1.

CHINA AIRLINES LTD V DANIEL CHIOK

GR No. 152122
FACTS:
Daniel Chiok purchased CAL ticket covering Manila-Taipei-Hongkong-Manila for air transpo. Chiok
took his trip from MNL to Taipei. Chiok proceeded to Hongkong International Airport for his return
trip to Manila. However, upon reaching the PAL counter, Chiok saw a poster stating that his flight was
cancelled because of a typhoon in Manila. He was then informed that all the confirmed ticket holders
of PAL flight were automatically booked for its next flight, which was to leave the next day. He
informed PAL personnel that, being the founding director of the Philippine Polysterene Paper
Corporation, he had to reach Manila on November 25, 1981 because of a business option which he
had to execute on said date.
On November 25, 1981, Chiok went to the airport. Cathay Pacific stewardess Lok Chan had taken and
received Chioks plane ticket and his luggage. Lok called the attention of Carmen Chan, PALs terminal
supervisor, and informed the latter that Chioks name was not in the computer list of passengers.
Therefore, he could not be permitted to board. Chiok requested Carmen to put into writing the alleged
reason why he was not allowed to take his flight. The latter sought to recover his luggage but found
only 2 which were placed at the end of the passengers line. Realizing that his new Samsonite luggage
was missing, which contained cosmetics worth HK$14,128.80, he complained to Carmen.
Chiok proceeded to PALs Hongkong office and confronted PALs reservation officer, Carie Chao, who
previously confirmed his flight back to MNL. She told Chiok that his name was on the list and pointed
to the latter his computer number listed on the PAL confirmation sticker attached to his plane ticket.
Chiok then decided to use another CAL ticket and asked Chao if this ticket could be used to book him
for the said flight. The latter, once again, booked and confirmed the formers trip, this time on board
PAL Flight No. PR 311 scheduled to depart that evening. Later, Chiok went to the PAL check-in
counter and it was Carmen who attended to him. As this juncture, Chiok had already placed his travel
documents, including his clutch bag, on top of the PAL check-in counter. Carmen directed PAL
personnel to transfer counters. In the ensuing commotion, Chiok lost his clutch bag containing
valuable items and sum of money.
When he reached MNL, he filed a complaint against CAL for damages. He alleged that despite several
confirmations of his flight, defendant PAL refused to accommodate him, for which reason he lost the
business option. He also alleged that PALs personnel, specifically Carmen, ridiculed and humiliated
him in the presence of so many people. Further, he alleged that defendants are solidarily liable for the
damages he suffered, since one is the agent of the other.
RTC of Manila held CAL and PAL jointly and severally liable. Carriers appealed to CA. CA affirmed
it. CA debunked petitioners claim that it had merely acted as an issuing agent for the ticket covering
the trip of respondents. CA cited the ruling in KLM Royal Dutch v CA, hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON CAL is liable for breach of transportation contract.
HELD:
Yes. CAL is liable. In the instant case, the CA ruled that under the contract of transportation, petitioner
-- as the ticket-issuing carrier (like KLM) -- was liable regardless of the fact that PAL was to perform
or had performed the actual carriage
Defendant-appellant CAL is clearly liable under the contract of carriage with [respondent] and
remains to be so, regardless of those instances when actual carriage was to be performed by another

carrier. The issuance of a confirmed CAL ticket in favor of respondent covering his entire trip abroad
concretely attests to this. This also serves as proof that defendant-appellant CAL, in effect guaranteed
that the carrier, such as defendant-appellant PAL would honor his ticket, assure him of a space therein
and transport him on a particular segment of his trip. Notwithstanding the errant quotation, we have
found after careful deliberation that the assailed Decision is supported in substance by KLM v. CA.
The misquotation by the CA cannot serve as basis for the reversal of its ruling.
It is significant to note that the contract of air transportation was between petitioner and respondent,
with the former endorsing to PAL the Hong Kong-to-Manila segment of the journey. Such contract of
carriage has always been treated in this jurisdiction as a single operation. Transportation to be
performed by several successive air carriers shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Convention, to
be one undivided transportation, if it has been regarded by the parties as a single operation, whether it
has been agreed upon under the form of a single contract or of a series of contracts, and it shall not
lose its international character merely because one contract or a series of contracts is to be performed
entirely within a territory subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate, or authority of the same
High Contracting Party
Carriage to be performed by several successive carriers under one ticket, or under a ticket and any
conjunction ticket issued therewith, is regarded as a single operation
In American Airlines v. Court of Appeals, we have noted that under a general pool partnership
agreement, the ticket-issuing airline is the principal in a contract of carriage, while the endorsee-airline
is the agent.
In the instant case, following the jurisprudence cited above, PAL acted as the carrying agent of CAL.
In the same way that we ruled against British Airways and Lufthansa in the aforementioned cases, we
also rule that CAL cannot evade liability to respondent, even though it may have been only a ticket
issuer for the Hong KongManila sector.

US V FOWLER
1 PHIL 614
FACTS:
The two defendants have been accused of the theft of sixteen bottles of champagne while on board the
transport Lawton, then navigating the high seas, which said bottles of champagne formed part of the
cargo of the said vessel and were the property of Julian Lindsay, The accused having been brought
before the court, the prosecuting attorney being present on behalf of the Government, counsel for the
defendants presented a demurrer, alleging that the CFI was without jurisdiction to try the crime
charged, inasmuch as it appeared from the information that the crime was committed on the high seas,
and not in the city of Manila or upon the seas within the 3-mile limit to which the jurisdiction of the
court extends, and asked, upon these grounds, that the case be dismissed.
This contention was opposed by the prosecuting attorney, who alleged that the court has original
jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which the penalty exceeds six months imprisonment, over all
crimes committed on board vessels flying the flag of the United States has been vested in the CFI of
the city of Manila. He argued that the President of the United States had unquestionable authority to
authorize the commanding general and the Civil Commission to establish a judicial system with
authority to take cognizance of maritime and admiralty causes, citing a decision of the Supreme Court
of the United States in support of this doctrine, TC held that the court was without jurisdiction to try
the accused for the theft alleged to have been committed on the high seas, sustained the demurrer, and
ordered the discharge of the defendants, with the costs to the Government. Against this order the
prosecuting attorney appealed, and the case was brought before this court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance has jurisdiction over crimes committed on the high seas on
board of transport not registered in the Philippines.
HELD: NO. . The Philippine court has no jurisdiction over the crime of theft committed on high seas
on board a vessel not registered or licensed in teh Philippines. The transport Lawton not being a
vessel of this class, our courts are without jurisdiction to take a cognizance of a crime committed on
board the same.
This case deals with a theft committed on board a transport while navigating the high seas. Act No.
136 of the organic law, as well as Act No. 186 passed by the Civil Commission, and which repealed
the former law, Act No. 76, do not expressly confer jurisdiction or authority upon this court to take
cognizance of all crimes committed on board vessels on the high seas. While the provisions of the law
are clear and precise with respect to civil admiralty or maritime cases, this is not true with respect to
criminal cases. If any doubt could arise concerning the true meaning of the law applicable to the case,
Act. No. 400 effectively dissipates such doubts. This law, which is an addition to Act No. 136, by
which the courts of justice of the Philippine Islands were organized, "Of all crimes and offenses
committed on the high seas or beyond the jurisdiction of any country, or within any of the navigable
waters of the Philippine Archipelago, on bard a ship or water craft of any kind registered or licensed in
the Philippine Islands in accordance with the laws thereof."
The purpose of this law was to define the jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance in criminal cases
for crimes committed on board vessels registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands. The transport
Lawton not being a vessel of this class, our courts are without jurisdiction to take cognizance of a
crime committed on board the same.