Buffalo Soldier in the Tip of Africa— Why-ya-ya… :

A study of the EU’s efficacy and goals in democracy-building in South Africa

LO, Stephen Andrew Kai Tai

100021067
The EU as an International Actor
 Lo 2

Introduction
Europe and Africa have had direct political and commercial relations since the 14th
century, with darker parts including the slave trade, imperialism and colonization. The
decolonization of Africa began in the latter half of the 20 th century (Tilly, 2007, p.44).
Power was handed over from European imperial powers to the local population
eventually. In many cases, the regime changes from colonial rule to nascent post-
colonial government in Africa oftentimes turned away from democracy to outright
dictatorship (Adejumobi, 2000, p. 59-60). In particular, South Africa had a policy of
apartheid from 1948 to 1994 where the population was racially segregated and
politically unequal (Tilly, 2007, p. 122-123). Furthermore, the EU and South Africa
“consider each other as true strategic partners” with common normative values and
goals in the region (COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 2007, p. 1). With the
end of apartheid, the EU has taken up an increasing role as a promoter of democracy
in South Africa, but a significant question remains: how effective has EU/EC
democracy promotion been in South Africa and why does the EU/EC want to pursue
this goal?
In order to answer this question, this paper will define “democracy”, its requisites
and trends that encourage democratization. It will show the EU’s role of democracy-
building so far in South Africa, assess the strengths of the EU’s actions in building
democracy in South Africa such as the socio-economic and political aspects of
successful transformation of Africa into a procedural democracy. This paper will also
investigate the EU’s shortcomings in dealing with challenges to South African
democracy including grave socio-economic problems that persist, and weaknesses in
the agent-structure relations in consolidating democracy in South Africa. In this
respect, this paper focuses on the policy tools that the EU has used such as sanctions,
state-building and support for civil society. It will also investigate the EU’s
democracy-building agenda in South Africa especially in the greater regional context.
Although there are many different definitions of democracy (Tilly, 2007, p. 7), the
definition of democracy used in this paper is a process-oriented approach which
according to Charles Tilly is: “a regime is democratic to the degree that political
relations between the state and its citizens feature broad, equal, protected and
mutually binding consultation” (Tilly, 2007, p. 13-14). Requisites for democracy
 Lo 3

under this definition are as follows:

1. All adult citizens belong to the “same homogeneous category of
citizenship” (Tilly, 2007, p. 14);
2. “[Ethnicity] has no significant connection with political rights or
obligations and largely equal rights prevail between native-born and naturalized
citizens” (Tilly, 2007, p. 14);
3. “[All] citizens enjoy publicly visible due process” (Tilly, 2007, p. 15);
4. “[State] agents have clear enforceable obligations to deliver benefits by
category of recipient” (Tilly, 2007, p. 15).
In addition to these criteria, trends that encourage democracy “consist of increasing
integration of trust networks into public politics, increasing insulation of public
politics from categorical inequality, and decreasing autonomy of major power centers
from public politics” (Tilly, 2007, p. 23).
Strengths of the EU/EC in building democracy in South Africa
From 1985 onwards, the EC implemented a harmonized policy of positive measures
in South Africa “to finance non-violent anti-apartheid organizations… assist in the
education of the non-White community… to support [the Southern African
Development Coordination Conference] and frontline states [to prevent regional
economic collapse], to increase awareness among citizens of Member States living in
South Africa, and to finally intensify contact with the non-White community in a
variety of sectors” (Fioramonti, 2003, p. 2-3).The “Special Programme for the victims
of apartheid” (SPVA), a set of funds designed to tackle racism, was very successful.
These funds were devoted to education and training activities (~ 50%), humanitarian
and social programs (~40%) and legal aid (~10%) (Fioramonti, 2003, p. 3-4).
Although the funding into the SPVA was relatively small (ECU 130.7 million
between 1985 and 1991), its impact was quite immense because the diplomats from
the EC pressured the apartheid government in order to keep the Programme alive; it
grew to become the EU’s “largest, programmable aid programme of any kind”
(Fioramonti, 2003, p. 4; Fioramonti, 2008, p. 324).
One of the EU’s first five “joint actions” introduced by the Maastricht Treaty
“consisted of a multi-tiered approach, individuating a wide range of tasks and goals to
achieve: monitoring the election process in 1994; the negotiation of a new bilateral
economic framework and a commitment to long-term involvement with the Special
Programme of development assistance” (SPDA) (Fioramonti, 2003, p. 5). The EU and
 Lo 4

South Africa had a “partnership for consolidation of democracy” (Fioramonti, 2003,

p. 11). The EU oversaw South Africa’s first free and fair elections and provided voter
education and voter registration in 1994 (Fioramonti, 2003, p. 5; Fioramonti, 2008, p.
324; Olson, 1998, p. 350). The SPDA, which was the largest single programmable
development project in Africa, grew to ECU 110 million per annum and the new
bilateral economic framework included the conditions of “…[democratization], rule
of law, human rights, good governance and popular participation” (Fioramonti, 2003,
p. 5).
The EU/EC has also been assisting South Africa in the development and
strengthening of state institutions such as the judiciary, parliament and provincial
legislatures, security forces, public services, executive departments government
agencies and research through training and funding from the EU Programme for
Reconstruction and Development (Fioramonti, 2003, p. 7, 17; Hearn, 2000, p. 819).
This democracy assistance involved strict dialogue with South African institutions
and cooperation with the government (Fioramonti, 2003, p. 6, 11). This avoided
prescriptive and often disadvantageous political and economic conditionality
(Fioramonti, 2003, p. 11). With greater local government effectiveness in delivering
public services and enhancing socio-economic conditions, state institutions can be
strengthened in the eyes of the ordinary citizen (Fioramonti, 2003, p. 13). The EU-
sponsored Parliamentary Support Programme though bureaucratic, inflexible and
sluggish, also encourages local ownership (Fioramonti, 2003, p. 13).
In addition to institution strengthening in South Africa, the EU aids South African
civil society groups through funding (Fioramonti, 2004, p. 750). The EU mainly acts
through the independent non-governmental organization (NGO), Foundation for
Human Rights (FHR), which it created jointly with the South African Department of
Justice (Fioramonti, 2004, p. 743), which draws its membership from professional
organizations, civil society groups and academia (Fioramonti, 2008, p. 325). Through
the FHR, the EU helps fund grassroots community-based organizations (CBO) that
help defend and inform the local citizenry of their rights, help create awareness of
societal problems such as AIDS and social justice, and create social security,
especially in the rural areas (Fioramonti, 2004, p. 325-329). The procedures needed
to apply for EU aid also made CBOs more skilled in fund-raising (Fioramonti, 2008,
p. 333).
 Lo 5

Shortcomings of the EU/EC in Building democracy in South Africa

Ever since the EU/EC began to impose negative measures against the apartheid
regime, it was rather disunited and timid in its approach (Fioramonti, 2003, p. 2, 13).
The EC adoption of a Code of Conduct for EC enterprises in South Africa had
rhetoric against apartheid such as negotiating with Black trade unions and a procedure
for monitoring compliance; however, under the Code of Conduct, all reporting
mechanisms were voluntary and had no Commission oversight (Fioramonti, 2003, p.
2). Negative measures were rather piecemeal and indecisive (Fioramonti, 2003, p.3).
Despite the key role of the ANC in bringing democracy to South Africa, it has
held on to power in South Africa since 1994. In South Africa, the central government
and the dominant ANC control most political authority at all levels, and there are
trends for power to become more centralized in the ANC, despite the use of a
proportional representation electoral system, which is supposed to prevent single
party rule (Zeff & Pirro, 1999). Corruption and inefficiency within the bureaucracy
has augmented and puts the notion of good governance in South Africa into question
(Fioramonti, 2003, p. 13; Zeff & Pirro, 1999). This shows the weakness of EU
institutional-strengthening aid.
CBOs in South Africa help by educating people of and defending the rights of
laborers, women and children and consumers. They also help to create awareness of
AIDS and racism. In addition, they provide social justice (Fioramonti, 2008, p. 325-
329). With the fall of the apartheid regime, international aid to the ubiquitous small
South African CBO has diminished and veered towards collapse in favor of building
state institutions (Fioramonti, 2008, p. 329-331; Hearn, 2000, p. 871). With the
withdrawal of funds to these small CBOs, they are forced to look for funds from local
actors (Fioramonti, 2008, p. 329-331; Hearn, 2000, p. 871). However, in many cases,
that “local actor” may very well be the state, and that erodes the independence of
CBOs as a watchdog against arbitrary and illegal action (Fioramonti, 2008, p. 329-
331). In order to ensure the successful functioning of CBOs in the outreaches of South
Africa, the EU must increase its funding to CBOs in order to make them effective,
especially if they feel that they have little influence on public policy in South Africa
(Fioramonti, 2004, p. 749-750). Many CBOs may very well be over-reliant on the EU
for their funding. (Fioramonti, 2004, p. 750).
 Lo 6

The EU’s Strategic Objectives of Democratizing South Africa

According to Olsen, several arguments explain the reasons for a shift of in the post
Cold-War era; the EU joint actions were filled with democratization rhetoric and
political conditions with various motives:
1. As a political excuse to continue a minimal amount of aid to Africa (Olsen,
1998, p. 346);
2. Or to cut aid in the atmosphere of an absence of a political reason to spend
money on client states or (Olsen, 1998, p. 346);
3. The euphoric hangover after the fall of communism leading the West to
believe that Western institutions and values were the best and can be exported
anywhere (Olsen, 1998, p. 346).
However, he argues that the EU wanted regime change in South Africa to prevent
regional destabilization as a result of the continuation of the apartheid regime since
South Africa was economically very important to the West with its mineral wealth
first and foremost (Olsen, 1998, p. 353); a secondary argument that he provides is that
some European states genuinely wanted democracy for South Africa (Olsen, 1998, p.
353). Another side note argument that he presents is the solidification of the Common
Foreign and Security Policy; however, Olsen also observes that this goal was
improbable because there was more unity on the question of South Africa during the
apartheid regime than after its demise with disagreements about the would-be status
of the commercial regime between South Africa and Europe (Olsen, 1998). South
Africa’s commercial relations are conducted under a Trade, Development and
Cooperation Agreement, and in association with the EU under the Lomé convention
and later Coutonou (Fioramonti, 2003, p. 13). There are plans for the establishment of
a free-trade area between South Africa and the EU by 2012 (EUR-Lex, 2006).
However, fifteen years has passed since the end of apartheid in South Africa, and
many changes have occurred since the end of the Cold War in Africa. It is a regional
power as a leader in the Southern African Development Community and the African
Union (WEED, 2004, p. 44). The EU also wants greater regional integration and
cooperation in Africa to reduce poverty and learn from experiences in the European
model, especially in the areas of creating regional policies and social cohesion, given
the vast inequality of wealth and access to state institutions and services between the
 Lo 7

urban metropole and the rural periphery (Council of the European Union, 2006, p. 2-
3; Council of the European Union, 2007, p. 2-6; EUR-Lex, 2006; WEED, 2004, p. 42-
45). On paper at least, the EU and Africa share common goals and values in South
Africa, Southern Africa, Africa and the world at large with such as multilateralism,
peace and security, sustainable development, democracy, respect for human rights,
good governance, recognition of the International Criminal Court, abolition of the
death penalty, etc. (Council of the European Union, p. 1-3; Council of the European
Union, 2007, p. 1-5; EUR-Lex, 2006).
Conclusion
The EU as a whole has invested quite a lot into the peaceful transition of South Africa
into a free and democratic country from the support of grassroots organizations and
state building. It is an impressive achievement, given the widespread failure of
democratization in much of Africa. South Africa still faces many challenges such as
poverty, the AIDS epidemic, rampant crime, dysfunctional economic and societal
systems leftover from the colonial era and apartheid regime, etc. (EUR-Lex, 2006).
Indeed, Europe, at multiple levels has a strategic vision for South Africa to become a
the dynamo of regional integration in the region in hopes that one day, the scars of
past injustices that Europe inflicted upon Africa will be healed with Africans being
able to enjoy the quality of life, rights, freedoms and social justice to which
Europeans take for granted. Europe also want a stable and peaceful Africa so that in
the future, Africa would no longer need to be a recipient of European aid because
Africa would be economically prosperous. However, Europe still wants to benefit
commercially from South Africa with its extensive natural resources.
Today, South Africa, despite its shortcomings, is “a regime is democratic to the
degree that political relations between the state and its citizens feature broad, equal,
protected and mutually binding consultation” (Tilly, 2007, p. 13-14). All adult
citizens belong to the “same homogeneous category of citizenship” (Tilly, 2007, p.
14). “[Ethnicity] no longer has significant connection with political rights or
obligations and largely equal rights prevail between native-born and naturalized
citizens” (Tilly, 2007, p. 14). “[All] citizens enjoy publicly visible due process”
(Tilly, 2007, p. 15), however violent crime and illegal exploitation still exists on a
very wide scale by western standards. Although “[state] agents have clear enforceable
obligations to deliver benefits by category of recipient” (Tilly, 2007, p. 15), they are
sometimes not delivered. Trends that encourage democracy, such as the “increasing
 Lo 8

integration of trust networks into public politics, increasing insulation of public

politics from categorical inequality, and decreasing autonomy of major power centers
from public politics” (Tilly, 2007, p. 23) are gradually taking place, thanks to the
intervention of the EU and its member states in their external struggle against the
apartheid. However, just because a democratic regime exists does not justify the end
of democratic aid to South Africa. South Africans need to have access to state
institutions that provide protection and, and have a high degree of knowledge of their
rights before aid should be withdrawn. The EU has been successful so far in
promoting democracy in South Africa, but much more needs to be done in order to
fully consolidate democracy in South Africa. After all, there has been no peaceful
alternation of power to an opposition party since democratization. On another note, it
is interesting to investigate the role of a democratic South Africa as a stabilizing and
dynamic integrating factor in Southern or Sub-Saharan Africa or the likelihood that
South Africa would develop a one-plus party system democracy the likes of which
Japan experienced since the post-WWII. Or will it go the way of India with sporadic
periods of instability and restrictions of civil liberties with its diverse ethnic makeup?
 Lo 9

Bibliography

Theoretical

Book

TILLY, Charles. Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 234 p.

Case Studies

Articles

ADEJUMOBI, Said. Elections in Africa: A Fading Shadow of Democracy? ,

International Political Science Review, Jan. 2000, vol. 21, nº 1, p. 59-73.

FIORAMONTI, Lorenzo. Analysing Micro-Assistance to Democracy: EU Support

for Grassroots Organizations in South Africa, Development in Practice, Nov. 2004,
vol. 14, nº 6, p. 741-752.

— Mircro-Assiastance to Democracy and Sustainability: An Empirical Study of EU

Aid to Post Apartheid South Africa, Politikon, Dec. 2008, vol. 35, nº 3, p. 321-338.

HEARN, Julie. Aiding Democracy? Donors and Civil Society in South Africa, Third
World Quarterly, Oct. 2000, vol. 21, nº 5, p. 815-830.

OLSEN, Gorm Rye. Europe and the Promotion of Democracy in Post Cold War
Africa: How Serious is Europe and for What Reason? , African Affairs, July 1998,
vol. 97, nº 388, p. 343-367.

Documents from the Internet

COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership –

Council conclusions, October 17th, 2006. Available on:
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/06/st14/st14094.en06.pdf

— The South Africa-European Union Strategic Partnership Joint Action Plan, May
15th, 2007. Available on:
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st09/st09650.en07.pdf

FIORAMONTI, Lorenzo. The European Union promoting democracy in South

Africa: strengths and Weaknesses, 2003. Available on:
http://www.edpsg.org/Documents/DP30.doc

WORLD ECONOMY, ECOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT (WEED). Civilian

Perspective or Security Strategy? : European Development Policy Confronting New
Challenges in Foreign and Security Policy, November 23, 2004. Available on:
http://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/projekte/typo3/site/fileadmin/research
 Lo 10

%20groups/4/report%20conf%20darmstadt%20nov05.pdf

ZEFF, Eleanor E. & PIRRO, Ellen. Redistribution of Authority: The South African
Case, International Studies Association 40th Annual Convention, Feb. 16-20, 1999.
Available on: http://www.ciaonet.org/isa/isa.html

Websites

EUR-LEX. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament – Towards an EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership, June 28th, 2006.
Available on: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!
DocNumber&lg=en&type_doc=COMfinal&an_doc=2006&nu_doc=347

EUROPA. Summaries of EU legislation: Strategic Partnership with South Africa,

Dec. 19, 2007. Available on:
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/development/south_africa/r12551_en.htm