Landing at Scarlet Beach

The Landing at Scarlet Beach (Operation Diminish)

(22 September 1943) took place during the Huon Peninsula campaign of the Second World War. Involving forces
from Australia, the United States and Japan, Allied forces
landed at Scarlet Beach, north of Siki Cove and south
of the Song River, to the east of Katika and about 10
kilometres (6.2 mi) north of Finschhafen. The capture
of Finschhafen allowed the construction of air base and
naval facilities to assist Allied air and naval forces to conduct operations against Japanese bases in New Guinea
and New Britain.

vancing up the steep slope under re, sometimes on their

hands and knees, the 2/15th took the position at the point
of the bayonet, killing 52 Japanese in close combat.
Australian fears of a Japanese counterattack grew and
they requested reinforcements from General Douglas
MacArthur. The request was denied as his intelligence
sta believed that there were only 350 Japanese in the
vicinity. Actually, there were already 5,000 Japanese
around Sattelberg and Finschhafen. The Australians received some reinforcements in the shape of the 2/43rd
Infantry Battalion. The arrival of this unit meant that the
entire 20th Infantry Brigade could concentrate on Finschhafen. The Japanese naval troops which were holding
Finschhafen began to withdraw and Finschhafen fell to
the Australians on 2 October. The 20th Infantry Brigade
then linked up with the 22nd Infantry Battalion, a Militia
infantry battalion that had cleared the coastal area in the
south of the Huon Peninsula, advancing from Lae over
the mountains. The Japanese withdrew into the mountains around Sattelberg.

After Lae had fallen sooner than the Allies had anticipated, they exploited the advantage. As a result of
faulty intelligence, which underestimated the size of the
Japanese force in the area, the assault force chosen consisted of only Brigadier Victor Windeyer's 20th infantry
Brigade. The landing at Scarlet Beach that took place
on 22 September 1943 was the rst opposed amphibious
landing that Australian forces had made since the Landing
at Anzac Cove in the Gallipoli Campaign of 1915. Navigational errors resulted in the troops being landed on the
wrong beach, with some of them coming ashore at Siki
Cove and taking heavy re from the strong Japanese de- 1
fences in pillboxes. After re-organising, the Australians
pushed inland. The Japanese put up sti resistance on
the high ground at Katika, but were forced back. By the 1.1
end of the day, the Australians had secured their objectives. A force of 8 Japanese bombers, escorted by 38
ghters attacked ships of the VII Amphibious Force on
the way back. The destroyer USS Reid, which was serving as ghter controller concentrated ve squadrons of US
ghter aircraft over the convoy. No ships were hit, but casualties mounted in the daily air attacks on the beachhead.
The next day the Australians commenced their advance
south towards the village of Finschhafen, about 5.6 miles
(9.0 km) south of the landing beach, with the 2/15th Infantry Battalion leading the way to the Bumi River. The
Japanese had established strong defences along the rivers
southern bank, which the Australians attempted to outank by sending a force to the west, climbing through
steep terrain. Once they had located a suitable place to
cross the river, they began wading across but were red
upon by a group of Japanese naval infantry who were positioned on a high feature overlooking the river. Despite
taking casualties, the Australians were able to establish
themselves south of the Bumi and at that point the 2/13th
Infantry Battalion began to advance on Finschhafen from
the west. Meanwhile, the 2/15th attacked the left ank of
the Japanese that had opposed their crossing. After ad-

Strategy
Allied

Map of Huon Peninsula operations, 194344

At the Pacic Military Conference in Washington, D.C.,

in March 1943, the Joint Chiefs of Sta approved
plans by General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme
Commander, South West Pacic Area for an advance
on the Japanese base at Rabaul.[1] On 13 June 1943,
MacArthurs General Headquarters (GHQ) in Brisbane
instructed General Sir Thomas Blamey's New Guinea
Force to
1

3 PRELUDE
...seize the Lae-Salamaua-FinschhafenMarkham River Valley area and establish
major elements of the [Air Force] therein to
provide from the Markham Valley area general
and direct air support of subsequent operations in northern New Guinea and western
New Britain, and to control Vitiaz Strait and
protect the north-western ank of subsequent
operations in western New Britain.[2]

Following the successful seaborne landing at Lae and

airborne landing at Nadzab, Salamaua, Lae and the
Markham River Valley were all in Allied hands by 16
September 1943. Blamey then turned his attention to his
next objective: Finschhafen.[2]

1.2

Japanese

The bombing of Wewak, in which 100 Japanese aircraft

were lost in August 1943, caused Imperial General Headquarters (IGHQ) in Tokyo to reconsider whether Eastern
New Guinea and the Solomon Islands could be held. Concluding that it could not, IGHQ authorised the commander of the Japanese Eighth Area Army to conduct a ghting withdrawal to a new defensive position in Western
New Guinea, which it hoped would be ready in 1944.[3]
Lieutenant General Hataz Adachi, the commander of
the Japanese XVIII Army in New Guinea, recognised
the importance of the Finschhafen area, and had placed
Major General Eizo Yamada, the commander of the 1st
Shipping Group in charge of defending it. To strengthen
the defences there, Adachi ordered the 80th Infantry Regiment and a battalion of eld artillery from the 20th Division at Madang to move to Finschhafen on 7 August
1943. The headquarters, artillery and heavy weapons departed Bogadjim on 15 August, and travelled by sea, but
the remainder marched along the coast.[4][5]

2 Geography
The Huon Peninsula is situated along the north-east coast
of Papua New Guinea, and stretches from Lae in the south
on the Huon Gulf to Sio in the north along the Vitiaz
Strait. Along the coast, between these two points, numerous rivers and streams cut the terrain. Of these, the most
prominent are the Song, Bumi and Mape Rivers. These
waterways ow from the mountainous interior which is
formed through the conglomeration of the Rawlinson
Range in the south, with the Cromwell Mountains in the
east. These meet in the centre of the peninsula to form
the Saruwaged Range massif, which joins the Finisterre
Range further west. Apart from a thin, at coastal strip,
at the time of the campaign, the area was thickly covered with dense jungle, through which very few tracks
had been cut.[7][8]
During planning, the Allies identied three areas as key
and decisive terrain in the area: the beach north of Katika,
which was later codenamed Scarlet by the Allies, the
3,150-foot (960 m) high peak called Sattelberg 5 miles
(8 km) to the south west, which dominated the area due
to its height, and Finschhafen, possessing a small aireld
and sitting on the coast in a bay which oered protected
harbour facilities.[8] There were good anchorages for vessels of up to 5,000 tons in Dreger Harbour, Langemak
Bay and Finsch Harbour.[9] The at coastal strip provided
a number of potential aireld sites.[10]

3 Prelude
3.1 Intelligence

Allied estimates of the number of Japanese troops in the

Finschhafen area varied. Brigadier General Charles A.
Willoughby, the Assistant Chief of Sta (G-2), and therefore the head of the intelligence branch at MacArthurs
GHQ, considered Finschhafen to be primarily a transhipment point, and the troops there to be mainly from line of
communication units. The fall of Lae ended its utility, so
he reduced his estimate of the number of Japanese troops
[11]
Based on this appreciation, GHQ
On 26 August, he assigned the 2nd Battalion, 238th In- in the area to 350.
believed
that
Finschhafen
would be a pushover.[12]
fantry Regiment, part of the 41st Division, which was in
the area en route to join the rest of the 238th Infantry There was reason to believe otherwise. A ten-man Allied
Regiment at Salamaua, to remain in the Finschhafen area Intelligence Bureau patrol that included three Australian
under Yamadas command. The landing at Lae on 4 ocers, an American amphibian scout from the US
September made an Australian advance on Finschhafen Armys 532nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, a
appear imminent, and Adachi ordered the rest of the 20th signaller from Z Special Unit, and native soldiers, was
Division, less the Nakai detachment in the Markham Val- landed during the night of 11/12 September in rubley, to move to Finschhafen. The main body, under Lieu- ber boats launched from two PT boats. The scouts
tenant General Shigeru Katagiri left Bogadjim bound for were unable to obtain the hydrographic information they
Finschhafen on 10 September, but was not expected to ar- sought due to Japanese patrols in the area. A numrive before October.[4][5] In the event of an Allied attack ber of machine-gun nests were identied during their
before he arrived, Yamada was to hold the high ground reconnaissance of the enemy positions before they were
extracted on 14 September.[13]
around Sattelberg and prepare for a counter-attack.[6]

3.2

Planning

As had happened during the Kokoda Track campaign

and the Battle of Buna-Gona, estimates by Australian
intelligence diered greatly from those at GHQ,[14] as
they used dierent methods.[15] The intelligence sta
at Blameys Allied Land Forces Headquarters (LHQ),
headed by Brigadier J. D. Rogers, had come up with a
much higher gure of 3,000.[16] I Corps produced an estimate of 1,800, which was passed on along with GHQs
estimate.[15] Unfortunately, the Allies best source of intelligence, Ultra, shone no light on the matter. Finschhafen was mentioned in only ve decrypted messages
in the previous three months. Most of these were in
the insecure Japanese Water Transport Code. Only after the capture of Japanese codebooks in the Battle of
Sio in January 1944 were the Allies able to systematically
break into the Japanese Army codes.[17] In fact, Japanese
strength in the area on 22 September was about 5,000.[18]

3.2

Planning

Two contingency plans had been prepared by Lieutenant

General Sir Edmund Herring's I Corps. One was a shipto-shore operation by the 6th Division's 16th Infantry
Brigade or the 7th Infantry Brigade, a Militia formation
at Milne Bay; the other was for a shore-to-shore operation by a brigade of Major General George Wootten's
9th Division.[19] The operation was codenamed Diminish, which was in fact that of Finschhafen itself.[20] In the
plan produced by I Corps on 24 August 1943, Herring selected beaches immediately south of the Song River for
the landing. Indications were that it was suitable for landing craft. Most of the Japanese defenders and defences
were believed to be facing south in anticipation of an Australian overland advance from Lae. It avoided having to
cross the Mape River, which was believed to be a significant obstacle.[19] The landing beach became known as
Scarlet Beach from the post-landing red screens and lights
used to guide landing craft. The left end of the beach was
marked with a solid red panel mounted on tent poles, the
right with one alternating red and white. At night, the
left would have a red light, and the right one alternating
red and white. This scheme had rst been used at Red
Beach during the landing at Lae.[21] To avoid confusion
of having two Red Beaches, the landing beach was called
Scarlet Beach instead.[22]
On 16 September, the day Lae fell, MacArthur ordered
that Finschhafen be captured as soon as possible. The following day he held a conference at Port Moresby. He and
Blamey selected the second contingency, a landing by a
brigade of the 9th Division. Brigadier Victor Windeyer's
20th Infantry Brigade was chosen as it was still relatively
fresh, and had experience with amphibious operations
from the landing at Lae. The 6th Divisions movement
to New Guinea was postponed. Rear Admiral Daniel E.
Barbey, the commander of the VII Amphibious Force,
had originally counted on four weeks break between the
fall of Lae and the Finschhafen operation. On 9 Septem-

Brigadier Victor Windeyer won the Distinguished Service Order at the Siege of Tobruk and again at the Second Battle of El
Alamein

ber, he had told Herring that it would require a minimum

of ten days.[19] Under pressure from MacArthur, Barbey
cut that to three days. This was too soon for Herring to
get the troops together, and 21 September was selected as
the target date.[23] Herring briefed Windeyer on the operation on 18 September. Windeyer felt that the schedule
was still too tight, and it was postponed one more day to
22 September.[20]
As at Lae, the rst wave, consisting of two companies
each from the 2/13th and 2/7th Infantry Battalions, would
land in plywood LCP(R)s launched by the four destroyer
transports,[24] the USS Brooks, Gilmer, Humphreys and
Sands.[25] The remainder of the assault would land in 6
LSTs, 15 LCIs and 6 LCTs of the VII Amphibious Force,
and 10 LCMs and 15 LCVPs of the 532nd Engineer Boat
and Shore Regiment.[24] The total force would number
about 5,300.[26] The 9th Division would be limited to taking 15 days supplies.[27] One of the lessons of the Lae operation was the need for a naval beach party to take soundings, mark the beaches and channels, and handle communications between ship and shore. US Navy doctrine held
that these should be composed of personnel drawn from
the attack transports, but none were involved in the Lae or
Finschhafen operations. For Finschhafen, an eight-man
Royal Australian Navy (RAN) Beach Party was organised under Lieutenant Commander J. M. Band.[28]

4 LANDING

A set of oblique aerial photographs of Scarlet Beach were

taken on 19 September by the USAAFs 8th Photo Reconnaissance Squadron, the only unit in SWPA with the
equipment to take them,[29] that showed a shallow sand
bar along the southern half of the beach, rendering it unsuitable for landing craft. This left beaching space for
only three LSTs. The landing plan was changed so only
three of the six LSTs would beach with the initial assault, the other three returning to Buna, and arriving on
the beach at 23:00 that night. Herring considered that
spreading the LST arrivals might make unloading easier. Wootten noted that this would mean that one battery
of 25-pounders, one light antiaircraft battery, a quarter
of the engineer stores, and the casualty clearing station
would have to arrive with the second group.[30] Ironically,
soundings taken by the RAN Beach Party after the landing revealed that the sand bar was actually a white shingle bottom, and in fact the beach was ideally suited to LST
operations.[31]

G. E. Colvin, arranged for them to travel on USS LCI337, LCI-338 and LCI-342.[37] Around sunset, six Sally
bombers attacked the escorting destroyers. They dropped
their bombs but scored no hits.[38][39]

The main point of disagreement between Herring and

Barbey concerned the timing of the landing.[32] Barbey
and the Commander of Allied Naval Forces, Vice Admiral Arthur S. Carpender did not want a repeat of what
happened at Lae,[33] when two LCIs were lost and two
LSTs were badly damaged.[34] Although the USAAF and
RAAF attacked Japanese air bases in New Britain, this
did not stop 9 Japanese bombers and 10 ghters attacking
Nadzab on 20 September. Moreover, some 23 Japanese
warships were sighted in the harbour at Rabaul, and there
were reports of Japanese submarines in the area.[33] Accordingly, Barbey proposed landing at 02:00 under a
quarter moon, which would allow his ships to unload and
get away soon after dawn. Noting that it was the rainy
season, and the sky would therefore likely be overcast,
Herring doubted that the VII Amphibious Force would
be able to locate the beach, and pressed for a dawn landing at 05:15.[32] In the end, a compromise was reached on
04:45.[33] Samuel Eliot Morison, the US Naval historian,
noted that: The Australians proved to be right; 'Uncle
Dans' outt was not prepared for a neat night landing.
The usual snafu developed. [35]

A Type 1 Heavy Machine Gun in a Japanese pillbox on the coast.

4
4.1

Landing
First wave

The ships arrived o Scarlet beach on time, and the

destroyers conducted a short 11-minute preliminary
bombardment.[38][40] It was doubtful if any Japanese
positions were hit or any casualties inicted.[41] Low
cloud trapped the smoke and dust produced by the
bombardment.[38] To the Australians, it was dark as the
inside of a cow.[42] Scarlet Beach and Siki Cove were
covered by bunker type pillboxes made of logs, spaced
about 50 yards (46 m) apart, and connected by shallow
trenches. They held about 300 Japanese defenders.[43]
Japanese tracer started pouring from the shore. At this
point, one Australian recalled I realised that this was not
an unopposed landing.[44] It was the rst opposed landing by Australian troops since the Landing at Anzac Cove
in the Gallipoli Campaign of 1915.[44]
Almost all the LCP(R)s in the rst wave veered o course
to the left, landing between Siki Creek and the rocks of
the headland between Siki Cove and Arndt Point.[45] All
the boats landed successfully except for one carrying 11
Platoon of the 2/15th Infantry Battalion, which had broken down and was towed by the LCP(R) carrying 10 Platoon, delaying both.[46] Another LCP(R) appeared and
took the platoon in. But only three of the sixteen landed
on Scarlet Beach.[45] In some ways this was good, as it
meant that the plywood landing craft were not subjected
to intense machine gun re, which might have caused
heavy casualties;[47] but there were still serious disadvantages to landing on the wrong beach.[41] On the right, Captain T.C. Sheldons B Company, 2/17th Infantry Battalion, accompanied by the anti-tank platoon and 10 Platoon
the Papuan Infantry Battalion, landed roughly where they
were supposed to,[48] and pushed on to their objective,
North Hill.[49]

USS APc-15 produced 140 mimeograph copies of the

VII Amphibious Force operation order, which was distributed by PT boat.[27] They then departed for G Beach,
14 miles (23 km) east of Lae. While they were en route
during the night, a Japanese raid on Buna sank an LCS(S),
and damaged a dock and two merchant ships; 9 people
were killed and 27 wounded.[36] USS LCI-31 developed
engine trouble, and was forced to return to Buna. This left The rest of the rst wave was jumbled up. Major P.H.
A Company of the 2/13th Infantry Battalion without its Pike found his A Company of the 2/17th mixed up with
transport. The battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Captain Paul Deschamps B Company of the 2/13th.

4.2

Follow-up

Since the latter had further to travel, and there was no

Japanese opposition, Pike agreed to hold his company
back while Deschamps moved on to his objective. Pike
then moved his men inland 100 yards (91 m) and waited
for daylight.[50] C Companys task was to seize Arndt
Point, but part of it was already there, facing a steep
cli.[41] The only platoon to encounter serious opposition
was Lieutenant C. Huggetts platoon, which for reason
had veered o to the right, and landed on Scarlet Beach
near the mouth of the Song River. It came under re from
two Japanese machine gun posts there. With the help
of an American Amphibian Scout, Lieutenant Herman
A. Koeln, Huggett attacked the posts with grenades and
small arms. Another Amphibian Scout, Lieutenant Edward K. Hammer, encountered a party of Japanese that
he red on. Koeln and Hammer were conspicuous because they were carrying the 10-foot (3.0 m) red canvas
signs to mark the beach. The beachmaster, Lieutenant
Commander J.M. Band, was fatally wounded making his
way to Scarlet Beach.[37] He was posthumously awarded
the US Navy Cross.[51]

4.2

Follow-up

The second wave came in LCIs. These were craft that

had no ramps; infantry disembarked from the down
gangways. That they were not suitable for an assault
landing was not overlooked, but they were all that was
available.[52] The rst waves mission had been to capture Scarlet Beach and the foreshore. Since that had
not been done, they came under re from the Japanese
bunkers. Despite explicit orders not to, they replied with
their Oerlikon 20 mm cannon. Some helped to suppress
the Japanese machine guns, while others red wildly and
caused casualties among the Australian troops ashore.
Like the rst wave, they veered o to the left, adding to
the chaos. [53] At least three of the LCIs grounded on a
sand bar, but were able to retract and make better landings, although still on the wrong beach.[54]

5
landed with the rst wave in the same LCP(R) as Pike.
With him was an Amphibian Scout carrying the red signal light that was to mark the centre of the beach for later
waves. They were unable to reach the correct location
in time for the second wave, but were able to place it
and switch it on in time for the third, so it was the rst
to land on Scarlet Beach. Although the rst wave had
landed seven minutes late, the second was fteen, and
the third was half an hour behind schedule. In the confusion, two LCIs collided, killing two soldiers and injuring
eight. Some of the LCI captains were reluctant to drive
their ships in hard enough, and many troops disembarked
into water that was over their heads.[53] Sergeant Iaking
Iwagu, of the Royal Papuan Constabulary, landing with
9 Platoon of the Papuan Infantry Battalion, was awarded
the George Medal for attempting to save Captain A.B.
Luetchford, who was hit in deep water.[55][56] The third
wave found the Japanese bunkers still manned, and assaulted them. Most of the Japanese defenders withdrew
rather than ght to the nish.[57]
Four LCMs of Lieutenant Colonel E. D. Brocketts Boat
Battalion of the 532nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment carrying Bofors 40 mm guns were supposed to arrive with the second wave, but due to some navigational
diculties, they were an hour late.[24][57] They came in
with the six LCMs and 4 LCVPs of the fourth wave,
which was itself 40 minutes late, arriving at 06:10. The
11 LCVPs of the fth wave reached the Scarlet Beach
ten minutes later.[43] By 06:30, the beach and the foreshore were clear of Japanese, and the destroyer transports and LCIs were on their way back to Buna.[58] The
amphibian engineers set up a portable surgical hospital
to treat the wounded.[43] Windeyer and his brigade major, Major B.V. Wilson, arrived in a landing craft from
the USS Conyngham, and he established brigade headquarters in a Kunai patch 200 yards (180 m) from the
beach. A Japanese soldier threw a hand grenade at them
that killed one man and wounded the brigade intelligence
ocer, Captain Barton Maughan. The Japanese soldier
was killed with an Owen gun.[58]

USS LST-168 unloads at Scarlet Beach

American and Australian troops with a Japanese prisoner cap-

The Military Landing Ocer, Major J. R. Broadbent tured in the landing at Scarlet Beach

4 LANDING

The sixth and nal wave consisted of USS LST-18, LST- Of the 115,000 rounds that were dropped, about 112,000
168 and LST-204.[36] They had instructions to wait until were recovered.[65]
the smaller craft had cleared the beach, and beached at
06:50.[59] Each carried an unloading party of 100 men,
drawn from the 2/23rd and 2/48th Infantry Battalions and
2/2nd Machine Gun Battalion, who would return with the
LSTs.[58] The unloading proceeded at a rapid pace. All
the cargo was unloaded from two of the three when they
retracted at 09:30, and headed o escorted by ten destroyers and the eet tug USS Sonoma.[59] The 2/3rd Field
Company, 2/1st Mechanical Equipment Company, 2/3rd
Pioneer Battalion and the Shore Battalion of the 532nd
Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment prepared four beach
exits. Stores were quickly moved o the beach to inland
dumps.[60][61][56] Some 5,300 troops, 180 vehicles, 32 25pounders and Bofors 40 mm guns and 850 measurement
tons (960 m3 ) of bulk stores had been unloaded.[62]
Fifth Air Force ghters provided air cover from 06:45. A
Japanese reconnaissance aircraft ew over the beachhead
at 09:10, and was shot down. A lone bomber showed up
ten minutes later and attacked the LSTs on the beach, but
missed. Two dive bombers attacked at 09:30, and were
driven o, but not before inicting casualties.[59] The Bofors guns of the 10th Light Anti Aircraft Battery were attacked, and ve men were wounded, one fatally.[56] Over
the next two weeks there was at least one air raid on the
beachhead every day.[62] The air raids proved an eective way of clearing the beach.[58] A large attack by 39
aircraft of the 4th Air Army ran into bad weather and
had to return to Wewak, but a naval air forces attack with
38 Zeke ghters and 8 Betty bombers found the LSTs
and destroyers near the Tami Islands on their way back
to Buna at 12:40.[63][35][36] The ghter cover was being
changed over, so the Fifth Air Force ghter controller on
board the USS Reid could deploy ve squadrons instead
of just three. They claimed to have shot down 29 ghters and 10 bombers.[64] Antiaircraft gunners from the destroyers, LSTs and Sonoma also engaged the bombers.[35]
While torpedo wakes were seen, no hits were suered.
Three Lockheed P-38 Lightning ghters were shot down,
but at least one pilot was rescued.[64] The Japanese pilots
claimed to have sunk two cruisers, two destroyers and two
transports.[35]

Bofors 40 mm gun of the 12th Battery, 2/4th Australian Light

Anti-Aircraft Regiment

Around daybreak, Pikes A Company, 2/17th Infantry

Battalion, reached the village of Katika, which turned out
to be a clearing with some dilapidated huts. His company came under re from Katika Spur, the high ground
to the west, which was strongly held by the 9th Company,
80th Infantry Regiment and a company of the 238th Infantry Regiment.[66] The Japanese attempted to outank
A Company on its left, but ran into Capitan L. Snells D
Company, 2/15th Infantry Battalion.[67][68]

The Japanese positions were well-sited on the spur for an

attack from the east along the track from Katika to Sattelberg, but at this point, Captain B. G. Cribb, the commander of D Company, 2/13th Infantry Battalion, came
on the radio and announced that he was in contact with
the Japanese to the west, and was going to attack from
that direction. A furious ght ensured. The Japanese
held their re until the Australians were almost on top
of them. Realising that the position was stronger than he
had thought, Cribb withdrew after suering eight dead
and twenty wounded.[67][68] Windeyer ordered the 2/17th
to bypass the position and proceed to its objective, the
high ground south of the Song River. The 2/15th was ordered to attack Katika Spur.[66] The attack was delivered
at 15:15 after a preliminary bombardment by 3 inch mortars, but the Japanese defenders had withdrawn, leaving
4.3 Consolidation
behind eight dead.[68] By nightfall, most of the brigade
[66]
A shortage of 9 mm ammunition for the Owen guns was was on their objectives.
discovered, apparently because it was in the LST that had The seventh wave, made up of USS LST-67, LST-452
not been completely unloaded. An emergency airdrop and LST-454,[36] arrived at Scarlet Beach at midnight.
was requested at 10:30. In Port Moresby, the 1st Air As with the previous wave, each carried an Australian
Maintenance Company prepared 30 parachutes, each at- labour force which unloaded the LST under the direction
tached to two boxes containing 2,560 rounds of 9 mm of the Shore Battalion. The extracted at 03:00 in order to
ammunition, a total of 153,600 rounds. This was loaded be well clear before dawn.[62] During the rst day, Ausonto three USAAF B-24 Liberator bombers at Wards tralian casualties were 20 killed, 65 wounded and 9 missAireld that took o at 16:55. They arrived over the Fin- ing, all of whom were eventually found to be either dead
schhafen area after dark at 19:15, where a drop zone in or wounded.[69] The VII Amphibious Force reported that
a Kunai patch was marked by men holding hand torches. three men had been wounded.[62]

Reinforcement

Blamey relinquished command of New Guinea Force on

22 September, handing over to Lieutenant General Sir
Iven Mackay.[70] As one of his nal actions before returning to LHQ in Brisbane, Blamey instructed Herring to
arrange for the reinforcement of Finschhafen with an extra brigade and 9th Division Headquarters.[71] That day,
though, MacArthur, who also returned to Brisbane on
24 September,[72] had issued an instruction that operations at Finschhafen were to be so conducted as to
avoid commitment of amphibious means beyond those
allotted.[73] Barbey therefore declined to arrange for
the reinforcement of Finschhafen.[72] Mackay took up
the matter with Carpender, who likewise demurred.[74]
MacArthur feared that committing additional resources
would divert resources and result in losses that would delay upcoming operations, relinquishing the initiative to
the Japanese. Ironically, the delay in reinforcing Finschhafen would cause just that.[75]

from being evacuated.[36][80][81]

While the 20th Infantry Brigade was engaged at Finschhafen, the 22nd Infantry Battalion, a Militia infantry
battalion from Victoria, advanced along the coast from
the Hopoi Mission Station towards Finschhafen. This
advance, constituting a minor epic in New Guinea
operations,[82] traversed increasing dicult terrain.
Supply using vehicles was impossible; the 22nd Infantry
Battalion was supplied by boats of the 532nd Engineer
Boat and Shore Regiment. Stores were dropped o at
advanced beaches and then carried from there by native
porters.[82] The 22nd Infantry Battalion fought a number
of skirmishes against the Japanese 2nd Battalion, 80th Infantry Regiment, which was under orders to withdraw.[83]
The 22nd Infantry Battalion therefore discovered a series
of well-prepared and strong positions which were either
unmanned or soon abandoned.[82][84] Along the way two
Type 41 75 mm Mountain Guns that had been disabled
were found, along with the bodies of the six natives who
had hauled the guns, who had been bound and shot.[85]
It reached Dreger Harbour on 1 October, where it made
contact with the 20th Infantry Brigade.[86]

6 Advance on Finschhafen

The rough terrain in the area necessitated these human supply

chains to get ammunition and food to the forward troops

Windeyer sent a signal on 27 September asking for another infantry battalion and a squadron of tanks,[76] and
Carpender agreed to ship the additional battalion.[12] The
following day Herring ew to Milne Bay to confer with
Barbey about this.[77] On takeo from Dobodura, the B25 Mitchell he was travelling in crashed. A ying fragment killed his chief of sta, Brigadier R. B. Sutherland,
instantly. Everyone else on board escaped shaken but
unscathed. The meeting was cancelled.[78] Willoughby
still clung to his original estimate of 350 Japanese in the
Finschhafen area, but MacArthur authorised the extra
battalion.[79] It was arranged that the rst LST departing Lae on the night of 28/29 September would stop at
G Beach and collect the 2/43rd Infantry Battalion and a
platoon of the 2/13th Field Company, a total of 838 men.
They were taken to Buna where they transferred to the destroyer transports USS Brooks, Gilmer and Humphreys.
The next night they made a run to Scarlet Beach. The
troops were landed and 134 wounded were taken back,
but surf conditions prevented the most seriously wounded

Map of the 20th Infantry Brigades advance on Finschhafen,

September 1943

On 23 September, Windeyer ordered an advance on Finschhafen. Lieutenant Colonel Colin Graces 2/15th Infantry Battalion reached the Bumi River at 12:40. It was
15 to 20 yards (14 to 18 m) wide and appeared fordable,
but the banks contained barbed wire and strongly fortied Japanese positions.[87][88] While Yamada was withdrawing towards Sattelberg, the Japanese marines of the
85th Garrison Unit remained in place. Yamada had no

ADVANCE ON FINSCHHAFEN

authority over the marines, and its commander, Captain Tsuzuki, saw no reason to conform to Yamadas
actions. He intended to hold Finschhafen for as long
as possible.[89][63] Grace ordered Major Ron Suthers to
outank the Japanese position by moving through the
foothills of the Kreutberg Range, as previously instructed
by Windeyer. While not high, these were very steep and
covered in thick vegetation.[87][88]
Suthers halted on the ridge for the night but resumed
his advance in the morning, reaching the Bumi at 10:00.
They again found the north bank defended but the south
occupied, so attempted to nd a crossing 150 yards (140
m) upstream. A Japanese sniper with a light machine gun
killed B Companys commander, Captain E. Christie, and
Lieutenant N. Harphain. Suthers then ordered Snell to
make an assault crossing with D Company. This was done
at 13:30, with the company crossing in waist-deep water.
Only one man was killed in the crossing. During the afternoon, the 2/13th Infantry Battalion crossed the river to
the bridgehead secured by B and D Companies.[87][88]
A large Japanese air raid at 12:30 by 20 ghters and 12
bombers struck the Australian positions around Launch
Jetty and the Finschhafen airstrip. About 60 bombs were
dropped. There were heavy casualties. The 2/3rd Field
Company lost 14 killed and 19 wounded; the 2/12th Field
Regiment lost 2 killed and 16 wounded, and the air liaison partys headquarters was hit, knocking out its radio
set and killing Captain Ferrel, its commander.[90][91][92]
Another 8 men were killed and 40 wounded in air raids on
25 September.[92] During the night of 25/26 September,
Japanese barges and a submarine were spotted oshore.
Windeyer had to bring a company of the 2/17th Infantry
Battalion back to protect the brigade area.[93]
Meanwhile, D Company of the 2/17th Infantry Battalion
had moved along the track to Sattelberg with the intent
of capturing that position. It reported that it was unoccupied, but in fact had captured Jivevenang instead. When
the mistake was realised and it attempted to take Sattelberg, it was found to be strongly defended. D Company
therefore withdrew to Jivevenang.[90] Unfortunately, the
news of the capture of Sattelberg was passed all the way
up the line to GHQ in Brisbane.[94]
The advance on Finschhafen continued on 26 September. Since the Salankaua Plantation was still reported to
be heavily defended, Windeyer attempted to force the defenders to withdraw. He started with attacks on two hills
to the south west of the plantation. B and D Companies
of the 2/15th Infantry Battalion attacked what came to be
called Snells Hill. It was captured in hand-to-hand combat using bayonets. The Australians captured three 13
mm heavy machine guns and seven light machine guns,
and buried 52 Japanese defenders. The other feature,
which came to be called Starvation Hill, was taken by
C Company. However, their capture did not prompt the
Japanese to leave the Salankaua Plantation.[95]

A 25-pounder of the 2/12th Australian Field Regiment shells the

Kakakog area from the airstrip

Ridge. Torrential rain was falling, making it dicult

to resupply the forward positions, particularly Starvation Hill.[96] On 1 October eight Douglas A-20 Havoc
bombers of the US 89th Bombardment Squadron attacked the Japanese positions in the Salankaua Plantation
and Kakakog Ridge area at 10:35, followed by ten Vultee
Vengeance dive bombers of No. 24 Squadron RAAF.
This was followed by twenty 25-pounders of the 2/12th
Field Regiment ring 30 rounds per gun.[97][98]
The attack was delivered but the assault companies were
soon pinned down. When a situation seemed desperate,
historian David Dexter noted, the Australian Army appeared to have the knack of producing a leader of the necessary character.[99] Sergeant G. R. Crawford led 11 and
12 Platoons of the 2/13th Infantry Battalion in a bayonet
charge on the Japanese positions covering Ilebbe Creek.
Private A. J. Roe, ring a bren gun from the hip, silenced one of the Japanese posts causing the most trouble.
He went on to silence another, but was wounded trying
to take out a third. Crawfords furious assault swept all
before it. One post remained on Crawfords left, which
was attacked with 2-inch mortars and attacked by 8 Platoon. The Japanese abandoned the post and withdrew
into the Salankaua Plantation.[100] Rolfe and Crawford
were awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal.[101][102]
The 2/13th Infantry Battalion lost 10 killed and 70; between 80 and 100 Japanese marines died.[103]

The arrival of the 2/43rd Infantry Battalion meant that

the 2/17th Infantry Battalion could be reassembled for
the advance on Finschhafen, thus enabling the entire 20th
Infantry Brigade to concentrate on that objective. On 2
October the 2/17th Infantry Battalion crossed the Bumi
without opposition, and found the Salankaua Plantation
unoccupied. In mopping up the area, it captured two
Japanese stragglers and killed three. By evening the
Finschhafen was in Australian hands.[103] Between 22
September and 2 October, the 20th Infantry Brigade had
taken its objectives. It had lost 73 dead, 276 wounded and
Windeyer realised that he needed to capture Kakakog
9 missing, all of whom were later accounted for as dead

9
or wounded. The 532nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment had 8 dead and 42 wounded.[104] Two Americans
were also killed in the Air Liaison Party.[105]

[2] Dexter 1961, p. 444.

[3] Tanaka 1980, p. 64.
[4] Tanaka 1980, p. 65.

Aftermath

[5] Willoughby 1966, p. 229.

[6] Coates 1999, p. 95.

MacArthurs decision to move swiftly against Fin[7] Johnston 2005, p. iv.

schhafen, coupled with Blameys to envelop the Japanese
defences by landing at Scarlet Beach, and Yamadas to [8] Coates 1999, pp. 9899.
avoid a decisive engagement that might result in the loss
of all or part of his force, gave Windeyer the time and [9] Allied Geographical Section, South West Pacic Area
1942, p. 6.
space he needed to take Finschhafen.[6] Blameys objective was therefore in Allied hands; but it was of limited [10] Allied Geographical Section, South West Pacic Area
use without Sattelberg. The Allied intelligence failure
1942, pp. 11f-11h.
and subsequent dithering meant that the Japanese reinforced their position faster, and the were able to size the [11] Coates 1999, pp. 130131.
initiative.[106]
[12] Dexter 1961, p. 483.
The Japanese launched a counter-attack on the Allied [13] Coates 1999, pp. 133134.
lodgement around Scarlet Beach. A three-pronged action, the counter-attack saw a diversionary attack to the [14] Coates 1999, p. 130.
north, while the Sugino Craft Raiding Unit attacked
[15] Dexter 1961, p. 446.
from the sea, and two infantry regiments assaulted the
centre aiming towards the beach and the Heldsbach [16] Thomson 2000, p. 166.
plantation.[107][108] It had been intended that once the
beachhead was overwhelmed, that the 79th and 80th In- [17] Coates 1999, p. 129.
fantry Regiments would link up and then clear the Fin- [18] Dexter 1961, p. 447.
schhafen and Langemark Bay areas; but the assault was
poorly co-ordinated and failed to achieve sucient weight [19] Dexter 1961, pp. 444446.
to overcome the Australians, while also suering from
[20] Coates 1999, pp. 7677.
a lack of artillery. The seaborne assault was interdicted
by US Navy PT boats, which inicted heavy casualties, [21] Casey 1959, p. 91.
and was destroyed by Allied machine gunners on the
beach.[109] In the centre, though, the Japanese were able [22] The Landing at Scarlet Beach. The Sydney Morning
Herald. 3 October 1947. p. 2. Retrieved 6 January 2011.
to break through to Siki Cove, and in the process isolated
several Australian units, including those ghting on the [23] Barbey 1969, pp. 8889.
western ank around Jivevenang, forcing the Australians
to resort to air drops to keep their forces supplied.[110][111] [24] Dexter 1961, p. 452.
While the Japanese briey managed to force the Australians to contract their forces around the beachhead, and
Japanese aircraft were able to attack the Allied ground
troops around the area over three successive nights between 19 and 21 October, the attack eventually ran
out of momentum on 24 October at which point the
Japanese commander, Yamada, ordered his forces to concentrate around the high ground at Sattelberg, where they
planned to make further attacks.[112][113] Meanwhile, the
Australians prepared for an assault against the Japanese
strong hold that had been established around the abandoned Lutheran mission atop the Sattelberg heights before advancing towards the Wareo plateau to cut o key
Japanese lines of communication.[114]

[25] Morison 1950, p. 261.

[26] Barbey 1969, p. 357.
[27] Barbey 1969, p. 91.
[28] Barbey 1945, p. II-31.
[29] Coates 1999, p. 277.
[30] Dexter 1961, p. 449.
[31] Mallett 2007, pp. 232233.
[32] Coates 1999, pp. 7879.
[33] Dexter 1961, p. 450.
[34] Morison 1950, pp. 262266.

Notes

[1] Dexter 1961, pp. 89.

[35] Morison 1950, p. 270.

[36] War Diary, VII Amphibious Force, September 1943
NARA RG38 Box 179

10

8 NOTES

[37] Dexter 1961, p. 455.

[72] Dexter 1961, p. 481.

[38] Barbey 1969, p. 92.

[73] Dexter 1961, p. 480.

[39] Morison 1950, p. 269.

[74] Dexter 1961, p. 482.

[40] Dexter 1961, p. 453.

[75] Coates 1999, pp. 139140.

[41] Windeyer 1943, p. 5.

[76] Dexter 1961, p. 479.

[42] Coates 1999, p. 76.

[77] Dexter 1961, p. 487.

[43] Casey 1959, p. 123.

[78] Sayers 1980, pp. 274277.

[44] Coates 1999, p. 70.

[79] Dexter 1961, p. 488.

[45] Coates 1999, pp. 7071.

[80] Dexter 1961, pp. 488490.

[46] War Diary, 2/15th Infantry Battalion. September 1943.

AWM52 8/3/15/25. Retrieved 14 February 2016.

[81] Keogh 1965, pp. 323324.

[47] Coates 1999, p. 72.

[48] Dexter 1961, p. 454.
[49] Dexter 1961, p. 458.
[50] Coates 1999, pp. 7273.
[51] John Morrel Band Recommendation: United States Navy
Cross. Australian War Memorial. Retrieved 5 February
2016.
[52] Windeyer 1943, p. 3.
[53] Coates 1999, pp. 7375.
[54] Casey 1959, p. 122.
[55] George Medal Presented to Courageous Papuan. The
Argus (National Library of Australia). 12 September
1944. p. 3. Retrieved 14 February 2016.

[82] Casey 1959, p. 126.

[83] Dexter 1961, p. 478.
[84] Dexter 1961, p. 484.
[85] Dexter 1961, p. 474.
[86] Dexter 1961, p. 498.
[87] Dexter 1961, pp. 467470.
[88] Coates 1999, pp. 101103.
[89] Coates 1999, pp. 99100.
[90] Windeyer 1943, p. 10.
[91] Watson 1950, p. 188.
[92] Dexter 1961, pp. 470471.
[93] Dexter 1961, p. 473.

[56] Dexter 1961, p. 464.

[57] Dexter 1961, p. 456.
[58] Dexter 1961, p. 457.
[59] Casey 1959, p. 124.
[60] Windeyer 1943, p. 6.
[61] Coates 1999, p. 75.
[62] Casey 1959, p. 125.
[63] Tanaka 1980, p. 179.
[64] Watson 1950, pp. 187188.
[65] Mallett 2007, p. 237.

[94] Coates 1999, p. 103.

[95] Coates 1999, pp. 108111.
[96] Windeyer 1943, pp. 1213.
[97] Odgers 1957, pp. 8586.
[98] Dexter 1961, p. 492.
[99] Dexter 1961, p. 494.
[100] Dexter 1961, pp. 494496.
[101] Honours and Awards: Georey Robertson Crawford.
Australian War Memorial. Retrieved 16 February 2016.

[66] Windeyer 1943, pp. 67.

[102] Honours and Awards: Alfred John Rolfe. Australian

War Memorial. Retrieved 16 February 2016.

[67] Dexter 1961, pp. 460463.

[103] Dexter 1961, pp. 498499.

[68] Coates 1999, pp. 8488.

[104] Dexter 1961, p. 500.

[69] Windeyer 1943, p. 8.

[105] Windeyer 1943, p. 15.

[70] Dexter 1961, p. 401.

[106] Coates 1999, p. 148.

[71] Coates 1999, p. 138.

[107] Pratten 2014, pp. 267268.

11

[108] Tanaka 1980, p. 184.

[109] Pratten 2014, p. 268.
[110] Johnston 2005, p. 7.
[111] Maitland 1999, p. 81.
[112] Pratten 2014, p. 269.
[113] Tanaka 1980, p. 187.
[114] Pratten 2014, p. 271.

References
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Area (19 November 1942). Terrain study No. 36
Huon Peninsula and Finschhafen area. Monash
University. Retrieved 5 February 2016.
Barbey, Daniel E. (1945). Seventh Amphibious
Force Command History 10 January 1943 23
December 1945. VII Amphibious Force. OCLC
2858676. Retrieved 12 February 2016.
Barbey, Daniel E. (1969). MacArthurs Amphibious
Navy: Seventh Amphibious Force Operations, 1943
1945. Annapolis, Maryland: United States Naval
Institute. OCLC 52066.
Casey, H. J., ed. (1959). Volume IV: Amphibian
Engineer Operations. Engineers of the Southwest
Pacic 19411945. Washington, DC: Government
Printing Oce. OCLC 220327009.
Coates, John (1999). Bravery Above Blunder: The
9th Division at Finschhafen, Sattelberg and Sio. Singapore: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19550837-8. OCLC 43736921.
Dexter, David (1961). The New Guinea Oensives. Australia in the War of 19391945. Series
1 Army. Volume VI. Canberra: Australian War
Memorial. OCLC 2028994.
Johnston, Mark (2005). The Huon Peninsula 1943
1944. Australians in the Pacic War. Canberra:
Department of Veterans Aairs. ISBN 1-92072055-3.
Keogh, Eustace (1965). The South West Pacic
194145. Melbourne, Victoria: Grayower Productions. OCLC 7185705.

Morison, Samuel Eliot (1950). Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier: 22 July 1942 1 May 1944. History
of United States Naval Operations in World War II.
Boston: Little, Brown and Company. ISBN 0-78581307-1. OCLC 10310299.
Odgers, George (1957). Air War Against Japan
19431945. Australia in the War of 19391945.
Series 3 Air. Volume II. Canberra: Australian
War Memorial. OCLC 246580191.
Pratten, Garth (2014). Applying the Principles of
War: Securing the Huon Peninsula. In Dean, Peter.
Australia 1943: The Liberation of New Guinea. Port
Melbourne, Victoria: Cambridge University Press.
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Sayers, Stuart (1980). Ned Herring: A Life of
Lieutenant-General the Honorable Sir Edmund Herring KCMG, KBE, MC, ED. K St J, MA, DCL. Melbourne: Hyland House. ISBN 0-908090-25-0.
Tanaka, Kengoro (1980). Operations of the Imperial
Japanese Armed Forces in the Papua New Guinea
Theater During World War II. Tokyo: Japan Papua
New Guinea Goodwill Society. OCLC 9206229.
Thomson, Judy (2000). Winning with Intelligence:
A Biography of Brigadier John David Rogers, CBE,
MC, 18951978. Loftus, New South Wales: Australian Military History Publications. ISBN 978-1876439-43-9. OCLC 48468871.
Watson, Richard L. (1950). Huon Gulf and Peninsula. In Craven, Wesley Frank; Cate, James Lea.
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1942 to July 1944. The Army Air Forces in World
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Retrieved 31 October 2011.

12

10

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Landing at Scarlet Beach Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Landing_at_Scarlet_Beach?oldid=709154064 Contributors: Davidcannon, Giraedata, Hawkeye7, Nick-D, Dicklyon, Dawnseeker2000, The Anomebot2, Afernand74, Newm30, Magus732, Anotherclown,
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