a public office is a public trust.
Third. Respondents participation in the irregularities herein reflects on the legal profession, in general,
and on lawyers in government, in particular. Such conduct in the performance of their official duties,
involving no less than the ascertainment of the popular will as expressed through the ballot, would have
merited for them suspension were it not for the fact that this is their first administrative transgression
and, in the case of Salayon, after a long public service.[29] Under the circumstances, a penalty of fine
in the amount of P10,000.00 for each of the respondents should be sufficient.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondents Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon GUILTY of
misconduct and imposes on each of them a FINE in the amount of P10,000.00 with a WARNING that
commission of similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 5119

April 17, 2013

ROSARIO BERENGUER-LANDERS and PABLO BERENGUER, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. ISABEL E. FLORIN, ATTY. MARCELINO JORNALES and ATTY. PEDRO VEGA,
Respondents.

WE HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing Statement of Votes by . . . [p]recinct is true and correct. IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, we sign these presents at the City/Municipality of ___________ Province of
____________ this _______ day of May, 1995. (Emphasis added)

DECISION

Nor does the fact that the canvassing was open to the public and observed by numerous individuals
preclude the commission of acts for which respondents are liable. The fact is that only they had access
to the SoVs and CoC and thus had the opportunity to compare them and detect the discrepancies
therein.

This is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Rosario Berenguer-Landers and Pablo Berenguer
(complainants) against herein respondents Isabel E. Florin (Florin), Marcelino Jomales (Jomales) and
Pedro Vega (Vega).

REYES, J.:

The factual antecedents are as follows:

Now, a lawyer who holds a government position may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official.[25] However, if the misconduct also
constitutes a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility or the lawyers oath or is of such
character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or shows moral delinquency on his part, such
individual may be disciplined as a member of the bar for such misconduct.[26]

Remedios Berenguer-Lintag, Carlo Berenguer and Belinda Berenguer-Aguirre, Rosario BerenguerLanders and Pablo Berenguer (Berenguers) are the registered owners of a 58.0649-hectare land in
Bibingcahan, Sorsogon, Sorsogon. Sometime in April 1998, a notice of coverage was issued by the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) regarding the acquisition of their landholding pursuant to

Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The Berenguers
protested and applied for the exclusion of their land with the DAR and for a notice to lift coverage based
on the ground that their landholdings have been used exclusively for livestock pursuant to DAR
Administrative Order No. 09.2

Undaunted, the Berenguers filed a second petition for certiorari with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 53174, which questioned the Orders dated March 15, 1999 and March 22, 1999 issued by Florin.
The petition was also denied on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and wrong mode of appeal.22
Thus, Florin issued on April 21, 1999 a Writ of Possession23 in favor of BARIBAG.

On October and November 1998, the DAR Secretary, without acting on the application for exclusion,
cancelled the Berenguers certificates of title on the land and issued Certificates of Land Ownership
Award3 (CLOAs) in favor of the members of the Baribag Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Development
Cooperative (BARIBAG).

Florin subsequently directed the full implementation of the writ of possession pursuant to Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court in spite of the Berenguers protestations.24
On June 3, 1999, the Berenguers moved to quash25 the Writ of Possession, to no avail.

Eventually, DAR Regional Director Percival Dalugdug (Dalugdug) denied their application for exclusion
from the CARPs coverage in the Order4 dated February 15, 1999 based on the Investigation Report
dated February 9, 1999 submitted by the DAR Region V Investigation that said area sought to be
excluded is principally devoted to coconuts and not the raising of livestock.5
Aggrieved, the Berenguers filed a notice of appeal6 with the Secretary of DAR.
While the case was pending appeal, BARIBAG filed a petition7 for the implementation of the Order
dated February 15, 1999 before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD). This was granted
by Florin, as RARAD, in an Order8 dated March 15, 1999. Accordingly, Florin directed the issuance and
implementation of the Writ of Possession.9
On March 19, 1999, the Berenguers filed a motion for reconsideration,10 claiming that they were
denied due process as they were not furnished with a copy of BARIBAGs petition for implementation.
Florin denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit in an Order11 dated March 22, 1999.
On March 25, 1999, the Berenguers appealed12 to the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB). BARIBAG,
on other hand, filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession.13 The Berenguers opposed14
the motion saying that the execution would be premature in view of their pending appeal before the
DARAB. Nevertheless, BARIBAG still filed a Motion for the Appointment of a Special Sheriff.15
In his Order16 dated April 6, 1999, DAR Acting Secretary Conrado S. Navarro denied the Berenguers
appeal.
On April 8, 1999, Florin issued a Resolution,17 which granted BARIBAGs Motion for the Appointment
of a Special Sheriff and ordered the issuance of the writ of possession prayed for.
On April 13, 1999, the Berenguers filed a motion to set aside18 the Resolution dated April 8, 1999,
arguing that: the DARAB already acquired jurisdiction over case when they seasonably filed an appeal
before it; and that Florin should have waited until the DARAB has decided the appeal. In an Order19
dated April 21, 1999, Florin denied the said motion prompting the Berenguers to move for her
inhibition20 on ground of partiality.
The Berenguers elevated the matter via petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals (CA), docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 51858, which was denied outright on procedural grounds, to wit: (1) copy of the
assailed order bears the words "certified true copy" but the name and authority of the person certifying
is not indicated as required in SC Circular No. 3-96, and the signature therein is illegible; (2) only one of
the petitioners signed the certification on non-forum shopping which is an insufficient compliance of
Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court; and (3) there is non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies as the assailed order of the Regional Director is not directly reviewable by the CA.21

On August 4, 1999, the complainants filed the instant Complaint26 for the disbarment of respondents
Florin, Jornales, in his capacity as Assistant Regional Director for DAR, and Vega, in his capacity as
DAR Legal Officer V, for allegedly conspiring and confederating in the commission of the following acts:
A. ATTY. ISABEL E. FLORIN AS REGIONAL ADJUDICATOR KNOWINGLY RENDERING AN UNJUST
JUDGEMENT, ORDERS AND RESOLUTIONS ADVERSE AND PREJUDICIAL TO THE INTEREST OF
PETITIONERS;
B. ISSUING AN ORDER AND GRANTING A WRIT OF EXECUTION EX-PARTE AND
SUBSEQUENTLY ISSUING AND SIGNING THE WRIT OF POSSESSION WITHOUT CERTIFICATION
OF FINALITY ISSUED BY THE PROPER OFFICER FULLY KNOWING THAT SHE HAS NO
AUTHORITY AND TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE APPLICABLE RULES AND IN CONTRAVENTION
WITH THE NEW RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
ADJUDICATION BOARD; FURTHER, HIDING THE WRIT OF POSSESSION FROM PETITIONERS
INSPITE OF REQUEST FOR A COPY;
C. REFUSING TO TAKE ACTION ON PLEADINGS FILED BY PETITIONERS THRU COUNSEL AND
FAILING AND REFUSING TO CONDUCT A HEARING AS PRAYED FOR BY COUNSEL; FAILING AND
REFUSING TO FORWARD THE APPEAL TO THE PROPER APPELLATE BOARD;
D. UNWARRANTED INTERFERENCE IN LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS TO THE PREJUDICE
OF PETITIONERS AND LAWYER; ABUSE OF AUTHORITY TO CITE COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER
IN CONTEMPT AND ISSUING AN ORDER OF ARREST WITHOUT HEARING CONTRARY TO THE
RULES OF COURT;
E. ATTY. MARCELINO JORNALES AND ATTY. PEDRO VEGA, INSPITE OF THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF
THE ILLEGALITY OF THE WRIT OF POSSESSION, PERSISTED AND ASSISTED IN THE ILLEGAL
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WRIT OF POSSESSION TO THE PREJUDICE OF LEGITIMATE
FARMERS AND PETITIONERS.27
Florin filed her Comment28 stating, among others, that: (1) the writ of possession is anchored on the
CLOAs issued by the Register of Deeds, and not on a final and executory decision that would require a
certification of finality as prescribed by the DARAB rules; (2) Atty. Federico De Jesus (De Jesus), as
Berenguers counsel, was not furnished with a copy of the writ because it was not yet issued at the time
when it was requested; (3) there was no intent to hide the writ; (4) when the writ of possession was
finally signed, it was delivered to the sheriff for service and enforcement; (4) it was unfair to impute
illegal acts against Vega and Jornales as DAR lawyers in view of the DARs denial of the motion for a
cease and desist order and because of the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of their
duty; (5) the petitions for certiorari filed with the CA were both dismissed; and (6) the findings of DAR
and the issuance of the CLOAs remain undisturbed. Florin also claimed that it is Atty. De Jesus who
wants her disbarred and not the Berenguers.

In a separate Comment,29 Vega denied the allegations against him arguing that: (1) the writ of
possession is not illegal in the absence of a court order stating its invalidity; (2) he did not participate in
the issuance of the writ of possession because he did not appear as the farmers counsel; (3) the Legal
Division he heads has no control or influence over the DARAB; and (4) his presence in the execution of
the writ of possession was to ascertain that no violations against any law are committed by the person/s
executing the writ.30
Jornales Comment,31 for his part, stated that: (1) the writ has no prima facie infirmity; (2) he is not
privy to the issuance thereof; (3) he has no supervision and control over the DAR which issued the writ;
and (4) he has no authority to determine the writs validity or invalidity. Jornales admitted, however, that
he was in the meeting presided by the PNP Provincial Director of Sorsogon prior to the writs
implementation in his capacity as Regional Assistant Director for Operations of DAR Region V and not
as a lawyer. He added that the disbarment complaint against him is not only malicious for lack of legal
basis but is also meant to harass and intimidate DAR employees in implementing the CARP.32
After the complainants filed their Consolidated Reply,33 the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

when she issued the assailed writs of execution and possession. Thus, the writ are [sic] void and would
be set aside."38
On May 26, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors adopted Resolution No. XVII-2006-282 modifying the
recommended penalty, viz:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and for knowingly rendering an unjust Judgment,
Orders and Resolutions, adverse and prejudicial to the interest of the complainants, Atty. Isabel F. Florin
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year. The charges against Atty. Marcelino
Jornales and Atty. Peter Vega are DISMISSED for failure of the complainants to substantiate the
charges against Respondents.39

IBP Commissioner Milagros San Juan (Commissioner San Juan) Recommended34 that Florin be
"suspended from the practice of law for three (3) years for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment,
Orders and Resolutions adverse and prejudicial to the interests of the Complainants."

In her opposition,40 Florin averred that: (1) jurisdiction was acquired over BARIBAG at the time it filed a
petition for the implementation of the Order dated February 15, 1999; (2) the DARAB has jurisdiction to
issue the CLOAs; (3) as RARAD, she has concurrent jurisdiction with DARAB; (4) the Berenguers were
not denied due process; and (5) the Berenguers never questioned the regularity of the DARs
acquisition of their landholding nor did they file a petition for the cancellation of the CLOAs issued to
BARIBAG.

Commissioner San Juan, meanwhile, recommended that the charges against Jornales and Vega be
dismissed for failure of the complainants to substantiate the charges against them.35

This Court agrees with the findings of the IBP Board of Governors but modifies the penalty to be
imposed.

Commissioner San Juans recommendation against Florin is based on the findings36 of the CA in its
Decision dated December 26, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 53174,37 which reads:

Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court provides:

The Petition for Certiorari filed by the complainants before the Court of Appeals was treated as a
petition for review and the court found the following errors:
"1) Respondent DAR Secretary has no jurisdiction over the subject properties being devoted to pasture
and livestock and already classified as residential and industrial land, hence, outside the coverage of
Republic Act 6657. (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) The generation and issuance of Certificate
of Landownership Award (CLOA) was therefore void;"
2) Being outside the coverage of CARL (Republic Act 6657), respondent Hon. Isabel E. Florin who is
exercising delegated jurisdiction from the DARAB has no jurisdiction over Petitioners Properties as
held in Krus na Ligas Farmers Coop vs. University of the Philippines; G.R. No. 107022, 8 December
1992, which is squarely in point with the case at bar."
Anent the issue regarding the qualified beneficiaries of the subject land, the Court ruled thus
"Assuming that the lands are indeed agricultural, we cannot understand why the DAR awarded them to
members of respondent Baribag and not to the farmers in the area, in violation of Sec. 22 of the CARL
x x x."
The court further stated "We cannot xxx close this discussion without mentioning our observation on
the actuations of Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator Isabel Florin. Just why she issued a writ of
execution and eventually a Writ of Possession in favor of respondent Baribag puzzles us no end. She
knew that Baribag is not a party in petitioners application for exclusion filed with the Office of DAR
Regional Director Percival Dalugdug. Obviously, she never acquired jurisdiction over Baribag. She also
knew that petitioners appealed to the DAR Secretary from the Order of Regional Director Dalugdug
dismissing petitioners application for exclusion. Clearly, such order was not yet final and executory

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore.A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before the admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party
without authority so to do. x x x.
In Lahm III v. Mayor, Jr.,41 the Court ruled that:
A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his
moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Gross misconduct is any inexcusable, shameful or
flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned with the administration of justice; i.e.,
conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause. The motive
behind this conduct is generally a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.42 (Citations omitted)
In the instant case, the Berenguers want this Court to impose disciplinary sanction against the three (3)
respondents as members of the bar. The grounds asserted by the complainants in support of the
charges against the respondents, however, are intrinsically connected with the discharge of their quasijudicial functions. Nevertheless, in Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig,43 the Court already ruled that if a
misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then a lawyer
may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar, viz:
Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the
Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if said misconduct
as a government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may be disciplined
by this Court as a member of the Bar.

xxxx
A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations. Hence, the
Code of Professional Responsibility, promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not meant to govern the
conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in government service. This is
clear from Canon 644 of said Code. Lawyers in government are public servants who owe the utmost
fidelity to the public service. Thus, they should be more sensitive in the performance of their
professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the public.
x x x For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might
tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity
of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing.1wphi1
Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high
degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice.45 (Citations omitted
and emphasis ours)
Thus, in Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr.,46 the Court ruled that an administrative case against a lawyer for
acts committed in his capacity as provincial adjudicator of the DARAB may be likened to administrative
cases against judges considering that he is part of the quasi-judicial system of our government.47
Similarly in this case, Florin, being part of the quasi-judicial system of our government, performs official
functions of a RARAD that are akin to those of judges. Accordingly, the present controversy may be
likened that of a judge whose decision, including the manner of rendition, is made subject of an
administrative complaint.
Going now to the acts complained of, Section 29 of DAR Administrative Order No. 06-00 provides:
SEC. 29. Effect of Appeal.Appeal to the Secretary, the Office of the President, or the Court of Appeals
shall have the following effects:
(a) Appeal from the Regional Director or Undersecretary to the Secretary.The appeal shall stay the
order appealed from unless the Secretary directs execution pending appeal, as he may deem just,
considering the nature and circumstances of the case (Executive Order No. 292 [1987], Book VII,
Chapter 4, Sec. 21).
xxxx
Based on the foregoing provision, the appeal of the Berenguers to the DAR Secretary clearly stayed
the implementation of Regional Director Dalugdugs Order dated February 15, 1999. Moreover, it is the
DAR Secretary who has jurisdiction to order execution pending appeal. Records reveal that there was
no order by the DAR Secretary directing execution of the Order dated February 15, 1999 during the
pendency of the Berenguers appeal.
Corollarily, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides for the instances when execution may be had,
namely: (1) after a decision or order has become final and executory;48 (2) pending appeal, only upon
good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing;49 and (3) execution of several, separate
or partial judgments.50
Moreover, Rule XX of the 2009 Rules of the DARAB reads:

Sec. 1. Execution Upon Final Order or Decision.Execution shall issue upon an order, resolution or
decision that finally disposes of the action or proceeding. Such execution shall issue as a matter of
course and upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.
The Adjudicator concerned may, upon certification by the proper officer that a resolution, order or
decision has been served to the counsel or representative on record and to the party himself, and has
become final and executory, and, upon motion or motu proprio, issue a writ of execution ordering the
DAR Sheriff or any DAR officer to enforce the same. In appropriate cases, the Board or any of its
Members or its Adjudicator shall deputize and direct the Philippine National Police, Armed Forces of the
Philippines or any of their component units or other law enforcement agencies in the enforcement of
any final order, resolution or decision.
Sec. 2. Execution Pending Appeal. Any motion for execution of the decision of the Adjudicator
pending appeal shall be filed before the Board which may grant the same upon meritorious grounds,
upon the posting of a sufficient bond in the amount conditioned for the payment of damages which the
aggrieved party may suffer, in the event that the final order or decision is reversed on appeal, provided
that the bond requirement shall not apply if the movant is a farmer-beneficiary/pauper litigant.
(Emphasis ours)
In this case, the Order dated February 15, 1999 of DAR Regional Director Dalugdug denying the
Berenguers application for exclusion from CARP is yet to become final and executory as it was
seasonably appealed to the DAR Secretary. There is also nothing in the records that will show whether
BARIBAG posted a bond pursuant to the Rules.
While a judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment absent proof that such error was made with
a conscious and deliberate intent to cause an injustice,51 the facts on hand prove otherwise. Florins
issuance of the writ of execution and writ of possession in order to fully implement Regional Director
Dalugdugs Order dated February 15, 1999 clearly constitutes ignorance of the law for as a rule, a writ
of execution is issued only after the subject judgment or order has already become final and
executory.52 As aptly stated by IBP Commissioner San Juan, Florin ordered the issuance of such writs
despite the pendency of the appeal with the DARAB.53 Consequently, the Court finds merit in the
recommendation of suspension.
As to the penalty
Judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith or deliberate intent to do
injustice will be administratively sanctioned.54 In this case, it appears, however, that this is the first time
that Florin has been made administratively liable. Although there is no showing that malice or bad faith
attended the commission of the acts complained of, the same does not negate the fact that Florin
executed an act that would cause an injustice to the Berenguers. To our mind, the act of issuing the writ
of execution and writ of possession is not simply an honest error in judgment but an obstinate disregard
of the applicable laws and jurisprudence.
With all these, the Court deems it reasonable to reconsider the penalty recommended and instead
impose the penalty of suspension for three (3) months55 without pay. As also held in Rallos v. Judge
Gako, Jr.,56 three (3) months suspension without pay was imposed against a judge after finding out
that the ignorance of the law he committed was not tainted with bad faith.
With respect to the complaint against Jornales and Vega, the Court agrees and adopts the finding of
the IBP that no sufficient evidence was adduced to substantiate the charges against them. Hence, the
complaint against them should be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent ATTY. ISABEL E. FLORIN is found guilty of
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, she is penalized with SUSPENSION from
the practice of law for three (3) months effective upon notice hereof. The complaint against Atty.
Marcelino Jornales and Atty. Pedro Vega is DISMISSED for lack of sufficient evidence.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in her record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. Nos. 1302, 1391 and 1543

April 26, 1991

PAULINO VALENCIA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ARSENIO FER CABANTING, respondent.
CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO C. ANTINIW, ATTY. EDUARDO U. JOVELLANOS and ATTY. ARSENIO FER.
CABANTING, respondents.
LYDIA BERNAL, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO C. ANTINIW, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
These consolidated administrative cases seek to disbar respondents Dionisio Antiniw, Arsenio Fer.
Cabanting and Eduardo Jovellanos (the last named, now an MCTC Judge) for grave malpractice and
misconduct in the exercise of their legal profession committed in the following manner:
1.

written in Ilocano. For this purpose, Paulino gave Atty. Antiniw an amount of P200.00 to pay the person
who would falsify the signature of the alleged vendor (Complaint, p. 2; Rollo, p. 7). A "Compraventa
Definitiva" (Exh. B) was executed purporting to be a sale of the questioned lot.
On January 22, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V, rendered a decision in favor
of plaintiff, Serapia Raymundo. The lower court expressed the belief that the said document is not
authentic. (Report, p. 14)
Paulino, thereafter, filed a Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 65, with Preliminary Injunction before the
Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court failed to provide a workable solution concerning his house.
While the petition was pending, the trial court, on March 9, 1973, issued an order of execution stating
that "the decision in this case has already become final and executory" (Exhibits 3 and 3-A). On March
14, 1973, a writ of execution was issued.
On March 20, 1973, Serapia sold 40 square meters of the litigated lot to Atty. Jovellanos and the
remaining portion she sold to her counsel, Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting, on April 25, 1973. (Annex "A" of
Administrative Case No. 1302).
On March 4, 1974, Paulino filed a disbarment proceeding (docketed as Administrative Case No. 1302)
against Atty. Cabanting on the ground that said counsel allegedly violated Article 1491 of the New Civil
Code as well as Article II of the Canons of Professional Ethics, prohibiting the purchase of property
under litigation by a counsel.
On March 21, 1974 the appellate court dismissed the petition of Paulino.
On October 14, 1974, Constancia Valencia, daughter of Paulino, filed a disbarment proceeding
(docketed as Administrative Case No. 1391) against Atty. Dionisio Antiniw for his participation in the
forgery of "Compraventa Definitiva" and its subsequent introduction as evidence for his client; and also,
against Attys. Eduardo Jovellanos and Arsenio Cabanting for purchasing a litigated property allegedly in
violation of Article 1491 of the New Civil Code; and against the three lawyers, for allegedly rigging Civil
Case No. V-2170 against her parents. On August 17, 1975, Constancia Valencia filed additional
charges against Atty. Antiniw and Atty. Jovellanos as follows:

Administrative Cases No. 1302 and 1391.

1.

In 1933, complainant Paulino Valencia (Paulino in short) and his wife Romana allegedly bought a parcel
of land, where they built their residential house, from a certain Serapia Raymundo, an heir of Pedro
Raymundo the original owner. However, they failed to register the sale or secure a transfer certificate of
title in their names.
Sometime in December, 1968, a conference was held in the house of Atty. Eduardo Jovellanos to settle
the land dispute between Serapia Raymundo (Serapia in short) another heir of Pedro Raymundo, and
the Valencia spouses since both were relatives and distant kin of Atty. Jovellanos. Serapia was willing
to relinquish ownership if the Valencias could show documents evidencing ownership. Paulino exhibited
a deed of sale written in the Ilocano dialect. However, Serapia claimed that the deed covered a different
property. Paulino and Serapia were not able to settle their differences. (Report of Investigating Judge
Catalino Castaneda, Jr., pp. 21-22).
On December 15, 1969 Serapia, assisted by Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting, filed a complaint against
Paulino for the recovery of possession with damages. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. V2170, entitled "Serapia Raymundo, Plaintiff, versus Paulino Valencia, Defendant." (Report, p. 11).
Summoned to plead in Civil Case No. V-2170, the Valencias engaged the services of Atty. Dionisio
Antiniw. Atty. Antiniw advised them to present a notarized deed of sale in lieu of the private document

AGAINST ATTY. DIONISIO ANTINIW:

In the year 1973 Atty. Dionisio Antiniw fraudulently and in confabulation with one Lydia Bernal had a
deed of sale, fabricated, executed and ratified before him as Notary Public by one Santiago Bernal in
favor of Lydia Bernal when as a matter of fact said Santiago Bernal had died already about eight years
before in the year 1965.
2.

AGAINST ATTY. EDUARDO JOVELLANOS:

In the year 1954 Atty. Eduardo Jovellanos, fraudulently and in bad faith, in confabulation with Rosa de
los Santos as vendee had, as Notary Public, executed and ratified before him, two (2) deeds of sale in
favor of said Rosa de los Santos when as a matter of fact the said deeds were not in fact executed by
the supposed vendor Rufino Rincoraya and so Rufino Rincoraya had filed a Civil Case in Court to annul
and declare void the said sales (p. 7, Report)
2.

Administrative Case No. 1543.

A deed of donation propter nuptias involving the transfer of a piece of land by the grandparents of Lydia
Bernal (complainant,) in favor of her parents, was lost during the last world war. For this reason, her
grandmother (the living donor) executed a deed of confirmation of the donation propter nuptias with

renunciation of her rights over the property. (Complaint, p. 1). Notwithstanding the deed, her
grandmother still offered to sell the same property in favor of the complainant, ostensibly to strengthen
the deed of donation (to prevent others from claim-ing the property).
On consultation, Atty., Antiniw advised them to execute a deed of sale. Atty. Antiniw allegedly prepared
and notarized the deed of sale in the name of her grandfather (deceased at the time of signing) with her
grandmother's approval.

Under Article 1491 of the New Civil Code:

The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public of judicial auction, either in person
or through the mediation of another:
xxx

xxx

xxx

Felicidad Bernal-Duzon, her aunt who had a claim over the property filed a complaint against her (Lydia
Bernal) and her counsel, Atty. Antiniw for falsification of a public document. (Complaint, pp. 1-2) The
fiscal exonerated the counsel for lack of evidence, while a case was filed in court against Lydia Bernal.

(5)
. . . this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers,
with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they make take
part by virtue of their profession.

On October 3, 1975, Lydia Bernal filed a disbarment proceeding (docketed as Administrative Case
No.1543) against Atty. Antiniw for illegal acts and bad advice.

Public policy prohibits the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved. It is intended to
curtail any undue influence of the lawyer upon his client. Greed may get the better of the sentiments of
loyalty and disinterestedness. Any violation of this prohibition would constitute malpractice (In re:
Attorney Melchor Ruste, 40 O.G. p. 78) and is a ground for suspension. (Beltran vs. Fernandez, 70 Phil.
248).

Pursuant to the resolution of the First Division of this Court dated December 9, 1974, the resolution of
the Second Division dated March 3, 1975 and the two resolutions of the Second Division both dated
December 3, 1975, Administrative Cases Nos. 1302, 1391 and 1543 were referred to the Office of the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.
Upon formal request of Constancia L. Valencia and Lydia Bernal dated March 3, 1976, all of these
cases were ordered consolidated by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza per his handwritten directive
of March 9, 1976.
On April 12, 1988, We referred the investigation of these cases to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.1wphi1 When Atty. Jovellanos was appointed as Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge of
Alcala-Bautista, Pangasinan, We referred the investigation of these cases to Acting Presiding Judge
Cesar Mindaro, Regional Trial Court, Branch 50, Villasis, Pangasinan, for further investigation.
In view of the seriousness of the charge against the respondents and the alleged threats against the
person of complainant Constancia L. Valencia, We directed the transfer of investigation to the Regional
Trial Court of Manila.
The three administrative cases were raffled to Branch XVII of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, under
the sala of Judge Catalino Castaneda, Jr.
After investigation, Judge Catalino Castaeda, Jr., recommended the dismissal of cases against Atty.
Jovellanos and Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting; dismissal of Administrative Case No. 1543 and the
additional charges in Administrative Case No. 1391 against Antiniw and Judge Jovellanos; however, he
recommended the suspension of Atty. Antiniw from the practice of law for six months finding him guilty
of malpractice in falsifying the "Compraventa Definitiva."
The simplified issues of these consolidated cases are:
I. Whether or not Atty. Cabanting purchased the subject property in violation of Art. 1491 of the New
Civil Code.
II. Whether or not Attys. Antiniw and Jovellanos are guilty of malpractice in falsifying notarial
documents.
III. Whether or not the three lawyers connived in rigging Civil Case No. V-2170.
I

Art. 1491, prohibiting the sale to the counsel concerned, applies only while the litigation is pending.
(Director of Lands vs. Adaba, 88 SCRA 513; Hernandez vs. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 775).
In the case at bar, while it is true that Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting purchased the lot after finality of
judgment, there was still a pending certiorari proceeding. A thing is said to be in litigation not only if
there is some contest or litigation over it in court, but also from the moment that it becomes subject to
the judicial action of the judge. (Gan Tingco vs. Pabinguit, 35 Phil. 81). Logic indicates, in certiorari
proceedings, that the appellate court may either grant or dismiss the petition. Hence, it is not safe to
conclude, for purposes under Art. 1491 that the litigation has terminated when the judgment of the trial
court become final while a certiorari connected therewith is still in progress. Thus, purchase of the
property by Atty. Cabanting in this case constitutes malpractice in violation of Art. 1491 and the Canons
of Professional Ethics. Clearly, this malpractice is a ground for suspension.
The sale in favor of Atty. Jovellanos does not constitute malpractice. There was no attorney-client
relationship between Serapia and Atty. Jovellanos, considering that the latter did not take part as
counsel in Civil Case No. V-2170. The transaction is not covered by Art. 1491 nor by the Canons
adverted to.
II
It is asserted by Paulino that Atty. Antiniw asked for and received the sum of P200.00 in consideration
of his executing the document "Compraventa Definitiva" which would show that Paulino bought the
property. This charge, Atty. Antiniw simply denied. It is settled jurisprudence that affirmative testimony is
given greater weight than negative testimony (Bayasen vs. CA, L-25785, Feb. 26, 1981; Vda. de
Ramos vs. CA, et al., L40804, Jan. 31, 1978). When an individual's integrity is challenged by evidence,
it is not enough that he deny the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the
evidence for the relator and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and
integrity which at all time is expected of him. (De los Reyes vs. Aznar, Adm. Case No. 1334, Nov. 28,
1989).
Although Paulino was a common farmer who finished only Grade IV, his testimony, even if not
corroborated by another witness, deserves credence and can be relied upon. His declaration dwelt on a
subject which was so delicate and confidential that it would be difficult to believe the he fabricated his
evidence.

There is a clear preponderant evidence that Atty. Antiniw committed falsification of a deed of sale, and
its subsequent introduction in court prejudices his prime duty in the administration of justice as an
officer of the court.
A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client (Santos vs. Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622), but not at
the expense of truth. (Cosmos Foundry Shopworkers Union vs. La Bu, 63 SCRA 313). The first duty of
a lawyer is not to his client but to the administration of justice. (Lubiano vs. Gordalla, 115 SCRA 459) To
that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be
scrupulously observant of law and ethics. While a lawyer must advocate his client's cause in utmost
earnestness and with the maximum skill he can marshal, he is not at liberty to resort to illegal means for
his client's interest. It is the duty of an attorney to employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes
confided to him, such means as are consistent with truth and honor. (Pangan vs. Ramos, 93 SCRA 87).
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. By far, the most important of them is
mindfulness that a lawyer is an officer of the court. (In re: Ivan T. Publico, 102 SCRA 722). This Court
may suspend or disbar a lawyer whose acts show his unfitness to continue as a member of the Bar.
(Halili vs. CIR, 136 SCRA 112). Disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a punishment depriving him of a
source of livelihood but is rather intended to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those
who exercise this function should be competent, honorable and reliable in order that courts and the
public may rightly repose confidence in them. (Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293). Atty. Antiniw failed to
live up to the high standards of the law profession.
The other charges of malpractice against Atty. Antiniw and Atty. Jovellanos should be dismissed for lack
of evidence.
During the proceedings in Administrative Case No. 1543, Lydia Bernal testified in full on direct
examination, but she never submitted herself for cross-examination. Several subpoenas for crossexamination were unheeded. She eventually requested the withdrawal of her complaint.
Procedural due process demands that respondent lawyer should be given an opportunity to crossexamine the witnesses against him.1wphi1 He enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the
charges against him until the contrary is proved. (Santos vs. Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622). The case must be
established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. (Camus vs. Diaz, Adm. Case No. 1616,
February 9, 1989), Since Atty. Antiniw was not accorded this procedural due process, it is but proper
that the direct testimony of Lydia Bernal be stricken out.
In view also of the affidavit of desistance executed by the complainant, Administrative Case No. 1543
should be dismissed. Although the filing of an affidavit of desistance by complainant for lack of interest
does not ipso facto result in the termination of a case for suspension or disbarment of an erring lawyer
(Munar vs. Flores, 122 SCRA 448), We are constrained in the case at bar, to dismiss the same because
there was no evidence to substantiate the charges.
The additional charge against Atty. Antiniw in Administrative Case No. 1391 is predicated on the
information furnished by Lydia Bernal. It was not based on the personal knowledge of Constancia L.
Valencia: hence, hearsay. "Any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value
is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of some other person not
on the witness stand." (Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 6th ed., vol. 2, 1989, p. 486). Being
hearsay, the evidence presented is inadmissible.
The additional charge filed by Constancia L. Valencia against Atty. Jovellanos in Administrative Case
No. 1391 was not proved at all. Complainant failed to prove her additional charges.
III

There is no evidence on record that the three lawyers involved in these administrative cases conspired
in executing the falsified "Compraventa Definitiva" and rigged the Civil Case No. V-2170.
Atty. Jovellanos is a distant kin of the Raymundos and Valencias. In fact, he and the Valencias are
neighbors and only two meters separate their houses. It would not be believable that Atty. Jovellanos, a
practicing lawyer, would hold a meeting with the heirs of Pedro Raymundo in his house with the
intention of inducing them to sue the Valencias. Atty. Jovellanos even tried to settle the differences
between the parties in a meeting held in his house. He appeared in Civil Case No. V-2170 as an
involuntary witness to attest to the holding of the conference.
Besides, the camaraderie among lawyers is not proof of conspiracy, but a sign of brotherhood among
them. One of the fourfold duties of a lawyer is his duty to the Bar. A lawyer should treat the opposing
counsel, and his brethren in the law profession, with courtesy, dignity and civility. They may "do as
adversaries do in law: strive mightily but (they) eat and drink as friends." This friendship does not
connote conspiracy.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring: 1. Dionisio Antiniw DISBARRED from the
practice of law, and his name is ordered stricken off from the roll of attorneys; 2. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six months from finality of this judgment; and 3.
Administrative Case No. 1391 against Attorney Eduardo Jovellanos and additional charges therein, and
Administrative Case No. 1543 DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Criminal Cases Nos. 6856, 6857, 6858, 6859, 6860. 6861, and 6862 were allegedly committed in July,
1980; Criminal Cases Nos. 6863 and 6864, in August, 1980; and Criminal Cases Nos. C-865, 6866 and
6867 in October, 1980. The separate vouchers involved in the twelve (12) cases are said to be the
following:
Crim. Case #6856, Vchr #211-90-10-174 at P558.80
Crim. Case #6857, Vchr #211-80-10-187 at 943.60
EN BANC

Crim. Case #6858, Vchr #211-80-10-189 at 144.00

G.R. No. 70332-43 November 13, 1986

Crim. Case #6859, Vchr #211-80-10-190 at 071.30

GENEROSO TRIESTE, SR., petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION), respondent.

Crim. Case #6860, Vchr #211-80-10-191 at 270.00

Arturo M. de Castro for petitioner.

Crim. Case #6862, Vchr #211-80-10-239 at 1,085.80

The Solicitor General for respondent.

Crim. Case #6863, Vchr #211-80-10-407 at 150.00

Crim. Case #6861, Vchr #211-80-10-232 at 1,820.00

Crim. Case #6864, Vchr #211-80-12-494 at 500.00

ALAMPAY, J.:
The present case relates to an appeal by way of a Petition for Review of the decision promulgated on
November 6, 1984, by the Sandiganbayan convicting the herein petitioner, Generoso Trieste, Sr., of
twelve (12) separate violations of Section 3 paragraph (h) of Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices - Act, which petitioner were accused of in Criminal Cases Nos. 68566867 of said Court. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was denied by the
respondent Sandiganbayan under its Resolution of March 11, 1985.
The twelve (12) separate Informations filed by the Tanodbayan against the herein petitioner for violation
of Section 3 (h) of the Anti-Graft Law are all similarly worded as the information presented in Criminal
Case No. 6856 which is hereunder quoted:
That on or about the month of July, 1980 and some time subsequent thereto, in the municipality of
Numancia, Aklan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed
accused, being then the Municipal Mayor and member of the Committee on Award of the Municipality of
Numancia, Aklan and as such, had administrative control of the funds of the municipality and whose
approval is required in the disbursements of municipal funds, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully
have financial or pecuniary interest in a business, contract or transaction in connection with which said
accused intervened or took part in his official capacity and in which he is prohibited by law from having
any interest, to wit the purchases of construction materials by the Municipality of Numancia, Aklan from
Trigen Agro-Industrial Development Corporation, of which the accused is the president, incorporator,
director and major stockholder paid under Municipal Voucher No. 211-90-10-174 in the amount of
P558.80 by then and there awarding the supply and delivery of said materials to Trigen Agro-Industrial
Development Corporation and approving payment thereof to said corporation in violation of the AntiGraft and corrupt Practices Act.
except only as to the dates of the commission of the offense, voucher numbers, and amounts involved.

Crim. Case #6865, Vchr #211-81-04-61 at 840.00

Crim. Case #6866, Vchr #211-81-04-62 at 787.00
Crim. Case #6867, Vchr #211-81-04-63 at 560.00
T o t a l - - - - P7,730.50
(Consolidated Comment, pg. 4; Rollo, 325)
After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered the challenged decision dated November 6, 1984, convicting
the petitioner in all the twelve (12) criminal cases, (Rollo, pp. 324-325) and in each case he was
sentenced,"...to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from THREE (3) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY as the minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as the maximum, to further suffer
perpetual disqualification from the public office, and to pay the cost of the action." (pp. 37-40, Decision;
Rollo, 322).
After the petition for review was filed in this case and pending the submission by respondent of its
comment to the petition, herein petitioner presented to this Court on June 7, 1985, an urgent petition to
lift the order of the Sandiganbayan dated September 12, 1983, suspending him from Office as the
elected Municipal Mayor of Numancia, Aklan. His term was to expire in 1986. No objection to the
petition for the lifting of the suspension order was interposed by the Solicitor General. Accordingly, and
pursuant to the resolution of this Court dated October 1, 1985, petitioner's preventive suspension was
lifted and his reinstatement as Municipal Mayor of Numancia, Aklan was ordered to take effect
immediately.
A supplemental petition, dated October 10, 1985, was later filed by petitioner's new counsel in
collaboration with the original counsel on record of petitioner. In this supplemental pleading, it was
vigorously stressed that the petitioner did not, in any way, intervene in making the awards and payment
of the purchases in question as he signed the voucher only after all the purchases had already been

made, delivered and paid for by the Municipal Treasurer. It was further pointed out that there was no
bidding at all as erroneously adverted to in the twelve informations filed against herein petitioner
because the transactions involved were emergency direct purchases by personal canvass.
Upon leave of the Court given, the former Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment dated
November 4, 1984, to the original petition filed in this case dated April 30, 1985 as well as on the
supplemental petition dated October 10, 1985. He argued the dismissal of the petition on the ground
that the same raise factual issues which are, therefore, non-reviewable (Consolidated Comment, pg.
20; Rollo, 341). The submission made by the Office of the Solicitor General in the Consolidated
Comment dated November 4, 1986, are hereunder quoted:
xxx

xxx

xxx

The impugned decision convicted petitioner for violation of Section 3 (h), paragraph (h) of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act which reads as follows:
SEC. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing laws, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer
and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx

xxx

xxx

Petitioner's exhaustive and well-reasoned out Brief which was filed with the Court on April 14, 1986,
raised the following legal questions.
xxx

xxx

xxx

From the foregoing recital of facts, the following legal questions arise:
1.
Does the mere signing by a Municipal Mayor of municipal vouchers and other supporting
papers covering purchases of materials previously ordered by the Municipal Treasurer without the
knowledge and consent of the former, subsequently delivered by the supplier, and, thereafter paid by
the same Municipal Treasurer also without the knowledge and consent of the Municipal Mayor,
constitute a violation of the provisions of Section 3 (h) of Rep. Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act?
2.
Does the mere signing of the mere documents above constitute the kind of intervention of
taking part in (his) official capacity within the context of the above-mentioned law?
3.
Was damage or prejudice, as an element of the offense under Section 3 (h) of the said law,
caused to the Government or the Municipality of Numancia as a result of the contracts in question and
as a corollary thereto, was undue advantage and gained by the transacting corporation?

(h)
Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or
transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is
prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest.

4.
Was there divestment on the part of the herein petitioner of his shares in Trigen AgroIndustrial Development Corporation long before the questioned transactions? (Appellant's Brief, page
15)

The elements essential in the commission of the crime are:

It was then discus and argued by the petitioner that the prosecution failed to establish the presence of
all the elements of the offense, and more particularly to adduce proof that petitioner has, directly or
indirectly, a financial or pecuniary interest in the imputed business contracts or transactions.

a)

The public officer has financial or pecuniary interest in a business, contract or transaction;

b)

In connection with which he intervenes in his official capacity.

Concurrence of both elements is necessary as the absence of one will not warrant conviction. (Rollo,
pp. 338-339).
The earlier view taken by the Solicitor General's Office was that petitioner's evidence of divestment of
interest in Trigen 'Corporation, which is said to have been effected on February 25, 1980, before the
petitioner assumed the Mayorship, should have been presented at the earliest opportunity before the
Tanodbayan and because this was not done by him the resolution of the Tanodbayan finding a prima
facie case against petitioner should be sustained. Furthermore, petitioner was faulted because the
transfer of his interest in the corporate stock of Trigen Corporation should have been recorded in the
Securities and Exchange Commission but no evidence of this sort, was presented. The consolidated
comment also played up the advertisement of Trigen Corporation in the program of the Rotary Club of
Kalibo, Aklan, showing the printed name of petitioner as the President-Manager of the said corporation.
(Consolidated Comment; Rollo, pp. 340-341)
Petitioner filed a Reply controverting the allegations and arguments recited in the aforestated
Consolidated Comment of the Solicitor General.
After considering the pleadings filed and deliberating on the issues raised in the petition and
supplemental petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Sandiganbayan, as well as the
consolidated comment and the reply thereto filed by petitioner's counsel, the Court in its resolution of
January 16, 1986, gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their respective briefs.

Discussion of petitioner's arguments in this regard will not however, be recited anymore as this was
obviated when a new Solicitor General, after seeking and obtaining several extensions of time to file its
Brief in this case at bar, filed on October 7, 1986, a "Manifestation For Acquittal" (in lieu of the People's
Brief). Rollo, 293).
The new Solicitor General's Office after adopting the statement of facts recited in the consolidated
comment of the former Solicitor General's Office moved for the acquittal of the petitioner, upon
acknowledging and concluding that:
xxx

xxx

xxx

Petitioner has divested his interest with Trigen

Petitioner sought to establish that before he assumed office as mayor on March 3, 1980, he had
already sold his shares with Trigen to his sister Mrs. Rosene Trieste-Tuason. The sale was made by
corresponding indorsements to her stock certificate which was duly recorded in the stock and transfer
book of the corporation.
Respondent Sandiganbayan however doubts the sale because the same was not reported to the SEC.
SEC records, as the prosecution evidence show, do not reflect the sale and petitioner still appears as
the firm's President.

The prosecution's evidence to establish non-divestment of petitioner's interest with Trigen is weak.
Anyway, Trigen has not updated its reports to the SEC since 1976. It have not even submitted its
financial annual report ever since. Absence of the sales report in the SEC does not mean that the sale
did not take place. Reporting the sale is not a mandatory requirement.

respondent Sandiganbayan dated November 2, 1984). The prosecution has not presented evidence to
show as to when petitioner signed the twelve (12) municipal vouchers. But it can safely be assumed as
a matter of procedure that petitioner had signed the voucher after Treasurer Vega signed and paid
them., (Rello, pp. 301-303)

Sales of stocks need not be reported to SEC

xxx

In any event, the law only requires submission of annual financial reports, not sales or disposal of
stocks (Section 141, Corporation Code of the Philippines).

Testimonial and documentary evidence confirms that petitioner signed vouchers after payment

Upholding the evidence of petitioner's divestment of his interest with Trigen would necessarily allow him
to act freely in his official capacity in the municipality's dealings or transactions with Trigen. That in itself
is sufficient to acquit him of the crimes charged. (Rollo, pp. 299-300).

xxx

xxx

Additional facts which respondent Court failed to consider and which could have altered the outcome of
the case in the following uncontroverted testimony of Josue Maravilla:
Q.
When these municipal vouchers were prepared by the municipal treasurer, as you said, and
then presented to Mayor Trieste for his signature, were the purchases in question already paid?

In the matter of the alleged intervention of petitioner, the Office of the Solicitor General itself subscribes
to and on its own volition place on record the following observations:

A.

They had already been paid for, sir.

Prosecution failed to prove charges; evidence discloses absence of bidding and award

Q.

Previously, prior to the signature of Mayor Trieste?

The prosecution's lone witness, Treasurer Aniceto Vega, testified that there never was a public bidding
conducted because all the transactions were made by direct purchases from Trigen.

A.

Yes, sir.

A.J. ESCAREAL:
Q.

In other words, in all these transactions there never really was any public bidding?

A.

Yes, Sir. There was no public bidding.

Q.

And these purchases were made by direct purchases from the establishment of Trigen?

A.

Yes, Sir. (pp. 36-37, Tsn., Oct. 26, 1983)

In the absence of a public bidding and as emphatically declared by the prosecution's sole witness Vega
that all the transactions were on direct purchases from Trigen, how can one ever imagine that petitioner
has awarded the supply and delivery of construction materials to Trigen as specifically charged in the
twelve (12) informations? The charges are of course baseless and even contradict the evidence of the
prosecution itself.
Even the respondent Court finally found that petitioner did not intervene during the bidding and award,
which of course is a false assumption because of Vega's testimony that there was no public bidding at
all. Respondent Court said:

Q.

Under what authority were they paid?

A.

Under official receipt issued by Trigen.

Q.

Who authorized the payment?

A.

The municipal treasurer who paid the materials.

ATTY. CONSULTA:
Q.
You said they had already been paid for. Do you know of any receipts issued by Trigen to
indicate that at the time these municipal vouchers were signed by Mayor Trieste, the materials had
already been delivered and paid by the municipality to Trigen?
xxx

xxx

A.

Yes, sir

xxx

. . . . In short, accused's intervention may not be present during the bidding and award, but his liability
may also come in when he took part in said transactions such as signing the vouchers under
certifications 1, 2 and 3 thereof, to make it appear that the transactions were regular and proper.
(Resolution dated March 11, 1985 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration/new trial, page 7).

Q.
Now, what exhibits particularly do you know were issued
by Trigen to indicate that payments were made prior to the signing of the municipal vouchers by Mayor
Trieste?

No evidence to prove petitioner approved payment

A.

Exhibits A, G, B, F, C, D, Exhibit I and Exhibit H.

Now, did petitioner intervene by approving payments to Trigen as also charged in the information? Can
there be intervention after payment.

xxx

xxx

Vega testified that petitioner signed the twelve (12) municipal vouchers (Exhibits A to L) for the
purchase and payment of construction materials. It was sometime after delivery of the construction
materials that he (Vega) signed and paid the twelve (12) -municipal vouchers (pages 5 to 7), decision of

xxx

Q.
Now, Mr. Maravilla, aside from these prosecution's exhibits which are Trigen receipts showing
payments long before the municipal vouchers were prepared, what can you say about the other
municipal vouchers in this case in reference to payments made by Trigen to the municipality?

ESCAREAL:

It is also an acknowledged fact that there was no complaint for non-delivery, underdelivery or
overpricing regarding any of the transactions.

Payment made by Trigen?

ATTY. CONSULTA:
I am sorry, Your Honor, made to Trigen by the municipality?
A.
Official receipts issued by Trigen also indicate that when municipal vouchers marked Exhibits
E, B, C, D, F, G, H, I were prepared, they had already been delivered and the amounts indicated therein
were already prepared by the municipal treasurer.
Q.
Did you say already made by the municipal treasurer-the amounts were already paid by the
municipal treasurer?

Considering the correct facts now brought to the attention of this Court by the Solicitor General and in
view of the reassessment made by that Office of the issues and the evidence and the law involved, the
Court takes a similar view that the affirmance of the decision appealed from cannot be rightfully
sustained. The conscientious study and thorough analysis made by the Office of the Solicitor General in
this case truly reflects its consciousness of its role as the People's Advocate in the administration of
justice to the end that the innocent be equally defended and set free just as it has the task of having the
guilty punished. This Court will do no less and, therefore, accepts the submitted recommendation that
the decision and resolution in question of the respondent Sandiganbayan be reversed and that as a
matter of justice, the herein petitioner be entitled to a judgment of acquittal.

A.

Already paid.

Q.

Who disbursed the funds evidenced by the Trigen official receipts?

WHEREFORE, the decision rendered by the Sandiganbayan, dated November 2, 1984, in Criminal
Cases Nos. 6856 to 6867, finding the herein petitioner, Generoso Trieste, Sr. guilty of the violations of
Section 3 paragraph (h) of Republic Act 3019, as amended, is hereby set aside and reversing the
appealed judgment, a new judgment is now rendered ACQUITTING Generoso Trieste, Sr., of said
offenses charged against him with costs de oficio.

A.

The municipal treasurer, then Mr. Vega.

SO ORDERED.

Q.
Now, do you know why Mr. Vega asked that those municipal vouchers be nevertheless
signed in spite of the fact that he knew that the amounts had already been disbursed and paid by him to
Trigen?

Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz and Paras, JJ., concur.

A.
He said that the municipal vouchers for record purposes is necessary to be signed by the
mayor. (Tsn., Mar. 5, 1984, pp. 19-49).

G.R. No. 91391

Inasmuch as Treasurer Vega signed and paid the vouchers after the materials were delivered,
petitioner's signature on the vouchers after payment is not, we submit the kind of intervention
contemplated under Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law.

January 24, 1991

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, in his capacity as Solicitor General, petitioner

vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.
Ponce Enrile, Cayetano Reyes & Manalastas for private respondent.

xxx

xxx

xxx

What is contemplated in Section 3(h) of the anti-graft law is the actual intervention in the transaction in
which one has financial or pecuniary interest in order that liability may attach. (Opinion No. 306, Series
1961 and Opinion No. 94, Series 1972 of the Secretary of Justice). The official need not dispose his
shares in the corporation as long as he does not do anything for the firm in its contract with the office.
For the law aims to prevent the don-tenant use of influence, authority and power (Deliberation on
Senate Bill 293, May 6, 1959, Congressional Record, Vol. 11, page 603).
There is absolutely no evidence that petitioner had, in his capacity as Mayor, used his influence, power,
and authority in having the transactions given to Trigen. He didn't ask anyone-neither Treasurer Vega
nor Secretary Maravilla for that matter, to get the construction materials from Trigen.
Trigen did not gain any undue advantage in the transaction
Petitioner should not be faulted for Trigen's transaction with the municipality, which by the way, has
been dealing with it even before petitioner had assumed the mayorship on March 3, 1980. Personal
canvasses conducted found that Trigen's offer was the lowest, most reasonable, and advantageous to
the municipality. . . . (Rollo, pp. 307-308; Emphasis supplied).

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The petitioner challenges the resolutions dated June 8, 1989 and November 2, 1989 of the
Sandiganbayan issued in Civil Case No. 0033 which granted the motion of private respondent Juan
Ponce Enrile, one of the defendants in the civil case, to implead the petitioner as additional party
defendant in Enrile's counterclaim in the same civil case and denied the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
On July 31, 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) with the assistance of Solicitor General Francisco Chavez filed with the
respondent Sandiganbayan a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 0033 against Eduardo Cojuangco,
Jr. and Juan Ponce Enrile, among others, for reconveyance, reversion and accounting, restitution and
damages.
After the denial of his motion to dismiss, respondent Enrile filed his answer with compulsory
counterclaim and cross-claim with damages.
The Republic filed its reply to the answer and motion to dismiss the counterclaim. The motion was
opposed by respondent Enrile.

On January 30, 1989, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a resolution, to wit:

He is sued in his personal and official capacities.

The resolution of the Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim against the Plaintiff government is deferred
until after trial, the grounds relied upon not appearing to be indubitable.

On or about October 1986, the PCGG, speaking through the then Chairman, now Senate President,
Hon. Jovito R. Salonga, found and declared that "not one of the documents left by then President and
Mrs. Ferdinand E. Marcos including the 2,300-page evidence turned over to the PCGG by the US State
Department implicates Enrile." Chairman Salonga stressed that in view of the PCGG's findings, he
refused to yield to the "pressure" exerted on him to prosecute Defendant.

On the matter of the additional parties (Solicitor General Chavez, Ex-PCGG Chairman Diaz, former
Commissioners Doromal, Rodrigo, Romero and Bautista), the propriety of impleading them either under
Sec. 14, Rule 6 or even under Sec. 12 as third-party defendant requires leave of Court to determine the
propriety thereof. No such leave has been sought. Consideration thereof cannot be entertained at this
time nor may therefore, the Motion to Dismiss the same be considered. (Rollo, p. 329; Annex "H",
Petition)
Respondent Enrile then requested leave from the Sandiganbayan to implead the petitioner and the
PCGG officials as party defendants for lodging this alleged "harassment suit" against him.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Notwithstanding the findings of the PCGG that there was absolutely no evidence linking Defendant to
the illegal activities of former President and Mrs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, the PCGG, this time composed
of Chairman Ramon Diaz, the Commissioners Quintin Doromal, Ramon Rodrigo, Orlando Romero and
Mary Concepcion Bautista, filed the Complaint against Defendant, among others, on or about 22 July
1987.

The motion was granted in a resolution dated June 8, 1989, to wit:

In respect to defendant Juan Ponce Enrile's Manifestation and Motion dated February 23, 1989, praying
for leave to implead additional parties to his counterclaim, the Court, finding reason in the aforesaid
Manifestation and Motion, grants leave to implead the defendants named in the counterclaim and
admits defendant Juan Ponce Enrile's answer with counterclaim.
This is without prejudice to the defenses which said defendants may put forth individually or in
common, in their personal capacities or otherwise. (Rollo, p. 27)
In a later resolution dated November 2, 1989, respondent Sandiganbayan denied a motion to
reconsider the June 8, 1989 resolution. The dispositive portion of the resolution states:
WHEREFORE, the Motions for Reconsideration of the Solicitor General and former PCGG officials
Ramon Diaz, Quintin Doromal, Orlando Romero, Ramon Rodrigo and Mary Concepcion Bautista are
denied, but, considering these motions as in the nature of motions to dismiss counterclaim/answers,
resolution of these motions is held in abeyance pending trial on the merits. (Rollo, p. 31)
Thereafter, all the PCGG officials filed their answer to the counterclaims invoking their immunity from
suits as provided in Section 4 of Executive Order No. 1. Instead of filing an answer, the petitioner
comes to this Court assailing the resolutions as rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction.
The lone issue in this petition is the propriety of impleading the petitioner as additional party defendant
in the counterclaim filed by respondent Enrile in Civil Case No. 0033.
It may be noted that the private respondent did not limit himself to general averments of malice,
recklessness, and bad faith but filed specific charges that then PCGG Chairman Jovito Salonga had
already cleared the respondent and yet, knowing the allegations to be false, the petitioner still filed the
complaint. This can be gleaned from excerpts found in respondent Enrile's Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim and Cross-Claim:
xxx

xxx

xxx

Defendant-in-counterclaim Francisco Chavez was the Solicitor General who assisted the PCGG in filing
and maintaining the instant Complaint against Defendant. As the incumbent Solicitor General, he
continues to assist the PCGG in prosecuting this case.

Defendant has reasons to believe, and so alleges that Chairman Diaz, and Commissioners Doromal,
Rodrigo, Romero and Bautista ordered, authorized, allowed or tolerated the filing of the utterly baseless
complaint against Defendant.
Solicitor General Francisco Chavez assisted or cooperated in, or induced or instigated, the filing of this
harassment suit against Defendant.
In so ordering, authorizing, allowing and tolerating the institution of the action against Defendant, all the
aforenamed officers, with malice and in evident bad faith, and with grave abuse of power and in excess
of their duty and authority, unjustly and unlawfully obstructed, defeated, violated, impeded or impaired
the constitutional rights and liberties of Defendant . . . . (Rollo, pp. 260-262)
On the other hand, the petitioner submits that no counter-claim can be filed against him in his capacity
as Solicitor General since he is only acting as counsel for the Republic. He cites the case of Borja v.
Borja, 101 Phil. 911 [1957] wherein we ruled:
. . . The appearance of a lawyer as counsel for a party and his participation in a case as such counsel
does not make him a party to the action. The fact that he represents the interests of his client or that he
acts in their behalf will not hold him liable for or make him entitled to any award that the Court may
adjudicate to the parties, other than his professional fees. The principle that a counterclaim cannot be
filed against persons who are acting in representation of another such as trustees in their
individual capacities (Chambers v. Cameron, 2 Fed. Rules Service, p. 155; 29 F. Supp. 742) could be
applied with more force and effect in the case of a counsel whose participation in the action is merely
confined to the preparation of the defense of his client. Appellant, however, asserted that he filed the
counterclaim against said lawyer not in his individual capacity but as counsel for the heirs of Quintin de
Borja. But as we have already stated that the existence of a lawyer-client relationship does not make
the former a party to the action, even this allegation of appellant will not alter the result We have arrived
at (at pp. 924-925)
Thus, the petitioner argues that since he is simply the lawyer in the case, exercising his duty under the
law to assist the Government in the filing and prosecution of all cases pursuant to Section 1, Executive
Order No. 14, he cannot be sued in a counterclaim in the same case.
Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena correctly observed that there is no general immunity arising
solely from occupying a public office.

The general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have
been performed in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is a
showing of bad faith. We ruled in one case:
A number of cases decided by the Court where the municipal mayor alone was held liable for back
salaries of, or damages to dismissed municipal employees, to the exclusion of the municipality, are not
applicable in this instance. In Salcedo v. Court of Appeals (81 SCRA 408 [1978]) for instance, the
municipal mayor was held liable for the back salaries of the Chief of Police he had dismissed, not only
because the dismissal was arbitrary but also because the mayor refused to reinstate him in defiance of
an order of the Commissioner of Civil Service to reinstate.
In Nemenzo v. Sabillano (25 SCRA 1 [1968]), the municipal mayor was held personally liable for
dismissing a police corporal who possessed the necessary civil service eligibility, the dismissal being
done without justifiable cause and without any administrative investigation.
In Rama v. Court of Appeals (G.R. Nos. L-44484, L-44842, L-44591, L-44894, March 16 1987), the
governor, vice-governor, members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, provincial auditor, provincial
treasurer and provincial engineer were ordered to pay jointly and severally in their individual and
personal capacity damages to some 200 employees of the province of Cebu who were eased out from
their positions because of their party affiliations. (Laganapan v. Asedillo, 154 SCRA 377 [1987])
Moreover, the petitioner's argument that the immunity proviso under Section 4(a) of Executive Order
No. 1 also extends to him is not well-taken. A mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso
facto result in the charges being automatically dropped.
In the case of Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Pea (159 SCRA 556 [1988]) then
Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, added a clarification of the immunity accorded PCGG officials under
Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 1 as follows:
With respect to the qualifications expressed by Mr. Justice Feliciano in his separate opinion, I just wish
to point out two things: First, the main opinion does not claim absolute immunity for the members of the
Commission. The cited section of Executive Order No. 1 provides the Commission's members immunity
from suit thus: "No civil action shall lie against the Commission or any member thereof for anything
done or omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by this order." No absolute immunity like that
sought by Mr. Marcos in his Constitution for himself and his subordinates is herein involved. It is
understood that the immunity granted the members of the Commission by virtue of the unimaginable
magnitude of its task to recover the plundered wealth and the State's exercise of police power was
immunity from liability for damages in the official discharge of the task granted the members of the
Commission much in the same manner that judges are immune from suit in the official discharge of the
functions of their office . . . " (at pp. 581-582)
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano stated in the same case:
It may be further submitted, with equal respect, that Section 4 (a) of Executive Order No. 1 was
intended merely to restate the general principle of the law of public officers that the PCGG or any
member thereof may not be held civilly liable for acts done in the performance of official duty, provided
that such member had acted in good faith and within the scene of his lawful authority. It may also be
assumed that the Sandiganbayan would have jurisdiction to determine whether the PCGG or any
particular official thereof may be held liable in damages to a private person injured by acts of such
manner. It would seem constitutionally offensive to suppose that a member or staff member of the
PCGG could not be required to testify before the Sandiganbayan or that such members were exempted
from complying with orders of this Court. (at pp. 586- 587)

Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a privileged
status not claimed by any other official of the Republic. (id., at page 586)
Where the petitioner exceeds his authority as Solicitor General acts in bad faith, or, as contended by
the private respondent, "maliciously conspir(es) with the PCGG commissioners in persecuting
respondent Enrile by filing against him an evidently baseless suit in derogation of the latter's
constitutional rights and liberties" (Rollo, p. 417), there can be no question that a complaint for
damages may be filed against him. High position in government does not confer a license to persecute
or recklessly injure another. The actions governed by Articles 19, 20, 21, and 32 of the Civil Code on
Human Relations may be taken against public officers or private citizens alike. The issue is not the right
of respondent Enrile to file an action for damages. He has the right. The issue is whether or not that
action must be filed as a compulsory counterclaim in the case filed against him.
Under the circumstances of this case, we rule that the charges pressed by respondent Enrile for
damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code arising from the filing of an alleged harassment suit with
malice and evident bad faith do not constitute a compulsory counterclaim. To vindicate his rights,
Senator Enrile has to file a separate and distinct civil action for damages against the Solicitor General.
In the case of Tiu Po v. Bautista, (103 SCRA 388 [1981]), we ruled that damages claimed to have been
suffered as a consequence of an action filed against the petitioner must be pleaded in the same action
as a compulsory counterclaim. We were referring, however, to a case filed by the private respondent
against the petitioners or parties in the litigation. In the present case, the counterclaim was filed against
the lawyer, not against the party plaintiff itself.
To allow a counterclaim against a lawyer who files a complaint for his clients, who is merely their
representative in court and not a plaintiff or complainant in the case would lead to mischievous
consequences.
A lawyer owes his client entire devotion to his genuine interest, warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability. (See Agpalo, Legal Ethics
[1980] p. 147 citing Javier v. Cornejo, 63 Phil. 293 [1936]; In re Tionko, 43 Phil. 191 [1922]; In re: Atty.
C. T. Oliva, 103 Phil. 312 [1958]; Lualhati v. Albert, 57 Phil. 86 [1932]; Toguib v. Tomol, Jr., G.R. Adm.
Case No. 554, Jan. 3, 1969; People v. Macellones, 49 SCRA 529 [1973]; Tan Kui v. Court of Appeals,
54 SCRA 199 [1973]). A lawyer cannot properly attend to his duties towards his client if, in the same
case, he is kept busy defending himself.
The problem is particularly perplexing for the Solicitor General.1wphi1 As counsel of the Republic, the
Solicitor General has to appear in controversial and politically charged cases. It is not unusual for high
officials of the Government to unwittingly use shortcuts in the zealous desire to expedite executive
programs or reforms. The Solicitor General cannot look at these cases with indifferent neutrality. His
perception of national interest and obedience to instructions from above may compel him to take a
stance which to a respondent may appear too personal and biased. It is likewise unreasonable to
require Government Prosecutors to defend themselves against counterclaims in the very same cases
they are prosecuting.
As earlier stated, we do not suggest that a lawyer enjoys a special immunity from damage suits.
However, when he acts in the name of a client, he should not be sued on a counterclaim in the very
same case he has filed only as counsel and not as a party. Any claim for alleged damages or other
causes of action should be filed in an entirely separate and distinct civil action.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The questioned resolutions of the Sandiganbayan
are SET ASIDE insofar as they allow the counterclaim filed against the petitioner.

xxx xxx xxx

SO ORDERED.

That, upon completion of the payment herein stipulated and agreed, the Vendor agrees to deliver to the
Vendee/s(,) his heirs, administrators and assigns(,) a good and sufficient deed of conveyance covering the
property, subject matter of this deed of conditional sale, in accordance with the provisions of law." (Exh. "A", p.
5, Records)[2]

[G.R. No. 118180. September 20, 1996]

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, Sps. NORMY D.
CARPIO and CARMEN ORQUISA; Sps. ROLANDO D. CARPIO and RAFAELA VILLANUEVA; Sps.
ELISEO D. CARPIO and ANUNCIACION del ROSARIO; LUZ C. REYES, MARIO C. REYES, JULIET
REYES-RUBIN, respondents.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks to set aside the
decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 28 February 1994 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 37158, as well as the
resolution dated 11 August 1994 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The facts are undisputed:
Private respondents were the original owners of a parcel of agricultural land covered by TCT No. T1432, situated in Barrio Capucao, Ozamis City, with an area of 113,695 square meters, more or less.
On 30 May 1977, private respondents mortgaged said land to petitioner. When private respondents
defaulted on their obligation, petitioner foreclosed the mortgage on the land and emerged as sole bidder in the
ensuing auction sale. Consequently, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-10913 was eventually issued in
petitioner's name.
On 6 April 1984, petitioner and private respondents entered into a Deed of Conditional Sale wherein
petitioner agreed to reconvey the foreclosed property to private respondents.
The pertinent stipulations of the Deed provided that:
"WHEREAS, the VENDOR acquired a parcel of land in an auction sale by the City Sheriff of Ozamiz City,
pursuant to Act 3135, as amended, and subject to the redemption period pursuant to CA 141, described as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, the VENDEES offered to repurchase and the VENDOR agreed to sell the above-described
property, subject to the terms and stipulations as hereinafter stipulated, for the sum of SEVENTY THREE
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED ONLY (P73,700.00), with a down payment of P8,900.00 and the balance
of P64,800 shall be payable in six (6) years on equal quarterly amortization plan at 18% interest per
annum. The first quarterly amortization of P4,470.36 shall be payable three months from the date of the
execution of the documents and all subsequent amortization shall be due and payable every quarter
thereafter.

On 6 April 1990, upon completing the payment of the full repurchase price, private respondents
demanded from petitioner the execution of a Deed of Conveyance in their favor.
Petitioner then informed private respondents that the prestation to execute and deliver a deed of
conveyance in their favor had become legally impossible in view of Sec. 6 of Rep. Act 6657 (the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law or CARL) approved 10 June 1988, and Sec. 1 of E.O. 407 issued 10
June 1990.
Aggrieved, private respondents filed a complaint for specific performance with damages against
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Ozamis City, Branch XV. During the pre-trial, the trial court
narrowed down the issue to whether or not Sec. 6 of the CARL (Rep. Act 6657) had rendered legally
impossible compliance by petitioner with its obligation to execute a deed of conveyance of the subject land in
favor of private respondents. The trial court ordered both parties to file their separate memorandum and
deemed the case submitted for decision thereafter.
On 30 January 1992, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive part of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered ordering defendant to execute and deliver unto plaintiffs a deed of final
sale of the land subject of their deed of conditional sale - Lot 5259-A, to pay plaintiffsP10,000.00 as nominal
damages, P5,000.00 as attorney's fees, P3,000.00 as litis expenses and costs."[3]
The trial court held that petitioner interpreted the fourth paragraph of Sec. 6, Rep. Act 6657 literally in
conjunction with Sec. 1 of E.O. 407.
The fourth paragraph of Sec. 6, Rep. Act 6657 states that:
"Upon the effectivity of this Act, any sale disposition, lease, management contract or transfer of possession of
private lands executed by the original landowner in violation of this act shall be null and void; Provided,
however, that those executed prior to this act shall be valid only when registered with the Register of Deeds
after the effectivity of this Act. Thereafter, all Register of Deeds shall inform the DAR within 320 days of any
transaction involving agricultural lands in excess of five hectares."
while Sec. 1 of E.O. 407 states that:
"Sec. 1. All government instrumentalities but not limited to x x x financial institutions such as the DBP x x x
shall immediately execute deeds of transfer in favor of the Republic of the Philippines as represented by the
Department of Agrarian Reform and surrender to the department all landholdings suitable for agriculture."
The court a quo noted that Sec. 6 of Rep. Act 6657, taken in its entirety, is a provision dealing primarily
with retention limits in agricultural land allowed the landowner and his family and that the fourth paragraph,
which nullifies any sale x x x by the original landowner in violation of the Act, does not cover the sale by
petitioner (not the original land owner) to private respondents.

On the other hand, according to the trial court, E.O. 407 took effect on 10 June 1990. But private
respondents completed payment of the price for the property, object of the conditional sale, as early as 6 April
1990. Hence, with the fulfillment of the condition for the sale, the land covered thereby, was detached from the
mass of foreclosed properties held by DBP, and, therefore, fell beyond the ambit or reach of E.O. 407.

It will be noted that Rep. Act 6657 was enacted on 10 June 1988. Following petitioner's argument in this
case, its prestation to execute the deed of sale was rendered legally impossible by Section 6 of said law. In
other words, the deed of conditional sale was extinguished by a supervening event, giving rise to an
impossibility of performance.

Dissatisfied, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), still insisting that its obligation to execute
a Deed of Sale in favor of private respondents had become a legal impossibility and that the non-impairment
clause of the Constitution must yield to the demands of police power.

We reject petitioner's contention as we rule - as the trial court and CA have correctly ruled - that neither
Sec. 6 of Rep. Act 6657 nor Sec. 1 of E.O. 407 was intended to impair the obligation of contract petitioner had
much earlier concluded with private respondents.

On 28 February 1994, the CA rendered judgment dismissing petitioner's appeal on the basis of the
following disquisitions:

More specifically, petitioner cannot invoke the last paragraph of Sec. 6 of Rep. Act 6657 to set aside its
obligations already existing prior to its enactment. In the first place, said last paragraph clearly deals with
"any sale, lease, management contract or transfer or possession of private lands executed by the original land
owner." The original owner in this case is not the petitioner but the private respondents. Petitioner acquired the
land through foreclosure proceedings but agreed thereafter to reconvey it to private respondents, albeit
conditionally.

"It is a rule that if the obligation depends upon a suspensive condition, the demandability as well as the
acquisition or effectivity of the rights arising from the obligation is suspended pending the happening or
fulfillment of the fact or event which constitutes the condition. Once the event which constitutes the condition is
fulfilled resulting in the effectivity of the obligation, its effects retroact to the moment when the essential
elements which gave birth to the obligation have taken place (8 Manresa, 5th Ed. Bk. 1, pa. 33). Applying this
precept to the case, the full payment by the appellee on April 6, 1990 retroacts to the time the contract of
conditional sale was executed on April 6, 1984. From that time, all elements of the contract of sale were
present. Consequently, the contract of sale was perfected. As such, the said sale does not come under the
coverage of R.A. 6657.
It is likewise interesting to note that despite the mandate of Sec. 1, R.A. 6657, appellant continued to accept
the payments made by the appellee until it was fully paid on April 6, 1990. All that the appellant has to do now
is to execute the final deed of sale in favor of the appellee. To follow the line of argument of the appellant
would only result in an unconscionable injury to the appellee. Obligations arising from contracts have the force
of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith (Flavio Macasaet &
Associates, Inc. vs. Commission on Audit, 173 SCRA 352).
Going now to E.O. 407, We hold that the same can neither affect appellant's obligation under the deed of
conditional sale. Under the said law, appellant is required to transfer to the Republic of the Philippines'all lands
foreclosed' effective June 10, 1990. Under the facts obtaining, the subject property has ceased to belong to
the mass of foreclosed property falling within the reach of said law. As earlier explained, the property has
already been sold to herein appellees even before the said E.O. has been enacted. On this same reason, We
therefore need not delve on the applicability of DBP Circular No. 11." [4]
In the present petition for review on certiorari, petitioner still insists on its position that Rep. Act 6657,
E.O. 407 and DBP Circular No. 11 rendered its obligation to execute a Deed of Sale to private respondents "a
legal impossibility."[5] Petitioner also questions the award of attorney's fees, nominal damages, and costs in
favor of private respondents, as not in accord with law and the evidence. [6]
We rule in favor of private respondents.
In conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights, as well as the extinguishment or loss of those already
acquired, shall depend upon the happening of the event which constitutes the condition. [7]
The deed of conditional sale between petitioner and private respondents was executed on 6 April
1984. Private respondents had religiously paid the agreed installments on the property until they completed
payment on 6 April 1990. Petitioner, in fact, allowed private respondents to fulfill the condition of effecting full
payment, and invoked Section 6 of Rep. Act 6657 onlyafter private respondents, having fully paid the
repurchase price, demanded the execution of a Deed of Sale in their favor.

As earlier stated, Sec. 6 of Rep. Act 6657 in its entirety deals with retention limits allowed by law to
small landowners. Since the property here involved is more or less ten (10) hectares, it is then within the
jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to determine whether or not the property can be
subjected to agrarian reform. But this necessitates an entirely different proceeding.
The CARL (Rep. Act 6657) was not intended to take away property without due process of law. Nor is it
intended to impair the obligation of contracts. In the same manner must E.O. 407 be regarded. It was enacted
two (2) months after private respondents had legally fulfilled the condition in the contract of conditional sale by
the payment of all installments on their due dates. These laws cannot have retroactive effect unless there is an
express provision in them to that effect.[8]
As to petitioner's contention, however, that the CA erred in affirming the trial court's decision awarding
nominal damages, and attorney's fees to private respondents, we rule in favor of petitioner.
It appears that the core issue in this case, being a pure question of law, did not reach the trial stage as
the case was submitted for decision after pre-trial.
The award of attorney's fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code is more of an exception to the general
rule that it is not sound policy to place a penalty on the right to litigate. While judicial discretion in the award of
attorney's fees is not entirely left out, the same, as a rule, must have a factual, legal or equitable
justification. The matter cannot and should not be left to speculation and conjecture. [9]
As aptly stated in the Mirasol case:
"x x x The matter of attorney's fees cannot be touched once and only in the dispositive portion of the
decision. The text itself must expressly state the reason why attorney's fees are being awarded. The court,
after reading through the text of the appealed decision, finds the same bereft of any findings of fact and law to
justify the award of attorney's fees. The matter of such fees was touched but once and appears only in the
dispositive portion of the decision. Simply put, the text of the decision did not state the reason why attorney's
fees are being awarded, and for this reason, the Court finds it necessary to disallow the same for being
conjectural."[10]
While DBP committed egregious error in interpreting Sec. 6 of RA 6657, the same is not equivalent to
gross and evident bad faith when it refused to execute the deed of sale in favor of private respondents.

For the same reasons stated above, the award of nominal damages in the amount of P10,000.00
should also be deleted.
The amount of P3,000.00 as litigation expenses and costs against petitioner must remain.

possession of private lands executed by the original landowner in violation of the retention limits
provided thereof upon its effectivity while the latter law requires all government instrumentalities to
immediately execute deeds of transfer in favor of the Republic of the Philippines as represented by the
Department of Agrarian Reform and to surrender to the latter department all landholdings suitable for

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED, and the decision of the CA is
hereby AFFIRMED, for lack of any reversible error, with the MODIFICATION that attorney's fees and nominal
damages awarded to private respondents are hereby DELETED.

agriculture.
Aggrieved, private respondents filed a complaint for specific performance with damages against
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

ISSUE:
The issue is whether or not said laws had rendered legally impossible compliance by
Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 118180, September 20, 1996

petitioner with its obligation to execute a deed of conveyance of the subject land in favor of private
respondents.

262 SCRA 245

HELD:

FACTS:

It is a rule that if the obligation depends upon a suspensive condition, the demandability as
well as the acquisition of effectivity of the rights arising from the obligationis suspended pending the
Private respondents were the original owners of a parcel of land which they mortgaged to

happening or fulfillment of the fact or event which constitutes the condition. Once the event which

petitioner bank and was subsequently foreclosed for the formers default on their obligation.

constitutes the condition is fulfilled resulting in the effectivity of the obligation, its effects retroact to the

Consequently, a Transfer Certificate of Title was eventually issued in petitioners name being the sole

moment when the essebtial elements which gave birth to the obligation have taken place. Applying this

bidder in the auction sale conducted during the foreclosure of said land.

precept to the case, the fullpayment by the appellees on April 6, 1990 retroacts to the time the contract

Thereafter, petitioner and private respondents entered into a Deed of Conditional Salewherein

of conditional sale was executed on April 6, 1984. From that time, all elements of the contract were

petitioner agreed to reconvey the foreclosed property to private respondents under the condition that

present.Consequently; the contract of sale was perfected. As such, the said sale does not come under

petitioner shall deliver to private respondents, their heirs, administrators and assigns a good and

the coverage of R.A. 6657 and E.O. 407.

sufficient deed of conveyance covering the property, subject matter of the said deed of conditional sale,
upon completion of payment by said private respondents.
Upon completing the payment of the full repurchase price, private respondents demanded from
petitioner the execution of a Deed of Conveyance in their favor.

Petitioner then informed private respondents that the prestation to execute and deliver a deed
of conveyance in their favor had become legally impossible in view of Sec.6 of R.A. 6657
(Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) approved on June 10, 1988 and Sec.1 of E.O. 407 issued June
10, 1990. The former law annulling all sales, dispositions, leases, management contracts or transfers of

Further, R.A. 6657 refers to the original owners of said agricultural lands and petitioner is not
as such.