BACSARPA vs.

CA
FACTS: Herein Appellants Bascarpa a collecting clerk, Lausa a clerk messenger and Macas a collector
were found to be short in their respective accounts by the Municipal Treasurer and Auditor in Agusan.
It is obvious that pursuant to Article 217 of the RPC there is enough prima facie evidence that they had
put such missing funds to their personal uses. Consequently, it was their burden to destroy the prima
facie case thus made against them by sufficient evidence.
Appellant Lausa contends that he should be declared guilty of malversation only for the sum of P71.06
and not the entire amount of P17,994.94. A similar contention was raised by Macas whose collection
not accounted for was only P193.20. As to petitioner Bascarpa, it is argued that the penalty imposed
upon him should be based on the amount of P6,930.68, instead of the aggregate amount mentioned
above, in view of the fact that the value of the Philippine National Bank Checks in the amount of
P10,300 and the Postal Money Orders in the amount of P1500 were recovered.
ISSUE: W/N the contention of the Appellants is of merit?
DECISION: In the absence of conspiracy between the appellants, the only evidence on record against
them is the prima facie evidence arising from their failure to account for their respective collections. It
can hardly be held that each of the Appellants has malversed the aggregate sum of P17,994.94 for
each of them has the obligation to account for his individual collections therefore their respective
responsibility should be narrowed to their individual collections which each of them failed to account
for. Hence Appellant Bascarpa who's account totaled to P17,730.68 even though the sum of P11,809
was recovered should still be held liable to the former amount malversed since the that was the total
amount Bacsarpa failed to account for.

PEOPLE v. QUISEL
CA 52 OG 6975
FACTS: Accused, then the guard duty in the municipal building of Dipolog, ordered four prisoners
under his custody to chase a carabao which had broken loose from the municipal pound. During the
chasing, the former merely stood at the cross-road instead of following the prisoners. After returning
the carabao in the municipal pound, it was discovered that one of the prisoners (Umaguing) was
missing. Accused immediately went in his pursuit but was able to apprehend him only three days later
in a barrio in Dapitan, and was immediately turned over to the Chief of police of Dipolog.
Accused was charged in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte with infidelity in the
custody of prisoners, where he pleaded not guilty.
CFI decided that said accused is guilty of the said charge.
Though the accused does not dispute the facts, he contends that he may be deemed excused by his
capture of the escaped prisoner without help from any other peace authority in spite of the negligence
committed. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the recapture of prisoners may exempt the accused-appellant from said crime.
RULING: The appellate court ruled that the accused-appellant is still considered guilty of infidelity in
the custody of prisoners. Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code states that a crime is committed "if the
evasion of the prisoner shall have taken place through the negligence of the officer charged with the
conveyance or custody of the escaping prisoner."In this case, the laxity of performing his duties by
merely watching the recapture of the carabao from afar instead of closely monitoring the prisoners
amounts to deliberate non-performance thereof. Thus, affirming the decision of the lower court.
However, the appellate court strongly recommend to the proper authorities for the extension to
appellant of full executive clemency.

G.R. No. L-22642 December 19, 1924

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
VICENTE P. CASTRO and PEDRO A. PACANA, defendants-appellants.
--------------------------G.R. No. L-22645 December 19, 1924
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,plaintiff-appellee
vs.
ISIDRO ADORABLE and PEDRO A. PACANA, defendants-appellants.
--------------------------G.R. No. L-22646 December 19, 1924
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
VICENTE P. CASTRO and PEDRO A. PACANA, defendants-appellants.
FACTS: These are five related criminal cases for the crimes of falsification of public documents
and estafa committed by means of falsification of public documents in which the accused are Pedro A.
Pacana, secretary of the provincial board of Misamis, Isidro Adorable, member of the provincial board
of Misamis, and Vicente P. Castro, member of the provincial board of Misamis. Should convictions be
sustained, Pacana will receive sentences totalling forty-four years and five days imprisonment, and
Adorable and Castro for the alleged unlawful taking of P25 each will receive sentences of ten years and
one day imprisonment.
The charge in the first numbered case against Pedro A. Pacana relates to the falsification by the
accused of minutes of the meeting of the provincial board on June 9, 1923, for the alleged purpose of
permitting the district engineer to incur illegal expenses in the reconstruction of a provincial road. The
charge in the second case against the same accused relates to the falsification of minutes of the
provincial board on June 16, 1923. The charge in the third case against the same accused relates to
the falsification of an excerpt from the minutes of the provincial board of June 9, 1923. And the last
two cases, one against provincial board member Isidro Adorable and Pedro A. Pacana, and the other
against provincial board member Vicente P. Castro and Pedro A. Pacana, relate to the crimes
of estafa committed by means of falsification of public documents, whereby it is alleged Adorable and
Castro were each able to collect the sum of P25 as per diems for two fictitious meetings of the
provincial board. Since the first three cases were tried together and the last two together, and since
the facts of all of them are closely interwoven, for convenience sake a general statement will first be
made, leaving for special mention certain circumstances affecting particular cases.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused are guilty for the crimes of falsification of public documents and
estafa through falsification of public documents.
DECISION: It must be admitted that the physical facts are mostly in favor of the accused. The
documents, Exhibits C and D, could not have been fabricated on June 9 and June 16, if the matters to
which they relate were not then before the provincial board for action. Unless by supernatural means,
that would be an utter impossibility. Just how we can reconcile these circumstances with the strong
oral testimony, mostly circumstantial in nature, presented by the prosecution, is hard to say, unless
there was exaggeration on the part of some of the witnesses. Now as to the motive, recognizing that a
quarrel was on between two provincial officers, and that possibly the provincial board was siding with
the district engineer and against the district auditor, just why was it necessary to make meetings out of
the air to serve this purpose when actual meetings would have served the same purpose just as
effectively? The resolution approving of the acts of the district engineer had to be made public and
copies of it had to be sent to the proper authorities. Just why two members of the provincial board
would care to certify to the correctness of meetings which were never held, in order to benefit
themselves in the paltry amount of P25 each, when they could have recovered the same amount for
actual meetings, is also difficult to understand. The whole case impresses us as a job bunglingly
performed by the provincial secretary. He is a man who should not be entrusted with official
responsibility. He has none of the qualifications which fit one of public office. But it is a far cry from

hopeless ineptitude and hopeless stupidity to criminal intent and criminal responsibility. Still, even
under the most favorable aspect, the facts skirt perilously near to the Penal Code crime of reckless
imprudence.
Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be crime. Actus non facit reum, nisi
mens sit rea. There can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting. Ignorance or mistake as to
particular facts, honest and real, will as a general rule, exempt the doer from criminal responsibility.
The exception, of course, is neglect in the discharge of a duty or indifference to consequences, which is
equivalent to a criminal intent. The element of malicious intent is supplied by the element of
negligence and imprudence. It is a serious matter to be responsible for sending the accused to prison
for long terms. All reasonable doubt intended to demonstrate error and not crime should be indulged in
to the benefit of the prisoners at bar. The Government has suffered no loss. If the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence
of the accused of the crime charged and the other consistent with their guilt, then the evidence does
not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. The court cannot bring
themselves to find these accused guilty on the facts of record. As a results, therefore, that the court
must, as they hereby do, reverse the judgments appealed from and acquit the accused of the charges
laid against them.
KATANIAG VS. PEOPLE
GR. No. L-48398
November 29, 1942
FACTS: The petitioner in this case is alleged with the crime of Infidelity in the Custody of Public
Documents. The court En Banc herein defined the crime committed; provided the essential elements
under the Criminal Law, that the removal of the document need not be coupled with proof of intention
to conceal under Statutory Construction, and damage to public interest or to third person.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has consummated or has attempted the crime mentioned.
DECISION: The court En Banc confirms that indeed the petitioner has consummated and not
attempted the crime of infidelity in the custody of public documents. True, at the moment of the arrest
the records he was caught carrying with him were intact, but as he had already succeeded in removing
or secreting away the documents in question from his office, for he was caught carrying them after he
had locked the door of his office and was already out walking through the lobby towards the main door
of the building, the crime of removal of public documents summated, it being immaterial whether he
has or has not actually accomplished moved said documents.

LAYUGAN vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT et al.

G.R. No. 73998
FACTS : Pedro T. Layugan filed an action for damages against Godofredo Isidro, alleging that on May
15, 1979 while at Baretbet, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, the plaintiff and a companion were repairing the
tire of their cargo truck which was parked along the right side of the National Highway when the
defendant's truck driven recklessly by Daniel Serrano bumped the plaintiff which resulted to his injuries
necessitating the amputation of his left leg.
Defendant admitted his ownership of the vehicle involved in the accident but countered that the
plaintiff was merely a bystander, not a truck helper being a brother-in-law law of the driver of said
truck. He further added that the truck allegedly being repaired was parked right after the curve,
occupying almost half of the right lane towards Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, hence, the proximate cause of
the incident was the failure of the driver of the parked truck in installing an early warning device.
The trial court decided in favor of Layugan but was revered by the IAC, hence, this petition.

ISSUE : W/N the IAC acted correctly in applying the doctrine of "res ipsa loquitur" in the instant case.
HELD : The crux of the controversy lies in the correctness or error of the decision of the respondent
court finding the petitioner negligent under the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur (The thing speaks for
itself). Corollary thereto, is the question as to who is negligent, if the doctrine is inapplicable.
The doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of negligence which
recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a
substitute for specific proof of negligence. The doctrine is not a rule of substantive law but merely a
mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. The rule, when applicable to the facts and
circumstances of a particular case, is not intended to and does not dispense with the requirement of
proof of culpable negligence on the part of the party charged. It merely determines and regulates what
shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the
duty of due care. The doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved,
direct evidence is absent and not readily available. Hence, it has generally been held that the
presumption of inference arising from the doctrine cannot be availed of, or is overcome, where plaintiff
has knowledge and testifies or presents evidence as to the specific act of negligence which is the cause
of the injury complained of or where there is direct evidence as to the precise cause of the accident
and all the facts and circumstances attendant on the occurrence clearly appear.
The evidence on record discloses that three or four meters from the rear of the parked truck, a lighted
kerosene lamp was placed. Whether the cargo truck was parked along the road or on half the shoulder
of the right side of the road would be of no moment taking into account the warning device consisting
of the lighted kerosene lamp. But despite this warning which we rule as sufficient, the Isuzu truck
driven by Daniel Serrano, an employee of the private respondent, still bumped the rear of the parked
cargo truck. As a direct consequence of such accident the petitioner sustained injuries on his left
forearm and left foot. His left leg was later amputated from below the knee when gangrene had set in.
It is clear from the foregoing disquisition that the absence or want of care of Daniel Serrano has been
established by clear and convincing evidence. It follows that in stamping its imprimatur upon the
invocation by respondent Isidro of the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur to escape liability for the negligence
of his employee, the respondent court committed reversible error. It is also clear that the driver did not
know his responsibilities because he apparently did not check his vehicle before he took it on the road.
If he did he could have discovered earlier that the brake fluid pipe on the right was cut, and could have
repaired it and thus the accident could have been avoided.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the respondent court as well as its
Resolution denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration are hereby SET ASIDE and the decision
of the trial court, dated January 20, 1983, is hereby REINSTATED in toto.
SO ORDERED.