No. L-68635. May 14, 1987.

*
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. WENCESLAO
LAURETA, AND OF CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE in G.R. No.
68635, entitled "EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL."
Attorneys; Due Process; Contempt; Where an attorney and a part-litigant were given a "ShowCause" order and they replied thereto and their arguments were not believed by the Supreme
Court, their plea that the Supreme Court violated due process for not ordering a hearing before
resolving the disbarment and contempt charges contained in the "Show-Cause" Order is not
impressed with merit.The argument premised on lack of hearing and due process; is not
impressed with merit. What due process abhors is absolute lack of opportunity to be heard (Tajonera
vs. Lamaroza. et al. 110 SCRA 438 [1981]). The word "hearing" does not necessarily connote a "trialtype" proceeding. In the show-cause Resolution of this Court, dated January 29, 1987, Atty. Laureta
was given sufficient opportunity to inform this Court of the reasons why he should not be subjected to
disciplinary action. His Answer, wherein he prayed that the disciplinary action against him be
dismissed, contained twenty-two (22) pages, double spaced. Eva Maravilla-Ilustre was also given a
like opportunity to explain her statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Court and/or the
official actions of the Justices concerned. Her Compliance Answer, wherein she prayed that the
contempt proceeding against her be dismissed, contained nineteen (19) pages, double spaced. Both
were afforded ample latitude to explain matters fully. Atty. Laureta denied having authored the letters
written by Ilustre, his being her counsel before the Tanodbayan, his having circularized to the press
copies of the complaint filed before said body, and his having committed acts unworthy of his
profession. But the Court believed otherwise and found that those letters and the charges levelled
against the Justices concerned, of themselves and by themselves, betray not only their malicious and
contemptuous character, but also the lack of respect for the two highest Courts of the land, a complete
obliviousness to the fundamental principle of separation of powers, and a wanton disregard of the
cardinal doctrine of independence of the Judiciary. Res ipsa loquitur. Nothing more needed to have
been said or proven. The necessity to conduct any further evidentiary hearing was obviated (see
People vs. Hon. Valenzuela, G.R. Nos. 63950-60, April 19, 1985, 135 SCRA 712). Atty. Laureta and
llustre were given ample opportunity to be heard, and were, in fact, heard.
Same; Same; Atty. Laureta's wife received the Tanodbayan resolution and his wife delivered it
to Mrs. Ilustre. Hence, Atty. Laureta cannot plausibly say his professional services for Mrs.
llustre had already been terminated.Of import, as well, is the report of Lorenzo C. Bardel, a
process server of this Court, that after having failed to serve copy of the Per Curiam Resolution of
March 12, 1987 of this Court on Ilustre personally at her address of record, "101 F. Manalo St., Cubao,
Quezon City," having been informed that she is "not a resident of the place," he proceeded to the
residence of Atty. Laureta where the latter's wife "voluntarily received the two copies of decision for her
husband and for Ms. Maravilla-Ilustre" (p. 670, Rollo, Vol. II). That Ilustre subsequently received copy
of this Court's Resolution delivered to Mrs. Laureta is shown by the fact that she filed, as of March 27,
1987, a "Petition for Extension of Time to file Motion for Reconsideration" and subsequently the Motion
for Reconsideration. In that Petition Ilustre acknowledged receipt of the Resolution on March 12, 1987,
the very same date Mrs. Laureta received copy thereof. If, indeed, the lawyer-client relationship
between her husband and Ilustre had been allegedly completely severed, all Mrs. Laureta had to do
was to return to the Sherif f the copy intended for Ilustre. As it was, however, service on Atty. Laureta
proved to be service on Ilustre as well. The close tie-up between the corespondents is heightened by
the fact that three process servers of this Court failed to serve copy of this Court's Per Curiam
Resolution on Ilustre personally.
Same; Same; If Atty. Laureta had nothing to do with the complaint in question (against some
members of the Supreme Court in the Tanodbayan), the DZRH reporter would not have called
him for an interview regarding it and he would not have given comments.Noteworthy, as well,
is that by Atty. Laureta's own admission, he was the one called by a "reporter" of DZRH to comment on
the Ilustre charges before the Tanodbayan. If, in fact, he had nothing to do with the complaint, he
would not have been pinpointed at all And if his disclaimer were the truth, the logical step for him to
have taken was to refer the caller to the lawyer/s allegedly assisting Ilustre, at the very least, out of
elementary courtesy and propriety. But he did "nothing of the sort." He gave his comment with alacrity.

Same; Same; The lack of respect of Atty. Laureta to the Supreme Court is shown by his
assertion that he understands the cooperation of Bulletin Today in remarking about the SC
decision suspending him as a lawyer.The impudence and lack of respect of Atty, Laureta for this
Court again surfaces when he asserts in his Motion for Reconsideration that he "understands the
cooperation" of the Bulletin Today as manifested in the serialized publication of the Per Curiam
Resolution of this Court and his being subjected to a scathing editorial by the same newspaper
"because after all, the Court rendered a favorable judgment in the Bulletin union case last year." The
malice lurking in that statement is most unbecoming of an officer of the Court and is an added reason
for denying reconsideration.
Same; Same; Atty. Laureta's protestations that he has done his best to uphold the Court's
dignity rings with insincerity.Atty. Laureta's protestations that he has done his best to protect and
uphold the dignity of this Court are belied by environmental facts and circumstances. His apologetic
stance for the "adverse publicity" generated by the filing of the charges against the Justices concerned
before the Tanodbayan rings with insincerity. The complaint was calculated precisely to serve that very
purpose. The threat to bring the case to "another forum of justice" was implemented to the full.
Besides, he misses the heart of the matter. Exposure to the glare of publicity is an occupational
hazard. If he has been visited with disciplinary sanctions it is because by his conduct, acts and
statements, he has, overall, deliberately sought to destroy the "authenticity, integrity, and
conclusiveness of collegiate acts," to "undermine the role of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of
all justiciable disputes," and to subvert public confidence in the integrity of the Courts and the Justices
concerned, and in the orderly administration of j ustice.
Same; Same; Same; Mrs. Ilustre and her counsel have allowed suspicion to blind their actions
and in so doing degraded the administration of justice. Court personnel cannot know the
voting of Justices in a case.Neither do we find merit in Ilustre's Motion for Reconsideration. She
has turned deaf ears to any reason or clarification. She and her counsel have refused to accept the
untenability of their case and the inevitability of losing in Court. They have allowed suspicion alone to
blind their actions and in so doing degraded the administration of justice, "Investigation" was utterly
uncalled for. All conclusions and judgments of the Court, be they en banc or by Division, are arrived at
only after deliberation. The fact that no dissent was indicated in the Minutes of the proceedings held
on May 14,1986 showed that the members of the Division voted unanimously. Court personnel are not
in a position to know the voting in any case because all deliberations are held behind closed doors
without any one of them being present. No malicious inferences should have been drawn from their
inability to furnish the information Ilustre and Atty. Laureta desired. The personality of the Solicitor
General never came into the picture. It was Justice Abad Santos, and not Justice Yap, who was
Chairman of the First Division when the Resolution of May 14, 1986 denying the Petition was
rendered. Thereafter Justice Yap inhibited himself from any participation. The fact that the Court en
banc upheld the challenged Resolutions of the First Division emphasizes the unmeritoriousness of
Ilustre's case irrespective of the personalities involved.

DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA, M.P., AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, M.P., ORLANDO S. MERCADO, M.P.,

HONORATO Y. AQUINO, M.P., ZAFIRO L. RESPICIO, M.P., DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, M.P., OSCAR F.
SANTOS, M.P., ALBERTO G. ROMULO, M.P., CIRIACO R. ALFELOR, M.P., ISIDORO E. REAL, M.P.,
EMIGDIO L. LINGAD, M.P., ROLANDO C. MARCIAL, M.P., PEDRO M. MARCELLANA, M.P., VICTOR
S. ZIGA, M.P., and ROGELIO V. GARCIA, M.P., petitioners, vs. HON. MANUEL ALBA in his capacity

as the MINISTER OF THE BUDGET and VICTOR MACALINGCAG in his capacity as the
TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Constitutional Law; The Court may pass upon constitutionality of Presidential Decree No.
1177, otherwise known as the "Budget Reform Decree of 1977".Indeed, where the legislature or
the executive branch is acting within the limits of its authority, the judiciary cannot and ought not to
interfere with the former. But where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its
constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the
government had assumed to do, as void. This is the essence of judicial power conferred by the
Constitution "In one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law" [Art. VIII,
Section I of the 1935 Constitution; Art. X, Section 1 of the 1973 Constitution and which was adopted
as part of the Freedom Constitution, and Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution] and which power
this Court has exercised in many instances.
Same; Same; Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD 1177 being repugnant to Section 16(5) Article
VIII of the 1973 Constitution declared null and void.Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177
unduly over-extends the privilege granted under said Section 16[5], It empowers the President to
indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive
Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the
General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the
funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or
whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be
made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby
amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof.
Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void. [Demetria vs.
Alba, 148 SCRA 208(1987)]

PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC. (COCOFED), MANUEL V. DEL

ROSARIO, DOMINGO P. ESPINA, SALVADOR P. BALLARES, JOSELITO A. MORALEDA, PAZ M.
YASON, VICENTE A. CADIZ, CESARIA DE LUNA TITULAR, and RAYMUNDO C. DE VILLA,
petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
JOVITO R. SALONGA, WIGBERTO E. TAADA, OSCAR F. SANTOS, ANA THERESIA
HONTIVEROS, and TEOFISTO L. GUINGONA III, Oppositors-Intervenors.
G.R. No. 178193.** September 17, 2009.*
DANILO B. URUSA, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G.R. No. 180705.** September 17, 2009.*
EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Corporation Law; A treasury share or stock, which may be common or preferred, may be used
for a variety of corporate purposes, such as for a stock bonus plan for management and
employees or for acquiring another company.A treasury share or stock, which maybe common or
preferred, may be used for a variety of corporate purposes, such as for a stock bonus plan for
management and employees or for acquiring another company. It may be held indefinitely, resold or
retired. While held in the companys treasury, the stock earns no dividends and has no vote in
company affairs. Thus, the CIIF common shares that would become treasury shares are not entitled to
voting rights. And should conversion push through, SMC, not Cojuangco, Jr., becomes the owner of
the reacquired sequestered CIIF SMC common shares. Should SMC opt, however, to sell said shares
in the future, prospective buyers, including possibly Cojuangco, Jr., have to put up their own money to
acquire said common shares. Thus, it is erroneous for intervenors to say that Cojuangco, Jr., with the
use of SMC funds, will be acquiring the CIIF SMC common shares. It bears to stress that it was SMC
which amended its articles of incorporation, reclassifying the existing composition of the authorized
capital stock from PhP 4.5 billion common shares to PhP 3.39 billion common shares and PhP 1.11
billion Series 1 Preferred Shares. The conversion in question is a legitimate exercise of corporate
powers under the Corporation Code. The shares in question will not be acquired with SMC funds but
by reason of the reconfiguration of said shares to preferred shares.
Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Under the principle of separation of powers, neither
Congress, the President, nor the Judiciary may encroach on fields allocated to the other
branches of government.The decision on whether to proceed with the conversion or defer action
thereon until final adjudication of the issue of ownership over the sequestered shares properly pertains
to the executive branch, represented by the PCGG. Just as it cannot look into the wisdom behind the
enactment of a law, the Court cannot question the wisdom and reasons behind the decision of the
executive branch to ask for the conversion of the common shares to preferred shares. Else, the Court
would be trenching on the well-settled doctrine of separation of powers. The cardinal postulate
explains that the three branches must discharge their respective functions within the limits of authority
conferred by the Constitution. Under the principle of separation of powers, neither Congress, the
President, nor the Judiciary may encroach on fields allocated to the other branches of government.
The legislature is generally limited to the enactment of laws, the executive to the enforcement of laws,
and the judiciary to their interpretation and application to cases and contro-versies. Jurisprudence is
well-established that the courts cannot intervene or interfere with executive or legislative discretion
exercised within constitutional limits. In JG Summit Holdings, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 450 SCRA 169
(2005), the Court explained: The discretion to accept or reject a bid and award contracts is vested in
the Government agencies entrusted with that function. The discretion given to the authorities on this
matter is of such wide latitude that the Courts will not interfere therewith, unless it is apparent that it is
used as a shield to a fraudulent award (Jalandoni v. NARRA, 108 Phil. 486 [1960]). x x x The exercise
of this discretion is a policy decision that necessitates prior inquiry, investigation, comparison,
evaluation, and deliberation. This task can best be discharged by the Government agencies x x x. The
role of the Courts is to ascertain whether a branch or instrumentality of the Government has
transgressed its constitutional boundaries. But the Courts will not interfere with executive or legislative
discretion exercised within those boundaries. Otherwise, it strays into the realm of policy decisionmaking.

Administrative Law; Administrative decisions on matters within the jurisdiction of

administrative bodies are to be respected and can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of
discretion, fraud, or error of law.Corollary to the principle of separation of powers is the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction that the courts will DEFER to the decisions of the administrative offices and
agencies by reason of their expertise and experience in the matters assigned to them. Administrative
decisions on matters within the jurisdiction of administrative bodies are to be respected and can only
be set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law. The only instance when the
Courts ought to interfere is when a department or an agency has acted with grave abuse of discretion
or violated a law. A circumspect review of the pleadings and evidence extant on record shows that the
PCGG approved the conversion only after it conducted an in-depth inquiry, thorough study, and
judicious evaluation of the pros and cons of the proposed conversion.

Constitutional Law; Judgments; The approval by the Presidential Commission on Good

Government (PCGG), for respondent Republic, of the conversion is a policy decision which
cannot be interfered with in the absence of a showing or proof, as here, that PCGG committed
grave abuse of discretion.The approval by the PCGG,for respondent Republic, of the conversion
is a policy decision which cannot be interfered with in the absence of a showing or proof, as here, that
PCGG committed grave abuse of discretion. In the similar Palm Avenue Realty Development
Corporation v. PCGG, 153 SCRA 579 (1987), the Court ruled that the approval by PCGG of the sale of
the sequestered shares of petitioner corporations allegedly owned and controlled by Kokoy Romualdez
was legal and could not be the subject of a writ of certiorari or prohibition, absent proof that PCGG
committed a grave abuse of discretion. The price of PhP 29 per share approved by the PCGG was
even below the prevailing price of PhP 43 per share.
Presidential Commission on Good Government; Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) has ample powers to address alleged strategies to thwart recovery of illgotten wealth.The mere presence of four (4) PCGG nominated directors in the SMC Board does
not mean it can prevent board actions that are viewed to fritter away the company assets. Even under
the status quo, PCGG has no controlling sway in the SMC Board, let alone a veto power at 24% of the
stockholdings. In relinquishing the voting rights, the government, through PCGG, is not in reality
ceding control. Moreover, PCGG has ample powers to address alleged strategies to thwart recovery of
ill-gotten wealth. Thus, the loss of voting rights has no significant effect on PCGGs function to recover
ill-gotten wealth or prevent dissipation of sequestered assets.
Corporation Law; It is also not correct to say that the holders of the preferred shares lose all
their voting rights.It is also not correct to say that the holders of the preferred shares lose all their
voting rights. Sec. 6 of the Corporation Code provides for the situations where non-voting shares like
preferred shares are granted voting rights, viz.: Section6. Classification of shares.The shares of
stock in corporations may be divided into classes or series of shares, or both, any of which classes or
series of shares may have such rights, privileges or restrictions as may be stated in the articles of
incorporation: Provided, That no share may be deprived of voting rights except those classified and
issues as preferred or redeemable shares, unless otherwise provided in this Code: Provided,
further, That there shall always be a class or series of shares which have complete voting rights.
Same; The loss of four (4) board seats would not in reality prejudice the rights and interests of
the holders of the preferred shares.The preferred shares will be placed under sequestration and
management of PCGG. It has powers to protect and preserve the sequestered preferred shares even
if there are no government-nominated directors in the SMC Board. Thus, the loss of four (4) board
seats would not in reality prejudice the rights and interests of the holders of the preferred shares. And
such loss is compensated by the tremendous financial gains and benefits and enormous protection
from loss or deterioration of the value of the CIIF SMC shares. The advantages accorded to the
preferred shares are undeniable, namely: the significant premium in the price being offered; the
preference enjoyed in the dividends as well as in the liquidation of assets; and the voting rights still

retained by preferred shares in major corporate actions. All things considered, conversion to preferred
shares would best serve the interests and rights of the government or the eventual owner of the CIIF
SMC shares.
Sequestration; The Court rules that the dividends shall be placed in escrow either at the Land
Bank of the Philippines or at the Development Bank of the Philippines in the name of
respondent Republic and not Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED).On
the issue of the net dividends accruing to COCOFED, the Court rules that the dividends shall be
placed in escrow either at the Land Bank of the Philippines or at the Development Bank of the
Philippines in the name of respondent Republic and not COCOFED.
Same; The Court, to be sure, has not barred the conversion of any sequestered common
shares of a corporation into preferred shares.The Court, to be sure, has not barred the
conversion of any sequestered common shares of a corporation into preferred shares. It may be
argued that the conversion scheme under consideration may later on be treated as an indirect sale of
the common shares from the registered owner to another person if and when SMC decides to redeem
the Series 1 preferred shares on the third anniversary from the issue date of the preferred shares. Still,
given the circumstances of the pending incident, the Court can validly allow the proposed conversion
in accordance with Rule 57, Sec. 11, in relation to Rule 59, Sec. 6 of the Rules of Court. Sec. 11
reads: SEC. 11. When attached property may be sold after levy on attachment and before entry of
judgment.Whenever it shall be made to appear to the court in which the action is pending, upon
hearing with notice to both parties, that the property attached is perishable, or that the interests of all
the parties to the action will be subserved by the sale thereof, the court may order such property to be
sold at public auction in such manner as it may direct, and the proceeds of such sale to be deposited
in court to abide the judgment in the action.

Same; While the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), as a sequestrator,

does not exercise acts of ownership over sequestered assets, the proper court, where the case
involving the sequestered asset is pending, may, nevertheless, issue a positive and definite
order authorizing the sale of said assets.Even if the conversion-cum-redemption partakes of an
indirect sale, PCGG can be allowed to approve the conversion in line with our ruling in Palm Avenue
Realty Development Corporation, 153 SCRA 579 (1987), subject to the approval of the Court.
Evidently, as long as the interests of all the parties will be subserved by the sale of the sequestered
properties, the Court may allow the properties to be sold. More so, the Rules would allow the mere
conversion of the shares of stock given the evident benefit that all the parties would receive from such
conversion that far outweighs any perceived disadvantage. Thus, the Court is clearly empowered to
allow the conversion herein pressed by the PCGG. While the PCGG, as sequestrator, does not
exercise acts of ownership over sequestered assets, the proper court, where the case involving the
sequestered asset is pending, may, nevertheless, issue a positive and definite order authorizing the
sale of said assets. As we held in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 192 scra 743 (1990): Our temporary
restraining order lifting the Sandiganbayan restraining order did not, by any stretch of the imagination,
authorize PCGG to sell the Falcon aircraft. A definite and positive order of a court is needed before the
jet plane may be sold. The proper procedure after the lifting of the restraining order was for PCGG to
go to Sandiganbayan and ask for formal authority to sell the aircraft. x xx The ruling in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan voiding the sale by PCGG of a sequestered jet does not apply squarely to the incident
at bar, because PCGG did not, in that case, seek court approval before the sale. Moreover, PCGG was
not able to provide any justification for the seizure of the jet from the lessee. In the pending incident
before the Court, it has long been settled that the CIIF SMC common shares were bought by what
have been declared as prima facie public funds. Thus, the sequestration is justified. More
importantly,respondent Republic, as contained in the Supplemental Comment filed by the OSG dated
September 4, 2009, has adopted Resolution No. 2009-037-756 approving the conversion of the
shares, and has prayed for the approval by the Court of such conversion.

HACIENDA LUISITA, INCORPORATED, petitioner, LUISITA INDUSTRIAL PARK CORPORATION

and RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, petitioners-in-intervention, vs.
PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL; SECRETARY NASSER PANGANDAMAN OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM; ALYANSA NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG BUKID NG
HACIENDA LUISITA, RENE GALANG, NOEL MALLARI, and JULIO SUNIGA1 and his
SUPERVISORY GROUP OF THE HACIENDA LUISITA, INC. and WINDSOR ANDAYA,
respondents.
Constitutional Law; Words and Phrases; Operative Fact Doctrine; The operative fact doctrine
does not only apply to laws subsequently declared unconstitutional or unlawful as it also
applies to executive acts subsequently declared as invalid.Contrary to the stance of
respondents, the operative fact doctrine does not only apply to laws subsequently declared
unconstitutional or unlawful, as it also applies to executive acts subsequently declared as invalid. As
We have discussed in Our July 5, 2011 Decision: That the operative fact doctrine squarely applies to
executive actsin this case, the approval by PARC of the HLI proposal for stock distributionis wellsettled in our jurisprudence. In Chavez v. National Housing Authority, We held: Petitioner postulates
that the operative fact doctrine is inapplicable to the present case because it is an equitable doctrine
which could not be used to countenance an inequitable result that is contrary to its proper office. On
the other hand, the petitioner Solicitor General argues that the existence of the various agreements
implementing the SMDRP is an operative fact that can no longer be disturbed or simply ignored, citing
Rieta v. People of the Philippines. The argument of the Solicitor General is meritorious. The operative
fact doctrine is embodied in De Agbayani v. Court of Appeals, wherein it is stated that a legislative or
executive act,prior to its being declared as unconstitutional by the courts, is valid and must be
complied with.
Same; Same; The term executive act is broad enough to encompass decisions of
administrative bodies and agencies under the executive department which are subsequently
revoked by the agency in question or nullified by the Court.For one, neither the De Agbayani
case nor the Municipality of Malabang case elaborates what executive act mean. Moreover, while
orders, rules and regulations issued by the President or the executive branch have fixed definitions
and meaning in the Administrative Code and jurisprudence, the phrase executive act does not have
such specific definition under existing laws. It should be noted that in the cases cited by the minority,
nowhere can it be found that the term executive act is confined to the foregoing. Contrarily, the term
executive act is broad enough to encompass decisions of administrative bodies and agencies under
the executive department which are subsequently revoked by the agency in question or nullified by the
Court.
Same; Operative Fact Doctrine; The operative fact doctrine is not confined to statutes and
rules and regulations issued by the executive department that are accorded the same status as
that of a statute or those which are quasi-legislative in nature.The operative fact doctrine is not
confined to statutes and rules and regulations issued by the executive department that are accorded
the same status as that of a statute or those which are quasi-legislative in nature.
Same; Same; The operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity; It is applied only in the absence of
statutory law and never in contravention of said law.The operative fact doctrine is a rule of
equity. As a complement of legal jurisdiction, equity seeks to reach and complete justice where courts
of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special
circumstances of cases, are incompetent to do so. Equity regards the spirit and not the letter, the intent
and not the form, the substance rather than the circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different
courts. Remarkably, it is applied only in the absence of statutory law and never in contravention of
said law.
Corporation Law; Piercing the Veil of Corporate Fiction; Absent any allegation or proof of fraud or other
public policy considerations,the existence of interlocking directors, officers and stockholders is
not enough justification to pierce the veil of corporate fiction.In the third place, by arguing that
the companies involved in the transfers of the 300-hectare portion of Hacienda Luisita have
interlocking directors and, thus, knowledge of one may already be imputed upon all the other

companies, AMBALA and Rene Galang, in effect, want this Court to pierce the veil of corporate fiction.
However, piercing the veil of corporate fiction is warranted only in cases when the separate legal
entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, such that in
the case of two corporations, the law will regard the corporations as merged into one. Absent any
allegation or proof of fraud or other public policy considerations, the existence of interlocking directors,
officers and stockholders is not enough justification to pierce the veil of corporate fiction as in the
instant case.
Agrarian Reform Law; Expropriation; Just Compensation; Department of Agrarian Reforms
(DARs) land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon
the landowner; The court has the right to review with finality the determination in the exercise
of what is admittedly a judicial function.The foregoing notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the
DARs land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the
landowner. The landowner can file an original action with the RTC acting as a special agrarian court to
determine just compensation. The court has the right to review with finality the determination in the
exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.

BUREAU OF CUSTOMS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (BOCEA), represented by its National

President (BOCEA National Executive Council) Mr. Romulo A. Pagulayan, petitioner, vs. HON.
MARGARITO B. TEVES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Finance, HON.
NAPOLEON L. MORALES, in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, HON. LILIAN
B. HEFTI, in her capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, respondents.
Remedial Law; Actions; Parties; Bureau of Customs Employees Associations (BOCEAs) members
have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that they have sustained or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of the enforcement of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9335 and its Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR).Prefatorily, we note that it is clear, and in fact uncontroverted, that BOCEA
has locus standi. BOCEA impugns the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR because its
members, who are rank-and-file employees of the BOC, are actually covered by the law and its IRR.
BOCEAs members have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that they have
sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of the enforcement of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR.
Constitutional Law; Administrative Agencies; Separation of Powers; The principle of separation of
powers ordains that each of the three great branches of government has exclusive cognizance of and
is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere; The principle of nondelegation of powers admits of numerous exceptions.The principle of separation of powers ordains
that each of the three great branches of government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in
matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere. Necessarily imbedded in this doctrine is
the principle of non-delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegata non
delegari potest, which means what has been delegated, cannot be delegated. This doctrine is based
on the ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be
performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the
intervening mind of another. However, this principle of non-delegation of powers admits of numerous
exceptions, one of which is the delegation of legislative power to various specialized administrative
agencies like the Board in this case.
Same; Equal Protection Clause; Equal protection simply provides that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated in a similar manner, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed; Purpose of the Equal Protection Clause.Equal protection simply provides that all persons
or things similarly situated should be treated in a similar manner, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a

states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express
terms of a statute or by its improper execution through the states duly constituted authorities. In other
words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may
not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate
governmental objective.
Same; Due Process; The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied
to administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain ones side.The essence
of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, a fair
and reasonable opportunity to explain ones side. BOCEAs apprehension of
deprivation of due process finds its answer in Section 7 (b) and (c) of R.A. No. 9335. The concerned
BIR or BOC official or employee is not simply given a target revenue collection and capriciously left
without any quarter. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR clearly give due consideration to all relevant factors that
may affect the level of collection.
Same; Statutes; Bill of Attainder; Republic Act No. 9335 is not a bill of attainder; A bill of attainder is a
legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a particular group without a
judicial trial.On this score, we hold that R.A. No. 9335 is not a bill of attainder. A bill of attainder is a
legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a particular group without a
judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain individuals or a group of
individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial.
Same; Same; Same; Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9335 merely lays down the grounds for the termination of
a Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) or Bureau of Customs (BOC) official or employee and provides for
the consequences thereof.R.A. No. 9335 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does
not seek to inflict punishment without a judicial trial. R.A. No. 9335 merely lays down the grounds for
the termination of a BIR or BOC official or employee and provides for the consequences thereof. The
democratic processes are still followed and the constitutional rights of the concerned employee are
amply protected.
Same; Same; Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9335 has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to
justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution and not one
that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative.As the Court is not a trier of facts, the investigation on
the veracity of, and the proper action on these anomalies are in the hands of the Executive branch.
Correlatively, the wisdom for the enactment of this law remains within the domain of the Legislative
branch. We merely interpret the law as it is. The Court has no discretion to give statutes a meaning
detached from the manifest intendment and language thereof. Just like any other law, R.A. No. 9335
has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative.
We have so declared in Abakada, and we now reiterate that R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR are
constitutional.

BRENDA L. NAZARETH, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF SCIENCE AND

TECHNOLOGY, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. IX, ZAMBOANGA CITY, petitioner, vs. THE HON.
REYNALDO A. VILLAR, HON. JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR., (COMMISSIONERS OF THE
COMMISSION ON AUDIT), and DIR. KHEM M. INOK, respondents.
Magna Carta for Scientists, Engineers, Researchers, and other Science and Technology Personnel in
the Government (R.A. No. 8439); Science and Technology; The salary scale of science and
technology personnel is differentiated by R.A. No. 8439 from the salary scales of government
employees under the existing law.R.A. No. 8439 was enacted as a manifestation of the States
recognition of science and technology as an essential component for the attainment of national
development and progress. The law offers a program of human resources development in science and
technology to help realize and maintain a sufficient pool of talent and manpower that will sustain the
initiative for total science and technology mastery. In furtherance of this objective, the law not only
ensures scholarship programs and improved science and engineering education, but also affords
incentives for those pursuing careers in science and technology. Moreover, the salary scale of science
and technology personnel is differentiated by R.A. No. 8439 from the salary scales of government
employees under the existing law.
Constitutional Law; Article VI, Section 29 (1) of the 1987 Constitution firmly declares that: No money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.Article VI,
Section 29 (1) of the 1987 Constitution firmly declares that: No money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. This constitutional edict requires that
the GAA be purposeful, deliberate, and precise in its provisions and stipulations. As such, the
requirement under Section 20 of R.A. No. 8439 that the amounts needed to fund the Magna Carta
benefits were to be appropriated by the GAA only meant that such funding must be purposefully,
deliberately, and precisely included in the GAA. The funding for the Magna Carta benefits would not
materialize as a matter of course simply by fiat of R.A. No. 8439, but must initially be proposed by the
officials of the DOST as the concerned agency for submission to and consideration by Congress. That
process is what complies with the constitutional edict. R.A. No. 8439 alone could not fund the payment
of the benefits because the GAA did not mirror every provision of law that referred to it as the source of
funding. It is worthy to note that the DOST itself acknowledged the absolute need for the appropriation
in the GAA. Otherwise, Secretary Uriarte, Jr. would not have needed to request the OP for the express
authority to use the savings to pay the Magna Carta benefits.
General Appropriations Act (GAA); The President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional
Commissions are authorized to transfer appropriations to augment any item in the General
Appropriations Act (GAA) for their respective offices from the savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.In the funding of current activities, projects, and programs, the general rule should
still be that the budgetary amount contained in the appropriations bill is the extent Congress will
determine as sufficient for the budgetary allocation for the proponent agency. The only exception is
found in Section 25 (5), Article VI of the Constitution, by which the President, the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the
heads of Constitutional Commissions are authorized to transfer appropriations to augment any item in
the GAA for their respective offices from the savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
The plain language of the constitutional restriction leaves no room for the petitioners posture, which
we should now dispose of as untenable.
Same; Commission on Audit (COA); The Commission on Audit (COA) is endowed with sufficient
latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow the irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or
unconscionable expenditures of government funds.The COA is endowed with sufficient latitude to
determine, prevent, and disallow the irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable
expenditures of government funds. It has the power to ascertain whether public funds were utilized for
the purposes for which they had been intended by law. The Constitution has made the COA the
guardian of public funds, vesting it with broad powers over all accounts pertaining to government
revenue and expenditures and the uses of public funds and property, including the exclusive authority
to define the scope of its audit and examination, to establish the techniques and methods for such

review, and to promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations. Thus, the COA is generally
accorded complete discretion in the exercise of its constitutional duty and responsibility to examine
and audit expenditures of public funds, particularly those which are perceptibly beyond what is
sanctioned by law. Verily, the Court has sustained the decisions of administrative authorities like the
COA as a matter of general policy, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but
also upon the recognition that such administrative authorities held the expertise as to the laws they are
entrusted to enforce. The Court has accorded not only respect but also finality to their findings
especially when their decisions are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to
grave abuse of discretion.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Commission on Audit (COA); Only when the
Commission on Audit (COA) has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may the Court entertain and grant a petition for
certiorari brought to assail its actions.Only when the COA has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may the Court
entertain and grant a petition for certiorari brought to assail its actions. Section 1 of Rule 65, Rules of
Court, demands that the petitioner must show that, one, the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and, two, there is neither an appeal nor any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of amending or nullifying the
proceeding. Inasmuch as the sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction,
which includes the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, the
petitioner should establish that the COA gravely abused its discretion. The abuse of discretion must be
grave, which means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or
board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere
abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the writ. [Nazareth vs. Villar, 689 SCRA
385(2013)]

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. (METROBANK), represented by ROSELLA A. SANTIAGO,

petitioner, vs. ANTONINO O. TOBIAS III, respondent.
Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have
no right to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Executive Branch of the Government, or to substitute their own judgments for that of the Executive
Branch.Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to directly decide
matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Executive Branch of the
Government, or to substitute their own judgments for that of the Executive Branch, represented in this
case by the Department of Justice. The settled policy is that the courts will not interfere with the
executive determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing an information, in the absence of
grave abuse of discretion. That abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in
contemplation of law, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or hostility. For instance, in Balanganan v. Court of Appeals, Special Nineteenth
Division, Cebu City, 562 SCRA 184 (2008), the Court ruled that the Secretary of Justice exceeded his
jurisdiction when he required hard facts and solid evidence in order to hold the defendant liable for
criminal prosecution when such requirement should have been left to the court after the conduct of a
trial.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; At a preliminary investigation, the
investigating prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice only determines whether the act or omission
complained of constitutes the offense charged.We stress that a preliminary investigation for the
purpose of determining the existence of probable cause is not part of a trial. At a preliminary
investigation, the investigating prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice only determines whether the act
or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Probable cause refers to facts and
circumstances that engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the
respondent is probably guilty thereof. There is no definitive standard by which probable cause is
determined except to consider the attendant conditions; the existence of probable cause depends
upon the finding of the public prosecutor conducting the examination, who is called upon not to
disregard the facts presented, and to ensure that his finding should not run counter to the clear
dictates of reason.
Criminal Law; Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents; Elements of.Tobias was charged
with estafa through falsification of public document the elements of which are: (a) the accused uses a
fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions, or employs other similar deceits; (b) such false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud; (c) the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act
or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false
pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; and (d) as a result thereof, the offended party suffered
damage. It is required that the false statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the very cause
or the only motive that induced the complainant to part with the thing.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Presumptions; A presumption of law is material during the actual trial of the
criminal case where in the establishment thereof the party against whom the inference is made should
adduce evidence to rebut the presumption and demolish the prima facie case.A presumption affects
the burden of proof that is normally lodged in the State. The effect is to create the need of presenting
evidence to overcome the prima facie case that shall prevail in the absence of proof to the contrary. As
such, a presumption of law is material during the actual trial of the criminal case where in the
establishment thereof the party against whom the inference is made should adduce evidence to rebut
the presumption and demolish the prima facie case. This is not so in a preliminary investigation, where
the investigating prosecutor only determines the existence of a prima facie case that warrants the
prosecution of a criminal case in court.
Same; Same; Same; The presumption that whoever possesses or uses a spurious document is its
forger applies only in the absence of a satisfactory explanation.The presumption that whoever

possesses or uses a spurious document is its forger applies only in the absence of a satisfactory
explanation. Accordingly, we cannot hold that the Secretary of Justice erred in dismissing the
information in the face of the controverting explanation by Tobias showing how he came to possess
the spurious document. Much less can we consider the dismissal as done with abuse of discretion,
least of all grave.
Banks and Banking; Negligence; Banks are expected to exercise greater care and prudence than
others in their dealings because their business is impressed with public interest.We do not lose sight
of the fact that METROBANK, a commercial bank dealing in real property, had the duty to observe due
diligence to ascertain the existence and condition of the realty as well as the validity and integrity of
the documents bearing on the realty. Its duty included the responsibility of dispatching its competent
and experience representatives to the realty to assess its actual location and condition, and of
investigating who was its real owner. Yet, it is evident that METROBANK did not diligently perform a
thorough check on Tobias and the circumstances surrounding the realty he had offered as collateral.
As such, it had no one to blame but itself. Verily, banks are expected to exercise greater care and
prudence than others in their dealings because their business is impressed with public interest. Their
failure to do so constitutes negligence on its part. [Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. (Metrobank)vs.
Tobias III, 664 SCRA 165(2012)]

MOHAMMAD ALI DIMAPORO, petitioner, vs. HON. RAMON V. MITRA, JR., Speaker, House of
Representatives, and (HON QUIRINO D. ABAD SANTOS, JR.) HON. CAMILO L. SABIO, Secretary,
House of representatives, respondents.
Administrative Law; Election Law; Petitioner's assumption that the questioned statutory provision is no
longer operative does not hold water.Obviously then, petitioner's assumption that the questioned
statutory provision is no longer operative does not hold water. He failed to discern that rather than cut
short the term of office of elective public officials, this statutory provision seeks to ensure that such
officials serve out their entire term of office by discouraging them from running for another public office
and thereby cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they
cannot go back to their former position. This is consonant with the constitutional edict that all public
officials must serve the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which they have
received from their constituents.
Same; Same; Term of office distinguished from tenure.In theorizing that the provision under
consideration cuts short the term of office of a Member of Congress, petitioner seems to confuse
"term" with "tenure" of office. As succinctly distinguished by the Solicitor General: "The term of office
prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the
period during which an officer actually holds the office (tenure), may be affected by circumstances
within or beyond the power of said officer. Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may not exist at
all. These situations will not change the duration of the term of office (see Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles,
76 Phil. 12)."
Same; Same; Same; Fact that the ground cited in Section 67, Article lX of BP Blg. 881 is not
mentioned in the Constitution itself as a mode of shortening the tenure of office of members of
Congress does not preclude its application to present members of Congress.That the ground cited
in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the Constitution itself as a mode of
shortening the tenure of office of members of Congress, does not preclude its application to present
members of Congress. Section 2 of Article XI provides that "(t)he President, the Vice-President, the
Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of
the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All
other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by
impeachment. Such constitutional expression clearly recognizes that the four (4) grounds found in
Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened are not
exclusive.
Same; Same; Forfeiture is automatic and permanently effective upon the filing of the certificate of
candidacy for another office.In Monroy vs. Court of Appeals, a case involving Section 27 of R.A. No.
180 above-quoted, this Court categorically pronounced that "forfeiture (is) automatic and permanently
effective upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office. Only the moment and act of
filing are considered. Once the certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited and nothing save a new
election or appointment can restore the ousted official.
Same; Same; Same; As the mere act of filing the certificate of candidacy for another office produces
automatically the permanent forfeiture of the elective position being presently held, it is not necessary
as petitioner opines, that the other position be actually held.As the mere act of filing the certificate of
candidacy for another office produces automatically the permanent forfeiture of the elective position
being presently held, it is not necessary, as petitioner opines, that the other position be actually held.
The ground for forfeiture in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is different from the forfeiture
decreed in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881, which is actually a mode of voluntary renunciation of
office under Section 7, par. 2 of Article VI of the Constitution.
Constitutional Law; Statute; To justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution not a doubtful and argumentative implication.The basic principle which
underlies the entire field of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is that by enactment of
legislation, a constitutional measure is presumed to be created. This Court has enunciated the
presumption in favor of constitutionality of legislative enactment. To justify the nullification of a law,

there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative
implication. A doubt, even if well-founded, does not suffice. [Dimaporo vs. Mitra, Jr., 202 SCRA
779(1991)]

G.R. No. 147387. December 10, 2003.*

RODOLFO C. FARIAS, MANUEL M. GARCIA, FRANCIS G. ESCUDERO, and AGAPITO A.
AQUINO, AS MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND ALSO AS TAXPAYERS, IN
THEIR OWN BEHALF AND IN REPRESENTATION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE MINORITY IN THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, petitioners, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, HON. FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR., SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY OF THE SENATE, AND SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
G.R. No. 152161. December 10, 2003.*
CONG. GERRY A. SALAPUDDIN, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Policy matters are not the concern of the Supreme Court
government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government.The
legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of harassment or
discrimination that had to be done away with and repealed. The executive department found cause
with Congress when the President of the Philippines signed the measure into law. For sure, some
sectors of society and in government may believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as it would
encourage political adventurism. But policy matters are not the concern of the Court. Government
policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government. It is not for this
Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed, whether an enactment
is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to
achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits
should be exercised in a particular manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the
serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance.
Same; Same; Same; Congress is not precluded from repealing Section 67 of Omnibus Election Code
by the ruling in Dimaporo v. Mitra upholding the validity of the provision and by its pronouncement in
the same case that the provision has a laudable purpose.Congress is not precluded from repealing
Section 67 by the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra upholding the validity of the provision and by
its pronouncement in the same case that the provision has a laudable purpose. Over time, Congress
may find it imperative to repeal the law on its belief that the election process is thereby enhanced and
the paramount objective of election lawsthe fair, honest and orderly election of truly deserving
members of Congressis achieved.
Same; Same; The avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be
embraced in its title page is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its
provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not received the notice, action
and study of the legislators and the public; It cannot be claimed that the legislators were not apprised
of the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as the same was amply and
comprehensively deliberated upon by members of the House of Representatives.Moreover, the
avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is
to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the
enactment into law of matters which have not received the notice, action and study of the legislators
and the public. In this case, it cannot be claimed that the legislators were not apprised of the repeal of
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as the same was amply and comprehensively deliberated
upon by the members of the House. In fact, the petitioners, as members of the House of
Representatives, expressed their reservations regarding its validity prior to casting their votes.
Undoubtedly, the legislators were aware of the existence of the provision repealing Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
Equal Protection Clause; Public Officers; Administrative Law; Substantial distinctions clearly exist
between elective officials and appointive officials.Substantial distinctions clearly exist between
elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the
electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon
stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their
designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a

permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the
appointing authority. Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under
Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative
Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil
service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take part in any
election except to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding
political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities.
Statutes; Enrolled Bill Doctrine; Words and Phrases; Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of a
bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of
both Houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment.The petitioners,
thus, urge the Court to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. The Court is not persuaded. Under the
enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President and
the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its
due enactment. A review of cases reveals the Courts consistent adherence to the rule. The Court
finds no reason to deviate from the salutary rule in this case where the irregularities alleged by the
petitioners mostly involved the internal rules of Congress, e.g., creation of the 2nd or 3rd Bicameral
Conference Committee by the House. This Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these
internal rules of Congress, whether House or Senate. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and
with their observance the courts have no concern. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal
validity of Rep. Act No 9006 must be resolved in its favor. The Court reiterates its ruling in Arroyo v. De
Venecia, viz.: But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the
courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to
comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional
provision or the rights of private individuals. In Osmea v. Pendatun, it was held: At any rate, courts
have declared that the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or
waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them. And it has been said that Parliamentary rules are
merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will
not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have
agreed to a particular measure. [Farias vs. The Executive Secretary, 417 SCRA 503(2003)]

ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, respondent. [Quinto vs. Commission on Elections, 613 SCRA 385(2010)]
Same; Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; It is the Legislature that is given the authority,
under our constitutional system, to balance competing interests and thereafter make policy choices
responsive to the exigencies of the times.The concern, voiced by our esteemed colleague, Mr.
Justice Nachura, in his dissent, that elected officials (vis--vis appointive officials) have greater political
clout over the electorate, is indeed a matter worth exploringbut not by this Court. Suffice it to say that
the remedy lies with the Legislature. It is the Legislature that is given the authority, under our
constitutional system, to balance competing interests and thereafter make policy choices responsive to
the exigencies of the times. It is certainly within the Legislatures power to make the deemed-resigned
provisions applicable to elected officials, should it later decide that the evils sought to be prevented are
of such frequency and magnitude as to tilt the balance in favor of expanding the class. This Court
cannot and should not arrogate unto itself the power to ascertain and impose on the people the best
state of affairs from a public policy standpoint.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Legal Research; The Court cannot blink away the fact that the United
States Supreme Court effectively overruled Mancuso v. Taft, 476 F. 2d 187 (1973), three months after
its promulgation by the United States Court of Appeals.Our assailed Decisions reliance on Mancuso
is completely misplaced. We cannot blink away the fact that the United States Supreme Court
effectively overruled Mancuso three months after its promulgation by the United States Court of
Appeals. In United States Civil Service Commission, et al. v. National Association of Letter Carriers
AFL-CIO, et al. and Broadrick, et al. v. State of Oklahoma, et al., the United States Supreme Court was
faced with the issue of whether statutory provisions prohibiting federal and state employees from
taking an active part in political management or in political campaigns were unconstitutional as to
warrant facial invalidation. Violation of these provisions results in dismissal from employment and
possible criminal sanctions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Standards of Review; The Courts assailed Decisions submission that the
right to run for public office is inextricably linked with two fundamental freedomsthose of expression
and associationlies on barren ground; American case law has never recognized a fundamental right
to express ones political views through candidacy, as to invoke a rigorous standard of review.Our
assailed Decisions submission that the right to run for public office is inextricably linked with two
fundamental freedomsthose of expression and associationlies on barren ground. American case
law has in fact never recognized a fundamental right to express ones political views through
candidacy, as to invoke a rigorous standard of review. Bart v. Telford pointedly stated that [t]he First
Amendment does not in terms confer a right to run for public office, and this court has held that it does
not do so by implication either. Thus, ones interest in seeking office, by itself, is not entitled to
constitutional protection. Moreover, one cannot bring ones action under the rubric of freedom of
association, absent any allegation that, by running for an elective position, one is advancing the
political ideas of a particular set of voters.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is crystal clear that the provisions challenged in the case at bar, are not
violative of the equal protection clausethe deemed-resigned provisions substantially serve
governmental interests (i.e., (i) efficient civil service faithful to the government and the people rather
than to party; (ii) avoidance of the appearance of political justice as to policy; (iii) avoidance of the
danger of a powerful political machine; and (iv) ensuring that employees achieve advancement on
their merits and that they be free from both coercion and the prospect of favor from political activity).
It is crystal clear that the provisions challenged in the case at bar, are not violative of the equal
protection clause. The deemed-resigned provisions substantially serve governmental interests (i.e., (i)
efficient civil service faithful to the government and the people rather than to party; (ii) avoidance of the
appearance of political justice as to policy; (iii) avoidance of the danger of a powerful political
machine; and (iv) ensuring that employees achieve advancement on their merits and that they be free
from both coercion and the prospect of favor from political activity). These are interests that are
important enough to outweigh the non-fundamental right of appointive officials and employees to seek
elective office.

Same; Same; Same; Overbreadth Doctrine; The myopic view that the evils sought to be prevented are
extant only when the incumbent appointive official running for elective office holds an influential post
obviously fails to consider a different, yet equally plausible, threat to the government posed by the
partisan potential of a large and growing bureaucracythe danger of systematic abuse perpetuated by
a powerful political machine that has amassed the scattered powers of government workers so as
to give itself and its incumbent workers an unbreakable grasp on the reins of power.According to
the assailed Decision, the challenged provisions of law are overly broad because they apply
indiscriminately to all civil servants holding appointive posts, without due regard for the type of position
being held by the employee running for elective office and the degree of influence that may be
attendant thereto. Its underlying assumption appears to be that the evils sought to be prevented are
extant only when the incumbent appointive official running for elective office holds an influential post.
Such a myopic view obviously fails to consider a different, yet equally plausible, threat to the
government posed by the partisan potential of a large and growing bureaucracy: the danger of
systematic abuse perpetuated by a powerful political machine that has amassed the scattered
powers of government workers so as to give itself and its incumbent workers an unbreakable grasp
on the reins of power.
Same; Same; Same; Same; This Court would do well to proceed with tiptoe caution, particularly when
it comes to the application of the overbreadth doctrine in the analysis of statutes that purportedly
attempt to restrict or burden the exercise of the right to freedom of speech, for such approach is
manifestly strong medicine that must be used sparingly, and only as a last resort; The probable harm
to society in permitting incumbent appointive officials to remain in office, even as they actively pursue
elective posts, far outweighs the less likely evil of having arguably protected candidacies blocked by
the possible inhibitory effect of a potentially overly broad statute.This Court would do well to proceed
with tiptoe caution, particularly when it comes to the application of the overbreadth doctrine in the
analysis of statutes that purportedly attempt to restrict or burden the exercise of the right to freedom of
speech, for such approach is manifestly strong medicine that must be used sparingly, and only as a
last resort. In the United States, claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained only where, in the
judgment of the court, the possibility that protected speech of others may be muted and perceived
grievances left to fester (due to the possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes) outweighs the
possible harm to society in allowing some unprotected speech or conduct to go unpunished. Facial
overbreadth has likewise not been invoked where a limiting construction could be placed on the
challenged statute, and where there are readily apparent constructions that would cure, or at least
substantially reduce, the alleged overbreadth of the statute. In the case at bar, the probable harm to
society in permitting incumbent appointive officials to remain in office, even as they actively pursue
elective posts, far outweighs the less likely evil of having arguably protected candidacies blocked by
the possible inhibitory effect of a potentially overly broad statute. [Quinto vs. Commission on Elections,
613 SCRA 385(2010)]

MAKIL U. PUNDAODAYA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ARSENIO DENSING

NOBLE, respondents. [Pundaodaya vs. Commission on Elections, 600 SCRA 178(2009)]
Election Law; Residence; Words and Phrases; It was held that the term residence is to be
understood not in its common acceptance as referring to dwelling or habitation but rather to
domicile or legal residence, that is the place where a party actually or constructively has his
permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to
return and remain (animus manendi).Section 39 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code, requires that an elective local official must be a resident in the barangay,
municipality, city or province where he intends to serve for at least one year immediately preceding the
election. In Japzon v. Commission on Elections, 576 SCRA 331 (2009), it was held that the term
residence is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to dwelling or habitation,
but rather to domicile or legal residence, that is, the place where a party actually or constructively
has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually
intends to return and remain (animus manendi).
Same; Same; The Court explained that domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which,
whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return.In Domino v.
Commission on Elections, 310 SCRA 568 (1999), the Court explained that domicile denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one
intends to return. It is a question of intention and circumstances. In the consideration of circumstances,
three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a man must have a residence or domicile
somewhere; (2) when once established it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) a man can have
but one residence or domicile at a time. If one wishes to successfully effect a change of domicile, he
must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one, and definite acts which
correspond with the purpose. Without clear and positive proof of the concurrence of these three
requirements, the domicile of origin continues.
Same; Same; We held that a persons registration as voter in one district is not proof that he is not
domiciled in another district.The above pieces of documentary evidence, however, fail to convince
us that Noble successfully effected a change of domicile. As correctly ruled by the COMELEC Second
Division, private respondents claim that he is a registered voter and has actually voted in the past 3
elections in Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental do not sufficiently establish that he has actually elected
residency in the said municipality. Indeed, while we have ruled in the past that voting gives rise to a
strong presumption of residence, it is not conclusive evidence thereof. Thus, in Perez v. Commission
on Elections, 317 SCRA 641 (1999), we held that a persons registration as voter in one district is not
proof that he is not domiciled in another district. The registration of a voter in a place other than his
residence of origin is not sufficient to consider him to have abandoned or lost his residence.
Same; Same; To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled
with conduct indicative of that intention.To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in
the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of that intention. It requires not only such bodily
presence in that place but also a declared and probable intent to make it ones fixed and permanent
place of abode.
Same; Same; We held that the one-year residency requirement is aimed at excluding outsiders from
taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain.We find
that Nobles alleged change of domicile was effected solely for the purpose of qualifying as a
candidate in the 2007 elections. This we cannot allow. In Torayno, Sr. v. Commission on Elections, 337
SCRA 574 (2000), we held that the one-year residency requirement is aimed at excluding outsiders
from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain.
Establishing residence in a community merely to meet an election law requirement defeats the
purpose of representation: to elect through the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to
the needs of the community. Thus, we find Noble disqualified from running as municipal mayor of
Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental in the 2007 elections.

Same; Considering the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental
occasioned by Nobles disqualification, the proclaimed Vice Mayor shall then succeed as mayor.
Considering the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental
occasioned by Nobles disqualification, the proclaimed Vice-Mayor shall then succeed as mayor.
[Pundaodaya vs. Commission on Elections, 600 SCRA 178(2009)

NORLAINIE MITMUG LIMBONA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MALIK BOBBY
T. ALINGAN, respondents.
Election Law; Certificates of Candidacy; The withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy does not
necessarily render the certificate void ab initioonce filed, the permanent legal effects produced
thereby remain even if the certificate itself be subsequently withdrawn.The withdrawal of a certificate
of candidacy does not necessarily render the certificate void ab initio. Once filed, the permanent legal
effects produced thereby remain even if the certificate itself be subsequently withdrawn. Section 73 of
the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881, as amended) provides: Sec. 73.
Certificate of candidacy.No person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he files a
sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein. A person who has filed a certificate of
candidacy may, prior to the election, withdraw the same by submitting to the office concerned a written
declaration under oath. No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same
election, and if he files his certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for
any of them. However, before the expiration of the period for the filing of certificate of candidacy, the
person who has filed more than one certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the office for
which he desires to be eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices.
The filing or withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or
administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred. (Emphasis supplied)
Same; Same; The fact that a persons certificate of candidacy as a substitute candidate is given due
course by the COMELEC does not bar the COMELEC from deciding on her qualifications to run as a
candidate.The fact that petitioners certificate of candidacy as a substitute candidate was given due
course by the Comelec did not bar the Comelec from deciding on her qualifications to run as municipal
mayor. As correctly found by the Comelec: Said resolution (Comelec Resolution No. 8255) discloses
only the following: a) movant is given the green lights to be the substitute candidate for her husband
who was disqualified; b) her certificate of candidacy was duly accomplished in form and substance
and c) the certificate of candidacy will not cause confusion among the voters. Clearly, no issue of
disqualification was passed upon by the Commission in the said resolution. Movant may have been
given the impression that the Commissions act of giving due course to her substitute certificate of
candidacy constitutes a pronouncement that she is not disqualified. It must be pointed out, however,
that the bases for giving due course to a certificate of candidacy are totally different from those for
enunciating that the candidate is not disqualified. x x x
Same; Same; Residence; Domicile; Words and Phrases; The term residence as used in the election
law is synonymous with domicile, which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention; For purposes of
election law, the question of residence is mainly one of intention.The Comelec correctly found that
petitioner failed to satisfy the one-year residency requirement. The term residence as used in the
election law is synonymous with domicile, which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place
but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. The
manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to exclude a stranger or newcomer,
unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an
elective office to serve that community. For purposes of election law, the question of residence is
mainly one of intention. There is no hard and fast rule by which to determine where a person actually
resides. Three rules are, however, well established: first, that a man must have a residence or domicile
somewhere; second, that where once established it remains until a new one is acquired; and third, a
man can have but one domicile at a time.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Domicile of Choice; Change of Domicile; Requisites.In order to acquire
a domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an
intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. A persons domicile once
established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established. To
successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change
of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new
one, and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must basically be
animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of

choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the
residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Husband and Wife; Family Code; Where there is failure to show that a
wife maintained a separate residence from her husband, and where there is no evidence to prove
otherwise, reliance on Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code is proper and is in consonance with
human experience.We note the findings of the Comelec that petitioners domicile of origin is
Maguing, Lanao del Norte, which is also her place of birth; and that her domicile by operation of law
(by virtue of marriage) is Rapasun, Marawi City. The Comelec found that Mohammad, petitioners
husband, effected the change of his domicile in favor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte only on November 11,
2006. Since it is presumed that the husband and wife live together in one legal residence, then it
follows that petitioner effected the change of her domicile also on November 11, 2006. Articles 68 and
69 of the Family Code provide: Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. Art. 69. The husband and wife
shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide. The court may exempt
one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and
compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not
compatible with the solidarity of the family. (Emphasis ours) Considering that petitioner failed to show
that she maintained a separate residence from her husband, and as there is no evidence to prove
otherwise, reliance on these provisions of the Family Code is proper and is in consonance with human
experience.
Same; Local Government Code; Succession to Office; Where there is a permanent vacancy arising
from the failure of a mayor to qualify or arising from her removal from office, the Vice-Mayor shall
succeed as mayor, not the second placer in the election.For failure to comply with the residency
requirement, petitioner is disqualified to run for the office of mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte.
However, petitioners disqualification would not result in Maliks proclamation who came in second
during the special election. The rules on succession under the Local Government Code shall apply, to
wit: SECTION 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and
Vice-Mayor.If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the x x x mayor, the x x x vice-mayor
concerned shall become the x x x mayor. x x x x For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy
arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify
or is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge
the functions of his office. x x x x (Emphasis ours) Considering the disqualification of petitioner to run
as mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte, the proclaimed Vice-Mayor shall then succeed as mayor.
[Limbona vs. Commission on Elections , 555 SCRA 391(2008)]

RENALD F. VILANDO, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL,

JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG AND HON. SPEAKER PROSPERO NOGRALES, respondents.
[Vilando vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 656 SCRA 17(2011)]
Same; Same; Congress; Citizenship; Courts will decide a question, otherwise moot and academic, if it
is capable of repetition, yet evading review; Citizenship, being a continuing requirement for Members
of the House of Representatives, may be questioned at anytime.Citizenship, being a continuing
requirement for Members of the House of Representatives, however, may be questioned at anytime.
For this reason, the Court deems it appropriate to resolve the petition on the merits. This position finds
support in the rule that courts will decide a question, otherwise moot and academic, if it is capable of
repetition, yet evading review. The question on Limkaichongs citizenship is likely to recur if she would
run again, as she did run, for public office, hence, capable of repetition.
Election Law; Election Protests; Citizenship; In our jurisdiction, an attack on a persons citizenship may
only be done through a direct action for its nullity; The proper proceeding to assail the citizenship of a
naturalized citizen should be in accordance with Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473.Vilandos
argument, that the quo warranto petition does not operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of
Limkaichongs father as the certificate of naturalization is null and void from the beginning, is devoid of
merit. In this petition, Vilando seeks to disqualify Limkaichong on the ground that she is a Chinese
citizen. To prove his point, he makes reference to the alleged nullity of the grant of naturalization of
Limkaichongs father which, however, is not allowed as it would constitute a collateral attack on the
citizenship of the father. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a persons citizenship may only be done
through a direct action for its nullity. The proper proceeding to assail the citizenship of Limkaichongs
father should be in accordance with Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473.
Same; Same; Same; Electoral Tribunals; The power of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET), no matter how complete and exclusive, does not carry with it the authority to delve
into the legality of the judgment of naturalization of a members father in the pursuit of disqualifying
said memberto rule otherwise would operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father
which is not permissible.Time and again, this Court has acknowledged this sole and exclusive
jurisdiction of the HRET. The power granted to HRET by the Constitution is intended to be as complete
and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. Such power is regarded as full, clear
and complete and excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any
wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same. Such power of the HRET, no matter how complete
and exclusive, does not carry with it the authority to delve into the legality of the judgment of
naturalization in the pursuit of disqualifying Limkaichong. To rule otherwise would operate as a
collateral attack on the citizenship of the father which, as already stated, is not permissible.

Same; Same; Same; Same; An application for, and the holding of, an alien certificate of registration is
not an act constituting renunciation of Philippine citizenshipfor renunciation to effectively result in the
loss of citizenship, the same must be express.Obtaining an ACR by Limkaichongs mother was not
tantamount to a repudiation of her original citizenship. Neither did it result in an acquisition of alien
citizenship. In a string of decisions, this Court has consistently held that an application for, and the
holding of, an alien certificate of registration is not an act constituting renunciation of Philippine
citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express.
Such express renunciation is lacking in this case. Accordingly, Limkaichongs mother, being a Filipino
citizen, can transmit her citizenship to her daughter.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The only instance where the Supreme Court may intervene in the
exercise of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunals (HRETs) so-called extraordinary
jurisdiction is upon a determination that the decision or resolution of the HRET was rendered without
or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or upon a clear showing of such
arbitrary and improvident use of its power to constitute a denial of due process of law, or upon a
demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of discretion
that there has to be a remedy for such abuse.Well-settled is the principle that the judgments of the
HRET are beyond judicial interference. The only instance where this Court may intervene in the

exercise of its so-called extraordinary jurisdiction is upon a determination that the decision or
resolution of the HRET was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion or upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of its power to constitute a
denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly
constituting such grave abuse of discretion that there has to be a remedy for such abuse. In this case,
there is no showing of any such arbitrariness or improvidence. The HRET acted well within the sphere
of its power when it dismissed the quo warranto petition. [Vilando vs. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, 656 SCRA 17(2011)]

ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ANTONIO V.

GONZALES and ORLANDO R. BALBON, JR., respondents.
[Mitra vs. Commission on Elections, 633 SCRA 580(2010)]
Same; Same; Same; Same; Commission on Elections (COMELECs) decision will be overturned if it
uses the wrong considerations in arriving at its conclusion on evidentiary matters.In an attempt to
show that Mitra considers himself a resident of Puerto Princesa City, the private respondents
submitted in their Motion for Reconsideration a colored certified true copy of Mitras alleged Puerto
Princesa City Community Tax Certificate (CTC) dated February 3, 2009 allegedly showing Mitras
signature. To recall, we found that based on the records before us, the purported February 3, 2009
CTC did not bear the signature of Mitra. Although the private respondents have belatedly filed this
evidence, we carefully examined the recently submitted colored copy of the February 3, 2009 CTC and
saw no reason to reverse our finding; the alleged signature appears to us to be a mere hazy
superimposition that does not bear any resemblance at all to Mitras signature. We, thus, stand by
our ruling that the February 3, 2009 CTC, if at all, carries very little evidentiary value. It did it not at all
carry Mitras signature; his secretarys positive testimony that she secured the CTC for Mitra, without
the latters participation and knowledge, still stands unrefuted.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A certification that states that the data therein contained are not yet
complete does not prove anything.We cannot give any evidentiary value to this submission for two
reasons. First, it was filed only on reconsideration stage and was not an evidence before us when the
case was submitted for resolution. Second, even if it had not been filed late, the Certification does not
prove anything; it is, on its face, contradictory. On the one hand, it categorically states that there are no
existing records of any pineapple plantation in Barangay Isaub, Aborlan, Palawan; on the other hand, it
also expressly states that its records are not yet complete since it is on the process of gathering data
on the Master list of Farmers engaged in growing High Value Commercial Crops in Aborlan. Under
what law or regulation the certifying office has the obligation to prepare a list of agricultural business
interests in Aborlan has not even been alleged.
[Mitra vs. Commission on Elections, 633 SCRA 580(2010)]

ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. [Bagabuyo vs.

Commission on Elections, 573 SCRA 290(2008)]

Municipal Corporations; Congressional Districts; Definition of Legislative Apportionment and

Reapportionment.Legislative apportionment is defined by Blacks Law Dictionary as the
determination of the number of representatives which a State, county or other subdivision may send to
a legislative body. It is the allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the population; the
drawing of voting district lines so as to equalize population and voting power among the districts.
Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about
by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.
Same; Same; Plebiscite; The Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly require a
plebiscite to carry out any creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a local
government unit; No plebiscite requirement exists under the apportionment or reapportionment
provision.A pronounced distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X, Section 10 is on the
requirement of a plebiscite. The Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly require a
plebiscite to carry out any creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a local
government unit. In contrast, no plebiscite requirement exists under the apportionment or
reapportionment provision. In Tobias v. Abalos, 239 SCRA 106 (1994), a case that arose from the
division of the congressional district formerly covering San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate
districts, we confirmed this distinction and the fact that no plebiscite is needed in a legislative
reapportionment. The plebiscite issue came up because one was ordered and held for Mandaluyong
in the course of its conversion into a highly urbanized city, while none was held for San Juan. In
explaining why this happened, the Court ruled that no plebiscite was necessary for San Juan because
the objective of the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as
required by Article X, Section 10 the Local Government Code; the creation of a new legislative district
only followed as a consequence. In other words, the apportionment alone and by itself did not call for a
plebiscite, so that none was needed for San Juan where only a reapportionment took place.
Same; Same; Same; The plebiscite requirement that applies to the division of a province, city,
municipality or barangay under the Local Government Code should not apply to and be a requisite for
the validity of a legislative apportionment or reapportionment.These considerations clearly show the
distinctions between a legislative apportionment or reapportionment and the division of a local
government unit. Historically and by its intrinsic nature, a legislative apportionment does not mean,
and does not even imply, a division of a local government unit where the apportionment takes place.
Thus, the plebiscite requirement that applies to the division of a province, city, municipality or barangay
under the Local Government Code should not apply to and be a requisite for the validity of a legislative
apportionment or reapportionment. [Bagabuyo vs. Commission on Elections, 573 SCRA 290(2008)]

SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR JESSE ROBREDO, petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS represented by its Chairman JOSE A.R. MELO and its
Commissioners, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO
VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH AND GREGORIO LARRAZABAL, respondents. [Aquino III vs.
Commission on Election, 617 SCRA 623(2010)]
Same; Election Law; Legislative Districts; There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a
250,000 minimum population that must compose a legislative district.There is no specific provision
in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must compose a legislative district. As
already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of the framers of the Constitution to
adopt a minimum population of 250,000 for each legislative district. The second sentence of Section
5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative. The provision draws
a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the
entitlement of a province to a district on the other.
Same; Same; Same; While Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a
minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to increase its
population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district.The Mariano case limited the
application of the 250,000 minimum population requirement for cities only to its initial legislative
district. In other words, while Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a
minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to increase its
population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district. There is no reason why the
Mariano case, which involves the creation of an additional district within a city, should not be applied to
additional districts in provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative district created within a city is not
required to represent a population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid, neither should such be
needed for an additional district in a province, considering moreover that a province is entitled to an
initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and regardless of its population.
[Aquino III vs. Commission on Election, 617 SCRA 623(2010)]

JUANITO MARIANO, JR., et al., petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE
MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.
G.R. No. 118627. March 7, 1995.*
JOHN R. OSMEA, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF
MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF
MAKATI, respondents. [Mariano, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, 242 SCRA 211(1995)]
Same; Same; Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in
the charter of a new city.These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos.
In said case, we ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law,
such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be
composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus
worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law,
other than a general reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A.
No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makatis legislative district. Moreover, to hold that
reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the
legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable
situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for
an indeterminate period of time. That intolerable situation will deprive the people of a new city or
province a particle of their sovereignty. Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is
indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty.
[Mariano, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, 242 SCRA 211(1995)]
Same; Same; Court reiterated the policy favoring a liberal construction of the one titleone subject
rule so as not to impede legislation.Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners contention that the
creation of an additional legislative district in Makati should have been expressly stated in the title of
the bill. In the same case of Tobias v. Abalos, op cit, we reiterated the policy of the Court favoring a
liberal construction of the one title-one subject rule so as not to impede legislation. To be sure, the
Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely
catalogue all its details. Hence, we ruled that it should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses
the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject. [Mariano, Jr. vs.
Commission on Elections, 242 SCRA 211(1995)]

GAPITO A. AQUINO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MOVE MAKATI, MATEO BEDON
and JUANITO ICARO, respondents.
Election Law; Obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does not automatically vest the
position in the winning candidate.Petitioner conveniently confuses the distinction between an
unproclaimed candidate to the House of Representatives and a member of the same. Obtaining the
highest number of votes in an election does not automatically vest the position in the winning
candidate.
Same; Electoral Tribunals; Jurisdiction; The electoral tribunal assumes jurisdiction over all contests
relative to the election, returns and qualifications of candidates for either the Senate or the House only
when the latter become members of either the Senate or the House of Representativesand, a
candidate who has not been proclaimed and has taken his oath of office cannot be said to be a
member.Under Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the electoral tribunal clearly
assumes jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications of candidates
for either the Senate or the House only when the latter become members of either the Senate or the
House of Representatives. A candidate who has not been proclaimed and who has not taken his oath
of office cannot be said to be a member of the House of Representatives subject to Section 17 of
Article VI of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Commission on Elections; While the proclamation of a winning candidate is ministerial,
B.P. 881 in conjunction with Sec. 6 of R.A. 6646 allows suspension of proclamation under
circumstances mentioned thereineven after the elections the COMELEC is empowered to continue
to hear and decide questions relating to qualifications of candidates.While the proclamation of a
winning candidate in an election is ministerial, B.P. 881 in conjunction with Sec. 6 of R.A. 6646 allows
suspension of proclamation under circumstances mentioned therein. Thus, petitioners contention that
after the conduct of the election and (petitioner) has been established the winner of the electoral
exercise from the moment of election, the COMELEC is automatically divested of authority to pass
upon the question of qualification finds no basis in law, because even after the elections the
COMELEC is empowered by Section 6 (in relation to Section 7) of R.A. 6646 to continue to hear and
decide questions relating to qualifications of candidates. [Aquino vs. Commission on Elections, 248
SCRA 400(1995)]
Same; The second placer is just that, a second placerhe lost the elections, he was repudiated by
either a majority or plurality of votershe could not be proclaimed winner as he could not be
considered the first among qualified candidates.To contend that Syjuco should be proclaimed
because he was the first among the qualified candidates in the May 8, 1995 elections is to
misconstrue the nature of the democratic electoral process and the sociological and psychological
underpinnings behind voters preferences. The result suggested by private respondent would lead not
only to our reversing the doctrines firmly entrenched in the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec but also to
a massive disenfranchisement of the thousands of voters who cast their vote in favor of a candidate
they believed could be validly voted for during the elections. Had petitioner been disqualified before the
elections, the choice, moreover, would have been different. The votes for Aquino given the acrimony
which attended the campaign, would not have automatically gone to second placer Syjuco. The nature
of the playing field would have substantially changed. To simplistically assume that the second placer
would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The
second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a
majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because
in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed.
We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under such circumstances.
Same; The Court cannot, in another shift of the pendulum, subscribe to the contention that the runnerup in an election in which the winner has been disqualified is actually the winner among the remaining
qualified candidates because this clearly represents a minority view supported only by a scattered
number of obscure American state and English court decisions.This, it bears repeating, expresses
the more logical and democratic view. We cannot, in another shift of the pendulum, subscribe to the
contention that the runner-up in an election in which the winner has been disqualified is actually the

winner among the remaining qualified candidates because this clearly represents a minority view
supported only by a scattered number of obscure American state and English court decisions. These
decisions neglect the possibility that the runner-up, though obviously qualified, could receive votes so
measly and insignificant in number that the votes they receive would be tantamount to rejection.
Theoretically, the second placer could receive just one vote. In such a case, it is absurd to proclaim
the totally repudiated candidate as the voters choice.
Same; By any mathematical formulation, the runner-up in an election cannot be construed to have
obtained a majority or plurality of votes cast where an ineligible candidate has garnered either a
majority or plurality of the votes.Moreover, even in instances where the votes received by the second
placer may not be considered numerically insignificant, voters preferences are nonetheless so volatile
and unpredictable that the result among qualified candidates, should the equation change because of
the disqualification of an ineligible candidate, would not be self-evident. Absence of the apparent
though ineligible winner among the choices could lead to a shifting of votes to candidates other than
the second placer. By any mathematical formulation, the runner-up in an election cannot be construed
to have obtained a majority or plurality of votes cast where an ineligible candidate has garnered
either a majority or plurality of the votes.
Same; Constitutional Law; Republicanism; As petitioner clearly lacks one of the essential qualifications
for running for membership in the House of Representatives, not even the will of a majority or plurality
of the voters of the district would substitute for a requirement mandated by the fundamental law itself.
A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. In a republican government those
laws are themselves ordained by the people. Through their representatives, they dictate the
qualifications necessary for service in government positions. And as petitioner clearly lacks one of the
essential qualifications for running for membership in the House of Representatives, not even the will
of a majority or plurality of the voters of the Second District of Makati City would substitute for a
requirement mandated by the fundamental law itself.
Election Law; Petitioner should be declared disqualified to run as representative in the 2nd district of
Makati City because he failed altogether to prove that he had actually and physically resided therein for
a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the elections.To my mind, petitioner
should be declared disqualified to run as representative in the 2nd district of Makati City in the 8 May
1995 elections not because he failed to prove his residence therein as his domicile of choice, but
because he failed altogether to prove that he had actually and physically resided therein for a period of
not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the 8 May 1995 elections.
Same; The candidate who received the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates
should be proclaimed.At this point, what I said in Marcos, supra, follows: What happens then when
after the elections are over, one is declared disqualified? Then, votes cast for him shall not be
counted and in legal contemplation, he no longer received the highest number of votes. It stands to
reason that Section 6 of RA 6646 does not make the second placer the winner simply because a
winning candidate is disqualified, but that the law considers him as the candidate who had obtained
the highest number of votes as a result of the votes cast for the disqualified candidate not being
counted or considered. As this law clearly reflects the legislative policy on the matter, then there is no
reason why this Court should not re-examine and consequently abandon the doctrine in the Jun Labo
case. It has been stated that the qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the
electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility most especially when it is mandated by no less than the Constitution. Therefore the
candidate who received the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates , should be
proclaimed.

VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY, ALYANSANG BAYANIHAN NG MGA MAGSASAKA,

MANGGAGAWANG BUKID AT MANGINGISDA, ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG TAO
PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN, and LUZON FARMERS PARTY, petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PAG-ASA, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA,
PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA, MAHARLIKA, OCWUNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL,
BANTAYBAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMEN-POWER, INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS
CARE, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAKBAYAN, ARBA,
MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, AABANTE KA PILIPINAS
All Being Party-List Parties/Organizationsand Hon. MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR. in His Capacity as
Speaker of the House of Representatives, respondents.
G.R. No. 136786. October 6, 2000.*
AKBAYAN! (CITIZENS ACTION PARTY), ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG TAO PARA
SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN (AKO), and ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVES (APEC), petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES represented by Speaker Manuel B. Villar, PAG-ASA, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP,
AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, MAHARLIKA, OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN,
KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMEN-POWER, INC., FEJODAP, CUP,
VETERANS CARE, FOUR L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAKBAYAN, ARBA, MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, AABANTE
KA PILIPINAS, respondents.
G.R. No. 136795. October 6, 2000.*
ALAGAD (PARTIDO NG MARALITANG-LUNGSOD), NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF SMALL
COCONUT FARMERS ORGANIZATIONS (NCSCFO), and LUZON FARMERS PARTY (BUTIL),
petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO,
NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAGASA, MAHARLIKA, OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL,
BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMEN-POWER, INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS
CARE, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN, ARBA,
MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, and AABANTE KA
PILIPINAS, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Congress; Party-List System; The Constitution makes the number of district
representatives the determinant in arriving at the number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, a
formulation which means that any increase in the number of district representatives, as may be
provided by law, will necessarily result in a corresponding increase in the number of party-list seats.
Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in arriving at the
number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party-list. We thus translate this legal provision
into a mathematical formula, as follows:
No. of district representatives
x .20 = No. of party-list
.80
representatives
This formulation means that any increase in the number of district representatives, as may be provided
by law, will necessarily result in a corresponding increase in the number of party-list seats.
Same; Same; Same; Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatoryit merely provides a
ceiling for party-list seats in Congress.In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress
enacted RA 7941. As said earlier, Congress declared therein a policy to promote proportional
representation in the election of party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them. It
however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the

system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order to be
entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could have additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes. Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can
have more than three seats in the House of Representatives. Thus the relevant portion of Section
11(b) of the law provides: (b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent
(2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That
those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition
shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats. Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it
will be shown presently that Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely
provides a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress. [Veterans Federation Party vs. Commission on
Elections, 342 SCRA 244(2000)]

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the acronym OFW), represented herein by its
secretary-general, MOHAMMAD OMAR FAJARDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;
CITIZENS DRUG WATCH; MAMAMAYAN AYAW SA DROGA; GO! GO! PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE
MARCOS LOYALIST ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES; PHILIPPINE LOCAL AUTONOMY;
CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE, ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT AND PEACE; CHAMBER OF
REAL ESTATE BUILDERS ASSOCIATION; SPORTS & HEALTH ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION,
INC.; ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKERS (OCW); BAGONG BAYANI
ORGANIZATION and others under Organizations/Coalitions of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785;
PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO; LAKAS NUCD-UMDP; NATIONALIST PEOPLES COALITION;
LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO; AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO; PDP-LABAN; LIBERAL PARTY;
NACIONALISTA PARTY; ANG BUHAY HAYAANG YUMABONG; and others under Political Parties of
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, respondents.
G.R. No. 147613. June 26, 2001.*
BAYAN MUNA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; NATIONALIST PEOPLEs COALITION
(NPC); LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP); PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO (PMP);
LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP; LIBERAL PARTY; MAMAMAYANG AYAW SA DROGA; CREBA; NATIONAL
FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE PLANTERS; JEEP; and BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION,
respondents. [Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on Elections, 359 SCRA
698(2001)]
Same; Party-List System; Under the Constitution and Republic Act (RA) 7941, political parties cannot
be disqualified from the party-list elections merely on the ground that they are political parties.We
now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be
disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution, provides that members of the House of Representatives may be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
Same; Same; The key words in the statutory policy set out in RA 7941 are proportional
representation, marginalized and underrepresented, and lack [of] well-defined constituencies.
The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional representation by means of
the Filipino-style party-list system, which will enable the election to the House of Representatives of
Filipino citizens, 1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties; and 2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but 3. who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. The key words in this policy
are proportional representation, marginalized and underrepresented, and lack [of] well-defined
constituencies.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Proportional representation does not refer to the number of
people in a particular district, but rather to the representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the lawnamely, labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals.Proportional representation here does not refer to the
number of people in a particular district, because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither
does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the
representation of the marginalized and underrepresented as exemplified by the enumeration in
Section 5 of the law; namely, labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.
Same; Same; The party-list organization or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized
and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5, and the persons nominated by the
party-list candidate-organization must be Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties.It is not enough for the candidate to claim
representation of the marginalized and underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and
to feign. The partylist organization or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and
underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5. Concurrently, the persons nominated by the
party-list candidate-organization must be Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties.

Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Lack of well-defined constituenc[y] refers to the absence of a
traditionally identifiable electoral groups, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of
government.Lack of well-defined constituenc[y] refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable
electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points
again to those with disparate interests identified with the marginalized or underrepresented. [Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on Elections, 359 SCRA 698(2001)]

LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., as the second nominee of CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION (CIBAC),
petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
respondents.
G.R. No. 180443.June 22, 2010.*
LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), EMMANUEL JOEL
J. VILLANUEVA, CINCHONA C. GONZALES and ARMI JANE R. BORJE, respondents. [Lokin, Jr.
Commission on Elections, 621 SCRA 385(2010)]
Same; Election Law; Party-List System; The Legislature deprived the party-list organization of the right
to change its nominees or to alter the order of nominees once the list is submitted to the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC), except when: (a) the nominee dies; (b) the nominee withdraws in writing his
nomination; or (c) the nominee becomes incapacitated.The provision is daylight clear. The
Legislature thereby deprived the party-list organization of the right to change its nominees or to alter
the order of nominees once the list is submitted to the COMELEC, except when: (a) the nominee dies;
(b) the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; or (c) the nominee becomes incapacitated. The
provision must be read literally because its language is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a
single, definite, and sensible meaning. Such meaning is conclusively presumed to be the meaning that
the Legislature has intended to convey. Even where the courts should be convinced that the
Legislature really intended some other meaning, and even where the literal interpretation should defeat
the very purposes of the enactment, the explicit declaration of the Legislature is still the law, from
which the courts must not depart. When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no
reason for interpretation or construction, but only for application. Accordingly, an administrative agency
tasked to implement a statute may not construe it by expanding its meaning where its provisions are
clear and unambiguous.
[Lokin, Jr. Commission on Elections, 621 SCRA 385(2010)]

ANTONIO D. DAYAO, ROLANDO P. RAMIREZ and ADELIO R. CAPCO, petitioners, vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and LPG MARKETERS ASSOCIATION, INC., respondents.
G.R. No. 193704.January 29, 2013.*
FEDERATION OF PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIES, INC., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and LPG MARKETERS ASSOCIATION, INC., respondents.
Election Law; Party-List System; For the Commission on Elections to validly exercise its statutory
power to cancel the registration of a party-list group, the law imposes only two (2) conditions: (1) due
notice and hearing is afforded to the party-list group concerned; and (2) any of the enumerated
grounds for disqualification in Section 6, R.A. No. 7941 exists.Section 6, R.A. No. 7941 lays down
the grounds and procedure for the cancellation of party-list accreditation, viz.: Sec.6. Refusal and/or
Cancellation of Registration.The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any
interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national,
regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds: (1) It is a religious
sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for religious purposes; (2) It advocates
violence or unlawful means to seek its goal; (3) It is a foreign party or organization; (4) It is receiving
support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly
or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election
purposes; (5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections; (6) It
declares untruthful statements in its petition; (7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or (8) It
fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%)
of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in
which it has registered. For the COMELEC to validly exercise its statutory power to cancel the
registration of a party-list group, the law imposes only two (2) conditions: (1) due notice and hearing is
afforded to the party-list group concerned; and (2) any of the enumerated grounds for disqualification
in Section 6 exists.
Same; Same; Each accreditation handed by the Commission on Elections to party-list organizations
can be likened to the franchise granted by Congress, thru the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), to corporations or associations created under the Corporation Code; A party-list organization,
like a corporation, owes its legal existence to the concession of its franchise from the State, thru the
Commission on Elections; Being a mere concession, it may be revoked by the granting authority upon
the existence of certain conditions.Each accreditation handed by the COMELEC to party-list
organizations can be likened to the franchise granted by Congress, thru the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), to corporations or associations created under the Corporation Code. Franchise is
a right or privilege conferred by law. It emanates from a sovereign power and the grant is inherently a
legislative power. It may, however, be derived indirectly from the state through an agency to which the
power has been clearly and validly delegated. In such cases, Congress prescribes the conditions on
which the grant of a franchise may be made. The power to pass upon, refuse or deny the application
for registration of any corporation or partnership is vested with the SEC by virtue of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 902-A. R.A. No 7941, on the other hand, is the legislative act that delegates to the
COMELEC the power to grant franchises in the form of accreditation to peoples organization desirous
of participating in the party-list system of representation. Corporations formed under the Corporation
Code become juridical entities only when they are granted registration by the SEC in the same way
that peoples organizations obtain legal existence as a party-list group only upon their accreditation
with the COMELEC. A party-list organization, like a corporation, owes its legal existence to the
concession of its franchise from the State, thru the COMELEC. Being a mere concession, it may be
revoked by the granting authority upon the existence of certain conditions. The power to revoke and
grounds for revocation are aptly provided in Section 6(1) of P.D. No. 902-A, for corporations and
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 for party-list organizations.
Same; Same; The fact that a franchise/accreditation may be revoked means that it can never be final
and conclusive.The fact that a franchise/accreditation may be revoked means that it can never be
final and conclusive. A fortiori, the factual findings leading to the grant of the franchise/accreditation
can never attain finality as well. Both the accreditation and the facts substantiating it can never attain
perpetual and irrefutable conclusiveness as against the power that grants it. The circumstances of the
grantee are subject to constant review and the franchise/accreditation from which it derives its

existence may be suspended or revoked at the will of the granting authority. The separate instances
when the COMELEC can check the qualifications of party-list groups entail distinct statutory powers
the power to register which includes the power to refuse registration, and the power to cancel the
registration so granted. Necessarily then, proceedings involving the exercise of one power is
independent of the other such that factual findings in the proceedings for a petition for registration are
not conclusive with respect to the factual issues that may be raised in a complaint for cancellation.
Same; Same; In Bello v. COMELEC, 637 SCRA 59 (2010) the Supreme Court confirmed that a
complaint for the cancellation of party-list registration, aside from a petition for the disqualification of
the party-list nominee, provides a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, against a party-list
organization alleged to have failed to comply with Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8807 which
requires a party-list group and its nominees to submit documentary evidence to prove that they belong
to a marginalized and underrepresented sector.In Bello v. COMELEC, 637 SCRA 59 (2010), the
Court confirmed that a complaint for the cancellation of party-list registration,
aside from a petition for the disqualification of the party-list nominee, provides a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy, against a party-list organization alleged to have failed to comply with Section 6 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8807 which requires a party-list group and its nominees to submit
documentary evidence to prove that they belong to a marginalized and underrepresented sector. In the
recent ABC (Alliance for Barangay Concerns) Party-List v. COMELEC, 646 SCRA 93 (2011), the Court
reiterated that Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 validates the authority of the COMELEC, not only to register
political parties, organizations or coalitions, but also to cancel their registration based on the same
legal grounds. Such authority emanates from no less than Section 2(5), Article IX-C of the
Constitution.
Same; Same; It is the role of the Commission on Elections to ensure the realization of the intent of the
Constitution to give genuine power to those who have less in life by enabling them to become veritable
lawmakers themselves, by seeing to it that only those Filipinos who are marginalized and
underrepresented become members of Congress under the party-list system.It is the role of the
COMELEC to ensure the realization of the intent of the Constitution to give genuine power to those
who have less in life by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves, by seeing to it that
only those Filipinos who are marginalized and underrepresented become members of Congress under
the party-list system. To effectively discharge this role, R.A. No. 7941 grants the COMELEC the power
not only to register party-list groups but also to review and cancel their registration. In ruling that the
finality of its Resolution dated January 5, 2010 stretched to the accreditation of LPGMA, the
COMELEC practically enfeebled and denied its own power to cancel what it is exclusively empowered
to grant.
Same; Same; The party-list system of representation was crafted for the marginalized and
underrepresented and their alleviation is the ultimate policy of the law.In Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. COMELEC, 359 SCRA 698 (2001) the Court explained that the laws, rules or
regulations relating to elections referred to in paragraph 5 include Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941, which
declares the underlying policy for the law that marginalized and underrepresented Filipino citizens
become members of the House of Representatives, viz.: Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which
disqualifies a party or group for violation of or failure to comply with election laws and regulations.
These laws include Section 2 of RA 7941, which states that the party-list system seeks to enable
Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties
x x x to become members of the House of Representatives. A party or an organization, therefore, that
does not comply with this policy must be disqualified. The party-list system of representation was
crafted for the marginalized and underrepresented and their alleviation is the ultimate policy of the law.
In fact, there is no need to categorically mention that those who are not marginalized and
underrepresented are disqualified. As state policy, it must permeate every discussion of the
qualification of political parties and other organizations under the party-list system. [Dayao vs.
Commission on Elections, 689 SCRA 412(2013)]

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent. [Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections, 694 SCRA 477(2013)]
Election Law; Party-List System; The party-list system is intended to democratize political power by
giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the
House of Representatives.The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of
representation. Simply put, the party-list system is intended to democratize political power by giving
political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of
Representatives. The voter elects two representatives in the House of Representatives: one for his or
her legislative district, and another for his or her party-list group or organization of choice.
Same; Same; The framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not only
sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties.Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution
intended the party-list system to include not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The
framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system.
As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can participate in the party-list
system [F]or as long as they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that
we shall designate in this Constitution.
Same; Same; The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they cannot
expect to win in legislative district elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least the
same number of votes that winning candidates can garner in legislative district elections.The
common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they cannot expect to win in
legislative district elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least the same number of
votes that winning candidates can garner in legislative district elections. The party-list system will be
the entry point to membership in the House of Representatives for both these non-traditional parties
that could not compete in legislative district elections.
Same; Same; The party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or
organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.What
the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5(1), could not be any clearer: the
party-list system is composed of three different groups, and the sectoral parties belong to only one of
the three groups. The text of Section 5(1) leaves no room for any doubt that national and regional
parties are separate from sectoral parties. Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different
groups: (1) national parties or organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral
parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral
parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations need not be organized along
sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector.
Same; Same; Political Party and Sectoral Party, Distinguished.Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941
defines a party as either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties. Clearly, a
political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that a
political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles
and policies for the general conduct of government. On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941
provides that a sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors
enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector. R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a political and a sectoral party.
Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other.
Same; Same; Republic Act No. 7941; R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or
organizations to represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors.R.A. No. 7941 does
not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the party-list system to
represent the marginalized and underrepresented is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideologybased and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system. How will these ideology-based and
cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections, participate in the electoral

process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To exclude them from the party-list system is
to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the armed
struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently
contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. Under the
party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly different from a sectoral
party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not represent any particular
sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party must
represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector. It is sufficient that the political party consists
of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and
policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens.
Same; Same; Same; The economically marginalized and underrepresented are those who fall in the
low income group as classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board.The phrase
marginalized and underrepresented should refer only to the sectors in Section 5 that are, by their
nature, economically marginalized and underrepresented. These sectors are: labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and
other similar sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral party must belong to
the marginalized and underrepresented. The nominees of the sectoral party either must belong to the
sector, or must have a track record of advocacy for the sector represented. Belonging to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector does not mean one must wallow in poverty, destitution or
infirmity. It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below the middle class. More specifically, the
economically marginalized and underrepresented are those who fall in the low
income group as classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board.
Same; Same; Same; Major political parties can participate in subsequent party-list elections since the
prohibition is expressly limited only to the 1988 party-list elections.Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941
expressly prohibited the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in the
House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress from participating in the May 1988 partylist elections. Thus, major political parties can participate in subsequent party-list elections since the
prohibition is expressly limited only to the 1988 party-list elections. However, major political parties
should participate in party-list elections only through their sectoral wings. The participation of major
political parties through their sectoral wings, a majority of whose members are marginalized and
underrepresented or lacking in well-defined political constituencies, will facilitate the entry of the
marginalized and underrepresented and those who lack well-defined political constituencies as
members of the House of Representatives.
Same; Same; Same; The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to
participate in party-list elections so as to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their
constituencies to the marginalized and underrepresented and to those who lack well-defined political
constituencies.The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate
in party-list elections so as to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to
the marginalized and underrepresented and to those who lack well-defined political constituencies.
The participation of major political parties in party-list elections must be geared towards the entry, as
members of the House of Representatives, of the marginalized and underrepresented and those who
lack well-defined political constituencies, giving them a voice in lawmaking. Thus, to participate in
party-list elections, a major political party that fields candidates in the legislative district elections must
organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women or youth
wing, that can register under the party-list system. Such sectoral wing of a major political party must
have its own constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, officers and members, a
majority of whom must belong to the sector represented. The sectoral wing is in itself an independent
sectoral party, and is linked to a major political party through a coalition. This linkage is allowed by
Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941, which provides that component parties or organizations of a coalition may
participate independently (in party-list elections) provided the coalition of which they form part does
not participate in the party-list system.

Same; Same; Same; A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization
which he or she seeks to represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee
one must either belong to the sector represented, or have a track record of advocacy for such sector.
Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications of party-list nominees. This provision
prescribes a special qualification only for the nominee from the youth sector. Section 9. Qualifications
of Party-List Nominees.No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of
not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a
bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days
preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the
election. In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more
than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains
the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his
term. A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he or she
seeks to represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee one must either
belong to the sector represented, or have a track record of advocacy for such sector. [Atong Paglaum,
Inc. vs. Commission on Elections, 694 SCRA 477(2013)]

BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT),

petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National Board of Canvassers),
respondent. [Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) vs.
Commission on Elections, 586 SCRA 210(2009)]

Constitutional Law; Party-List System Act; In computing the allocation of additional seats, the
continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in
the second clause of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional.We rule that, in computing
the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the
distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is
unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to
achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list
seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the
additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the
House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.
Same; Same; The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation
of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.We therefore
strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found
in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an
unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and
prevents the attainment of the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in
the House of Representatives.
Same; Same; Procedure in determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941.In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives
under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed: 1. The parties,
organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of
votes they garnered during the elections. 2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at
least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one
guaranteed seat each. 3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in
paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the
additional seats are allocated. 4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more
than three (3) seats.
Same; Same; The remaining available seats for allocation as additional seats are the maximum
seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats.In computing the additional
seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated, at
one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as additional
seats are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats.
Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding
off of fractional seats.
Same; Same; Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from
participating in the party-list system.Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major
political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the
Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their
sectoral wings.
Same; Same; By a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major
political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.By a vote of 8-7, the
Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in
the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted to continue disallowing major political
parties from the party-list elections joined Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate opinion. On

the formula to allocate party-list seats, the Court is unanimous in concurring with this ponencia.
[Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) vs. Commission on
Elections, 586 SCRA 210(2009)]

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its Chair, DANTON REMOTO, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Party-List System; The enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive.As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party
v. Commission on Elections, 359 SCRA 698 (2001), the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically
enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution
and RA 7941.
Same; Same; Same; Aside from Commission on Elections (COMELECs) moral objection and the
belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that
Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under
Republic Act No. 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani.We find that Ang Ladlad has
sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside
from COMELECs moral objection and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records
has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list
organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The
difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlads morality, or lack thereof.
Same; Same; Same; It was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Our
Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls
for is government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly, governmental reliance on religious
justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. We thus find that it was grave violation of the
non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion
of Ang Ladlad.
Same; Same; Same; Through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps homosexuals themselves,
have borne the brunt of societal disapproval.We are not blind to the fact that, through the years,
homosexual conduct, and perhaps homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt of societal
disapproval. It is not difficult to imagine the reasons behind this censurereligious beliefs, convictions
about the preservation of marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust of homosexuals
themselves and their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines has not seen fit to
criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore, these generally accepted public morals have
not been convincingly transplanted into the realm of law.
Election Law; Party-List System; Civil Law; Nuisance, Defined.Article 694 of the Civil Code defines
a nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks,
defies, or disregards decency or morality, the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised
Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings.
Same; Same; Evidence; A mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of
civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.A violation of Article
201 of the Revised Penal Code, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal
conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and
a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings
and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.
Same; Same; Moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify
exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system.We hold that moral disapproval,
without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from
participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further
any substantial public interest. Respondents blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion

that the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any particular morally
reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that implicates our equal protection clause.
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Party-List System; Equal Protection Clause; Recent jurisprudence
has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, the Supreme
Court will uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate
government end.Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right
nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational relationship
to some legitimate government end. In Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng
Pilipinas, 446 SCRA 299 (2004), we declared that [i]n our jurisdiction, the standard of analysis of
equal protection challenges xxx have followed the rational basis test, coupled with a deferential
attitude to legislative classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Law of general application should apply with equal force to Lesbian, Gay,
Bisexual and Transgender (LGBTs), and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the
same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.From the standpoint of the political
process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in participating in the
party-list system on the same basis as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this
case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal force to
LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other
marginalized and under-represented sectors.
Same; Same; Freedom of Expression; Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential
foundations of a democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably
received but also to those that offend, shock or disturb.Freedom of expression constitutes one of the
essential foundations of a democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are
favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this
sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is
not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the
COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an
approved message or discouraging a disfavored one.
Same; Same; Same; Freedom of Association; Only if a political party incites violence or puts forward
policies that are incompatible with democracy does it fall outside the protection of the freedom of
association guarantee.A political group should not be hindered solely because it seeks to publicly
debate controversial political issues in order to find solutions capable of satisfying everyone
concerned. Only if a political party incites violence or puts forward policies that are incompatible with
democracy does it fall outside the protection of the freedom of association guarantee.
Same; Party-List System; Equal Protection Clause; The principle of non-discrimination requires that
laws of general application relating to elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual
orientation.The principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general application relating to
elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation. Although sexual
orientation is not specifically enumerated as a status or ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the
ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has opined that the reference to sex in Article 26
should be construed to include sexual orientation. Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies
have declared discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited under various
international agreements.
Same; Same; Same; Yogyakarta Principles; Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta
Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated by various international law professors, areat best
de lege ferendaand do not constitute binding obligations on the Philippines.Using even the most
liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated by various
international law professors, areat bestde lege ferendaand do not constitute binding obligations
on the Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary international law is characterized by the soft
law nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of principles that promote international cooperation,
harmony, and respect for human rights, most of which amount to no more than well-meaning desires,

without the support of either State practice or opinio juris. [Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on
Elections, 618 SCRA 32(2010)]

G.R. Nos. 177857-58

February 11, 2010

PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC. (COCOFED), MANUEL V. DEL ROSARIO,

DOMINGO P. ESPINA, SALVADOR P. BALLARES, JOSELITO A. MORALEDA, PAZ M. YASON, VICENTE
A. CADIZ, CESARIA DE LUNA TITULAR, and RAYMUNDO C. DE VILLA, Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
JOVITO R. SALONGA, WIGBERTO E. TAADA, OSCAR F. SANTOS, ANA THERESIA HONTIVEROS, and
TEOFISTO L. GUINGONA III, Oppositors-Intervenors.
WIGBERTO E. TAADA, OSCAR F. SANTOS, SURIGAO DEL SUR FEDERATION OF AGRICULTURAL
COOPERATIVES (SUFAC) and MORO FARMERS ASSOCIATION OF ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR (MOFAZS),
represented by ROMEO C. ROYANDOYAN; and PAMBANSANG KILUSAN NG MGA SAMAHAN NG
MAGSASAKA (PAKISAMA), represented by VICENTE FABE, Movants-Intervenors.

RESOLUTION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Before us is the motion for reconsideration1 of the Resolution of the Court dated September 17, 2009,
interposed by oppositors-intervenors Jovito R. Salonga, Wigberto E. Taada, Oscar F. Santos, Ana Theresa
Hontiveros, and Teofisto L. Guingona III.
As may be recalled, the Court, in its resolution adverted to, approved, upon motion of petitioner Philippine
Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED), the conversion of the sequestered 753,848,312 Class "A"
and "B" common shares of San Miguel Corporation (SMC), registered in the name of Coconut Industry
Investment Fund (CIIF) Holding Companies (hereunder referred to as SMC Common Shares), into
753,848,312 SMC Series 1 Preferred Shares.
Oppositors-intervenors Salonga, et al. anchor their plea for reconsideration on the following submission or
issues:
1
The conversion of the shares is patently disadvantageous to the government and the coconut
farmers, given that SMCs option to redeem ensures that the shares will be bought at less than
their market value.
2
The honorable court overlooks the value of the fact that the government, as opposed to the
current administration, is the winning party in the case below and thus has no incentive to
convert.2
The Court is not inclined to reconsider.
The two (2) issues and the arguments and citations in support thereof are, for the most part and with slight
variations, clearly replications of oppositors-intervenors previous position presented in opposition to
COCOFEDs motion for approval of the conversion in question. They have been amply considered, discussed
at length, and found to be bereft of merit.
Oppositors-intervenors harp on the perceived economic disadvantages and harm that the government would
likely suffer by the approval of the proposed conversion. Pursuing this point, it is argued that the Court missed
the fact that the current value of the shares in question is increasing and the "perceived advantages of
pegging the issue price at PhP 75 are dwindling on a daily basis."3
Oppositors-intervenors concerns, encapsulated above, have been adequately addressed in some detail in the
resolution subject of this motion. For reference we reproduce what we wrote:
Salonga, et al. also argue that the proposed redemption is a right to buy the preferred shares at less than the
market value. That the market value of the preferred shares may be higher than the issue price of PhP
75 per share at the time of redemption is possible. But then the opposite scenario is also possible .
Again, the Court need not delve into policy decisions of government agencies because of their expertise and
special knowledge of these matters. Suffice it to say that all indications show that SMC will redeem said
preferred shares in the third year and not later because the dividend rate of 8% it has to pay on said shares is
higher than the interest it will pay to the banks in case it simply obtains a loan. When market prices of shares

are low, it is possible that interest rate on loans will likewise be low. On the other hand, if SMC has available
cash, it would be prudent for it to use such cash to redeem the shares than place it in a regular bank deposit
which will earn lower interests. It is plainly expensive and costly for SMC to keep on paying the 8% dividend
rate annually in the hope that the market value of the shares will go up before it redeems the shares. Likewise,
the conclusion that respondent Republic will suffer a loss corresponding to the difference between a high
market value and the issue price does not take into account the dividends to be earned by the preferred
shares for the three years prior to redemption. The guaranteed PhP 6 per share dividend multiplied by three
years will amount to PhP 18. If one adds PhP 18 to the issue price of PhP 75, then the holders of the preferred
shares will have actually attained a price of PhP 93 which hews closely to the speculative PhP 100 per share
price indicated by movants-intervenors.4 (Emphasis added.)
Elaborating on how the value of the sequestered shares will be preserved and conserved, we said:
Moreover, the conversion may be viewed as a sound business strategy to preserve and conserve the value of
the governments interests in CIIF SMC shares. Preservation is attained by fixing the value today at a
significant premium over the market price and ensuring that such value is not going to decline despite
negative market conditions. Conservation is realized thru an improvement in the earnings value via the 8% per
annum dividends versus the uncertain and most likely lower dividends on common shares.
In this recourse, it would appear that oppositors-intervenors seem unable to accept, in particular, the
soundness angle of the conversion. But as we have explained, the conversion of the shares along with the
safeguards attached thereto will ensure that the value of the shares will be preserved. In effect, due to the
nature of stocks in general and the prevailing business conditions, the government, through the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), chose not to speculate with the CIIF SMC shares, as prima facie
public property, in the hope that there would be a brighter economy in the future, and that the value of the
shares would increase. We must respect the decision of the executive department, absent a clear showing of
grave abuse of discretion.
Next, oppositors-intervenors argue that:
The very reason why the PCGG and the OSG [Office of Solicitor General] are before this Honorable Court is
precisely because, on their own, they have no authority to alter the nature of the sequestered shares. This fact
ought not to be novel to this Honorable Court because it is the Court itself that established such jurisprudence.
Thus, the reference to separation of powers is rather gratuitous.5
The Court to be sure agrees with the thesis that, under present state of things, the PCGG and the Office of the
Solicitor General have no power, by themselves, to convert the sequestered shares of stock. That portion,
however, about the reference to the separation of powers being gratuitous does not commend itself for
concurrence. As may be noted, the reference to the separation of powers concept was made in the context
that the ownership of the subject sequestered shares is the subject of a case before this Court; hence, the
need of the Courts approval for the desired conversion is effected.
Apropos the separation of powers doctrine and its relevance to this case, it may well be appropriate to again
quote the following excerpts from our decision in JG Summit Holdings, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,6 to wit:
The role of the Courts is to ascertain whether a branch or instrumentality of the Government has transgressed
its constitutional boundaries. But the Courts will not interfere with executive or legislative discretion exercised
within those boundaries. Otherwise, it strays into the realm of policy decision-making.
and our complementary holding in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,7 thus:
x x x [A] court is without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is not empowered to substitute its
judgment for that of Congress or of the President. It may, however, look into the question of whether such
exercise has been made in grave abuse of discretion.
The point, in fine, is: while it may, in appropriate cases, look into the question of whether or not the PCGG
acted in grave abuse of discretion, the Court is not empowered to review and go into the wisdom of the policy
decision or choices of PCGG and other executive agencies of the government. This is the limited mandate of
this Court. And as we have determined in our Resolution, the PCGG thoroughly studied and considered the
effects of conversion and, based upon such study, concluded that it would best serve the purpose of
maintaining and preserving the value of the shares of stock to convert the same. It was proved that the PCGG
had exercised proper diligence in reviewing the pros and cons of the conversion. The efforts PCGG have
taken with respect to the desired stock conversion argue against the notion of grave abuse of
discretion.1avvphi1
Anent the second issue that it is the government, as opposed to the current administration of President Gloria

Macapagal-Arroyo, that is the winning party in the case below and has no incentive to convert, the Court finds
that this argument has no merit.
The current administration, or any administration for that matter, cannot be detached from the government. In
the final analysis, the seat of executive powers is located in the sitting President who heads the government
and/or the "administration." Under the government established under the Constitution, it is the executive
branch, either pursuant to the residual power of the President or by force of her enumerated powers under the
laws, that has control over all matters pertaining to the disposition of government property or, in this case,
sequestered assets under the administration of the PCGG. Surely, such control is neither legislative nor
judicial. As the Court aptly held in Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 8 resolving the issue as to
which between the Governor-General, as head of the executive branch, and the Legislature may vote the
shares of stock held by the government:
It is clear that they are not legislative in character, and still more clear that they are not judicial. The fact that
they do not fall within the authority of either of these two constitutes legal ground for concluding that they do
fall within that of the remaining one among which the powers of the government are divided.
The executive branch, through the PCGG, has given its assent to the conversion and such decision may be
deemed to be the decision of the government. The notion suggested by oppositors-intervenors that the current
administration, thru the PCGG, is without power to decide and act on the conversion on the theory that the
head of the current administration is not government, cannot be sustained for lack of legal basis.
Likewise, before the Court is the Motion to Admit Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for Reconsideration
[Re: Conversion of SMC Shares] dated October 16, 2009 9 filed by movants-intervenors Wigberto E. Taada;
Oscar F. Santos; Surigao del Sur Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives (SUFAC) and Moro Farmers
Association of Zamboanga del Sur (MOFAZS); and Pambansang Kilusan ng mga Samahan ng Magsasaka
(PAKISAMA).
In filing their motion, movants-intervenors explain that:
Messrs. Taada and Santos earlier joined an opposition filed by a group led by former Senate President Jovito
R. Salonga, by way of solidarity and without desire or intent of trifling with judicial processes as, in fact, the
instant Motion for Reconsideration is filed by herein movants-intervenors, through counsel, Atty. Taada, and
also by way of supplement and support to the Opposition earlier filed by Salonga, et al., and the Opposition
originally intended to be filed by herein Movants-intervenors.10 (Emphasis supplied.)
Movants-intervenors argue further that the Court allowed them to intervene in a Resolution in G.R. No.
180702, which also arose from Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0033-F and, thus, should similarly be allowed
to intervene in the instant case.11
This motion of Taada, et al. must fail.
As it were, Atty. Taada and Oscar Santos admit having joined oppositors-intervenors Salonga, et al. in the
latters October 7, 2009 motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, they should have voiced out all their
arguments in the Salonga motion for reconsideration following the Omnibus Motion Rule. The filing of yet
another motion for reconsideration by way of supplement to the Salonga motion for reconsideration is a clear
deviation from the Omnibus Motion Rule and cannot be countenanced.
Even the joinder of SUFAC, MOFAZS, and PAKISAMA with co-intervenors Taada and Santos will not cure
the flawed motion. In Heirs of Geronimo Restrivera v. De Guzman,12 the Court explained why:
Indeed, the right of intervention should be accorded to any one having title to property "which is the subject of
litigation, provided that his right will be substantially affected by the direct legal operation and effect of the
decision, and provided also that it is reasonably necessary for him to safeguard an interest of his own which
no other party on record is interested in protecting." (Emphasis supplied.)
SUFAC, MOFAZS, and PAKISAMA all failed to demonstrate that none of the existing parties, that are similarly
situated as they, would not defend their common interest. In the instant case, COCOFED, the federation of
farmers associations recognized by the Philippine Coconut Authority, has actively participated in the instant
case, vigorously defending their rights and those of all the coconut farmers who are supposedly stockholders
of SMC.
The Court can extend to the instant motion of Taada, et al. the benefit of the liberal application of procedural
rules and entertain the motion and resolve the issues therein. Nonetheless, an examination of the issues
raised in the Taada motion for reconsideration would show that the same have been more than adequately
addressed in our Resolution of September 19, 2009.

Movants-intervenors contend that the challenged resolution violates the Courts holding in San Miguel
Corporation v. Sandiganbayan,13 as the conversion of the sequestered common shares into treasury shares
would destroy the character of the shares of stock.
The invocation of San Miguel Corporation is quite misplaced, it being inapplicable since it is not on all fours
factually with the instant case.
San Miguel Corporation involved the sale by the 14 CIIF Companies, through the United Coconut Planters
Bank (UCPB), of 33,133,266 SMC shares, to the SMC. Before the perfection of the sale, however, the said
shares were sequestered. Thus, the SMC group suspended payment of the purchase price of the shares,
while the UCPB group rescinded the sale. Later, the SMC and UCPB groups entered into a Compromise
Agreement and Amicable Settlement, whereby they undertook to continue with the sale of the subject shares
of stock. The parties, over the opposition of both the Republic and the COCOFED, then moved for the
approval of this agreement by the Sandiganbayan where the case was then pending. Later, UCPB and the
SMC groups implemented their agreement extra-judicially, withdrawing, at the same time, their petition for the
approval of their aforementioned compromise agreement. Thereafter, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order
dated August 5, 1991, directing the SMC to deliver to the graft court the sequestered SMC shares that it
bought from UCPB. This was followed by another Order dated March 18, 1992, for the delivery to the court of
dividends pertaining to the subject SMC shares. It was these two delivery Orders that were submitted for the
consideration of the Court.
An examination of the facts of San Miguel Corporation would show the factual dissimilarities of such case to
the instant controversy. First, in San Miguel Corporation, the Court did not even pass upon the validity of the
Compromise Agreement, while, in the instant case, the Court approved the conversion. Second, in the instant
case, court approval was sought before the execution of the conversion, while in San Miguel Corporation, no
court approval was sought for the Compromise Agreement. And third, in San Miguel Corporation, both the
Republic and COCOFED opposed the Compromise Agreement, while, in the instant case, they both agreed to
the conversion. Clearly, San Miguel Corporation finds no application to the instant case.
Moreover, our ruling in San Miguel Corporation did not per se forbid the conversion of sequestered common
shares into preferred/treasury shares. As we held thereat, the changes that are unacceptable are those "of
any permanent character that will alter their being sequestered shares and, therefore, in custodia legis, that is
to say, under the control and disposition of this Court." Here, the SMC Series 1 Preferred Shares will also be
sequestered in exchange for the common shares originally sequestered. Thus, the approval of the conversion
of the subject SMC shares in the instant case does not run counter, as movants insist otherwise, to the ruling
in San Miguel Corporation.
Movants-intervenors also assail the conversion of the SMC shares from common to preferred on another
angle, thus:
Simply, there is no right to vote: There is no greater alteration of the very nature of a common share. In a very
real sense, therefore, a common share with all its rights, is reduced to a mere promissory note; worse, an
unsecured and conditional promissory note, the returns on which is dependent on available retained earnings
and the over-all viability of SMC.14
The assault is without merit.
Again, by their very nature, shares of common stock, while giving the stockholder the right to vote, do not
guarantee that the vote of the stockholder will prevail. That is non sequitur. This we explained in the
Resolution subject of reconsideration:
The mere presence of four (4) PCGG nominated directors in the SMC Board does not mean it can prevent
board actions that are viewed to fritter away the company assets. Even under the status quo, PCGG has no
controlling sway in the SMC Board, let alone a veto power at 24% of the stockholdings. In relinquishing the
voting rights, the government, through the PCGG, is not in reality ceding control.
Moreover, PCGG has ample powers to address alleged strategies to thwart recovery of ill-gotten wealth. Thus,
the loss of voting rights has no significant effect on PCGGs function to recover ill-gotten wealth or prevent
dissipation of sequestered assets.151avvphi1
Movants-intervenors likewise challenge the legality of the conversion in light of Commission on Audit (COA)
Circular No. 89-296, which provides that the divestment or disposal of government property shall be
undertaken primarily through public auction.
The postulation has no merit, for there is, in the first place, no divestment or disposal of the SMC shares. The
CIIF companies shall remain the registered owners of the SMC Series 1 Preferred Shares after conversion,
although the shares are still subject of sequestration. To state the obvious, these SMC shares are not yet
government assets as ownership thereof are still to be peremptorily determined. Hence, COA Circular No. 89-

296, which covers only the disposition of government property, cannot plausibly be made to govern the
conversion of the SMC shares in question, assuming for the nonce that the challenged conversion is
equivalent to disposition. As explained in the September 17, 2009 Resolution, the sequestered assets are akin
to property subject of preliminary attachment or receivership. As stated in the assailed resolution, the Court is
authorized to allow the conversion of the subject shares under Rule 57, Sec. 11, in relation to Rule 59, Sec. 6
of the Rules of Court. And as may be recalled, the Court, in Palm Avenue Realty Development Corporation v.
PCGG,16 allowed the sale of sequestered properties without an auction sale given that, as here, the
sequestered assets would not have fetched the correct market price. In the instant case, the same is also true.
It is highly doubtful that anyone other than SMC would purchase the sequestered shares at market value.
Finally, Taada, et al. posit the view that the conversion of shares needs the acquiescence of the 14 CIIF
companies.
The contention is untenable.
It should be remembered that the SMC shares allegedly owned by the CIIF companies are sequestered
assets under the control and supervision of the PCGG pursuant to Executive Order No. 1, Series of 1986. Be
that as it may, it is the duty of the PCGG to preserve the sequestered assets and prevent their dissipation. In
the exercise of its powers, the PCGG need not seek or obtain the consent or even the acquiescence of the
sequestered assets owner with respect to any of its acts intended to preserve such assets. Otherwise, it would
be well-nigh impossible for PCGG to perform its duties and exercise its powers under existing laws, for the
owner of the sequestered assets will more often than not oppose or resist PCGGs actions if their consent is a
condition precedent. The act of PCGG of proposing the conversion of the sequestered SMC shares to Series
1 Preferred Shares was clearly an exercise of its mandate under existing laws, where the consent of the CIIF
Companies is rendered unnecessary.
Additionally, the above contention has been rendered moot with the filing on October 26, 2009 of the
Manifestation dated October 23, 2009. Attached to such Manifestation is the Secretarys Certificate of the 14
CIIF companies approving the conversion of the SMC Common Shares into Series 1 Preferred Shares.17
As a final consideration, the Court also takes note of the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and Admit
Attached Motion for Partial Reconsideration dated October 5, 2009 and the Motion for Partial Reconsideration
dated October 6, 2009 filed by movant-intervenor UCPB. UCPB claims to have direct interest in the SMC
shares subject of the instant case, being the statutory administrator, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. (PD)
1468, of the Coconut Industry Investment Fund and as an investor in the CIIF companies.
UCPB argues that, as the statutory administrator of the CIIF, the proceeds of the net dividend earnings of,
and/or redemption proceeds from, the Series 1 Preferred Shares of SMC should be deposited in escrow with it
rather than, as directed by the Court in its September 17, 2009 Resolution, with the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP) or the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP).
Concededly, UCPB is the administrator of the CIIF, which invested in the subject Series 1 Preferred Shares of
SMC. UCPBs legal authority as such administrator does not, however, include its being made the exclusive
depository bank of the proceeds of dividends, interest, or income from the investments solely with UCPB. To
be sure, the relevant decrees, PD Nos. 775, 961, and 1468, did not constitute UCPBthe bank acquired for
the coconut farmers under PD 755to be the sole depositary of the proceeds of the returns of the
investments authorized under Sec. 9, Art. III of PD 1468.
Besides, since the subject sequestered SMC shares are under custodia legis, the Court has certain control
over them and their fruits. Nonetheless, the PCGG, having administrative control over the subject sequestered
shares pending resolution of the actual ownership thereof, possesses discretion, taking into account the
greater interest of the government and the farmers, to decide on where to deposit on escrow the net dividend
earnings of, and/or redemption proceeds from, the Series 1 Preferred Shares of SMC. The depository bank
may be the DBP/LBP or the UCPB.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to DENY for lack of merit the: (1) Motion for Reconsideration dated October
7, 2009 filed by oppositors-intervenors Jovito R. Salonga, Wigberto E. Taada, Oscar F. Santos, Ana Theresa
Hontiveros, and Teofisto L. Guingona III; and (2) Motion to Admit Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for
Reconsideration [Re: Conversion of SMC Shares] dated October 16, 2009 filed by movants-intervenors
Wigberto E. Taada, Oscar F. Santos, SUFAC, MOFAZS, represented by Romeo C. Royandoyan, and
PAKISAMA, represented by Vicente Fabe.
The Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and Admit Attached Motion for
Partial Reconsideration dated October 5, 2009, and the Motion for Partial Reconsideration dated October 6,
2009 filed by movant-intervenor UCPB.
The Court AMENDS its Resolution dated September 17, 2009 to give to the PCGG the discretion in depositing
on escrow the net dividend earnings on, and/or redemption proceeds from, the Series 1 Preferred Shares of

SMC, either with the Development Bank of the Philippines/Land Bank of the Philippines or with the United
Coconut Planters Bank, having in mind the greater interest of the government and the coconut farmers.
SO ORDERED.