Chapter5

Corruptionandthewatchdogroleofthenewsmedia
SheilaCoronel
The notion of the press as watchdog is more than 200 years old. Yet the idea of vigilant
mediamonitoringgovernmentandexposingitsexcesseshasgainednewtractioninmanypartsof
theworld.Globalization,thefallofauthoritarianandsocialistregimes,andthederegulationofthe
mediaworldwidehavefuelledarenewedinterestinaswellasasurgeineffortsbyvariousgroups
tosupportwatchdoggingbythemedia.
Sincethelate17thCentury,classicalliberaltheoristshadarguedthatpublicityandopenness
providethebestprotectionfromtheexcessesofpower.TheideaofthepressasFourthEstate,asan
institutionthatexistsprimarilyasacheckonthoseinpublicoffice,wasbasedonthepremisethat
powerful states had to be prevented from overstepping their bounds. The press working
independentlyofgovernment,evenasitsfreedomswereguaranteedbythestate,wassupposedto
helpensurethatthiswasso.
The 1980s and 1990s saw the revival of this centuriesold notion and its application
especially to transition societies then emerging from the ruins of socialist and authoritarian
regimes. It had resonance among citizens facing pervasive corruption, weak rule of law, and
predatory or incompetent governments unable to deliver basic services. Today even in countries
wheredemocracyisafairly newexperimentor even inthose,likeChina,where democracy and a
freepresshaveyettotakeroot,thenotionofthepressaswatchdogsofpowerisembeddedinthe
selfdefinitionofjournalists1andinvaryingdegrees,alsoinpublicexpectationsofthemedia.Itis,
moreover, a particularly seductive notion to the international donor community, which, since the
1990s, began to publicly acknowledge that corrupt and inept governments were a major
impediment to development efforts. As a result, donors who wanted to fund governance reforms
alsobecameinterestedinsupportingthemediaintheirperformanceoftheirmonitoringfunction.
But is the press acting as watchdog always desirable? In countries where the media are
hobbled by draconian state restrictions or driven largely by the imperatives of profitobsessed
markets, is such a role even possible? If so, what enabling conditions make a watchdog press
effective?Finally,whatimpacthasmediamonitoringhadinensuringgovernmentaccountability?Is
a watchdog press the key to governance reform, or is it civil society, responsive government
institutions, or an elite push for reform? Put differently, even if the press were an exemplary
watchdograther than a lapdog or attack dog of powercan it actually make a difference,
especiallyinsocietiesthatseemresistantto,orincapableof,change?
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Themanyfacesofwatchdogreporting
In new and old democracies, the idea of the media as the publics eyes andears, and not
merely a passive recorder of events, is today widely accepted. Indeed, the myth of the intrepid
journalistdoggedlypursuingthetrailofwrongdoingremainsverymuchalive,bothinthemediaas
well as popular lore. Governments, it is argued, cannot be held accountable if citizens are ill
informedabouttheactionsofofficialsandinstitutions.Watchdogreportingcoversawiderangeof
different types of journalism. On a routine basis, the watchdog press monitors the daytoday
workingsofgovernment,therebyhelpingcitizensassesstheefficacyofitsperformance.Reporting
thatgoesbeyondwhatofficialsortheirspokespersonssay,toexaminegovernmentperformance,is
alsoaformofwatchdogging.
Thegenre,atleastforthepurposesofthischapter,coversarangeofexposurejournalism,
regardlessofwhereitispublishedoraired,andregardlessofthequality,target,andinitiatorofthe
investigation.Thetargetsofexpossrangefromlowleveltohighlevelofficialsorcelebrities.They
canbeonsmallscalewrongdoinginvolvingpettyofficialsliketrafficpolicemenorclerks,butcanjust
aswellbeonhighlevelpoliticalcorruptioninvolvingmillions,evenbillionsofdollars,asinthecase
of ThirdWorld dictators and kleptocracies. The targets cut across various sectors: while many
exposs are about wrongdoing in government, they can also uncover malfeasance in the private
sector, such as corporations that cause damage to the public interest, as well as nonprofits who
takemoneyfromunsuspectingcitizens.Watchdoggingcaninvolveoversightonbothindividualsand
institutions. Almost no public person or group is immune from investigationindeed journalists
haveinvestigatedscammingBuddhistmonks(Thailand),sexualabuseintheCatholicChurch(US),as
wellaswrongdoinginvenerableinstitutionsliketheBoyScouts(US).
Watchdog reporting covers an array of malfeasance: from sex and personal scandals to
financial wrongdoing, political corruption, enrichment in public office, and other types of
wrongdoing.Theycanalsobeclassifiedaccordingtowhoinitiatestheexpos:sometimestheseare
the results of leaks from interested parties such as government investigators, rival businesses or
politicians, or opposition political parties; others are triggered by whistleblowers inside an
organization.Someareinvestigatedfirstbyadvocacygroupsandcampaigners,beforebeingtaken
up by mainstream news organizations. The classic exposs, however, like the Watergate
investigationthatresultedintheresignationofUSPresidentRichardNixon,aretheproductbothof
the initiative and enterprise of journalists as well as the cooperation of government investigators.
Watchdogreportsarepublishedorairedinavarietyofmedia:frommainstreamnewspapersandTV
programs to scandalmongering tabloids, alternative magazines and newspapers, and muckraking
Web sites like the Drudge Report. Some exposs are wellresearched and crafted; others publish
2

basedonrumorratherthanfact.Somewatchdogreportersadheretothestrictestethicalstandards;
othersmayacceptmoneyorfavorsinexchangefortheirexposs.
Investigative reporting, where journalists invest time and effort to ferret out and expose
wrongdoing, is perhaps watchdog journalisms most celebrated form. Investigative journalists
reportonhowlawsandregulationsareviolated.Theycomparehoworganizationsworkagainsthow
theyaresupposedtowork.Theyexposehowandwhyindividualsandinstitutionsfail.Theyreport
when things go wrong, who is responsible, how the wrongdoing was done, and its consequences.
Thebestinvestigativeworkexposesnotjustindividual,butalsosystemic,failures.Theyshowhow
individual wrongs are part of a larger pattern of negligence or abuse and the systems that make
these possible. They examine what went wrong and show who suffered from the mistakes. They
probe not just what is criminal or illegal, but also what may be legal and aboveboard but
nonethelesscausesharm.
Watchdogjournalismisexposurejournalism.Theethicalstandardsofthejournalistorthe
quality of the reporting may be high or low. What distinguishes watchdogging is the exposure of
wrongdoinginthepublicinterest.Whatevermotivatesthejournalistorthenewsorganizationthat
publishes a muckraking report is not the issue; what matters is that the reporting warns citizens
about those that are doing them harm and empowers them with the information they need to
know.Watchdoggingcanbebothepisodicasinoneoffexpossthatmayormaynothaveimpact
or sustained, especially where a community of journalists devotes its energies to exposing
malfeasanceandproducesacontinuousstreamofreportsonwrongdoing.
Isthewatchdogdesirable?
A watchdog press ensures thatindividualsandinstitutionswho aresupposedtoserve the
public remain transparent and are held accountable. A vigilant press is therefore key to good
governance.That,atleast,istheliberaldemocraticorthodoxy.2Thisorthodoxyisnotunchallenged,
however. To nonbelievers, the watchdog role should be subordinate to other, in their view more
constructive, goals. Leninist views of the press, for example, which prevailed in socialist regimes,
sawthepressprimarilyasacollectivepropagandistandagitator,asapartnerinbuildingsocialism,
ratherthananentityindependentandskepticalofgovernment. 3Arelatedview,fashionablein
the 1970s,wastheschoolof developmentjournalism,which preached that inpoor countries,the
media should veer away from the Western fixation on conflict and disaster and should instead
promotedevelopmentalgoals.Fromthisperspective,thepressbluntsitscriticaledgeandinstead
functionsmainlyasinformationproviderandcheerleaderinsupportofthedevelopmentagenda. 4
Similarly, as discussed in chapter 14, the Asian values conception of the media, which had its
3

heydayduringthe1990s,stressedtheimportanceofcollective,overindividual,rightsandwelfare.
Thisview,premisedontheuniquenessofAsiansocieties,castasideWesternnotionsofawatchdog
pressasinappropriatefortheregion,where,itisasserted,citizensarewillingtosacrificeindividual
freedoms in exchange for economic wellbeing. In the Asian values school, the medias role is
primarily that of helping forge social consensus for strong governments in pursuit of economic
growth.5
Evenwithintheliberaltradition,however,thereisskepticismaboutwhetherthewatchdog
role of the press should take primacy. Some media scholars and critics argue that the adversarial
natureofreportingerodestrustandsupportforgovernment.StudiesonU.S.televisionreporting,
for example, say that TV news presents the image of government as inefficient and wasteful and
that this constant barrage of reporting on government wrongdoing may lead to the public being
desensitizedtoactualinstancesofmisbehaviorbypublicofficials. 6Westernscholarsbelongingto
the media malaise school of media effects say that too much negative reporting undermines
supportforpublicofficials,makingitmoredifficultforthemtogoverneffectively.Theysuggestthat
these practices also lead to rising dissatisfaction with governments and more broadly, with
democratic institutions and democracy itself. 7 Elsewhere, particularly in postconflict societies,
questions have been raised about whether adversarial media can endanger democratic
consolidationandsparkchaos.8
Another strain of criticism portrays media exposure of wrongdoing not as furthering their
watchdog role but as morphing into their less edifying role as purveyor of scandal. Media as
scandalmonger means that the end goal is to titillate and amuse citizens, rather than inform and
mobilize them for reform. The constant barrage of media exposs reinforces the politics of
permanentscandal,wherethereisunendingcontroversyandfrenzyonthepoliticalstagebutnot
much substantial reform. Instead, scandalsjust like electionsbecome an arena for political
struggleamongelites,ratherthanavenueformobilizingthepublictopushforchange.9Thedanger,
asaHungarianscholarwritingabouttheBalkansputit,isthatwheneveryonecrieswolf,thepublic
losesallinterestinaccusationsofcorruptionandnormalizesit.Theveryhighlevelofgovernment
corruptionbecomesanormalfactoflife.10
Moreradicalcritiquesofthemedia,ontheotherhand,saytheopposite:thatthemedia,far
frombeinghypercritical,actuallyrarelyperformtheirwatchdogroleorquestiontheexistingsocial
order.Thus,theywonderwhetherthemediaspurposeandorganizingprincipleoughttobebased
onwhattheydoNOTdomostofthetime.11Thewatchdogdoctrine,afterall,datesbacktoanera
when the media consisted largely of smallcirculation and largely polemical newsletters and the
state was dominated by a landed aristocracy. The argument then was that private ownership
4

protected the press against state intervention. But private ownership has not shielded the press
from market pressures, resulting in the downgrading of watchdog reporting in favor of fluff and
entertainment. In other words, while a press autonomous of government should in theory act as
watchdog, it cannot do so given the constraints of marketbased media. The liberal orthodoxy
stuckinromantic,18thcenturynotionsofsmallpapersfightingautocracythereforeprivilegesthe
mediaswatchdogrolevisvisthestatewhileputtingthepressintheserviceofcorporatepower.12
Thewatchdogandgovernment
For sure, the way the press operates in the real world rarely corresponds with normative
prescriptionsofhowthemediaoughttofunction.Allovertheworld,themediaareseldomimmune
fromthepressuresofeitheror,in manycountries,boththestateand themarket.Inaddition,
the structure and ownership of the media industry as well as professional practices, cultures, and
normshaveabearingonhowwellthepressperformsaswatchdog.Therelationshipbetweenthe
mediaandthoseinpowerisalsoafactor.Moreover,certainhistoricalmomentsseemtobemore
conducivetowatchdogreportingthanothers.
Without doubt, the institutional arrangements of democracy provide the most hospitable
environmentforwatchdogreporting.Theconstitutionalandlegalprotectionsforafreepressaswell
asaccesstogovernmentheldinformationgivejournalistsnotonlytheright,butalsothetoolswith
whichtomonitorgovernment.Thechecksandbalancesinherentintherepresentativesystemalso
legitimize journalistic inquiry as part of a broader framework of government accountability to
citizens.
ThisiswhywatchdogreportingcannottakeplaceinBurmaorNorthKorea.Thisisalsowhy
ithasemergedinnewdemocracies,eveninplacesliketheBalkansthathavenohistoryortradition
ofindependentmedia.13Theburstofinvestigativeenergiesinthelast20yearswaslargelyinplaces
where repressive regimes fell apart. After years of propaganda and thought control, citizens were
hungry for information, and their appetite for news and commentary was unleashed once the
restraints were relaxed. New democratic leaders not only dismantled information ministries and
state censorship but also liberated the media from state ownership, paving the way for
entrepreneurswhotookadvantageofthecommercialopportunitiestocatertoamarkethungryfor
news.Freedfromstatecontrols,themediatookongovernmentandalsomadeprofitsfromtheir
exposs. Emboldened by their freedom, their prestige, and their profits, the media in many new
democraciesnowpoketheirnosesintoareasofpubliclifefromwhichtheyhadoncebeenbarred,
exposing corruption and malfeasance in both high and low places, and in areas like the military,
whichpreviouslyhavenotbeensubjectedtopressscrutiny.
5

What is surprising is that investigative reporting has taken root in a nondemocracy like
China,aonepartystatewheremediafreedomsarenotguaranteedandjournalistscancountonfew
protections. There, watchdog journalism was fuelled not so much by political, but by market,
liberalization.Economicreformsinitiatedinthelate1970sledtomediareformsinthe1990s,which
included decreased government subsidies for the media. This, in turn, forced media agencies to
operateascommercialenterprisesastheyhadtodependonadvertisingandcirculationinorderto
survive.Recognizingthatmuckrakingcanbeprofitable,journalistswereencouragedtoreportmore
aggressively. 14Soonpublicationsandpublicaffairsprogramsspecializingininvestigativereporting
weresetup,probingissueslikecorruption,crime,andtheenvironment.Althoughthetargetsofthe
investigationswerelowandmidlevelofficials,thenewreportingrepresentsaradicalchangefrom
thepast.15
Despite country differences, the forces that propelled investigative reporting in Latin
America,SoutheastAsia,andChinawerebroadlysimilar:socialandpoliticalupheavalsthatcreated
ademandforinformation;journalistsandmediaentrepreneurswhotookadvantageoftheloosened
controlsandthenewbusinessopportunitiestoexposewrongdoing;andarestlesspublicthatwas
primed for muckraking reporting.16 In earlier eras, these same factors also spurred investigative
journalism elsewherein the United States in the early 1900s and again in the 1970s, and in the
UnitedKingdominthe1960sand70s.17
Inallthesecountries,acombustiblemixofsocialferment,competitivemediamarkets,and
politicalliberalizationfuelledinvestigativeenergies.Butagencyisimportantaswell:acommunityof
journalistsandentrepreneursneededtoseizetheopportunitiescreatedbymarketandsocialforces.
The importance of journalistic agency cannot be underestimated. After all, in many developing
countriesinvestigativereporterstakegreatrisksandarepoorlyormodestlypaid.Mostoftheover
600journalistskilledworldwidesince2000wereinvestigatingcrime,politics,andcorruption.More
than 70 percent of those killed were specifically targeted for murder, often by contract assassins.
Andmostofthemwereworkingfornewspapersandbroadcaststationsindemocraticcountries. 18
Apart from physical attacks, investigative reporters have also been subjected to jail terms and
harassmentlawsuitsaswellaslawsthatrestrictinformationaccess,allofwhichimpedetheirability
toexposewrongdoing.
The pathology is clear: even as democracy providesthe optimum conditionsfor watchdog
reporting, many democracies in the world are unable to provide adequate protections for
journalists. And yet, neither murders nor lawsuits have succeeded in gagging the press. In
democracies like the Philippines, Mexico, and Colombia, where the journalist casualty rates are
among the highest in the world, the muckraking zeal does not seem to have been severely
6

dampened.OneexceptionisRussia,butotherfactorsapartfromkillings,includingthepublicmood
and the takeover of independent media by businesspeople close to the Kremlin, may explain why
Russianmediahavetendedtowardacquiescenceinrecentyears.19
Thewatchdogandthemarket
Thereisnoargumentthatstatecontrolsareanimpedimenttowatchdogjournalism.There
is far less consensus about the role of the market. On one hand, market liberalization and
competition have encouraged the emergence of, and in many places, also sustained, investigative
reporting. But at the same time, market pressures are a major obstacle to its continued viability.
Democraciesallovertheworldsufferfromthesecontradictions.Mosteverywhere,thecomplaintis
the same: Because most of the media are organized as forprofit enterprises, the performance of
democraticservicesisoftensecondarytoprofitmaking.Sometimesthereisafit:profitmotivesspur
concern for the public welfare. But often the goals collide. There is a design flaw: Critics say that
privatelyownedmedia,independentofthestatebutslavetothemarket,areatbest,episodicand
unreliablewatchdogs.20
This view gained currency in the U.S. in the 1980s, with the emergence of big media
conglomerates and the takeover of familyowned media enterprises by giant corporations. 21 The
dumbing down of the news and the dominance of entertainment values in the media have been
blamed on the rise of profithungry media behemoths. Even so, many big news organizations
supportedinvestigativereporting,partlybecauseoftheprestigeitbroughtandpartlybecausetheir
profitscouldsustainit.Today,asnewmediaandnewtechnologiesthreatenthebusinessmodelthat
has supported journalism for the last century, the resources for watchdogging are being slashed.
Thereisthereforerenewedcriticismoftheshortcomingsofprofitorientedmediaandmuchmore
criticalthinkingaboutalternatives,includingnonprofitmodelsforsustainingwatchdogreporting.22
Elsewhere, the evidence ismixed.In Europe,astudy bytheDutchFlemish Associationfor
Investigative Journalists (VVOJ), showed that the leading outlets for investigative reporting are
national newspapers, publicservice broadcasters, and in some countries, weeklies and Sunday
papers. Local media and commercialbroadcasters rarely invested in investigations, saidthestudy,
which included both Eastern and Western Europe, Turkey, Russia, and Ukraine. Concerns about
profitabilitydonotseemtobethedrivingforce.Thehistoryofthenewspaper,newsroomculture,
and editorial leadership are more important determinants of whether a news organization would
invest in watchdog reporting. 23 While in the past tabloids competed for scoops on political
malfeasance,theywerenowshiftingtheirrivalrytothecoverageofcelebrities,theVVOJstudysaid.
In the older democracies of Western Europe, therefore, the market does not now seem to be
7

propellingorrepressinginvestigativeenergies.Insteadtheseenergiesarechanneledtocertaintypes
ofmedia.
Incontrast,inChina,themarkethasprovedtobearealboontomuckraking.Itcouldbethat
incountrieswhereonepartymonopolizespoliticalpowerandcontrolsthemediawithaheavyhand,
profitoriented media provide probably the only check on power and a competitive media market
can spawn muckraking in various forms. In postauthoritarian Latin America, mainstream
publications that were part of media conglomerates began investing in highquality investigative
reportinginthe1980s.Withtheireconomicpowerandpoliticalinfluence,theycouldriskexposing
wrongdoingingovernmentwithoutfearoffinancialorpoliticalrepercussions.Profits,wroteSilvio
Waisbord, laid the groundwork for watchdog journalism, spawning a politically confident press
uncompromisedwithgovernmentinterests.24
In postdictatorship Southeast Asia, the emboldened media with an eye toward profit and
market share exposed corruption and malfeasance in public life in both the prestige and tabloid
press.Television,inparticular,uncoveredsleazeandcorruptiontoattractviewers.Gotchareporting,
such as exposs of state employees receiving bribes, often dramatized with the use of hidden
cameras,becamepartofthemenuofprimetimetelevisionnews,togetherwithshowbizgossipand
reports on the bizarre and the supernatural.25 Reporting on malfeasance can indeed give a media
organizationcompetitiveadvantage,butitdoesnotensurethatoncetheeyeballstireofcorruption,
themediasgazewillnotshiftelsewhere.Ifwatchdoggingwereprimarilyamarketinggimmick,then
it can be sustained only so long as the gimmick works. Financially viable muckraking presumes a
publicthatisinterestedintheexposureofwrongdoing.
Investigative reportingis expensiveandtimeconsuming. It requiresaninvestment in staff
andresources.Itisalsorisky.Sometimes,however,thepoliticalandprestigerewardscanoffsetthe
financial costs, as is the case in Latin America and Southern Europe where news organizations
conducted exposs in order to promote the pragmatic political or economic interests of various
groupsorbecauseofpettypersonalrivalries.26InRussia,andtosomeextentinLatinAmericaand
Asia, journalists are sometimes used to promote a political or financial agenda through the
publication of welltimed leaks. In many instances, these journalists, many of them underpaid,
receive money from interested parties. The term kompromat in Russian refers to black PR or the
publication of dossiers prepared by the political or business rivals of the subject of the expos. In
LatinAmerica,thisiscalleddenuncismo.Whateverthename,thistypeofcompromisedinvestigative
reporting is driven neither by the market nor by journalistic initiative but by vested interests that
crippletheautonomyofjournalistsandnewsorganizations.

No doubt financial viability brings independence as well as the capacity to support

muckraking reporting. In theory, forprofit, privately owned media can support production of
expossbecauseoftheirresourcesandtheirautonomyfromgovernment.Thattheydonotalways
dosoisanotherissue.Butthequestionthatarisesiswhathappensifprivatelyownedmediaarenot
profitable. In some countries, state subsidies and citizen contributions, as in the case of public
servicebroadcasters,orphilanthropicsupportprovideanalternativesourceoffundingforwatchdog
reporting.
Indeed, some of the most sophisticated and fearless watchdogging is being done by
independent,nonprofitentitiesdevotedtoinvestigativereporting.Arecentstudyshowedthatsome
40 such groups have emerged since the late 1980s in such diverse places as Romania, the
Philippines, Jordan, and South Africa. 27 These groups are largely funded by foundations or
international donors. They fill a gap in media systems where market, ownership, or political
pressures make investigative reporting by commercial or stateowned media difficult if not
impossible.Thesecentersareinvolvedintrainingandreportingandserveasmodelsofexcellence
thatarehelpingraisethestandardsoflocaljournalism.
Elsewhere, startup ventures by individual journalists are taking the lead in cuttingedge
investigations.InMalaysia,theWebbasednewssiteMalaysiakiniisfillingtheinformationgapina
country where the media are in the hands of the ruling party and its business allies. The site is
fundedpartlybyfoundationsandpartlybysubscribers.InIndia,Tehelka,anewspaperstartupthat
had its origins on the Web, is doing classic muckraking involving sting operations and undercover
cameras in a country where private media are immensely profitable and have a tradition of
independencefromgovernment.
Theremaybesoundeconomicargumentsforthis.Aneconomistusinggametheoryposits
thatolder,bigger,andmoreestablishedmediacompanieswilltendtoundertakeinvestigationsonly
when the expected gain from exposure is large enough to justify the expenditure. On the other
hand, new and emerging media entities that have little to lose are more likely to take the risk on
muckraking reporting that allows them to establish a foothold, particularly in nascent media
markets.28Unsurprisingly,astudydoneinthe1990sbyaSwedisheditorconcludedthatinEurope,
newsrooms that were in bad shape financially tended to do more substantial investigative
reporting.29Onereasoncouldbethattheyneededtocompetewiththemarketleaders.Throughout
Europe, many big and profitable news organizations did not do investigative reporting at all. In
contrast,manymoresmallandfinanciallystrappedmediahadatraditionofexposurejournalism.

Insum,watchdogreportinghasbeendoneunderavarietyofconditions.Thetypeofmedia
ownership, the size of the news organization, its financial viability, and profitability are not in
themselves sufficient factors in determining whether watchdog reporting can take root and be
sustained.Investigativereportinghasbeenspawnedinavarietyofmarketconditionsandhasbeen
undertaken as much to enhance profits as to further political, professional, or prestige goals. The
structuresthatbestsupportwatchdogjournalismvaryovertimeandacrosscountries:Thesecould
be competitive, nonstate media as in contemporary China; big and profitable private media
companiesinLatinAmerica;ornoncompetitive,publiclyfundedbroadcastersinNorthernEurope.
Competitionappearstobeafactor,whichmeansthatnewsroomsaremorelikelytoinvest
in exposs if these give them a competitive edge over their rivals. But competition alone is not a
predictor,asmediacompaniescancompeteinotherareasaswell;expossdonotalwaysguarantee
an audience. Moreover, the rise of nonprofits as well as citizen journalism Web sites engaged in
watchdoggingchangestheequation,ifonlybecausetheydonotfactorinprofitsandcompetitive
edgeintheircalculations.Themarketisnotunimportant.Butitisnottherockonwhichthefateof
watchdogjournalismrests.
Thewatchdogandtheprofession
It is interesting, but not surprising, that when journalists study themselves, they tend to
stressagencyoverstructure. 30Academicstudies,incontrast,tendtodotheopposite,analyzingthe
structuresthatshapemediadevelopmentbycreatingtheimpedimentsaswellastheopportunities
to which journalists and media organizations respond. Journalists do take structural conditions
seriously,buttheyalsopointtowhereinterventions,eitherbyindividualsornewsorganizations,can
make a difference. The VVOJ study of investigative journalism in Europe, for example, lists
preconditions for watchdog reporting (press freedom, access to information, laws that facilitate
rather than impede the ability of journalists to conduct investigations). But it devoted more
substantialresearchonwhatconditionsinnewsroomsandwhatkindsofjournaliststendedtoward
muckrakingandwhatmotivatedthemtodoso.
Diggingnewsrooms,accordingtoVVOJ,hadmorecreativestaffandallowedtheirreporters
more freedom. In addition, they had stronger, more competent, and less authoritarian
management.Journaliststrainedininvestigativetechniquesalsotendedtopracticethesemore.As
elsewhere, European investigative reporters had political, personal, and professional motives for
muckraking, VVOJ said. Political motives dominate in countries where the media have political
affiliationsandsonewsorganizationsworkonexposstopromotepartisanpoliticalgoals.Personal
motivestakeprecedencewherethemediaarenolongerpoliticallyalignedbuthavenotyetbecome
10

professional.Inthisinstance,investigationsareconductedmainlybylonewolves,freelancersor
staffreportersinnewsroomsthatdonotprovidemuchsupportforexposs.Thesehighlymotivated
individualsdrivenbythe watchdog ethosinitiateandcatalyzeinterestininvestigativereportingin
their news organizations and in the media at large. Certainly, many of the nonprofit investigative
reportingcentersthathaverecentlyflourishedinnewdemocraciesaredrivenlargelybyindividuals
ofthiskind.Theyareessentiallylonewolvesworkingatthemarginsofthemainstream,whichisnot
(yet)hospitabletowatchdogreporting.
Professional motives take preeminence when investigative reporting has been
institutionalized in newsrooms and the media as an industry have become professionalized (e.g.
journalists are academically trained, there are professional standards to which they must comply,
theirnewsorganizationstakeaneutralstance,etc.)TheVVOJstudyoutlinedalinearprogression
frompartisantoprofessionalmuckraking.
Therehasnotbeenalackofacademicattentiononhowprofessionalnorms,practices,and
valuesaffecthowthemediadotheirwork.Mostofthescholarlyresearchlooksathowthesenorms
evolvedasaresponsetolargerchangesinmediaandsociety.Forexample,thenormofjournalistic
objectivityissaidtohaveemergedintheUnitedStatesinthelate19thcenturyasaresponsetoboth
the elevation of science and the scientific method and the rise of newspapers that depended on
advertising and circulation for their sustenance. Unlike the party presses of an earlier era, these
newspapers attracted bigger audiences by promoting impartiality and factuality rather than
partisanshipandpolemic.31
Professionalization in the media, some studies have argued, took place where the mass
circulationpresswasstrongandtheincreasinglylargescaleandprofitablemediaorganizationsthat
evolved needed professional standards and practicesas all large organizations doin order to
operate efficiently.

32

All these developments were themselves a consequence of capitalist

development,theriseofmassdemocracy,andanassertivemiddleclass.33
LikeVVOJ,thesescholarsseeaprogressionfrompartisantoprofessionalmedia.Certainly,
this was the case in Latin America, where the ideological press monopolized watchdogging in the
1960s and 70s. But things changed in the 1980s and 90s, when big mainstream publications that
werecarriersoftheideologyofprofessionaljournalismdominatedtheinvestigativescene.34
Ifthistrajectoryisthestandardpathofmediadevelopment,thenitcouldbearguedthatit
wouldbefutilefordevelopingcountriesstillintheearlierphasesofthedevelopmentarctoaspire
for the kind of professional investigative reporting done in big newsrooms in North America and
Western Europe. They would need to wait for the structures to evolve to make this kind of
11

journalismthenorm.Inthemeantime,theflameofmuckrakingwouldbekeptalivebyjournalists
andmediaorganizationssustainedbypoliticalorpersonal,ratherthanprofessionalorinstitutional,
agendas.
Butyetagain,theInternetputsadamperonallthesecalculations.Thefirstdecadeofthis
centuryhasseentheriseofmuckrakingblogsandWebsites,someofwhichdonotadhereto20th
centurystandardsofprofessionaljournalism,partlybecausetheyarenotpartoflargeorganizations
that need to be governed by professional norms. Many of these new entities are not run by
professional journalists but by savvy individuals who report and write unencumbered by the
ideology of professionalism. Some of them in fact are critical of the standards and practices
associatedwiththemainstreammedia.IntheU.S.andelsewherearangeofnewmediamuckrakers
challenges traditional professional norms. They could be foreshadowing the next step in the
trajectory, a sort of postprofessionalization phase brought about by the different values and
normsaswellasthedifferentnewsimperativesthatprevailintheonlineworld.
Inthedevelopingworld,wherethemediaarenotprofessionalizedtothedegreetheyarein
the West, the pre and postprofessionalization phases coexist. For example, in China, where the
mainstream media remain under Party control, the blogosphere, despite sophisticated Internet
surveillance, has provided a home for watchdogging by citizens. There were 136 million Internet
usersinChinabytheendof2006andtensofmillionsofblogs.Whileonlyafractionofthesedeals
with public affairs, the political bloggers take seriously their role as watchdogs of power, even if
manyofthemremainCommunistPartysupporters.35
Chinaisanillustrativecaseofhowtheselfdefinitionofjournalists(andindeed,ofcitizens)
canevolveovertime.HugodeBurghconductedinterviewswithChinesejournalistsandconcluded
ina2003paperthatacrossthegenerationsandregardlessofthemediumwithinwhichtheywork,
Chinesejournalistsdoatpresenthaveapassionforthatjournalismwhichscrutinizesauthorityand
delvesintothefailingsofsociety.36
Thiswascertainlynotthecaseforalongtime.DeBurghpositedthatthisnewethoscould
be a reflection of a change in the way the Chinese see themselves and their relationship with
authority. But this new watchdog role is complex, not quite what it is in the West, where
investigativejournalistsexposenotonlyderelictionsofdutybutalsoexpandnotionsofdutybeyond
whatislegallydefinedornormallyacceptedbysociety.Chinesejournalists,saiddeBurgh,areboth
upholders of the order and its critics, both limiting discourse to acceptable topics and extending
moralboundaries.

12

This shows that journalists are constantly redefining their roles in response to both
institutional and economic changes as well as the expectations of their audiences. Normative role
definitions are adjusted to the reality in which journalists find themselves. In China, social and
economicchangescreatedanenvironmentthatrequiredthemediatobemoreresponsivetotheir
audience.Strivingtoadjusttothesechanges,ChinesejournalistsfoundinspirationbothinWestern
notions of watchdog reporting as well as the example of Chinese activistjournalists writing in the
earlypartofthe20thcentury. 37Theywerealsorespondingtoamoreawareandrestlesscitizenry
angryaboutcorruptionandmalfeasance.Butatthesametime,manyofthemwerebelieversinthe
ambitionsofChinaasaresurgentglobalpowerandintheideathatthemediasroleisasmuchto
establishpublicconfidenceingovernmentasitistoexposebetrayalsofthepublictrust.
The journalist as watchdog, therefore, is a role that is defined differently across countries
andcultures.Thatdefinitionisfluid,oftencontingentontheexistingsocial,political,andeconomic
conditionsandareflectionasmuchofthehistoricalmomentasitisofpreexistingstructuresand
mediacultures.Journalistsareinspiredbyliberaldemocraticnotionsofthepressaswatchdogbut
theydrawfromthewelloftheirowncultureandhistoryaswell.Theyadjusttheirroledefinitionsto
thedemandsoftheiraudiences,theirnewsorganizations,andofthetimesinwhichtheylive.
Among journalists, watchdogging is not universally seen as a role that the press ought to
play.Thisisthecaseeveninmaturedemocracies.DavidWeaversstudyfoundthatwhilethevast
majorityofBritishandFinnishjournalistsbelievedinthewatchdogfunction,only3040percentof
German and French reporters did.38 And certainly it is possible, as it was in China, that these
perceptions will change. De Burgh and others have argued that it could well be that the pre
eminence of the watchdogging ethos rises and ebbs over time, depending on the appetite of
consumers. Certainly in the United States, public interest in investigative reporting peaked in the
early 1900s and again in the 1970s; in the intervening period, watchdogging did not capture the
imaginationofmanyjournalistsorthepublic.IntheUK,theinterestinexposurejournalismpeaked
inthe1960sandagaininthe1980s.Suchpeaksusuallyoccurduringtimesofsocialferment,when
thereiswidespreadquestioningofauthority,socialmovementsarestrong,andthereisgreatpublic
interestintheexposureofsocialandpoliticalills.
Intheend,awatchdogselfdefinitionhelpschanneljournalisticenergiestoinvestigationsin
places where states and markets create enough of an opening for this kind of reporting. But it
certainly helps to have audience interest and public demand for exposs. While public interest in
watchdogging may be inconstant and fleeting, however, the institutionalization of government
monitoring and investigative reporting in journalistic practice may help ensure that the watchdog
functionremainsalive.Journalismschoolsplayaroleininstillingthewatchdogethosandteaching
13

investigative skills to future generations of journalists. Press associations and other professional
organizationsthatdotrainingininvestigativeskillsalsohelp.Newsorganizationsthatadheretohigh
standards of investigative reporting help build a tradition of watchdog journalism and provide a
model that others can emulate. All these efforts help sustain the notionindeed, the mythof
watchdogreporting,evenifthepracticeitselfflags.
Thewatchdogsimpact
Theproponentsofwatchdogjournalismhavehighhopesforwhatitcando,especiallyinthe
controlofcorruption.Byexposingwrongdoing,theysay,thepresspromptsinvestigationsofthose
involvedinmalfeasanceandcatalyzeschangesinlawsandregulations.Ithelpsshapepublicopinion
againstcorruptgovernmentsandgeneratepublichostilityagainstthosewhoabusetheiroffice.39
In the U.S., media scholars Protess et. al. found that investigative reporting can produce
threetypesofpolicyeffects:Thefirsttypeisdescribedasdeliberative,meaningthereportsresult
inofficialcommitmentstodiscusstheproblemsraisedandthepossiblesolutions;thus,studiesmay
be commissioned or government bodies may initiate hearings to deliberate reform initiatives.
Individualistic results take place when sanctions are applied against individual persons or
enterprisesaccusedofwrongdoing.Substantivereformshappenwhentheinvestigationsresultin
tangible changes in rules, laws, procedures, or policies or new governmental units or bodies are
createdorpublicfundsarereallocated.40
All of these are not in the realm of possibility; they have happened. There are countless
examples from all over the world of how watchdog reporting has helped cause the downfall of
governments, reforms in law or policy, and the creation of new mechanisms of government
accountability. But it should also be said that many welldocumented investigations end up in
oblivion. They maymake waves, winawards,generatecontroversyforacoupleof weeks, butthe
wrongdoings they expose are not acted upon. Certain institutions remain impervious to reform,
whileothersmayinitiatechangesonlytobackslideintothepracticesofthepast.
InhisstudyofinvestigativereportinginLatinAmerica,Waisbordsaidthatfactorsunrelated
to the quality of journalistic work affect the impact of an expos. These include the timing of the
reports release, the prestige of the news organization, and the production values of the
investigation. 41 Scandals involving wellknown figures and sensational details get more public
attentionasdoinvestigationsthatappealtothepublicsvoyeuristicappetites.But,asheshowedin
thecaseofArgentina,whiletheGatetypeofscandalsgeneratebuzz,especiallyinpoliticalcircles,
theyarelargelymetwithpublicindifference.Wherethepublicisaccustomedtohighlevelpolitical
corruption,scandalfatiguecanresult.Incontrast,scandalsonissuesthataffectcitizensdirectly
14

suchashumanrightsabusesinArgentinainthelate1990sareabletoengagepublicsnotusually
interested in politics.

42

In addition, the balance of political forces is an important factor.

Accountability, he said, hinges on the combined actions of a network of institutions such as the
judiciary,parliament,politicalparties.
The Southeast Asian experience affirms these findings. The different outcomes of
journalisticinvestigationsonofficialassetsoneinthePhilippines,andtheother,inThailand,both
in2000showthattheimpactofinvestigativereportsiscontingentupontheconfigurationofsocial
andpoliticalforcesataparticularpointintimeandontheabilityofinterestedpublicstomobilize
againstthewrongdoingthathasbeenexposed.Agreatdealalsodependsonhowthedebateson
therevelationsofwrongdoingareframedinthepublicdiscourse.
In thePhilippines,ateam ofinvestigativereportersuncovered howthenPresident Joseph
Estrada,aformermoviestarwhopubliclyparadedhisfourmistresses,concealedtheassetsofhis
multiplefamilies.ThereportersrevealedthathewasbuildinggrandhousesandbuyingJaguarsfor
hisparamours,acquisitionsthatwerenotreflectedeitherinhisassetdisclosuresorhisincometax
returnsbutwhichwerepurchasedthroughfrontcompaniesornominees.Thereportingimpliedthat
the reason for the nondisclosures was that Estrada had been accumulating wealth from illegal
sourcesandcouldthereforenotmakeafulldisclosurewithoutincriminatinghimself.43
Thesereports,togetherwiththepublicrevelationbyoneofthepresidentsclosestfriends
thathewasmakingmillionsfrompayoffsmadebyillegalgamblers,weresoscandalousthattheylet
loosealltheforcesthathadpreviouslybeenheldincheckbythepresidentspopularity:opposition
politicalparties,theCatholicChurch,citizensgroupswithareformistagenda,andeventhebusiness
community,whichfromthebeginninghadseriousdoubtsaboutthepresidentscapacitytogovern.
Eventually,oppositioncongressmeninitiatedanimpeachmentchargeagainstthepresident.
The investigative reports and the revelations of the gambling whistleblower provided the initial
evidencefortheimpeachmenttrial.Whenitseemedthetrialwasgoingtobecompromised,with
therefusalofthemajorityofsenatorstoacceptincriminatingevidenceagainstEstrada,hundredsof
thousandsofFilipinosmassedupinthecenterofManilainapeoplepoweruprisingthatousted
thepresidentinJanuary2001.
ThedebateonEstradawasframedinmoralterms:hisexcesseswereseenastransgressions
ofthestandardsonhowofficialsshouldbehave.TheCatholicChurch,whichplayedakeyroleinthe
antiEstradamovement,ensuredthatthedebatewouldbefoughtonmoralgrounds.Thekeyactors
intheuprisingweremainlymiddleclassreformers,professionals,students,officeworkers,andkey

15

sectionsoftheManilabusinesscommunity,thesameconstituencythattookpartinthe1986revolt
againstFerdinandMarcos.
AtaboutthesametimethatEstradawasbeingsubjectedtoapublicscrutinyofhisassets,a
similar investigation was happening in Thailand. A Bangkokbased business biweekly revealed that
Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra hid $50million worth of shares in the names of, among
others,hisdriver,housekeeper,securityguard,andmaid.Thaksin,atelecommunicationsandmedia
tycoon,wasamongtherichestbusinessmeninThailand.Aformerpolicegeneral,hehadahistoryof
usinghispoliticalclouttobuildhisbusinessempire.Thepressexposledtoaninvestigationbythe
NationalCounterCorruptionCommission,whichruledthatThaksinhadintentionallyconcealedhis
assetsaspartofadishonestscheme.TherulingwasbroughtuptotheConstitutionalCourt,which
acquittedtheprimeministerinasplitvote.ButunlikeintheEstradacase,therewasnouprisingon
thestreetsofBangkokasaresult.Whythedifferentoutcomesforessentiallysimilarcasesbrought
tothepublicattentionbydiligentinvestigativereportingdoneinthesameyear?
Theanswerliesnotsomuchinthefailureofinvestigativereportingbutinthesuccessofa
mediasavvyprimeministerinchangingtheparametersofthedebateandinframingthediscourse
indifferentterms.ThepressandcivilsocietygroupsinThailandlookedattheThaksincaseaspartof
acontinuum ofpoliticalreformsthathadbeenundertakeninthecountrysinceitwashardhit by
the1997Asiancrisis.Tothem,itwasasimplematteroftheruleoflaw:Theprimeministerliedin
his statement of assets; therefore, he should be punished. Thaksin, however, invoked popularity
against the rule of law. 44 He succeeded in convincing large segments of the public that what he
didusing nomineeswas part of normal business practice. In the face of a critical press, he
broughthiscasedirectlytothepublicandcourtedpopularopinionbyinstitutingpopulistmeasures.
Riding on the phenomenal success of his telecommunications empire, Thaksin told Thais that he
alonecouldboosttheeconomyandgetridofpoverty.
ThedifferencebetweenthePhilippineandThaicaseswasnotjustinthewaythedebatewas
framed,butalsointhemoodofpoliticizedpublics.BothThaksinandEstradawerepopularheadsof
statewithlargeelectoralmandates.Bothalsorepresentedadeparturefromthepast:Thaksinwasa
modernizingbusinessman,notacrustybureaucrat;Estrada,amovieactor,notagreasypolitician.
Bothwereelectedtoheadcountrieswithafreepress,recenthistoriesofpopularmobilization,and
aninfluentialandpoliticallyactivemiddleclass.InthePhilippines,thepoliticalclassmadeupofa
significantsectionoftheelite,theChurch,NGOs,andthemiddleclass,weresoscandalizedbythe
boozing, thieving, and womanizing Estrada that they wanted him out. On the other hand, in
Thailand,thebusinesscommunity,thepoliticians,andthepublicsupportedThaksinandboughtinto

16

hisvisionoftheprimeministerasCEO.Theywerewillingtooverlookhistransgressionsifhecould
deliverandtosomeextent,hedid.45
Certainly, one reason the Estrada investigation caught fire was that it had all the tabloid
ingredientssex and scandal, mansions and mistresses. The issues concerning Thaksin were far
more complicated and far less sexy. For the most part, the most successful investigative reports
havebeenthosethatfocusonindividualwrongdoing,onstorieswithclearvillains,ratherthanon
morecomplexissuesthathavetodowithsocialinequity,injustice,harmfulpublicpolicy,orsocial
andpoliticalstructuresthatlackaccountability.Estradasexcesses,forexample,couldbeseeninthe
lightoftheproblemsinherentinthePhilippinespresidentialformofgovernment,wherethechief
executive holds extraordinary powers unchecked by existing oversight mechanisms. The media,
however, failed to frame the story in a larger context: It was primarily treated as the story of
individualexcess,ratherthanoneofsystemicflaws.
Structures and systems are hard to explain. Journalists throughout the world are
accustomed to dealing with the current and the empirical; they are generally handicapped in
handling systemic, historical or structural questions. Even if they had this skill, however, such
contentwouldfindscantspaceinthecommerciallyorientedmedia.Storiesthathaveahumanand
dramatic element sell better. It is also easier to correct wrongdoing committed by an individual
ratherthanonethatinvolvessystemicorstructuralchange.Investigativejournalists,therefore,try
tohumanizeanddramatizetheirfindingsbyportrayingindividualcharactersandusingliteraryand
dramaticdevicestohighlightthewrongdoingthattheyexpose.46Theyalsotrytoframetheirstories
inawaythatmakesthemeasilyunderstandableto,andappreciatedby,thepublic.
Forsure,theframingcanbewrong,atleastpartially.Theclassicofthegenre,thereporting
on Watergate, has been widely regarded since the 1970s as the touchstone and archetype for
investigative reporting worldwide. The Watergate investigation, more than any other in
contemporarytimes,showedthepowerofthepressinademocracy.Butmorerecentcriticssaythat
Watergatesverdict,asframedbytheliberalpressthatNixonwasuniquelydisgraceful,hisdirect
abuses of power and violation of the law, unprecedentedwas wrong. 47 Other presidents were
guilty of equal, or even greater, betrayals of the public trust. Watergate is instructive in other
respects.Tobeginwith,thepressdidnotuncoverWatergateonitsown:governmentinvestigators
andCongressallplayedarole. 48OthersgosofarastosaythatWatergatewasdrivennotsomuch
by the media or publicopinionbut by politicalinsiders.Thepolitical elitedrovethe reportingand
this resulted in Watergate being defined as a legal issue, rather than a systemic one.49 Certainly
many media investigations in the developing world are Watergatelike in their inception and
framing.
17

Unsurprisingly, Protess and others were skeptical of the mobilization model, which says
that exposs, by changingpublicopinionand mobilizingpublics, ultimately leadtopolicy reforms.
Theremaybealinkbetweenpressexposureandpolicychanges,theysay,butthelinkisweakand
unreliable.50Themediamaychangepublicattitudesbuttheydontnecessarilymobilizethepublic
toparticipateinpoliticallife.Thepressmaybemoreinfluentialinmoldingtheattitudeandbehavior
of political elites, who are much more sensitive to how the media report on them. Protess et. al.
examined six investigative reports and found that policy changes that result from exposs are
sometimes triggered not so much by public outrage but by prepublication transactions between
journalistsandofficials.Therelationshipbetweenmuckrakingreportersandpolicymakerswasnot
alwaysadversarial,butmaybecooperative,whenpressandpolicyagendasoverlap.
All these considerations, however, do not negate the fact that ultimately, whatever the
constellationoffactorsthatledthemthere,expossofwrongdoinginpublicofficecanhelpmake
personnel and policy changes possible if the environment is ripe for reform. They can sometimes
also mobilize the public, but they are often more successful in getting officials to act. While
watchdog reporting may push the wheels of change and reform, however, the media have little
controlofthedirectionthesetakeandtheobstaclestheyface.Theimpactofwatchdogjournalismis
oftendiminishedbytheinertiaofgovernments,theunwillingnessofelitestotakeaction,theweight
ofbureaucraticculturesthatareresistanttochange,alawenforcementsystemthatisincapableof
punishingwrongdoing,andanapatheticandcynicalpublic.
Despite these, Aymo Brunetti and Beatrice Weder argued that watchdog reporting is
potentially a highly effective mechanism of external control against two particularly pernicious
types of corruption. 51 The first type is extortive corruption where a government official has the
power to delay or refuse service in order to get a bribe. The authors posited that the press can
provide a vehicle for voicing complaints about such extortions. Victims, they said, have a strong
incentivetoexposethistypeofcorruptiontojournalists.Pressreports,inturn,increasetherisksof
exposureofcorruptbureaucrats,andovertime,actasadeterrenttoofficialextortions.Thepress,
however, is even more effective against collusive corruption, the authors argued. When there is
collusion,bothbureaucratsandtheirclientshavenoincentivetoexposemalfeasance,asinthecase
of extortive corruption. In a freepress system, however, journalists are motivated by competition
andaprofessionalethostoexposewrongdoing,thusunravelingcollusivearrangementsandmaking
thempublic.
Inthelongterm,itsproponentsargue,watchdogreportinghelpsetsoffavirtuouscycleof
media and governance reforms. Carefully researched, highimpact investigative reports help build
themediascredibilityandsupportamongthepublic.Thepressasaninstitutionisstrengthenedif
18

journalists have demonstrated that they serve the public interest by uncovering malfeasance and
abuse. Not only that, a credible press is assured of popular backing if it is muzzled or otherwise
constrained. Investigative reporting is also seen as contributing to journalistic freedom. By
constantly digging for information, by forcing government and the private sector to release
documents, and by subjecting officials and other powerful individuals to rigorous questioning,
investigativejournalistsexpandtheboundariesofwhatispossibletoprintorair.Atthesametime,
theyaccustomofficialstoaninquisitivepress.Inthelongterm,theconstantgiveandtakebetween
journalistsandofficialshelpsdevelopacultureandatraditionofdisclosure.52Intheend,evenif
in the shortterm, exposs make little impact, they educate citizens and provide information, a
processthatovertimeenrichesdemocraticdiscourse.
Such role is particularly important during democratic transitions, when the media are still
assertingtheirautonomyfromgovernmentandhelpingconstructthenewrulesofengagementwith
officials.Whilesomecriticssaythataggressivereportingongovernmentwrongdoingmaytranslate
into the withdrawal of support for democracy, more recent studies of thirdwave democracies
indicatethatthismaynotbeso.Citizensmayinfactseecriticalreportingasanindicationthatthe
checksandbalancesofdemocracyareatwork.Intheirstudyofthemediainnewdemocraciesin
Europe,SchmittBeckandVoltmerfound thatdespitetheriseofadversarialandsensationalnews
reporting in postauthoritarian media, on the whole, media exposure is conducive to democratic
consolidationandhelpsbuildsupportfordemocracy.53
Thewatchdogsdarkside
There are, however, contrarian views. Some view media exposs not as part of a virtuous
cycleofmediaandpoliticalreformsbutasacomponentofthepoliticsofpermanentscandalthat
characterize modern democracies. 54 In this view, a competitive media, coupled with democratic
institutions and structures to scrutinize wrongdoing, create a hothouse environment for scandal
politics.Thistypeofpoliticsbecomesapermanentfeatureofdemocraciesanddoesnotnecessarily
resultineithercleanergovernmentsormoreresponsiblemedia.Instead,scandalsleadtocynicism
rather than a renewed commitment to democratic values and institutions. These practices are
therefore dysfunctional. They also draw public attention away from other, perhaps more crucial
issuesthatrequireaction.Inmanydevelopingandtransitionsocieties,accusationsofcorruption
played out in the mediaare part of the arsenal of political contestation. The charges of
malfeasance, sometimes made by media organizations friendly with the accusers, have become
regular media fare. Even when the charges are true, wrote Andras Sajo, these may distort
democraticpoliticsasthepoliticalcompetitioncentersupontheopponents(un)cleannesstothe
detriment of other issues that the public needs to address. 55 Transition societies, he added, are
19

particularly prone toward such distortion because many actors both nationally and internationally
areinterestedin (andfund) the exposureof corruptionin these countries:Exposurehas become
professionalized. To others, however, scandal and exposure can play a functional role. One
argument is that scandals are rituals of collective absolution which reaffirm the social order.56
Through scandal, the public becomes part of a morality play and public life is cleansed in the
process. Another perspective knocks down the doomsayers despairing about the adversarial
projection of politics. From this point of view, the media, despite the dominance of scandal and
exposure,generateuseful politicalinformationwhosequalityandquantity exceed thatwhich was
availabletocitizensofanearlierage.Theykeepcitizensinformed,althoughwhatcitizenscanand
shoulddowithsuchinformationisanotherquestion.But,asBrianMcNairasked:Isthere,fromthe
point of view of the efficiency and integrity of the democratic process, an optimal upper limit, as
wellaslower,onthequantityofinformationflowinginasociety,andtheamountofcriticalscrutiny
exercisedbythemediaoverelitesandtheirrhetoric?57
Perhapsthemostattractiveperspectivesettlesforthemiddleground:Scandalandexposure
arecontestedspheres.Theiroutcomesthereforeareuncertain.Themediaandpoliticianscanprofit
fromscandalasmuchaslosefromthem.Theymayleadtotherenewalofapoliticalsystemasmuch
as to disaffection with it. Citizens may find them mere distractions, but they can equally become
outragedandengaged.58Themediasperformanceofitswatchdogfunctioncanbeseeninthesame
way.Asshownintheexamplesabove,theoutcomesofpressexpossareseldomcertain.Theycan
evenendupwiththepressbeingatthelosingend,ifitsmotivesandmethodsarechallenged.No
doubt,pressexposureofcorruptionhasthepotentialtocatalyzegovernancereformsandtoremedy
someofthedeficienciesthathobblethemedia,butitdoesnotalwayssucceedindoingso.Atthe
veryleast,therefore,watchdogreportingoffersatool,awindowforraisingthelevelofdiscourse,
forengagingthepublic,andreconstructingapublicspheremuchdiminishedbytheonslaughtofthe
marketandthestricturesofthestate.Italsokeepsalivethemostbelovedofjournalisticmyths:that
ofthepressastheguardianofthepublicinterest.59Andthat,intheend,maybethemostenduring
impact of watchdog journalism: it sustains the belief among both journalists and citizens that
exposureandvigilancecanchecktheabusesofpower.Itkeepsthefaith.
Insum,itshouldbesaidthatatitsverybest,thewatchdogpresscanmakerealpolicyand
personnelchangespossible.Itcanraisetheawarenessofcitizensaboutwrongdoingandabuseso
that they demand such changes. It pushes important issues into the public sphere that would
otherwise be ignored. It keeps democracy alive by forcing institutions and individuals to be
accountable for what they do. The threat of media exposure helps keep both private and public
institutions honest. A free and independent press is perhaps the most important accountability
20

instrument in democracies. If it does its job well, it becomes the primary guardian of the public
interest. And in the end, by exposing wrongdoing and catalyzing reforms, it renews faith in
democracy and the democratic process. Citizens feel empowered if their outrage over media
expossisreflectedinpublicpolicychanges.Thissenseofpopularempowerment,inturn,leadstoa
moreparticipatoryandresponsivedemocracyaswellasmoreeffectivegovernance.
Policyrecommendations
Byplayingitswatchdogrole,themediahelpbringaboutreformsandinthelongterm,assist
in creating a culture of civic discourse, transparency, and government accountability. While there
are genuine limits to the medias effectiveness and power, the medias capacity to promote good
governanceisenhancediftherightsofthepressareguaranteed,informationismadeavailableto
the media and the public, journalists are protected, and news organizations enjoy editorial
independence and abide by high ethical and professional standards. In addition, the press is most
effective and less prone to capture by vested interests if there is a plurality of media entities
representing diverse views and ownership patters operating in a competitive market as well as
broadpublicaccesstothemedia.Somespecificpolicyinterventionscouldinclude:
Providing a legal and regulatory environment that allows the media to be an effective
watchdog:Thisentailssafeguardingpressindependenceandfreedomaswellasensuringpluralism
in media ownership and points of view. Such pluralism ensures that the medias ability to act as
watchdogisnotconstrainedbytheinterestsorpointsofviewofmediaproprietors.Italsomeans
the establishment of mechanisms that make the media, like government, transparent and
accountable. The watchdog, after all, cannot be effective if it is not credible and accountable for
whatitdoes.Specificreformscaninvolve:

Enactmentoffirmconstitutionalguaranteesofafreepressandfreedomofinformation;

Enactmentandimplementationofliberalfreedomofinformationlaws;

Strengtheningthecourts,the police,andthejusticesystem,andgenerally,theruleof
law,toprovideadequateprotectionforjournalists;

Enabling regulations that would lower the barriers to media ownership and reduce
concentrationofmediaownership;

Establishing independent press councils, mediawatch groups, Ombudsmen, and other

mediaselfregulatorybodiesautonomousfromthegovernment;

Removingrestrictions thatprevent themediafrom playing its watchdog role, such as

the use ofstateadvertisingtocontrolmedia content, onerous licensing requirements,
21

laws that unduly penalize the revelation of state secrets and compel journalists to
revealtheirsourcesandlawsthatcriminalizelibelanddefamation;

Promoting genuine public service media that will provide indepth and informative
reportingaccessibletoasmanycitizensaspossible;whilepublicservicemediamaybe
subsidizedbystatefunds,theyshouldberunindependentlyofgovernment;and

Donor funding for nonprofit investigative reporting efforts as well as support for the
longtermfinancialviabilityofinvestigativenewsorganizations.

Raisingprofessionalandethicalstandards:Thismeansimprovingthelevelofskillsinvarious
areas of journalism, not to mention improving working conditions and raising compensation to
respectable levels. These help raise the social status of watchdog journalists and also make them
lesspronetocorruption.Itisimportanttobuildacommunityofjournalistsboundbyawatchdog
ethosandcommittedtodemocraticprinciples.Journalistsunionsandjournalistsassociationscan
playaroleinthese.Socandonorsthatfundmediadevelopment.Butdonorsshouldalsoappreciate
thelimitsofwhatjournalistscando,thecontingentnatureofnews,andthedemandsofthemarket.
Reformsinthisarenacaninclude:

Trainingjournalistsininvestigativereportingskillsandethicalstandardsandfundingfor
suchefforts;

Teaching investigative reporting in journalism schools and including references to the

watchdogroleofthepressingeneraleducationcurricula;

Institutingawardsandotherformsofrecognitionforexcellenceinwatchdogreporting;

Supporting and providing more funds for investigative journalism courses, whether in
universitiesorelsewhere;

Enactingjournalisticcodesofethicsandinstituting mechanismstoensure thesecodes

are followed; governments should not legislate media ethics, which should be the
domainofthemediathemselves;

Making media organizations more transparent about their ownership, their editorial
decisionmakingprocessandthepressuresandrestraintsonreporting;

Encouraging and supporting free and independent journalist unions and associations
thatpromotepressfreedom,ethicaljournalismandwatchdogreporting;and

Providingbetterpayandjobconditionsforwatchdogjournalists.

22

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FredS.Siebert,TheodorePetersonandWilburSchramm.1963.FourTheoriesofthePress.Urbana

andChicago:UniversityofIllinoisPress.
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FredS.Siebert,TheodorePetersonandWilburSchramm.1963.FourTheoriesofthePress.Urbana

andChicago:UniversityofIllinoisPress.
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ChristineL.Ogan.1980.DevelopmentJournalism/Communication:TheStatusoftheConcept.

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Seethefollowing,forexample:ThomasE.Patterson.1996.BadNews,BadGovernance.Annalsof

theAmericanAcademyofPoliticalandSocialScience,546:97108;RobertD.Putnam,SusanJ.Pharr
andRusselJ.Dalton.2000.Introduction:WhatsTroublingtheTrilateralDemocracies?in
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IsabellaKarlowicz.Nodate.TheDifficultBirthoftheFourthEstate:MediaDevelopmentand

DemocracyAssistanceinthePostConflictBalkans.PolicyDocumentationCenter,CentralEuropean
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9

SeeHowardTumblerandSilvioWaisbord.2004.PoliticalScandalsandMediaacrossDemocracies.

AmericanBehavioralScientist,(47)7;MichaelSchudson.1992.WatergateinAmericanMemory:
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AndrasSajo.2003.Fromcorruptiontoextortion:Conceptualizationofpostcommunist

corruption.Crime,LawandSocialChange.40:171194.

23

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JamesCurran.2005.MediationsofDemocracy.InMassMediaandSociety,4thedition,eds.

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SophieBeach.2004.InChina,NewJournalismandNewThreatsin

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15

HugodeBurgh.2003.Kingswithoutcrowns?Thereemergenceofinvestigativejournalismin

China.Media,Culture&Society,25:801820.
16

OnLatinAmerica,seeSilvioWasibord.2000.WatchdogJournalisminSouthAmerica:News,

Accountability,andDemocracy.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress.OnSoutheastAsia,seeSheila
S.CoronelandHowieG,Severino.2006.InvestigativeReportingforTelevisioninSoutheastAsia.On
China,seeHugodeBurgh.2003.Kingswithoutcrowns?Thereemergenceofinvestigative
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17

DavidProtess,et.al.1991.TheJournalismofOutrage:InvestigativeReportingandAgendaBuilding

inAmerica.NewYork:TheGuildfordPress;HugodeBurgh.2000.InvestigativeJournalism:Context
andPractice.London:Routledge.
18

DatafromtheCommitteetoProtectJournalists,whichkeepsadatabaseofjournalistkillings.See

http://cpj.org/deadly/index.html
19

MashaLipman.2006.RussiasLidontheMedia.WashingtonPost,June15,A27.

20

DorisA.Graber.1986.PressFreedomandtheGeneralWelfare.PoliticalScienceQuarterly.101

(2):257275.
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22

CharlesLewis.2007.TheGrowingImportanceofNonprofitJournalism.TheJoanShorenstein

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24

24

SilvioWasibord.2000.WatchdogJournalisminSouthAmerica:News,Accountability,and

Democracy.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress.
25

SheilaS.CoronelandHowieG,Severino.2006.InvestigativeReportingforTelevisioninSoutheast

Asia.
26

SilvioWasibord.2000.WatchdogJournalisminSouthAmerica:News,Accountability,and

Democracy.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress.SeealsoRudigerSchmittBeckandKatrinVoltmer.
2007.Themassmediainthirdwavedemocracies:gravediggersorseedsmenofdemocratic
consolidation?InDemocracy,IntermediationandVotinginFourContinents,eds.RichardGunther,
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27

DavidKaplan.2007.GlobalInvestigativeJournalism:StrategiesforSupport.Centerfor

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SamarthVaidya.2005.Corruptioninthemediasgaze.EuropeanJournalofPoliticalEconomy,21:

667687.
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ThestudyisbyTorbjornvonKrog,editoroftheSwedishbiweeklyPressensTindig,andiscitedin

VerenigingvanOnderzoeksjournalisten(VVOJ).2006.InvestigativeJournalisminEuropein
http://www.vvoj.nl/cms/vereniging/publicaties/reportaboutjournalismineurope/.
30

See,forexample,VerenigingvanOnderzoeksjournalisten(VVOJ).2006.InvestigativeJournalismin

Europeinhttp://www.vvoj.nl/cms/vereniging/publicaties/reportaboutjournalismineurope/VVOJ
2006;CharlesLewis.2007.TheGrowingImportanceofNonprofitJournalism.TheJoanShorenstein
CenteronthePress,PoliticsandPublicPolicyWorkingPaperSeries;andDavidKaplan.2007.Global
InvestigativeJournalism:StrategiesforSupport.CenterforInternationalMediaAssistanceResearch
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RichardKaplan.2002.PoliticsandtheAmericanPress:TheRiseofObjectivity,18651920.New

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DanielC.Hallin.2004.ComparingMediaSystems:ThreeModelsofMediaandPolitics.NewYork:

CambridgeUniversityPress
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SilvioWasibord.2000.WatchdogJournalisminSouthAmerica:News,Accountability,and

Democracy.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress.
25

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[http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1503785,00.html].
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HugodeBurgh.2003.Kingswithoutcrowns?Thereemergenceofinvestigativejournalismin

China.InMedia,Culture&Society,25:801820.
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HugodeBurgh.2003.Kingswithoutcrowns?Thereemergenceofinvestigativejournalismin

China.InMedia,Culture&Society,25:801820.
38

DavidWeaver(ed.).1998.TheGlobalJournalist:NewsPeoplearoundtheWorld.NewJersey:

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40

DavidProtess,et.al.1991.TheJournalismofOutrage:InvestigativeReportingandAgendaBuilding

inAmerica.NewYork:TheGuildfordPress.
41

SilvioWasibord.2000.WatchdogJournalisminSouthAmerica:News,Accountability,and

Democracy.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress.
42

SilvioWaisbord.2004.Scandals,MediaandCitizenshipinContemporaryArgentina.American

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PhilippineCenterforInvestigativeJournalism.
44

PasukPhongpaichitandChrisBaker.2004.Thaksin:TheBusinessofPoliticsinThailand.Chiang

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PasukPhongpaichitandChrisBaker.2004.Thaksin:TheBusinessofPoliticsinThailand.Chiang

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DavidProtess,et.al.1991.TheJournalismofOutrage:InvestigativeReportingandAgendaBuilding

inAmerica.NewYork:TheGuildfordPress.
47

MichaelSchudson.1992.WatergateinAmericanMemory:HowWeRemember,Forgetand

ReconstructthePast.NewYork:BasicBooks.
48

MichaelSchudson.1992.WatergateinAmericanMemory:HowWeRemember,Forgetand

ReconstructthePast.NewYork:BasicBooks.
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GladysLangandKurtLang.1983.TheBattleforPublicOpinion:ThePresident,ThePressandThe

PollsduringWatergate.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress.
26

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DavidProtess,et.al.1991.TheJournalismofOutrage:InvestigativeReportingandAgendaBuilding

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RudigerSchmittBeckandKatrinVoltmer.2007.Themassmediainthirdwavedemocracies:

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54

HowardTumblerandSilvioWaisbord.2004.PoliticalScandalsandMediaacrossDemocracies:

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AndrasSajo.2003.Fromcorruptiontoextortion:Conceptualizationofpostcommunist

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27