Constitutional Law 2

Cases on Rights of the

Accused

Melvin P. Lacsie

Constitutional Law Rights of the Accused

(1)
Gamboa Vs. Cruz, GR No. L-56291
June 27, 1988
During the lineup of five (5) detainees, including petitioner,
complainant pointed to petitioner and said, "that one is a
companion." He was ordered to stay in front of her. Three
days after, an information of robbery was filed against him.
Petitioner was arraigned. Thereafter, hearings were held.
On 2 April 1980, the prosecution formally offered its
evidence and then rested its case.
Petitioner, by counsel, instead of presenting his defense,
manifested in open court that he was filing a Motion to
Acquit or Demurrer to Evidence. On 13 August 1980,
petitioner filed said Motion predicated on the ground that
the conduct of the line-up, without notice to, and in the
absence of, his counsel violated his constitutional rights to
counsel and to due process.
Court held: The rights to counsel and to due process of law
are indeed two (2) of the fundamental rights guaranteed by
the Constitution, whether it be the 1973 or 1987
Constitution. In a democratic society, like ours, every
person is entitled to the full enjoyment of the rights
guaranteed by the Constitution.

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Constitutional Law Rights of the Accused

Sec. 12 (1) Any person under investigation for the

commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services
of counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel;

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or

any other means which vitiate the free will shall be
used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention
are prohibited;

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation

of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible
in evidence against him.

The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an

investigation, i.e. when the investigating officer starts to
ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or
admissions from the respondent/accused. At such point or
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Constitutional Law Rights of the Accused

stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by

counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false
or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the
person undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an
offense. Any person under investigation must, among other
things, be assisted by counsel. The above-cited provisions
of the Constitution are clear. They leave no room for
equivocation. Accordingly, in several cases, this Court has
consistently held that no custodial investigation shall be
conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel, engaged
by the person arrested, or by any person in his behalf, or
appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee
himself, or by anyone in his behalf, and that, while the right
may be waived, the waiver shall not be valid unless made
in writing and in the presence of counsel.
As aptly observed, however, by the Solicitor General, the
police line-up (at least, in this case) was not part of the
custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at
such stage, to counsel. (Since petitioner in the course of
his Identification in the police line-up had not yet been
held to answer for a criminal offense, he was, therefore,
not deprived of his right to be assisted by counsel because
the accusatory process had not yet set in. The police could
not have violated petitioner's right to counsel and due
process as the confrontation between the State and him
had not begun.)
Even under the constitutional guarantees obtaining in the
United States, petitioner would have no cause for claiming
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Constitutional Law Rights of the Accused

a violation of his rights to counsel and due process.

In Kirby vs. Illinois, it was held that the constitutional
right to counsel did not attach until judicial criminal
proceedings were initiated, and that the exclusionary rule
relating to out-of-court Identifications in the absence of
counsel did not apply to Identification testimony based
upon a police station show-up which took place before the
accused had been indicted or otherwise formally charged
with any criminal offense. xxx under the 1973 and 1987
Philippine Constitutions, the right to counsel attaches at
the start of investigation against a respondent and,
therefore, even before adversary judicial proceedings
against the accused have begun.

Given the clear constitutional intent in the 1973 and 1987

Constitutions, to extend to those under police investigation
the right to counsel, this occasion may be better than any
to remind police investigators that, while the Court finds
no real need to afford a suspect the services of counsel
during a police line-up, the moment there is a move or
even an urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or
confessions or even plain information which may appear
innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he
should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he
waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing
and in the presence of counsel.
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Constitutional Law Rights of the Accused

On the right to due process, the Court finds that petitioner

was not, in any way, deprived of this substantive and
constitutional right, as he was duly represented by a
member of the Bar. He was accorded all the opportunities
to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his
defense; only that he chose not to, and instead opted to file
a Motion to Acquit after the prosecution had rested its
case. What due process abhors is the absolute lack of
opportunity to be heard.

(2)
People vs. Macam, GR No. 91011-12
November 24, 1994
It appears that the security guards at the factory of the
father of accused Eduardo Macam detained appellants.
They were later brought to the Quezon City Police
Headquarters for investigation. Since they refused to admit
their participation in the commission of the crime,
appellants were then brought to the Quezon City General
Hospital and were made to line-up together with several
policemen in civilian clothes. Salvacion Enrera, Benito
Macam and Nilo Alcantara, who were confined at the
hospital for injuries sustained during the robbery, were
asked to pinpoint the perpetrators. At that time, appellants
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Constitutional Law Rights of the Accused

were handcuffed and bore contusions on their faces

caused by the blows inflicted on them by the police
investigators.
Appellants contend that their arrest without a warrant and
their uncounseled identification by the prosecution
witnesses during the police line-up at the hospital are
violative of their constitutional rights under Section 12,
Article 3 of the Constitution.
In Gamboa v. Cruz, 162 SCRA 642 (1988), we held that the
right to counsel attaches upon the start of an
investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to
ask questions to elicit information, confessions or
admissions from the accused (See also People v. Dimaano,
[1992]). Historically, the counsel guarantee was intended
to assure the assistance of counsel at the trial, inasmuch
as the accused was "confronted with both the intricacies of
the law and the advocacy of the public prosecutor."
However, as a result of the changes in patterns of police
investigation, today's accused confronts both expert
adversaries and the judicial system well before his trial
begins (U.S. v. Ash). It is therefore appropriate to extend
the counsel guarantee to critical stages of prosecution even
before the trial. The law enforcement machinery at present
involves critical confrontations of the accused by the
prosecution at pre-trial proceedings "where the result
might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial
itself to a mere formality." A police line-up is considered a
"critical" stage of the proceedings (U.S. v. Wade)
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Constitutional Law Rights of the Accused

After the start of the custodial investigation, any

identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police
line-up is inadmissible. This is particularly true in the
case at bench where the police officers first talked to the
victims before the confrontation was held. The
circumstances were such as to impart improper
suggestions on the minds of the victims that may lead to a
mistaken identification. Appellants were handcuffed and
had contusions on their faces.
However, the prosecution did not present evidence
regarding appellant's identification at the police line-up.
Hence, the exclusionary sanctions against the admission
in evidence of custodial identification of an uncounseled
accused can not be applied. On the other hand, appellants
did not object to the in-court identification made by the
prosecution witnesses. The prosecution witnesses, who
made the identification of appellants at the police line-up
at the hospital, again identified appellants in open court.
Appellants did not object to the in-court identification as
being tainted by the illegal line-up. In the absence of such
objection, the prosecution need not show that said
identifications were of independent origin (Gilbert v.
California).
The arrest of appellants was made without the benefit of a
warrant of arrest. However, appellants are estopped from
questioning the legality of their arrest. This issue is being
raised for the first time by appellants before this Court.
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Constitutional Law Rights of the Accused

They have not moved for the quashing of the information

before the trial court on this ground. Thus, any
irregularity attendant to their arrest was cured when they
voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the
trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and by
participating in the trial (People v. Rabang, 187 SCRA 682
[1990]).

(3)
People Vs. Judge Ayson, GR No 85215
July 7, 1987

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