Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of the estate in
her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased,
claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together with her son,
Macikequerox Rosales.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-40789 February 27, 1987

Thus, Irenea Rosales sought the reconsideration of the aforementioned Orders. The trial
court denied her plea. Hence this petition.

INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA C. ROSALES, petitioner,

vs.
FORTUNATO ROSALES, MAGNA ROSALES ACEBES, MACIKEQUEROX ROSALES
and ANTONIO ROSALES, respondents.

In sum, the petitioner poses two (2) questions for Our resolution petition. First is a
widow (surviving spouse) an intestate heir of her mother-in-law? Second are the Orders
of the trial court which excluded the widow from getting a share of the estate in question
final as against the said widow?

Jose B. Echaves for petitioner.

Our answer to the first question is in the negative.

Jose A. Binghay and Paul G. Gorres for respondents.

Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely, those who inherit by their
own right, and those who inherit by the right of representation. 1 Restated, an intestate heir
can only inherit either by his own right, as in the order of intestate succession provided for
in the Civil Code, 2 or by the right of representation provided for in Article 981 of the same
law. The relevant provisions of the Civil Code are:

GANCAYCO, J.:
In this Petition for Review of two (2) Orders of the Court of First Instance of Cebu the
question raised is whether the widow whose husband predeceased his mother can inherit
from the latter, her mother-in-law.
It appears from the record of the case that on February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra V. Rosales, a
resident of Cebu City, died intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunate T.
Rosales and their two (2) children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another
child, Carterio Rosales, predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales,
and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. The estate of the dismissed has an
estimated gross value of about Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).
On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The case was docketed
as Special Proceedings No. 3204-R. Thereafter, the trial court appointed Magna Rosales
Acebes administratrix of the said estate.
In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order dated June 16,
1972 declaring the following in individuals the legal heirs of the deceased and prescribing
their respective share of the estate
Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes (daughter), 1/4;
Macikequerox Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio Rosales son, 1/4.
This declaration was reiterated by the trial court in its Order I dated February 4, 1975.

Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in
their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other
children who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own
right, and the latter by right of representation.
Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shag inherit by right
of representation, and if any one of them should have died, leaving
several heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the
latter in equal portions.
Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children
or their descendants and illegitimate children or their descendants,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, such widow or widower shall be
entitled to the same share as that of a legitimate child.

There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an
intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision which
entitles her to inherit from her mother-in- law either by her own right or by the right of
representation. The provisions of the Code which relate to the order of intestate
succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs
of a decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir. The conspicuous absence of a
provision which makes a daughter-in-law an intestate heir of the deceased all the more
confirms Our observation. If the legislature intended to make the surviving spouse an
intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have so provided in the Code.
Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the provisions of Article
887 of the Civil Code which provides that:
Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate
parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with
respect to their legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287;
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by
those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes
mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner and to the extent
established by this Code.
The aforesaid provision of law 3 refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case
the surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the
estate of a parent-in-law.
Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of the
parent-in-law. We had occasion to make this observation in Lachenal v. Salas, 4 to Wit:
We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be determined in Civil
Case No. 3597 (not in the intestate proceeding) because it affects the

lessee thereof, Lope L. Leoncio, the decedent's son-in-law, who,

although married to his daughter or compulsory heir, is nevertheless a
third person with respect to his estate. ... (Emphasis supplied).
By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil Code aforecited does not
support petitioner's claim. A careful examination of the said Article confirms that the estate
contemplated therein is the estate of the deceased spouse. The estate which is the subject
matter of the intestate estate proceedings in this case is that of the deceased Petra V.
Rosales, the mother-in-law of the petitioner. It is from the estate of Petra V. Rosales that
Macikequerox Rosales draws a share of the inheritance by the right of representation as
provided by Article 981 of the Code.
The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained by Articles 970 and 971
of the Civil Code, viz
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of
which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the
person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have
if he were living or if he could have inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and
not by the person represented. The representative does not succeed
the person represented but the one whom the person represented
would have succeeded. (Emphasis supplied.)
Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is called to succession by law
because of his blood relationship. He does not succeed his father, Carterio Rosales (the
person represented) who predeceased his grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter
whom his father would have succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the same right of
representation as she has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law.
Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her husband Carterio Rosales
he had an inchoate or contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales as compulsory
heir. Be that as it may, said right of her husband was extinguished by his death that is why
it is their son Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded from Petra Rosales by right of
representation. He did not succeed from his deceased father, Carterio Rosales.
On the basis of the foregoing observations and conclusions, We find it unnecessary to
pass upon the second question posed by the petitioner.
Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that a surviving spouse is not an
intestate heir of his or her parent-in-law.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit,
with costs against the petitioner. Let this case be remanded to the trial-court for further
proceedings.

SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA C. ROSALES, petitioner,
vs.
FORTUNATO ROSALES, ET AL
Principle:
A widow/widower cannot inherit from the parent-in-law by right of representation. Article
971 explicitly declares that the representative is called to succession by law because of
blood relationship. The representative does not succeed the person represented but the
one whom the person represented would have succeeded. A widow of the person
represented cannot assert the same right of representation as there is no filiation by blood.
Facts: Petra Rosales is the decedent. She is survived by her husband, their two (2)
children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosales,
predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C.
Rosales, the herein petitioner.
In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order dated June 16,
1972 declaring the following in individuals the legal heirs of the deceased and prescribing
their respective share of the estate
Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes (daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox
Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio Rosales son, 1/4.
These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of the estate in
her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased,
claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together with her son,
Macikequerox Rosales.
Petitioner contends that she is a compulsory heir as enumerated in Art. 887 being the
widow or widower of the son of the decedent and that at the time of the death of her
husband Carterio Rosales he had an inchoate or contingent right to the properties of Petra
Rosales as her compulsory heir.
Issue: Can a widow inherit from the mother-in-law?
Held: NO
There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an
intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision which
entitles her to inherit from her mother-in- law either by her own right or by the right of
representation. The provisions of the Code which relate to the order of intestate
succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs
of a decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir. The conspicuous absence of a

provision which makes a daughter-in-law an intestate heir of the deceased all the more
confirms Our observation. If the legislature intended to make the surviving spouse an
intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have so provided in the Code.
Article 887 refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse
(widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law.
Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of the
parent-in-law.
By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil Code aforecited does not
support petitioner's claim. A careful examination of the said Article confirms that the estate
contemplated therein is the estate of the deceased spouse. The estate which is the subject
matter of the intestate estate proceedings in this case is that of the deceased Petra V.
Rosales, the mother-in-law of the petitioner. It is from the estate of Petra V. Rosales that
Macikequerox Rosales draws a share of the inheritance by the right of representation as
provided by Article 981 of the Code.
The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained by Articles 970 and 971
of the Civil Code, viz
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and
acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have
inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person
represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented but the one
whom the person represented would have succeeded. (Emphasis supplied.)
Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is called to succession by law
because of his blood relationship. He does not succeed his father, Carterio Rosales (the
person represented) who predeceased his grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter
whom his father would have succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the same right of
representation as she has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law.
Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her husband Carterio Rosales
he had an inchoate or contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales as compulsory
heir. Be that as it may, said right of her husband was extinguished by his death that is why
it is their son Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded from Petra Rosales by right of
representation. He did not succeed from his deceased father, Carterio Rosales.

named Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita Dizon, Marina Dizon (herein executrixappellee), Angelina Dizon and Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate granddaughter named Lilia
Dizon, who is the only legitimate child and heir of Ramon Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate
son of the said decedent. Six of these seven compulsory heirs (except Marina Dizon, the
executrix-appellee) are the oppositors-appellants.
The deceased testatrix left a last will executed on February 2, 1960 and written in the
Pampango dialect. Named beneficiaries in her will were the above-named compulsory
heirs, together with seven other legitimate grandchildren, namely Pablo Rivera, Jr., Gilbert
D. Garcia, Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera, Agripina Ayson, Jolly Jimenez and Laureano
Tiambon.
In her will, the testatrix divided, distributed and disposed of all her properties appraised at
P1,801,960.00 (except two small parcels of land appraised at P5,849.60, household
furniture valued at P2,500.00, a bank deposit in the sum of P409.95 and ten shares of
Pampanga Sugar Development Company valued at P350.00) among her above-named
heirs.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24561 June 30, 1970
MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee,
vs.
ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON, JOSEFINA DIZON,
ANGELINA DIZON and LILIA DIZON, oppositors-appellants.
Punzalan, Yabut & Eusebio for executrix-appellee.
Leonardo Abola for oppositors-appellants.

TEEHANKEE, J.:
Appeal from orders of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga approving the Executrixappellee's project of partition instead of Oppositors-Appellants' proposed counter-project of
partition. 1
On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in Angeles,
Pampanga, and was survived by seven compulsory heirs, to wit, six legitimate children

Testate proceedings were in due course commenced 2 and by order dated March 13, 1961,
the last will and testament of the decedent was duly allowed and admitted to probate, and
the appellee Marina Dizon-Rivera was appointed executrix of the testatrix' estate, and
upon her filing her bond and oath of office, letters testamentary were duly issued to her.
After the executrix filed her inventory of the estate, Dr. Adelaido Bernardo of Angeles,
Pampanga was appointed commissioner to appraise the properties of the estate. He filed
in due course his report of appraisal and the same was approved in toto by the lower court
on December 12, 1963 upon joint petition of the parties.
The real and personal properties of the testatrix at the time of her death thus had a total
appraised value of P1,811,695.60, and the legitime of each of the seven compulsory heirs
amounted to P129,362.11. 3 (/7 of the half of the estate reserved for the legitime of
legitimate children and descendants). 4 In her will, the testatrix "commanded that her
property be divided" in accordance with her testamentary disposition, whereby she devised
and bequeathed specific real properties comprising practically the entire bulk of her estate
among her six children and eight grandchildren. The appraised values of the real
properties thus respectively devised by the testatrix to the beneficiaries named in her will,
are as follows:
1. Estela Dizon ....................................... P 98,474.80
2. Angelina Dizon .................................. 106,307.06
3. Bernardita Dizon .................................. 51,968.17
4. Josefina Dizon ...................................... 52,056.39
5. Tomas Dizon ....................................... 131,987.41
6. Lilia Dizon .............................................. 72,182.47
7. Marina Dizon ..................................... 1,148,063.71
8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. ...................................... 69,280.00

9. Lilia Dizon, Gilbert Garcia,

Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera,
Agripina Ayson, Dioli or Jolly
Jimenez, Laureano Tiamzon ................. 72,540.00
Total Value ...................... P1,801,960.01
The executrix filed her project of partition dated February 5, 1964, in substance
adjudicating the estate as follows:
(1) with the figure of P129,254.96 as legitime for a basis Marina
(exacultrix-appellee) and Tomas (appellant) are admittedly considered
to have received in the will more than their respective legitime, while
the rest of the appellants, namely, Estela, Bernardita, Angelina,
Josefina and Lilia received less than their respective legitime;
(2) thus, to each of the latter are adjudicated the properties respectively
given them in the will, plus cash and/or properties, to complete their
respective legitimes to P129,254.96; (3) on the other hand, Marina and
Tomas are adjudicated the properties that they received in the will less
the cash and/or properties necessary to complete the prejudiced
legitime mentioned in number 2 above;
(4) the adjudications made in the will in favor of the grandchildren
remain untouched.<re||an1w>
On the other hand oppositors submitted their own counter-project of
partition dated February 14, 1964, wherein they proposed the
distribution of the estate on the following basis:
(a) all the testamentary dispositions were proportionally reduced to the
value of one-half () of the entire estate, the value of the said one-half
() amounting to P905,534.78; (b) the shares of the OppositorsAppellants should consist of their legitime, plus the devises in their
favor proportionally reduced; (c) in payment of the total shares of the
appellants in the entire estate, the properties devised to them plus other
properties left by the Testatrix and/or cash are adjudicated to them; and
(d) to the grandchildren who are not compulsory heirs are adjudicated
the properties respectively devised to them subject to reimbursement
by Gilbert D. Garcia, et al., of the sums by which the devise in their
favor should be proportionally reduced.
Under the oppositors' counter-project of partition, the testamentary disposition made by the
testatrix of practically her whole estate of P1,801,960.01, as above stated, were proposed
to be reduced to the amounts set forth after the names of the respective heirs and
devisees totalling one-half thereof as follows:

1. Estela Dizon ........................................... P 49,485.56

2. Angelina Dizon ......................................... 53,421.42
3. Bernardita Dizon ....................................... 26,115.04
4. Josefina Dizon .......................................... 26,159.38
5. Tomas V. Dizon ......................................... 65,874.04
6. Lilia Dizon .................................................. 36,273.13
7. Marina Dizon ........................................... 576,938.82
8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. ......................................... 34,814.50
9. Grandchildren Gilbert Garcia et al .......... 36,452.80
T o t a l ................................................... P905,534.78
while the other half of the estate (P905,534.78) would be deemed as constituting the
legitime of the executrix-appellee and oppositors-appellants, to be divided among them in
seven equal parts of P129,362.11 as their respective legitimes.
The lower court, after hearing, sustained and approved the executrix' project of partition,
ruling that "(A)rticles 906 and 907 of the New Civil Code specifically provide that when the
legitime is impaired or prejudiced, the same shall be completed and satisfied. While it is
true that this process has been followed and adhered to in the two projects of partition, it is
observed that the executrix and the oppositors differ in respect to the source from which
the portion or portions shall be taken in order to fully restore the impaired legitime. The
proposition of the oppositors, if upheld, will substantially result in a distribution of intestacy,
which is in controversion of Article 791 of the New Civil Code" adding that "the testatrix has
chosen to favor certain heirs in her will for reasons of her own, cannot be doubted. This is
legally permissible within the limitation of the law, as aforecited." With reference to the
payment in cash of some P230,552.38, principally by the executrix as the largest
beneficiary of the will to be paid to her five co-heirs, the oppositors (excluding Tomas
Dizon), to complete their impaired legitimes, the lower court ruled that "(T)he payment in
cash so as to make the proper adjustment to meet with the requirements of the law in
respect to legitimes which have been impaired is, in our opinion, a practical and valid
solution in order to give effect to the last wishes of the testatrix."
From the lower court's orders of approval, oppositors-appellants have filed this appeal, and
raise anew the following issues: .
1. Whether or not the testamentary dispositions made in the testatrix' will are in the nature
of devises imputable to the free portion of her estate, and therefore subject to reduction;
2. Whether the appellants are entitled to the devise plus their legitime under Article 1063,
or merely to demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code; and
3. Whether the appellants may be compelled to accept payment in cash on account of their
legitime, instead of some of the real properties left by the Testatrix;
which were adversely decided against them in the proceedings below.

The issues raised present a matter of determining the avowed intention of the testatrix
which is "the life and soul of a will." 5 In consonance therewith, our Civil Code included the
new provisions found in Articles 788 and 791 thereof that "(I)f a testamentary disposition
admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by which the
disposition is to be operative shall be preferred" and "(T)he words of a will are to receive
an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one which will
render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to
be preferred which will prevent intestacy." In Villanueva vs. Juico 6 for violation of these
rules of interpretation as well as of Rule 123, section 59 of the old Rules of Court, 7 the
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, overturned the lower court's decision
and stressed that "the intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his
will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to
its execution and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain
and literal meaning of the testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was
otherwise." 8
The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter of
testaments, and to paraphrase an early decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, 9 when
expressed clearly and precisely in his last will amount to the only law whose mandate must
imperatively be faithfully obeyed and complied with by his executors, heirs and devisees
and legatees, and neither these interested parties nor the courts may substitute their own
criterion for the testator's will. Guided and restricted by these fundamental premises, the
Court finds for the appellee.
1. Decisive of the issues at bar is the fact that the testatrix' testamentary disposition was in
the nature of a partition of her estate by will. Thus, in the third paragraph of her will, after
commanding that upon her death all her obligations as well as the expenses of her last
illness and funeral and the expenses for probate of her last will and for the administration
of her property in accordance with law, be paid, she expressly provided that "it is my wish
and I command that my property be divided" in accordance with the dispositions
immediately thereafter following, whereby she specified each real property in her estate
and designated the particular heir among her seven compulsory heirs and seven other
grandchildren to whom she bequeathed the same. This was a valid partition 10 of her
estate, as contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph of Article 1080 of the Civil
Code, providing that "(S)hould a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter
vivos or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the
legitime of the compulsory heirs." This right of a testator to partition his estate is subject
only to the right of compulsory heirs to their legitime. The Civil Code thus provides the
safeguard for the right of such compulsory heirs:
ART. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title
less than the legitime belonging to him may demand that the same be
fully satisfied.
ART. 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or diminish the legitime
of the compulsory heirs shall be reduced on petition of the same,
insofar as they may be inofficious or excessive.

This was properly complied with in the executrix-appellee's project of

partition, wherein the five oppositors-appellants namely Estela,
Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia, were adjudicated the
properties respectively distributed and assigned to them by the testatrix
in her will, and the differential to complete their respective legitimes of
P129,362.11 each were taken from the cash and/or properties of the
executrix-appellee, Marina, and their co-oppositor-appellant, Tomas,
who admittedly were favored by the testatrix and received in the
partition by will more than their respective legitimes.
2. This right of a testator to partition his estate by will was recognized even in Article 1056
of the old Civil Code which has been reproduced now as Article 1080 of the present Civil
Code. The only amendment in the provision was that Article 1080 "now permits
any person (not a testator, as under the old law) to partition his estate by actinter
vivos." 11 This was intended to repeal the then prevailing doctrine 12 that for a testator to
partition his estate by an actinter vivos, he must first make a will with all the formalities
provided by law. Authoritative commentators doubt the efficacy of the amendment 13 but
the question does not here concern us, for this is a clear case of partition by will, duly
admitted to probate, which perforce must be given full validity and effect. Aside from the
provisions of Articles 906 and 907 above quoted, other codal provisions support the
executrix-appellee's project of partition as approved by the lower court rather than the
counter-project of partition proposed by oppositors-appellants whereby they would reduce
the testamentary disposition or partition made by the testatrix to one-half and limit the
same, which they would consider as mere devises or legacies, to one-half of the estate as
the disposable free portion, and apply the other half of the estate to payment of the
legitimes of the seven compulsory heirs. Oppositors' proposal would amount substantially
to a distribution by intestacy and pro tanto nullify the testatrix' will, contrary to Article 791 of
the Civil Code. It would further run counter to the provisions of Article 1091 of the Civil
Code that "(A) partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the
property adjudicated to him."
3. In Habana vs. Imbo, 14 the Court upheld the distribution made in the will of the deceased
testator Pedro Teves of two large coconut plantations in favor of his daughter, Concepcion,
as against adverse claims of other compulsory heirs, as being a partition by will, which
should be respected insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs, in
accordance with Article 1080 of the Civil Code. In upholding the sale made by Concepcion
to a stranger of the plantations thus partitioned in her favor in the deceased's will which
was being questioned by the other compulsory heirs, the Court ruled that "Concepcion
Teves by operation of law, became the absolute owner of said lots because 'A partition
legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to
him' (Article 1091, New Civil Code), from the death of her ancestors, subject to rights and
obligations of the latter, and, she can not be deprived of her rights thereto except by the
methods provided for by law (Arts. 657, 659, and 661, Civil Code). 15 Concepcion Teves
could, as she did, sell the lots in question as part of her share of the proposed partition of
the properties, especially when, as in the present case, the sale has been expressly
recognized by herself and her co-heirs ..."

4. The burden of oppositors' contention is that the testamentary dispositions in their favor
are in the nature of devises of real property, citing the testatrix' repeated use of the words
"I bequeath" in her assignment or distribution of her real properties to the respective heirs.
From this erroneous premise, they proceed to the equally erroneous conclusion that "the
legitime of the compulsory heirs passes to them by operation of law and that the testator
can only dispose of the free portion, that is, the remainder of the estate after deducting the
legitime of the compulsory heirs ... and all testamentary dispositions, either in the nature of
institution of heirs or of devises or legacies, have to be taken from the remainder of the
testator's estate constituting the free portion." 16
Oppositors err in their premises, for the adjudications and assignments in the testatrix' will
of specific properties to specific heirs cannot be considered all devises, for it clearly appear
from the whole context of the will and the disposition by the testatrix of her whole estate
(save for some small properties of little value already noted at the beginning of this
opinion) that her clear intention was to partition her whole estate through her will. The
repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her testamentary dispositions acquire no legal
significance, such as to convert the same into devises to be taken solely from the free onehalf disposable portion of the estate. Furthermore, the testatrix' intent that her testamentary
dispositions were by way of adjudications to the beneficiaries as heirs and not as mere
devisees, and that said dispositions were therefore on account of the respective legitimes
of the compulsory heirs is expressly borne out in the fourth paragraph of her will,
immediately following her testamentary adjudications in the third paragraph in this wise:
"FOURTH: I likewise command that in case any of those I named as my heirs in this
testament any of them shall die before I do, his forced heirs under the law enforced at the
time of my death shall inherit the properties I bequeath to said deceased." 17
Oppositors' conclusions necessarily are in error. The testamentary dispositions of the
testatrix, being dispositions in favor of compulsory heirs, do not have to be taken only from
the free portion of the estate, as contended, for the second paragraph of Article 842 of the
Civil Code precisely provides that "(O)ne who has compulsory heirsmay dispose of his
estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the
legitime of said heirs." And even going by oppositors' own theory of bequests, the second
paragraph of Article 912 Civil Code covers precisely the case of the executrix-appellee,
who admittedly was favored by the testatrix with the large bulk of her estate in providing
that "(T)he devisee who is entitled to a legitime may retain the entire property,provided its
value does not exceed that of the disposable portion and of the share pertaining to him as
legitime." For "diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for making a testament;
otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate." 18 Fundamentally, of course, the
dispositions by the testatrix constituted a partition by will, which by mandate of Article 1080
of the Civil Code and of the other cited codal provisions upholding the primacy of the
testator's last will and testament, have to be respected insofar as they do not prejudice the
legitime of the other compulsory heirs.
Oppositors' invoking of Article 1063 of the Civil Code that "(P)roperty left by will is not
deemed subject to collation, if the testator has not otherwise provided, but the legitime
shall in any case remain unimpaired" and invoking of the construction thereof given by
some authorities that "'not deemed subject to collation' in this article really means not

imputable to or chargeable against the legitime", while it may have some plausibility 19 in
an appropriate case, has no application in the present case. Here, we have a case of a
distribution and partition of the entire estate by the testatrix, without her having made any
previous donations during her lifetime which would require collation to determine the
legitime of each heir nor having left merely some properties by will which would call for the
application of Articles 1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code on collation. The amount of the
legitime of the heirs is here determined and undisputed.
5. With this resolution of the decisive issue raised by oppositors-appellants, the secondary
issues are likewise necessarily resolved. Their right was merely to demand completion of
their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code and this has been complied with in the
approved project of partition, and they can no longer demand a further share from the
remaining portion of the estate, as bequeathed and partitioned by the testatrix principally to
the executrix-appellee.
Neither may the appellants legally insist on their legitime being completed with real
properties of the estate instead of being paid in cash, per the approved project of partition.
The properties are not available for the purpose, as the testatrix had specifically partitioned
and distributed them to her heirs, and the heirs are called upon, as far as feasible to
comply with and give effect to the intention of the testatrix as solemnized in her will, by
implementing her manifest wish of transmitting the real properties intact to her named
beneficiaries, principally the executrix-appellee. The appraisal report of the properties of
the estate as filed by the commissioner appointed by the lower court was approved in
toto upon joint petition of the parties, and hence, there cannot be said to be any question
and none is presented as to fairness of the valuation thereof or that the legitime of
the heirs in terms of cash has been understated. The plaint of oppositors that the
purchasing value of the Philippine peso has greatly declined since the testatrix' death in
January, 1961 provides no legal basis or justification for overturning the wishes and intent
of the testatrix. The transmission of rights to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of death of the decedent (Article 777, Civil Code) and accordingly, the value
thereof must be reckoned as of then, as otherwise, estates would never be settled if there
were to be a revaluation with every subsequent fluctuation in the values of the currency
and properties of the estate. There is evidence in the record that prior to November 25,
1964, one of the oppositors, Bernardita, accepted the sum of P50,000.00 on account of her
inheritance, which, per the parties' manifestation, 20 "does not in any way affect the
adjudication made to her in the projects of partition of either party as the same is a mere
advance of the cash that she should receive in both projects of partition." The payment in
cash by way of making the proper adjustments in order to meet the requirements of the law
on non-impairment of legitimes as well as to give effect to the last will of the testatrix has
invariably been availed of and sanctioned. 21 That her co-oppositors would receive their
cash differentials only now when the value of the currency has declined further, whereas
they could have received them earlier, like Bernardita, at the time of approval of the project
of partition and when the peso's purchasing value was higher, is due to their own decision
of pursuing the present appeal.
ACCORDINGLY, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed. Without cost.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Barredo
and Villamor, JJ., concur.
MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee,
vs.
ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON, JOSEFINA DIZON,
ANGELINA DIZON and LILIA DIZON, oppositors-appellants.
33 SCRA 554 (1970)
The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some
effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative. Of the two projects
of partition submitted by the contending parties, that project which will give the greatest effect
to the testamentary disposition should be adopted. Thus, where the testatrix enumerated the
specific properties to be given to each compulsory heir and the testatrix repeatedly used the
words "I bequeath" was interpreted to mean a partition of the estate by an act mortis causa,
rather than as an attempt on her part to give such properties as devises to the designated
beneficiaries. Accordingly, the specific properties assigned to each compulsory heir were
deemed to be in full or partial payment of legitime, rather than a distribution in the nature of
devises.
The tenor of the decision notwithstanding, it is important to note the provision of Article 886
which reads: "Legitime is that part of the testator's property which he cannot dispose of
because the law has reserved it for certain heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory heirs."
Article 886 is couched upon a negative prohibition "cannot dispose of". In the will under
consideration, the testatrix disposed of practically her entire estate by designating a beneficiary
for each property. Necessarily, the testamentary dispositions included that portion of the estate
called "legitime." It is thus imperative to reconcile the tenor of Article 1080 (which is the basis of
the following decision) with Article 886.
FACTS: In 1961, Agripina Valdez (widow) died and was survived by seven compulsory heirs:
6 legitimate children and 1 legitimate granddaughter. Marina is the appellee while the others
were the appellants
1.
2.

3.
4.

Valdez left a w ill executed in February 1960 and written in Pampango. The
beneficiaries were the 7 compulsory heirs and six grandchildren
In her will, Valdez distributed and disposed of her properties (assessed at P1.8
million) which included real and personal properties and shares of stocks at
Pampanga Sugar Central Devt Co
During the probate proceedings, Marina (appellee) was name the executor of the
deceaseds estate
In her will, Valdez commanded that her property be divided in accordance with her
testamentary disposition where she devised and bequeathed specific real properties
comprising almost her entire estate among her heirs. Based on the partition, Marina
and Tomas were to receive more than the other heirs

5.

6.
7.

Subsequently, Marina filed her project of partition adjudicating the estate as follows:
a. the legitime computed for each compulsory heir was P129,254.96, which was
comprised of cash and/or properties specifically given to them based on the will
b. Marina and Tomas were adjudicated the properties that they received in the will
less the cash/properties to complete their respective legitime
The other heirs opposed the partition and proposed a counter-partition on the estate
where Marina and Tomas were to receive considerably less
The lower court approved the executors project of partition citing that Art 906 and
907 NCC specifically provide that when the legitime is impaired or prejudiced, the
same shall be completed. The court cited that if the proposition of the oppositors was
upheld, it will substantially result in a distribution of intestacy which is a violation of
Art 791 NCC

ISSUE: WON the last will of the deceased is to be considered controlling in this case
HELD: Yes. Art 788 and 791 NCC provide that "If a testamentary disposition admits of
different interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition is to be
operative shall be preferred" and "The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will
give to every expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions
inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent
intestacy." In Villanueva v. Juico, the SC held that "the intentions and wishes of the testator,
when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all
questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be settled in
accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the testator's words,
unless it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise."
The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter of
testaments, and to paraphrase an early decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, when
expressed clearly and precisely in his last will, amount to the only law whose mandate must
imperatively be faithfully obeyed and complied with by his executors, heirs and devisees and
legatees, and neither these interested parties nor the courts may substitute their own criterion
for the testator's will. Thus, the oppositors proposition for partition cannot be given effect.
ON PARTITION: The testamentary disposition of the decedent was in the nature of a
partition. In her will, the decedent noted that after commanding that upon her death all her
obligations as well as the expenses of her last illness and funeral and the expenses for the
probate of her last will and for the administration of her property in accordance with law, be
paid, she expressly provided that "it is my wish and I command that my property be
divided" in accordance with the dispositions immediately thereafter following, whereby
she specified each real property in her estate and designated the particular heir among
her seven compulsory heirs and seven other grandchildren to whom she bequeathed
the same. This was a valid partition of her estate, as contemplated and authorized in the
first paragraph of Art 1080 NCC, providing that "Should a person make a partition of his

estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it
does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs."
CAB: This was properly complied with in the executors project of partition as the oppositors
were adjudicated the properties respectively distributed and assigned to them by the decedent
in her will and the differential to complete their legitimes were taken from the cash and/or
properties of Marina and Tomas, who were obviously favored by the decedent in her will.
Aside from the provisions of Art 906 and 907, other codal provisions support the executrixappellee's project of partition as approved by the lower court rather than the counter-project of
partition proposed by oppositors-appellants whereby they would reduce the testamentary
disposition or partition made by the testatrix to one-half and limit the same, which they would
consider as mere devises and legacies, to one-half of the estate as the disposable free
portion, and apply the other half of the estate to payment of the legitimes of the seven
compulsory heirs. Oppositors' proposal would amount substantially to a distribution by
intestacy and pro tanto nullify the testatrix's will, contrary to Art 791 NCC.
EFFECT OF PARTITION: 'A partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive
ownership of the property adjudicated to him", from the death of her ancestors, subject to
rights and obligations of the latter, and, she cannot be deprived of her rights thereto except by
the methods provided for by law
DEVISES: The adjudication and assignments in the testatrix's will of specific properties to
specific heirs cannot be considered all devises, for it clearly appears from the whole context of
the will and the dispositions by the testatrix of her whole estate (save for some small properties
of little value already noted at the beginning of this opinion) that her clear intention was to
partition her whole estate through her will. Furthermore, the testatrix's intent that her
testamentary dispositions were by way of adjudications to the beneficiaries as heirs and not as
mere devisees, and that said dispositions were therefore on account of the respective
legitimes of the compulsory heirs is expressly borne out in the fourth paragraph of her will,
immediately following her testamentary adjudications in the third paragraph in this wise:
"FOURTH: I likewise command that in case any of those I named as my heirs in this testament
any of them shall die before I do, his forced heirs under the law enforced at the time of my
death shall inherit the properties I bequeath to said deceased."
COLLATION: Collation is not applicable in this case because here, distribution and partition of
the entire estate was made by the testatrix, without her having made any previous donations
during her lifetime which would require collation to determine the legitime of each heir nor
having left merely some properties by will which would call for the application of Art 1061 to
1063 of the Civil Code on collation.
CAN THE OPPOSITORS DEMAND MORE THAN THEIR LEGITIME? No. Their right was
merely to demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code and this has
been complied with in the approved project of partition, and they can no longer demand a
further share from the remaining portion of the estate, as bequeathed and partitioned by the
testatrix principally to the executrix-appellee.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
BUHAY DE ROMA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and FELICIDAD CARINGAL, as Guardian of
Rosalinda de Roma,respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Candelaria de Roma had two legally adopted daughters, Buhay de Roma and Rosalinda de
Roma. She died intestate on April 30, 1971, and administration proceedings were instituted in
the Court of First Instance of Laguna by the private respondent as guardian of Rosalinda. Buhay
was appointed administratrix and in due time filed an inventory of the estate. This was opposed
by Rosalinda on the ground that certain properties earlier donated by Candelaria to Buhay, and
the fruits thereof, had not been included.1
The properties in question consisted of seven parcels of coconut land worth P10,297.50.2 There
is no dispute regarding their evaluation; what the parties cannot agree upon is whether these
lands are subject to collation. The private respondent rigorously argues that it is, conformably to
Article 1061 of the Civil Code. Buhay, for her part, citing Article 1062, claims she has no
obligation to collate because the decedent prohibited such collation and the donation was not
officious.
The two articles provide as follows:
Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must
bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received
from the decedent during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other
gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of
each heir, and in the account of the partition.
Article 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the
donor should have so expressly provided, or if the donor should repudiate
the inheritance, unless the donation should be reduced as inofficious.
The issue was resolved in favor of the petitioner by the trial court,* which held that the
decedent, when she made the donation in favor of Buhay, expressly prohibited
collation. Moreover, the donation did not impair the legitimes of the two adopted

daughters as it could be accommodated in, and in fact was imputed to, the free
portion of Candelaria's estate.3

provision was merely directory and failure to decide on time would not deprive the corresponding
courts of jurisdiction or render their decisions invalid.

On appeal, the order of the trial court was reversed, the respondent court** holding that
the deed of donation contained no express prohibition to collate as an exception to
Article 1062. Accordingly, it ordered collation and equally divided the net estate of the
decedent, including the fruits of the donated property, between Buhay and Rosalinda.4

It is worth stressing that the aforementioned provision has now been reworded in Article VIII,
Section 15, of the 1987 Constitution, which also impresses upon the courts of justice, indeed
with greater urgency, the need for the speedy disposition of the cases that have been clogging
their dockets these many years. Serious studies and efforts are now being taken by the Court to
meet that need.

The pertinent portions of the deed of donation are as follows:

IKALAWA. Na alang-alang sa aking pagmamahal, pagtingin at pagsisilbi sa akin ng
aking anak na si BUHAY DE ROMA, kasal kay Arabella Castaneda, may karampatang
gulang, mamamayang Pilipino at naninirahan at may pahatirang-sulat din dito sa
Lunsod ng San Pablo sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito ay kusang-loob kong
ibinibigay, ipinagkakaloob at inililipat sa nabanggit na BUHAY DE ROMA, sa kanyang
mga kahalili at tagapagmana, sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing
muli, ang lahat ng mga lagay ng lupa na sinasabi sa itaas, sa ilalim ng kasunduan na
ngayon pa ay siya na ang nagmamay-aring tunay ng mga lupang ito at kanya nang
maaring ipalipat ang mga hoja declaratoria ng mga lupang ito sa kanyang pangalan,
datapwa't samantalang ako ay nabubuhay, ay ako rin ang makikinabang sa mga
mapuputi at mamomosesion sa mga nasabing lupa;
IKATLO. Na pinagtibay ko na ako ay marami pang ibang mga pag-aari sa sapat pang
aking ikabuhay at sa pagbibigay kong ito ay hindi masisira ang legitimate ng mga tao
na dapat magmana sa akin, sapagkat ang mga lupang sinasabi sa itaas ay bahagui
ng aking kabuhayan na ako ay may layang ipamigay kahit na kaninong tao na kung
tawagin ay Libre Disposicion. 5
We agree with the respondent court that there is nothing in the above provisions expressly
prohibiting the collation of the donated properties. As the said court correctly observed, the
phrase "sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli" merely described the
donation as "irrevocable" and should not be construed as an express prohibition against
collation.6 The fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the subject thereof
from the collation required under Article 1061.
We surmise from the use of such terms as "legitime" and "free portion" in the deed of donation
that it was prepared by a lawyer, and we may also presume he understood the legal
consequences of the donation being made. It is reasonable to suppose, given the precise
language of the document, that he would have included therein an express prohibition to collate
if that had been the donor's intention.
Anything less than such express prohibition will not suffice under the clear language of Article
1062.1awphil The suggestion that there was an implied prohibition because the properties
donated were imputable to the free portion of the decedent's estate merits little consideration.
Imputation is not the question here, nor is it claimed that the disputed donation is officious The
sole issue is whether or not there was an express prohibition to collate, and we see none.
The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and unequivocally as an
exception to the general rule announced in Article 1062. Absent such a clear indication of that
intention, we apply not the exception but the rule, which is categorical enough.
There is no need to dwell long on the other error assigned by the petitioner regarding the
decision of the appealed case by the respondent court beyond the 12-month period prescribed
by Article X, Section 11 (1) of the 1973 Constitution. As we held in Marcelino v. Cruz,7 the said

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the petitioner. It is
so ordered.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 89783 February 19, 1992

MARIANO B. LOCSIN, JULIAN J. LOCSIN, JOSE B. LOCSIN, AUREA B. LOCSIN,
MATILDE L. CORDERO, SALVADOR B. LOCSIN and MANUEL V. DEL
ROSARIO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE JAUCIAN, FLORENTINO JAUCIAN,
MERCEDES JAUCIAN ARBOLEDA, HEIRS OF JOSEFINA J. BORJA, HEIRS OF
EDUARDO JAUCIAN and HEIRS OF VICENTE JAUCIAN, respondents.
Aytona Law Office and Siquia Law Offices for petitioners.
Mabella, Sangil & Associates for private respondents.

NARVASA, C.J.:
Reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV-11186 affirming with
modification the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Albay in favor of the plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 7152 entitled "Jose Jaucian, et al. v. Mariano B. Locsin, et al.," an action for
recovery of real property with damages is sought. in these proceedings initiated by
petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The petition was initially denied due course and dismissed by this Court. It was however
reinstated upon a second motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners, and the
respondents were required to comment thereon. The petition was thereafter given due
course and the parties were directed to submit their memorandums. These, together with
the evidence, having been carefully considered, the Court now decides the case.

First, the facts as the Court sees them in light of the evidence on record:
The late Getulio Locsin had three children named Mariano, Julian and Magdalena, all
surnamed Locsin. He owned extensive residential and agricultural properties in the
provinces of Albay and Sorsogon. After his death, his estate was divided among his three
(3) children as follows:
(a) the coconut lands of some 700 hectares in Bual, Pilar, Sorsogon, were adjudicated to
his daughter, Magdalena Locsin;
(b) 106 hectares of coconut lands were given to Julian Locsin, father of the petitioners
Julian, Mariano, Jose, Salvador, Matilde, and Aurea, all surnamed Locsin;
(c) more than forty (40) hectares of coconut lands in Bogtong, eighteen (18) hectares of
riceland in Daraga, and the residential lots in Daraga, Albay and in Legazpi City went to his
son Mariano, which Mariano brought into his marriage to Catalina Jaucian in 1908.
Catalina, for her part, brought into the marriage untitled properties which she had inherited
from her parents, Balbino Jaucian and Simona Anson. These were augmented by other
properties acquired by the spouses in the course of their union, 1 which however was not
blessed with children.
Eventually, the properties of Mariano and Catalina were brought under the Torrens System.
Those that Mariano inherited from his father, Getulio Locsin, were surveyed cadastrally
and registered in the name of "Mariano Locsin, married to Catalina Jaucian.'' 2
Mariano Locsin executed a Last Will and Testament instituting his wife, Catalina, as the
sole and universal heir of all his properties. 3 The will was drawn up by his wife's nephew
and trusted legal adviser, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. Attorney Lorayes disclosed that the
spouses being childless, they had agreed that their properties, after both of them shall
have died should revert to their respective sides of the family, i.e., Mariano's properties
would go to his "Locsin relatives" (i.e., brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces), and
those of Catalina to her "Jaucian relatives." 4
Don Mariano Locsin died of cancer on September 14, 1948 after a lingering illness. In due
time, his will was probated in Special Proceedings No. 138, CFI of Albay without any
opposition from both sides of the family. As directed in his will, Doa Catalina was
appointed executrix of his estate. Her lawyer in the probate proceeding was Attorney
Lorayes. In the inventory of her husband's estate 5 which she submitted to the probate
court for approval, 6Catalina declared that "all items mentioned from Nos. 1 to 33 are the
private properties of the deceased and form part of his capital at the time of the marriage
with the surviving spouse, while items Nos. 34 to 42 are conjugal." 7
Among her own and Don Mariano's relatives, Doa Catalina was closest to her nephew,
Attorney Salvador Lorayes, her nieces, Elena Jaucian, Maria Lorayes-Cornelio and Maria
Olbes-Velasco, and the husbands of the last two: Hostilio Cornelio and Fernando
Velasco. 8 Her trust in Hostilio Cornelio was such that she made him custodian of all the
titles of her properties; and before she disposed of any of them, she unfailingly consulted
her lawyer-nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. It was Atty. Lorayes who prepared the
legal documents and, more often than not, the witnesses to the transactions were her
niece Elena Jaucian, Maria Lorayes-Cornelio, Maria Olbes-Velasco, or their husbands. Her
niece, Elena Jaucian, was her life-long companion in her house.

Don Mariano relied on Doa Catalina to carry out the terms of their compact, hence, nine
(9) years after his death, as if in obedience to his voice from the grave, and fully cognizant
that she was also advancing in years, Doa Catalina began transferring, by sale, donation
or assignment, Don Mariano's as well as her own, properties to their respective nephews
and nieces. She made the following sales and donation of properties which she had
received from her husband's estate, to his Locsin nephews and nieces:
EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/SQ.M. PRICE WITNESSES
23 Jan. 26, 1957 Deed of Absolute Sale in 962 P 481
favor of Mariano Locsin
1-JRL Apr. 7, 1966 Deed of Sale in favor of 430,203 P 20,000
Jose R. Locsin
1-JJL Mar. 22, 1967 Deed of Sale in favor of 5,000 P 1,000 Hostilio Cornello
Julian Locsin (Lot 2020) Helen M. Jaucian
1 Nov. 29, 1974 Deed of Donation in 26,509
favor Aurea Locsin,
Matilde L. Cordero
and Salvador Locsin
2 Feb. 4, 1975 Deed of Donation in 34,045
favor Aurea Locsin,
Matilde L. Cordero
and Salvador Locsin
3 Sept. 9, 1975 Deed of Donation in (Lot 2059)
favor Aurea Locsin,
Matilde L. Cordero
and Salvador Locsin
4 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,424 Hostilio Cornelio
favor of Aurea B. Locsin Fernando Velasco
5 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,456 P 5,750 Hostilio Cornelio
favor of Aurea B. Locsin Elena Jaucian
6 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,237 P 5,720 - ditto favor of Aurea B. Locsin
7 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,404 P 4,050 - ditto favor of Aurea B. Locsin
15 Nov. 26, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 261 P 4,930 - ditto Aurea Locsin

16 Oct. 17, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 533 P 2,000 Delfina Anson
Aurea Locsin M. Acabado

30 Apr. 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 31 P 1,000

favor of Inocentes Motocinos

17 Nov. 26, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 373 P 1,000 Leonor Satuito
Aurea Locsin Mariano B. Locsin

31 Feb. 12, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 150 P 1,500

favor of Casimiro Mondevil

19 Sept. 1, 1975 Conditional Donation in 1,130 P 3,000 - ditto favor of Mariano Locsin

32 Mar. 1, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 112 P 1,200

favor of Juan Saballa

1-MVRJ Dec. 29, 1972 Deed of Reconveyance 1,5110.66 P 1,000 Delfina Anson
in favor of Manuel V. del (Lot 2155) Antonio Illegible
Rosario whose maternal
grandfather was Getulio
Locsin

25 Dec. 28, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 250 P 2,500

of Rogelio Marticio

2-MVRJ June 30, 1973 Deed of Reconveyance 319.34 P 500 Antonio Illegible
in favor of Manuel V. del (Lot 2155) Salvador Nical
Rosario but the rentals
from bigger portion of
Lot 2155 leased to Filoil
Refinery were assigned to
Maria Jaucian Lorayes
Cornelio
Of her own properties, Doa Catalina conveyed the following to her own nephews and
nieces and others:
EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/SQ.M. PRICE
2-JJL July 16, 1964 Deed of Sale in favor 5,000 P 1,000
Vicente Jaucian (lot 2020)
(6,825 sqm. when
resurveyed)
24 Feb. 12, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale 100 P 1,000
in favor of Francisco M.
Maquiniana
26 July 15, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 130 P 1,300
favor of Francisco
Maquiniana
27 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 100 P 1,000
favor of Ireneo Mamia
28 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 75 P 750
favor of Zenaida Buiza
29 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 150 P 1,500
favor of Felisa Morjella

Doa Catalina died on July 6, 1977.

Four years before her death, she had made a will on October 22, 1973 affirming and
ratifying the transfers she had made during her lifetime in favor of her husband's, and her
own, relatives. After the reading of her will, all the relatives agreed that there was no need
to submit it to the court for probate because the properties devised to them under the will
had already been conveyed to them by the deceased when she was still alive, except
some legacies which the executor of her will or estate, Attorney Salvador Lorayes,
proceeded to distribute.
In 1989, or six (6) years after Doa Catalina's demise, some of her Jaucian nephews and
nieces who had already received their legacies and hereditary shares from her estate, filed
action in the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City (Branch VIII, Civil Case No. 7152) to
recover the properties which she had conveyed to the Locsins during her lifetime, alleging
that the conveyances were inofficious, without consideration, and intended solely to
circumvent the laws on succession. Those who were closest to Doa Catalina did not join
the action.
After the trial, judgment was rendered on July 8, l985 in favor of the plaintiffs (Jaucian),
and against the Locsin defendants, the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment for the plaintiffs and
against the defendants:
(1) declaring the, plaintiffs, except the heirs of Josefina J. Borja and
Eduardo Jaucian, who withdrew, the rightful heirs and entitled to the
entire estate, in equal portions, of Catalina Jaucian Vda. de Locsin,
being the nearest collateral heirs by right of representation of Juan and
Gregorio, both surnamed Jaucian, and full-blood brothers of Catalina;
(2) declaring the deeds of sale, donations, reconveyance and exchange
and all other instruments conveying any part of the estate of Catalina J.
Vda. de Locsin including, but not limited to those in the inventory of
known properties (Annex B of the complaint) as null and void ab-initio;
(3) ordering the Register of Deeds of Albay and/or Legazpi City to
cancel all certificates of title and other transfers of the real properties,

subject of this case, in the name of defendants, and derivatives

therefrom, and issue new ones to the plaintiffs;
(4) ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to reconvey
ownership and possession of all such properties to the plaintiffs,
together with all muniments of title properly endorsed and delivered,
and all the fruits and incomes received by the defendants from the
estate of Catalina, with legal interest from the filing of this action; and
where reconveyance and delivery cannot be effected for reasons that
might have intervened and prevent the same, defendants shall pay for
the value of such properties, fruits and incomes received by them, also
with legal interest from the filing, of this case
(5) ordering each of the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the amount of
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and the further sum of P20,000.00
each as moral damages; and
(6) ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs attorney's fees and
litigation expenses, in the amount of P30,000.00 without prejudice to
any contract between plaintiffs and counsel.
Costs against the defendants. 9
The Locsins appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. CV-11186) which rendered its
now appealed judgment on March 14, 1989, affirming the trial court's decision.
The petition has merit and should be granted.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the private respondents,
nephews and nieces of Doa Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin, entitled to inherit the properties
which she had already disposed of more than ten (10) years before her death. For those
properties did not form part of her hereditary estate, i.e., "the property and transmissible
rights and obligations existing at the time of (the decedent's) death and those which have
accrued thereto since the opening of the succession." 10 The rights to a person's
succession are transmitted from the moment of his death, and do not vest in his heirs until
such time. 11 Property which Doa Catalina had transferred or conveyed to other persons
during her lifetime no longer formed part of her estate at the time of her death to which her
heirs may lay claim. Had she died intestate, only the property that remained in her estate
at the time of her death devolved to her legal heirs; and even if those transfers were, one
and all, treated as donations, the right arising under certain circumstances to impugn and
compel the reduction or revocation of a decedent's gifts inter vivos does not inure to the
respondents since neither they nor the donees are compulsory (or forced) heirs. 12
There is thus no basis for assuming an intention on the part of Doa Catalina, in
transferring the properties she had received from her late husband to his nephews and
nieces, an intent to circumvent the law in violation of the private respondents' rights to her
succession. Said respondents are not her compulsory heirs, and it is not pretended that
she had any such, hence there were no legitimes that could conceivably be impaired by
any transfer of her property during her lifetime. All that the respondents had was
an expectancy that in nowise restricted her freedom to dispose of even her entire estate

subject only to the limitation set forth in Art. 750, Civil Code which, even if it were
breached, the respondents may not invoke:
Art. 750. The donation may comprehend all the present property of the
donor or part thereof, provided he reserves, in full ownership or in
usufruct, sufficient means for the support of himself, and of all relatives
who, at the time of the acceptance of the donation, are by law entitled
to be supported by the donor. Without such reservation, the donation
shall be reduced on petition of any person affected. (634a)
The lower court capitalized on the fact that Doa Catalina was already 90 years old when
she died on July 6, 1977. It insinuated that because of her advanced years she may have
been imposed upon, or unduly influenced and morally pressured by her husband's
nephews and nieces (the petitioners) to transfer to them the properties which she had
inherited from Don Mariano's estate. The records do not support that conjecture.
For as early as 1957, or twenty-eight (28) years before her death, Doa Catalina had
already begun transferring to her Locsin nephews and nieces the properties which she
received from Don Mariano. She sold a 962-sq.m. lot on January 26, 1957 to his nephew
and namesake Mariano Locsin II. 13 On April 7, 1966, or 19 years before she passed away,
she also sold a 43 hectare land to another Locsin nephew, Jose R. Locsin. 14 The next
year, or on March 22, 1967, she sold a 5,000-sq.m. portion of Lot 2020 to Julian Locsin. 15
On March 27, 1967, Lot 2020 16 was partitioned by and among Doa Catalina, Julian
Locsin, Vicente Jaucian and Agapito Lorete. 17 At least Vicente Jaucian, among the other
respondents in this case, is estopped from assailing the genuineness and due execution of
the sale of portions of Lot 2020 to himself, Julian Locsin, and Agapito Lorete, and the
partition agreement that he (Vicente) concluded with the other co-owners of Lot 2020.
Among Doa, Catalina's last transactions before she died in 1977 were the sales of
property which she made in favor of Aurea Locsin and Mariano Locsin in 1975. 18
There is not the slightest suggestion in the record that Doa Catalina was mentally
incompetent when she made those dispositions. Indeed, how can any such suggestion be
made in light of the fact that even as she was transferring properties to the Locsins, she
was also contemporaneously disposing of her other properties in favor of the Jaucians?
She sold to her nephew, Vicente Jaucian, on July 16, 1964 (21 years before her death)
one-half (or 5,000 sq.m.) of Lot 2020. Three years later, or on March 22, 1967, she sold
another 5000 sq.m. of the same lot to Julian Locsin. 19
From 1972 to 1973 she made several other transfers of her properties to her relatives and
other persons, namely: Francisco Maquiniana, Ireneo Mamia, Zenaida Buiza, Feliza
Morjella, Inocentes Motocinos, Casimiro Mondevil, Juan Saballa and Rogelio
Marticio. 20 None of those transactions was impugned by the private respondents.
In 1975, or two years before her death, Doa Catalina sold some lots not only to Don
Mariano's niece, Aurea Locsin, and his nephew, Mariano Locsin
II, 21 but also to her niece, Mercedes Jaucian Arboleda. 22 If she was competent to make
that conveyance to Mercedes, how can there be any doubt that she was equally competent
to transfer her other pieces of property to Aurea and Mariano II?

The trial court's belief that Don Mariano Locsin bequeathed his entire estate to his wife,
from a "consciousness of its real origin" which carries the implication that said estate
consisted of properties which his wife had inherited from her parents, flies in the teeth of
Doa Catalina's admission in her inventory of that estate, that "items 1 to 33 are the private
properties of the deceased (Don Mariano) and forms (sic) part of his capital at the time of
the marriage with the surviving spouse, while items 34 to 42 are conjugal properties,
acquired during the marriage." She would have known better than anyone else whether the
listing included any of her paraphernal property so it is safe to assume that none was in
fact included. The inventory was signed by her under oath, and was approved by the
probate court in Special Proceeding No. 138 of the Court of First Instance of Albay. It was
prepared with the assistance of her own nephew and counsel, Atty. Salvador Lorayes, who
surely would not have prepared a false inventory that would have been prejudicial to his
aunt's interest and to his own, since he stood to inherit from her eventually.
This Court finds no reason to disbelieve Attorney Lorayes' testimony that before Don
Mariano died, he and his wife (Doa Catalina), being childless, had agreed that their
respective properties should eventually revert to their respective lineal relatives. As the
trusted legal adviser of the spouses and a full-blood nephew of Doa Catalina, he would
not have spun a tale out of thin air that would also prejudice his own interest.
Little significance, it seems, has been attached to the fact that among Doa Catalina's
nephews and nieces, those closest to her: (a) her lawyer-nephew Attorney Salvador
Lorayes; (b) her niece and companion Elena Jaucian: (c) her nieces Maria Olbes-Velasco
and Maria Lorayes-Cornelio and their respective husbands, Fernando Velasco and Hostilio
Cornelio, did not join the suit to annul and undo the dispositions of property which she
made in favor of the Locsins, although it would have been to their advantage to do so.
Their desistance persuasively demonstrates that Doa Catalina acted as a completely free
agent when she made the conveyances in favor of the petitioners. In fact, considering their
closeness to Doa Catalina it would have been well-nigh impossible for the petitioners to
employ "fraud, undue pressure, and subtle manipulations" on her to make her sell or
donate her properties to them. Doa Catalina's niece, Elena Jaucian, daughter of her
brother, Eduardo Jaucian, lived with her in her house. Her nephew-in-law, Hostilio
Cornelio, was the custodian of the titles of her properties. The sales and donations which
she signed in favor of the petitioners were prepared by her trusted legal adviser and
nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. The (1) deed of donation dated November 19,
1974 23 in favor of Aurea Locsin, (2) another deed of donation dated February 4, 1975 24 in
favor of Matilde Cordero, and (3) still another deed dated September 9, 1975 25 in favor of
Salvador Lorayes, were all witnessed by Hostilio Cornelio (who is married to Doa
Catalina's niece, Maria Lorayes) and Fernando Velasco who is married to another niece,
Maria Olbes. 26The sales which she made in favor of Aurea Locsin on July 15, 1974 27 were
witnessed by Hostilio Cornelio and Elena Jaucian. Given those circumstances, said
transactions could not have been anything but free and voluntary acts on her part.
Apart from the foregoing considerations, the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in
not dismissing this action for annulment and reconveyance on the ground of prescription.
Commenced decades after the transactions had been consummated, and six (6) years
after Doa Catalina's death, it prescribed four (4) years after the subject transactions were
recorded in the Registry of Property, 28 whether considered an action based on fraud, or
one to redress an injury to the rights of the plaintiffs. The private respondents may not
feign ignorance of said transactions because the registration of the deeds was constructive
notice thereof to them and the whole world. 29

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision dated March 14, 1989 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 11186 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The private
respondents' complaint for annulment of contracts and reconveyance of properties in Civil
Case No. 7152 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch VIII of Legazpi City, is DISMISSED,
with costs against the private respondents, plaintiffs therein.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Mariano B. Locsin v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 89783; February 19, 1992
Facts:
Mariano inherited extensive property from his father Getulio. He brought his inheritance
into his marriage with Catalina Jaucian. Catalina, for her part, brought into the marriage
untitled properties which she had inherited from her parents.
Mariano Locsin executed a last will and testament instituting his wife as the sole and
universal heir of all his properties. The spouses being childless, they had agreed that their
properties, after both of them shall have died should revert to their respective sides of the
family. After Mariano's death, (1948) his will was probated without opposition from both
sides of the family. Nine years after the death of Don Mariano, Catalina began transferring,
by sale, donation or assignment, Mariano's as well as her own, props to their respective
nephews and nieces.
Catalina died in 1977. Four years before her death, she made a will affirming the transfers
she made. Six years after her demise, some of Catalina's nephews and nieces filed an
action in the RTC of Legaspi to recover the properties which she had conveyed to the
Locsins, alleging that the conveyances were innoficious, without consideration, and
intended solely to circumvent the laws on succession. After the trial, judgment was
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Issue:
WON the PRs are entitled to inherit the properties which Catalina had already disposed of
more than 10 yrs before her death.
Held:
No. The properties did not form part of her hereditary estate. The rights to a persons
succession are transmitted from the moment of his death, and do not vest in his heirs until
such time. 11 Property which Doa Catalina had transferred or conveyed to other persons
during her lifetime no longer formed part of her estate at the time of her death to which her
heirs may lay claim. Had she died intestate, only the property that remained in her estate
at the time of her death devolved to her legal heirs; and even if those transfers were, one
and all, treated as donations, the right arising under certain circumstances to impugn and

compel the reduction or revocation of a decedent's gifts inter vivos does not inure to the
respondents since neither they nor the donees are compulsory (or forced) heirs.
There is thus no basis for assuming an intention on the part of Doa Catalina, in
transferring the properties she had received from her late husband to his nephews and
nieces, an intent to circumvent the law in violation of the private respondents' rights to her
succession. Said respondents are not her compulsory heirs, and it is not pretended that
she had any such, hence there were no legitimes that could conceivably be impaired by
any transfer of her property during her lifetime. All that the respondents had was an
expectancy that in nowise restricted her freedom to dispose of even her entire estate
subject only to the limitation set forth in Art. 750, Civil Code which, even if it were
breached, the respondents may not invoke.

FIRST DIVISION

[G. R. No. 136773. June 25, 2003]

MILAGROS
MANONGSONG,
joined
by
her
husband,
CARLITO
MANONGSONG, petitioners,
vs. FELOMENA
JUMAQUIO
ESTIMO,
EMILIANA JUMAQUIO, NARCISO ORTIZ, CELESTINO ORTIZ, RODOLFO
ORTIZ, ERLINDA O. OCAMPO, PASTOR ORTIZ, JR., ROMEO ORTIZ
BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ, SR., BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ, JR., AURORA
NICOLAS, GLORIA RACADIO, ROBERTO DELA CRUZ, JOSELITO DELA
CRUZ and LEONCIA S. LOPEZ, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before this Court is a petition for review [1] assailing the Decision[2] of 26 June 1998
and the Resolution of 21 December 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
51643. The Court of Appeals reversed the Decision dated 10 April 1995 of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 135, in Civil Case No. 92-1685, partitioning the property
in controversy and awarding to petitioners a portion of the property.

Antecedent Facts

Spouses Agatona Guevarra (Guevarra) and Ciriaco Lopez had six (6) children,
namely: (1) Dominador Lopez; (2) Enriqueta Lopez-Jumaquio, the mother of respondents
Emiliana Jumaquio Rodriguez and Felomena Jumaquio Estimo (Jumaquio sisters); (3)
Victor Lopez, married to respondent Leoncia Lopez; (4) Benigna Lopez-Ortiz, the mother
of respondents Narciso, Celestino, Rodolfo, Pastor Jr. and Romeo Ortiz, and Erlinda Ortiz
Ocampo; (5) Rosario Lopez-dela Cruz, married to respondent Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr. and

the mother of respondents Benjamin Jr., Roberto, and Joselito, all surnamed dela Cruz,
and of Gloria dela Cruz Racadio and Aurora dela Cruz Nicolas; and (6) Vicente Lopez, the
father of petitioner Milagros Lopez Manongsong (Manongsong).
The contested property is a parcel of land on San Jose Street, Manuyo Uno, Las
Pias, Metro Manila with an area of approximately 152 square meters (Property). The
records do not show that the Property is registered under the Torrens system. The
Property is particularly described in Tax Declaration No. B-001-00390 [3] as bounded in the
north by Juan Gallardo, south by Calle Velay, east by Domingo Lavana and west by San
Jose Street. Tax Declaration No. B-001-00390 was registered with the Office of the
Municipal Assessor of Las Pias on 30 September 1984 in the name of Benigna Lopez, et
al.[4] However, the improvements on the portion of the Property denominated as No. 831
San Jose St., Manuyo Uno, Las Pias were separately declared in the name of Filomena J.
Estimo under Tax Declaration No. 90-001-02145 dated 14 October 1991.[5]
Milagros and Carlito Manongsong (petitioners) filed a Complaint [6] on 19 June 1992,
alleging that Manongsong and respondents are the owners pro indiviso of the
Property. Invoking Article 494 of the Civil Code, [7] petitioners prayed for the partition and
award to them of an area equivalent to one-fifth (1/5) of the Property or its prevailing
market value, and for damages.
Petitioners alleged that Guevarra was the original owner of the Property. Upon
Guevarras death, her children inherited the Property. Since Dominador Lopez died without
offspring, there were only five children left as heirs of Guevarra. Each of the five children,
including Vicente Lopez, the father of Manongsong, was entitled to a fifth of the
Property. As Vicente Lopez sole surviving heir, Manongsong claims her fathers 1/5 share
in the Property by right of representation.
There is no dispute that respondents, who are the surviving spouses of Guevarras
children and their offspring, have been in possession of the Property for as long as they
can remember. The area actually occupied by each respondent family differs, ranging in
size from approximately 25 to 50 square meters. Petitioners are the only descendants not
occupying any portion of the Property.
Most respondents, specifically Narciso, Rodolfo, Pastor Jr., and Celestino Ortiz, and
Erlinda Ortiz Ocampo (Ortiz family), as well as Benjamin Sr., Benjamin Jr., and Roberto
dela Cruz, Aurora dela Cruz Nicolas and Gloria Dela Cruz Racadio (Dela Cruz family),
entered into a compromise agreement with petitioners. Under the Stipulation of Facts and
Compromise Agreement[8] dated 12 September 1992 (Agreement), petitioners and the
Ortiz and Dela Cruz families agreed that each group of heirs would receive an equal share
in the Property. The signatories to the Agreement asked the trial court to issue an order of
partition to this effect and prayed further that those who have exceeded said one-fifth (1/5)
must be reduced so that those who have less and those who have none shall get the
correct and proper portion.[9]
Among the respondents, the Jumaquio sisters and Leoncia Lopez who each occupy
50 square meter portions of the Property and Joselito dela Cruz, did not sign the
Agreement.[10] However, only the Jumaquio sisters actively opposed petitioners claim. The
Jumaquio sisters contended that Justina Navarro (Navarro), supposedly the mother of
Guevarra, sold the Property to Guevarras daughter Enriqueta Lopez Jumaquio.
The Jumaquio sisters presented provincial Tax Declaration No. 911[11] for the year
1949 in the sole name of Navarro. Tax Declaration No. 911 described a residential parcel
of land with an area of 172.51 square meters, located on San Jose St., Manuyo, Las Pias,
Rizal with the following boundaries: Juan Gallardo to the north, I. Guevarra Street to the
south, Rizal Street to the east and San Jose Street to the west. In addition, Tax Declaration

No. 911 stated that the houses of "Agatona Lopez" and "Enriquita Lopez" stood on the
Property as improvements.
The Jumaquio sisters also presented a notarized KASULATAN SA BILIHAN NG
LUPA[12] (Kasulatan) dated 11 October 1957, the relevant portion of which states:
AKO SI JUSTINA NAVARRO, sapat ang gulang, may asawa, Pilipino at naninirahan sa
LAS PIAS, ay siyang nagma-may-ari at nagtatangkilik ng isang lagay na lupa na
matatagpuan sa Manuyo, Las Pias, Rizal, lihis sa anomang pagkakautang lalong
napagkikilala sa pamamagitan ng mga sumusunod na palatandaan:
BOUNDARIES:
NORTH: JUAN GALLARDO SOUTH: I. GUEVARRA ST. EAST: RIZAL
ST., WEST: SAN JOSE ST.,
na may sukat na 172.51 metros cuadrados na may TAX DECLARATION
BILANG 911.
NA DAHIL AT ALANG ALANG sa halagang DALAWANG DAAN LIMANGPUNG PISO
(P250.00), SALAPING PILIPINO, na sa akin ay kaliwang iniabot at ibinayad ni
ENRIQUETA LOPEZ, may sapat na gulang, Pilipino, may asawa at naninirahan sa Las
Pias, Rizal, at sa karapatang ito ay aking pinatutunayan ng pagkakatanggap ng nasabing
halaga na buong kasiyahan ng aking kalooban ay aking IPINAGBILI, ISINALIN AT
INILIPAT sa nasabing, ENRIQUETA LOPEZ, sa kanyang mga tagapagmana at kahalili,
ang kabuuang sukat ng lupang nabanggit sa itaas nito sa pamamagitan ng bilihang walang
anomang pasubali. Ang lupang ito ay walang kasama at hindi taniman ng palay o mais.
Simula sa araw na ito ay aking ililipat ang pagmamay-ari at pagtatangkilik ng nasabing
lupa kay ENRIQUETA LOPEZ sa kanilang/kanyang tagapagmana at kahalili x x x.
The Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Manila certified on 1 June 1994 that
the KASULATAN SA BILIHAN NG LUPA, between Justina Navarro (Nagbili) and Enriqueta
Lopez (Bumili), was notarized by Atty. Ruperto Q. Andrada on 11 October 1957 and
entered in his Notarial Register xxx. [13] The certification further stated that Atty. Andrada
was a duly appointed notary public for the City of Manila in 1957.
Because the Jumaquio sisters were in peaceful possession of their portion of the
Property for more than thirty years, they also invoked the defense of acquisitive
prescription against petitioners, and charged that petitioners were guilty of laches. The
Jumaquio sisters argued that the present action should have been filed years earlier, either
by Vicente Lopez when he was alive or by Manongsong when the latter reached legal
age. Instead, petitioners filed this action for partition only in 1992 when Manongsong was
already 33 years old.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

After trial on the merits, the trial court in its Decision [14] of 10 April 1995 ruled in favor
of petitioners. The trial court held that the Kasulatan was void, even absent evidence
attacking its validity. The trial court declared:
It appears that the ownership of the estate in question is controverted. According to
defendants Jumaquios, it pertains to them through conveyance by means of a Deed of
Sale executed by their common ancestor Justina Navarro to their mother Enriqueta, which
deed was presented in evidence as Exhs. 4 to 4-A. Plaintiff Milagros Manongsong debunks
the evidence as fake. The document of sale, in the observance of the Court, is however
duly authenticated by means of a certificate issued by the RTC of the Manila Clerk of Court
as duly notarized public document (Exh. 5). No countervailing proof was adduced by
plaintiffs to overcome or impugn the documents legality or its validity.
xxx The conveyance made by Justina Navarro is subject to nullity because the property
conveyed had a conjugal character. No positive evidence had been introduced that it was
solely a paraphernal property. The name of Justina Navarros spouse/husband was not
mentioned and/or whether the husband was still alive at the time the conveyance was
made to Justina Navarro. Agatona Guevarra as her compulsory heir should have the legal
right to participate with the distribution of the estate under question to the exclusion of
others. She is entitled to her legitime. The Deed of Sale [Exhs 4 & 4-1(sic)] did not at all
provide for the reserved legitime or the heirs, and, therefore it has no force and effect
against Agatona Guevarra and her six (6) legitimate children including the grandchildren,
by right of representation, as described in the order of intestate succession. The same
Deed of Sale should be declared a nullity ab initio. The law on the matter is clear. The
compulsory heirs cannot be deprived of their legitime, except on (sic) cases expressly
specified by law like for instance disinheritance for cause. xxx (Emphasis supplied)

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioners, in their appellees brief before the Court of Appeals, presented for the first
time a supposed photocopy of the death certificate [16] of Guevarra, which stated that
Guevarras mother was a certain Juliana Gallardo. Petitioner also attached an
affidavit[17]from Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr. attesting that he knew Justina Navarro only by
name and had never met her personally, although he had lived for some years with
Agatona Guevarra after his marriage with Rosario Lopez. On the basis of these
documents, petitioners assailed the genuineness and authenticity of the Kasulatan.
The Court of Appeals refused to take cognizance of the death certificate and affidavit
presented by petitioners on the ground that petitioners never formally offered these
documents in evidence.
The appellate court further held that the petitioners were bound by their admission
that Navarro was the original owner of the Property, as follows:
Moreover, plaintiffs-appellees themselves admitted before the trial court that Justina
Navarro and not Juliana Gallardo was the original owner of the subject property and was
the mother of Agatona Navarro (sic). Plaintiffs-appellees in their Reply-Memorandum
averred:
As regards the existence of common ownership, the defendants clearly admit as follows:
xxx xxx xxx

Since the other respondents had entered into a compromise agreement with
petitioners, the dispositive portion of the trial courts decision was directed against the
Jumaquio sisters only, as follows:

History of this case tells us that originally the property was owned by JUSTINA NAVARRO
who has a daughter by the name of AGATONA GUEVARRA who on the other hand has six
children namely: xxx xxx xxx.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs

and against the remaining active defendants, Emiliana Jumaquio and Felomena J.
Estimo, jointly and severally, ordering:

which point-out that co-ownership exists on the property between the parties. Since this is
the admitted history, facts of the case, it follows that there should have been proper
document to extinguish this status of co-ownership between the common owners either by
(1) Court action or proper deed of tradition, xxx xxx xxx.

1. That the property consisting of 152 square meters referred to above be immediately
partitioned giving plaintiff Milagros Lopez-Manongsong her lawful share of 1/5 of the area
in square meters, or the prevailing market value on the date of the decision;
2. Defendants to pay plaintiffs the sum of P10,000.00 as compensatory damages for
having deprived the latter the use and enjoyment of the fruits of her 1/5 share;
3. Defendants to pay plaintiffs litigation expenses and attorneys fee in the sum
of P10,000.00; and

The trial court confirms these admissions of plaintiffs-appellees. The trial court held:
xxx xxx xxx
With the parties admissions and their conformity to a factual common line of relationship of
the heirs with one another, it has been elicited ascendant Justina Navarro is the common
ancestor of the heirs herein mentioned, however, it must be noted that the parties failed to
amplify who was the husband and the number of compulsory heirs of Justina
Navarro. xxx xxx xxx

4. Defendants to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

[15]

(Emphasis supplied)

When the trial court denied their motion for reconsideration, the Jumaquio sisters
appealed to the Court of Appeals.

Therefore, plaintiffs-appellees cannot now be heard contesting the fact that Justina
Navarro was their common ancestor and was the original owner of the subject property.

The Court of Appeals further held that the trial court erred in assuming that the
Property was conjugal in nature when Navarro sold it. The appellate court reasoned as
follows:
However, it is a settled rule that the party who invokes the presumption that all property of
marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership, must first prove that the property was
acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coveture is a condition sine
qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership.
In this case, not a single iota of evidence was submitted to prove that the subject property
was acquired by Justina Navarro during her marriage. xxx

4. WHETHER THE RULE OF THE MAJORITY CO-OWNERS ON THE LAND

SHOULD PREVAIL;
5. WHETHER THE ALLEGED SALE IS VALID AND BINDS THE OTHER COHEIRS;
6. WHETHER PRESCRIPTION APPLIES AGAINST THE SHARE OF
PETITIONERS.[21]
The fundamental question for resolution is whether petitioners were able to prove, by
the requisite quantum of evidence, that Manongsong is a co-owner of the Property and
therefore entitled to demand for its partition.

The findings of the trial court that the subject property is conjugal in nature is not supported
by any evidence.
To the contrary, records show that in 1949 the subject property was declared, for taxation
purposes under the name of Justina Navarro alone. This indicates that the land is the
paraphernal property of Justina Navarro.
For these reasons, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. A new one is hereby rendered DISMISSING plaintiffs-appellees complaint in
so far as defendants-appellants are concerned.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition lacks merit.

The issues raised by petitioners are mainly factual in nature. In general, only
questions of law are appealable to this Court under Rule 45. However, where the factual
findings of the trial court and Court of Appeals conflict, this Court has the authority to
review and, if necessary, reverse the findings of fact of the lower courts. [22] This is precisely
the situation in this case.
We review the factual and legal issues of this case in light of the general rules of
evidence and the burden of proof in civil cases, as explained by this Court in Jison v.
Court of Appeals :[23]

Costs against plaintiffs-appellees.

SO ORDERED.[18]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals denied the
same in its Resolution of 21 December 1998.[19]
On 28 January 1999, petitioners appealed the appellate courts decision and
resolution to this Court. The Court initially denied the petition for review due to certain
procedural defects. The Court, however, gave due course to the petition in its Resolution of
31 January 2000.[20]

The Issues

Petitioners raise the following issues before this Court:

1. WHETHER PETITIONER HAS NO COUNTERVAILING EVIDENCE ON THE
ALLEGED SALE BY ONE JUSTINA NAVARRO;
2. WHETHER THERE IS PRETERITION AND THE ISSUES RAISED ARE
REVIEWABLE;
3. WHETHER THERE IS CO-OWNERSHIP PRO INDIVISO;

xxx Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and
upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. However, in the course of
trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the
burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff's prima facie case, otherwise,
a verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the
burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to
rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendants.
The concept of preponderance of evidence refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or
more convincing, that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of
truth.

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the validity of the

Kasulatan sa Bilihan ng Lupa

Petitioners anchor their action for partition on the claim that Manongsong is a coowner or co-heir of the Property by inheritance, more specifically, as the heir of her father,
Vicente Lopez. Petitioners likewise allege that the Property originally belonged to
Guevarra, and that Vicente Lopez inherited from Guevarra a 1/5 interest in the Property. As
the parties claiming the affirmative of these issues, petitioners had the burden of proof to
establish their case by preponderance of evidence.
To trace the ownership of the Property, both contending parties presented tax
declarations and the testimonies of witnesses. However, the Jumaquio sisters also

presented a notarized KASULATAN SA BILIHAN NG LUPA which controverted petitioners

claim of co-ownership.
The Kasulatan, being a document acknowledged before a notary public, is a public
document and prima facie evidence of its authenticity and due execution. To assail the
authenticity and due execution of a notarized document, the evidence must be clear,
convincing and more than merely preponderant.[24] Otherwise the authenticity and due
execution of the document should be upheld. [25] The trial court itself held that (n)o
countervailing proof was adduced by plaintiffs to overcome or impugn the documents
legality or its validity.[26]
Even if the Kasulatan was not notarized, it would be deemed an ancient document
and thus still presumed to be authentic. The Kasulatan is: (1) more than 30 years old, (2)
found in the proper custody, and (3) unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance
of suspicion. It appears, on its face, to be genuine.[27]
Nevertheless, the trial court held that the Kasulatan was void because the Property
was conjugal at the time Navarro sold it to Enriqueta Lopez Jumaquio. We do not
agree. The trial courts conclusion that the Property was conjugal was not based on
evidence, but rather on a misapprehension of Article 160 of the Civil Code, which provides:
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.

belatedly attached these documents to their appellees brief. Petitioners could easily have
offered these documents during the proceedings before the trial court. Instead, petitioners
presented these documents for the first time on appeal without any explanation. For
reasons of their own, petitioners did not formally offer in evidence these documents before
the trial court as required by Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. [33] To admit these
documents now is contrary to due process, as it deprives respondents of the opportunity to
examine and controvert them.
Moreover, even if these documents were admitted, they would not controvert
Navarros ownership of the Property. Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr.s affidavit stated merely that,
although he knew Navarro by name, he was not personally acquainted with her.
[34]
Guevarras alleged birth certificate casts doubt only as to whether Navarro was indeed
the mother of Guevarra. These documents do not prove that Guevarra owned the Property
or that Navarro did not own the Property.
Petitioners admitted before the trial court that Navarro was the mother of
Guevarra. However, petitioners denied before the Court of Appeals that Navarro was the
mother of Guevarra. We agree with the appellate court that this constitutes an
impermissible change of theory. When a party adopts a certain theory in the court below,
he cannot change his theory on appeal. To allow him to do so is not only unfair to the other
party, it is also offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. [35]

As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, the presumption under Article 160 of
the Civil Code applies only when there is proof that the property was acquired during the
marriage. Proof of acquisition during the marriage is an essential condition for the
operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. [28]

If Navarro were not the mother of Guevarra, it would only further undermine
petitioners case. Absent any hereditary relationship between Guevarra and Navarro, the
Property would not have passed from Navarro to Guevarra, and then to the latters children,
including petitioners, by succession. There would then be no basis for petitioners claim of
co-ownership by virtue of inheritance from Guevarra. On the other hand, this would not
undermine respondents position since they anchor their claim on the sale under
theKasulatan and not on inheritance from Guevarra.

There was no evidence presented to establish that Navarro acquired the Property
during her marriage. There is no basis for applying the presumption under Article 160 of
the Civil Code to the present case. On the contrary, Tax Declaration No. 911 showed that,
as far back as in 1949, the Property was declared solely in Navarros name. [29] This tends to
support the argument that the Property was not conjugal.

Since the notarized Kasulatan is evidence of greater weight which petitioners failed
to refute by clear and convincing evidence, this Court holds that petitioners were not able
to prove by preponderance of evidence that the Property belonged to Guevarras
estate.There is therefore no legal basis for petitioners complaint for partition of the
Property.

We likewise find no basis for the trial courts declaration that the sale embodied in
the Kasulatan deprived the compulsory heirs of Guevarra of their legitimes. As opposed to
a disposition inter vivos by lucrative or gratuitous title, a valid sale for valuable
consideration does not diminish the estate of the seller. When the disposition is for
valuable consideration, there is no diminution of the estate but merely a substitution of
values,[30] that is, the property sold is replaced by the equivalent monetary consideration.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of 26 June 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV

No. 51643, dismissing the complaint of petitioners against Felomena Jumaquio Estimo and
Emiliana Jumaquio, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Under Article 1458 of the Civil Code, the elements of a valid contract of sale are: (1)
consent or meeting of the minds; (2) determinate subject matter and (3) price certain in
money or its equivalent.[31] The presence of these elements is apparent on the face of
theKasulatan itself. The Property was sold in 1957 for P250.00.[32]
Milagros Manongsong v. FelomenaJumaquio Estimo
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not admitting the documents presented by
petitioners for the first time on appeal

We find no error in the Court of Appeals refusal to give any probative value to the
alleged birth certificate of Guevarra and the affidavit of Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr. Petitioners

G. R. No. 136773. June 25, 2003

FACTS:
Allegedly, AgatonaGuevarra (Guevarra) inherited a property from Justina Navarro, which
is now under possession of the heirs of Guevarra. Guevarra had six children, one of them
is Vicente Lopez, the father of petitioner Milagros Lopez Manongsong (Manongsong).

The respondents, the Jumaquio sisters and Leoncia Lopez claimed that the property was
actually sold to them by Justina Navarro prior to her death. The respondents
presented deed of sale dated October 11, 1957. Milagros and CarlitoManongsong
(petitioners) filed a Complaint on June 19, 1992 praying for the partition and award to
them of an area equivalent to one-fifth (1/5), by right of representation. The RTC ruled that
the conveyance made by Justina Navarro is subject to nullity because the property
conveyed had aconjugal character and that AgatonaGuevarra as her compulsory heir
should have the legal right to participate with the distribution of the estate under question
to the exclusion of others. The Deed of Sale did not at all provide for the reserved legitime
or the heirs, and, therefore it has no force and effect against AgatonaGuevarra and should
be declared a nullity ab initio.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the rights of the compulsory heirs were impaired by the alleged sale of the
property by Justina.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

RULING:
No. The Kasulatan, being a document acknowledged before a notary public, is
a public document andprima facie evidence of its authenticity and due execution. There is
no basis for the trial courts declaration that the sale embodied in the Kasulatan deprived
the compulsory heirs of Guevarra of their legitimes. As opposed to a disposition inter vivos
by lucrative or gratuitous title, a valid sale for valuable consideration does not diminish the
estate of the seller. When the disposition is for valuable consideration, there is
no diminution of the estate but merely a substitution of values, that is, the property sold is
replaced by the equivalent monetary consideration. The Property was sold in 1957 for
P250.00.
The trial courts conclusion that the Property was conjugal, hence the sale is void ab
initio was not based on evidence, but rather on a misapprehension of Article 160 of the
Civil Code, which provides: All property of the marriage is presumed to belong
to the conjugal partnership; unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife. The presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code applies only
when there is proof that the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of
acquisition during the marriage is an essential condition for the operation of the
presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. There was no evidence presented to
establish that Navarro acquired the Property during her marriage.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 126376

November 20, 2003

SPOUSES BERNARDO BUENAVENTURA and CONSOLACION JOAQUIN, SPOUSES

JUANITO EDRA and NORA JOAQUIN, SPOUSES RUFINO VALDOZ and EMMA
JOAQUIN, and NATIVIDAD JOAQUIN, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES LEONARDO JOAQUIN and FELICIANA LANDRITO,
SPOUSES FIDEL JOAQUIN and CONCHITA BERNARDO, SPOUSES TOMAS
JOAQUIN and SOLEDAD ALCORAN, SPOUSES ARTEMIO JOAQUIN and SOCORRO
ANGELES, SPOUSES ALEXANDER MENDOZA and CLARITA JOAQUIN, SPOUSES
TELESFORO CARREON and FELICITAS JOAQUIN, SPOUSES DANILO VALDOZ and
FE JOAQUIN, and SPOUSES GAVINO JOAQUIN and LEA ASIS, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari 1 to annul the Decision2 dated 26 June 1996 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41996. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
Decision3 dated 18 February 1993 rendered by Branch 65 of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati ("trial court") in Civil Case No. 89-5174. The trial court dismissed the case after it
found that the parties executed the Deeds of Sale for valid consideration and that the
plaintiffs did not have a cause of action against the defendants.
The Facts
The Court of Appeals summarized the facts of the case as follows:

Defendant spouses Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito are the parents of plaintiffs
Consolacion, Nora, Emma and Natividad as well as of defendants Fidel, Tomas, Artemio,
Clarita, Felicitas, Fe, and Gavino, all surnamed JOAQUIN. The married Joaquin children
are joined in this action by their respective spouses.
Sought to be declared null and void ab initio are certain deeds of sale of real property
executed by defendant parents Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito in favor of their
co-defendant children and the corresponding certificates of title issued in their names, to
wit:
1. Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-C-7 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd256395 executed on 11 July 1978, in favor of defendant Felicitas Joaquin, for a
consideration of P6,000.00 (Exh. "C"), pursuant to which TCT No. [36113/T-172]
was issued in her name (Exh. "C-1");
2. Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-I-3 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd256394 executed on 7 June 1979, in favor of defendant Clarita Joaquin, for a
consideration of P1[2],000.00 (Exh. "D"), pursuant to which TCT No. S-109772
was issued in her name (Exh. "D-1");
3 Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-I-1 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd256394 executed on 12 May 1988, in favor of defendant spouses Fidel Joaquin
and Conchita Bernardo, for a consideration of P54,[3]00.00 (Exh. "E"), pursuant
to which TCT No. 155329 was issued to them (Exh. "E-1");
4. Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-I-2 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd256394 executed on 12 May 1988, in favor of defendant spouses Artemio
Joaquin and Socorro Angeles, for a consideration ofP[54,3]00.00 (Exh. "F"),
pursuant to which TCT No. 155330 was issued to them (Exh. "F-1"); and
5. Absolute Sale of Real Property covering Lot 168-C-4 of subdivision plan (LRC)
Psd-256395 executed on 9 September 1988, in favor of Tomas Joaquin, for a
consideration of P20,000.00 (Exh. "G"), pursuant to which TCT No. 157203 was
issued in her name (Exh. "G-1").
6. Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-C-1 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd256395 executed on 7 October 1988, in favor of Gavino Joaquin, for a
consideration of P25,000.00 (Exh. "K"), pursuant to which TCT No. 157779 was
issued in his name (Exh. "K-1").]
In seeking the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid deeds of sale and certificates of title,
plaintiffs, in their complaint, aver:
- XXThe deeds of sale, Annexes "C," "D," "E," "F," and "G," [and "K"] are simulated as they are,
are NULL AND VOIDAB INITIO because
a) Firstly, there was no actual valid consideration for the deeds of sale xxx over
the properties in litis;

b) Secondly, assuming that there was consideration in the sums reflected in the
questioned deeds, the properties are more than three-fold times more valuable
than the measly sums appearing therein;
c) Thirdly, the deeds of sale do not reflect and express the true intent of the
parties (vendors and vendees); and
d) Fourthly, the purported sale of the properties in litis was the result of a
deliberate conspiracy designed to unjustly deprive the rest of the compulsory
heirs (plaintiffs herein) of their legitime.
- XXI Necessarily, and as an inevitable consequence, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 36113/T172, S-109772, 155329, 155330, 157203 [and 157779] issued by the Registrar of Deeds
over the properties in litis xxx are NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
Defendants, on the other hand aver (1) that plaintiffs do not have a cause of action against
them as well as the requisite standing and interest to assail their titles over the properties
in litis; (2) that the sales were with sufficient considerations and made by defendants
parents voluntarily, in good faith, and with full knowledge of the consequences of their
deeds of sale; and (3) that the certificates of title were issued with sufficient factual and
legal basis.4 (Emphasis in the original)
The Ruling of the Trial Court
Before the trial, the trial court ordered the dismissal of the case against defendant spouses
Gavino Joaquin and Lea Asis.5 Instead of filing an Answer with their co-defendants, Gavino
Joaquin and Lea Asis filed a Motion to Dismiss.6 In granting the dismissal to Gavino
Joaquin and Lea Asis, the trial court noted that "compulsory heirs have the right to a
legitime but such right is contingent since said right commences only from the moment of
death of the decedent pursuant to Article 777 of the Civil Code of the Philippines." 7
After trial, the trial court ruled in favor of the defendants and dismissed the complaint. The
trial court stated:
In the first place, the testimony of the defendants, particularly that of the xxx father will
show that the Deeds of Sale were all executed for valuable consideration. This assertion
must prevail over the negative allegation of plaintiffs.
And then there is the argument that plaintiffs do not have a valid cause of action against
defendants since there can be no legitime to speak of prior to the death of their parents.
The court finds this contention tenable. In determining the legitime, the value of the
property left at the death of the testator shall be considered (Art. 908 of the New Civil
Code). Hence, the legitime of a compulsory heir is computed as of the time of the death of
the decedent. Plaintiffs therefore cannot claim an impairment of their legitime while their
parents live.
All the foregoing considered, this case is DISMISSED.

In order to preserve whatever is left of the ties that should bind families together, the
counterclaim is likewise DISMISSED.

Petitioners assign the following as errors of the Court of Appeals:

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
CONVEYANCE IN QUESTION HAD NO VALID CONSIDERATION.

No costs.
SO ORDERED.8
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT EVEN

ASSUMING THAT THERE WAS A CONSIDERATION, THE SAME IS GROSSLY
INADEQUATE.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.1wphi1 The appellate court
ruled:

3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE DEEDS

OF SALE DO NOT EXPRESS THE TRUE INTENT OF THE PARTIES.

To the mind of the Court, appellants are skirting the real and decisive issue in this case,
which is, whether xxx they have a cause of action against appellees.

4. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE

CONVEYANCE WAS PART AND PARCEL OF A CONSPIRACY AIMED AT
UNJUSTLY DEPRIVING THE REST OF THE CHILDREN OF THE SPOUSES
LEONARDO JOAQUIN AND FELICIANA LANDRITO OF THEIR INTEREST
OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES.

Upon this point, there is no question that plaintiffs-appellants, like their defendant brothers
and sisters, are compulsory heirs of defendant spouses, Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana
Landrito, who are their parents. However, their right to the properties of their defendant
parents, as compulsory heirs, is merely inchoate and vests only upon the latters death.
While still alive, defendant parents are free to dispose of their properties, provided that
such dispositions are not made in fraud of creditors.
Plaintiffs-appellants are definitely not parties to the deeds of sale in question. Neither do
they claim to be creditors of their defendant parents. Consequently, they cannot be
considered as real parties in interest to assail the validity of said deeds either for gross
inadequacy or lack of consideration or for failure to express the true intent of the parties. In
point is the ruling of the Supreme Court in Velarde, et al. vs. Paez, et al., 101 SCRA 376,
thus:
The plaintiffs are not parties to the alleged deed of sale and are not principally or
subsidiarily bound thereby; hence, they have no legal capacity to challenge their validity.
Plaintiffs-appellants anchor their action on the supposed impairment of their legitime by the
dispositions made by their defendant parents in favor of their defendant brothers and
sisters. But, as correctly held by the court a quo, "the legitime of a compulsory heir is
computed as of the time of the death of the decedent. Plaintiffs therefore cannot claim an
impairment of their legitime while their parents live."
With this posture taken by the Court, consideration of the errors assigned by plaintiffsappellants is inconsequential.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against
plaintiffs-appellants.

5. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS

HAVE A GOOD, SUFFICIENT AND VALID CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.10
The Ruling of the Court
We find the petition without merit.
We will discuss petitioners legal interest over the properties subject of the Deeds of Sale
before discussing the issues on the purported lack of consideration and gross inadequacy
of the prices of the Deeds of Sale.
Whether Petitioners have a legal interest over the properties subject of the Deeds of Sale
Petitioners Complaint betrays their motive for filing this case. In their Complaint,
petitioners asserted that the "purported sale of the properties in litis was the result of a
deliberate conspiracy designed to unjustly deprive the rest of the compulsory heirs
(plaintiffs herein) of their legitime." Petitioners strategy was to have the Deeds of Sale
declared void so that ownership of the lots would eventually revert to their respondent
parents. If their parents die still owning the lots, petitioners and their respondent siblings
will then co-own their parents estate by hereditary succession. 11
It is evident from the records that petitioners are interested in the properties subject of the
Deeds of Sale, but they have failed to show any legal right to the properties. The trial and
appellate courts should have dismissed the action for this reason alone. An action must be
prosecuted in the name of the real party-in-interest.12

SO ORDERED.9
[T]he question as to "real party-in-interest" is whether he is "the party who would be
benefitted or injured by the judgment, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit."

Hence, the instant petition.

Issues

xxx

In actions for the annulment of contracts, such as this action, the real parties are those
who are parties to the agreement or are bound either principally or subsidiarily or are
prejudiced in their rights with respect to one of the contracting parties and can show the
detriment which would positively result to them from the contract even though they did not
intervene in it (Ibaez v. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, 22 Phil. 572 [1912]) xxx.
These are parties with "a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere
expectancy or future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest. The phrase
present substantial interest more concretely is meant such interest of a party in the
subject matter of the action as will entitle him, under the substantive law, to recover if the
evidence is sufficient, or that he has the legal title to demand and the defendant will be
protected in a payment to or recovery by him."13
Petitioners do not have any legal interest over the properties subject of the Deeds of Sale.
As the appellate court stated, petitioners right to their parents properties is merely
inchoate and vests only upon their parents death. While still living, the parents of
petitioners are free to dispose of their properties. In their overzealousness to safeguard
their future legitime, petitioners forget that theoretically, the sale of the lots to their siblings
does not affect the value of their parents estate. While the sale of the lots reduced the
estate, cash of equivalent value replaced the lots taken from the estate.
Whether the Deeds of Sale are void for lack of consideration
Petitioners assert that their respondent siblings did not actually pay the prices stated in the
Deeds of Sale to their respondent father. Thus, petitioners ask the court to declare the
Deeds of Sale void.
A contract of sale is not a real contract, but a consensual contract. As a consensual
contract, a contract of sale becomes a binding and valid contract upon the meeting of the
minds as to price. If there is a meeting of the minds of the parties as to the price, the
contract of sale is valid, despite the manner of payment, or even the breach of that manner
of payment. If the real price is not stated in the contract, then the contract of sale is valid
but subject to reformation. If there is no meeting of the minds of the parties as to the price,
because the price stipulated in the contract is simulated, then the contract is void. 14 Article
1471 of the Civil Code states that if the price in a contract of sale is simulated, the sale is
void.
It is not the act of payment of price that determines the validity of a contract of sale.
Payment of the price has nothing to do with the perfection of the contract. Payment of the
price goes into the performance of the contract. Failure to pay the consideration is different
from lack of consideration. The former results in a right to demand the fulfillment or
cancellation of the obligation under an existing valid contract while the latter prevents the
existence of a valid contract.15
Petitioners failed to show that the prices in the Deeds of Sale were absolutely simulated.
To prove simulation, petitioners presented Emma Joaquin Valdozs testimony stating that
their father, respondent Leonardo Joaquin, told her that he would transfer a lot to her
through a deed of sale without need for her payment of the purchase price. 16 The trial court
did not find the allegation of absolute simulation of price credible. Petitioners failure to
prove absolute simulation of price is magnified by their lack of knowledge of their
respondent siblings financial capacity to buy the questioned lots.17 On the other hand, the
Deeds of Sale which petitioners presented as evidence plainly showed the cost of each lot

sold. Not only did respondents minds meet as to the purchase price, but the real price was
also stated in the Deeds of Sale. As of the filing of the complaint, respondent siblings have
also fully paid the price to their respondent father.18
Whether the Deeds of Sale are void for gross inadequacy of price
Petitioners ask that assuming that there is consideration, the same is grossly inadequate
as to invalidate the Deeds of Sale.
Articles 1355 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 1355. Except in cases specified by law, lesion or inadequacy of cause shall not
invalidate a contract, unless there has been fraud, mistake or undue influence. (Emphasis
supplied)
Article 1470 of the Civil Code further provides:
Art. 1470. Gross inadequacy of price does not affect a contract of sale, except as may
indicate a defect in the consent, or that the parties really intended a donation or some
other act or contract. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners failed to prove any of the instances mentioned in Articles 1355 and 1470 of the
Civil Code which would invalidate, or even affect, the Deeds of Sale. Indeed, there is no
requirement that the price be equal to the exact value of the subject matter of sale. All the
respondents believed that they received the commutative value of what they gave. As we
stated in Vales v. Villa:19
Courts cannot follow one every step of his life and extricate him from bad bargains, protect
him from unwise investments, relieve him from one-sided contracts, or annul the effects of
foolish acts. Courts cannot constitute themselves guardians of persons who are not legally
incompetent. Courts operate not because one person has been defeated or overcome by
another, but because he has been defeated or overcome illegally. Men may do foolish
things, make ridiculous contracts, use miserable judgment, and lose money by them
indeed, all they have in the world; but not for that alone can the law intervene and restore.
There must be, in addition, a violation of the law, the commission of what the law knows as
an actionable wrong, before the courts are authorized to lay hold of the situation and
remedy it. (Emphasis in the original)
Moreover, the factual findings of the appellate court are conclusive on the parties and carry
greater weight when they coincide with the factual findings of the trial court. This Court will
not weigh the evidence all over again unless there has been a showing that the findings of
the lower court are totally devoid of support or are clearly erroneous so as to constitute
serious abuse of discretion.20 In the instant case, the trial court found that the lots were
sold for a valid consideration, and that the defendant children actually paid the purchase
price stipulated in their respective Deeds of Sale. Actual payment of the purchase price by
the buyer to the seller is a factual finding that is now conclusive upon us.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals in toto.
SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
AMELIA P. ARELLANO, represented by her duly
appointed guardians, AGNES P. ARELLANO and
NONA P. ARELLANO,
Petitioner,

respondents assailed but which they, in any event, posited that it may be considered as an

G.R. No. 189776

advance legitime to petitioner, the trial court, acting as probate court, held that it was

Present:

precluded from determining the validity of the donation.

CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,

PERALTA,*
Provisionally passing, however, upon the question of title to the donated
BERSAMIN,
MENDOZA,** and
property only for the purpose of determining whether it formed part of the decedents
SERENO, JJ.

- versus FRANCISCO PASCUAL and MIGUEL PASCUAL,

Respondents.

estate,[4] the probate court found the Deed of Donation valid in light of the presumption of

Promulgated:
December 15, 2010
x--------------------------------------------------x

validity of notarized documents. It thus went on to hold that it is subject to collation

following Article 1061 of the New Civil Code which reads:[5]
Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory
heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which
he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the
latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title in order that it
may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and
in the account of the partition.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his
siblings,

namely: petitioner

Amelia

P.

Arellano

who

is

represented

by

her

[1]

daughters Agnes P. Arellano (Agnes) and Nona P. Arellano, and respondents Francisco
Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual.[2]

The probate court thereafter partitioned the properties of the intestate

estate. Thus it disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring that:

In a petition for Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters of

1.

The property covered by TCT No. 181889 of the Register of

Deeds of Makati as part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual;

2.

The property covered by TCT No. 181889 to be subject to

collation;

3.

1/3 of the rental receivables due on the property at the

mezzanine and the 3rd floor of Unit 1110 Tanay St., Makati City
form part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual;

4.

The following properties form part of the estate of Angel N.

Pascual:

Administration, docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. M-5034, filed by respondents on

April 28, 2000 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, respondents alleged, inter
alia, that a parcel of land (the donated property) located in Teresa Village, Makati, which
was, by Deed of Donation, transferred by the decedent to petitioner the validity of which
donation respondents assailed, may be considered as an advance legitime of petitioner.

Respondents nephew Victor was, as they prayed for, appointed as Administrator of the
estate by Branch 135 of the Makati RTC.

a.

1/3 share in the House and Lot at 1110 Tanay St., Rizal
Village Makati TCT No. 348341 and 1/3 share in the
rental income thereon;

b.

1/3 share in the Vacant Lot with an area of 271 square

meters located at Tanay St., Rizal Village, Makati City,
TCT No. 119063;

[3]

Respecting the donated property, now covered in the name of petitioner by

Transfer Certificate of Title No. 181889 of the Register of Deeds of Makati, which

c.

Agricultural land with an area of 3.8 hectares located at

Puerta Galera Mindoro covered by OCT No. P-2159;

d.

Shares of stocks in San Miguel Corporation covered by

the following Certificate Numbers: A0011036, A006144,
A082906, A006087, A065796, A11979, A049521,
C86950, C63096, C55316, C54824, C120328, A011026,
C12865, A10439, A021401, A007218, A0371, S29239,
S40128, S58308, S69309;

e.

f.

I
. . . THE PROPERTY DONATED TO APPELLANT AMELIA PASCUAL
ARELLANO IS PART OF THE ESTATE OF ANGEL PASCUAL, JR.
II
. . . THE PROPERTY DONATED TO APPELLANT IS SUBJECT TO
COLLATION UNDER ARTICLE 1061 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.

Shares of stocks in Paper Industries Corp. covered by

the following Certificate Numbers: S29239, S40128,
S58308, S69309, A006708, 07680, A020786, S18539,
S14649;

III
. . . APPELLEES WHO ARE MERELY COLLATERAL RELATIVES OF
DECEASED ANGEL N. PASCUAL JR. AS HIS COMPULSORY
HEIRS ENTITLED TO LEGITIMES.

share in Eduardo Pascuals shares in Baguio Gold

Mining Co.;

g. Cash in Banco De Oro Savings Account No. 2 014 12292 4

in the name of Nona Arellano;
i.

Property previously covered by TCT No. 119053 now

covered by TCT No. 181889, Register of Deeds of
Makati City;

j.

Rental receivables from Raul Arellano per Order issued

by Branch 64 of the Court on November 17, 1995.

5. AND the properties are partitioned as follows:

a.

To heir Amelia P. Arellano-the property covered by TCT

No. 181889;

b.

To heirs Francisco N. Pascual and Miguel N. Pascualthe real properties covered by TCT Nos. 348341 and
119063 of the Register of Deeds of Makati City and the
property covered by OCT No. 2159, to be divided equally
between them up to the extent that each of their share
have been equalized with the actual value of the property
in 5(a) at the time of donation, the value of which shall be
determined by an independent appraiser to be
designated by Amelia P. Arellano, Miguel N. Pascual and
Francisco N. Pascual. If the real properties are not
sufficient to equalize the shares, then Franciscos and
Miguels shares may be satisfied from either in cash
property or shares of stocks, at the rate of quotation. The
remaining properties shall be divided equally among
Francisco,
Miguel
and
Amelia.(emphasis
and
underscoring supplied)

Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner faulted the trial court in holding that

xxxx
and
V
. . . IN NOT PARTITIONING THE ESTATE OF ANGEL N. PASCUAL
JR. EQUALLY AMONG HIS LEGAL OR INTESTATE HEIRS.
[6]
(underscoring supplied)

By Decision[7] of July 20, 2009, the Court of Appeals found petitioners appeal
partly meritorious. It sustained the probate courts ruling that the property donated to
petitioner is subject to collation in this wise:
Bearing in mind that in intestate succession, what governs is
the rule on equality of division, We hold that the property subject of
donation inter vivos in favor of Amelia is subject to
collation. Amelia cannot be considered a creditor of the decedent and
we believe that under the circumstances, the value of such immovable
though not strictly in the concept of advance legitime, should be
deducted from her share in the net hereditary estate. The trial court
therefore committed no reversible error when it included the said
property as forming part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual.[8] (citation
omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The appellate court, however, held that, contrary to the ruling of the probate
court, herein petitioner was able to submit prima facie evidence of shares of stocks owned

Petitioners thus raise the issues of whether the property donated to petitioner is subject to

by the [decedent] which have not been included in the inventory submitted by the

collation; and whether the property of the estate should have been ordered equally

administrator.

distributed among the parties.

Thus, the appellate court disposed, quoted verbatim:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is
hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated January 29, 2008 of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 135 in Special
Proceeding Case No. M-5034 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
insofar as the order of inclusion of properties of the Intestate Estate of
Angel N. Pascual, Jr. as well as the partition and distribution of the
same to the co-heirs are concerned.
The case is hereby REMANDED to the said court for further
proceedings in accordance with the disquisitions herein.[9] (underscoring
supplied)

On the first issue:

The term collation has two distinct concepts: first, it is a mere mathematical
operation by the addition of the value of donations made by the testator to the value of the
hereditary estate; and second, it is the return to the hereditary estate of property disposed
of by lucrative title by the testator during his lifetime. [13]
The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory heirs in
so far as is possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding the legitime, so that

Petitioners Partial Motion for Reconsideration [10] having been denied by the
appellate court by Resolution [11] of October 7, 2009, the present petition for review on
certiorari was filed, ascribing as errors of the appellate court its ruling
I
. . . THAT THE PROPERTY DONATED BY ANGEL N. PASCUAL, JR.
TO PETITIONER AMELIA PASCUAL ARELLANO IS PART OF HIS
ESTATE AT THE TIME OF HIS DEATH.
II
. . . THAT THE PROPERTY DONATED TO PETITIONER IS SUBJECT
TO COLLATION UNDER ARTICLE 1061 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.

inofficious donations may be reduced.[14]

Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being
to determine the legitime and the free portion. If there is no compulsory heir, there is no
legitime to be safeguarded.[15]

The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or concurring
compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who are his collateral relatives and,
therefore, are not entitled to any legitime that part of the testators property which he cannot
dispose of because the law has reserved it for compulsory heirs.[16]

III
. . . THAT RESPONDENTS ARE COMPULSORY HEIRS OF THEIR
DECEASED BROTHER ANGEL N. PASCUAL JR. AND
ARE ENTITLED TO LEGITIMES.
IV
. . . IN NOT PARTITIONING THE ESTATE OF ANGEL N. PASCUAL,
JR. EQUALLY AMONG PETITIONER AND RESPONDENTS, AS HIS
LEGAL OR INTESTATE HEIRS.[12] (underscoring supplied)

The compulsory heirs may be classified into (1) primary, (2) secondary,
and (3) concurring. The primary compulsory heirs are those who have
precedence over and exclude other compulsory heirs; legitimate
children and descendants are primary compulsory heirs. The secondary
compulsory heirs are those who succeed only in the absence of the
primary heirs; the legitimate parents and ascendants are secondary
compulsory heirs. The concurring compulsory heirs are those who
succeed together with the primary or the secondary compulsory heirs;
the illegitimate children, and the surviving spouse are concurring
compulsory heirs.[17]

AMELIA P. ARELLANO, represented by her duly appointed guardians, AGNES P.

ARELLANO
The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime,

and

NONA

P.

ARELLANO, Petitioner,

vs.
FRANCISCO PASCUAL and MIGUEL PASCUAL, Respondents.

he was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his siblingscollateral relatives to inherit. His donation to petitioner, assuming that it was valid, [18] is
deemed as donation made to a stranger, chargeable against the free portion of the estate.
[19]

There being no compulsory heir, however, the donated property is not subject to

collation.

FACTS:
Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his siblings,

On the second issue:

namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her daughters Agnes P.

Arellano (Agnes) and Nona P. Arellano, and respondents Francisco Pascual and Miguel N.

The decedents remaining estate should thus be partitioned equally among his

Pascual.

heirs-siblings-collateral relatives, herein petitioner and respondents, pursuant to the

Respondents filed a petition for "Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of

provisions of the Civil Code, viz:

Letters of Administration," on April 28, 2000 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati, and alleged, inter alia, that a parcel of land located in Teresa Village, Makati, which

Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants,

illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall
succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the
following articles. (underscoring supplied)

was, by Deed of Donation, transferred by the decedent to petitioner the validity of which

Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of

the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

The probate court found the Deed of Donation as valid and went on to hold that it is subject

donation respondents assailed, "may be considered as an advance legitime" of petitioner.

to collation following Article 1061 of the New Civil Code which reads:
Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision ordering the
collation of the property donated to petitioner, Amelia N. Arellano, to the estate of the
deceased Angel N. Pascual, Jr. is SET ASIDE.

mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent,
during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title in order that
it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of
the partition.

Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the court of origin, Branch 135 of
the Makati Regional Trial Court, which is ordered to conduct further proceedings in the

ISSUE:

case for the purpose of determining what finally forms part of the estate, and thereafter to
divide whatever remains of it equally among the parties.

Whether or not the subject property donated by decedent to Amelia is subject to collation?

SO ORDERED.
HELD:
G.R. No. 189776

December 15, 2010

Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to

therefore, are not entitled to any legitime. The decedent not having left any compulsory

determine the legitime and the free portion. If there is no compulsory heir, there is no

heir who is entitled to any legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if

legitime to be safeguarded. The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the

nothing was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His donation to petitioner,

compulsory heirs in so far as is possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding the

assuming that it was valid, is deemed as donation made to a "stranger," chargeable

legitime, so that inofficious donations may be reduced.

against the free portion of the estate.There being no compulsory heir, however, the
donated property is not subject to collation.

The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or concurring
compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who are his collateral relatives and,