REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CYNTHIA VICENCIO, respondents.

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is an appeal interposed by the Republic of the Philippines as represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), assailing the decision i[1] of the
Court of Appeals promulgated on April 28, 1989, which affirmed the decision ii[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 52, dated, August 31, 1987. The
appealed decision granted private respondent Cynthia Vicencios petition for change of surname, from Vicencio to Yu.
As found by the trial court, hereunder are the facts and circumstances of the case:
Petitioners evidence is to the effect that she was born on 19 January 1971 at the Capitol Medical Center, Quezon City, to the spouses Pablo Castro Vicencio
and Fe Esperanza de Vega Leabres (Exh. C, also marked Annex A of Petition); that on 10 January 1972, after a marital spat, Pablo Vicencio left their conjugal
abode then situated at Meycauayan, Bulacan; that since then Pablo Vicencio never reappeared nor sent support to his family and it was Ernesto Yu who had
come to the aid of Fe Esperanza Labres (sic) and her children; that on 29 June 1976, Fe Esperanza Leabres filed a petition in the then Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Manila for dissolution of their conjugal partnership, Civil Case No. E-02009, which was granted in a decision rendered by the Hon. Regina C.
Ordoez Benitez on 11 July 1977 (Exhs. D, D-1 to D-3); that sometime in 1983, petitioners mother filed another petition for change of name, Sp. Proc. No. 8316346, that is to drop the surname of her husband therefrom, and after hearing a decision was rendered on 5 July 1983 by the Hon. Emeterio C. Cui of Branch
XXV of this Court approving the petition (Exh. E); that in 1984, petitioners mother again filed another petition with this Court, Sp. Proc. No. 84-22605, for the
declaration of Pablo Vicencio as an absentee, and which petition was granted on 26 April 1984 in a decision rendered by the Hon. Corona Ibay-Somera (Exh. F
& F-1); that on 15 April 1986, petitioners mother and Ernesto Yu were joined in matrimony in a ceremony solemnized by Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos of
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila (Exh. G).
It was also established that evern (sic) since her childhood, petitioner had not known much less remembered her real father Pablo Vicencio, and her known
father had been and still is Ernesto Yu; that despite of which she had been using the family name Vicencio in her school and other related activities therein;
that in view of such situation, confusion arose as to her parentage and she had been subjected to inquiries why she is using Vicencio as her family name, both
by her classmates and their neighbors, causing her extreme embarrassment; that on two (2) occassions when she ran as a beauty contestant in a Lions Club
affair and in a Manila Red Cross pageant, her name was entered as Cynthia L. Yu; that her step-father had been priorly consulted about this petition and had
given his consent thereto; that in fact Ernesto Yu testified for petitioner and confirmed his consent to the petition as he had always treated petitioner as his
own daughter ever since.iii[3]
At the hearing of the petition for change of name by the trial court, the OSG manifested that it was opposing the petition. It participated in the proceedings by
cross-examining the private respondent Cynthia Vicencio, (petitioner a quo) and her witnesses.
Disregarding the OSGs contention, the trial court ruled that there is no valid cause for denying the petition. Further, the trial court stated that it could not
compel private respondents step-father to adopt her, as adoption is a voluntary act; but failure to resort to adoption should not be a cause for disallowing
private respondent to legally change her name.iv[4] Hence, it granted the change of surname of private respondent from Vicencio to Yu.
The decision of the trial court was affirmed by the appellate court, which held that it is for the best interest of petitioner that her surname be changed. The
appellate court took into account the testimonies of private respondent and her witnesses that allowing the change of surname would give her an opportunity
to improve her personality and welfare. v[5] It likewise noted that the discrepancy between her original surname, taken from her biological father; and the
surname of her step-father, who has been socially recognized as her father, caused her embarrassment and inferiority complex. vi[6]
The main issue before us is whether the appellate court erred in affirming the trial courts decision allowing the change of private respondents surname to that
of her step-fathers surname.

In Republic vs. Hernandez vii[7], we have recognized inter alia, the following as sufficient grounds to warrant a change of name: (a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change is a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption; (c) when the change will
avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) when the
change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice to anybody; and (f) when
the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose, or that the change of name would
prejudice public interest.
Private respondent asserts that her case falls under one of the justifiable grounds aforecited. She says that confusion has arisen as to her parentage because
ever since childhood, Ernesto Yu has acted as her father, assuming duties of rearing, caring and supporting her. Since she is known in society as the daughter
of Ernesto Yu, she claims that she has been subjected to inquiries regarding her use of a different surname, causing her much humiliation and embarrassment.
However, it is not denied that private respondent has used Vicencio as her surname in her school records and related documents. But she had used the
surname of her step-father, Yu, when she participated in public functions, such as entering beauty contests, namely, with the Lions Club and the Manila Red
Cross, and when she celebrated her debut at the Manila Hotel. viii[8]
The Solicitor General however argues that there is no proper and reasonable cause to warrant private respondents change of surname. Such change might
even cause confusion and give rise to legal complications due to the fact that private respondents step-father has two (2) children with her mother. In the
event of her step-fathers death, it is possible that private respondent may even claim inheritance rights as a legitimate daughter. In his memorandum, the
Solicitor General, opines that Ernesto Yu has no intention of making Cynthia as an heir because despite the suggestion made before the petition for change of
name was heard by the trial court that the change of family name to Yu could very easily be achieved by adoption, he has not opted for such a remedy. ix[9]
We find merit in the Solicitor Generals contention.
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be proper and reasonable cause for which the change is sought.x[10] The assailed decision as
affirmed by the appellate court does not persuade us to depart from the applicability of the general rule on the use of surnames xi[11], specifically the law
which requires that legitimate children shall principally use the surname of their father xii[12].
Private respondent Cynthia Vicencio is the legitimate offspring of Fe Leabres and Pablo Vicencio. As previously stated, a legitimate child generally bears the
surname of his or her father. It must be stressed that a change of name is a privilege, not a matter of right, addressed to the sound discretion of the court,
which has the duty to consider carefully the consequences of a change of name and to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown. xiii[13]
Confusion indeed might arise with regard to private respondents parentage because of her surname. But even, more confusion with grave legal consequences
could arise if we allow private respondent to bear her step-fathers surname, even if she is not legally adopted by him. While previous decisions have allowed
children to bear the surname of their respective step-fathers even without the benefit of adoption, these instances should be distinguished from the present
case. In Calderon vs. Republic, xiv[14] and Llaneta vs. Agrava,xv[15] this Court allowed the concerned child to adopt the surname of the step-father, but unlike
the situation in the present case where private respondent is a legitimate child, in those cases the children were not of legitimate parentage. In Moore vs.
Republic,xvi[16] where the circumstances appears to be similar to the present case before us, the Court upheld the Republics position:
We find tenable this observation of governments counsel. Indeed, if a child born out of a lawful wedlock be allowed to bear the surname of the second
husband of the mother, should the first husband die or be separated by a decree of divorce, there may result a confusion as to his real paternity. In the long
run the change may redound to the prejudice of the child in the community.
While the purpose which may have animated petitioner is plausible and may run along the feeling of cordiality and spiritual relationship that pervades among
the members of the Moore family, our hand is deferred by a legal barrier which we cannot at present overlook or brush aside. xvii[17]
Similarly in Padilla vs. Republic, xviii[18] the Court ruled that:

To allow said minors to adopt the surname of their mothers second husband, who is not their father, could result in confusion in their paternity. It could also
create the suspicion that said minors, who were born during the coverture of their mother with her first husband, were in fact sired by Edward Padilla, thus
bringing their legitimate status into discredit. xix[19]
Private respondent, might sincerely wish to be in a position similar to that of her step-fathers legitimate children, a plausible reason the petition for change of
name was filed in the first place. Moreover, it is laudable that Ernesto Yu has treated Cynthia as his very own daughter, providing for all her needs as a father
would his own flesh and blood. However, legal constraints lead us to reject private respondents desire to use her stepfathers surname. Further, there is no
assurance the end result would not be even more detrimental to her person, for instead of bringing a stop to questions, the very change of name, if granted,
could trigger much deeper inquiries regarding her parentage.
Lastly, when this case was decided by the appellate court, private respondent was already 18 years old but still considered a minor because Republic Act
6809,xx[20] lowering the age of majority, was then in effect. However, regardless of private respondents age, our conclusion remains considering the
circumstances before us and the lack of any legally justifiable cause for allowing the change of her surname.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-20997

April 27, 1967

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO CHANGE NAME OF ONG HUAN TIN TO TERESITA TAN ONG. HUAN TIN, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellee.

J.
C.
Yuseco
Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor and appellee.

for

petitioner

and

appellant.

SANCHEZ, J.:
Petition to change the name of Ong Huan Tin to Teresita Tan (Special Proceeding 03521, Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court). Due publication was had. The
petition was set for hearing. But, before the petition could be heard on the merits, the court, motu proprio, in its order of November 6, 1962 expressed the
opinion "that an alien cannot avail himself of the provisions of our Rules of Court relating to change of name" and thereupon denied the petition. A move to
reconsider was rejected in the court's order of November 24, 1962. Offshoot is the present appeal.
1. At issue is whether an alien may petition for a change of name. Primarily, this question hinges on the proper interpretation of the word person as it is
employed in Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. This problem, by all means, is not new.
In a recent judicial test (In the Petition for the Change of Name of JOSELITO YU, G.R. L-20874, May 25, 1966) * We held that Philippine citizenship of the
applicant is not a prerequisite for a petition to change name; and, that, accordingly, an alien may petition for a change of name. There, this Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Makalintal, declared:
Rule 103 does not say that only citizens of the Philippines may petition for a change of name. [Neither does Public Act No. 1386 of the Philippine
Commission (enacted September 1, 1905) from which the Rule has been adopted.] Section 1 provides that "a person desiring to change his name shall
present the petition to the Court of First Instance of the province in which he resides, or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court." Here the word "person" is a generic term which is not limited to Filipino citizens, but embraces all natural persons. The rule does not even
require that the citizenship of the petitioner be stated in his petition. It is enough that the petition be verified, signed by the petitioner or some other
person in his behalf, and set forth (a) that the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least three (3)
years prior to the date of filing; (b) the cause for which the change of name is sought; and (c) the name asked for (Section 2). The rule is clear and
affords no room for interpretation. It sets forth all the requirements, and Filipino citizenship is not one of them.
The court a quo ruled that since the use of surnames is based on family rights, and since under Article 15 of the Civil Code laws relating to family
rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad, the
converse of the principle must be recognized, that is to say, the same matters in respect of are alien must be governed by the laws of his own country.
The major premise of the proposition may be true in a general sense: one's surname is usually that by which not only one as an individual but one's
family as well is known. Thus Title XIII of the Civil Code (Articles 364 to 373) contains provision for the use of surnames by legitimate, legitimated,
illegitimate, and adopted children, as well as by women who are married, widowed or legally separated from their husbands. But a change of name as
authorized under Rule 103 does not by itself define, or effect a change in, one's existing family relations, or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom;
nor does it create new family rights and duties where none before were existing. It does not alter one's legal capacity, civil status or citizenship. What
is altered is only the name, which in that word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from others and which he bears as the label
or appellation for the convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him (38 Am. Jur. 595). The situation is no
different whether the person whose name is changed be a citizen or an alien.
To be sure, there could be instances where the change applied for maybe open to objection by parties who already bear the surname desired by the applicant,
not because he would thereby acquire certain family ties with them but because the existence of such ties might be erroneously impressed on the public
mind. But this is precisely the purpose of the judicial application to determine whether there is proper and reasonable cause for the change of name. As
held by this Court are several cases, in which pertinently enough the petitioners were aliens, the change is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be
exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will likely follow (Ong Peng Oan vs. Republic, L-8035, Nov. 1957; Tan vs. Republic, L16384, April 26, 1962; Ong Te vs. Republic, L-15549, June 30, 1962; Moore vs. Republic, L-18407, June 26, 1963). In not one of those cases, however, has it
been ruled that an alien is not entitled to file a petition at all."
2. Nonetheless, we pause to consider whether every alien in this country may petition for a change of name.

Change of name under our own law is a special proceeding to establish the status of a person involving his relations with others, that is, his legal position
in, or with regard to, the rest of the community. The petition therefor is directed against all. It is in rem. So it is, that under Section 3 of Rule 103, publication of
the petition is required.1
The broad general doctrine is that the status of an alien individual is governed and controlled by the lex domicilii.2 Implicit in this precept is that an alien may
be allowed to change his name here only if he be domiciled in the Philippines. And "domicile" means "permanent home, the place to which, whenever absent
for business or pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances, in the sense that they disclose intent." 3
An alien who temporarily stays in the Philippines may not there avail of the right to change his name. For, what good will that be if, after all, his stay will be for
a short period of time? It would not be of much benefit to him; court proceedings for the purpose could yet be a useless ceremony; that salutary effects
flowing from a change of his social relation and condition may not thus be achieved. And then, stock should be taken of the fact that in a change of name,
third persons and the State are concerned. Correct, then, it is to say that change of name is not temporary in nature; the new name may not be shunted aside
at will.
We, accordingly, lay down the rule that only alien domiciled in the Philippines may apply for change of name in the courts thereof.1wph1.t
Considering that the petition herein complies with the requisites set forth in the Rules of Court, we vote to set aside the orders of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of November 6, 1962 and November 24, 1962; and to direct said Court to proceed with the hearing and determination of Special Proceeding
03521, entitled "In the Matter of the Petition to Change Name of Ong Huan Tin to Teresita Tan." No costs. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Castro, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-27621 August 30, 1973

IN THE
MATTER OF THE CHANGE OF NAMES
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.

OF

SECAN

KOK

and

MARILYN

SE,

SECAN

KOK,

petitioner-appellee,

Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro for oppositor-appellant.
Emmanuel D. Badoy for petitioner-appellee.

MAKASIAR, J.:
Appeal by the Republic of the Philippines from the order of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato dated September 3, 1966 reinstating the order dated March
30, 1966 granting the motion for supplemental judgment of petitioner-appellee and authorizing appellee's legal wife Lucia O. Tee and their minor children
namely, Perfecto, Romeo, Tomas, Daniel and Antonio, Jr., to bear his newly granted surname Cuakok.
On May 18, 1964, appellee Secan Kok filed a petition to change his name and that of his daughter Marilyn Se respectively to Antonio Cuakok and Gloria
Cuakok, although his petition mentions his other minor children, namely Perfecto, Romeo, Betty, Tomas, Daniel and Antonio, Jr. (p. 1, ROA) as having been born
out of his marriage in the Catholic church on August 2, 1947 at Cotabato City, without, significantly, mentioning the name of his wife (pp. 1-4, ROA).
On November 7, 1964, the trial court directed the amendment of the verification as it was insufficient (pp. 4-5, ROA).
On January 13, 1965, petitioner-appellee filed the amended petition with the corrected verification, but containing the same allegations and the same prayer
(pp. 5-8, ROA).
Accordingly, on January 18, 1965, the Court ordered the publication of the amended petition (pp. 9-12, ROA).
On July 28, 1965, the trial court, after finding that:
The evidence shows that the petitioner, Secan Kok a prosperous businessman, is a Chinese citizen, born of Chinese parents in Amoy, China, on
September 7, 1917. Sometime in 1928, the petitioner came to the Philippines, landed at the City of Manila and resided there for ten years. In
1938, the petitioner transferred to Cotabato, now Cotabato City, and has since then continuously resided therein. The petitioner is in
possession of Alien Certificate of Registration No. A-62640, dated September 22, 1950, issued by the Commissioner of Immigration. He is also
in possession of Certificate of Legalization of Residence, dated January 24, 1947.
The evidence also shows that the petitioner's true and correct Chinese name is Cua Kian Kok but by clerical mistake committed by the
immigration official who prepared his registration papers, he is officially called Secan Kok. In 1947, the petitioner was converted to the Roman
Catholic Church and was baptized in Cotabato City with the name of Antonio Cua. In that same year, the petitioner was married to his present
wife, Lucia O. Tee, a Filipina. Presently, the petitioner has seven children, namely: Marilyn, Perfecto, Romeo, Betty, Tomas, Daniel and Antonio,
Jr., all of minor ages and all born and residents of Cotabato City.

The petitioner has thus presently acquired three distinct names: Cua Kian Kok, Secan Kok and Antonio Cua. He has consistently used Secan Ko
as registered in the Bureau of Immigration in his official and business dealings. But his family and friends have also made use of his Christian
names, Antonio Cua. In fact, his youngest son has been baptized as Antonio Cua, Jr.. This situation has caused confusion and embarrassment
to the petitioner so that he has taken this legal step to change his registered name, and adopt his Christian baptismal name of Antonio
Cuakok.
Petitioner's daughter, Marilyn, 17 years old, is now enrolled in the Notre Dame College at Cotabato City. Since her childhood, she has been
called "Gloria", not by her baptismal name "Marilyn". In official and school records, she has been known as "Maria Gloria Cua". Therefore, to
avoid this confusion, petitioner desires to change the name of (his) daughter, Marilyn, to "Gloria Cuakok" for all legal intents and purposes.
Petitioner has filed this petition in good faith. Asst. City Fiscal Guialuzon Ibad submitted the case without presenting any evidence against the
petition.
Finding the petition meritorious, the Court hereby grants the name as prayed for. The name of the petitioner, Secan Kok, is hereby changed to
Antonio Cuakok Petitioner's daughter's name, Marilyn, is hereby changed to Gloria Cuakok (pp. 14-16, ROA).
On January 7, 1966, petitioner-appellee filed a motion for supplemental judgment, alleging that the Bureau of Immigration refused to change the surname of
his wife Lucia O. Tee and their aforesaid six (6) minor children to Cuakok who were then registered in the Bureau of Immigration with the surname of Cua (pp.
16-19, ROA).
On January 10, 1966, the government, thru the Assistant City Fiscal, opposed the motion on the ground that (a) the order dated July 28, 1965 of the trial court
authorizing the change of his name from Secan Kok to Antonio Cuakok, and the name of his daughter from Marilyn Se to Gloria Cuakok has long become final
and therefore can no longer be supplemented; and (b) that his wife Lucia O. Tee, being of age, should file a separate petition to change her name, such a
petition being an individual and personal matter and not a collective one (pp. 20-22, ROA).
On February 4, 1966, petitioner-appellee replied to the said opposition contending that legitimate children shall principally use the surname of their father
(Article 264, Civil Code of the Philippines) and that the wife has the right to use the surname of her husband (Article 370, Civil Code; pp. 22-26, ROA).
On February 28, 1966, the court set the hearing of the motion for the reception of evidence on the full identity of appellee's wife and six (6) minor children
(pp. 26-27, ROA).
On March 24, 1966, the government filed a motion for the reconsideration of the aforesaid order of February 28, 1966 (pp. 27-29, ROA).
In an order dated March 30, 1966, the court granted the motion for supplemental judgment after finding that:
The evidence shown that Lucia Tee Kok is the legitimate wife of the petitioner, with Alien Certificate of Registration No. A 62605. The children
of the petitioner, all born and residing in the City of Cotabato are:
1.
Gloria,
2.
Perfecto,
3.
Romeo,
4.
Betty,
5.
Tomas
(twin
6.
Daniel
(twin
7. Antonio, Jr., 3, ACR No. B 70913

17,
15,
11,
7,
of
of

ACR
ACR
ACR
ACR
Daniel),
Tomas),

5,
5,

No.
No.
No.
No.
ACR
ACR

B
A
B
No.
No.

B
B

B46434
105775
252184
23005
46417
46417

All these children were baptized in the Roman Catholic Church of Cotabato City bearing the old surname of the petitioner Cua. Now, Lucia
Tee Kok desire to follow the new surname of her husband Cuakok. The children Perfecto, Romeo, Betty, Tomas, Daniel and Antonio, Jr.,
also desire to adopt the new surname of their father, pursuant to law. (pp. 31-32, ROA).
On May 3, 1966, the government filed a motion for the reconsideration of the aforesaid order of March 30, 1966 (pp. 33-37, ROA), which was granted on May
12, 1966 by the trial court on the ground that the judgment had long become final and was already executory when the present motion for supplemental
judgment was filed and that the said motion amounted to the re-opening of the main petition in accordance with Rules 37 and 38 of the Revised Rules of
Court, and forthwith set aside its order dated February 28, 1966, without prejudice to petitioner's right to file a new and separate petition for the purpose (p.
38, ROA).
However, upon motion for reconsideration by petitioner-appellee on August 27, 1966 (pp. 39-44, ROA), despite the opposition thereto by the government filed
on September 1, 1966 (pp. 45-47, ROA), the trial court in its order dated September 3, 1966 set aside its order dated May 12, 1966 and reinstated its previous
order dated March 30, 1966 (pp. 47-49, ROA), from which the State appealed.
The appeal should be sustained.
The rules are very explicit. Section 2 of Rule 103 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a petition for a change of name shall be signed and verified by the
person desiring his name to be changed, or some other person in his behalf. There is need therefore for a separate petition to be filed by the wife Lucia O. Tee,
who is already of age, in her own behalf and in behalf of her minor children.
Then again, to confer jurisdiction on the court, since petitions for change of name are proceedings in rem, strict compliance with the requirements is essential,
namely, that such verified petition should be published for three (3) successive weeks in some newspapers of general circulation in the province; and that
both the title or caption of the petition and its body shall recite (1) the name or names or aliases of the applicant; (2) the cause for which the change of name
is sought; and (3) the name or names or aliases of the applicant; (2) the cause for which the change of name is sought; and (3) the new name asked for. The
reason for these requirements is that a change of name is a matter of public interest. The petitioner might be in, the rogues' gallery or hiding to avoid service
of sentence or compliance with a judgment in a criminal case, or could have escaped from prison; or if an alien, he might have given cause for deportation or
might be one against whom an order of deportation was issued or that the new name the petitioner desires to adopt may be similar to that of a respectable
person and the latter might have evidence that petitioner is of unsavory reputation that might impair his own good name. Being a privilege and not a right, a
change of name lies within the discretion of the court give or withhold. Failure to comply with these jurisdictional requirements, renders the proceedings a
nullity. 1
To allow the change of name of the wife and other minor children of petitioner-appellee, upon a mere motion as an incident in the proceedings for the change
of name of petitioner-appellee, will not only deprive the government of the required filing fees therefor but will also dispense with the aforesaid essential
requirements respecting the recitals in the title of the petition and the publication to apprise persons, who may be in possession of adverse information or
evidence against the grant of the petition, so that they will come forward with such information or evidence in order to protect public interest as well as the
interest of private individuals who may be prejudiced by the change of name of the petitioner.
As reiterated in the aforecited cases, all the names or aliases of petitioner must appear in the title or caption of the petition; because the reader usually
merely glances at the title of the petition and may only proceed to read the entire petition if the title is of interest to him. Moreover, the petition and the order
directing its publication are usually found in the inside or back pages of a newspaper, which escape the notice of the reader who merely glances at the title of
the petition and does not notice the other names and/or aliases of the applicant if these are mentioned only in the body of the petition or order.
Since there is a total absence of a petition signed by Lucia O. Tee and her other minor children and the publication thereof, the challenged orders dated March
30, 1966 and September 3, 1966 are completely void ab initio.
Inasmuch as petitioner-appellee's own petition and the publication of the same do not include all his names and aliases, the new name he desires to bear as
well as those of his minor daughter Marilyn Se, the trial court likewise acquired no jurisdiction over his petition and the decision granting his petition is
similarly void ab initio and could be attacked collaterally, vitiated as it was by a fatal flaw lack of jurisdiction.

IN VIEW HEREOF, THE QUESTIONED ORDERS DATED SEPTEMBER 3, 1966 AND MARCH 30, 1966 OF THE TRIAL COURT, AS WELL AS THE JUDGMENT DATED JULY
28, 1965 ARE HEREBY SET ASIDE AS NULL AND VOID; AND THIS CASE IS HEREBY REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT WHICH SHALL DIRECT PETITIONERAPPELLEE TO FILE AN AMENDED PETITION THAT SHOULD BE PUBLISHED AS HEREINABOVE INDICATED. WITH COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER-APPELLEE.

[G.R. No. 118387. October 11, 2001]

MARCELO LEE, ALBINA LEE-YOUNG, MARIANO LEE, PABLO LEE, HELEN LEE, CATALINO K. LEE, EUSEBIO LEE, EMMA LEE, and TIU CHUAN, petitioners, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS and HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION and HON. JAIME T. HAMOY, in their capacities as Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial Court of Manila
and Branch 130, Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, respectively and RITA K. LEE, LEONCIO LEE TEK SHENG in their personal capacities and ROSA K. LEEVANDERLEK, MELODY K. LEE-CHIN, LUCIA K. LEE TEK SHENG, JULIAN K. LEE, HENRY K. LEE, MARTIN K. LEE, VICTORIANO K. LEE, NATIVIDAD K. LEE-MIGUEL, and
THOMAS K. LEE, represented by RITA K. LEE, respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari, with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, seeks the reversal of
the Decisionxxi[1] of the Court of Appeals dated October 28, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP NO. 31786 xxii[2]. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals upheld the
Orders issued by respondents Judges Hon. Lorenzo B. Veneracion xxiii[3] and Hon. Jaime T. Hamoyxxiv[4] taking cognizance of two (2) separate petitions filed by

private respondents before their respective salas for the cancellation and/or correction of entries in the records of birth of petitioners pursuant to Rule 108 of
the Revised Rules of Court.
This is a story of two (2) sets of children sired by one and the same man but begotten of two (2) different mothers. One set, the private respondents herein,
are the children of Lee Tek Sheng and his lawful wife, Keh Shiok Cheng. The other set, the petitioners herein, are allegedly children of Lee Tek Sheng and his
concubine, Tiu Chuan.
Rita K. Lee, Leoncio Lee Tek Sheng, Rosa K. Lee-Vanderlek, Melody K. Lee-Chin, Lucia K. Lee Tek Sheng-Ong, Julian K. Lee, Henry K. Lee, Martin K. Lee,
Victoriano K. Lee, Natividad K. Lee-Miguel and Thomas K. Lee (hereinafter referred to as private respondents) filed two (2) separate petitions for the
cancellation and/or correction of entries in the records of birth of Marcelo Lee, Albina Lee-Young, Mariano Lee, Pablo Lee, Helen Lee, Catalino K. Lee, Eusebio
Lee, and Emma Lee (hereinafter referred to as petitioners). On December 2, 1992, the petition against all petitioners, with the exception of Emma Lee, was
filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila and docketed as SP. PROC. NO. 92-63692 xxv[5] and later assigned to Branch 47 presided over by
respondent Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion. On February 3, 1993, a similar petition against Emma Lee was filed before the RTC of Kalookan and docketed as SP.
PROC. NO. C-1674xxvi[6] and assigned to the sala of respondent Judge Jaime T. Hamoy of Branch 130.
Both petitions sought to cancel and/or correct the false and erroneous entries in all pertinent records of birth of petitioners by deleting and/or canceling
therein the name of Keh Shiok Cheng as their mother, and by substituting the same with the name Tiu Chuan, who is allegedly the petitioners true birth
mother.
The private respondents alleged in their petitions before the trial courts that they are the legitimate children of spouses Lee Tek Sheng and Keh Shiok Cheng
who were legally married in China sometime in 1931. Except for Rita K. Lee who was born and raised in China, private respondents herein were all born and
raised in the Philippines.
Sometime in October, 1948, Lee Tek Sheng, facilitated the arrival in the Philippines from China of a young girl named Tiu Chuan. She was introduced by Lee
Tek Sheng to his family as their new housemaid but far from becoming their housemaid, Tiu Chuan immediately became Lee Tek Shengs mistress. As a result
of their illicit relations, Tiu Chuan gave birth to petitioners.
Unknown to Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents, every time Tiu Chuan gave birth to each of the petitioners, their common father, Lee Tek Sheng,
falsified the entries in the records of birth of petitioners by making it appear that petitioners mother was Keh Shiok Cheng.
Since the birth of petitioners, it was Tiu Chuan who gave maternal care and guidance to the petitioners. They all lived in the same compound Keh Shiok Cheng
and private respondents were residing in. All was well, therefore, before private respondents discovery of the dishonesty and fraud perpetrated by their father,
Lee Tek Sheng.
The tides turned after Keh Shiok Chengs demise on May 9, 1989. Lee Tek Sheng insisted that the names of all his children, including those of petitioners, be
included in the obituary notice of Keh Shiok Chengs death that was to be published in the newspapers. It was this seemingly irrational act that piqued private
respondents curiosity, if not suspicion.xxvii[7]
Acting on their suspicion, the private respondents requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct an investigation into the matter. After
investigation and verification of all pertinent records, the NBI prepared a report that pointed out, among others, the false entries in the records of birth of
petitioners, specifically the following:
1.
As per Birth Certificate of MARCELO LEE (Annex F-1), their father, LEE TEK SHENG made it appear that he is the 12 th child of Mrs. KEH SHIOK CHENG,
but upon investigation, it was found out that her Hospital Records, the mother who gave birth to MARCELO LEE had given birth for the 1 st time, as per
diagnosis of the attending physician, Dr. R. LIM, it was GRAVIDA I, PARA I which means first pregnancy, first live birth delivery (refer to: MASTER PATIENTS
RECORDS SUMMARY Annex I). Also, the age of the mother when she gave birth to MARCELO LEE as per record was only 17 years old, when in fact and in truth,
KEH SHIOK CHENGs age was then already 38 years old. The address used by their father in the Master Patient record was also the same as the Birth Certificate
of MARCELO LEE (2425 Rizal Avenue, Manila). The name of MARCELO LEE was recorded under Hospital No. 221768, page 73.

10

2.
As per Birth Certificate of ALBINA LEE (Annex F-2), it was made to appear that ALBINA LEE was the third child which is without any rationality, because
the 3rd child of KEH SHIOK CHENG is MELODY LEE TEK SHENG (Annex E-2). Note also, that the age of the mother as per Hospital Records jump (sic) from 17 to
22 years old, but the only age gap of MARCELO LEE and ALBINA LEE is only 2 years.
3.
As per Birth Certificate of MARIANO LEE (Annex F-3), it was made to appear that MARIANO LEE was the 5 th child, but the truth is, KEH SHIOK CHENGs
th
5 child is LUCIA LEE TEK SHENG (Annex E-4). As per Hospital Record, the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG was only 23 years old, while the actual age of KEH SHIOK
CHENG, was then already 40 years old.
4.
As per Birth Certificate of PABLO LEE (Annex F-4), it was made to appear that PABLO LEE was the 16 th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG which is impossible to
be true, considering the fact that KEH SHIOK CHENG have stopped conceiving after her 11 th child. Also as per Hospital Record, the age of the mother was
omitted in the records. If PABLO LEE is the 16 th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG, it would only mean that she have (sic) given birth to her first born child at the age
of 8 to 9 years, which is impossible to be true.
Based on the birth record of MARIANO LEE in 1953, the recorded age of KEH SHIOK CHENG was 23 years old. Two years after PABLO LEE was born in 1955, the
difference is only 2 years, so it is impossible for PABLO LEE to be the 16 th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG, as it will only mean that she have (sic) given birth at that
impossible age.
5.
As per Birth Certificate of HELEN LEE (Annex F-5), it was made to appear that she is the 6 th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG, but as per Birth Certificate of
JULIAN LEE (Annex E-5), he is the true 6 th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG. Per Hospital Record, KEH SHIOK CHENG is only 28 years old, while KEH SHIOK CHENGS
true age at that time was 45 years old.
6.
EMMA LEE has no record in the hospital because, as per complainants allegation, she was born at their house, and was later admitted at Chinese
General Hospital.
7.
As per Birth Certificate of CATALINO LEE (Annex F-7), it was made to appear that he is the 14 th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG, and that the age of KEH
SHIOK CHENG a.k.a. Mrs. LEE TEK SHENG, jumped from 28 years old at the birth of HELEN LEE on 23 August 1957 to 38 years old at the birth of CATALINO LEE
on 22 April 1959.
8.
As per Birth Certificate of EUSEBIO LEE, the alleged last son of KEH SHIOK CHENG, the age of the mother is 48 years old. However, as per Hospital
Record, the age of Mrs. LEE TEK SHENG, then was only 39 years old. Considering the fact, that at the time of MARCELOs birth on 11 May 1950. KEH SHIOK
CHENGs age is 38 years old and at the time of EUSEBIOs birth, she is already 48 years old, it is already impossible that she could have given birth to 8 children
in a span of only 10 years at her age. As per diagnosis, the alleged mother registered on EUSEBIOs birth indicate that she had undergone CEASARIAN
SECTION, which Dr. RITA K. LEE said is not true.
In view of the foregoing facts, the NBI concluded that:
10.

In conclusion, as per Chinese General Hospital Patients Records, it is very obvious that the mother of these 8 children is certainly not KEH
SHIOK CHENG, but a much younger woman, most probably TIU CHUAN. Upon further evaluation and analysis by these Agents, LEE TEK
SHENG, is in a quandary in fixing the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG possibly to conform with his grand design of making his 8 children as their
own legitimate children, consequently elevating the status of his 2 nd family and secure their future. The doctor lamented that this
complaint would not have been necessary had not the father and his 2 nd family kept on insisting that the 8 children are the legitimate
children of KEH SHIOK CHENG.xxviii[8]

It was this report that prompted private respondents to file the petitions for cancellation and/or correction of entries in petitioners records of birth with the
lower courts.

11

The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss both petitions - SP. PROC. NO. 92-63692 and SP. PROC. NO. C-1674 - on the grounds that: (1) resort to Rule 108 is
improper where the ultimate objective is to assail the legitimacy and filiation of petitioners; (2) the petition, which is essentially an action to impugn legitimacy
was filed prematurely; and (3) the action to impugn has already prescribed. xxix[9]
On February 12, 1993, respondent Judge Veneracion denied the motion to dismiss SP. PROC. NO. 92-63692 for failure of the herein petitioners (defendants in
the lower court) to appear at the hearing of the said motion. xxx[10] Then on February 17, 1993, Judge Veneracion issued an Order, the pertinent portion of
which, reads as follows:
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the same is hereby given due course. Let this petition be set for hearing on March 29, 1993 at 8:30
in the morning before this Court located at the 5th Floor of the City Hall of Manila.
Notice is hereby given that anyone who has any objection to the petition should file on or before the date of hearing his opposition thereto with a statement of
the grounds therefor.
Let a copy of this Order be published, at the expense of the petitioners, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines.
Let copies of the verified petition with its annexes and of this Order be served upon the Office of the Solicitor General, and the respondents, and be posted on
the Bulletin Board of this Court, also at the expense of the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.xxxi[11]
On the other hand, respondent Judge Hamoy issued an Order dated April 15, 1993 taking cognizance of SP. PROC. No. C-1674, to wit:
It appearing from the documentary evidence presented and marked by the petitioners that the Order of the Court setting the case for hearing was published
in Media Update once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, that is on February 20, 27, and March 6, 1993 as evidenced by the Affidavit of Publication and
the clippings attached to the affidavit, and by the copies of the Media Update published on the aforementioned dates; further, copy of the order setting the
case for hearing together with copy of the petition had been served upon the Solicitor General, City Prosecutor of Kalookan City, Civil Registrar of Kalookan
City and the private respondents, the Court holds that the petitioners have complied with the jurisdictional requirements for the Court to take cognizance of
this case.
xxx

xxx

x x x.

SO ORDERED.xxxii[12]
Petitioners attempts at seeking a reconsideration of the above-mentioned orders of Judge Veneracion and Judge Hamoy failed, hence their recourse to the
Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction. Petitioners averred that respondents judges had acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed orders allowing the petitions for the cancellation and/or correction of entries in petitioners records of birth to prosper in the lower courts.
In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the petitioners raised the following arguments: (1) Rule 108 is inappropriate for impugning the legitimacy and
filiation of children; (2) Respondents judges are sanctioning a collateral attack against the filiation and legitimacy of children; (3) Respondents judges are
allowing private respondents to impugn the legitimacy and filiation of their siblings despite the fact that their undisputed common father is still alive; (4)
Respondents judges are entertaining petitions which are already time-barred; and (5) The petitions below are part of a forum-shopping spree. xxxiii[13]
Finding no merit in petitioners arguments, the Court of Appeals dismissed their petition in a Decision dated October 28, 1994. xxxiv[14] Petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration of the said decision was also denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated December 19, 1994. xxxv[15]

12

Hence, this petition.

I.
Petitioners contend that resort to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court is improper since private respondents seek to have the entry for the name of
petitioners mother changed from Keh Shiok Cheng to Tiu Chuan who is a completely different person. What private respondents therefore seek is not merely a
correction in name but a declaration that petitioners were not born of Lee Tek Shengs legitimate wife, Keh Shiok Cheng, but of his mistress, Tiu Chuan, in
effect a bastardization of petitioners. xxxvi[16] Petitioners thus label private respondents suits before the lower courts as a collateral attack against their
legitimacy in the guise of a Rule 108 proceeding.
Debunking petitioners above contention, the Court of Appeals observed:
xxx

xxx

x x x.

As correctly pointed out by the private respondents in their comment x x x, the proceedings are simply aimed at establishing a particular fact, status and/or
right. Stated differently, the thrust of said proceedings was to establish the factual truth regarding the occurrence of certain events which created or affected
the status of persons and/or otherwise deprived said persons of rights. xxxvii[17]
xxx

xxx

x x x.

It is precisely the province of a special proceeding such as the one outlined under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court to establish the status or right of a
party, or a particular fact.xxxviii[18] The petitions filed by private respondents for the correction of entries in the petitioners records of birth were intended to
establish that for physical and/or biological reasons it was impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to have conceived and given birth to the petitioners as shown in
their birth records. Contrary to petitioners contention that the petitions before the lower courts were actually actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer therein
is not to declare that petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng, but to establish that the former are not the latters children. There is nothing to
impugn as there is no blood relation at all between Keh Shiok Cheng and petitioners. xxxix[19]
Further sanctioning private respondents resort to Rule 108, the Court of Appeals adverted to our ruling in the leading case of Republic vs. Valenciaxl[20] where
we affirmed the decision of Branch XI of the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu City ordering the correction in the nationality and civil status of
petitioners minor children as stated in their records of birth from Chinese to Filipino, and legitimate to illegitimate, respectively. Although recognizing that the
changes or corrections sought to be effected are not mere clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature, this Court, sitting en banc, held therein that even
substantial errors in a civil register may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the
appropriate adversary proceeding.xli[21] In the said case, we also laid down the rule that a proceeding for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the
civil register under Rule 108 ceases to be summary in nature and takes on the characteristics of an appropriate adversary proceeding when all the
procedural requirements under Rule 108 are complied with. Thus we held:
Provided the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given
opportunity to demolish the opposite partys case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered, the suit or proceeding is appropriate.
The pertinent sections of rule 108 provide:
SEC. 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest
which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. - Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause
reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once in a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

13

SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.
Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register are - (1) the civil
registrar, and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of the court
to - (1) issue an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. The following are likewise entitled to oppose the petition: - (1) the civil registrar, and
(2) any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought.
If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if filed and
conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as summary. There can be no doubt that when an opposition to the
petition is filed either by the Civil Registrar or any person having or claiming any interest in the entries sought to be cancelled and/or corrected and the
opposition is actively prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become adversary proceedings. xlii[22] (Underscoring supplied.)
To the mind of the Court of Appeals, the proceedings taken in both petitions for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the records of birth of petitioners in
the lower courts are appropriate adversary proceedings.
We agree. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals:
In the instant case, a petition for cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth was filed by private respondents and pursuant to the order of the RTC-Manila,
dated February 17, 1993, a copy of the order setting the case for hearing was ordered published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper
of general circulation in the Philippines. In the RTC-Kalookan, there was an actual publication of the order setting the case for hearing in Media Update once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks. In both cases notices of the orders were ordered served upon the Solicitor General, the Civil Registrars of Manila and
Kalookan and upon the petitioners herein. Both orders set the case for hearing and directed the Civil Registrars and the other respondents in the case below to
file their oppositions to the said petitions. A motion to dismiss was consequently filed by herein petitioners Marcelo, Mariano, Pablo, Helen, Catalino and
Eusebio, all surnamed Lee, and Albina Lee-Young in the RTC-Manila, and an opposition was filed by Emma Lee in the RTC-Kalookan.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the petitions filed by the private respondents in the courts below by way of a special proceeding for cancellation and/or
correction of entries in the civil registers with the requisite parties, notices and publications could very well be regarded as that proper suit or appropriate
action.xliii[23] (Underscoring supplied.)
The petitioners assert, however, that making the proceedings adversarial does not give trial courts the license to go beyond the ambit of Rule 108 which is
limited to those corrections contemplated by Article 412 of the New Civil Code or mere clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature. xliv[24] The petitioners
point to the case of Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic,xlv[25] which is of a later date than Republic vs. Valencia,xlvi[26] where this Court reverted to the doctrine laid
down in earlier cases, xlvii[27] starting with Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic, xlviii[28] prohibiting the extension of the application of Rule 108 beyond innocuous or
harmless changes or corrections. Petitioners contend that as held in Go, et al. vs. Civil Registrar,xlix[29] allowing substantial changes under Rule 108 would
render the said rule unconstitutional as the same would have the effect of increasing or modifying substantive rights.
At the outset, it should be pointed out that in the cited case of Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic,l[30] the reason we declared null and void the portion of the lower
courts order directing the change of Labayo-Rowes civil status and the filiation of one of her children as appearing in the latters record of birth, is not because
Rule 108 was inappropriate to effect such changes, but because Labayo-Rowes petition before the lower court failed to implead all indispensable parties to the
case.
We explained in this wise:
x x x. An appropriate proceeding is required wherein all the indispensable parties should be made parties to the case as required under Section 3, Rule 108 of
the Revised Rules of Court.

14

In the case before Us, since only the Office of the Solicitor General was notified through the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, representing the Republic of the
Philippines as the only respondent, the proceedings taken, which is summary in nature, is short of what is required in cases where substantial alterations are
sought. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General, all other indispensable parties should have been made respondents. They include not only the declared
father of the child but the child as well, together with the paternal grandparents, if any, as their hereditary rights would be adversely affected thereby. All
other persons who may be affected by the change should be notified or represented x x x.
xxx

xxx

x x x.

The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her parents would be substantially impaired if her status would be changed from legitimate to illegitimate.
Moreover, she would be exposed to humiliation and embarrassment resulting from the stigma of an illegitimate filiation that she will bear thereafter. The fact
that the notice of hearing of the petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice thereof was served upon the State will not change the
nature of the proceedings taken. Rule 108, like all the other provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rulemaking authority under Section 13, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, which directs that such rules shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.
If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding,
so as to comprehend substantial and controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, without
observing the proper proceedings as earlier mentioned, said rule would thereby become an unconstitutional exercise which would tend to increase or modify
substantive rights. This situation is not contemplated under Article 412 of the Civil Code. li[31] (Underscoring supplied).
Far from petitioners theory, this Courts ruling in Labayo-Rowe vs. Republiclii[32] does not exclude recourse to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court to effect
substantial changes or corrections in entries of the civil register. The only requisite is that the proceedings under Rule 108 be an appropriate adversary
proceeding as contra-distinguished from a summary proceeding. Thus:
If the purpose of the petition [for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil register] is merely to correct the clerical errors which are visible to the
eye or obvious to the understanding, the court may, under a summary procedure, issue an order for the correction of a mistake. However, as repeatedly
construed, changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial and controversial alterations which can only
be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings depending upon the nature of the issues involved. Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a
party are substantial in character and should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issues in controversy, and wherein all the
parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented and evidence is submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the
contrary admitted. x x x.liii[33] (Underscoring supplied.)
It is true that in special proceedings formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the remedy granted upon mere application or motion. But this
is not always the case, as when the statute expressly provides. liv[34] Hence, a special proceeding is not always summary. One only has to take a look at the
procedure outlined in Rule 108 to see that what is contemplated therein is not a summary proceeding per se. Rule 108 requires publication of the petition
three (3) times, i.e., once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks (Sec. 4). The Rule also requires inclusion as parties of all persons who claim any interest
which would be affected by the cancellation or correction (Sec. 3). The civil registrar and any person in interest are also required to file their opposition, if any,
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice (Sec. 5). Last, but not the least, although the court may
make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the same (Sec. 7).
Thus, we find no reason to depart from our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia,lv[35] that Rule 108, when all the procedural requirements thereunder are followed,
is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register. It must be conceded, however, that
even after Republic vs. Valencialvi[36] there continues to be a seesawing of opinion on the issue of whether or not substantial corrections in entries of the civil
register may be effected by means of Rule 108 in relation to Article 412 of the New Civil Code. The more recent cases of Leonor vs. Court of Appealslvii[37] and
Republic vs. Labradorlviii[38] do seem to signal a reversion to the Ty Kong Tin ruling which delimited the scope of application of Article 412 to clerical or
typographical errors in entries of the civil register.
In Republic vs. Labrador, the Court held that Rule 108 cannot be used to modify, alter or increase substantive rights, such as those involving the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child. We ruled thus:

15

This issue has been resolved in Leonor vs. Court of Appeals. In that case, Respondent Mauricio Leonor filed a petition before the trial court seeking the
cancellation of the registration of his marriage to Petitioner Virginia Leonor. He alleged, among others, the nullity of their legal vows arising from the nonobservance of the legal requirements for a valid marriage. In debunking the trial courts ruling granting such petition, the Court held as follows:
On its face, the Rule would appear to authorize the cancellation of any entry regarding marriages in the civil registry for any reason by the mere filing of a
verified petition for the purpose. However, it is not as simple as it looks. Doctrinally, the only errors that can be canceled or corrected under this Rule are
typographical or clerical errors, not material or substantial ones like the validity or nullity of a marriage. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or
obvious to the understanding; error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing ( Black vs. Republic, L-10869, Nov. 28, 1958); or some
harmless and innocuous change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent (Ansalada vs.
Republic, L-10226, Feb. 14, 1958).
Where the effect of a correction in a civil registry will change the civil status of petitioner and her children from legitimate to illegitimate, the same cannot be
granted except only in an adversarial x x x.
Clearly and unequivocally, the summary procedure under Rule 108, and for that matter under Article 412 of the Civil Code cannot be used by Mauricio to
change his and Virginias civil status from married to single and of their three children from legitimate to illegitimate. x x x
Thus, where the effect of a correction of an entry in a civil registry will change the status of a person from legitimate to illegitimate, as in Sarah Zitas case, the
same cannot be granted in summary proceedings. lix[39]
It is, therefore, high time that we put an end to the confusion sown by pronouncements seemingly in conflict with each other, and perhaps, in the process,
stem the continuing influx of cases raising the same substantial issue.
The basis for the pronouncement that extending the scope of Rule 108 to substantial corrections is unconstitutional is embodied in the early case of Ty Kong
Tin vs. Republiclx[40] that first delineated the extent or scope of the matters that may be changed or corrected pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code.
The Supreme Court ruled in this case that:
x x x. After a mature deliberation, the opinion was reached that what was contemplated therein are mere corrections of mistakes that are clerical in nature
and not those that may affect the civil status or the nationality or citizenship of the persons involved. If the purpose of the petition is merely a clerical error
then the court may issue an order in order that the error or mistake may be corrected. If it refers to a substantial change, which affects the status or
citizenship of a party, the matter should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issue involved. Such action can be found at
random in our substantive and remedial laws the implementation of which will naturally depend upon the factors and circumstances that might arise affecting
the interested parties. This opinion is predicated upon the theory that the procedure contemplated in article 412 is summary in nature which cannot cover
cases involving controversial issues.lxi[41]
This doctrine was taken a step further in the case of Chua Wee, et al. vs. Republiclxii[42] where the Court said that:
From the time the New Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1950 until the promulgation of the Revised Rules of Court on January 1, 1964, there was no law nor
rule of court prescribing the procedure to secure judicial authorization to effect the desired innocuous rectifications or alterations in the civil register pursuant
to Article 412 of the New Civil Code. Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court now provides for such a procedure which should be limited solely to the
implementation of Article 412, the substantive law on the matter of correcting entries in the civil register. Rule 108, like all the other provisions of the Rules of
Court, was promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making authority under Section 13 of Art. VIII of the Constitution, which directs that such
rules of court shall not diminish or increase or modify substantive rights. If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or
corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and controversial alterations concerning
citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, said Rule 108 would thereby become unconstitutional for it would be increasing or
modifying substantive rights, which changes are not authorized under Article 412 of the New Civil Code. lxiii[43] (Underscoring supplied).

16

We venture to say now that the above pronouncements proceed from a wrong premise, that is, the interpretation that Article 412 pertains only to clerical
errors of a harmless or innocuous nature, effectively excluding from its domain, and the scope of its implementing rule, substantial changes that may affect
nationality, status, filiation and the like. Why the limited scope of Article 412? Unfortunately, Ty Kong Tin does not satisfactorily answer this question except to
opine that the procedure contemplated in Article 412 is summary in nature and cannot, therefore, cover cases involving controversial issues. Subsequent
cases have merely echoed the Ty Kong Tin doctrine without, however, shedding light on the matter.
The flaw in Ty Kong Tin lies in its theory that Article 412 contemplates a summary procedure.
First of all, Article 412 is a substantive law that provides as follows:
No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without a judicial order.
It does not provide for a specific procedure of law to be followed except to say that the corrections or changes must be effected by judicial order. As such, it
cannot be gleaned therefrom that the procedure contemplated for obtaining such judicial order is summary in nature.
Secondly, it is important to note that Article 412 uses both the terms corrected and changed. In its ordinary sense, to correct means to make or set right; to
remove the faults or errors from lxiv[44] while to change means to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a
substitute.lxv[45] The provision neither qualifies as to the kind of entry to be changed or corrected nor does it distinguish on the basis of the effect that the
correction or change may have. Hence, it is proper to conclude that all entries in the civil register may be changed or corrected under Article 412. What are
the entries in the civil register? We need not go further than Articles 407 and 408 of the same title to find the answer.
Art. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
Art. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7)
legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14)
judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
It is beyond doubt that the specific matters covered by the preceding provisions include not only status but also nationality. Therefore, the Ty Kong Tin
pronouncement that Article 412 does not contemplate matters that may affect civil status, nationality or citizenship is erroneous. This interpretation has the
effect of isolating Article 412 from the rest of the articles in Title XVI, Book I of the New Civil Code, in clear contravention of the rule of statutory construction
that a statute must always be construed as a whole such that the particular meaning to be attached to any word or phrase is ascertained from the context and
the nature of the subject treated. lxvi[46]
Thirdly, Republic Act No. 9048lxvii[47] which was passed by Congress on February 8, 2001 substantially amended Article 412 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. - No entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the
concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
The above law speaks clearly. Clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil register are now to be corrected and changed without need of a judicial
order and by the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general. The obvious effect is to remove from the ambit of Rule 108 the correction or changing of
such errors in entries of the civil register. Hence, what is left for the scope of operation of Rule 108 are substantial changes and corrections in entries of the
civil register. This is precisely the opposite of what Ty Kong Tin and other cases of its genre had said, perhaps another indication that it was not sound doctrine
after all.

17

It may be very well said that Republic Act No. 9048 is Congress response to the confusion wrought by the failure to delineate as to what exactly is that socalled summary procedure for changes or corrections of a harmless or innocuous nature as distinguished from that appropriate adversary proceeding
for changes or corrections of a substantial kind. For we must admit that though we have constantly referred to an appropriate adversary proceeding, we
have failed to categorically state just what that procedure is. Republic Act No. 9048 now embodies that summary procedure while Rule 108 is that
appropriate adversary proceeding. Be that as it may, the case at bar cannot be decided on the basis of Republic Act No. 9048 which has prospective
application. Hence, the necessity for the preceding treatise.
II. The petitioners contend that the private respondents have no cause of action to bring the cases below as Article 171 of the Family Code allows the heirs of
the father to bring an action to impugn the legitimacy of his children only after his death. lxviii[48]
Article 171 provides:
The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the preceding article only in the following cases:
(1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing this action;
(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint, without having desisted therefrom; or
(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.
Petitioners contention is without merit.
In the recent case of Babiera vs. Catotal,lxix[49] we upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals that affirmed the judgment of the RTC of Lanao del Norte
declaring the birth certificate of one Teofista Guinto as null and void ab initio, and ordering the Local Civil Registrar of Iligan City to cancel the same from the
Registry of Live Births. We ruled therein that private respondent Presentacion Catotal, child of spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa, had the
requisite standing to initiate an action to cancel the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera, another alleged child of the same spouses because she is the one who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. lxx[50]
We likewise held therein that:
x x x Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case. A close reading of the provision shows that it applies to instances in which the father
impugns the legitimacy of his wifes child. The provision, however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of the mother. The present case
alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. In other words, the prayer therein is not to declare that petitioner is an illegitimate child of
Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the latters child at all. x x x. lxxi[51]
Similarly, we ruled in Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appealslxxii[52] that:
Petitioners insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code to the case at bench cannot be sustained. x x x.
xxx

xxx

x x x.

A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a child is alleged not be the child of
nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife.
Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual
intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific
reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification

18

by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of
the prescriptive period within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate
court did not err when it refused to apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente are
contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in CabatbatLim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned decision is apropos, viz:
Petitioners recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Art. 170 of the Family Code] is not well taken. This legal provision refers to an action to impugn
legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents to claim
their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased,
but that she is not the decedents child at all. Being neither legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza
Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased. lxxiii[53]
III. Petitioners claim that private respondents cause of action had already prescribed as more than five (5) years had lapsed between the registration of the
latest birth among the petitioners in 1960 and the filing of the actions in December of 1992 and February of 1993. lxxiv[54]
We disagree. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, inasmuch as no law or rule specifically prescribes a fixed time for filing the special proceeding
under Rule 108 in relation to Article 412 of the New Civil Code, it is the following provision of the New Civil Code that applies:
Art. 1149. All other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code or in other laws must be brought within five years from the time the right of action
accrues.
The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of three (3) elements, namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever
means and under whatever law it arises or is created; b) an obligation on the part of the defendant to respect such right; and c) an act or omission on the part
of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff. It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action
has arisen.lxxv[55]
It is indubitable that private respondents have a cause of action. The last element of their cause of action, that is, the act of their father in falsifying the
entries in petitioners birth records, occurred more than thirty (30) years ago. Strictly speaking, it was upon this occurrence that private respondents right of
action or right to sue accrued. However, we must take into account the fact that it was only sometime in 1989 that private respondents discovered that they
in fact had a cause of action against petitioners who continue to use said falsified birth records.
Hence, it would result in manifest injustice if we were to deprive private respondents of their right to establish the truth about a fact, in this case, petitioners
true mother, and their real status, simply because they had discovered the dishonesty perpetrated upon them by their common father at a much later date.
This is especially true in the case of private respondents who, as their fathers legitimate children, did not have any reason to suspect that he would commit
such deception against them and deprive them of their sole right to inherit from their mothers (Keh Shiok Chengs) estate. It was only sometime in 1989 that
private respondents suspicions were aroused and confirmed. From that time until 1992 and 1993, less than five (5) years had lapsed.
Petitioners would have us reckon the five-year prescriptive period from the date of the registration of the last birth among the petitioners-siblings in 1960, and
not from the date private respondents had discovered the false entries in petitioners birth records in 1989. Petitioners base their position on the fact that birth
records are public documents, hence, the period of prescription for the right of action available to the private respondents started to run from the time of the
registration of their birth certificates in the Civil Registry.
We cannot agree with petitioners thinking on that point.
It is true that the books making up the Civil Register and all documents relating thereto are public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts
therein contained.lxxvi[56] Petitioners liken their birth records to land titles, public documents that serve as notice to the whole world. Unfortunately for the
petitioners, this analogy does not hold water. Unlike a title to a parcel of land, a persons parentage cannot be acquired by prescription. One is either born of a
particular mother or not. It is that simple.

19

IV. Finally, petitioners accuse private respondents of forum shopping. They enumerate the other actions filed by private respondents against them prior to the
filing of their Rule 108 petitions in the lower courts, as follows:
(1)
A criminal complaint for falsification of entries in the birth certificates filed against their father as principal and against defendants as alleged
accessories;
(2)

A petition for the cancellation of the naturalization certificate of their father, Lee Tek Sheng; and

(3)

A petition for partition of Keh Shiok Chengs estate. lxxvii[57]

According to the petitioners, all the three (3) actions above-mentioned, as well as the Rule 108 petitions, subject of the case before us, raise the common
issue of whether petitioners are the natural children of Keh Shiok Cheng or Tiu Chuan. They contend that in all these cases, the judge or hearing officer would
have to resolve this issue in order to determine whether or not to grant the relief prayed for. lxxviii[58]
Forum shopping is present when in the two or more cases pending there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action and reliefs sought. lxxix[59] Even a
cursory examination of the pleadings filed by private respondents in their various cases against petitioners would reveal that at the very least there is no
identity of rights or causes of action and reliefs prayed for. The present case has its roots in two (2) petitions filed under Rule 108, the purpose of which is to
correct and/or cancel certain entries in petitioners birth records. Suffice it to state, the cause of action in these Rule 108 petitions and the relief sought
therefrom are very different from those in the criminal complaint against petitioners and their father which has for its cause of action, the commission of a
crime as defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code, and which seeks the punishment of the accused; or the action for the cancellation of Lee Tek
Shengs naturalization certificate which has for its cause of action the commission by Lee Tek Sheng of an immoral act, and his ultimate deportation for its
object; or for that matter, the action for partition of Keh Shiok Chengs estate which has for its cause of action the private respondents right under the New
Civil Code to inherit from their mothers estate.
We therefore concur in the finding of the Court of Appeals that there is no forum shopping to speak of in the concept that this is described and contemplated
in Circular No. 28-91 of the Supreme Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 28, 1994 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 120587

January 20, 2004

20

MILAGROS M. BARCO, as the Natural Guardian and Guardian Ad Litem of MARY JOY ANN GUSTILO,
petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL SIXTEENTH DIVISION), REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (BR. 133-MAKATI), NCJR; THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
MAKATI; and NADINA G. MARAVILLA, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The story behind the present petition is a portrait of dysfunction. The familial situation of the parties is complicated, to say the least. The judicial conferment
of the status of illegitimacy on a daughter who is by law legitimate has created a tangled braid of various legal doctrines that, like the Gordian knot of yore, is
in this case ultimately unbound through one fell swoop of the sword.
On 24 December 1970, private respondent Nadina Maravilla ("Nadina") married Francisco Maravilla ("Francisco"). By February of 1977, the spouses had opted
to live separately, 1 and in February of the following year they obtained an ecclesiastical annulment of marriage issued by the Catholic Diocese of Bacolod City. 2
On 9 June 1978, Nadina gave birth to a daughter named June Salvacion ("June") in Makati, Metro Manila. Junes birth certificate listed Francisco Maravilla as
the father, and Maravilla as the childs surname. 3 Nadina signed the birth certificate shortly after it was accomplished.
Despite the notation in Junes birth certificate, Nadina subsequently claimed that all along, the real father of her child was Armando Gustilo ("Gustilo"), a
former Congressman with whom she maintained a relationship. At the time of Junes birth, Gustilo was married to one Consuelo Caraycong, who would later
perish in the MV Don Juan naval accident of 1981. 4 On 21 August 1982, Nadina and Gustilo were married in the United States. 5 This marriage took place two
and a half years before Nadinas marriage to Francisco was alleged to have been annulled in the Philippines. On 12 March 1985, Nadina apparently was able to
obtain a judicial declaration annulling her marriage to Francisco. 6
On 17 March 1983, Nadina filed in her own name a Petition for Correction of Entries in the Certificate of Birth of her daughter June with the Regional Trial Court
("RTC") of Makati.7 Therein, she alleged that she had been living separately from her lawful spouse Francisco since February of 1977, and that Gustilo was the
real father of June.8 She claimed that she did not allow Francisco to have any sexual congress with her within the first 20 days of the three hundred days
preceding the birth of June.9 She prayed that the Local Civil Registrar of Makati be directed to correct the birth certificate of June to the effect that the latters
full name be made "June Salvacion C. Gustilo," and that the name of her father be changed from "Francisco Maravilla" to "Armando Gustilo." Notably, Francisco
affixed his signature to the Petition signifying his conformity thereto. 10
On 20 March 1983. Gustilo filed a "Constancia," wherein he acknowledged June as his daughter with Nadina, and that he was posing no objection to Nadinas
petition.11
The Petition was docketed as SP Proc. No. M-130. On 26 July 1983, the RTC, in accordance with Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, issued an Order setting the case
for hearing and directing that a copy of the order be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. On 7
September 1983, Nadina filed an Amended Petition,12 this time impleading Francisco and Gustilo as respondents. Correspondingly, the RTC amended the Order
on 22 September 1983 to reflect the additional impleaded parties. 13
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition on the ground that the RTC "had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and/or the
nature of th[e] suit."14 They cited various jurisprudence holding that only innocuous or clerical errors may be corrected under a Rule 108 petition for correction
of entries, and that the Petition seeks changes "are substantial and controversial in character which directly affect the filiation and legitimacy of petitioners
daughter."15 On 23 February 1984, the Motion to Dismiss was denied by the RTC, which also subsequently denied a Motion for Reconsideration thereto filed by
the Solicitor General.
On 7 January 1985, the RTC issued an Order ("RTC Order") granting the petition and ordering the requested corrections to be effected. The RTC considered the
claim of Nadina that she had relied completely on her uncle William R. Veto 16 to facilitate the preparation of Junes birth certificate, that it was through his
inadvertence that the mistaken entries were made, and that she was in intense physical discomfort when she had affixed her signature to the birth certificate

21

containing the incorrect entries. 17 The RTC also noted that Francisco had signified his conformity to the action by signing the original petition, and that Gustilo
had manifested through a Constancia dated 20 March 1983 that he was acknowledging June as his daughter and expressing no objection to the petition. 18
Gustilo died in 19 December 1986. 19 Two estate proceedings arose from his death, one lodged in Makati, 20 the other in Harris County, Texas. 21 Among the
participants in both estate proceedings was Jose Vicente Gustilo ("Jose Vicente"), allegedly a biological child of Gustilo. 22 On 5 March 1993, he filed with the
Court of Appeals a Petition23 seeking the annulment of the RTC Order of 7 January 1985 which had effected changes in the civil status of June. Jose Vicente
amended his Petition in July of 1993 to implead Nadina as an indispensable party. 24 In her Comment, Nadina countered that Jose Vicente had not sufficiently
proven that he was a child of Armando, and there was neither extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction that would justify the annulment of the RTC Order. 25 Nadina
also pointed out that the Makati intestate court had approved a compromise agreement wherein the parties had agreed that the only heirs of the decedent
Armando are "the surviving spouse, Nadina G. Gustilo, the daughter, June Salvacion G. Gustilo, the son, Jose Vicente Gustilo III, and another daughter, Mary
Joy Ann Gustilo."26 However, this compromise agreement was subsequently voided on petition by Jose Vicente to the Court of Appeals, on the ground that the
Civil Code prohibited compromise as to the civil status of persons. 27
After the Court of Appeals commenced hearings on the petition, petitioner Milagros Barco ("Barco"), on 11 January 1994, filed in her capacity as the natural
guardian and/or guardian ad litem of her daughter, Mary Joy Ann Gustilo ("Mary Joy"), a Motion for Intervention with a Complaint-in-Intervention attached
thereto.28 Barco alleged that Mary Joy had a legal interest in the annulment of the RTC Order as she was likewise fathered by Gustilo. In her Complaint-inIntervention, Barco claimed that she and Gustilo had maintained a relationship since 1967, and to them was born Mary Joy in 1977. 29 Barco also alleged that
she actually moved in with Gustilo after the death of the latters wife in 1980, and maintained her affair with Gustilo until 1983, when she was purportedly
supplanted by Nadina as Gustilos common-law companion after Gustilo had become gravely ill. 30
After the parties had filed their respective memoranda, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision on 13 March 1995, dismissing both the Petition and the
Complaint-in-Intervention.31 The appellate court held that neither Jose Vicente nor Barco were able to establish the existence of lack of jurisdiction and
extrinsic fraud, the two grounds that would justify the annulment of a final judgment. 32 It ruled that while Jose Vicente and Barco had not been made parties in
the Petition for Correction, the subsequent notice and publication of the Order setting the case for hearing served as constructive notice to all parties who
might have an interest to participate in the case. The publication of the Order conferred upon the RTC the jurisdiction to try and decide the case. 33 It also found
no merit in Jose Vicentes claim that he learned of the RTC Order only in November of 1992, pointing out that as early as 1987, he filed a pleading with the
intestate court alleging that Junes birth certificate had been amended to record the name of her true father. 34
Only the intervenor Barco filed a Motion for Reconsideration 35 of the Court of Appeals Decision, which the appellate court denied on 16 May 1995. 36 Thus,
Barco filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals Decision and the annulment of the 1985 RTC Order.
Before this Court, Barco assails that RTC Order on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. That was the same ground she invoked in the Court of Appeals.
Specifically, she raises the following issues:
1) Barco should have been made a party to the Nadinas petition and the failure to implead her deprived the RTC of jurisdiction;
2) This RTC could not have entertained Nadinas petition, since the Courts ruling in a long line of cases, beginning with Republic v. Valencia,37 that a
petition for correction of entries in the civil register is not limited to innocuous or clerical mistakes, applies only to citizenship cases;
3) The petition for correction was filed out of time, as Article 263 of the Civil Code of 1950 sets a prescriptive period for impugning the legitimacy of a
child which is one year from the recording of birth in the Civil Registry, if the husband should be in the same place, or in a proper case, any of his
heirs;
4) Nadinas petition should have been treated as a petition for change of name, which can only be filed by the person whose name is sought to be
changed;
5) The RTC Order contravenes the legal presumption that children born during the pendency of a marriage are legitimate and the rule that legitimate
children cannot adopt the surname of a person who is not their father; and

22

6) The RTC should have excluded as hearsay the Constancia allegedly signed by Gustilo and that the surrounding circumstances under which it was
issued gave reason to doubt its authenticity and credibility.
Interestingly, the questions that Barco raised would tickle the fancies of erudite civilists yearning for a challenge. However, the ultimate resolution of this case
hinges on whether the de rigueur requirements of the extraordinary remedy of annulment of judgment have been satisfied.
First, a brief revisit of the action to annul judgment.
The recourse is equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases, as where there is no available or other adequate remedy. Annulment of judgments is
a remedy long authorized and sanctioned in our jurisdiction. 38 As far back as 1918, this Court in Banco Espaol-Filipino v. Palanca 39 recognized the availability
of a direct attack of a final judgment on the ground that it is void for want of jurisdiction. In Reyes v. Datu40 we held that the validity of a final judgment or
order of the court may be attacked only by a direct action or proceeding or by motion in another case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Yet, it was only in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure that for the first time the procedure for the annulment of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil
cases of regional trial courts, through a petition before the Court of Appeals, was formally provided. Rule 47 thereof under which the procedure was integrated
incorporates settled jurisprudence on annulment of judgment.
Statutory basis for the remedy was laid way back in 1980, with the enactment of The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. 41 Section 9 thereof vests in the
Court of Appeals exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of the lower courts.
Section 2, Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly provides only two grounds for annulment of judgment, namely: extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction. This express limitation is significant since previous jurisprudence recognized other grounds as well. 42 The underlying reason is traceable to the
notion that annulling final judgments goes against the grain of finality of judgment. Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is
essential to an effective administration of justice that once a judgment has become final the issue or cause involved therein should be laid to rest. The basic
rule of finality of judgment is grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of
courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some definite date fixed by law. 43 Even if the rule on annulment of judgment is grounded
on equity, the relief is of an extraordinary character, and not as readily available as the remedies obtaining to a judgment that is not yet final.
There are two aspects of jurisdiction which are vital for disposition of this case - jurisdiction over the nature of the action or subject matter, and
jurisdiction over the parties.44 Barco claims that the RTC failed to satisfy both aspects of jurisdiction. She opines that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over
the parties due to the failure to implead her as a party to the petition for correction. On the other hand, the remaining issues that she raises as errors put into
question whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the subject matter of Nadinas petition.
We shall first tackle the question of whether the RTC had acquired jurisdiction over Barco and all other indispensable parties to the petition for correction.
The essential requisite for allowing substantial corrections of entries in the civil registry is that the true facts be established in an appropriate adversarial
proceeding. This is embodied in Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, which states:
Section 3. Parties When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
The Court of Appeals held that jurisdiction over the parties was properly acquired through the notice by publication effected in conformity with Section 4 of
Rule 108. Barco assails this holding and claims that the failure to implead her as a party to the petition for correction deprived the RTC of jurisdiction.
Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Section 3 of Rule 108. Her interest was affected by the petition for correction, as any judicial
determination that June was the daughter of Armando would affect her wards share in the estate of her father. It cannot be established whether Nadina knew
of Mary Joys existence at the time she filed the petition for correction. Indeed, doubt may always be cast as to whether a petitioner under Rule 108 would

23

know of all the parties whose interests may be affected by the granting of a petition. For example, a petitioner cannot be presumed to be aware of all the
legitimate or illegitimate offsprings of his/her spouse or paramour. The fact that Nadina amended her petition to implead Francisco and Gustilo indicates
earnest effort on her part to comply with Section 3 as quoted above.
Yet, even though Barco was not impleaded in the petition, the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that the defect was cured by compliance with Section 4,
Rule 108, which requires notice by publication, thus:
Section 4. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to
be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province.
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision would cover
even parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108, but were inadvertently left out. The Court of Appeals correctly noted:
The publication being ordered was in compliance with, and borne out by the Order of January 7, 1985. The actual publication of the September 22,
1983 Order, conferred jurisdiction upon the respondent court to try and decide the case. While "nobody appeared to oppose the instant petition"
during the December 6, 1984 hearing, that did not divest the court from its jurisdiction over the case and of its authority to continue trying the case.
For, the rule is well-settled, that jurisdiction, once acquired continues until termination of the case. 45
Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a thing and not against a person. 46 The decision on the petition binds not only the parties
thereto47 but the whole world.48 An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. 49 Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding
has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established. 50 It is the publication
of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. 51
Since the RTC properly acquired jurisdiction over the parties, what remains for determination is whether it had acquired jurisdiction over Nadinas cause of
action. It should be emphasized that jurisdiction over the nature of the action or the subject matter is conferred by law. This Courts recent holding in Durisol
Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals52 is instructive in this regard:
[I]t should be stressed that in a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, petitioner must show not merely an abuse of
jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction means absence of or no jurisdiction, that is, the court should not have
taken cognizance of the petition because the law does not vest it with jurisdiction over the subject matter. 53
The question of whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter can be answered simply by determining if on the basis of the complaint or petition the
court has, under the law, the power to hear and decide the case. Barcos remaining arguments are to be tested against this standard.
One of Barcos striking assertions is that the general rule still is that the jurisdiction of the court in the correction of entries in the civil register is limited to
innocuous or clerical mistakes, as what she insinuates as the apparent contrary holding in Republic v. Valencia54 applies only to citizenship cases.
Since the promulgation of the Valencia ruling in 1986 the Court has repeatedly ruled that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a
petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial
proceeding. Barco, by seeking to limit the application of the Valencia doctrine to citizenship cases, is flogging a dead horse. This argument was debunked in
subsequent cases,55 notably the recent case of Lee v. Court of Appeals.56 The exhaustive disquisition therein of Justice Sabino de Leon should preclude any
further arguments on the scope of Rule 108.
The Court in Lee acknowledged that there existed a line of decided cases, some of them decided after Valencia, stating that Rule 108 cannot be used to effect
substantial corrections in entries of the civil register. 57 The doctrine was traced back to the 1954 case of Ty Kong Tin v. Republic,58 the rationale of which the
Court reevaluated in Lee:

24

We venture to say now that the above pronouncements proceed from a wrong premise, that is, the interpretation that Article 412 pertains only to
clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature, effectively excluding from its domain, and the scope of its implementing rule, substantial changes
that may affect nationality, status, filiation and the like. Why the limited scope of Article 412? Unfortunately, Ty Kong Tin does not satisfactorily answer
this question except to opine that the procedure contemplated in Article 412 is summary in nature and cannot, therefore, cover cases involving
controversial issues. Subsequent cases have merely echoed the Ty Kong Tin doctrine without, however, shedding light on the matter.
The flaw in Ty Kong Tin lies in its theory that Article 412 contemplates a summary procedure.
First of all, Article 412 is a substantive law that provides as follows:
"No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without a judicial order."
It does not provide for a specific procedure of law to be followed except to say that the corrections or changes must be effected by judicial order. As
such, it cannot be gleaned therefrom that the procedure contemplated for obtaining such judicial order is summary in nature.
Secondly, it is important to note that Article 412 uses both the terms "corrected" and "changed." In its ordinary sense, to correct means "to make or
set right;" "to remove the faults or errors from" while to change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something
that serves as a substitute". The provision neither qualifies as to the kind of entry to be changed or corrected nor does it distinguish on the basis of the
effect that the correction or change may have. Hence, it is proper to conclude that all entries in the civil register may be changed or corrected under
Article 412. What are the entries in the civil register? We need not go further than Articles 407 and 408 of the same title to find the answer.
"Art. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register."
"Art. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name."
It is beyond doubt that the specific matters covered by the preceding provisions include not only status but also nationality. Therefore, the Ty Kong Tin
pronouncement that Article 412 does not contemplate matters that may affect civil status, nationality or citizenship is erroneous. This interpretation
has the effect of isolating Article 412 from the rest of the articles in Title XVI, Book I of the New Civil Code, in clear contravention of the rule of
statutory construction that a statute must always be construed as a whole such that the particular meaning to be attached to any word or phrase is
ascertained from the context and the nature of the subject treated. 59
Lee also points out that Republic Act No. 9048, enacted in 2001, has effectively changed the nature of a proceeding under Rule 108. Under this new law,
"clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname" may now be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal registrar or
consul general, without need of any judicial order. The obvious effect is to remove from the ambit of Rule 108 the correction or changing of such errors in
entries of the civil register. Hence, what is left for the scope of operation of Rule 108 are substantial changes and corrections in entries of the civil register. 60
It may be very well said that Republic Act No. 9048 is Congresss response to the confusion wrought by the failure to delineate as to what exactly is
that so-called summary procedure for changes or corrections of a harmless or innocuous nature as distinguished from that appropriate adversary
proceeding for changes or corrections of a substantial kind. For we must admit that though we have constantly referred to an appropriate adversary
proceeding, we have failed to categorically state just what that procedure is. Republic Act No. 9048 now embodies that summary procedure while Rule
108 is that appropriate adversary proceeding. xxx61

25

Republic Act No. 9048 may not find application in this case, yet it is clearly another indicium of how entrenched the Valencia ruling is today. With the
enactment of the law, the legislature acknowledged the potency of the ruling. To repeat, substantial corrections to the civil status of persons recorded in the
civil registry may be effected through the filing of a petition under Rule 108. Any further attempt to limit the scope of application of Rule 108 runs against the
wall of judicial precedent cemented by legislative affirmation.
Next, Barco argues that the petition for correction had prescribed under the Civil Code; and that the petition for correction should be treated as a petition for
change of name which can only be filed by the person whose name is sought to be changed. These arguments can be decided jointly. They both are not well
taken as they cannot allude to a lack of jurisdiction that would render the RTC Order subject to annulment.
Assuming arguendo that Nadinas petition for correction had prescribed and/or that the action seeking the change of name can only be filed by the party
whose name is sought to be changed, this does not alter the reality that under the law the Makati RTC had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition
for correction. The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the applicable law at the time, clearly conferred on the Makati RTC exclusive original jurisdiction in all
civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. 62 In complementation of grant of jurisdiction, Section 1 of Rule 108
provides that the verified petition to the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto should be filed with the Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
Prescription and lack of capacity to bring action cannot be ignored by a court of law in properly resolving an action, to the extent that a finding that any of
these grounds exist will be sufficient to cause the dismissal of the action. 63 Yet, the existence of these grounds does not oust the court from its power to decide
the case. Jurisdiction cannot be acquired through, waived, enlarged or diminished by any act or omission of the parties. 64 Contrariwise, lack of capacity to sue
and prescriptions as grounds for dismissal of an action may generally be rendered unavailing, if not raised within the proper period. 65
It thus follows that assuming that the petition for correction had prescribed, or that Nadina lacked the capacity to file the action which led to the change of her
daughters name, the fact that the RTC granted the Order despite the existence of these two grounds only characterizes the decision as erroneous. An
erroneous judgment is one though rendered according to the course and practice of the court is contrary to law. 66 It is not a void judgment.67
As for Barcos remaining arguments, they similarly fail, as the worst they could establish is that the RTC Order is an erroneous judgment.
Barco correctly notes, however, that the RTC erred in directing that the name of Nadinas daughter be changed from "June Salvacion Maravilla" to "June
Salvacion Gustilo." Following the trial courts determination that Gustilo was the father of June, but prescinding from the conclusive presumption of legitimacy
for the nonce assuming it could be done, the child would obviously be illegitimate. The applicable laws mandate that June, as an illegitimate child, should bear
the surname of her mother, and not the father. 68 From another perspective, the RTCs error in ordering the change of name is merely an error in the exercise of
jurisdiction which neither affects the courts jurisdiction over Nadinas petition nor constitutes a ground for the annulment of a final judgment. As the seminal
case of Herrera v. Barretto69 explains:
xxx Jurisdiction should therefore be distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction. The authority to decide a cause at all, and not the decision rendered
therein, is what makes up jurisdiction. Where there is jurisdiction of the person and subject matter xxx the decision of all other questions arising in the
case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction.70
In the same vein, it is of no moment that the RTC Order contravenes the legal presumption accorded June of being the legitimate child of Francisco and
Nadina.71 A review of the records does indicate the insufficiency of the evidence offered to defeat the presumption, against which the only evidence admissible
is the physical impossibility of the husbands having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the
birth of the child.72 It seems that the RTC relied primarily on the testimony of Nadina in adjudging that Gustilo, and not Francisco, was the father of June. Yet,
Article 256 of the Civil Code renders ineffectual any pronouncement against legitimacy made by the mother. 73 The testimony proffered by the mother has no
probative value as regards Junes paternity. The RTCs cognizance of Gustilos Constancia might likewise be subject to critical scrutiny. 74 But the Court is now
precluded from reviewing the RTCs appreciation of the evidence, however erroneous it may be, because the Order is already final. The RTCs possible
misappreciation of evidence is again at most, an error in the exercise of jurisdiction, which is different from lack of jurisdiction. These purported errors do not
extend to the competence of the RTC to decide the matter and as such does not constitute a valid ground to annul the final order.

26

The law sanctions the annulment of certain judgments which, though final, are ultimately void. Annulment of judgment is an equitable principle not because it
allows a party-litigant another opportunity to reopen a judgment that has long lapsed into finality but because it enables him to be discharged from the burden
of being bound to a judgment that is an absolute nullity to begin with. The inevitable conclusion is that the RTC Order, despite its apparent flaws, is not null
and void, and thus cannot be annulled. Consequently, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in issuing the assailed decision.
This Court has been constrained in the past to leave erroneous decisions as they were. 75 Our fealty to justice in its pristine form the upholding of "right" over
"wrong" is equipoised with our adherence to due process, and the rules that emanate from that principle. The Court takes great care in drafting rules of
procedure so that the axioms that govern the legal battleground may live up to Justice Frankfurters approximation of due process as "the embodiment of the
sporting idea of fair play."76 Due process dictates that litigants be afforded a reasonable opportunity to attack erroneous judgments and be shielded from the
adverse effects of void judgments. Due process likewise demands that a party, after trekking the long road of litigation should be permitted to enjoy the fruits
of an auspicious final judgment. Absent any convincing demonstration that the RTC Order is patently null and void, there is no reason under law and
jurisprudence to upset it, given the reality that it has long become final.
WHEREFORE, the above premises considered, the Petition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 186027

December 8, 2010

REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
vs.
MERLYN MERCADERA through her Attorney-in-Fact, EVELYN M. OGA, Respondent.

Petitioner,

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the December 9, 2008 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA G.R. CV No. 00568-MIN, which affirmed the
September 28, 2005 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 8 (RTC), in a petition for correction of entries, docketed as Special Proceedings
No. R-3427 (SP No. R-3427), filed by respondent Merlyn Mercadera (Mercadera) under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The Factual and Procedural Antecedents
On June 6, 2005, Merlyn Mercadera (Mercadera), represented by her sister and duly constituted Attorney-in-Fact, Evelyn M. Oga (Oga), sought the correction of
her given name as it appeared in her Certificate of Live Birth - from Marilyn L. Mercadera to Merlyn L. Mercadera before the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
Dipolog City pursuant to Republic Act No. 9048 (R.A. No. 9048).2

27

Under R.A. No. 9048, the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general, as the case may be, is now authorized to effect the change of first name or
nickname and the correction of clerical or typographical errors in civil registry entries. "Under said law, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is
now primarily lodged with administrative officers. The law now excludes the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 until and unless an
administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied" 3 and removes "correction or changing of clerical errors in entries of the civil
register from the ambit of Rule 108." Hence, what is left for the scope of operation of the rules are substantial changes and corrections in entries of the civil
register.4
The Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City, however, refused to effect the correction unless a court order was obtained "because the Civil Registrar
therein is not yet equipped with a permanent appointment before he can validly act on petitions for corrections filed before their office as mandated by
Republic Act 9048."5
Mercadera was then constrained to file a Petition For Correction of Some Entries as Appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth under Rule 108 before the
Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City (RTC). The petition was docketed as Special Proceedings No. R-3427 (SP No. R-3427). Section 2 of Rule 108 reads:
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or
corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from
the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil
interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name. [Underscoring supplied]
Upon receipt of the petition for correction of entry, the RTC issued an order, dated June 10, 2005, which reads:
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, notice is hereby given that the hearing of said petition is set on JULY 26, 2005 at 8:30 oclock in the
morning, at the Session Hall of Branch 8, this Court, Bulwagan ng Katarungan, Dipolog City, on which date, time and place, anyone appearing to contest the
petition shall state in writing his grounds there[for], serving a copy thereof to the petitioner and likewise file copies with this Court on or before the said date
of hearing.
Let this order be published at the expense of petitioner once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper edited and published in Dipolog City and
of general circulation therein, the City of Dapitan and the province of Zamboanga del Norte, and copies hereof be furnished to the Office of the Solicitor
General of (sic) 134 Amorsolo St., Legaspi Village, Makati, Metro Manila, the City Civil Registrar of Dipolog, and posted on the bulletin boards of the City Hall of
Dipolog, the Provincial Capitol Building, and of this Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for the Republic of the Philippines and deputized the Office of the City Prosecutor to assist in
the case only on the very day of the hearing. This prompted the court to reset the hearing on September 5, 2005. On said day, there being no opposition,
counsel for Mercadera moved for leave of court to present evidence ex parte. Without any objection from the City Prosecutor, the trial court designated the
branch clerk of court to receive evidence for Mercadera.
On September 15, 2005, the testimony of Oga and several photocopies of documents were formally offered and marked as evidence to prove that Mercadera
never used the name "Marilyn" in any of her public or private transactions. On September 26, 2005, the RTC issued an order 6 admitting Exhibits "A" to "I" 7 and
their submarkings, as relevant to the resolution of the case.
The following facts were gathered from documentary evidence and the oral testimony of Oga, as reported by the lower court:
Petitioner Merlyn M. Mercadera was born on August 19, 1970 at Dipolog City. She is the daughter of spouses Tirso U. Mercadera and Norma C. Lacquiao. The
fact of her birth was reported to the Office of the City Civil Registrar of Dipolog City on September 8, 1970. It was recorded on page 68, book no. 9, in the

28

Registry of Births of said civil registry. In the certification of birth dated May 9, 2005 issued by the same registry, her given name appears as Marilyn and not
Merlyn (Exhibit "C").
On September 29, 1979, petitioner was baptized according to the rites and ceremonies of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines. As reflected in her
certificate of baptism issued by said church, she was baptized by the name Merlyn L. Mercadera (Exhibit "D").
In her elementary diploma issued by the Paaralang Sentral ng Estaka, Dipolog City; her high school diploma issued by the Zamboanga del Norte School of Arts
and Trades, Dipolog City; and college diploma issued by the Silliman University, Dumaguete City, where she earned the degree of Bachelor of Secondary
Education, uniformly show her name as Merlyn L. Mercadera (Exhibits "E", "F", and "G").
Presently, she is working in U.P. Mindanao, Buhangin, Davao City. Her certificate of membership issued by the Government Service Insurance System also
bears his [sic] complete name as Merlyn Lacquiao Mercadera (Exhibit "H").
When she secured an authenticated copy of her certificate of live birth from the National Statistics Office, she discovered that her given name as registered is
Marilyn and not Merlyn; hence, this petition.
In its September 28, 2005 Decision, 8 the RTC granted Mercaderas petition and directed the Office of the City Civil Registrar of Dipolog City to correct her name
appearing in her certificate of live birth, Marilyn Lacquiao Mercadera, to MERLYN Lacquiao Mercadera. Specifically, the dispositive portion of the RTC Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Office of the City Civil Registrar of Dipolog City is hereby directed to correct the given name of
petitioner appearing in her certificate of live birth, from Marilyn Lacquiao Mercadera to MERLYN Lacquiao Mercadera.
In a four-page decision, the RTC ruled that the documentary evidence presented by Mercadera sufficiently supported the circumstances alleged in her petition.
Considering that she had used "Merlyn" as her given name since childhood until she discovered the discrepancy in her Certificate of Live Birth, the RTC was
convinced that the correction was justified.
The OSG timely interposed an appeal praying for the reversal and setting aside of the RTC decision. It mainly anchored its appeal on the availment of
Mercadera of the remedy and procedure under Rule 108. In its Brief 9 filed with the CA, the OSG argued that the lower court erred (1) in granting the prayer for
change of name in a petition for correction of entries; and (2) in admitting the photocopies of documentary evidence and hearsay testimony of Oga.
For the OSG, the correction in the spelling of Mercaderas given name might seem innocuous enough to grant but "it is in truth a material correction as it
would modify or increase substantive rights."10 What the lower court actually allowed was a change of Mercaderas given name, which would have been proper
had she filed a petition under Rule 103 and proved any of the grounds therefor. The lower court, "may not substitute one for the other for purposes of
expediency."11 Further, because Mercadera failed to invoke a specific ground recognized by the Rules, the lower courts order in effect allowed the change of
ones name in the civil registry without basis.
The CA was not persuaded. In its December 9, 2008 Decision,
assessed the controversy in this wise:

12

the appellate court affirmed the questioned RTC Order in CA-G.R. CV No. 00568-MIN. The CA

Appellants insistence that the petition should have been filed under Rule 103 and not Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is off the mark. This Court does not
entertain any doubt that the petition before the trial court was one for the correction on an entry in petitioners Certificate of Live Birth and not one in which
she sought to change her name. In Co v. Civil Register of Manila, G.R. No. 138496, February 23, 2004, the High Court reiterated the distinction between the
phrases "to correct" and "to change." Said the High Court:
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from." To change means "to replace something with something else of the same
kind or with something that serves as a substitute. Article 412 of the New Civil Code does not qualify as to the kind of entry to be changed or corrected or

29

distinguished on the basis of the effect that the correction or change may be. Such entries include not only those clerical in nature but also substantial errors.
After all, the role of the Court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is to ascertain the truths about the facts recorded therein.
That appellee sought to correct an entry and not to change her name is patent to the Court from the allegations in her petition, specifically, paragraphs 7 and
8 thereof
xxxx
Anent the RTCs error in admitting the photocopies of Mercaderas documentary evidence and in vesting probative value to Ogas testimony, the CA cited the
well-established rule that "evidence not objected to may be admitted and may be validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment." 13
On March 6, 2009, the OSG filed the present petition. On behalf of Mercadera, the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) filed its Comment 14 on July 3, 2009. The OSG
declined to file a reply claiming that its petition already contained an exhaustive discussion on the following assigned errors: 15
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN GRANTING THE CHANGE IN RESPONDENTS NAME UNDER RULE 103.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN CONSIDERING SECONDARY EVIDENCE.
Rule 103 procedurally governs judicial petitions for change of given name or surname, or both, pursuant to Article 376 of the Civil Code. 16 This rule provides
the procedure for an independent special proceeding in court to establish the status of a person involving his relations with others, that is, his legal position in,
or with regard to, the rest of the community. 17 In petitions for change of name, a person avails of a remedy to alter the "designation by which he is known and
called in the community in which he lives and is best known." 18 When granted, a persons identity and interactions are affected as he bears a new "label or
appellation for the convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of, or dealing with him." 19 Judicial permission for a change of name aims
to prevent fraud and to ensure a record of the change by virtue of a court decree.
The proceeding under Rule 103 is also an action in rem which requires publication of the order issued by the court to afford the State and all other interested
parties to oppose the petition. When complied with, the decision binds not only the parties impleaded but the whole world. As notice to all, publication serves
to indefinitely bar all who might make an objection. "It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the
court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it."20
Essentially, a change of name does not define or effect a change of ones existing family relations or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom. It does not
alter ones legal capacity or civil status. 21 However, "there could be instances where the change applied for may be open to objection by parties who already
bear the surname desired by the applicant, not because he would thereby acquire certain family ties with them but because the existence of such ties might
be erroneously impressed on the public mind." 22 Hence, in requests for a change of name, "what is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance
of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced x x x mindful of the consequent results in the event of
its grant x x x."23
Rule 108, on the other hand, implements judicial proceedings for the correction or cancellation of entries in the civil registry pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil
Code.24 Entries in the civil register refer to "acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons," 25 also as enumerated in Article 408 of the
same law.26 Before, only mistakes or errors of a harmless and innocuous nature in the entries in the civil registry may be corrected under Rule 108 and
substantial errors affecting the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party are beyond the ambit of the rule. In the abandoned case of Chua Wee v.
Republic,27 this Court declared that,

30

x x x if Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the
understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of
marriage, said Rule 108 would thereby become unconstitutional for it would be increasing or modifying substantive rights, which changes are not authorized
under Article 412 of the new Civil Code."
In the latter case of Wong v. Republic,28 however, Justice Vicente Abad Santos, in a separate concurrence, opined that Article 412, which Rule 108 implements,
contemplates all kinds of issues and all types of procedures because "the provision does not say that it applies only to non-controversial issues and that the
procedure to be used is summary in nature." In Republic v. Judge De la Cruz, 29 the dissenting opinion penned by Justice Pacifico De Castro echoed the same
view:
It is not accurate to say that Rule 108 would be rendered unconstitutional if it would allow the correction of more than mere harmless clerical error, as it would
thereby increase or modify substantive rights which the Constitution expressly forbids because Article 412 of the Civil Code, the substantive law sought to be
implemented by Rule 108, allows only the correction of innocuous clerical errors not those affecting the status of persons. As was stressed in the dissent on
the aforesaid Wong Case, Article 412 does not limit in its express terms nor by mere implication, the correction authorized by it to that of mere clerical errors.
x x x it would be reasonable and justified to rule that Article 412 contemplates of correction of erroneous entry of whatever nature, procedural safeguards
having only to be provided for, as was the manifest purpose of Rule 108.
x x x proceedings for the correction of erroneous entry should not be considered as establishing one's status in a legal manner conclusively beyond dispute or
controversion, x x x the books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto x x x shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein
contained. Hence, the status as corrected would not have a superior quality for evidentiary purpose. Moreover, the correction should not imply a change of
status but a mere rectification of error to make the matter corrected speak for the truth. x x x
Finally in Republic v. Valencia, 30 the above stated views were adopted by this Court insofar as even substantial errors or matters in a civil registry may be
corrected and the true facts established, provided the parties aggrieved avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. "If the purpose of the
petition is merely to correct the clerical errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, the court may, under a summary procedure, issue
an order for the correction of a mistake. However, as repeatedly construed, changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, as well as
sex, are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings depending upon the nature of the issues
involved. Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial in character and should be threshed out in a proper action depending
upon the nature of the issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented and evidence is
submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted x x x." 31 "Where such a change is ordered, the Court will not be
establishing a substantive right but only correcting or rectifying an erroneous entry in the civil registry as authorized by law. In short, Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court provides only the procedure or mechanism for the proper enforcement of the substantive law embodied in Article 412 of the Civil Code and so does not
violate the Constitution."32
In the case at bench, the OSG posits that the conversion from "MARILYN" to "MERLYN" is not a correction of an innocuous error but a material correction
tantamount to a change of name which entails a modification or increase in substantive rights. For the OSG, this is a substantial error that requires compliance
with the procedure under Rule 103, and not Rule 108.
It appears from these arguments that there is, to some extent, confusion over the scope and application of Rules 103 and Rule 108. Where a "change of
name" will necessarily be reflected by the corresponding correction in an entry, as in this case, the functions of both rules are often muddled. While there is no
clear-cut rule to categorize petitions under either rule, this Court is of the opinion that a resort to the basic distinctions between the two rules with respect to
alterations in a persons registered name can effectively clear the seeming perplexity of the issue. Further, a careful evaluation of circumstances alleged in the
petition itself will serve as a constructive guide to determine the propriety of the relief prayed for.
The "change of name" contemplated under Article 376 and Rule 103 must not be confused with Article 412 and Rule 108. A change of ones name under Rule
103 can be granted, only on grounds provided by law. In order to justify a request for change of name, there must be a proper and compelling reason for the
change and proof that the person requesting will be prejudiced by the use of his official name. To assess the sufficiency of the grounds invoked therefor, there
must be adversarial proceedings. 33

31

In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry may be raised. Considering that the enumeration
in Section 2, Rule 10834 also includes "changes of name," the correction of a patently misspelled name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it to say, not all
alterations allowed in ones name are confined under Rule 103. Corrections for clerical errors may be set right under Rule 108.
This rule in "names," however, does not operate to entirely limit Rule 108 to the correction of clerical errors in civil registry entries by way of a summary
proceeding. As explained above, Republic v. Valencia is the authority for allowing substantial errors in other entries like citizenship, civil status, and paternity,
to be corrected using Rule 108 provided there is an adversary proceeding. "After all, the role of the Court under Rule 108 is to ascertain the truths about the
facts recorded therein."35
A serious scrutiny of this petition reveals a glaring lack of support to the OSGs assumption that Mercadera intended to change her name under Rule 103. All
that the petition propounded are swift arguments on the alleged procedural flaws of Mercaderas petition before the RTC. In the same vein, no concrete
contention was brought up to convince this Court that the dangers sought to be prevented by the adversarial proceedings prescribed in Rule 103 are
attendant in this case. Instead, the RTC found the documents presented by Mercadera to have satisfactorily shown that she had been known as MERLYN ever
since, discounting the possibility that confusion, or a modification of substantive rights might arise. Truth be told, not a single oppositor appeared to contest
the petition despite full compliance with the publication requirement.
Thus, the petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC correctly falls under Rule 108 as it simply sought a correction of a misspelled given name. To correct
simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from." To change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with
something that serves as a substitute." 36 From the allegations in her petition, Mercadera clearly prayed for the lower court "to remove the faults or error" from
her registered given name "MARILYN," and "to make or set aright" the same to conform to the one she grew up to, "MERLYN." It does not take a complex
assessment of said petition to learn of its intention to simply correct the clerical error in spelling. Mercadera even attempted to avail of the remedy allowed by
R.A. No. 9048 but she unfortunately failed to enjoy the expediency which the law provides and was constrained to take court action to obtain relief. Thus, the
petition was clear in stating:
7. That as such, there is a need to correct her given name as appearing in her Certificate of Live Birth from MARILYN to MERLYN to conform to her true
and correct given name that she had been using and had been known within the community x x x.
8. That herein petitioner went to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City and requested them to effect such correction in her Certificate of
Live Birth, however, the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City will not effect such correction unless an order is obtained by herein petitioner from this
Honorable Court because the Local Civil Registrar therein is not yet equipped with permanent appointment before he can validly act on petitions for
corrections filed before their office as mandated by Republic Act 9048, hence the filing of this petition. [Emphases supplied]
Indeed, there are decided cases involving mistakes similar to Mercaderas case which recognize the same a harmless error. In Yu v. Republic37 it was held that
"to change Sincio to Sencio which merely involves the substitution of the first vowel i in the first name into the vowel e amounts merely to the righting of
a clerical error." In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic,38 it was held that the change of petitioners name from "Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayu" to "Emperatriz Labayo"
was a mere innocuous alteration wherein a summary proceeding was appropriate. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto,
the correction involved the substitution of the letters "ch" for the letter "d," so that what appears as "Midael" as given name would read "Michael." In the latter
case, this Court, with the agreement of the Solicitor General, ruled that the error was plainly clerical, such that, "changing the name of the child from Midael
C. Mazon to Michael C. Mazon cannot possibly cause any confusion, because both names can be read and pronounced with the same rhyme (tugma) and
tone (tono, tunog, himig)."39
In this case, the use of the letter "a" for the letter "e," and the deletion of the letter "i," so that what appears as "Marilyn" would read as "Merlyn" is patently a
rectification of a name that is clearly misspelled. The similarity between "Marilyn" and "Merlyn" may well be the object of a mix- up that blemished
Mercaderas Certificate of Live Birth until her adulthood, thus, her interest to correct the same.
The CA did not allow Mercadera the change of her name. What it did allow was the correction of her misspelled given name which she had been using ever
since she could remember.

32

It is worthy to note that the OSGs reliance on Republic vs. Hernandez 40 is flawed. In that case, this Court said that "a change in a given name is a substantial
matter" and that it "cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding that would in effect render it a mere incident or an offshoot of another special
proceeding." While this Court stands true to the ruling in Hernandez, the said pronouncement therein was stated in a different tenor and, thus, inapplicable to
this case. Hernandez was decided against an entirely different factual milieu. There was a petition for adoption that must not have led to a corresponding
change in the adoptees given name because "it would be procedurally erroneous to employ a petition for adoption to effect a change of name in the absence
of a corresponding petition for the latter relief at law." In the present case, the issue is the applicability of either Rule 103 or Rule 108 and the relief sought by
Mercadera can in fact be granted under the latter. This Court finds no attempt on the part of Mercadera to render the requirements under Rule 103 illusory as
in Hernandez.
Besides, granting that Rule 103 applies to this case and that compliance with the procedural requirements under Rule 108 falls short of what is mandated, it
still cannot be denied that Mercadera complied with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding before the lower court. The publication and posting of the
notice of hearing in a newspaper of general circulation and the notices sent to the OSG and the Local Civil Registry are sufficient indicia of an adverse
proceeding. The fact that no one opposed the petition, including the OSG, did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the same and did not make the
proceeding less adversarial in nature. Considering that the OSG did not oppose the petition and the motion to present its evidence ex parte when it had the
opportunity to do so, it cannot now complain that the proceedings in the lower court were procedurally defective. Indeed, it has become unnecessary to
further discuss the reasons why the CA correctly affirmed the findings of the lower court especially in admitting and according probative value to the evidence
presented by Mercadera.
WHEREFORE, the December 9, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00568-MIN is AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 170340

June 29, 2007

REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
petitioner,
vs.
CARLITO I. KHO, MICHAEL KHO, MERCY NONA KHO-FORTUN, HEDDY MOIRA KHO-SERRANO, KEVIN DOGMOC KHO (Minor), and KELLY DOGMOC
KHO (Minor), respondents.
DECISION

33

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Challenged via petition for review on certiorari is the October 27, 2005 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 78124 which affirmed the
September 4, 2002 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Butuan City, Branch 5 granting the prayer of respondents Carlito I. Kho (Carlito), Michael Kho,
Mercy Nona Kho-Fortun, and Heddy Moira Kho-Serrano for the correction of entries in their birth certificates as well as those of Carlitos minor children Kevin
and Kelly Dogmoc Kho.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
On February 12, 2001, Carlito and his siblings Michael, Mercy Nona and Heddy Moira filed before the RTC of Butuan City a verified petition for correction of
entries in the civil registry of Butuan City to effect changes in their respective birth certificates. Carlito also asked the court in behalf of his minor children,
Kevin and Kelly, to order the correction of some entries in their birth certificates.
In the case of Carlito, he requested the correction in his birth certificate of the citizenship of his mother to "Filipino" instead of "Chinese," as well as the
deletion of the word "married" opposite the phrase "Date of marriage of parents" because his parents, Juan Kho and Epifania Inchoco (Epifania), were allegedly
not legally married.
The same request to delete the "married" status of their parents from their respective birth certificates was made by Carlitos siblings Michael, Mercy Nona,
and Heddy Moira.
With respect to the birth certificates of Carlitos children, he prayed that the date of his and his wifes marriage be corrected from April 27, 1989 to January 21,
2000, the date appearing in their marriage certificate.
The Local Civil Registrar of Butuan City was impleaded as respondent.
On April 23, 2001, Carlito et al. filed an Amended Petition 3 in which it was additionally prayed that Carlitos second name of "John" be deleted from his record
of birth; and that the name and citizenship of Carlitos father in his (Carlitos) marriage certificate be corrected from "John Kho" to "Juan Kho" and "Filipino" to
"Chinese," respectively.
As required, the petition was published for three consecutive weeks 4 in Mindanao Daily Patrol-CARAGA, a newspaper of general circulation, after which it was
set for hearing on August 9, 2001.
In a letter of June 18, 2001 addressed to the trial court, the city civil registrar 5 stated her observations and suggestions to the proposed corrections in the birth
records of Carlito and his siblings but interposed no objections to the other amendments.
On the scheduled hearing of the petition on August 9, 2001, only the counsel for respondents appeared as the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) had yet to
enter its appearance for the city civil registrar. The trial court thus reset the hearing to October 9, 2001. 6 On September 14, 2001, 7 the OSG entered its
appearance with an authorization to the city prosecutor of Butuan City to appear in the case and render assistance to it (the OSG).
On January 31, 2002, respondents presented documentary evidence showing compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of the petition. They also
presented testimonial evidence consisting of the testimonies of Carlito and his mother, Epifania. During the same hearing, an additional correction in the birth
certificates of Carlitos children was requested to the effect that the first name of their mother be rectified from "Maribel" to "Marivel."
By Decision8 of September 4, 2002, the trial court directed the local civil registrar of Butuan City to correct the entries in the record of birth of Carlito, as
follows: (1) change the citizenship of his mother from "Chinese" to "Filipino"; (2) delete "John" from his name; and (3) delete the word "married" opposite the
date of marriage of his parents. The last correction was ordered to be effected likewise in the birth certificates of respondents Michael, Mercy Nona, and Heddy
Moira.

34

Additionally, the trial court ordered the correction of the birth certificates of the minor children of Carlito to reflect the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel
Dogmoc (Marivel) as January 21, 2000, instead of April 27, 1989, and the name "Maribel" as "Marivel."
With respect to the marriage certificate of Carlito and Marivel, the corrections ordered pertained to the alteration of the name of Carlitos father from "John
Kho" to "Juan Kho" and the latters citizenship from "Filipino" to "Chinese."
Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, appealed the RTC Decision to the CA, faulting the trial court in granting the petition for correction of entries in the
subject documents despite the failure of respondents to implead the minors mother, Marivel, as an indispensable party and to offer sufficient evidence to
warrant the corrections with regard to the questioned "married" status of Carlito and his siblings parents, and the latters citizenship.
Petitioner also faulted the trial court for ordering the change of the name "Carlito John Kho" to "Carlito Kho" for non-compliance with jurisdictional
requirements for a change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
By the assailed Decision of October 27, 2005, the CA denied petitioners appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial court.
The CA found that Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, which outlines the proper procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry, was
observed in the case.
Regarding Carlitos minor children Kevin and Kelly, the appellate court held that the correction of their mothers first name from "Maribel" to "Marivel" was
made to rectify an innocuous error.
As for the change in the date of the marriage of Carlito and Marivel, albeit the CA conceded that it is a substantial alteration, it held that the date would not
affect the minors filiation from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" considering that at the time of their respective births in 1991 and 1993, their father Carlitos first
marriage was still subsisting as it had been annulled only in 1999.
In light of Carlitos legal impediment to marry Marivel at the time they were born, their children Kevin and Kelly were illegitimate. It followed, the CA went on
to state, that Marivel was not an indispensable party to the case, the minors having been represented by their father as required under Section 5 of Rule 3 9 of
the Revised Rules of Court.
Further, the CA ruled that although Carlito failed to observe the requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, he had complied nonetheless with the
jurisdictional requirements for correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The petition for correction of entry in Carlitos birth
record, it noted, falls under letter "o" of the enumeration under Section 2 of Rule 108.
In the present petition, petitioner contends that since the changes sought by respondents were substantial in nature, they could only be granted through an
adversarial proceeding in which indispensable parties, such as Marivel and respondents parents, should have been notified or impleaded.
Petitioner further contends that the jurisdictional requirements to change Carlitos name under Section 2 of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court were not satisfied
because the Amended Petition failed to allege Carlitos prior three-year bona fide residence in Butuan City, and that the title of the petition did not state
Carlitos aliases and his true name as "Carlito John I. Kho." Petitioner concludes that the same jurisdictional defects attached to the change of name of Carlitos
father.
The petition fails.
It can not be gainsaid that the petition, insofar as it sought to change the citizenship of Carlitos mother as it appeared in his birth certificate and delete the
"married" status of Carlitos parents in his and his siblings respective birth certificates, as well as change the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel involves
the correction of not just clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature. 10 Rather, the changes entail substantial and controversial amendments.

35

For the change involving the nationality of Carlitos mother as reflected in his birth certificate is a grave and important matter that has a bearing and effect on
the citizenship and nationality not only of the parents, but also of the offspring. 11
Further, the deletion of the entry that Carlitos and his siblings parents were "married" alters their filiation from "legitimate" to "illegitimate," with significant
implications on their successional and other rights.
Clearly, the changes sought can only be granted in an adversary proceeding. Labayo-Rowe v. Republic 12 explains the raison d etre:
x x x. The philosophy behind this requirement lies in the fact that the books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be prima facie
evidence of the facts therein contained. If the entries in the civil register could be corrected or changed through mere summary proceedings and not through
appropriate action wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented, the door to fraud or other mischief would be set open,
the consequence of which might be detrimental and far reaching. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
In Republic v. Valencia, 13 however, this Court ruled, and has since repeatedly ruled, that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a
petition filed under Rule 108.14
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving
nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature.
However, it is also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to
the principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail
themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.
xxxx
What is meant by "appropriate adversary proceeding?" Blacks Law Dictionary defines "adversary proceeding["] as follows:
One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the
other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. x x x 15 (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
The enactment in March 2001 of Republic Act No. 9048, otherwise known as "An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General to
Correct a Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the Civil Register Without Need of Judicial Order," has been
considered to lend legislative affirmation to the judicial precedence that substantial corrections to the civil status of persons recorded in the civil registry may
be effected through the filing of a petition under Rule 108. 16
Thus, this Court in Republic v. Benemerito 17 observed that the obvious effect of Republic Act No. 9048 is to make possible the administrative correction of
clerical or typographical errors or change of first name or nickname in entries in the civil register, leaving to Rule 108 the correction of substantial changes in
the civil registry in appropriate adversarial proceedings.
When all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are thus followed, the appropriate adversary proceeding necessary to effect substantial corrections to
the entries of the civil register is satisfied. 18 The pertinent provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court read:
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil registrar is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest
which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause
reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once in a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

36

SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
There is no dispute that the trial courts Order 19 setting the petition for hearing and directing any person or entity having interest in the petition to oppose it
was posted20 as well as published for the required period; that notices of hearings were duly served on the Solicitor General, the city prosecutor of Butuan and
the local civil registrar; and that trial was conducted on January 31, 2002 during which the public prosecutor, acting in behalf of the OSG, actively participated
by cross-examining Carlito and Epifania.
What surfaces as an issue is whether the failure to implead Marivel and Carlitos parents rendered the trial short of the required adversary proceeding and the
trial courts judgment void.
A similar issue was earlier raised in Barco v. Court of Appeals. 21 That case stemmed from a petition for correction of entries in the birth certificate of a minor,
June Salvacion Maravilla, to reflect the name of her real father (Armando Gustilo) and to correspondingly change her surname. The petition was granted by the
trial court.
Barco, whose minor daughter was allegedly fathered also by Gustilo, however, sought to annul the trial courts decision, claiming that she should have been
made a party to the petition for correction. Failure to implead her deprived the RTC of jurisdiction, she contended.
In dismissing Barcos petition, this Court held that the publication of the order of hearing under Section 4 of Rule 108 cured the failure to implead an
indispensable party.
The essential requisite for allowing substantial corrections of entries in the civil registry is that the true facts be established in an appropriate adversarial
proceeding. This is embodied in Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, which states:
Section 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest
which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
xxxx
Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Section 3 of Rule 108. Her interest was affected by the petition for correction, as any judicial
determination that June was the daughter of Armando would affect her wards share in the estate of her father. x x x.
Yet, even though Barco was not impleaded in the petition, the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that the defect was cured by compliance with Section 4,
Rule 108, which requires notice by publication x x x.
xxxx
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision would cover
even parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108, but were inadvertently left out. x x x
xxxx
Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a thing and not against a person. The decision on the petition binds not only the parties
thereto but the whole world. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has

37

for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established. It is the publication of
such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. 22
Given the above ruling, it becomes unnecessary to rule on whether Marivel or respondents parents should have been impleaded as parties to the proceeding.
It may not be amiss to mention, however, that during the hearing on January 31, 2002, the city prosecutor who was acting as representative of the OSG did
not raise any objection to the non-inclusion of Marivel and Carlitos parents as parties to the proceeding.
Parenthetically, it seems highly improbable that Marivel was unaware of the proceedings to correct the entries in her childrens birth certificates, especially
since the notices, orders and decision of the trial court eHe were all sent to the residence 23 she shared with Carlito and the children.
It is also well to remember that the role of the court in hearing a petition to correct certain entries in the civil registry is to ascertain the truth about the facts
recorded therein.24
With respect to the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel, their certificate of marriage 25 shows that indeed they were married on January 21, 2000, not on
April 27, 1989. Explaining the error, Carlito declared that the date "April 27, 1989" was supplied by his helper, adding that he was not married to Marivel at the
time his sons were born because his previous marriage was annulled only in 1999. 26 Given the evidence presented by respondents, the CA observed that the
minors were illegitimate at birth, hence, the correction would bring about no change at all in the nature of their filiation.
With respect to Carlitos mother, it bears noting that she declared at the witness stand that she was not married to Juan Kho who died in 1959. 27 Again, that
testimony was not challenged by the city prosecutor.
The documentary evidence supporting the deletion from Carlitos and his siblings birth certificates of the entry "Married" opposite the date of marriage of
their parents, moreover, consisted of a certification issued on November 24, 1973 by St. Joseph (Butuan City) Parish priest Eugene van Vught stating that Juan
Kho and Epifania had been living together as common law couple since 1935 but have never contracted marriage legally. 28
A certification from the office of the city registrar, which was appended to respondents Amended Petition, likewise stated that it has no record of marriage
between Juan Kho and Epifania.29 Under the circumstances, the deletion of the word "Married" opposite the "date of marriage of parents" is warranted.
With respect to the correction in Carlitos birth certificate of his name from "Carlito John" to "Carlito," the same was properly granted under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court. As correctly pointed out by the CA, the cancellation or correction of entries involving changes of name falls under letter "o" of the following
provision of Section 2 of Rule 108:30
Section 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or
corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separation; (e) judgments of annulment of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil
interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Hence, while the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 103 (which governs petitions for change of name) were not complied with, observance of the provisions of
Rule 108 suffices to effect the correction sought for.
More importantly, Carlitos official transcript of record from the Urious College in Butuan City, 31 certificate of eligibility from the Civil Service Commission, 32 and
voter registration record33 satisfactorily show that he has been known by his first name only. No prejudice is thus likely to arise from the dropping of the
second name.
The correction of the mothers citizenship from Chinese to Filipino as appearing in Carlitos birth record was also proper. Of note is the fact that during the
cross examination by the city prosecutor of Epifania, he did not deem fit to question her citizenship. Such failure to oppose the correction prayed for, which
certainly was not respondents fault, does not in any way change the adversarial nature of the proceedings.

38

Also significant to note is that the birth certificates of Carlitos siblings uniformly stated the citizenship of Epifania as "Filipino." To disallow the correction in
Carlitos birth record of his mothers citizenship would perpetuate an inconsistency in the natal circumstances of the siblings who are unquestionably born of
the same mother and father.
Outside the ambit of substantial corrections, of course, is the correction of the name of Carlitos wife from "Maribel" to "Marivel." The mistake is clearly clerical
or typographical, which is not only visible to the eyes, but is also obvious to the understanding 34 considering that the name reflected in the marriage
certificate of Carlito and his wife is "Marivel."
Apropos is Yu v. Republic35 which held that changing the appellants Christian name of "Sincio" to "Sencio" amounts merely to the righting of a clerical error.
The change of name from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayu to Emperatriz Labayo was also held to be a mere innocuous alteration, which can be granted through
a summary proceeding.36 The same ruling holds true with respect to the correction in Carlitos marriage certificate of his fathers name from "John Kho" to
"Juan Kho." Except in said marriage certificate, the name "Juan Kho" was uniformly entered in the birth certificates of Carlito and of his siblings. 37
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 157043

February 2, 2007

REPUBLIC
OF
vs.
TRINIDAD R.A. CAPOTE, Respondent.

THE

PHILIPPINES,

Petitioner,

DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari 1 seeks to set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) decision 2 dated January 13, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66128, which affirmed
the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23 of San Juan, Southern Leyte dated September 14, 1999 granting a petition for change of name.

39

Respondent Trinidad R. A. Capote filed a petition for change of name of her ward from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores on September 9, 1998. In
Special Proceeding No. R-481,3 Capote as Giovannis guardian ad litem averred:
xxx xxx xxx
1. [Respondent] is a Filipino citizen, of legal age, married, while minor GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO, is also a Filipino citizen, sixteen (16) years old and
both are residents of San Juan, Southern Leyte where they can be served with summons and other court processes;
2. [Respondent] was appointed guardian [ad litem] of minor Giovanni N. Gallamaso by virtue of a court order in Special [Proc.] No. R-459, dated
[August 18, 1998] xxx xxx authorizing her to file in court a petition for change of name of said minor in accordance with the desire of his mother [who
is residing and working abroad];
3. Both [respondent] and minor have permanently resided in San Juan, Southern Leyte, Philippines for more than fifteen (15) years prior to the filing of
this instant petition, the former since 1970 while the latter since his birth [in 1982];
4. The minor was left under the care of [respondent] since he was yet nine (9) years old up to the present;
5. Minor GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO is the illegitimate natural child of Corazon P. Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso. [He] was born on July 9, 1982 [,]
prior to the effectivity of the New Family Code and as such, his mother used the surname of the natural father despite the absence of marriage
between them; and [Giovanni] has been known by that name since birth [as per his birth certificate registered at the Local Civil Register of San Juan,
Southern Leyte];
6. The father, Diosdado Gallamaso, from the time [Giovanni] was born and up to the present, failed to take up his responsibilities [to him] on matters
of financial, physical, emotional and spiritual concerns. [Giovannis pleas] for attention along that line [fell] on deaf ears xxx xxx xxx;
7. [Giovanni] is now fully aware of how he stands with his father and he desires to have his surname changed to that of his mothers surname;
8. [Giovannis] mother might eventually petition [him] to join her in the United States and [his] continued use of the surname Gallamaso, the surname
of his natural father, may complicate [his] status as natural child; and
9. The change of name [from] GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO to GIOVANNI NADORES will be for the benefit of the minor.
xxx xxx xxx4
Respondent prayed for an order directing the local civil registrar to effect the change of name on Giovannis birth certificate. Having found respondents
petition sufficient in form and substance, the trial court gave due course to the petition. 5 Publication of the petition in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province of Southern Leyte once a week for three consecutive weeks was likewise ordered. 6 The trial court also directed that the local civil registrar be notified
and that the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) be sent a copy of the petition and order. 7
Since there was no opposition to the petition, respondent moved for leave of court to present her evidence ex parte before a court-appointed commissioner.
The OSG, acting through the Provincial Prosecutor, did not object; hence, the lower court granted the motion.
After the reception of evidence, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the change of name from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores. 8
From this decision, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed an appeal with a lone assignment of error: the court a quo erred in granting
the petition in a summary proceeding.

40

Ruling that the proceedings were sufficiently adversarial in nature as required, the CA affirmed the RTC decision ordering the change of name. 9
In this petition, the Republic contends that the CA erred in affirming the trial courts decision which granted the petition for change of name despite the nonjoinder of indispensable parties. 10 Petitioner cites Republic of the Philippines v. Labrador 11 and claims that the purported parents and all other persons who
may be adversely affected by the childs change of name should have been made respondents to make the proceeding adversarial. 12
We deny the petition.
"The subject of rights must have a fixed symbol for individualization which serves to distinguish him from all others; this symbol is his name." 13
Understandably, therefore, no person can change his name or surname without judicial authority. 14 This is a reasonable requirement for those seeking such
change because a persons name necessarily affects his identity, interests and interactions. The State must be involved in the process and decision to change
the name of any of its citizens.
The Rules of Court provides the requirements and procedure for change of name. Here, the appropriate remedy is covered by Rule 103, 15 a separate and
distinct proceeding from Rule 108 on mere cancellation and correction of entries in the civil registry (usually dealing only with innocuous or clerical errors
thereon).16
The issue of non-joinder of alleged indispensable parties in the action before the court a quo is intertwined with the nature of the proceedings there. The point
is whether the proceedings were sufficiently adversarial.
Summary proceedings do not extensively address the issues of a case since the reason for their conduct is expediency. This, according to petitioner, is not
sufficient to deal with substantial or contentious issues allegedly resulting from a change of name, meaning, legitimacy as well as successional rights. 17 Such
issues are ventilated only in adversarial proceedings wherein all interested parties are impleaded and due process is observed. 18
When Giovanni was born in 1982 (prior to the enactment and effectivity of the Family Code of the Philippines), 19 the pertinent provision of the Civil Code then
as regards his use of a surname, read:
Art. 366. A natural child acknowledged by both parents shall principally use the surname of the father. If recognized by only one of the parents, a natural
child shall employ the surname of the recognizing parent. (emphasis ours)
Based on this provision, Giovanni should have carried his mothers surname from birth. The records do not reveal any act or intention on the part of Giovannis
putative father to actually recognize him. Meanwhile, according to the Family Code which repealed, among others, Article 366 of the Civil Code:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code. xxx xxx xxx (emphasis ours)
Our ruling in the recent case of In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or Correction/Cancellation of Entry in Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang 20 is
enlightening:
Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father. The Family Code gives
legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their
father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the fathers surname.
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears only a given name and his mother surname, and
does not have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is only when the illegitimate
child is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public document or private handwritten instrument that he

41

bears both his mothers surname as his middle name and his fathers surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged
child.1awphi1.net21
The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a persons name to his identity, his status in relation to his parents and his successional
rights as a legitimate or illegitimate child. For sure, these matters should not be taken lightly as to deprive those who may, in any way, be affected by the right
to present evidence in favor of or against such change.
The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovannis petition. Giovanni availed of the proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules
of Court, and complied with all the procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court affirmed) that the evidence presented
during the hearing of Giovannis petition sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was
never recognized by his father while his mother has always recognized him as her child. A change of name will erase the impression that he was ever
recognized by his father. It is also to his best interest as it will facilitate his mothers intended petition to have him join her in the United States. This Court will
not stand in the way of the reunification of mother and son.
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the cases cited by petitioner 22 in support of its position deal with cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry, a
proceeding separate and distinct from the special proceedings for change of name. Those cases deal with the application and interpretation of Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court while this case was correctly filed under Rule 103. Thus, the cases cited by petitioner are irrelevant and have no bearing on respondents case.
While the OSG is correct in its stance that the proceedings for change of name should be adversarial, the OSG cannot void the proceedings in the trial court on
account of its own failure to participate therein. As the CA correctly ruled:
The OSG is correct in stating that a petition for change of name must be heard in an adversarial proceeding. Unlike petitions for the cancellation or correction
of clerical errors in entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 cannot be decided through a
summary proceeding. There is no doubt that this petition does not fall under Rule 108 for it is not alleged that the entry in the civil registry suffers from
clerical or typographical errors. The relief sought clearly goes beyond correcting erroneous entries in the civil registry, although by granting the petition, the
result is the same in that a corresponding change in the entry is also required to reflect the change in name. In this regard, [appellee] Capote complied
with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding by posting in a newspaper of general circulation notice of the filing of the petition. The
lower court also furnished the OSG a copy thereof. Despite the notice, no one came forward to oppose the petition including the OSG. The
fact that no one opposed the petition did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the same nor does it make the proceeding less
adversarial in nature. The lower court is still expected to exercise its judgment to determine whether the petition is meritorious or not and not merely
accept as true the arguments propounded. Considering that the OSG neither opposed the petition nor the motion to present its evidence ex parte when it had
the opportunity to do so, it cannot now complain that the proceedings in the lower court were not adversarial enough. 23 (emphasis supplied)
A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. 24
Respondent gave notice of the petition through publication as required by the rules. 25 With this, all interested parties were deemed notified and the whole
world considered bound by the judgment therein. In addition, the trial court gave due notice to the OSG by serving a copy of the petition on it. Thus, all the
requirements to make a proceeding adversarial were satisfied when all interested parties, including petitioner as represented by the OSG, were afforded the
opportunity to contest the petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the January 13, 2003 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66128 AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

42

G.R. No. 174689

October 22, 2007

ROMMEL
JACINTO
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DANTES

SILVERIO,

petitioner,

DECISION
CORONA, J.:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please
let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came two human beings;
one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named the man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of
Malakas and Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and
counseling with regard to a persons sex? May a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the
result of a sex reassignment surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His
name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male."

43

He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself
with girls since childhood. 1 Feeling trapped in a mans body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination,
hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex
reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the
Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from
"Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the Peoples Journal Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three
consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American fianc, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision 4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of
making his birth records compatible with his present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [reassignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioners misfortune to be
trapped in a mans body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the contrary,
granting the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fianc] and the realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present petition despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the
State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the
Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for petitioners first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioners gender from "Male" to
FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. 6 It alleged that there is no
law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals 7 rendered a decision 8 in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial courts decision lacked legal basis. There is no
law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted
the Republics petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it
was denied.9 Hence, this petition.

44

Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and
108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.10
The petition lacks merit.
A Persons First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and sex. As found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose
of making his birth records compatible with his present sex. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. 11 A change of name is a privilege, not a right. 12 Petitions
for change of name are controlled by statutes. 13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. No entry in a civil register shall be changed
or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or
changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules
and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. 14 It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil
registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the
aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of
Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name
is first filed and subsequently denied. 15 It likewise lays down the corresponding venue, 16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings
regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following
cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or
nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.

45

Petitioners basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought
he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter ones legal capacity or civil status. 18 RA 9048 does not sanction a
change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioners first name for his declared purpose may only
create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. 19 In
addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. 20 In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that
he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioners first name was not within that courts primary jurisdiction as the
petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper
remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all.
For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. 21 In this connection, Article 412 of
the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or
change of such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the
ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. 22 Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil
register.23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing
an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to
the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided,
however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the
applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the
Civil Code:24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.

46

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7)
legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil
interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth. 25 However, no reasonable
interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change means "to replace something with something else of the
same kind or with something that serves as a substitute." 26 The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those
corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and
naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage,
declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of
name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their
effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it
recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality
and his family membership.27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at
his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive term status include such matters as the
beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation,
adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession. 28 (emphasis supplied)
A persons sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a persons legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of
the Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioners cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. The declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the
declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt
from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in
attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c)
names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant
was born; and (f) such other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.
xxx

xxx

xxx (emphasis supplied)

47

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. 29 Thus, the sex of a person is determined
at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, 30 is immutable.31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words
"sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be understood in
their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure
and function that distinguish a male from a female" 32 or "the distinction between male and female." 33 Female is "the sex that produces ova or bears young" 34
and male is "the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova." 35 Thus, the words "male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not
include persons who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are
presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary." 36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in
the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used then is something alterable through surgery or something that
allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be included in the category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes
the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his
birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground of Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would
cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the
petition was but petitioners first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fianc. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a
special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman.37 One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be
a male and a female.38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It
will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various
laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, 39 certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code 40
and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, 41 among others. These laws underscore the public policy in
relation to women which could be substantially affected if petitioners petition were to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency
of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend
it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of
sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be
filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person
who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the
guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this
Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the
written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.

48

Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and [the] realization of their dreams." No argument about that.
The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social convention
and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the
legislature, not by the courts.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. 166676

Petitioner,
- versus -

Present:

JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN,
Respondent.

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising purely questions of law and seeking a reversal of the Decision 1[1] dated January
12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, which granted the Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate filed by Jennifer B.
Cagandahan and ordered the following changes of entries in Cagandahans birth certificate: (1) the name Jennifer Cagandahan changed to Jeff Cagandahan and
(2) gender from female to male.
The facts are as follows.
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate 2[2] before the RTC, Branch 33 of
Siniloan, Laguna.
In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up,
she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus
afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She further alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age
six, underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized,
she has stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual development. She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and
emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and
her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.

1
2
49

The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks and was posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff
of the court. The Solicitor General entered his appearance and authorized the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.
To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the
PhilippinesPhilippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical certificate stating that respondents condition is known as CAH. He explained that
genetically respondent is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally and she has two sex organs
female and male. He testified that this condition is very rare, that respondents uterus is not fully developed because of lack of female hormones, and that she
has no monthly period. He further testified that respondents condition is permanent and recommended the change of gender because respondent has made
up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male, and the gender change would be advantageous to her.
The RTC granted respondents petition in a Decision dated January 12, 2005 which reads:
The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily shown that he is entitled to the reliefs prayed [for]. Petitioner has adequately
presented to the Court very clear and convincing proofs for the granting of his petition. It was medically proven that petitioners body produces
male hormones, and first his body as well as his action and feelings are that of a male. He has chosen to be male. He is a normal person and
wants to be acknowledged and identified as a male.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil Register of Pakil, Laguna is hereby ordered to make the following corrections in the birth
[c]ertificate of Jennifer Cagandahan upon payment of the prescribed fees:
a)

By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF CAGANDAHAN; and

b)

By changing the gender from female to MALE.

It is likewise ordered that petitioners school records, voters registry, baptismal certificate, and other pertinent records are hereby
amended to conform with the foregoing corrected data.
SO ORDERED.3[3]

Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the abovementioned ruling.
The issues raised by petitioner are:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION CONSIDERING THAT:
I.
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH; AND,
II.
CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT ALLOW CHANGE OF SEX OR GENDER IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE, WHILE RESPONDENTS
MEDICAL CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA DOES NOT MAKE HER A MALE.4[4]

3
4
50

Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of respondent to change her sex or
gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical condition known as CAH, and her name from Jennifer to Jeff, under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules
of Court.
The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because while the local
civil registrar is an indispensable party in a petition for cancellation or correction of entries under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, respondents
petition before the court a quo did not implead the local civil registrar. 5[5] The OSG further contends respondents petition is fatally defective since it failed to
state that respondent is a bona fide resident of the province where the petition was filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing as
mandated under Section 2(b), Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. 6[6] The OSG argues that Rule 108 does not allow change of sex or gender in the birth certificate
and respondents claimed medical condition known as CAH does not make her a male. 7[7]
On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local Civil Registrar of Pakil, Laguna was not formally named a party in the Petition for
Correction of Birth Certificate, nonetheless the Local Civil Registrar was furnished a copy of the Petition, the Order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all
pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the proceedings, 8[8] respondent is actually a male person and hence his birth certificate has to be corrected to
reflect his true sex/gender, 9[9] change of sex or gender is allowed under Rule 108, 10[10] and respondent substantially complied with the requirements of
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.11[11]
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:

Rule 103
CHANGE OF NAME
SECTION 1. Venue. A person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the Regional Trial Court of the province in which
he resides, [or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court].
SEC. 2. Contents of petition. A petition for change of name shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his name changed, or
some other person on his behalf, and shall set forth:
(a)
That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to
the date of such filing;
(b)

The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
51

(c)

The name asked for.

SEC. 3. Order for hearing. If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance, the court, by an order reciting the purpose of the
petition, shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof, and shall direct that a copy of the order be published before the hearing at least
once a week for three (3) successive weeks in some newspaper of general circulation published in the province, as the court shall deem best.
The date set for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to an election nor within four (4) months after the last publication of the
notice.
SEC. 4. Hearing. Any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the petition. The Solicitor General or the proper
provincial or city fiscal shall appear on behalf of the Government of the Republic.
SEC. 5. Judgment. Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order that such order has been published as directed
and that the allegations of the petition are true, the court shall, if proper and reasonable cause appears for changing the name of the
petitioner, adjudge that such name be changed in accordance with the prayer of the petition.
SEC. 6. Service of judgment. Judgments or orders rendered in connection with this rule shall be furnished the civil registrar of the
municipality or city where the court issuing the same is situated, who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.
Rule 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which
has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the
Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be
cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k)
election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and
(o) changes of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or
claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the
same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be
published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction
is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the proceedings is brought may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may
also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the cancellation or correction prayed

52

for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his
record.

The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because respondents
petition did not implead the local civil registrar. Section 3, Rule 108 provides that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would
be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceedings. Likewise, the local civil registrar is required to be made a party in a proceeding for the
correction of name in the civil registry. He is an indispensable party without whom no final determination of the case can be had. 12[12] Unless all possible
indispensable parties were duly notified of the proceedings, the same shall be considered as falling much too short of the requirements of the rules. 13[13] The
corresponding petition should also implead as respondents the civil registrar and all other persons who may have or may claim to have any interest that would
be affected thereby.14[14] Respondent, however, invokes Section 6,15[15] Rule 1 of the Rules of Court which states that courts shall construe the Rules
liberally to promote their objectives of securing to the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of the matters brought before it. We agree that there
is substantial compliance with Rule 108 when respondent furnished a copy of the petition to the local civil registrar.
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article
412 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.

Together with Article 376 16[16] of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic Act No. 9048 17[17] in so far as clerical or typographical
errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order.
In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial
changes and corrections in entries in the civil register. 18[18]
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial
change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. 19[19]

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
53

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408
of the Civil Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth. 20[20]
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or inappropriate appearance of male characteristics. A person, like respondent, with
this condition produces too much androgen, a male hormone. A newborn who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with
the urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia often appearing more male than female; (2) normal internal structures of the female reproductive
tract such as the ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some features start to appear male, such as deepening of the voice, facial hair,
and failure to menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with CAH.
CAH is one of many conditions 21[21] that involve intersex anatomy. During the twentieth century, medicine adopted the term intersexuality to apply
to human beings who cannot be classified as either male or female. 22[22] The term is now of widespread use. According to Wikipedia, intersexuality is the
state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither
exclusively male nor female. An organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and female sexes.
Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In most societies, intersex individuals have been expected to conform to either
a male or female gender role.23[23] Since the rise of modern medical science in Western societies, some intersex people with ambiguous external genitalia
have had their genitalia surgically modified to resemble either male or female genitals. 24[24] More commonly, an intersex individual is considered as suffering
from a disorder which is almost always recommended to be treated, whether by surgery and/or by taking lifetime medication in order to mold the individual as
neatly as possible into the category of either male or female.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject
to outright denial. It has been suggested that there is some middle ground between the sexes, a no-mans land for those individuals who are neither truly male
nor truly female.25[25] The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is
not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification.

20
21
22
23
24
25
54

In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for gender. But if we
determine, based on medical testimony and scientific development showing the respondent to be other than female, then a change in the
subjects birth certificate entry is in order.
Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and categorically female nor consistently and categorically male)
composition. Respondent has female (XX) chromosomes. However, respondents body system naturally produces high levels of male hormones (androgen). As
a result, respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic features of a male.
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be
what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male
and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male.
Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like
respondent, is fixed.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And
accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong medication, 26
[26] to force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in respondents
development to reveal more fully his male characteristics.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a matter so innately private as ones sexuality and lifestyle
preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider respondent as
having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment
and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who
has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial
choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an
incompetent27[27] and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally entitled
to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondents position and his personal judgment of being a male.
In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other
words, we respect respondents congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but
respect how respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus help make his life easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case.
As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be
exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow. 28[28] The trial courts grant of respondents change of name from Jennifer
to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondents change of name merely recognizes his
preferred gender, we find merit in respondents change of name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to
male.
WHEREFORE, the Republics petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, is

26
27
28
55

AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 186571

August 11, 2010

GERBERT
R.
CORPUZ,
vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.

Petitioner,

DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on certiorari 2
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000. 3 On January 18,
2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. 4 Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada
soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an
affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario,
Canada granted Gerberts petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006. 5
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines,
Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite the
registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists
under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO
Circular No. 4, series of 1982. 6
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved ( petition) with the RTC. Although
summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to
Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested
that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts.

56

In its October 30, 2008 decision, 7 the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial
recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, 8 in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law. 9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as
determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;10 the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." 11
THE PETITION
From the RTCs ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination
of his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in
Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a
possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiance in the Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be
on file with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments, 14 both support Gerberts position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this
jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURTS RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino
spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages void 15 and voidable16 marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of
absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the
lawful union for cause arising after the marriage.17 Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens. 18
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative
powers under the Freedom Constitution,19 enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

57

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law this Courts holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 20
and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouses assertion of marital rights after a foreign courts divorce
decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond between the spouses.
The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x
cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse]. The
latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served. 22
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." 23 The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or
her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino
spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. 24 Without the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that
purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of
severing the marital bond;25 Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a
foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for
recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the
court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another
marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose
status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law. 26
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting
the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the
complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his
foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven according to
our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for
the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the
judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and
their successors in interest by a subsequent title.

58

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake
of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action
before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law. 27
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and
laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another
country."28 This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the aliens applicable
national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. 29 The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the
purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be
official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or
(2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity, 30 but failed to
include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. 31 Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence,
unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wifes (Daisylyns) obvious
conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioners
presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state,
every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the
effect of res judicata32 between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. 33
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect
of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This
same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns
marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the decree. 34 We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention of
the bench and the bar to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The
law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a persons legal capacity and status, i.e., those
affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not."35
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a persons legal capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or
the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:

59

Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be entered:
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices the following books, in which they shall, respectively make the
proper entries concerning the civil status of persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but also divorces and dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto
authorize the decrees registration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be
given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage
certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982, 36 and
Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982 37 both of which required a final order from a competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment,
dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the
registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.1avvphi1

60

Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the
cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of
Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements
Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or
corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment,
authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the
RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located; 38 that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made
parties to the proceedings;39 and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation. 40 As these basic jurisdictional
requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree
in the civil registry one for recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate
adversarial proceeding41 by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch
11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let
a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

61

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. 189476

Petitioner,
Present:

- versus -

CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,

BRION,

JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENGMAGPAYO (A.K.A. JULIAN EDWARD

EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG),

BERSAMIN, and

Respondent.

SERENO, JJ.

VILLARAMA, JR., and

Promulgated:
February 2, 2011

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

62

Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo (respondent) is the son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique
Marquez-Lim Coseteng who, as respondents certificate of live birth 29[1] shows, contracted marriage on March 26, 1972.

Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally married, respondent filed on July 22, 2008 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a
Petition to change his name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng. The petition, docketed as SPP No. Q-0863058, was entitled IN RE PETITION
FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG MAGPAYO TO JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG.

In support of his petition, respondent submitted a certification from the National Statistics Office stating that his mother Anna Dominique does not
appear in [its] National Indices of Marriage. 30[2] Respondent also submitted his academic records from elementary up to college 31[3] showing that he carried
the surname Coseteng, and the birth certificate of his child where Coseteng appears as his surname. 32[4] In the 1998, 2001 and 2004 Elections, respondent
ran and was elected as Councilor of Quezon Citys 3rd District using the name JULIAN M.L. COSETENG. 33[5]

On order of Branch 77 of the Quezon City RTC, 34[6] respondent amended his petition by alleging therein compliance with the 3-year residency
requirement under Section 2, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.35[7]

The notice setting the petition for hearing on November 20, 2008 was published in the newspaper Broadside in its issues of October 31-November 6,
2008, November 7-13, 2008, and November 14-20, 2008. 36[8] And a copy of the notice was furnished the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
No opposition to the petition having been filed, an order of general default was entered by the trial court which then allowed respondent to present
evidence ex parte.37[9]

29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
63

By Decision of January 8, 2009, 38[10] the trial court granted respondents petition and directed the Civil Registrar of Makati City to:

1. Delete the entry March 26, 1972 in Item 24 for DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF PARTIES [in herein respondents
Certificate of live Birth];
2. Correct the entry MAGPAYO in the space for the Last Name of the [respondent] to COSETENG;
3. Delete the entry COSETENG in the space for Middle Name of the [respondent]; and
4. Delete the entry Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr. in the space for FATHER of the [respondent] (emphasis and
underscoring supplied; capitalization in the original)

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the trial court by Order of July 2, 2009, 39[11] hence, it,
thru the OSG, lodged the present petition for review to the Court on pure question of law.

The Republic assails the decision in this wise:

I.

. . . THE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAMEINVOLVES THE CHANGE OF [RESPONDENTS] CIVIL STATUS FROM LEGITIMATE TO
ILLEGITIMATE AND, THEREFORE, SHOULD BE MADE THROUGH APPROPRIATE ADVERSARIAL PROCEEDINGS

II.

THE TRIAL COURT EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT DIRECTED THE DELETION OF THE NAME OF RESPONDENTS FATHER
FROM HIS BIRTH CERTIFICATE.40[12] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

38
39
40
64

The Republic contends that the deletion of the entry on the date and place of marriage of respondents parents from his birth certificate has the effect
of changing his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, hence, any change in civil status of a person must be effected through an appropriate adversary
proceeding.41[13]

The Republic adds that by ordering the deletion of respondents parents date of marriage and the name of respondents father from the entries in
respondents birth certificate,42[14] the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction, such order not being in accord with respondents prayer reading:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that the Honorable Court issue an order allowing the change of name
of petitioner from JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG MAGPAYO to JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG, and that the
Honorable Court order the Local Civil Registrar and all other relevant government agencies to reflect the said change of name in their records.
Petitioner prays for other reliefs deemed proper under the premises. 43[15] (underscoring supplied)

Respondent counters that the proceeding before the trial court was adversarial in nature. He cites the serving of copies of the petition and its annexes
upon the Civil Registrar of Makati, the Civil Registrar General, and the OSG; the posting of copies of the notice of hearing in at least four public places at least
ten days before the hearing; the delegation to the OSG by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to appear on behalf of the Republic; the publication of the notice
of hearing in a newspaper of general circulation for three consecutive weeks; and the fact that no oppositors appeared on the scheduled hearing. 44[16]

The petition is impressed with merit.

A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME) using valid and meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is
ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c) when the
change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e)
a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes
embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public
interest.45[17] Respondents reason for changing his name cannot be considered as one of, or analogous to, recognized grounds, however.

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42
43
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The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. Republic of the Philippines. 46[18] In Alfon, the Court allowed the therein petitioner, Estrella
Alfon, to use the name that she had been known since childhood in order to avoid confusion. Alfon did not deny her legitimacy, however. She merely sought to
use the surname of her mother which she had been using since childhood. Ruling in her favor, the Court held that she was lawfully entitled to use her mothers
surname, adding that the avoidance of confusion was justification enough to allow her to do so. In the present case, however, respondent denies his
legitimacy.

The change being sought in respondents petition goes so far as to affect his legal status in relation to his parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to
that of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not suffice to grant respondents supplication.

Labayo-Rowe v. Republic47[19] categorically holds that changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate . . . are substantial and
controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings . . .

Since respondents desired change affects his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, Rule 108 applies. It reads:

SECTION 1. Who may file petition.Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons
which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with
the [RTC] of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
xxxx
SEC. 3. Parties.When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who
have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the
same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition . The court shall also cause the order to
be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. (emphasis, italics and
underscoring supplied)

Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns ones civil status should be filed in the civil registry in which the entry is sought to be cancelled
or corrected that of Makati in the present case, and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby should be made parties to the
proceeding.

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As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not in Makati where his birth certificate was registered but in Quezon City. And as the
above-mentioned title of the petition filed by respondent before the RTC shows, neither the civil registrar of Makati nor his father and mother were made
parties thereto.

Respondent nevertheless cites Republic v. Capote48[20] in support of his claim that his change of name was effected through an appropriate adversary
proceeding.

Republic v. Belmonte,49[21] illuminates, however:

The procedure recited in Rule 103 regarding change of name and in Rule 108 concerning the cancellation or correction of entries in the
civil registry are separate and distinct. They may not be substituted one for the other for the sole purpose of expediency. To hold
otherwise would render nugatory the provisions of the Rules of Court allowing the change of ones name or the correction of entries in the civil
registry only upon meritorious grounds. . . . (emphasis, capitalization and underscoring supplied)

Even assuming arguendo that respondent had simultaneously availed of these two statutory remedies, respondent cannot be said to have sufficiently
complied with Rule 108. For, as reflected above, aside from improper venue, he failed to implead the civil registrar of Makati and all affected
parties as respondents in the case.

Republic v. Labrador50[22] mandates that a petition for a substantial correction or change of entries in the civil registry should have as respondents
the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who have or claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby. It cannot be gainsaid that change of
status of a child in relation to his parents is a substantial correction or change of entry in the civil registry.

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49
50
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Labayo-Rowe51[23] highlights the necessity of impleading indispensable parties in a petition which involves substantial and controversial alterations. In
that case, the therein petitioner Emperatriz Labayo-Rowe (Emperatriz) filed a petition for the correction of entries in the birth certificates of her children,
Vicente Miclat, Jr. and Victoria Miclat, in the Civil Registry of San Fernando, Pampanga. Emperatriz alleged that her name appearing in the birth certificates is
Beatriz, which is her nickname, but her full name is Emperatriz; and her civil status appearing in the birth certificate of her daughter Victoria as married on
1953 Bulan are erroneous because she was not married to Vicente Miclat who was the one who furnished the data in said birth certificate.

The trial court found merit in Emperatrizs petition and accordingly directed the local civil registrar to change her name appearing in her childrens birth
certificates from Beatriz to Emperatriz; and to correct her civil status in Victorias birth certificate from married to single and the date and place of marriage to
no marriage.

On petition before this Court after the Court of Appeals found that the order of the trial court involved a question of law, the Court nullified the trial
courts order directing the change of Emperatriz civil status and the filiation of her child Victoria in light of the following observations:

x x x x Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General, all other indispensable parties should have been made respondents.
They include not only the declared father of the child but the child as well, together with the paternal grandparents, if any, as their
hereditary rights would be adversely affected thereby. All other persons who may be affected by the change should be notified or
represented. The truth is best ascertained under an adversary system of justice.
The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her parents would be substantially impaired if her status would be changed from
legitimate to illegitimate. Moreover, she would be exposed to humiliation and embarrassment resulting from the stigma of an illegitimate
filiation that she will bear thereafter. The fact that the notice of hearing of the petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation
and notice thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken. Rule 108, like all the other provisions of
the Rules of Court, was promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making authority under Section 13, Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution, which directs that such rules shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond
innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend
substantial and controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage ,
without observing the proper proceedings as earlier mentioned, said rule would thereby become an unconstitutional exercise which
would tend to increase or modify substantive rights. This situation is not contemplated under Article 412 of the Civil Code. 52[24]
(emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

As for the requirement of notice and publication, Rule 108 provides:

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SEC. 4. Notice and publication.Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the
hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall
also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

SEC. 5. Opposition.The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose
cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of
publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

A reading of these related provisions readily shows that Rule 108 clearly mandates two sets of notices to different potential oppositors. The first notice
is that given to the persons named in the petition and the second (which is through publication) is that given to other persons who are not named in the
petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties, such as creditors. That two sets of notices are mandated under the above-quoted
Section 4 is validated by the subsequent Section 5, also above-quoted, which provides for two periods (for the two types of potential oppositors) within which
to file an opposition (15 days from notice or from the last date of publication).

This is the overriding principle laid down in Barco v. Court of Appeals.53[25] In that case, Nadina Maravilla (Nadina) filed a petition for correction of
entries in the birth certificate of her daughter June from June Salvacion Maravilla to June Salvacion Gustilo, Armando Gustilo being, according to Nadina, her
daughters real father. Gustilo in fact filed before the trial court a CONSTANCIA wherein he acknowledged June as his daughter. The trial court granted the
petition.

After Gustilo died, his son Jose Vicente Gustilo filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the Order of the trial court granting the
change of Junes family name to Gustilo.

Milagros Barco (Barco), natural guardian of her minor daughter Mary Joy Ann Gustilo, filed before the appellate court a motion for intervention, alleging
that Mary Joy had a legal interest in the annulment of the trial courts Order as Mary Joy was, by Barcos claim, also fathered by Gustilo.

The appellate court dismissed the petition for annulment and complaint-in-intervention.

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69

On appeal by Barco, this Court ruled that she should have been impleaded in Nadinas petition for correction of entries of the birth certificate of Mary
Joy. But since a petitioner, like Nadina, is not expected to exhaustively identify all the affected parties, the subsequent publication of the notice cured the
omission of Barco as a party to the case. Thus the Court explained:

Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Section 3 of Rule 108. Her interest was affected by the petition for
correction, as any judicial determination that June was the daughter of Armando would affect her wards share in the estate of her father. It
cannot be established whether Nadina knew of Mary Joys existence at the time she filed the petition for correction. Indeed, doubt may
always be cast as to whether a petitioner under Rule 108 would know of all the parties whose interests may be affected by
the granting of a petition. For example, a petitioner cannot be presumed to be aware of all the legitimate or illegitimate
offsprings of his/her spouse or paramour. x x x x.
xxxx
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of
the decision would cover even parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108 but were inadvertently
left out. x x x x.54[26] (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

Meanwhile, in Republic v. Kho,55[27] Carlito Kho (Carlito) and his siblings named the civil registrar as the sole respondent in the petition they filed for
the correction of entries in their respective birth certificates in the civil registry of Butuan City, and correction of entries in the birth certificates of Carlitos
minor children. Carlito and his siblings requested the correction in their birth certificates of the citizenship of their mother Epifania to Filipino, instead of
Chinese, and the deletion of the word married opposite the phrase Date of marriage of parents because their parents Juan and Epifania were not married.
And Carlito requested the correction in the birth certificates of their children of his and his wifes date of marriage to reflect the actual date of their marriage as
appearing in their marriage certificate. In the course of the hearing of the petition, Carlito also sought the correction of the name of his wife from Maribel to
Marivel.

The Khos mother Epifania took the witness stand where she declared that she was not married to Juan who died before the filing of the Khos petition.

The trial court granted the petition.

On the issue of whether the failure to implead Marivel and the Khos parents rendered the trial of the petition short of the required adversary
proceedings and the trial courts judgment void, this Court held that when all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are followed, the publication of the

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notice of hearing cures the failure to implead an indispensable party. In so ruling, the Court noted that the affected parties were already notified of the
proceedings in the case since the petitioner-siblings Khos were the ones who initiated the petition respecting their prayer for correction of their citizenship,
and Carlito respecting the actual date of his marriage to his wife; and, with respect to the Khos petition for change of their civil status from legitimate to
illegitimate, their mother Epifania herself took the witness stand declaring that she was not married to their father.
What is clear then in Barco and Kho is the mandatory directive under Section 3 of Rule 108 to implead the civil registrar and the parties who would
naturally and legally be affected by the grant of a petition for correction or cancellation of entries. Non-impleading, however, as party-respondent of one who
is inadvertently left out or is not established to be known by the petitioner to be affected by the grant of the petition or actually participates in the proceeding
is notified through publication.

IN FINE, when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations including those
on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is
mandated.

WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, GRANTED. The January 8, 2009 Decision of Branch 77 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City in SP Proc. No. Q-0863058 is NULLIFIED.

SO ORDERED.

71

MA. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA, PAOLO

JOSEF T. BRAZA and JANELLE ANN T.
BRAZA,

G.R. No. 18117

Petitioners,
versus THE
CITY
CIVIL
REGISTRAR
OF
HIMAMAYLAN
CITY,
NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL,
minor
PATRICK
ALVIN
TITULAR BRAZA, represented by LEON
TITULAR, CECILIA TITULAR and LUCILLE
C. TITULAR,
Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Petitioner Ma. Cristina Torres (Ma. Cristina) and Pablo Sicad Braza, Jr. (Pablo), also known as Pablito Sicad Braza, were married 56[1] on January 4, 1978.
The union bore Ma. Cristinas co-petitioners Paolo Josef 57[2] and Janelle Ann58[3] on May 8, 1978 and June 7, 1983, respectively, and Gian Carlo 59[4] on June 4,
1980.

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Pablo died60[5] on April 15, 2002 in a vehicular accident in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia.

During the wake following the repatriation of his remains to the Philippines, respondent Lucille Titular (Lucille) began introducing her co-respondent
minor Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Patrick) as her and Pablo's son. Ma. Cristina thereupon made inquiries in the course of which she obtained Patrick's birth
certificate61[6] from the Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental with the following entries:

Name of Child: PATRICK ALVIN CELESTIAL

TITULAR
Date of Birth: 01 January 1996
Mother: Lucille Celestial Titular
Father: Pablito S. Braza
Date Received at the
Local Civil Registrar: January 13, 1997
Annotation: "Late Registration"
Annotation/Remarks: "Acknowledge (sic) by the father Pablito Braza on January 13, 1997"
Remarks: Legitimated by virtue of subsequent marriage of parents on April 22, 1998 at Manila. Henceforth, the child shall
be known as Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Ma. Cristina likewise obtained a copy 62[7] of a marriage contract showing that Pablo and Lucille were married on April 22, 1998, drawing her and her
co-petitioners to file on December 23, 2005 before the Regional Trial Court of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental a petition 63[8] to correct the entries in the
birth record of Patrick in the Local Civil Register.

Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed marriage between Lucille and Pablo, said marriage being bigamous on
account of the valid and subsisting marriage between Ma. Cristina and Pablo, petitioners prayed for (1) the correction of the entries in Patrick's birth record
with respect to his legitimation, the name of the father and his acknowledgment, and the use of the last name "Braza"; 2) a directive to Leon, Cecilia and
Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor Patrick, to submit Parick to DNA testing to determine his paternity and filiation; and 3) the declaration
of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and, for this purpose, the declaration of the marriage of Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.

58
59
60
61
62
63
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On Patricks Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, the trial court, by Order 64[9] of September 6, 2007, dismissed the petition without prejudice, it
holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry, the court, which is not acting as a family court under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an
action to annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test, hence, the controversy
should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied by Order 65[10] of November 29, 2007, they filed the present petition for review.

Petitioners maintain that the court a quo may pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on legitimacy even in an action to correct entries in the
civil registrar. Citing Cario v. Cario,66[11] Lee v. Court of Appeals67[12] and Republic v. Kho,68[13] they contend that even substantial errors, such as those
sought to be corrected in the present case, can be the subject of a petition under Rule 108. 69[14]

The petition fails. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial
court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil Code70[15] charts the procedure by which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled
or corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the
civil registry. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying
or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent. Substantial or
contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed. 71
[16]

64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
74

The allegations of the petition filed before the trial court clearly show that petitioners seek to nullify the marriage between Pablo and Lucille on the
ground that it is bigamous and impugn Patricks filiation in connection with which they ask the court to order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test.

Petitioners insist, however, that the main cause of action is for the correction of Patricks birth records 72[17] and that the rest of the prayers are merely
incidental thereto.

Petitioners position does not lie. Their cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucilles marriage as void for being bigamous and
impugn Patricks legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art.
17173[18] of the Family Code, respectively, hence, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said Code.

It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably
filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such as the petition filed before the court a quo.

Petitioners reliance on the cases they cited is misplaced.

Cario v. Cario was an action filed by a second wife against the first wife for the return of one-half of the death benefits received by the first after the
death of the husband. Since the second wife contracted marriage with the husband while the latters marriage to the first wife was still subsisting, the Court
ruled on the validity of the two marriages, it being essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the death benefits.
In Lee v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that contrary to the contention that the petitions filed by the therein petitioners before the lower courts were
actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer was not to declare that the petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng as stated in their records of birth
but to establish that they are not the latters children, hence, there was nothing to impugn as there was no blood relation at all between

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the petitioners and Keh Shiok Cheng. That is why the Court ordered the cancellation of the name of Keh Shiok Cheng as the petitioners mother and the
substitution thereof with Tiu Chuan who is their biological mother. Thus, the collateral attack was allowed and the petition deemed as adversarial proceeding
contemplated under Rule 108.
In Republic v. Kho, it was the petitioners themselves who sought the correction of the entries in their respective birth records to reflect that they were
illegitimate and that their citizenship is Filipino, not Chinese, because their parents were never legally married. Again, considering that the changes sought to
be made were substantial and not merely innocuous, the Court, finding the proceedings under Rule 108 to be adversarial in nature, upheld the lower courts
grant of the petition.
It is thus clear that the facts in the above-cited cases are vastly different from those obtaining in the present case.

76

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