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39
The problem of the age of the universe and whether, in principle, it must
be finite or could be infinite has a long history and views have been divided.
It is my contention, contrary to the opinion now widely held, that the basic
philosophical problem has not been resolved by Cantor's theory of infinite
sets.
I
See Philoponos, J.: Contra Proclum de Aeternitate Mundi, (ed.) H. Rabe. Leipzig:
Teubner, 1899, pp. 8 et seq.
40 G. Whitrow
Bentley's point was that an infinite sequence of past events is not analogous
to an infinite sequence of future events. All past events are empirical
certainties, in the sense that we can, at least in principle, be presented with
evidence ('traces') of their occurrence. On the other hand, all future events
are no more than empirical possibilities, however strongly we may
happen to believe that they will in fact occur. Moreover, the reason why
universe. 'Now', argued Kant, 'the infinity of a series consists in the fact
that it can never be completed by successive synthesis. It thus follows that
it is impossible for an infinite world-series to have passed away, and that
a beginning of the world is therefore a necessary condition of the world's
existence.' (Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, Kemp-Smith translation, p.
217). This argument as stated by Kant is imprecise by modern standards.
Kant did not clearly distinguish between the question of whether there
was, or was not, a first event in the world's history and the question of
whether the total duration of past time isfiniteor infinite. Kant's discussion
of the hypothesis that the world had no beginning in time is formulated
as an argument against the idea that the past sequence of successive 'states
of things' is, in the language of modern mathematics, an open set with no
first member. Whether or not an infinite measure is to be associated with
it depends on the choice of temporal unit.
Kant's idea of successive 'states of things' presupposes that there is a
unique time-sequence for the whole universe. However, as I have argued
elsewhere ([1966], p. 568), the objection to the possibility of an infinite
past applies to any set of discrete events forming a sequence in time, e.g.
the swings of a pendulum, or the successive clicks of a Geiger counter
produced by the emission of particles from a radioactive source.
As I have already indicated, in my view Kant's argument cannot be
automatically disposed of by appealing to the modern theory of infinite
sets and sequences. Indeed, all reference to temporal concepts has been
purged from the modern theory of infinite sets and sequences, which are
thought of as aggregates and not as being produced in time. Of course,
any temporal sequence of events can, if we wish, be thought of as merely
an aggregate, but only by omitting all reference to its production in time.
Kant's argument, however, concerns successive actions or events occurring
in time. It does not conflict with the idea that infinite sequences and series
in general are legitimate objects of thought, but it rejects the occurrence
of an infinite sequence of past events as an actual possibility.
42 G. WUtrow
There remains the possibility that the world might be such that there are
an infinite number of unrelated past sequences E_r such that, although
each sequence can necessarily only contain a finite number of events,
there is no definite finite integer N such that none of the sequences concerned contains more than N members. In that sense, and in that sense
only, could there be a past situation analogous to a potentially infinite
sequence of future events. Nevertheless, there still could not be the possibility of an infinite number of past 'states of the universe'. For, if there is
a temporal sequence of past 'states of the universe' (cf. the technical concept of 'cosmic time' in modern theoretical cosmology withfor the
purposes of this discussionthe usual continuous variable t replaced by
a sequence of discrete instants . . . t_T_1, _n t_r+] . . . t0, where t0 denotes
the present), it must itself constitute a temporal chain of the type that
I have been considering, and hence the number of events in the chain,
whatever this number may be, must necessarily be finite.
Hence, the only possibility that the universe does not have a finite
past arises if no temporal sequence of successive states can be associated
with it. Consequently, a steady-state static universe, for example an
Einstein universe, is not open to objection if it is assumed that nothing
1
There is symmetry, in this respect, of future and past: an infinite sequence (actual
infinity, or aleph-zero) of past events corresponds to an actually infinite (aleph-zero)
sequence of future events. The latter concept has to be rejected and likewise, in my view,
the former.
44 G. WUtrow
ever happens in it, so that strictly speaking it is timeless. On the other hand,
in the steady-state expanding world-models devised, in 1948, by Hoyle
and by Bondi and Gold, respectively, although the past history of every
observable galaxy is finite, there exists a unidirectional cosmic time t
which is assumed to be without beginning or end. These models are therefore open to the objection discussed above, even if overall they do not
change with time.1
4
TRANSFORMATIONS OF TIME-SCALE
CONCLUSION
Kant assumed that, if the concept of time could be associated with the
universe as a whole, it would be quasi-Newtonian, but he argued that the
universe could not have an infinite past nor have existed for only a
finite part of an infinite past (other 'leg' of the First Antimony of Pure
Reason). He therefore concluded that time does not pertain to the
universe itself but merely to our way of regarding it. Instead, I conclude
that: either the universe is such that there is no 'cosmic time' (in the
modern technical sense) applicable to it, or elseas I prefer to believe
the universe is such that cosmic time exists but its total past range is finite,
in the sense explained above.
1
These models have now been rejected by most astronomers because they are believed to be
incompatible with observations, e.g. the cosmic background 3K black-body radiation
discovered in 1965 by Penzias and Wilson.
1 r
REFERENCES