ANTI-ALIAS LAW

C.A. No. 142 (as amended by RA 6085)

Punishable act under C.A. No. 142 as amended by RA 6085:
Using any name different from the one with which a person was
registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry, or with
which he was baptized for the first time, or, in case of an alien,
with which he wasregistered in the bureau of immigration upon
entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a
competent court.

What are the instances when a second name can be used?

An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be

used by him publicly and habitually usually in business
transactions in addition to his real name by which he is
registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name
authorized by a competent authority. A mans name is simply the
sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his
fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man
is known by several different names and these are known as
aliases. (Cesario Ursua vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112170.
April 10, 1996)
There must be a sign or indication that the user intends to be
known by this name (the alias) in addition to his real name from
that day forth for the use of alias to fall within the prohibition
contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended.(People vs. Estrada,
G.R. Nos. 164368-69, April 2, 2009)

An individual can make use of a second name without infringing

upon the law in the following instances:
What is the purpose of the law?
1. As a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio
or other entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the
use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice;
2. When the use of the second name or alias is judicially
authorized and dulyrecorded in the proper local civil registry;
3. The use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to a
single person in a single instance without any sign or indication
that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his
real name from that day forth.
Define ALIAS.

The purpose of the Anti-Alias Law is to prevent confusion and

fraud in business transactions.
The objective and purpose of C.A. No. 142 have their origin and
basis in Act No. 3883, An Act to Regulate the Use in Business
Transactions of Names other than True Names, Prescribing the
Duties of the Director of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry
in its Enforcement, Providing Penalties for Violations thereof,
and for other purposes, which was approved on 14 November
1931 and amended by Act No. 4147, approved on 28 November
1934. The enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was made
primarily to curb the common practice among the Chinese of

adopting scores of different names and aliases which created

tremendous confusion in the field of trade. Such a practice
almost bordered on the crime of using fictitious names which for
obvious reasons could not be successfully maintained against the
Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a
thousand and one names. C.A. No. 142 thus penalized the act of
using an alias name, unless such alias was duly authorized by
proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil register.
(Cesario Ursua vs. Court of Appeals, ibid.)

What is the penalty for violation of Anti-Alias Law?

The penalty provided by the Anti-Alias Law for violation of the
terms thereof is imprisonment from one to five years and a fine
of P5,000.00 to P10,000.00.

How should C.A. No. 142 be construed?

C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly
against the State and in favor of the accused. The reason for this
principle is the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals
and the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to
which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court
limited. Indeed, our mind cannot rest easy on the proposition
that petitioner should be convicted on a law that does not clearly
penalize the act done by him. There exists a valid presumption
that undesirable consequences were never intended by a
legislative measure and that a construction of which the statute is
fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable,
mischievous,indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious
consequences.

What is the prescriptive period for Anti-Alias Law?

The prescriptive period for the offense is 8 years.
Section 1 of Act No. 3326 (as amended by Act 3763) provides:
"Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise
provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following
rules: xxx (c) after eight years for those punished by
imprisonment for two years or more, but less than six years; xxx.
Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission
of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the
time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceeding for its investigation and punishment."

Will the use of another name in a particular instance

constitute use of an alias?
No. An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to
be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business
transactions in addition to his real name by which he is
registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name
authorized by a competent authority. A mans name is simply the
sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his
fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man
is known by several different names and these are known as

aliases. Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name

belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign
or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in
addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within
the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended.
It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office
of the Ombudsman as Oscar Perez, which was the name of the
messenger of his lawyer who should have brought the letter to
that office in the first place instead of petitioner. He did so while
merely serving the request of his lawyer to obtain a copy of the
complaint in which petitioner was a respondent. Oscar Perez is
not an alias name of petitioner. There is no evidence showing
that he had used or was intending to use that name as his second
name in addition to his real name. The use of the name Oscar
Perez was made by petitioner in an isolated transaction where
he was not even legally required to expose his real identity. For,
even if he had identified himself properly at the Office of the
Ombudsman, petitioner would still be able to get a copy of the
complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the Ombudsman
could not refuse him because the complaint was part of public
records hence open to inspection and examination by anyone
under the proper circumstances.
While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions
of law, such does not constitute an offense within the concept of
C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. The
confusion and fraud in business transactions which the anti-alias
law and its related statutes seek to prevent are not present here as
the circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those
contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as
amended. There exists a valid presumption that undesirable
consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and

that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible

isfavored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous,
indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences.
Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be
construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused.
(Cesario Ursua vs. Court of Appeals, ibid.)
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Cases:
In the petition for naturalization it was alleged that appellant's
full name is Anselmo Lim Hok Albano, alias Lim Hok alias Lim
Hok Anselmo Albano. The decisive question to be determined is
whether appellant's use of aliases comes within the
contemplation of Commonwealth Act No. 142, otherwise known
as the Anti-Alias Law. It is noteworthy that this law is not
violated if one uses a name with which he was christened or by
which he has been known since childhood. It is a matter of
record that the name "Lim Hok" is one by which the appellant
has been known since childhood and that, although he was
baptized as Anselmo Lim Hok, he has always added "Albano",
the surname of his godfather, Dionisio Albano, in connection
with his business and social dealings, merely to emphasize his
identity. There is no showing that confusion or prejudice ever
was or has been caused by the addition of that surname, the
effect that Commonwealth Act No. 142 seeks to prevent. We are
not thus prepared to hold that the appellant has violated the AntiAlias Law. (Anselmo Lim Hok Albano vs. Republic, G.R. No.
L-10912, October 31, 1958)
Under the law, except as a pseudonym for literary purposes, no
person shall use any name different from the one with which he

was christened or by which he has been known since childhood,

or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a
competent court (Section 1, Commonwealth Act 142). Aside
from the name "Ong Hock Lian," appellee is using the alias
"Julian Ong." There is no evidence that appellee has been
baptized with the latter name or that he has been known by it
since childhood, or that the court has authorized the use thereof.
Appellee has therefore committed a violation of the Anti-Alias
Law. (Ong Hock Lian vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-21197, May 19,
1966)
The penalty provided by the Anti-Alias Law for violation of
the terms thereof is imprisonment from one to five years and a
fine of P5,000.00 to P10,000.00. According to the provisions of
Act 3326 (as amended by Act 3763), covering prescription of
offenses punished by special laws, the prescriptive period for the
offense charged is eight (8) years. Considering that the
Information was filed on March 13, 1984 charging petitioner
with violation of the Anti-Alias Law "on or about July 17, 1961,
and subsequent thereto", or twenty-three (23) years later to be
exact, it is clear that, by prescription, the People has lost the
right to prosecute the crime.
The principle cited by the prosecution and sustained by the
Appellate Court that the prescription of a continuing offense
starts to run from the date of the last illegal use of the
unauthorized alias sued upon, is inapplicable to this case. As
Judge Bagasao had pointed out in his dismissal Order:
Public records consisting of the accused's petition for
naturalization, his marriage contract, his passport dated August
21, 1967, alien certificate of registration No. 3116 dated

November 20, 1963, ACR No. 2267733 dated August 4, 1949,

Immigration Certificate of Registration (ICR) No. 37922 dated
August 4, 1949, show that the accused had already used publicly
the name Tahilram J. Balani and the government authorities are
deemed to have known the alleged violation.
Where the offense has not been concealed, as when the offense
is evidenced by a public record open to inspection, the State will
not be permitted to plead ignorance of the act of the accused, in
order to evade the operation of the Statute of Limitations.
(Balani vs. IAC, G.R. No. L-69537, June 20, 1986)
The rule in the law of libel that mere communication to a
third person is publicity does not apply to violations of CA No.
142. The required publicity in the use of alias is more than mere
communication to a third person; the use of the alias, to be
considered public, must be made openly, or in an open manner
or place, or to cause it to become generally known. In order to
be held liable for a violation of CA No. 142, the user of the alias
must have held himself out as a person who shall publicly be
known under that other name. In other words, the intent to
publicly use the alias must be manifest.
To our mind, the presence of Lacquian and Chua when Estrada
signed as Jose Velarde and opened Trust Account No. C-163
does not necessarily indicate his intention to be publicly known
henceforth as Jose Velarde. In relation to Estrada, Lacquian and
Chua were not part of the public who had no access to Estradas
privacy and to the confidential matters that transpired in
Malacaan where he sat as President; Lacquian was the Chief of
Staff with whom he shared matters of the highest and strictest
confidence, while Chua was a lawyer-friend bound by his oath

of office and ties of friendship to keep and maintain the privacy

and secrecy of his affairs. Thus, Estrada could not be said to
have intended his signing as Jose Velarde to be for public
consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian and Chua were also
inside the room at that time. The same holds true for Estradas
alleged representations with Ortaliza and Dichavez, assuming
the evidence for these representations to be admissible. All of
Estradas representations to these people were made in privacy
and in secrecy, with no iota of intention of publicity.
The nature, too, of the transaction on which the indictment rests,
affords Estrada a reasonable expectation of privacy, as the
alleged criminal act related to the opening of a trust account a
transaction that R.A. No. 1405 considers absolutely confidential
in nature.We have consistently ruled that bank deposits under
R.A. No. 1405 (the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law) are
statutorily protected or recognized zones of privacy.[37] Given
the private nature of Estradas act of signing the documents as
Jose Velarde related to the opening of the trust account, the
People cannot claim that there was already a public use of alias
when Ocampo and Curato witnessed the signing. We need not
even consider here the impact of the obligations imposed by
R.A. No.1405 on the bank officers; what is essentially
significant is the privacy situation that is necessarily implied in
these kinds of transactions. This statutorily guaranteed privacy
and secrecy effectively negate a conclusion that the transaction
was done publicly or with the intent to use the alias publicly
(People vs. Estrada, ibid.).