Oxford University Press

THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTIONS

Author(s): S. Krner
Source: The Monist, Vol. 51, No. 3, Kant Today: Part I (JULY, 1967), pp. 317-331
Published by: Oxford University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27902036
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THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF
TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTIONS
The purpose of this paper is first to explain a general notion ot
transcendental deductions, of which the Kantian are special cases;
next to show, and to illustrate by examples from Kant's work, that
no transcendental deduction can be successful; and thirdly to put
one of Kant's

in its proper light by substituting for

achievements
and
distinction
between
exposition
metaphysical
spurious
transcendental deduction, a revised notion of metaphysical
expo
sition and of the philosophical
tasks arising out of it.

his

L The General Notion

oj a Transcendental

Deduction

statements about the external world presupposes not

Making
a
only
prior distinction between oneself and that world, but also a
method for differentiating, within one's experience of it, external
and relations of which external
objects and attributes-properties
I
are
bearers.
the
shall
say that such a method of external
objects
differentiation is associated with, or belongs to, a categorial schema

or, briefly, a "schema" of external differentiation if, and only if,

the attributes employed comprise what may be called respectively,
in accordance with philosophical
tradition, "constitutive" and "in
An
is constitutive
attributes.
attribute
dividuating"
(of external
it
and
is
to
external
if,
only if,
applicable
objects)
objects and if,
to an object logically
in addition, its applicability
implies, and is
an
external
the
logically implied by,
object's being
object. I shall
more
a
attribute
that
constitutive
is
say,
briefly,
"comprehensively
to external objects. An attribute is individuating
applicable"
(for
to every external
external objects)
if, and only if, it is applicable
to an external object
object and if, in addition, its applicability
and
is
logically implies,
logically implied by, the external object's
all
other
external objects. I shall say, more
distinct
from
being
an
attribute
that
individuating
"exhaustively individuates"
briefly,
external objects.

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318

THE MONIST

Some comments on these definitions may be helpful. Although

view of the
not yet fully general, they fit, for example, Kant's
attribute 'x is a substance* as constitutive of, and his view of the
attribute 6xwholly occupies a region of absolute space during a
period of absolute time* as individuating for, external objects. The
term "logically
implies" is used to express the converse of the
relation of logical deducibility with respect to some underlying

logic, which at this stage need not be made explicit. An individuat

ing attribute the possession of which by an external object logi
cally implies its being distinct from all others, must not be confused
with any merely identifying attribute the possession of which by an
external object happens as a matter of fact to distinguish it from
all others. Lastly it should be emphasised that a method of prior
external differentiation does not necessarily belong to a categorial
schema.

about the external world are not the only ones

which presuppose a prior differentiation of experience into objects
and attributes, and thus, possibly, a categorial schema consisting
of constitutive and individuating attributes. We also make, at least
of other kinds, presupposing
prima facie, statemer
prior dif
Statements

ferentiations of other
gions of experience, e.g. sensory, moral
to
and aesthetic experience, which may or may not belong
categorial schemata. A schema of sensory differentiation would con
tain constitutive attributes of, and individuating attributes for, sen
for schemata of
sory objects. The* same would hold analogously

moral and aesthetic differentiation, if any. Such considerations per

mit us to generalize the definition of a categorial schema as follows:
A method of prior differentiation of a region of experience is as
sociated with, or belongs to, a categorial schema if, and only if, the
attributes employed comprise attributes which are constitutive of
the region's objects, and attributes which are individuating for them.
For my purpose here it is not necessary to raise, much less to answer,
the question why anybody uses themethods of prior differentiation
which he does in fact use, or why for him experience should fall
into more or less clearly distinguishable
regions and should fall
into them in one way rather than in any other.
A transcendental deduction can now be defined quite generally
as a logically sound demonstration of the reasons why a particular
categorial schema is not only in fact, but also necessarily employed,

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IMPOSSIBILITY

OF TRANSCENDENTAL

DEDUCTIONS

319

definition is very
in differentiating a region of experience. This
wide indeed and will presently be shown to cover Kant's conception
of its generality it must
of a transcendental deduction. Because
of
be protected against such charges
vagueness as would rob the
can be
all
of
discussion
cogency. Such protection
subsequent
the
of
achieved by the following characterization
key-phrases which
occur in the definition. Although a "logically sound demonstration"
need not be a deductive argument, itmay contain deductive argu

in which case these must not be fallacious. Again, whatever

else may be meant by the statement that a schema "is necessarily
it logically
in differentiating a region of experience"
employed
or
possibly employed in differ
implies that any method actually
entiating the region belongs to the schema. Apart from these pro
visos no further restrictions are imposed on interpreting the

ments

definition.

at
important and interesting examples of
tempted transcendental deductions are, of course, those found in
Kant's philosophy, on which I shall be drawing for illustrations of
are impossible.
the general thesis that transcendental deductions
of schemata of ex
This
choice will limit me to an examination
Among

the most

transcendental deduc
ternal and practical differentiation. Kant's
tions contain only such. He held that of all the methods of prior
differentiation of experience which he investigated, only those of
external and practical differentiation-and
not, for example, any
to categorial schemata.
method of aesthetic differentiation-belong
It would not be difficult to find, in these or other fields, many
arguments easily rec
simpler or more simple-minded philosophical
in the sense of
ognizable as attempts at transcendental deductions
our definition.
II. The Impossibility

of Transcendental

Deductions

I shall now examine the preconditions of the possibility of any

transcendental deduction, and show that at least one of them is
such that it cannot be satisfied; from which result, of course, the
follows immediately. Be
impossibility of transcendental deductions
fore a transcendental deduction can be attempted for any region
of experience, a method of prior differentiation of the region must
first be exhibited and shown to belong to a schema. This, as was

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320

THE

MONIST

pointed out by and was perfectly clear to Kant, need not be the
case. But if the method of prior differentiation does
a
belong to
of
the
task
the
schema
feasible.
It
consists
is
schema
exhibiting
(a)
in searching for nonempty attributes, e.g. an attribute P such that
?x is an object of the region* logically implies and is implied by,
'x is a P\ Sometimes one may succeed in the more ambitious
task of giving a complete, finite enumeration of the simplest consti
tutive attributes, i.e. such as are not logically equivalent to a con
junction of other constitutive attributes. We might, following
Kant, call such simple and finitely enumerable attributes the "cate
gories" of the region and say that they are ultimately constitutive
of the region's objects. But this pleasant possibility may be ignored.
The task further consists (b) in searching for at least one non
to every object of
such that Q is applicable
empty attribute, say
the region, and is such that 'x is an object of the region and a Qf

logically implies, and is logically implied by, *x is a distinct object

of the region*. If another attribute say R, should also turn out to
be an individuating attribute for the objects of the region then lx
is an object of the region and an RJ logically implies, and is logical
ly implied by, 'x is an object of the region and a Q*. We may again
fulfilment of the first precondition of
ignore this possibility. The
the possibility of a transcendental deduction, i.e. of the above tasks
the
(a) and (b) may be called "the establishment of a schema"-on
basis of investigating a particular method of prior differentiation of
a region of
experience into objects and attributes.
With
the establishment of a schema the preconditions
for its
transcendental deduction are, however, not yet satisfied. For to
establish a schema is to establish that a particular method for dif
ferentiating a region of experience belongs to the schema, and not
that any method which might actually or possibly be thus em
ployed, also belongs to it. Before one can show why any and every
possible method belongs to the schema one has to show that any
and every possible method

demonstrate

How

the schema's

belongs

to it. One must,

as I shall say,

uniqueness.

could this be done? Prima facie three possibilities

are
open. First, to demonstrate the schema's uniqueness by comparing
it with experience undifferentiated by any method of prior differ
entiation. But this cannot be done since the statements by which
the comparison would have to be made, cannot be formulated with

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IMPOSSIBILITY

OF TRANSCENDENTAL

DEDUCTIONS

321

out employing some prior differentiation of

experience; and even if
there were undifferentiated experience, one could at best show
that a certain schema "reflects" it, and not that some other schema
could not also reflect it. Second,
to demonstrate
the schema's
by comparing it with its possible competitors. But this
uniqueness
that they all can be exhibited, and is
presupposes
self-contradictory
in attempting a "demonstration" of the schema's
uniqueness, by con
ceding that the schema was not unique. Thirdly, one might propose
to examine the schema and its
application entirely from within the
schema itself, i.e. by means of statements belonging
to it. Such an
at
best, could only show how the schema functions in
examination,
the differentiation of a region of experience, not that it is the only
possible schema to which every differentiation of the region must
belong.
The

three methods

include the possible grounds for a con

between reality and its apprehension, mentioned
in the
to the second edition of The Critique of Pure Reason.
preface
In order to avoid vague appeals to demonstrations of a categorial
schema's uniqueness
by other methods, e.g. some mystical insight
or some special Logic, I am prepared to reduce my claim to the
thesis that uniqueness demonstrations of a schema by comparing it
with undifferentiated experience, by comparing itwith other sche
mata, or by examining it from within, are impossible. It should be
noted that I am speaking not of isolated concepts, such as 'per
manence* or 'change*, which may or may not be indispensable
to
our thinking, but which by themselves are not constitutive of, or
for, the objects of a region of experience-even
individuating
a
of their uniqueness
demonstration
is, as I should be pre
though
to
argue,
pared
equally impossible.
It is the impossibility of demonstrating a schema's uniqueness
that renders transcendental deductions
impossible. The
general
on
two
rests
sketched
distinctions:
the dis
argument just
mainly
tinction between a method of prior differentiation and its cate
gorial schema, if any; and the distinction between
(a) establish
a
a
to
method
of
differentiation
that
schema and
ing
belongs
prior
the
of
the
schema.
In
to illus
order
(b) demonstrating
uniqueness
trate my conclusion with examples from Kant's work, I shall try
to choose such as will not only serve to draw attention to errors,
but will also suggest reasons why these errors are liable to escape
cordance

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322

THE MONIST

I begin with what I consider to be a mistake which

undetected.
have in
all the Kantian
attempts at transcendental deductions
common.

Assume that we have investigated a method of prior differentia

tion of a region of experience and found that it belongs to a
schema. The result, as we have seen, is formulated
(a) by state
ments to the effect that some of the attributes employed by the
method are constitutive of the objects of the region, e.g. that among

to
the attributes is one, say P, such that P is applicable
objects
an
of the region and such that *x is
object of the region* logically
a
implies, and is implied by, (x is P\ (b) by statements to the effect
that one (ormore) of the attributes employed are individuating for
the objects of the region, e.g. that among the attributes is an at
tribute, say Q, such that Q applies to every object of the region and
such that *x is an object of the region and a Q* logically implies,
and is implied by, 'x is a distinct object of the region*. Let us now,
as Kant did, examine the logical status of (a) statements of compre
hensive applicability and (b) statements of exhaustive individuation.
Each of them is a conjunction of two statements. The first ex
presses that the extension of an attribute is, as a matter of fact, not
empty, that something exists, the existence of which could not be
guaranteed by logic or definitions alone. It is therefore a synthetic
statement. The
second is clearly logically necessary. Since a con
a
of
synthetic and a logically necessary statement is syn
junction

and exhaus
thetic, the statements of comprehensive applicability
tive individuation are all synthetic.
each of these two kinds of statements in question,
Moreover,
that
of
namely
comprehensive applicability and that of exhaustive
individuation, is compatible with any statement about objects, i.e.
with any statement expressing the applicability or inapplicability
of attributes to objects-provided
that such a statement is made
a
method
of
differentiation
which belongs to the schema.
by
prior
The reason for this is that in that case no attribute can be applied
or refused to any objects except such as are constituted and indi
viduated by the schema's constitutive and individuating attributes.
Thus no incompatibility can arise between the statements of com
and exhaustive
individuation
of a cate
prehensive applicability
on
one
the
and
schema
statement
hand,
any
gorial
expressed by a
to the schema on the
method of prior differentiation belonging

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IMPOSSIBILITY

OF TRANSCENDENTAL

DEDUCTIONS

323

statements of comprehensive applicability and exhaus

other. The
are thus a priori with respect to a particular
tive individuation
rschema, namely the schema which comprises them. It does not fol
low that they are also a priori with respect to any schema which
can be claimed to be the only one possible,
i.e. that they are
a
a
in establishing that method of prior
priori." Thus
"uniquely
to a schema one shows eo ipso that the
differentiation belongs
statements of comprehensive applicability and of exhaustive indi
a priori. To
are synthetic and nonuniquely
viduation
show that
a demonstration of the
they are uniquely a priori would require
schema's uniqueness, which I have just argued to be impossible.
Kant did not see this, and he conflates uniquely a priori with
a
conflation not only per
priori statements. This
nonuniquely
vades his whole philosophy, but even determines its structure, espe
cially the division of all his principal arguments into metaphysical
expositions and transcendental deductions.1 A metaphysical
exposi
tion which exhibits a concept as, or exhibits it insofar as it is,
a
priori is always the result of inquiry into one actually employed
method of differentiation. It can thus at best establish the schema,
if any, to which the method belongs. A transcendental deduction,
aimed at showing that and how a priori concepts are applicable or
possible, examines only the schema which has been established by
the metaphysical
exposition of this particular schema. It thus does
not examine a schema the
of which has been dem
uniqueness
onstrated. Kant's failure even to consider the need for interpolating
a
between any metaphysical
uniqueness-demonstration
exposition
and a corresponding transcendental deduction and his conflation of
and uniquely a priori statements are so intimately
nonuniquely
related that they deserve to be regarded as two aspects of the same
error.

The reasons why these points, which in our own day are not
too difficult to see, have escaped Kant, are
partly historical and
The
historical
of
that like most of
ones,
are,
course,
partly logical.
his contemporaries, Kant considered the mathematics
and physics
of his day and the moral code by which he found himself bound,
to be true beyond doubt; he felt in no way
compelled to consider,
therefore, the question of schemata other than those to which be
l See
Critique

of Pure

Reason,

B. 38, 80 etc.

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324

THE MONIST

long the methods of differentiation employed by him in his mathe

matical, physical and moral thinking. The
logical reasons are that
at
his various attempts
transcendental deductions
contain sub
tend to reinforce the common error
sidiary assumptions which
underlying all of them.
The Transcendental

Aesthetic which exhibits the individuat

schema is based on the assumption
ing attributes of the Kantian
that the propositions of Euclidean
geometry describe the spatial
relations between external objects; also the more general assump
tion that ii-per
different geometries were con
impossibile-two
ceivable, then at most one of them would describe, and at least

one would misdescribe,

these relations. However, neither Euclidean
geometry, nor any other, describes the spatial structure of external
objects or the spatial relations between them. A physical triangle,
for example, is not an instance of the concept 'Euclidean
triangle*,
or for thatmatter 'non-Euclidean
triangle', just as neither a Euclid
ean triangle nor a non-Euclidean
one is an instance of the con

cept 'physical triangle*. To "apply geometry to the external world"

is not to assert geometrical attributes of external objects, but to
identify external objects with instances of geometrical attributes
in certain contexts and for certain purposes, i.e. to treat them as if
theywere identical. The applicability, in this sense of one geometry
does not exclude the applicability of another. Kant assumes the
to external objects of Euclidean
applicability
geometry,
even
to establish
the assumption. Yet the
attempting
geometry to
assumption of the unique applicability of Euclidean
external objects is a key premiss in the very argument by which he
tries to establish that spatio-temporal location in Euclidean
space
and Newtonian
time is the principle of individuation
for all ex
ternal objects-a principle which he shows to be synthetic, and non
(not, as he thinks, uniquely) a priori.
uniquely
Again, the Transcendental
Analytic, which exhibits the consti
tutive attributes of the Kantian schema, assumes as a principle that
the categories must be recognized as conditions a priori of the pos
sibility of experience2 conceived as differentiated into distinct exter
nal objects and attributes of such. Sufficient conditions are not
distinguished from sufficient and necessary conditions. The former,

unique
without

2 See

e.g. B

126.

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IMPOSSIBILITY

OF TRANSCENDENTAL

DEDUCTIONS

325

which Kant tries to establish, are satisfied by the establishment of

a schema. The latter would be satisfied only if the schema's
unique
ness were also demonstrated. Failure to distinguish between the two
thus supports the conflation of statements
lands of conditions
a priori, with synthetic and
synthetic and nonuniquely
uniquely
a priori statements of
comprehensive applicability.
The most convincing way to expose Kant's failure to give a

transcendental deduction of the schema of external differentiation

established
in the Critique of Pure Reason,
is simply to provide
an
a different schema of external differentiation. Since
of
example
I have gone into this point in detail elsewhere,3 I may put it here
quite briefly. Grant that determinate spatio-temporal location, as
conceived by Newton
and Kant, exhaustively individuates exter
nal objects of which the Kantian
categories of substance, causality
and the rest, are the constitutive attributes; and grant also that the
statements to this effect are synthetic a priori. The
existence of
us
to
relativistic quantum-mechanics
that
grant equally
compels
a
location
in
con
determinate
spatio-temporal
spatio-temporal
tinuum of an altogether different kind exhaustively individuates ex
ternal objects of which the constitutive attributes are quite other
than the Kantian
categories; and to grant equally that the state
ments to this effect are synthetic a priori. But neither schema of
external differentiation is unique; and the synthetic a priori state
ments about the comprehensive
applicability of, and the exhaustive
individuation for, external objects with respect to either schema
a priori.
are
non-uniquely
In Kant's practical philosophy he investigates a method for dif
ferentiating objects and attributes within the experience of the
practicable. The objects might be called "morally relevant" objects
since their attributes include moral attributes. By
exhibiting the
constitutive and individuating attributes employed by the method,
the method is shown to belong to a schema. Again no
attempt is
to demonstrate the
made
of
an at
the
schema.
Such
uniqueness
as
I
could
case
have
in
have
been
not,
tempt
successful,
any
argued,
from which circumstance
the impossibility of any transcendental
deduction
3'Zur

of the schema immediately follows.

Kantischen

Begr

ndung

Kant Studien, 56,No. s/4 (1966).

der Mathematik

und

der Naturwissenschaften*

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326

THE

MONIST

At this point, however, Kant varies his usual procedure. Hav

ing established the schema, he does not immediately attempt its
transcendental deduction. Instead he tries to derive a new principle
of
from it, namely the categorical
imperative, the applicability
which does not only characterize the merely morally relevant ob
are constituted and individuated by the schema, but
jects, which
also those among themorally relevant objects which are the bearers
of moral
value. Only after the alleged derivation
of the cate
a
transcendental
gorical imperative is completed, does he attempt
deduction of it and the schema.
Kant's belief that an examination of his schema of practical
differentiation yields the categorical imperative, which he regarded
as a necessary and sufficient criterion of themorality of any action,
was one of the main reasons why, in his practical philosophy, he
the circumstance that to establish a schema is not to
overlooked
and why consequently
demonstrate
its uniqueness;
there too he
a
conflated synthetic statements which are nonuniquely
priori with
a
ones.
not
I
consider
of the
Kant's
derivation
shall
priori
uniquely
from
the
of
schema
categorical imperative
allegedly unique
practi
cal differentiation. Instead I shall compare that schema with a dif
ferent one, thus providing
the strongest possible kind of argu
ment against the assumption of its uniqueness,
and, therefore,
against the soundness of the attempted transcendental deduction
of it.
Since what is practicable
is practicable
in the external world,
any method of practical differentiation will depend on, and vary

of external differentiation and even

with, the adopted method
with substantive assumptions about the external world, formulated
by means of this method. Let us ignore such variations, however

important theymay be. Kant's metaphysical

exposition as a search
for the constitutive and individuating attributes employed in his

of practical differentiation leads him to the following con

a
clusions:
(a) the attribute 'x is morally relevant object* is not
empty; and it logically implies, and is logically implied by, lx is a

method

type of act and x is performed in accordance with a maxim, chosen

latter attribute is not only constitutive of
by an agent*, (b) The
morally relevant objects, but also individuates them exhaustively.
The

key-terms of the bilateral

implication require comment.

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IMPOSSIBILITY

OF TRANSCENDENTAL

DEDUCTIONS

327

act is the intentional initiation

(prevention or nonpreven
a
a
in
the
situation which confronts
of
person
change
tion) by
him. A maxim
is a rule of the general form: 'If in a situation of
type S, perform an act of type A\ S and A are not the unmanage
An

ably long, and possibly unlimited, conjunctions of attributes which

are respectively characteristic of concrete situations and particular

acts. They are manageable

of relevant attributes
conjunctions
their relevance or irrelevance being determined by the person who
chooses the maxim before acting, who formulates it retrospectively
or who is at least assumed to be capable of doing so. S may, and
usually does, comprise some reference to the person's desires and

intentions other than the intention involved in performing the act.

A need not, usually does not, and-on
some interpretations of
Kant's
of
theory-must not, comprise such a reference. Examples
maxims where A does not comprise it are: If in . . . help (or don't
help) your neighbour, commit (or don't commit) suicide etc.
to Kant an act by itself is not a morally relevant ob
According
constitutes and individuates
the bearers of moral at
ject. What

tributes, i.e. of moral value, disvalue and indifference, is the type A

under which a person subsumes his act, and the maxim
to which
he conforms in acting. At this point a glance at the history ofmoral
philosophy is sufficient to provide examples of schemata of practical
differentiation, which are internally consistent, have been actually
to
employed and are quite different from the Kantian. According
a whole class of such schemata a morally relevant
a
com
is
object
plicated relation between an act, the agent's beliefs, the truth or

falsehood of his beliefs and his desires. Such a relation need not
and is quite compatible
depend on the person's chosen maxims;
with the reasonable assumption that not every act is governed by a
maxim. The Kantian
schema of practical differentiation is non
and
its
transcendental
deduction therefore impossible.
unique
III. A Revised Notion

ofMetaphysical

Exposition

arguing that the spurious distinction between meta

should be re
physical exposition and transcendental deduction
a
notion
of
revised
placed by
metaphysical
exposition and showing
how much in harmony such replacement is with some of Kant's
insights, another attempt must be briefly examined at reconstruct
Before

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328

THE

MONIST

It sees the
ing the strategy of the transcendental philosophy.
fundamental error not in neglecting the problem of demonstrating
the (undemonstrable)
uniqueness of any schema of differentiation,
but merely in a narrowness of the methods
investigated by Kant
of prior differentiation and a corresponding narrowness of the
schemata established by him.
the post-Kantian
of physics and
development
for example, would merely show the Kantian
schema
to be widened
differentiation as having
before a
is attempted; one need not regard a
transcendental deduction
as
in principle impossible. Thus
the indi
transcendental deduction
viduating attribute for external objects 'x wholly occupies a region
of space and an interval of time as conceived by Newton* is to be
On

this view

mathematics,
of external

a region of space and an interval

replaced by *xwholly occupies
or a
of time as conceived by Newton
spatio-temporal region as
con
conceived by Einstein*. In a similar manner
the Kantian
stitutive attributes are to be replaced by unions of them with other
constitutive attributes. But, then, how could one
corresponding

show that the available

constitutive and individuating attributes
exhaust all the conceivable ones, or that all those conceivable have
been conceived? To show this, one would have to produce a dem
onstration of the widened
schema's uniqueness
and, as has been
argued quite generally, such a demonstration is impossible.
In his metaphysical
expositions of a particular method of prior
external and a particular method of prior practical differentiation,
Kant has established that they belong to schemata, i.e. that they
employ constitutive and individuating attributes. The statements to
the effect that the constitutive attributes are comprehensively
ap
to the objects of the differentiated region of experience
plicable
and that the individuating are exhaustively individuating for them,
a
are synthetic and nonuniquely
as Kant
thought
priori-not
a
not
statements
do
These
demarcate
the structure
priori.
uniquely
of any method of external or of practical differentiation, as neces
they are compatible with the assumption-and
sarily unchangeable;
the historical truth-that schemata of external and practical dif
ferentiation can change and become obsolete.
The
constitutive and individuating
attributes of a schema
which is no longer employed, may even turn out, or be judged, to
be empty. Having
the Kantian
schema of external
e.g. abandoned

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IMPOSSIBILITY

OF TRANSCENDENTAL

DEDUCTIONS

329

differentiation in favour of another, it becomes possible-looking

assert that the Kantian
as it were from the outside-to
attribute
a priori
of substance is empty, i.e. that the synthetic, nonuniquely
to
statement asserting its comprehensive applicability
external ob
a
similar manner
jects is false. A social anthropologist may in
a de
judge that the constitutive and individuating attributes of
a
are
even
cer
empty,
though
monology, which he has investigated,

tain way of lifemight be inseparably bound up with it.

In order to do justice to such possibilities I now define a revised
notion of metaphysical
exposition, which relativizes the Kantian
absolute notion in a number of ways. It is the analysis of methods
for the differentiation of more-or-less-well-demarcated
domains into
at
and
which
aims
the
attributes
of synthetic
exhibition
objects
a
and nonuniquely
the
schemata
statements,
by exhibiting
priori
in respect of which the statements are a priori. The differentiated
domain, as became clear in discussing geometrical statements, need
not be a region of experience. It may be a domain of ideal ob
of differentiation belongs, we remember, to a
jects. A method
schema if, and only if, it employs
of all objects of the domain and
of them. The
constitutive and
schema. A statement is synthetic
valid with respect to the logic

attributes which are constitutive

attributes which individuate all
attributes are the
individuating

if, and only if, it is not logically

the methods
of dif
underlying
we must, distinguish
Thus
e.g.

ferentiation being considered.

statements synthetic with respect to classical from those synthetic
with respect to intuitionist logic. A statement is a priori with re
spect to a schema if, and only if, it is compatible with any statement
to one or more distinct
in which an attribute is applied
objects
means
of
which
method
any
by
belongs to the schema.

Among the kinds of schemata which a metaphysical

exposition
(in the revised sense) of various methods of differentiation may
establish for them are the following: Schemata
(a) of external
differentiation, including the schema established in the Critique of
Pure Reason for themethod of external differentiation
investigated
by it. But there are other, methods of external differentiation be
longing to the same or other schemata. Schemata
(b) of practical
differentiation, including the schema established in the Critique of
Practical Reason
for the method
of practical differentiation in
are
it.
But
there
other
methods
of practical differentia
vestigated by

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330

THE

MONIST

to the same or other schemata. Schemata

tion belonging
(c) of
idealized external or, briefly, mathematical
differentiation of a do
main which is an idealization of some aspects of external experience.
The methods of differentiating such a domain and the statements
which are true about
it, are sometimes expressed in axiomatic
even
mathematical
theories,
though a large class of such theories
as
G del has shown, comprise all the statements which are
cannot,
true about the domain. Kant, as was
pointed out earlier, failed
to recognize themultiplicity of
mathematical
schemata and
possible
confused mathematical with external differentiation. Schemata
(d)
of idealized practical differentiation, which are of interest in the
study of certain normative, e.g. legal, systems. Schemata
(e) of
logical differentiation. Their establishment results in synthetic non
a priori statements of
uniquely
comprehensive applicability. Such a
statement is a conjunction
consisting of two statements, an ana
lytic statement asserting that certain statement-forms are true of all
objects constituted and individuated by any of the available meth
ods of differentiation, and a synthetic statement asserting that the
domain of these objects is not empty. Kant, who was not faced with
the problem of alternative logics, naturally did not consider this
possibility.
a priori statement is a
Every synthetic, nonuniquely
priori with
statements of comprehensive
respect to at least one schema. Thus
applicability and exhaustive individuation are a priori with respect
to the schema to whose constitutive and
individuating attributes
refer.
all
are a
ideal
statements
Next,
they
synthetic,
priori with
respect to any schema of external differentiation, because no state
ment solely about ideal
objects can be incompatible with any state
ments solely about external
objects, however these may be consti
tuted or individuated. Again the question how far statements which
belong to a schema of practical differentiation are a priori with re
spect to a schema of external differentiation cannot be answered
in general, since methods of external differentiation and methods
of practical differentiation (and their schemata, if
any) may stand
in a variety of relations to each other.
The
important Kantian distinction between synthetic a priori
statements and regulative
principles remains valid. We might de
fine a regulative principle as being
synthetic if, and only if, the
statement describing the type of action
prescribed by the principle

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IMPOSSIBILITY

OF

TRANSCENDENTAL

DEDUCTIONS

331

is synthetic; and as a priori with respect to a schema of differentia

tion if, and only if, the descriptive statement is compatible with any
statement in which attributes are applied to objects by a method
of differentiation which belongs to the schema. Regulative
prin
a priori dif
ciples which are in this sense synthetic and nonuniquely
a
fer, of course, from synthetic and nonuniquely
priori statements
a
course
no
of metaphysical exposition
truth-value. In the
by having
such principles will often be uncovered, whether or not we decide
to include their exhibition among its explicit aims. Epistemologi
cally of greatest interest are those regulative principles which regu
late the construction of theories and those which

for some

over

schemata

express preferences

others.

deductions of schemata and of synthetic a priori

Transcendental
statements are, as I have argued, impossible because their unique
ness cannot be demonstrated. The Kantian
question as to how
synthetic and uniquely a priori judgements are possible does not
arise. In its place, however, there arises another question: How are
a priori statements possible? To answer
synthetic and nonuniquely
this question
is, as we have learned from Kant, to examine the
function of such statements, that is to say their relations to each
task is by no
other, to analytic and to empirical statements. The
means simple or trivial as can be seen, for example, by considering
the relation

in scientific thinking between various schemata of ex

since contrary
ternal, ideal and logical differentiation. Moreover,
to Kant's convictions, not only methods of differentiation but also
the schemata to which they belong can and do change, the task
cannot be completed once and for all, but must be undertaken

over

THE

and

over

UNIVERSITY,

again.

S. K

RNER

BRISTOL

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