Kaleb Erickson: Bare Bones Paper

Why Compatibilism is Not Compatible With the World

In this paper I will argue that compatibilism does not reconcile the different positions of
determinism and free will and is inconsistent by definition. Compatibilism is, as Peter van
Inwagen (2002) explains, the reconciliation of the concepts of determinism and free will. To
properly define compatibilism, we need a definition of determinism and free will. Roderick M.
Chisholm (1964) states that determinism is the view that every event that is involved in an act is
caused by some other event. And free will is defined by Randolph Clarke (2000) as the unique
ability of persons to exercise control over their conduct in the fullest manner necessary for moral
responsibility. As such, the argument of compatibilism seeks to peacefully reconcile these two
polar opposites. Compatibilists argue that although only one path or chain of events will be
followed from the present to the future (as per the definition of determinism), this set path is
determined by the choices that we would make according to our desires, giving us free will. This
means an individuals life is set even before he was born; written in stone, yet with the ability to
intellectually consider alternate pathways, and the pre-programmed restriction that the individual
must choose the path that nature previously stated. The universe created one path that all must
travel down, but, mercifully, also created tempting side views of possibilities that can never be
attained.
Compatibility thus creates a problem: negated culpability. If determinism is true then
because of a past chain of events, any decision, regardless of free wills involvement, must occur.
For example: Joe, determined by the universe to be a criminal before his birth, kills his friend.
Compatibility allows that Joe had the intellect to assess his other options, but he is not able to
take any of them because the universe determined that he could not make any other choice but to
kill his friend. Thus making him not culpable for his actions but still subject to societal
punishment. Inwagen also mentions that one technique of modifying behavior in humans is
through rewards and punishments. But if a persons choices are pre-determined, then these
rewards and punishments serve no purpose in affecting someones choices. A theory on free will
and what causes events is necessary for humans to assume moral responsibility and to improve
human behavior.
Compatibilism has a valid explanation for how these two seemingly opposite concepts
can exist in harmony with each other. This argument states that all of our actions are
predetermined and if it had been our will or choice in that moment to make a different action,
then that different action would have occurred instead, thus allowing for determinism to function
in accordance with free will. This argument brings up a discussion of desires and volitions and
how they relate to free will, as explained by Harry Frankfurt (1971). This discussion will be used
to undermine this argument supporting compatibilism.
The biggest weakness of compatibilism lies in the definition of the two concepts that it
tries to harmonize. My argument emphasizes these clashing definitions as follows: In a
deterministic view, all events are brought to pass by antecedent events and there is no other
possible course of action, implying that humans are not responsible for their actions because
there is no physically possible alternative. Free will is defined as a persons ability to control
their conduct as necessary for moral responsibility. If no other outcome is possible, a person
would have no moral responsibility for any of their actions, a direct contradiction with the
definition of free will. Thus, free will and determinism are conflicting by definition and cannot
coincide. This argument clearly shows that free will and determinism are incompatible concepts
and any attempts to reconcile these two beliefs is contradictory and inconsistent by definition.