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APRIL 23 HALAL LETTER TO COMELEC

The En Banc
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Palacio del Gobernador
Intramuros, Manila
Hon. Chairman JOSE A. R. MELO
Hon. Commissioner RENE V. SARMIENTO
Hon. Commissioner NICODEMO T. FERRER
Hon. Commissioner LUCENITO T. TAGLE
Hon. Commissioner ARMANDO C. VELASCO
Hon. Commissioner ELIAS R. YUSOPH
Hon. Commissioner GREGORIO Y. LARRAZABAL
Gentlemen:
We are deeply concerned that the risk of failure of the
Automated Election System (AES) remains unacceptably high. But
it is very late in the day to return to the old manual system,
which may not save us either. It will simply mean
business-as- usual for the cheats, who have mastered the manual
system so well that they can manipulate its results in their
sleep.
Halalang Marangal (HALAL) proposes three simple things for the
COMELEC to do that can help lead us out of this dilemma.
THREE THINGS WE ASK FROM THE COMELEC TO ASSUAGE PEOPLE'S CONCERNS
ABOUT THE AES
ONE. We ask the COMELEC to assign every scanning machine and its
associated precinct cluster a simple unique identifier and
widely disseminate this information to the public.
Why? Because this will make the Precinct Count Optical Scanner
(PCOS) machines more accountable, just as vehicles with license
plates, or policemen with visible name plates, are more
accountable. It empowers the voting public better when they know
exactly the individual machine they are dealing with, making it
easy to identify errant machines, send reports, complaints, etc.
The unique identifiers of all machines in a polling center must
be conspicuously displayed outside the center, in big
characters. The ID of each PCOS must also be conspicuously
displayed in the room where the machine is located. A unique
identifier, known by all, is a fundamental requirement in any
automation project.
These unique PCOS IDs must be quickly added to the COMELEC
Project of Precincts (POP), which is the master list of all
polling precincts. The updated POP must be made available to the
media and the public on a compact disc (CD), for quick copying
and dissemination.
(If a unique ID per PCOS already exists, then the COMELEC need
only publicize them widely. Smartmatic is apparently using a
Stock-Keeping Unit (SKU) system that uses seven digits for
internal control. This is enough. The important thing is that
the identifiers are unique per machine, that they are
consistently used in all official lists and ERs, and that they
are publicly known and, on election day, conspicuously displayed
outside polling centers and in the precincts.)
TWO. We ask the Comelec to authorize election inspectors to print
before transmission 29 of the 30 Election Returns (ERs).
Why? To make as many copies of the precinct results as possible,
before the connection with a central server and its associated
possibility that the authentic PCOS data may be overwritten with
false data from the server during transmission. Also, to remove
any cause for PPCRV and NAMFREL, Nacionalistas and Liberals, or
national and local candidates of the same party, to dispute who
should get ER originals. There may not be enough with eight
copies, there will be enough with 29 copies. With so many copies
of the original ER circulating, suppressing the truth will be
much harder.
The printed ER should contain the machine's unique ID. The ER
originals can now go to more political parties, election
watchdogs, media organizations, and other accredited civic
groups.
The 30th copy of the ER, printed after transmission, should be
immediately read aloud by the BEI so that everyone who had
received an earlier copy may make sure that their copy is
identical with the 30th copy. If not, then the transmission has
compromised the election results in the PCOS memory as well as
the 30th copy. These, and the electronic ER copy just
transmitted to the central servers, must now be presumed to
contain false data and must be questioned. This must be noted in
the minutes. But the 29 original ERs still contain the authentic
data.
THREE. We ask the COMELEC to authorize a 100% manual audit of the
votes for president.
Why? As a final check on the accuracy of the PCOS count, for the
same reason that a bank teller still manually counts bills after
they have been counted by a machine. The COMELEC reverted to a
100% manual audit of ballot authenticity after it was discovered
that the high-speed printing caused 1-2 mm misalignment which
resulted in the inaccurate scanning of the UV security mark. For
exactly the same reason, we need a 100% manual audit of the
votes, to find out if a similar misaligment of ovals due to
high-speed printing also resulted in the inaccurate scanning of
marks. Without the PCOS feature that allows each voter to verify
if his choices were correctly registered by the machine, a 100%
manual audit is our only remaining option to check the scanning
and counting accuracy of the PCOS. Earlier proposals that have
been raised for a 100% manual audit covering three positions
only were in the right direction. Our counsel to limit further
the coverage of the audit to the president is meant to
streamline the process even more, by making possible a very
simple manual method as follows:
The BEI will first count the ballots, and then sort them into
separate stacks, one stack per presidential candidate. The
stacks should be double-checked by individual watchers and
elections watchdogs. The BEI will then count in public, aloud,
the ballots in each stack. If the counts are correct, then the
total of the counts will equal the number of ballots. If no
discrepancy is found, we estimate that this method will take no
more than one hour. If a discrepancy is found, it may take
another half hour to confirm the accuracy of the manual count.
(This is how some countries do their manual count. After voting
closes, all ballots for one electoral jurisdiction are
transported to a big hall or covered court, authenticaled, and
then dumped on the floor. "Scrutineers" then sort the ballots
into stacks, one candidate, one stack. Double-checked, of
course. If the contest is not very close, the heights of the
stacks will show before the counting starts â even before the
sorting is over â who won as member of parliament in that
jurisdiction. On the same night, winners in most juristictions
would be known, as well as the majority party if any, and then
of course the prime minister â a clean and honest count, without
automation.)
We emphasize that extra care must be taken to make this manual
audit 100% accurate, because it will serve as the standard
against which the accuracy of the PCOS machine will be measured.
The stacks and the final vote counts must be checked several
times to detect and correct any errors. The results of this
manual count of votes for president, including the total votes
and any discrepancy in the totals, must be appended to the
printed ERs and countersigned by the BEI. The results of the
manual count will also be entered in the minutes. They should be
taken into account before any winner is proclaimed. After all,
the term of outgoing elected officials will end only in June 30.
There no need to rush any proclamation.
Airplanes and ships are required by law to carry life vests and
life boats, even if these are superfluous most of the time
because air and sea accidents are rare. They are there not only
to assuage passenger concerns, but also because of the lives
they will save in those rare events when they are needed.
Similarly, we ask the COMELEC for the following safety
mechanisms: unique PCOS identifiers made public, 29 ERs printed
before any transmission, and a 100% manual audit of the votes
for president before proclaiming any winner.
We hope the COMELEC will consider these HALAL recommendations
for the 2010 elections, which we are now formally submitting to
the COMELEC in the spirit of supporting the Commission's efforts
to protect the integrity of the ballot and the sanctity of the
peopleâ s voice.
Very truly yours,
HALALANG MARANGAL CONVENORS/BOARD OF DIRECTORS:
WIGBERTO TAÃ ADA, Chairman, HALAL
Former Senator, Senate of the Philippines
FRANCISCO GUDANI, President, HALAL
Retired General, Armed Forces of the Philippines
MEHOL K. SADAIN, Former Commissioner, Commission on Elections
ISAGANI SERRANO, President, Philippine Rural Reconstruction
Movement
Sr. MARY JOHN MANANZAN, Association of Major Religious Superiors
MA. PAZ LUNA, TOYM Awardee
ROBERTO VERZOLA, Secretary-General, HALAL

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