Case Title

Citation

CONFLICT OF LAWS
Topic

Aznar v. Garcia

7 SCRA 95

Renvoi

Bellis vs. Bellis

20 SCRA 358

Renvoi

Gibbs vs. Government

59 Phil 293

Renvoi

Fluemer vs. Hix

54 Phil 610

Application of Foreign
Law

Miciano vs. Brimo

50 Phil 867

Application of Foreign
Law

Doctrine
Art. 946 (California Law) which autohrizes the
reference or return of questions to the law of domicile
is the national law referred to in Art. 16 of the NCC.
Art 946 refers back the case when the decedent is not
domiciled in California to the Philippines. The court
of domicile should not refer back the case to
California as it will lead to a case incapable of
determination - like a football.
Art.17 of the NCC does not serve as an exception to
Art. 16. Congress intended to make Art. 16 a specific
provision itself which must be applied in succession.
The nature and extent of the title of Mrs. Gibbs s to
Philippine lands must be determined in accordance
with lex rei sitae or by the law of the place where the
property is situated. Thus, under Philippine law, Mrs.
Gibbs has been vested of a descindible interest equal
to that of her husband. Such interest was transmitted
to her by virtue of inheritance and their transmission
falls within the language of Sec. 1536 of the
Administrative Code, which levies a tax on
inheritance.
The laws of the foreign jurisdiction do not prove
themselves in Philippine courts. Such must be proven
as facts. In this case, the requirements of law were not
met:
1. No printed or published copy under the authority of
West Virginia
2. Nor extract from the law attested by the certificate
of the officer having charge of the original
3. No evidence that the extract from the laws of West
Virginia were in force at that time.
The condition that Philippine laws shall govern is
considered unwritten as it is contrary to Art. 10 of the
Civil Code (old) and the institution of legatees in said
will is unconditional and consequently valid and
effective as to Andre Brimo.

Suntay vs. Suntay

95 Phil 500

application of Foreign
Law

PCIB vs. Escolin

56 SCRA 266

Proof of Foreign Law /

Judicial Notice

In re: Johnson

39 Phil 156

Proof of Foreign Law

CIR vs. Fisher

110 Phil 686

Proof of Foreign Law

The facts that: (1) municipal district court of Amoy

China is a probate court; (2) the law of China on
probate or allowance procedure; (3) the lega
lrequirements for execution of a valid will in China in
1931 must be proven.
The unverified answers to the questions for the Consul
General of China are inadmissble because apart from
the fact that the office of the Consul General does not
qualify and make the person who holds it an expert in
Chinese procedural law, if the same be admitted, the
adverse party will be deprived of his right to crossexamine the witness.
The question of what are the Texas laws governing
matters in issue is one of fact, not of law. Elementary
is the rule that foreign laws may not be taken judicial
notice of and had to be proven like any other fact in
dispute between parties in any proceeding, with the
rare excpetion in instances when the laws are already
within the actual knowledge of the court, such as
when: (1) they sre well and generally known; (2) they
have been actually ruled upon and none of the parties
claim otherwise.
SC held that RTC judge should not have taken judicial
notice of LAws of States of American Union as Sec.
275 of the Code of Civil Procedure only allows the
judicial notice of the Law of the United States. He
was merely satisfied by examining the Illinois law
exhibited under a textbook annotation.
In absence of proof, the Court is jusitified in indulging
in processual presumption, in presuming that the law
of England is the same as Philippine law,
It is clear from both provisions that reciprocity with
respect to transfer or death taxes of ant and every
character. If any of the two states collects or imposes
and does not exempt any transfer, death, legacy, or
succession tax of any character, the reciprocity does
not work.

Board of Commissioners vs. Dela Rosa 197 SCRA 853

Phil Trsut Co. vs. Bohanan

56 SCRA 266

Zalamea vs. CA

228 SCRA 23

Wildvalley Shipping vs. CA

G.R. No. 119602

Ellis vs. Republic

7 SCRA 962

Since there was no showing of what laws of China

were, the petitioners postulate that for said marriages
to be valid in the Philippines, it should have been
Proof of Foreign Law /
shown that they were valid by the laws of China.
Nationality
Hence, Santiago's children followed the citizenship of
their mother having been born outside of a valid
marriage.
Executor was not able to introduce Nevada Law in
evidence. The law of Nevad, being a foreign law, can
only ne proven in our courts in the form and manner
prescribed by our Rules - (1) official publication
Judicial Notice of Foreign
thereof; or (2) copy attested by the officer having
Law
legal custody of the record.
However, children of testator did not dispute the
Nevada law, thus the Court took judicial notice of it,
applying Art. 10 of the old Civil Code.
There was fraud or bad faith on the part of TWA
airlines because the US Law which provides the ride
Judicial Notice of Foreign to overbook flights was not proven in court.
Law
Aslo, SC noted that lex loci contractus is applicable in
this case since such law governs where the airline
tickes was issued - that is the Philippines.
For a copy of a foreign public document to be
admissible, the following requisites are mandatory:
1. must be attested by the officer having legal custody
of the records or by his deputy
2. must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary
Judicial Notice of Foreign
ofthe embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
Law
consular or consular agent or foreign service officer,
and with seal of his office. (PH embassy)
The latter requirement is not a mere technicality but is
intended to justify the giving of full faith and credit to
the genuineness of a document in a foreign country.
Art. 15 of the NCC adheres to the theory that
jurisidction over the status of a natural person is
Personal Law
detemrined by the latter's nationality. Thus, the SC has
jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rosem a FIilipino
citizen, but not over Spouses Ellis, who are foreigners.

Tecson vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 161434

Personal Law

AASJS vs. Datumanong

G.R. No. 160869

Personal Law

Republic vs. Maddela

27 SCRA 702

Nationality

Burca vs. Republic

51 SCRA 248

Nationality

Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner

41 SCRA 292

Nationality

Any conclusion to the Filipino ctiizenship of Lorenzo

Pou could only be drawn from the presumption of
having died in 1954 at 84 years old, he would have
been born sometime in 1870, and that San Carlos,
Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death. In
the absence of any other evidence, Lorenzo could
have benefited from the en masse Filipinization by
virtue of the Philippine Bill in 1902. His citizenship
will then be extended to his son Allan f. Poe, father of
FPJ. The 1935 Constitution confers citizenship to all
persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless
whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
RA 9225 (Dual Citizenship Act) is not
unconstitutional. It only allows dual citizenship to a
natural-born Filipino who lost Philippine citizenship
by reason of their naturalization as ctiizens of a
foreign country. It does not recognize dual allegiance.
Plainly from Sec. 3 of the law, it stayed clear out of
the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden
of confronting the issue to the concerned foreign
country.
No person claiming to be a citizen may get a judicial
determination of citzenship. As an incident only of the
adjudication of the right of the parties to a
contorversy, the court may pass upon, and make a
pronouncement relative to their status. Otherwise,
such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power.
The foreign wife of a Filipino can only become a
Filipino citizen if she must possess all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications under
the Naturalization Law and must file a petition for
naturalization.
The generl rule is question of citizenship is NOT res
judicata; EXCEPT if the following concues: (1) with
participation of the OSG; (2) affirmed by the SC; (3)
citizenship is material issue; (4) a full-blown hearing
Under Section 18 of the Commonwealth Act 473, an
alien woman marrying a Filipino becomes ipso facto a

Oh Hek How vs. Republic

29 SCRA 94

Nationality

Nuval vs. Gurray

52 Phil 645

Domicile : Election

Velilla vs. Posadas

62 Phil 624

Domicile : Taxation

Ujano vs. Republic

17 SCRA 147

Domicile : Citizenship

Filipina providshe is not disqualified to be a citizen of

the Philippines under Sec. 4 of the same law.
Section 12 of the Commonwealth Act 473 provides
that before the naturalization certificate is issued, the
petitioner shall solemnly sweat that he renounces
absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to
any foreign pricem potentate and particularly to the
state.
The question of how a Chinese citizen may strip
himself of that status is necessarily governed by the
laws of China (pursuant to Arts. 15 and 16 of NCC).
As a consequence, a Chinese national cannot be
naturalized as a citizen of the Philippines, unless he
has complied with the laws of Nationalist China
requiring previous permission of its Minister of the
Interior for the renunciation of nationality.
It is an established rule that where a voter abandons
his residence in a state and acquires one in another
state, he cannot again vote in the state of his former
residence until he has qualified by a new period of
residence. The term residence is synonymous with
domicile which imports: (1) intent to reside in a fixed
place and (2) personal presence in that place, coupled
with (3) conduct indicative of such intention.
There is no statement of Moody that he had adopted a
new domicile while he was absent from Manila.
Though he was physically present in Calcutta for
some months, the appellant does not claim that
Moody had a domicile there.
Our Civil Code (old) defines domicile of natural
erosins as the place of their usual residnece. To effect
hte abandonment of one;s domicile there must be: (1)
deliberate and provable choice of a new domicile; (2)
coupled with actual residence in the place chosen; (3)
with a declared or provable intent that it should be
one's fixed and permanent place of abode.
A domicile is characterized by animis manendi. So an
alien admitted to thid country as a temporary visitor

Caasi vs. CA

191 SCRA 229

Domicile

Marcos vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 119976

Domicile

Jimenez vs. Republic

109 Phil 273

Personal Status and

Capacity

Recto vs. Harden

100 Phil 427

Personal Status and

Capacity / Absolute
Divorce

cannot be said to have established his domicile here

because the period of that is only temporary in nature
and must leave when the purpose of his coming is
accomplished.
Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration
to the United States in 1984 constituted an
abandonment of his domicile and residence in the
Philippines. For he did not go to the US merely to
visit his children or his doctor. He entered the US with
the intention to live there permanently as evidenced
by his application for an immigrant's visa.
His act of filing a COC for elective office in the
Philippines did not itself constitute a waiver of his
status as permanent resident or immigrant of the US.
The waiver must be indubitable as his application for
it.
For purposes of political law, the concepts of
residence and domicile are synonymous.
An individual does not lose his domicile even if he
has lived and maintained residence in different places.
Imedla continued to kept close ties with Tacloban
celebrating her birthdays and other important personal
milestones for the benefit of her province and
hometown.
The incidents of the status of marriage are governed
by law, not by the will of the parties. Our law is
specific in enumerating the legal grounds that must be
proved to exist by indubitable evidence to annul a
marriage.
The purpose of the contract was not to secure a
divorce, or to facilitate or promote the procurement of
a divorce as it merely sought to protect the interest of
Mrs. Harden in the conjugal partnership, during the
pendency of a divorce suit she intended to file in the
United States. What is more, inasmuch as Mr. and
Mrs. Harden are admittedly citizens of the United
States, their status and the dissolution thereof are
governed by the laws of the United States, which

sanction divorce.

Barnuevo vs. Fuster

29 Phil 606

Personal Status and

Capacity

Quita vs. Dandan

G.R. No. 124862

Personal Status and

Capacity

Llorente vs. CA

G.R. No. 123371

Personal Status and

Capacity

Goitia vs. Campos Rueda

35 Phil 252

Marriage

Wong Woo Yiu vs. Vivo

13 SCRA 55

Marriage

The authority of the jurisdictional power of courts to

decree a divorce is not comprised with the personal
status of the husband and wife. The whole theory of
the statues and of the rights which belong to everyone
does not go beyond the sphere of private law and the
autority and jurisdiction of the courts are not a matter
of the private law of persons, but of the public or
political law of the nation.
Quita was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of
her divorce from Arturo. The doubt persisted as to
whether she was still a Filipino citizen when her
divorce was decreed. The trial court must have
overlooked the materiality of such aspect. The ruling
in Van Dorn would become applicable and she could
very well lose her right to inherit from him.
Only Filipino nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces. Aliens may validly obtain
divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to
their national law. (Van Dorn vs. Ranillo)
Quoted, Quita vs. Dandan.
Marriage partakes of the nature of an ordinary
contract but it is something more than a mere contract.
It is a new relation, the rights, duties and obligations
of which rest not upon the agreement of parties but
upon the general law. Marriage is an institution of
which its purity the public is deeply interested.
The pro tanto separation resulting from a decree of
separate support is not an impeachment of that public
policy. It is merely a stronger policy overruling a
weaker one.
But no validity can be given to this contention
becuase no proof was presented relative to the law of
Marriage in China. Such being the case, we should
apply the general rule of processual presumption.

Adong vs. Chaong Seng Gee

43 Phil 43

Marriage

Ching Suat vs. Co Heong

77 Phil 988

Marriage

People vs. Mora Dumpo

62 Phil 739

Marriage

Lao and Lao vs. Dee tim

45 Phil 739

Marriage

Since our law only recognizes marriage celebrated

before any of the officers mentioned therein, and a
village leader is not one of them, it is clear that
petitioner's marriage, even if true, cannot be
recognized in the Philippines.
In the case at bar, there is no competent testimony as
to what the laws of China in the Province of Amoy
concerning marriage was in 1895. There is lacking of
proof so clear, strong and unrequivocal as to produce
moral conviction of the alleged existence of the prior
Chinese marriage.
We regard the evidence as producing a moral
conviction of the exitence of the Mohammedan
marriage. We regard the provisions of Section IX of
the Marriage law as validating marriages performed
according to the rites of the Mohammedan religion.
On the other hand, the marriage between Co Heong
and Gue Min has not been proven. There was likewise
no evidence to support that the supposed marriage was
performed in accordance with the laws were of China
in force at the time of its supposed performance, nor
even what those laws were.
The uncontradicted testimony if Tahari, an imam,
authorized to solemnize marriages between
Mohammedans, to the effect that the consent of the
bride's father or in the absence thereof, that of the
chief of the tribe to which she belongs is an
indispensable requirement for the validity of such
contracts. Dumpo's father did not give his consent to
his daughter's alleged second marriage.
It is an essential element of bigamy that the alleged
second marriage, having all essential requisites, would
be valid were it not for the subsitence of the first
marriage.
Both marriages were subsisting. That both Dee Tim
and Maria Lao were legally married to Yap Siong in
good faith, believing that each was his sole and
separate wife, living in absolute ignorance of the fact

Yao Kee vs. Gonzales

167 SCRA 736

Republic vs. Obrecido

G.R. No. 154380

Djumantan vs. Domingo

240 SCRA 746

Roehr vs. Rodriguez

G.R. No. 142820

of his double marriage. This is because Dee Tim has

presented a certificate of marriage and that such is
proof of her marriage and complied with the custom
and practice in China. She also presented several
witnesses to prove existence and compliance with
Chinese marriage ceremonies.
No validity can be given to the marriage because no
proof was presented relative to the marriage law in
China. Such being the case, we should apply the
Marriage
general rule that in the absence of proof of the law of
a foreign country, it should be presumed that it is the
same as our own.
Art. 26(2) must be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of celebration of the
marriage were Philippine citizens, but one of them
later on becomes naturalized as a foreign citizenvand
Marriage
obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should
likewise ve allowed to remarry as if the other party
were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of
the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction
absurdity and injustice.
There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to
Filipino citizens the right to be admitted, much less to
be given permanent residency, in the Philippines.
The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not
Dissolution of Marriage:
withdraw her from the operation of the immigration
Absolute Divorce
laws governing the admission and exclusion of aliens.
The entry of aliens into the country and their
admission as immigrants is not a matter of right, even
if they are legally married to Filipino citizens.
Dissolution of Marriage: Divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other
Absolute Divorce
countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the
legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support
of the children, must still be determined by our courts.
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to
a foreign judgment, it must be shown that the parties
opposed to the judgment had been given ample
opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule

Gonzales vs. Gonzales

58 Phil 57

Tenchavez vs. Escano

15 SCRA 355

Sikat vs. Canson

67 Phil 207

39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court Effect of foreign judgments. - The effect of a
judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the
judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the
judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by
a subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled
by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice
to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law
or fact.
Thus, it is clearly provided that with respect to actions
in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a
foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie
evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as
such, is subject to proof to the contrary.
The Court held that while their decisions in refusing
to recognize the validity of foreign have been based
Dissolution of Marriage:
upon lack of matrimonial domicile or fraud or
Absolute Divorce
collusion, they emphasize, in this case Articles 9 and
11 of the Civil Code. (Nationality Principle)
At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta
Escao, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen.
She was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15
of the Civil Code of the Philippines
Dissolution of Marriage: For the Philippine courts to recognize and give
Absolute Divorce
recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute
divorce betiveen Filipino citizens could be a patent
violation of the declared public policy of the state,
specially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17
of the Civil Code
Dissolution of Marriage: The Nevada court never acquired jurisdiction over her
Absolute Divorce
person. This was not a proceeding in rem to justify a
court in entering a decree as to the res or marriage
relation entitled to be enforced outside of the
territorial jurisdiction of the court.

Arca vs. Javier

95 Phil 579

Ramirez vs. Gmur

42 Phil 855

The courts in the Philippines can grant a divorce only

on the ground of "adultery on the part of the wife or
concubinage on the part of the husband" as provided
for under section 1 of Act No. 2710.
In order to determine whether a country has
jurisdiction over valid decree of divorce, plaintiff
must have been domiciled in good faith in the State in
which it was granted.
It is established by the great weight of authority that
Dissolution of Marriage:
the court of a country in which neither of the spouses
Absolute Divorce
is domiciled and to which one or both of them may
resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce
has no jurisdiction to determine their matrimonial
status; and a divorce granted by such a court is not
entitled to recognition elsewhere.
The decree of divorce upon which reliance is placed
by the representation of the Mory children cannot be
recognized as valid in the courts of the Philippine
Islands. The French tribunal has no jurisdiction to
entertain an action for the dissolution of a marriage
contracted in these Islands by person domiciled here,
such marriage being indissoluble under the laws then
prevailing in this country.
The evidence shows conclusively that Frederick von
Dissolution of Marriage: Kauffman at all times since earliest youth has been,
Absolute Divorce
and is now, domiciled in the city of Iloilo; that he
there married Leona Castro, who was a citizen of the
Philippines, and that Iloilo was their matrimonial
domicile; that his departure for the purpose of taking
his wife to Switzerland was limited to that purpose
alone, without any intent to establish a domicile
elsewhere; and finally that he went to Paris in 1904,
for the sole purpose of getting a divorce, without any
intention of establishing a permanent residence in that
city.

Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. vs.

Teodoro

20 SCRA 653

Van Dorn vs. Romillo

139 SCRA 139

Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera

174 SCRA 653

There is no doubt that the decree of divorce granted

by the Court of Nevada in 1954 is not valid under
Philippine law, which has outlawed divorce
altogether; that the matrimonial bonds between Jose
Corominas, Jr. and Sonia Lizares have not been
dissolved, although their conjugal partnership was
terminated in 1957; and that the former's subsequent
marriage in Hongkong to Trinidad Teodoro is
bigamous and void.
The particular properties involved here which were
admittedly acquired by respondent Teodoro, cannot be
Dissolution of Marriage:
deemed to belong to such co-ownership because, as
Absolute Divorce
found by the trial court and confirmed by the Court of
Appeals, the funds used in acquiring said properties
were fruits of respondent's paraphernal investments
which accrued before her "marriage" to Corominas. In
other words they were not acquired by either or both
of the partners in the void marriage through their work
or industry or their wages and salaries, and hence
cannot be the subject of co-ownership under Article
144. They remain respondent's exclusive properties,
beyond the reach of execution to satisfy the judgment
debt of Corominas.
Private respondent is no longer the husband of the
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue
petitioner to exercise control over conjugal assets. He
is estopped by his own representation before the court
from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.
Dissolution of Marriage:
Precursor of Article 26 (2); liens may obtain divorces
Absolute Divorce
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national
law. Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations
to respondent by virtue of her nationality laws. She
should not be discriminated against her own country if
the end of justice is to be served.
Dissolution of Marriage: In prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the
Absolute Divorce
person who can legally file the complaint should be

Garcia vs. Recio

366 SCRA 437

the offended spouse solely. Though in this case, it

appeared that private respondent is the offended
spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said
divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Under the
same consideration and rationale, private respondent
is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal
standing to commence the adultery case
The court cannot conclude that Recio who was then a
naturalized Australian citizen was legally capacitated
to marry Garcia. Neither can the court grant Garcias
prayer to declare her marriage null and void on the
ground of bigamy. After all it may turn out that under
Dissolution of Marriage:
Australian law he was really capacitated to marry
Absolute Divorce
Garcia as result of the divorce decree. The SC laid
down the following basic legal principles; a marriage
between two Filipino cannot be dissolved even by a
divorce decree obtained abroad because of Articles 15
and 17 of the Civil Code.