THIRD DIVISION

CORAZON D. SARMIENTA,
JOSE DERAMA, CATES RAMA,
JOSIE MIWA, TOTO NOLASCO,
JESUS OLIQUINO, NORBERTO
LOPEZ, RUBEN ESPOSO,
BERNARDO FLORESCA,
MARINA DIMATALO, ROBLE
DIMANDAKO, RICARDO PEA,
EDUARDO ESPINO, ANTONIO
GALLEGOS, VICTOR
SANDOVAL, FELICITAS
ABRANTES, MERCY CRUZ,
ROSENDO ORGANO, RICKY
BARENO, ANITA TAKSAGON,
JOSIE RAMA and PABLO
DIMANDAKO,
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 182953

Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J.,

Chairperson,
BRION,
BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ.

- versus MANALITE HOMEOWNERS

ASSOCIATION, INC. (MAHA),
Respondent.
Promulgated:
October 11, 2010
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to nullify the Decision[1] dated October 19,
2007 and Resolution[2] dated May 21, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 93050. The CA had affirmed the Decision[3] dated January 10, 2006[4] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 74, in Civil Case No. 05-485
which reversed the Decision[5] of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of
Antipolo City, Branch 1, in Civil Case No. 104-00.
The case stemmed from a complaint [6] for Forcible Entry/Unlawful Detainer filed
by respondent Manalite Homeowners Association, Inc. (MAHA) against AMARA
W CIGELSALO Association (AMARA) and its members. The complaint was
raffled to the MTCC of Antipolo City, Branch 1 and docketed as Civil Case No.
104-00.
MAHA alleged that it is the registered owner of a certain parcel of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 222603 [7] with an area of 9,936
square meters situated in Sitio Manalite, Phase I, Barangay Sta. Cruz, Antipolo
City.[8] Through force, intimidation, threat, strategy and stealth, petitioners entered
the premises and constructed their temporary houses and an office building.
[9]
Petitioners likewise even filed a civil case to annul MAHAs title on September
2, 1992, but said case was dismissed by the trial court. After said dismissal,
MAHA demanded that petitioners vacate the land. Petitioners pleaded that they be
given one year within which to look for a place to transfer, to which request
MAHA acceded. The said one-year period, however, was repeatedly extended due
to the benevolence of MAHAs members. Later on, petitioners came up with a
proposal that they become members of MAHA so they can be qualified to acquire
portions of the property by sale pursuant to the Community Mortgage Program
(CMP).[10] MAHA again agreed and tolerated petitioners possession, giving them
until December 1999 to comply with the requirements to avail of the CMP
benefits. Petitioners nonetheless failed to comply with said requirements. Thus, on
August 9, 2000, MAHA sent formal demand letters to petitioners to vacate the
property. Upon the latters refusal to heed the demand, MAHA filed the complaint
for Forcible Entry/Unlawful Detainer.
In their Answer with Counterclaims,[11] petitioners denied the said allegations and
averred that they are the owners of the subject lot, having been in actual physical
possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years before MAHA intruded into the

land. They claimed that as the years went by, they established the AMARA and
bought the subject property from Julian Tallano. The property later became known
as the Tallano Estate and registered under TCT No. 498. They likewise argued that
the allegations in the complaint do not confer jurisdiction upon the court acting as
an ejectment court, and that the complaint was irregular and defective because its
caption states that it was forForcible Entry/Unlawful Detainer. MAHA,
additionally, had no legal capacity to sue and was guilty of forum shopping. Its
officers were likewise fictitious.
On May 19, 2005, the MTCC of Antipolo City rendered a decision dismissing the
case for lack of cause of action. The MTCC held that the complaint filed was one
of forcible entry, but MAHA failed to establish the jurisdictional requirement of
prior physical possession in its complaint.[12] Also, the trial court held that MAHAs
failure to initiate immediate legal action after petitioners unlawfully entered its
property and its subsequent declaration of benevolence upon the petitioners cannot
be construed as tolerance in accordance with law as to justify the treatment of the
case as one for unlawful detainer.[13]
MAHA appealed the decision to the RTC. The RTC rendered a Decision dated
January 10, 2006, reversing the decision of the MTCC. The RTC held that the
lower court erred in dismissing the case by considering the complaint as one of
forcible entry which required prior physical possession. The RTC found that
MAHA was able to allege and prove by preponderance of evidence that petitioners
occupation of the property was by mere tolerance. MAHA tolerated the occupation
until all those who wanted to acquire MAHAs rights of ownership could comply
with membership obligations and dues.[14] Petitioners, however, failed to comply
with said obligations within the given period; thus, their occupation became illegal
after MAHA demanded that they vacate the property.[15] The dispositive portion of
the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment appealed from
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is rendered
ordering the defendants; their representatives and all persons acting for
and in their behalf; members of their families; their lessees and sublessees; or other people whose occupation of the premises are from the
authority of defendants, their representatives or members of the
defendants families; and other transferees pendente lite:

1) to vacate the subject premises;

2) to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff the sum of THIRTY FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P35,000.00) as for attorneys fee[s] and the cost of
suit; and,
3) to pay the plaintiff severally the sum of ONE HUNDRED PESOS
(P100.00) per month from June 1992 until the premises are actually
vacated.
SO ORDERED.[16]

Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for review with the CA assailing the decision
of the RTC. In a Decision dated October 19, 2007, the CA affirmed the decision of
the RTC.The CA held that while the complaint in the beginning alleged facts which
make out a case for forcible entry, the rest of the averments therein show that the
cause of action was actually for unlawful detainer. The CA noted that the
complaint alleged supervening events that would show that what was initially
forcible entry was later tolerated by MAHA thereby converting its cause of action
into one for unlawful detainer. Accordingly, the complaint was filed within the
required one-year period counted from the date of last demand. The CA further
held that the fact that the complaint was captioned as both for forcible entry and
unlawful detainer does not render it defective as the nature of the complaint is
determined by the allegations of the complaint. The dispositive portion of the CA
decision reads,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City,
Branch 74 dated January 10, [2006] is herebyAFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[17]

Petitioners motion for reconsideration from the said decision was denied in a
Resolution dated May 21, 2008. Hence, petitioners are now before this Court
raising the following issues:
I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE
DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF

ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 74 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 05-485

REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURT [IN CITIES], BRANCH 1, ANTIPOLO CITY THAT
DISMISS[ED]
THE
FORCIBLE
ENTRY/UNLAWFUL
DETAINER CASE FOR LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION.
II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE
COURT [A QUO] ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE.

III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE
COMPLAINT BOTH CAPTIONED AS FORCIBLE ENTRY
AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER IS NOT DEFECTIVE.

IV.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS [HAVE] A

SUPERIOR RIGHT OF POSSESSION OVER THE PROPERTY
IN QUESTION.

V.

WHETHER OR NOT THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT

IN CITIES, BRANCH 1, ANTIPOLO CITY HAS
JURISDICTION.

VI.

WHETHER OR NOT THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT

IN CITIES, BRANCH 1, ANTIPOLO CITY HAS
JURISDICTION OVER AN EJECTMENT CASE BASED ON
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER.[18]

Essentially, there are two principal issues for our resolution: (1) whether or not the
allegations in the complaint are sufficient to make up a case of forcible entry or
unlawful detainer; and (2) whether or not the CA was correct in affirming the RTCs
decision finding a case of unlawful detainer.
Petitioners assert that the jurisdictional requirement of prior physical possession in
actions for forcible entry was not alleged with particularity in the complaint, as it
merely alleged that respondent had been deprived of its possession over the
property. They also maintained that they were not withholding possession of the
property upon the expiration or termination of their right to possess because they

never executed any contract, express or implied, in favor of the respondent. Hence,
there was also no unlawful detainer.
We deny the petition.
Well settled is the rule that what determines the nature of the action as well as the
court which has jurisdiction over the case are the allegations in the complaint. [19] In
ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such statement of facts as to bring
the party clearly within the class of cases under Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Section 1 provides:
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when.-- Subject to
the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the
possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy,
or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the
expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any
contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of
any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within
one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against
the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession,
or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such
possession, together with damages and costs.

There are two entirely distinct and different causes of action under the aforequoted
rule, to wit: (1) a case for forcible entry, which is an action to recover possession of
a property from the defendant whose occupation thereof is illegal from the
beginning as he acquired possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth; and (2) a case for unlawful detainer, which is an action for recovery of
possession from the defendant whose possession of the property was inceptively
lawful by virtue of a contract (express or implied) with the plaintiff, but became
illegal when he continued his possession despite the termination of his right
thereunder.
In forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege in the complaint, and prove, that he was
in prior physical possession of the property in dispute until he was deprived thereof
by the defendant by any of the means provided in Section 1, Rule 70 of

the Rules either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. [20] In unlawful
detainer, there must be an allegation in the complaint of how the possession of
defendant started or continued, that is, by virtue of lease or any contract, and that
defendant holds possession of the land or building after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or
implied.
In the present case, a thorough perusal of the complaint would reveal that the
allegations clearly constitute a case of unlawful detainer:
xxxx
3. Plaintiff is the registered owner of that certain parcel of land involved
in the instant case covered by TCT No. 222603 containing an area of
9,936 sq.m. situated in Sitio Manalite, Phase I, Baranggay Sta. Cruz,
Antipolo City, which property was place under community mortgage
program (CMP);
4. Other defendants in the instant case are all member and officers of
defendant AMARA who, through force, intimidation, threat, strategy and
stealth entered into the premises herein and constructed their temporary
houses and office building respectively, pre-empting plaintiff from using
the premises thus, depriving the same of its prior possession thereof;
5. On September 2, 1992 as an strategy of the cheapest sort defendants,
in conspiracy and collusion with each other, defendants as representative
of Heirs of Antonio and Hermogenes Rodriquez, the alleged owner of
the property at bar, filed civil case no. 92-2454 against plaintiff, lodge
before Branch 73 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, seeking
to annul plaintiff title;
6. Immediately upon final dismissal of such groundless, baseless and
malicious suit, plaintiff demanded defendants to vacate the premises, but
the latter pleaded with the former to be given a one (1) year period
within which to look for a place to transfer, which period, upon pleas of
defendants, coupled with plaintiffs benevolence was repeatedly extended
by said plaintiffs tolerance of occupancy thereof, but under such terms
and conditions. Due to failure to comply with their undertaking despite
repeated demands therefor plaintiffs sent a formal demand letter upon
defendants;

7. Upon receipt of the above-stated demand, defendants propose to

become members of plaintiff, as qualification to acquire portions of the
property by sale pursuant to the CMP, to which plaintiff agreed and
tolerated defendants possession by giving the same a period until the
month of December 1999, to comply with all the requirements prerequisite to the availing of the CMP benefits but failed and despite
repeated demands therefor, thus, the filing of a complaint with the
Baranggay and the issuance of the certificate to file action dated
February 8, 2000;
8. As time is of the essence, and the fact that the defendants are mere
intruders or usurpers who have no possessory right whatsoever over the
land illegally occupied by them, trifling technicalities that would tend to
defeat the speedy administration of justice formal demand is not
necessary thereto, (Republic vs. Cruz C.A. G.R. No. 24910 R Feb. 7,
1964) however, to afford a sufficient period of time within which to
vacate the premises peacefully another oral and formal demands were
made upon the same to that effect, and demolish the temporary office
and houses they constructed on plaintiffs property and instead defendants
again, as representative to alleged Estate of Julian Tallano filed a
complaint for ejectment against plaintiffs former President, Hon.
Marcelino Aben which case, is docketed as civil case no. 4119, lodged,
before branch 11 of this Honorable court, defendants obstinately refused
to peacefully turn over the property they intruded upon in fact they even
dared plaintiff to file a case against them boasting that nobody can order
them to vacate the premises;
9. Defendants letter dated August 9, 2000, acknowledged actual receipt
of plaintiffs two (2) formal demands letters. Thus, the issuance of
Katibayan Upang Makadulog sa Hukuman dated September 25, 2000;
10. As a result thereof, plaintiff was compelled to engage the services of
the undersigned counsel in order to immediately institute the instant suit
for which services plaintiff agreed to pay the amount of P35,000.00 plus
P3,500.00 per court appearance;
x x x x[21]

A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites

the following: (1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract
with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal

upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latters right of

possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and
deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one year from the
last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the
complaint for ejectment.[22]
Likewise, the evidence proves that after MAHA acquired the property, MAHA
tolerated petitioners stay and gave them the option to acquire portions of the
property by becoming members of MAHA. Petitioners continued stay on the
premises was subject to the condition that they shall comply with the requirements
of the CMP. Thus, when they failed to fulfill their obligations, MAHA had the right
to demand for them to vacate the property as their right of possession had already
expired or had been terminated. The moment MAHA required petitioners to leave,
petitioners became deforciants illegally occupying the land. [23] Well settled is the
rule that a person who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or
permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied
promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for
ejectment is the proper remedy against him. [24] Thus, the RTC and the CA correctly
ruled in favor of MAHA.
As to petitioners argument that MAHAs title is void for having been secured
fraudulently, we find that such issue was improperly raised. In an unlawful detainer
case, the sole issue for resolution is physical or material possession of the property
involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties. [25] Since the
only issue involved is the physical or material possession of the premises, that is
possession de facto and not possession de jure, the question of ownership must be
threshed out in a separate action.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated October 19, 2007 and
Resolution dated May 21, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93050
are hereby AFFIRMED.
With costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 156439 : September 29, 2010]
CLEMENCIA P. CALARA, ET AL., PETITIONER, VS. TERESITA FRANCISCO, ET AL. RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
The delineation of the jurisdiction of the regular courts and the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) over cases between a subdivision owner and buyer is primarily at issue in this petition for reviewon certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the 12 April 2002
Decision rendered by the Special Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 91771. [1]
The Facts
Petitioner Clemencia Calara and her children, petitioners Concepcion, Elenita, Isidro, Carlosa, Bernardino,
Doris, Cladiolosa and Lophcal, all surnamed Calara, own the Lophcal (Calara) Subdivision in Brgy. Anos, Los
Baos.[2] Petitioner Clemencia Calara was named respondent in a letter-complaint for violation of P.D.
957[3] instituted on 28 April 1982 by a group of buyers, one Gaudencio Navarro and respondent Jesus
Francisco among them, before the then Human Settlement Regulatory Commission (HSRC). Incorporating
such grievances as absence of a drainage system, unfinished curb and gutter, undeveloped roads and
abandoned electrical facilities, the complaint was docketed before said office as HSRC Case No. REM060482-1043.[4]
Contending that the portions sold in favor of the complaining buyers resulted from the partitioning of the
aforesaid parcel by its co-owners, petitioner Clemencia Calara filed an answer dated 11 July 1982 alleging
that the subdivision was exempt from P.D. 957 and that complaints for ejectment were about to be filed
against said buyers.[5] On 29 July 1982, petitioners consequently filed against respondents Spouses Jesus
and Teresita Francisco the complaint for unlawful detainer docketed as Civil Case No. 993 before the then
Municipal Court of Los Banos, Laguna.[6] A separate complaint for unlawful detainer was likewise filed by
petitioners against Gaudencio Navarro and was docketed before the same court as Civil Case No. 994. [7]
In their 29 January 1990 amendment of the complaint against respondents, petitioners alleged that,
sometime in 1976, the former manifested their intention to buy the 250-square meter parcel denominated
as Lot No. 23 of the Lophcal (Calara) Subdivision at the price of P80.00 per square meter; that having made
an advance payment in the sum of P8,093.00, respondents were made to understand that their purchase of
said parcel is conditioned on the parties' execution of a contract to sell over the same; that after
constructing a house of strong materials, however, respondents have not only refused to execute a contract
to sell but also failed to make any further payments on the lot; and, that having already ignored petitioner
Clemencia Calara's 20 March 1979 demand letter for them to vacate the property, respondents also refused
to heed the 27 March 1982 demand to the same effect served upon them by petitioners' counsel. In
addition to respondents' ejectment from the lot and the turnover of the peaceful possession thereof,
petitioners sought indemnities for exemplary damages, attorney's fees and the costs. [8]
On 26 August 1982, respondents and Gaudencio Navarro filed a joint motion to dismiss on the ground that
the Municipal Court had no jurisdiction over the complaints filed against them by petitioner since another
action over the same cause and the same parties was pending before the HSRC; and, that said complaints
failed to state a cause of action. Dissatisfied with the denial of said motion in the 28 June 1983 resolution
issued by the Municipal Court which had, by then, been reorganized as a Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
[9]
pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,[10] respondents and Gaudencio Navarro filed a 30 June 1983 motion
for reconsideration[11] which was no longer resolved in view of the ensuing approval and effectivity of the
Rules on Summary Procedure. In the meantime, the HSRC rendered a decision dated 4 June 1985 in HLURB
Case No. REM-060482-1043,[12]disposing of the case in the following wise:
Premises considered, it appearing that respondent had sold subdivision lots within the Opaco Lophcal
Subdivision project without securing the necessary license to sell as required in Section 4 & 5 of P.D. 957,
and it appearing further that respondent had failed to develop the subdivision despite repeated demands

thereof(r) by complainants, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondent (1) to cease and desist from
selling or offering to sell the remaining unsold lots in Opaco Lophcal Subdivision until such time as she shall
have duly registered the subdivision project and secured the requisite license to sell pursuant to Section 4 &
5 of P.D. 957; (2) to develop the subdivision within four (4) months from receipt of this decision and to
submit to this Commission, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, a timetable to undertake said
development and, thereafter, a progress report every end of the month or as often as this Commission may
require.
An administrative fine of P5,000.00 is hereby imposed upon respondent for violation of Section 4, 5 and 20
of P.D. 957.
Failure to comply with this decision shall constrain this Commission to forward the records of this case to the
Task Force on Subdivision, Ministry of Justice, for the filing of appropriate charges against respondent
Clemencia Calara for violation of P.D. 957.
Let copies of this decision be furnished all parties concerned.
It is SO ORDERED.[13]
On the other hand, in compliance with the MTC's directive during 23 May 1989 hearing conducted in the
case,[14] respondents and Gaudencio Navarro, filed their 5 June 1989 answer, specifically denying the
material allegations of the complaint. Calling attention to the HSRC's 4 June 1985 decision in HSRC Case No.
REM-060482-1043, said answering defendants averred that, despite the perfection of the sale over the lots
respectively occupied by them, they were constrained to stop paying the monthly amortizations thereon in
view of petitioners' failure to comply with their obligations as subdivision developers. Signifying their
willingness to continue paying their respective amortizations/installments upon the latter's compliance with
the decision rendered by the HSRC, the former prayed for the dismissal of the complaint as well as the grant
of their counterclaims for moral damages.[15]
Having terminated the mandatory pre-trial conference [16] and in receipt of the position papers submitted by
the parties, the MTC went on to render a decision dated 6 October 1999, discounting the existence of a
contract of sale between petitioners and respondents and upholding its jurisdiction over the case. Further
finding that respondents were builders in bad faith,[17] the MTC disposed of Civil Case No. 993 in the
following wise:
WHEREFORE, the above premises considered, and on a finding that plaintiff and her children have been
unlawfully deprived of possession of the subject lot they own, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiff CLEMENCIA F. CALARA, and her children. CONCEPCION, ELENITA, ISIDRO, CARLOSA, BERNARDO",
DORIS CLADIOLOSA and LOPCHAL, all surnamed CALARA, and as against defendants TERESITA FRANCISCO
and JESUS FRANCISCO, and ordering.
1.

Said defendants TERESITA FRANCISCO and JESUS FRANCISCO and all those acting in their
behalves, or claiming rights under them, to completely vacate the parcel of residential lot identified
as Lot No. 4-A-4-9-20-D-5-A, containing 278 square meters, more or less, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Tide No. T-52242. registered in the name of plaintiffs, and which lot is identified as Lot
23 in the original subdivision plan of LOPHCAL (CALARA) SUBDIVISION, located at Brgy. Anos, Los
Banos, Laguna, and forthwith to turn over and surrender possession of the same to said plaintiff and
her children;

2.

Said defendants, and all persons claiming rights under them, to remove and demolish any and all
houses, structures erected, built, or constructed by them, or existing, over the said described
property, without right of reimbursement, forthwith upon receipt of a copy of this Judgment;

3.

Said defendants to jointly and severally pay said plaintiffs) damages representing the reasonable
rental compensation or value for the use and occupancy of the lot belonging to plaintiffs and
children, in the total sum of P188,771.28 corresponding to the period from April 1, 1979 up to
October 31, 1999 and the sum of P1,800.00 a month, corresponding to reasonable rental
thenceforth with twenty 20% percent increase per annum, up to and until said defendants fully
vacate the property of the plaintiffs, with all accrued and unpaid amounts to bear interest at 6%
from date of first demand and/or date when they had/should have first accrued and until fully paid;

4.

Said defendants to pay said plaintiffs the sum of P60,000.00, for and as attorney's fee:

5.

Said defendants to pay plaintiffs the sum of P10,000.00 representing litigation costs.

The counterclaims interposed by defendants against plaintiffs is hereby ordered dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[18]
Elevated by respondents on appeal before Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calamba, Laguna,
the foregoing decision was affirmed in toto in the 23 May 2000 decision rendered by said court in Civil Case
No. 2866-99-C. Undeterred by the denial of their motion for reconsideration of said decision in the RTC's
order dated 21 September 2000,[20] respondents filed the petition for review which was docketed as CAG.R. SP No. 61243 before the CA which, thru its then Special Twelfth Division, granted their application for a
writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of said 23 May 2000 decision. [21] On 12 April 2002,
the then Special Seventh Division of the CA rendered the herein assailed decision, reversing the decisions of
the MTC and RTC and ordering the dismissal of petitioners' complaint for unlawful detainer [22] upon the
following findings and conclusions:
The action is not a simple case for unlawful detainer. The complaint focuses on [respondents'] refusal to
execute the Contract to Sell and to pay the monthly installments for Lot 23 in Lophcal Subdivision.
[Respondents] claimed that they were within their rights, as provided by P.D. 957, to stop paying the
monthly amortizations since the [petitioners] failed to develop the subdivision. The issue, therefore, involves
the rights and obligations of parties to a sale of real property, as regulated by P.D. 957.
When a complaint for unlawful detainer arises from the failure of a buyer on installment basis of real
property to pay based on a right to stop paying monthly amortizations under PD 957, the determinative
question is exclusively cognizable by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). Therefore, the
question of the right to collect the monthly amortization must be determined by said agency (Francel Really
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 129).
Section 3 of PD 957, provides:
'The National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and
business in accordance with the provisions of this Decree."
In Executive Order No. 90 dated December 17, 1986, the exclusive jurisdiction of National Housing Authority
(NHA) over the above case was transferred to the HLURB.
xxxx
Where the law confines in an administrative office quasi-judicial functions, the jurisdiction of such office shall
prevail over the court. Thus, the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question
which is lodged with an administrative tribunal of special competence and when a uniformity of ruling is
essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered (Brett vs. IAC, 191 SCRA 687;
Roxas and Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 106).
The MTC having no jurisdiction to entertain the case, it is also without jurisdiction to award damages to
[petitioners]."[23]
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the foregoing decision was denied in the CA's 20 November 2002
resolution, [24] hence, this petition.
The Issues
Petitioners urge the reversal of the assailed decision on the following grounds:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE HOUSING AND LAND USE
REGULATORY BOARD (HLURB) HAS EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE
WHETHER THERE IS A PERFECTED CONTRACT TO SELL BETWEEN PETITIONER CALARA AND
RESPONDENTS FRANCISCO[25]
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RESOLVING THE ISSUE ON WHETHER
RESPONDENTS FRANCISCO HAVE STILL LEGAL PERSONALITY TO PURSUE THE PETITION FOR
REVIEW IN SPITE OF THE SEVERAL LAPSES THEY HAD COMMITTED BEFORE THE MUNICIPAL
TRIAL COURT AND THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT
HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT COMPLAINT FOR EJECTMENT/UNLAWFUL DETAINER
FILED BY PETITIONER CLEMENCIA CALARA AGAINST RESPONDENTS TERESITA AND JESUS
FRANCISCO
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN STATING THAT RESPONDENTS FRANCISCO HAD
BOUGHT THE SUBJECT LOT FROM PETITIONER CALARA
IV.
The Court's Ruling
We find the petition bereft of merit.
As a preliminary consideration, petitioners argue that respondents should not have been allowed to pursue
their appeals in view of their numerous procedural lapses before the MTC, the RTC and the CA. Petitioners
call attention to the fact that, instead of filing their answer in compliance with the MTC's 28 June 1983
resolution which denied their motion to dismiss, respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which was
not acted upon in view of its being a prohibited motion under the Rules on Summary Procedure. Having
filed their answer only on 6 June 1989, respondents are additionally taken to task by petitioners for filing
their position paper only on 28 June 1999 or beyond the 29 May 1999 deadline set by the MTC. Considering
respondents' added failure to file the requisite supersedeas bond during the pendency of their appeal before
the RTC and their petition for review before the CA, petitioners further maintain that the MTC's 26 October
1999 decision had long become final and executory.[26]
While it is true that the foregoing matters were raised by petitioners in their comment to respondents'
petition for review before the CA,[27] our perusal of the record shows that respondents' 30 June 1983 motion
for reconsideration of the MTC's 28 June 1983 resolution denying their motion to dismiss was filed before the
1 August 1983 effectivity of the Rules on Summary Procedure. Despite the ensuing prohibition against said
motion and the MTC's long inaction thereon, however, petitioners appear to have made no move at all to
submit the case for decision on the strength of the allegations of their complaint or, for that matter, to object
to the MTC's directive for respondents to file their answer within 10 days from the 23 May 1989 hearing
conducted in the case. Even with respondents' belated filing of their answer on 6 June 1989, petitioners also
failed to cause the inclusion of the consequences of said procedural lapses among the issues identified for
resolution in the 15 April 1999 Pre-Trial Order subsequently issued by the MTC.
The rule is settled that the determination of the issues at a pre-trial conference bars the consideration of
other questions on appeal.[28] Having accepted the MTC's favorable 26 October 1999 decision which cited
liberal construction of procedural rules in excusing respondents' tardy filing of their position paper,
[29]
petitioners were also resultantly barred from taking issue against the former's late filing of said position
paper on 28 June 1999. With the RTC's 23 May 2000 decision in Civil Case No. 2866-99-C likewise not
delving into the matter, we find that the CA cannot be faulted for brushing aside petitioners' belated harping
over said procedural lapses in their comment to respondents' petition for review which was docketed thereat
as CA-G.R. SP No. 6123. After all, points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention
of the trial court will not be and ought not to be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal.[30]

Neither is there merit in petitioners1 position that respondents' failure to file the required supersedeas bond
had already rendered the MTC's 26 October 1999 decision final and executory. Although a decision in an
ejectment case favorable to the plaintiff is immediately executory[31] unless a supersedeas bond is filed by
the defendant[32] the latter's failure to file said bond does not prejudice the appeal otherwise perfected in the
premises. This is evident from Section 19, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which, in part,
provides as follows:
"Sec. 19. Immediate execution of judgment, how to stay the same, - If judgment is rendered against the
defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and the
defendant to stay the- execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond approved by the Municipal Trial Court
and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages and costs accruing down to the time of the
judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate
court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of
the Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the
reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate
determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or
period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with other papers, to the
clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed.
All amounts so paid to the appellate court shall be deposited with said court or authorized government
depositary bank, and shall be held there until the final disposition of the appeal, unless the court, by
agreement of the interested parties, or in the absence of reasonable grounds of opposition to a motion to
withdraw, or for justifiable grounds, shall decree otherwise. Should the defendant fail to make the payments
above prescribed from time to lime during the pendency of the appeal, the appellate court, upon motion of
the plaintiff and upon proof of such failure, shall order the execution of the judgment appealed from with
respect to the restoration of possession, but such execution shall not be a bar to the appeal taking its
course until the final disposition thereof on the merits." [33]
xxxx
A similar dearth of merit may be said of petitioners' contention that the CA erred in discounting the MTC's
jurisdiction over the complaint instituted a quo. Designed to provide an expeditious means of protecting
actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved, [34] ejectment cases concededly fall
within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of first level courts [35] by express provision of Section 33
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, in relation to Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure[36]Considering that the same is determined by the allegations pleaded in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought,[37] the rule is equally settled that jurisdiction in ejectment cases cannot be
made to depend upon the defences set up in the answer or pleadings filed by the defendant. [38]
However, our perusal of the record shows that the CA correctly ruled that the cause of action embodied in
the original and amended complaint petitioners filed a quo was not a simple cause of action for unlawful
detainer against respondents. Claiming that respondents offered to buy Lot 23 of the Lophcal Subdivision
sometime in 1976 for the selling price of P80.00 per square meters, petitioners alleged, among other
matters that, they accepted advance payments in the total sum of P8,093.00 from the former, on the
condition that the transaction would only push through upon the parties execution of a written contract to
sell; that aside from not making any further payments on the property, respondents have unjustifiably
refused to heed their repeated demands for the execution of said contract to sell; that in view of their nonperformance of the foregoing prestations, respondents were guilty of bad faith in constructing a house of
strong materials on the Lot 23; and, that respondents stubborn refusal to heed the 20 March 1979 and 27
March 1982 demands to vacate respectively served by petitioner Clemencia Calara and her counsel left them
no other recourse except to file the complaint for unlawful detainer from which the instant suit stemmed. [39]
In Francel Realty Corporation vs. Sycip,[40] the townhouse developer similarly filed a complaint for unlawful
detainer against the buyer on the ground that the latter failed to pay the monthly amortizations stipulated in
the parties' Contract to Sell. In his answer, the buyer alleged that he stopped payment of his monthly
amortizations because the townhouse was defective and that he had already filed an action for unsound real
estate business practice against the townhouse developer. While dismissing the complaint on the ground
that jurisdiction over the case properly pertained to the HLURB, however, the MTC granted the buyer's
counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees. With the RTC's affirmance of
the decision, the townhouse developer filed a petition for review with the CA which upheld the grant of
damages on the ground that the MTC had jurisdiction over the complaint for unlawful detainer. In reversing
the CA's decision, this Court ruled as follows:

Petitioner's complaint is for unlawful detainer. While generally speaking such action falls within the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC, the determination of the ground for ejectment requires a consideration
of the rights of a buyer on installment basis of real property. Indeed private respondent claims that he has a
right under P.D. No. 957, 23 to stop paying monthly amortizations after giving due notice to the owner or
developer of his decision to do so because of petitioner's alleged failure to develop the subdivision or
condominium project according to the approved plans and within the time for complying with the same. The
case thus involves a determination of the rights and obligations of parties in a sale of real estate under P.D.
No. 957. Private respondent has in fact filed a complaint against petitioner for unsound real estate business
practice with the HLURB.
This is, therefore, not a simple case for unlawful detainer arising from the failure of the lessee to pay the
rents, comply with the conditions of a lease agreement or vacate the premises after the expiration of the
lease. Since the determinative question is exclusively cognizable by the HLURB, the question of the right of
petitioner must be determined by the agency.
Petitioner's cause of action against private respondent should instead be filed as a counterclaim in HLURB
Case No. REM-07-9004-80 in accordance with Rule 6, 6 of the Rules of Court which is of suppletory
application to the 1.987 HLURB Rules of Procedure per 3 of the same. In the case of Estate Developers
and Investors Corporation v. Antonio Sarte and Erlinda Sarte the developer filed a complaint to collect the
balance of the price of a lot bought on installment basis, but its complaint was dismissed by the Regional
Trial Court for lack of jurisdiction. It appealed the order to this Court. In dismissing the appeal, we held:
The action here is not a simple action to collect on a promissory note; it is a complaint to collect
amortization payments arising from or in connection with a sale of a subdivision lot under PD. Nos. 957 and
1344, and accordingly falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate the real estate
trade and industry, and to hear and decide cases of unsound real estate business practices. Although the
case involving Antonio Sarte is still pending resolution before the HLURB Arbiter, and there is as yet no order
from the HLURB authorizing suspension of payments on account of the failure of plaintiff developer to make
good its warranties, there is no question to Our mind that the matter of collecting amortizations for the sale
of the subdivision lot is necessarily tied up to the complaint against the plaintiff and it affects the rights and
correlative duties of the buyer of a subdivision lot as regulated by NHA pursuant to P.D. 957 as amended. It
must accordingly fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the said Board, and We find that the motion
to dismiss was properly granted on the ground that the regular court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance
of the complaint."
In the case at bench, respondents similarly claimed in their answer that they stopped payments on Lot 23 in
view of petitioners' failure to develop Lophcal (Calara) Subdivision. Prior to the commencement of the case
for unlawful detainer before the MTC, respondent Jesus Francisco, along with other lot buyers at said
subdivision, also filed a letter-complaint for violations of P.D. 957 which was docketed before HSRC as HSRC
Case No. REM-060482-1043. In her answer to the complaint, petitioner Clemencia Calara alleged that the
subdivision was not covered by P.D. 957 and that she was about to file complaints for ejectment against said
buyers.[41] Even before the issues could be joined in the complaint for unlawful detainer petitioners filed
against respondents, however, the record shows that a decision dated 4 June 1985 was rendered in HSRC
Case No. REM-060482, holding petitioner Clemencia Calara liable for violation of P.D. 957, upon the following
findings and conclusions:
The ocular inspection of the subject subdivision conducted by this Commission on 16 August 1982 confirmed
complainants' allegations of non-development. It is, however, imperative that the issue on whether or not
(the) subject subdivision is covered by P.D. 957 be resolved.
Section 2, paragraph (d) of P.D. 957 defines 'Subdivision Project' as a tract or a parcel of land registered
under Act No. 496 which is partitioned primarily for residential purposes into individual lots with or without
improvements thereon and offered to the public for sale, in cash or in installment terms. It shall include all
residential, commercial, industrial and recreational areas, as well as open spaces, and other community and
public areas in the project.'
It has been established from the evidence presented that all the elements of a subdivision project are
present in this case. The land involved which is located at Bo. Anos, Los Banos. Laguna had been
subdivided into 44 individual lots evidently for residential purposes as evidenced by the photocopy of the
development plan of the said subdivision. Also, there had been an offering of the individual lots to the public
for sale in installment basis as shown by the contract of sale executed by respondent in favor of
complainants herein. Moreover, the lots, as contained in the contracts to sell, are registered under Act 496.

The foregoing circumstances clearly show that the land involved is a subdivision project the operation of
which is subject to supervision and regulation by this Commission. [42]
Given the foregoing factual and procedural antecedents and the absence of showing that petitioner
Clemencia Calara perfected an appeal from the foregoing decision, We find that the CA correctly ruled that
the case petitioners filed before the MTC fell within the jurisdiction of the HLURB which, as a reconfiguration
of the HSRC,[43] retained said office's regulatory and adjudicatory functions under Section 8 of E.O. 648.
"When an administrative agency is conferred quasi-judicial functions, it has been ruled that all controversies
relating to the subject matter pertaining to its specialization are deemed to be included within its
jurisdiction" since "split jurisdiction is not favored."[46] This holds particularly true of the case at bench
where, despite petitioner Clemencia Calara's failure to appeal the aforequoted decision of the HSRC,
petitioners' pursuit of their complaint for unlawful detainer against respondents was accompanied by a
defiance of said office's order to develop subdivision which had, in the meantime, been renamed as the San
Isidro Village.[47]
The mere relationship of the parties as a subdivision developer/owner and subdivision lot buyer does not,
concededly, vest the HLURB automatic jurisdiction over a case. In the cases of Roxas vs. Court of
Appeals [48] and Filar Development Corporation vs. Sps. Villar,[49] this Court upheld the MTC's jurisdiction
over the complaint for ejectment commenced by the subdivision developer on account of the buyer's failure
to pay the installments stipulated in the party's contract to sell. In said cases, however, the buyers had no
justifiable ground to stop payment of the stipulated installments and/or any of the causes of action
cognizable by the HLURB under Section 1[50] of P.D. 1344.[51] In not applying the ruling in Francel Realty
Corporation vs. Sycip,[52] moreover, the Court likewise took appropriate note of the fact that the buyers in
said cases have not commenced an action for unsound real estate businesses practices against the
subdivision developers. Here, respondents have not only instituted a complaint for violation of P.D. 957
against petitioner Clemencia Calara but had also already obtained a definitive ruling on the latter's failure to
fully develop the subdivision which they cited as justification for not making further payments on Lot No. 23
of the Lophcal (Calara) Subdivision.
In addition to respondents' failure to make further payments on Lot 23, petitioners have, of course, made
much of the supposed fact that no contract of sale was perfected between the parties in view of the former's
supposed refusal to execute the requisite Contract to Sell. [53] In this regard, petitioner calls our attention to
the 18 October 2001 decision rendered by the CA's then Special Eighth Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 58498,
the petition filed by Gaudencio Navarro for the review of the 7 March 2000 decision of Branch 35 Of the RTC
of Calamba which, in turn, affirmed the 26 October 1999 decision rendered by the MTC of Los Banos in favor
of petitioners in Civil Case No. 994.[54] In said 18 October 2001 decision, the CA upheld the jurisdiction of
the MTC over the complaint for ejectment similarly filed by petitioners against Gaudencio Navarro and
discounted the existence of a perfected contract of sale between the parties for lack of concrete showing of
"specific terms and conditions on the manner of payment" of the stipulated consideration for the lot
purchased by said buyer.[55] For failure of Gaudencio Navarro to file a petition for review of said decision in
CA-G.R. SP No. 58498, the corresponding Entry of Judgment was issued by the CA on 8 November 2001. [56]
As a consensual contract, however, it cannot be gainsaid that sale is perfected by mere consent, [57]which is
manifested by a meeting of the minds as to the offer and acceptance thereof on the subject matter, price
and terms of payment of the price.[58] That these essential requisites are present in the oral contract of sale
between the parties may be readily gleaned from paragraph 3 of petitioners' own amended complaint which
distinctly identified the Lot 23 of the Lophcal (Calara) Subdivision as the subject matter thereof and the
price of P80.00 per square meter as the agreed consideration for its total area of 250 square meters. [59]
Unlike their contract with Gaudencio Navarro, moreover, petitioners appear to have further agreed on the
terms of payment of the price for the lot purchased by respondents. Having allowed the latter to build a
house on said lot after accepting their initial payments in the aggregate sum of P7,948.00, [60] petitioner
Clemencia Calara significantly specified the terms of payment agreed upon by the parties in the following 20
March 1979 demand letter she sent respondent Teresita Francisco,[61] to wit:
"Mangyari na sumulat uli ako sa iyo tungkol sa pagtanggi mong sumang-ayon at lumagda sa Kasunduan sa
Pagbibil(i) ng Lote sa kabila ng iyong pakiusap mo noon sa akin na magpapagawa ka muna ng bahay bago
ka lalagda sa sinasabing kasunduan. Sa hindi malamang dahilan ng matapos na ang iyong ipinagagawang
bahay at kasunod na rin dito ang pag-aakupa ninyo nilo, ay bigla ka na lang tnmangging lumagda sa
kasunduan at kasunod na rin ang pagtanggi mong magbayad ng kaukuiang buwanang-hulog sa ninanais
mong bilihing lote,

Sa pagkakataong ito ay muli kong ipina-aalala sa iyo na simula't mula pa ay alam mo na babayaran mo ang
hinahangad mong bilihing lote sa paraang buwanang hulugan (equal monthly installment) sa halagang
P361.00 sa hob ng anim na pung (60) buwan pagkatapos na mabayaran ang kaukuiang labin limang (15%)
por ciento ng kabuoang halaga ng lote bilang unang bayad o downpayment.
Dahil sa hindi mo pagtupad ng iyong tungkulin sa amin ay ikinalulungkot kong ipa-alam sa inyo na alisin mo
ang iyong bahay sa lupang tinitirikan nito sa loob ng tatlumpung (30) araw pasimula sa pagkatanggap mo
ng liham na ito, at gayon din ay umalis kayo at iwanan ang sinasabing lot ang walang pasubali." [62]
Contracts shall be obligatory, in whatever form they may have been entered into, provided all the essential
requisites for their validity are present.[63] Given the proven justification for respondents' stoppage of
further payments on Lot 23, We find that respondents' alleged refusal to execute said contract only gives
rise to a cause of action for specific performance pursuant to Articles 1357 [64]and 1357[65] of the Civil Code of
the Philippines. Insofar as it concerns the sale of subdivision lots, jurisdiction over such a case is vested
with the HLURB under Section 8 (11) of E.O. 648. In the second Francel Realty Corporation vs.
Sycip[66] case which dealt with the complaint for reconveyance and damages subsequently filed by the
subdivision developer, this Court ruled that "the HLURB is not deprived of jurisdiction to hear and decide a
case merely on the basis that it has been initiated by the developer and not by the buyer."
Finally, it bears emphasizing that more than 33 years have already elapsed from the time that petitioners
and respondents agreed on the sale of Lot 23 of the Lophcal (Calara) Subdivision sometime in 1976. In the
intervening period, the parties have not only filed their respective complaints before the HLURB and the MTC
but had already performed acts and acquired rights, the myriad consequences of which could not possibly be
squarely addressed in the case for unlawful detainer where possession is unlawfully witliheld after the
expiration or termination of the right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. [67] As the
sole regulatory body for housing and land development, [68] the HLURB has jurisdiction over petitioners' cause
against respondents and is clearly the best forum for the determination of all the issues relevant thereto.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

PIO MODESTO and CIRILA

RIVERA-MODESTO,
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 189859

Present:

versus -

NACHURA, J.,

BRION, Acting Chairperson,

VILLARAMA, JR.,

MENDOZA, and
CARLOS URBINA,
substituted by the heirs of SERENO, JJ.
OLYMPIA MIGUEL VDA. DE
URBINA (Surviving
Promulgated:
Spouse) and children,
namely: ESCOLASTICA M.
October 18, 2010
URBINA, ET AL.,
Respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners

Pio Modesto and Cirila Rivera Modesto (Modestos or petitioners)
dated March 1, 2010,[1] seeking to reverse our January 11, 2010

Resolution, which denied their petition for review on certiorari for

lack of merit.[2]

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

Civil Case No. 53483

This case stems from a complaint for recovery of possession

filed by respondent Carlos Urbina (Urbina) against the petitioners
with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig (RTC), docketed as Civil Case
No. 53483.

In his complaint, Urbina alleged that he is the owner of a

parcel of land situated at Lower Bicutan, Taguig, designated as Lot
56, PLS 272. According to Urbina, the Modestos, through stealth,
scheme, and machination, were able to occupy a portion of this
property, designated as Lot 356, PLS 272. Thereafter, the
Modestos negotiated with Urbina for the sale of this lot. However,
before the parties could finalize the sale, the Modestos allegedly
cancelled the transaction and began claiming ownership over the
lot. Urbina made several demands on the Modestos to vacate the
property, the last of which was through a demand letter sent on
July 22, 1983. When the Modestos still refused to vacate, Urbina
filed the present action against them.

In their answer, the Modestos claimed that Urbina could not

be the lawful owner of the property because it was still

government property, being a part of the Fort Bonifacio Military

Reservation.

After the resolution of various procedural issues, [3] the RTC of

Pasig City rendered a decision in favor of Urbina on April 24, 2000,
ordering the petitioners to immediately vacate and surrender the
lot to Urbina and to pay him P200.00 monthly as compensation
for the use of the property from July 22, 1983 until they finally
vacate.[4]

The RTC noted that the petitioners recognized Urbinas

possessory rights over the property when they entered into a
negotiated contract of sale with him for the property. Thus, the
Modestos were estopped from subsequently assailing or
disclaiming Urbinas possessory rights over this lot.

The petitioners appealed this decision with the Court of

Appeals (CA).

LMB Conflict No. 110

Urbinas claim of ownership over Lot 56 is based primarily on his

Miscellaneous Sales Application No. (III-1) 460 (Miscellaneous
Sales Application), which he filed on July 21, 1966.[5]

While Urbinas accion publiciana complaint was pending

before the RTC, the Modestos filed a letter-protest against Urbinas
Miscellaneous Sales Application with the Land Management
Bureau (LMB) on January 29, 1993, claiming that: (a) they are the

owners of Lot 356, PLS 272;[6] (b) they have been occupying this
lot for almost 33 years; and (c) their house is constructed on this
lot.

The Modestos also alleged that they filed an unnumbered

sales application for Lot 356 with the LMB, based on their actual
occupancy of the property, pursuant to Proclamations 2476 and
172, on February 10, 1993.

On January 31, 2008, the LMB denied with finality the

Modestos unnumbered sales application/protest against
Urbinas
application,
in
turn
upholding
Urbinas
Miscellaneous Sales Application.

Refusing to give up, the Modestos filed a motion for

reconsideration. They also filed an Insular Government Patent
Sales Application over Lot 356 on January 27, 2009. [7]

THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION

The CA affirmed in toto the RTC decision in Civil Case No.

53483 on January 26, 2009.[8] The CA agreed with the RTCs
observation that the Modestos were estopped from challenging
Urbinas right to possess the property after they acknowledged
this right when they entered into the negotiated contract of
sale. The CA also gave credence to the January 31, 2008 LMB
order in LMB Conflict No. 110, ruling that this LMB order bolstered
Urbinas possessory rights over the subject property.

At the time the CA decision was issued, respondent Carlos

Urbina had already passed away and had been substituted by his
surviving heirs, his spouse, Olympia Miguel Vda. de Urbina, and
his children, Escolastica, Cecilia, Efren, Manolito, and Purificacion,
all surnamed Urbina (respondents).

THE PETITION

The petitioners subsequently filed a petition for review

on certiorari with this Court, asserting that the CA committed
reversible error in finding that Urbina had possessory rights over
the property. The Modestos mainly argued that at the time
Urbina filed his MSA and acquired tax declarations over
the subject property, the property was still government
property, being part of a military reservation. The property
was thus not alienable and disposable, and could not legally be
possessed by a private individual. Accordingly, Urbina could not
use the MSA and the tax declarations as proof of a better right to
possess the property as against the Modestos.

The Modestos further claimed that the CA committed grievous

error when it held that they were estopped from challenging
Urbinas right to possess the subject property. While they admitted
to negotiating with Urbina for the sale of the property, they
alleged that they did so based on Urbinas misrepresentation that
he had a legal claim of ownership over the property. Since their
offer to buy the property from Urbina was based on his
false assertions, the principle of estoppel cannot apply.

Additionally, the Modestos alleged that since the property is

covered by Proclamation No. 172 and Memorandum Order No.

119, the lower courts should have given due consideration to the
primary and exclusive jurisdiction of the Director of Lands (of the
Bureau of Lands, now Director of the Land Management Bureau)
over these parcels of public lands.

Lastly, the Modestos questioned Urbinas qualifications to possess

the property, claiming that Urbina was not in actual, adverse,
public and continuous possession of the property. According to the
Modestos, from the time that Urbina filed his Miscellaneous Sales
Application in 1966 until the present, Urbina was a resident of
Makati City, and did not actually occupy the property.

In our Order dated January 11, 2010, we denied the Modestos

petition for failing to sufficiently show any reversible error in the
assailed CA decision.

THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

On March 3, 2010, the Modestos filed their motion for

reconsideration, raising essentially the same grounds already
brought up in their petition for review on certiorari.

Notably, the Modestos attached LMB Order dated February

19, 2010 (February 19, 2010 LMB Order), which resolved their
motion for reconsideration of the LMBs January 31, 2008 order in
LMB Conflict No. 110. This Order held that the subject property
had indeed been a part of the Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation,

and only became alienable and disposable after October 16,

1987. Thus, Urbinas Miscellaneous Sales Application over the
property was improper and could not be the source of possessory
rights over the property.

The order also noted that Urbina failed to comply with the
requirements of an applicant for ownership of the property, as set
forth in Memorandum No. 119, the implementing guidelines of
Proclamation No. 172.

Responding to this motion, the respondents, in their Comment

dated May 31, 2010, reiterated that the petitioners are estopped
from assailing Urbinas possessory rights over the property after
they entered into a negotiated sales contract with him over the
subject property. They also accused the Modestos of employing
dilatory tactics in filing the present motion.

THE RULING

We GRANT the motion for reconsideration.

Procedural issue

An accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to

determine the better right of possession of realty independently
of title.[9] Accion publiciana is also used to refer to an ejectment

suit where the cause of dispossession is not among the grounds

for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, or when possession has
been lost for more than one year and can no longer be
maintained under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. The objective of a
plaintiff in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not
ownership.[10]

In asking us to determine which of the parties has a better right to possess

the property, we are asked to resolve a factual issue, involving as it does the
weighing and evaluation of the evidence presented by the parties in the courts
below. Generally, such an exercise is not appropriate in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to resolve only
questions of law. Moreover, the factual findings of the CA, when supported by
substantial evidence, are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not
reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls under any of the following
recognized exceptions:

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,

surmises and conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee;
(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;

(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main
and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record.[11]

Since the CA affirmed the factual findings of the RTC, we

would normally be precluded from re-examining the factual
circumstances of this case. However, it appears that the RTC and
the CA, in concluding that Urbina has the right to lawfully eject
the Modestos from the lot in question, have greatly
misapprehended the facts of this case.

In finding for Urbina, both the RTC and the CA mainly relied
on the principle of estoppel, and focused on the Modestos
admission that they entered into a negotiated contract of sale
with Urbina. In the process, they injudiciously ignored the other
material issues that the Modestos raised regarding the validity of
Urbinas possession of the property, specifically the Modestos
allegation that at the time Urbina began staking his claim over
the property, it was still government land.

This error on the part of the lower courts is made more evident when we take
into account an intervening event which significantly affects the resolution of this
case the issuance by the LMB of its order dated February 19, 2010, which
expressly stated that Urbina did not acquire any possessory rights over the lot. For
these reasons, we find the review of the evidence on record proper.

Jurisdiction of the Court

The authority of the courts to resolve and settle questions

relating to the possession of property has long been settled.
[12]
This authority continues, even when the land in question is
public land. As we explained in Solis v. Intermediate Appellate
Court:[13]
We hold that the power and authority given to the Director of
Lands to alienate and dispose of public lands does not divest the
regular courts of their jurisdiction over possessory actions instituted
by occupants or applicants against others to protect their respective
possessions and occupations. While the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Lands [now the Land Management Bureau] is confined to the
determination of the respective rights of rival claimants to public lands
or to cases which involve disposition of public lands, the power to
determine who has the actual, physical possession or occupation or the
better right of possession over public lands remains with the courts.
The rationale is evident. The Bureau of Lands does not have the
wherewithal to police public lands. Neither does it have the means to
prevent disorders or breaches of peace among the occupants. Its power is
clearly limited to disposition and alienation and while it may decide
disputes over possession, this is but in aid of making the proper
awards. The ultimate power to resolve conflicts of possession is
recognized to be within the legal competence of the civil courts and
its purpose is to extend protection to the actual possessors and
occupants with a view to quell social unrest.

Consequently, while we leave it to the LMB to determine the

issue of who among the parties should be awarded the title to the
subject property, there is no question that we have sufficient
authority to resolve which of the parties is entitled to rightful
possession.

On the issue of possessory rights

Prefatorily, we observe that the subject property has not yet

been titled, nor has it been the subject of a validly issued patent
by the LMB. Therefore, the land remains part of the public
domain, and neither Urbina nor the Modestos can legally claim
ownership over it. This does not mean, however, that neither of
the parties have the right to possess the property.
Urbina alleged that he is the rightful possessor of the
property since he has a pending Miscellaneous Sales Application,
as well as tax declarations over the property. He also relied, to
support his claim of a better right to possess the property, on the
admission on the part of the Modestos that they negotiated with
him for the sale of the lot in question.

On the other hand, the Modestos anchored their right to

possess the same on their actual possession of the property.
They also questioned the legality of Urbinas Miscellaneous Sales
Application, and his tax declarations over the property, arguing
that since these were obtained when the land was still not
alienable and disposable, they could not be the source of any
legal rights.

After reviewing the records of this case, we find the reasoning of

the Modestos to be more in accord with applicable laws and
jurisprudence.

The February 19, 2010 LMB

Order

Factual findings of administrative agencies are generally

respected and even accorded finality because of the special
knowledge and expertise gained by these agencies from handling
matters falling under their specialized jurisdiction. [14] Given that
the LMB is the administrative agency tasked with assisting the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) in the management and disposition of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain, [15] we defer to its
specialized knowledge on these matters. In this regard, we quote
with approval the observations made by the Director of the LMB in
the February 19, 2010 LMB Order:

Movants [the Modestos] have anchored their Motion

for Reconsideration on three (3) assigned errors, to wit:

I.

THIS OFFICE ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS THAT THE

AREA IS NOT COVERED BY PROCLAMATION NO. 172,
AS IMPLEMENTED BY MEMORANDUM ORDER NO.
119;

II.

THIS OFFICE ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS THAT CARLOS

T. URBINA WAS IN ACTUAL, ADVERSE, PUBLIC AND

CONTINUOUS POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY IN

QUESTION;

III.

THIS OFFICE ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT A NEW

SURVEY OF THE AREA IN QUESTION SHOULD BE
DONE AND CONDUCTED TO DETERMINE THE TRUE
BOUNDARIES OF THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION VIS-VIS THE CLAIMS OF EACH PARTY.

In order to clarify the issues raised in the Motion for

Reconsideration, this Office ordered that another ocular
inspection and investigation on the subject premises be
conducted by Special Investigator Danilo Lim. After said
investigation, Special Investigator, Danilo Lim, submitted
his Report to the Regional Technical Director, Lands
Management Services, thru the Chief, Land Management
Division, DENR-NCR.

In his Report, Special Investigator, Danilo Lim made

the following findings:

The Miscellaneous Sales Application

filed by Carlos Urbina is not appropriate
because Lot 356 had ceased to be public
land as it had become part of the Fort
Bonifacio Military Reservation, and hence,
no one can claim possessory rights over
the said property since it is within said
Military Reservation. The subject area which
is located in Lower Bicutan, Taguig, only
became alienable and disposable upon the

issuance of Presidential Proclamation No. 172

and its implementing guidelines Memorandum
Order No. 119 on October 16, 1987.

After a judicious evaluation of the arguments raised

in the instant motion, and taking into account the findings
and recommendations of Special Investigator Danilo Lim
as contained in his Report, this Office finds the same to
be not entirely without merit.

Anent the first assigned error, Special Investigator

Danilo Lim has found that the area is indeed a part of
the Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation and is
covered by Proclamation No. 172 and Memorandum
Order No. 119. Upon a thorough research of the origin of
the subject property, it turned out that the area was
originally part of the vast parcel of land known as
Hacienda De Maricaban. Sometime in 1902, the United
States of America purchased said vast tract of land with
an area of Seven Hundred and Twenty Nine and Fifteenth
Hundred
(729.15)
Hectares
and
spanning
the
Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Paranaque and Pasay, from
its original owner, Dona Dolores Pacual Casal Y Ochoa, for
the
purpose
of establishing
a
US
Military
Reservation which they later named Fort William Mc
Kinley. On July 12, 1957, President Carlos P. Garcia
issued Proclamation No. 423, reserving for military
purposes, the parcels of land identified as Parcel No. 2,
No. 3 and No. 4, Psu-2031, on which parcels of land
excluding Parcel No. 2, the present Fort Bonifacio was
established for the Republic of the Philippines. Parcel No.
3, Psu-2031 is covered by T.C.T. No. 61524 registered in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines. On October

16, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued

Proclamation No. 172 in order to exclude from the
operation of Proclamation No. 423 which established Fort
Bonifacio, certain portions of land embraced therein
known as Barangays Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan,
Western Bicutan and Signal Village, all situated in the
Municipality of Taguig, and to declare the same open for
disposition to actual occupants and qualified applicants
under the provisions of Republic Act No. 274 and Republic
Act No. 730 in relation to the Public Land Act as amended;
and under Memorandum Order No. 119 issued by
President Corazon Aquino. In Proclamation No. 172, Lower
Bicutan is described as Lot 3 situated in the Municipality
of Taguig, M.M., and containing an area of One Million
Eighty Four Thousand Three Hundred Eleven (1,084,311)
sqm more or less or 108.43 hectares.

In view of all the above recitals, it appears that the

parcel of land subject of this case (Lot 356) which is
located in Barangay Lower Bicutan, City of Taguig is
covered by Proclamation No. 172 issued by President
Corazon C. Aquino, and hence, the same only became
alienable and disposable to qualified applicants
after October 16, 1987, the date of its issuance,
contrary to what is believed in the assailed Order of this
Office.

With respect to the second assigned error, the issue

can be resolved by the application of the legal provisions
covering the subject property, which is Proclamation No.
172 and its implementing guidelines. Under its
implementing guidelines, Memorandum No. 119, the
following are the qualifications for an applicant to be

qualified to apply for and acquire a lot under Proclamation

No. 172, among others, to wit:

(1) He/She must be a bona fide resident of the

proclaimed
areas.
To
be
considered
a bona
fide resident, the applicant must have the following
qualifications:

a) A Filipino citizen of legal age and/or a head of the

family;
b) Must have constructed a house in the area
proclaimed for disposition on or before January 6,
1986 and actually residing therein;
c) Must not own any other residential or
commercial lot in Metro Manila;
d) Must not have been a registered awardee of any
lot under the administration of the NHA, MHS, or
any other government agency, nor the AFP
Officers village;
e) Must not be a professional squatter. A
professional squatter, for purposes of this Order,
is one who engages in selling lots in the areas
proclaimed for disposition; and
f) Has filed the proper application to purchase.

Based on the Report of Special Investigator Lim and

the other Land Inspectors who investigated this case,
namely: Jose P. Antonio and Jose P. Parayno, it was found
that Pio Modesto and his family are the actual

occupants of the area with a residential house and

chapel made of light materials and Pio Modesto and
his family are actually residing in the said residential
house. On the other hand, it was established that Carlos
Urbina has been a resident of Pasay Road or 4929
Pio Del Pilar, Makati City. Applying the qualifications
provided for in Memorandum Order No. 119, we find that
Spouses Modesto are to be qualified to apply for the
subject lot as they have been in occupation thereof and
have constructed their residential house thereon. Hence,
they satisfy the requirements in order to be considered a
Bonafide Resident as defined in the guidelines. As per our
records, Spouses Pio and Cirila Modesto have also
filed an unnumbered I.G.P.S.A. Application for the
subject lot on January 27, 2009. Carlos Urbina,
however, never constructed any house on the
subject lot and neither did he actually reside
therein. Besides, he already owns a residential lot
in Makati City where he had been residing all this
time. Hence, he cannot be considered a bonafide
resident of the subject lot. He likewise failed to file his
I.G.P.S.A application for the lot. Instead, what he had filed
on January 20, 1966 was a Miscellaneous Sales
Application. At that time, however, the area of Barangay
Lower Bicutan, where the subject lot is located, was still
part of the Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation, and the
same had not yet been segregated and declared to be
alienable and disposable.Hence, no possessory rights
could have been acquired by his over the subject
lot.[16]

From this LMB order, we consider the following facts

established:

First, the lot in question, situated in Barangay Lower Bicutan,

was part of the Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation, and only
became alienable and disposable after October 16, 1987,
pursuant to Proclamation No. 172. This factual finding finds
further support in the testimony, before the RTC, of Jose Exequiel
Vale, Special Investigator and Assisting Hearing Officer of the
DENR.[17]

Second, the Modestos are bona fide residents of the lot in

question, being the actual residents of the lot and having built a
house and chapel on the property.

Third, the Modestos have a pending Insular Government

Patent Sales Application over the lot in question, filed after the
property became alienable and disposable.

Taking these facts into account, we now make a distinction, based

on the corresponding legal effects, between: (a) possession of the
property before October 16, 1987, when the land was still
considered inalienable government land, and (b) possession of
the property after October 16, 1987, when the land had already
been declared alienable and disposable.

Possession prior to October 16, 1987

Unless a public land is shown to have been reclassified as

alienable or actually alienated by the State to a private person,
that piece of land remains part of the public domain, [18] and its

occupation in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot

confer ownership or possessory rights. [19] It is only after the
property has been declared alienable and disposable that
private persons can legally claim possessory rights over it.

Accordingly, even if we recognize that Urbina had been in

possession of the property as early as July 21, 1966, when he filed
his Miscellaneous Sales Application, his occupation was unlawful
and could not be the basis of possessory rights, in keeping with
Section 88 of the Public Land Act, that states:
Section 88. The tract or tracts of land reserved under
the provisions of section eighty-three shall be nonalienable and shall not be subject to occupation, entry,
sale, lease, or other disposition until again declared
alienable under the provisions of this Act or by
proclamation of the President.

The same holds true for Urbinas tax declarations. Absent any
proof that the property in question had already been declared
alienable at the time that Urbina declared it for tax purposes, his
tax declarations over the subject property cannot be used to
support his claim of possession.

Similarly, while the Modestos claim to have been in

possession of Lot 356 for almost 33 years, [20] this occupation could
not give rise to possessory rights while the property being
occupied remain government land that had not yet been declared
alienable and disposable.
Possession after October 16, 1987

The different land investigators[21] sent by the LMB to survey

the subject property have consistently held that the Modestos are
the actual occupants of the lot in question. This actual occupation
is not denied by Urbina. As a matter of fact, we know from
Urbinas final demand letter that the Modestos have been in open
and continuous possession of the property since July 22, 1983.
[22]
We also consider established that the Modestos built a house
on the subject property, a fact that Urbina affirmed in his
testimony before the RTC.[23] From these circumstances, we
consider as settled the fact that the Modestos were the actual
possessors of the property when it was declared alienable
and disposable on October 16, 1987, and continued to
possess the property until the present time.

Furthermore, the Modestos have a valid Insular Government

Patent Sales Application over the property pending with the LMB,
which they filed on January 27, 2009.[24]In contrast, Urbina has a
Miscellaneous Sales Application filed in 1966, which the LMB
considered invalid since it was filed when the property still formed
part of a military reservation.

As for the Certification from the City Treasurer of Taguig that

the respondents presented,[25] which certified that Carlos Urbina
had paid real estate taxes on real property describe[d] in the
name of Carlos Urbina, with property located at Lower Bicutan,
Taguig City from 2009 and prior years, we note that the
certification contains no description of the property subject of the
tax declaration, leaving us to wonder on the identity of the
property covered by the declaration.

In any case, even if we consider this certification as sufficient

proof that Urbina declared the subject property for tax declaration
purposes, it must be stressed that the mere declaration of land
for
taxation
purposes
does
not
constitute
possession thereof nor is it proof of ownership in the
absence of the claimants actual possession.[26] And in light of
our categorical finding that the Modestos actually occupied the
property in question from the time that it was declared alienable
and disposable until the present time, the tax declaration fails to
convince us that Urbina has a right to legally possess it.

For these reasons, we find that Urbina utterly failed to prove

that he has a better right to possess the property. Thus, we
cannot sustain his complaint for ejectment against the Modestos
and, perforce, must dismiss the same for lack of merit.

On the finding of estoppel

Lastly, we find the CAs reliance on the principle of estoppel

against the Modestos to be misplaced.

Through estoppel, an admission or representation is

rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be
denied or disproved as against the person relying on it. [27] This
doctrine is based on the grounds of public policy, fair dealing,
good faith and justice, and its purpose is to forbid one to speak
against his own act, representations, or commitments to the
injury of one to whom they were directed and who reasonably

relied on it.[28] It bears noting, however, that no estoppel arises

where the representation or conduct of the party sought
to be estopped is due to ignorance founded upon an
innocent mistake.[29]

Here, the Modestos do not deny that they negotiated with

Urbina for the sale of the subject property. However, because they
entered the negotiated sales contract with Urbina on the mistaken
belief, based on Urbinas erroneous assertion, that he was the
lawful owner-possessor of the property in question, we do not
consider them bound by this action. Consequently, the principle of
estoppel finds no application in this case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the motion

and REINSTATE the
petition.
Consequently,
we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision dated January 26,
2009 and Resolution dated October 5, 2009 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68007. We DISMISS the complaint for
Recovery of Possession filed by Carlos T. Urbina for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

DR. DIOSCORO CARBONILLA,

G.R. No. 177637

Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,

- versus -

NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

MARCELO ABIERA and

MARICRIS ABIERA PAREDES,
SUBSTITUTED BY HER HEIRS,
Respondents.

Promulgated:

July 26, 2010

x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review are the Decision [1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated September 18, 2006 and
the Resolution dated April 17, 2007, which dismissed petitioners
complaint for ejectment against respondents.

The case arose from the following antecedents:

Petitioner, Dr. Dioscoro Carbonilla, filed a complaint for

ejectment against respondents, Marcelo Abiera and Maricris
Abiera Paredes, with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Maasin City. The complaint alleged that petitioner is the
registered
owner
of
a
parcel
of
land,
located
in Barangay Canturing, Maasin City, identified as Lot No. 1781-BP-3-B-2-B PSD-08-8452-D, Maasin Cadastre. The land is
purportedly covered by a certificate of title, and declared for
assessment and taxation purposes in petitioners name. Petitioner
further claimed that he is also the owner of the residential
building standing on the land, which building he acquired through
a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate (Residential Building)
with Waiver and Quitclaim of Ownership. He maintained that the
building was being occupied by respondents by mere tolerance of
the previous owners. Petitioner asserted that he intends to use
the property as his residence, thus, he sent a demand letter to
respondents asking them to leave the premises within 15 days
from receipt of the letter, but they failed and refused to do so.
Conciliation efforts with the Barangay proved futile.[2]

To corroborate his claim, petitioner presented copies of

Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-3784; Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate (Residential Building) with Waiver and
Quitclaim of Ownership dated November 10, 2002, executed by
the heirs of Jovita Yanto Garciano; Tax Declaration (TD) with ARP
No. 07020-000019; and Demand Letter dated November 20,
2002. TCT No. T-3784 shows that the land was originally
registered on January 30, 1968 in the name of Diosdado
Carbonilla, petitioners father, under Original Certificate of Title
No. 185.

In their defense, respondents vehemently denied petitioners

allegation that they possessed the building by mere tolerance of
the previous owners. Instead, they asserted that they occupied
the building as owners, having inherited the same from Alfredo
Abiera and Teodorica Capistrano, respondent Marcelos parents
and respondent Maricris grandparents. They maintained that they
have been in possession of the building since 1960, but it has not
been declared for taxation purposes. As for the subject land,
respondents claimed that they inherited the same from Francisco
Plasabas, grandfather of Alfredo Abiera. They pointed out that the
land had, in fact, been declared for taxation purposes in the name
of Francisco Plasabas under TD No. 4676, before the Second
World War. This TD was later cancelled by TD No. 8735 in 1948,
TD No. 14363 in 1958, and TD No. 16182 in 1963. Respondents
averred that the building was previously a garage-like structure
but, in 1977, Alfredo Abiera and Teodorica Capistrano repaired
and remodeled it, for which reason, they obtained a building
permit on April 11, 1977 from the then Municipality of
Maasin. Finally, respondents contended that the case should be
dismissed for failure to implead as defendants respondent
Marcelos siblings, who are co-heirs of the subject properties.
[3]
Respondents presented copies of the two TDs in the name of
Francisco Plasabas and the Building Permit dated April 11, 1977.

The MTCC decided the case in favor of respondents. It opined

that petitioners claim of ownership over the subject parcel of land
was not successfully rebutted by respondents; hence, petitioners
ownership of the same was deemed established. [4] However, with
respect to the building, the court declared respondents as having
the better right to its material possession in light of petitioners
failure to refute respondents claim that their predecessors had
been in prior possession of the building since 1960 and that they
have continued such possession up to the present. [5] In so ruling,
the court applied Art. 546[6] of the Civil Code which allows the

possessor in good faith to retain the property until he is

reimbursed for necessary expenses. Thus, in its decision dated
March 15, 2004, the MTCC pronounced:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered and the

collated evidences at hand [have] preponderantly
established, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered in favor of the
defendants DECLARING the defendants to have the better
rights of (material) possession to the assailed building
and deemed as possessors in good faith and are legally
entitled to its possession and occupancy.

The plaintiff judicially affirmed as the land owner is

enjoined to respect the rights of the defendants pursuant
to the provisions of Art. 546, Chapter III, New Civil Code of
thePhilippines[, w]ithout prejudice to the provisions of
Arts. 547 and 548, New Civil Code of the Philippines. No
pronouncement as to costs as defendants predecessorsin-interest are deemed possessors and builders in good
faith.

SO ORDERED.[7]

Petitioner elevated the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC).

On July 12, 2004, the RTC reversed the MTCC decision. The RTC
agreed with the MTCC that the land is owned by petitioner. The
two courts differed, however, in their conclusion with respect to
the building. The RTC placed the burden upon respondents to
prove their claim that they built it prior to petitioners acquisition
of the land, which burden, the court found, respondents failed to
discharge. The RTC held that, either waywhether the building was

constructed before or after petitioner acquired ownership of the

landpetitioner, as owner of the land, would have every right to
evict respondents from the land. As theorized by the RTC, if the
building was erected before petitioner or his predecessors
acquired ownership of the land, then Article 445 [8] of the Civil
Code would apply. Thus, petitioner, as owner of the land, would be
deemed the owner of the building standing thereon, considering
that, when ownership of the land was transferred to him, there
was no reservation by the original owner that the building was not
included in the transfer. On the other hand, if the building was
constructed after petitioner became the owner of the land, it is
with more reason that petitioner has the right to evict
respondents from the land. The dispositive portion of the RTC
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered

1.

Reversing the decision of the court a quo;

2.

Ordering defendants to immediately vacate

the residential house/building subject of this
litigation;

3.

Ordering defendants to pay attorneys fee in

the amount of P30,000.00; and

4.

To pay the cost of the suit.

SO ORDERED.[9]

Respondents then filed a petition for review with the CA. Finding
no evidence to prove that respondents possession of the building
was by mere tolerance, the CA reversed the RTC decision and
ordered the dismissal of petitioners complaint. Because of this,
the CA, following this Courts ruling in Ten Forty Realty and
Development Corporation v. Cruz,categorized the complaint as
one for forcible entry. It then proceeded to declare that the action
had prescribed since the one-year period for filing the forcible
entry case had already lapsed. The dispositive portion of the CA
Decision dated September 18, 2006 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision
promulgated on July 12, 2004 of Branch 25 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Maasin City, Southern Leyte in
Civil Case No. R-3382 is hereby declared NULL and VOID
for failure of the plaintiff (herein respondent) to prove that
the case at bar is for unlawful detainer or forcible entry.
Accordingly, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.[10]

Petitioner sought reconsideration of the Decision, but the CA

denied petitioners motion for lack of merit. [11] Hence, petitioner
came to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.

On September 3, 2007, respondents counsel informed this

Court that respondent, Maricris Abiera Paredes, died on June 25,
2006 of asphyxia due to hanging, and moved that the latters heirs
be allowed to substitute for the deceased. [12] In the

Resolution[13] dated November 14, 2007, the Court granted the

motion.

Petitioner argues that he has sufficiently established his

ownership of the subject properties; consequently, he asserts the
right to recover possession thereof.

The petition has no merit.

To set the record straight, while petitioner may have proven

his ownership of the land, as there can be no other piece of
evidence more worthy of credence than a Torrenscertificate of
title, he failed to present any evidence to substantiate his claim of
ownership or right to the possession of the building. Like the CA,
we cannot accept the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
(Residential Building) with Waiver and Quitclaim of Ownership
executed by the Garcianos as proof that petitioner acquired
ownership of the building. There is no showing that the Garcianos
were the owners of the building or that they had any proprietary
right over it. Ranged against respondents proof of possession of
the building since 1977, petitioners evidence pales in comparison
and leaves us totally unconvinced.

Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is

entitled to its possession. However, the owner cannot simply
wrest possession thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of
the property. To recover possession, he must resort to the proper
judicial remedy and, once he chooses what action to file, he is
required to satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to
prosper.

In the present case, petitioner opted to file an ejectment

case against respondents. Ejectment casesforcible entry and
unlawful detainerare summary proceedings designed to provide
expeditious means to protect actual possession or the right to
possession of the property involved. [14] The only question that the
courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the
physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de
facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even matter if
a partys title to the property is questionable. [15] For this reason, an
ejectment case will not necessarily be decided in favor of one who
has presented proof of ownership of the subject property. Key
jurisdictional facts constitutive of the particular ejectment case
filed must be averred in the complaint and sufficiently proven.

The statements in the complaint that respondents

possession of the building was by mere tolerance of petitioner
clearly make out a case for unlawful detainer. Unlawful detainer
involves the persons withholding from another of the possession
of the real property to which the latter is entitled, after the
expiration or termination of the formers right to hold possession
under the contract, either expressed or implied. [16]

A requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer

case is that possession must be originally lawful, and such
possession must have turned unlawful only upon the expiration of
the right to possess.[17] It must be shown that the possession was
initially lawful; hence, the basis of such lawful possession must be
established. If, as in this case, the claim is that such possession is
by mere tolerance of the plaintiff, the acts of tolerance must be
proved.

Petitioner failed to prove that respondents possession was

based on his alleged tolerance. He did not offer any evidence or
even only an affidavit of the Garcianos attesting that they
tolerated respondents entry to and occupation of the subject
properties. A bare allegation of tolerance will not suffice. Plaintiff
must, at least, show overt acts indicative of his or his
predecessors permission to occupy the subject property. Thus, we
must agree with the CA when it said:

A careful scrutiny of the records revealed that herein

respondent miserably failed to prove his claim that
petitioners possession of the subject building was by
mere
tolerance
as
alleged
in
the
complaint. Tolerance must be [present] right from the
start of possession sought to be recovered to be within
the purview of unlawful detainer. Mere tolerance always
carries with itpermission and not merely silence or
inaction for silence or inaction is negligence, not
tolerance.[18]

In addition, plaintiff must also show that the supposed acts

of tolerance have been present right from the very start of the
possessionfrom entry to the property. Otherwise, if the possession
was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would
be an improper remedy.[19] Notably, no mention was made in the
complaint of how entry by respondents was effected or how and
when dispossession started. Neither was there any evidence
showing such details.

In any event, petitioner has some other recourse. He may

pursue recovering possession of his property by filing an accion
publiciana, which is a plenary action intended to recover the

better right to possess; or an accion reivindicatoria, a suit to

recover ownership of real property. We stress, however, that the
pronouncement in this case as to the ownership of the
land should be regarded as merely provisional and, therefore,
would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties
involving title to the land.[20]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.

The CA Decision dated September 18, 2006 and Resolution
dated April 17, 2007 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

LA CAMPANA DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,

G.R. No. 154152

Present:

Petitioner,
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA

- versus

ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

ARTURO
LEDESMA,
HON.
JUDGE
ESTRELLA
T.
ESTRADA, in her capacity as
PRESIDING JUDGE, Regional
Trial
Court,
Branch
83,
Quezon City, and the HON.
COURT OF APPEALS,

Promulgated:

August 25, 2010

Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, praying that the Resolution [1] of the Court of Appeals
(CA), dated February 13, 2002, ordering the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, and its Resolution[2] dated June 28, 2002
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, be declared null
and void ab initio.

The antecedent facts are as follows.

Petitioner filed an ejectment case with the Metropolitan Trial Court

(MeTC) against private respondent Ledesma, alleging that despite
expiration of the contract of lease executed between them and
demands to vacate subject premises and pay rentals therefor, the
latter failed to comply with such demands. Private respondent
countered in his Answer that he had paid the rentals over subject
premises and petitioner no longer had the right to possess the
property as it had been foreclosed by the Development Bank of
the Philippines (DBP). Private respondent further pointed out that
subject premises had in fact been in the possession of the DBP
since March or April of 1997, so since that time, it was with the
DBP that he made arrangements for his continued occupation of
the subject premises.
The MeTC then rendered judgment in favor of petitioner, ordering
private respondent to surrender possession of subject premises to
petitioner. Private respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), and to stay execution of said judgment, private respondent
filed a supersedeas bond with the MeTC.

The RTC affirmed the MeTC judgment. Petitioner then moved for
the immediate execution of the RTC Decision, which motion was

granted by the RTC. Meanwhile, private respondent elevated the

case to the CA via a petition for review on certiorari with prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction. A temporary restraining order was issued
by the CA, effectively staying implementation of the writ of
execution issued by the RTC. Eventually, the CA also issued a writ
of preliminary injunction per Resolution dated February 13,
2002. In justification of the issuance of said writ, the CA stated in
said Resolution that:

Based on the evidence before Us, We are convinced that

the execution of the assailed decision of the RTC at this
stage will probably cause injustice to the petitioner [herein
private respondent].We cannot ignore Our ruling in CA-GR
CV No. 34856 which had already attained finality. The facts
on hand show that the DBP is the present owner of the
leased premises. The only person who can lawfully eject
an unwelcome tenant from the leased premises is the
owner thereof or persons deriving rights from said owner,
of which private respondent [herein petitioner], in its
Opposition to the present motion, does not pretend to
be. Contrary to the stand of the respondent, the petitioner
is not estopped from questioning the title of respondent
over the leased premises as the rule on estoppel against
tenants is subject to a qualification. It does not apply if the
landlord's title has expired, or has been conveyed to
another, or has been defeated by a title paramount,
subsequent to the commencement of lessor-lessee
relationship. In other words, if there was a change in the
nature of the title of the landlord during the subsistence of
the lease, then the presumption does not apply.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said Resolution was

denied on June 28, 2002.
Thus, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari seeking the
annulment of the aforementioned CA Resolutions.
The issues boil down to whether the CA committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to stay the
immediate execution of the RTC judgment and whether
mandamus lies to compel respondent RTC Judge to issue a writ of
execution.

The Court finds the petition unmeritorious.

For the Court to issue a writ of certiorari against the CA, it is

incumbent upon petitioner to show that said lower court
committed grave abuse of discretion. In Quasha Ancheta Pea &
Nolasco Law Office v. Special Sixth Division, Court of Appeals,
[3]
the Court stated that:

Grave abuse of discretion means a capricious and

whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it
must be so grave as when the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as
to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation or law.[4]

A showing of such grave abuse of discretion is sorely wanting in

this case.
It is true that Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides
that [t]he judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the
defendant shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a
further appeal that may be taken therefrom. However, the Court
ruled in Benedicto v. Court of Appeals[5] that on appeal the
appellate court may stay the said writ should circumstances so
require. x x x even if RTC judgments in unlawful detainer cases
are immediately executory, preliminary injunction may still be
granted. Citing Amagan v. Marayag[6] and Vda. de Legaspi v.
Avendao,[7] the Court explained in Benedicto that:

Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal detainer,

as distinguished from one of forcible entry, and the right of
the plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in
issue in a proper judicial proceeding, it is more equitable
and just and less productive of confusion and disturbance
of physical possession, with all its concomitant
inconvenience and expenses. For the Court in which the
issue of legal possession, whether involving ownership or
not, is brought to restrain, should a petition for preliminary
injunction be filed with it, the effects of any order or
decision in the unlawful detainer case in order to await the
final judgment in the more substantive case involving
legal possession or ownership. x x x[8]

Moreover,

the

Asuncion[9] that:

Court

also

stressed

in City

of

Naga

v.

As a rule, the issuance of a preliminary injunction rests

entirely within the discretion of the court taking
cognizance of the case and will not be interfered with,
except in cases of manifest abuse. x x x
xxxx

x x x Be it noted that for a writ of preliminary injunction to

be issued, the Rules of Court do not require that the act
complained of be in clear violation of the rights of the
applicant. Indeed, what the Rules require is that the act
complained of be probably in violation of the rights of the
applicant. Under the Rules, probability is enough basis for
injunction to issue as a provisional remedy. x x x[10]

In the afore-quoted case, the Court reiterated that when

exigencies in the case warrant it, the appellate court may stay the
writ of execution issued by the RTC in an action for ejectment if
there are circumstances necessitating such action. An example of
such exceptional circumstance can be seen in Laurel v. Abalos.
[11]
Therein, a defendant was ordered by the trial court to vacate
the premises of the disputed property and return possession
thereof to the plaintiffs, but while the ejectment case was on
appeal, a judgment was promulgated in a separate case where
the sale of the property to said plaintiffs was declared null and
void, making the plaintiffs' right to possess the disputed property
inconclusive. The Court ruled in said case that:

Where supervening events (occurring subsequent to the

judgment) bring about a material change in the situation
of the parties which makes the execution inequitable,
or where there is no compelling urgency for the

execution because it is not justified by the

prevailing circumstances, the court may stay
immediate execution of the judgment.[12]

Based on the foregoing earlier ruling in Laurel,[13] the Court also

considered it just and equitable to stay the execution of the RTC
judgment in an ejectment case against the City of Naga, stating
that:

Needless to reiterate, grave and irreparable injury will be

inflicted on the City of Naga by the immediate execution of
the June 20, 2005 RTC Decision. x x x the people of Naga
would be deprived of access to basic social services. It
should not be forgotten that the land subject of the
ejectment case houses government offices which perform
important functions vital to the orderly operation of the
local government. x x x[14]

In the present case, there also exists a material change in the

situation of the parties. The CA properly took into serious
consideration the fact that in its Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 34856
entitled La Campana Food Products, Inc. v. Development Bank of
the Philippines, which has become final and executory, it
ordered herein petitioner, formerly known as La Campana
Food Products, Inc., to surrender possession of subject
properties
to
the
Development
Bank
of
the
Philippines. Evidently, a serious cloud of doubt has been cast on
petitioners right of possession, making it questionable whether
the RTC Decision, ordering private respondent to surrender
possession of subject premises to petitioner, should be
immediately implemented. Therefore, the CA did not gravely
abuse its discretion in this case; rather, it acted prudently when it
stayed execution of the RTC Decision until such time that a final
resolution of the main case is reached.

Petitioner's contention, that it was improper for the CA to have

granted
private
respondent's
motion
to
consider
the supersedeas bond it posted with the Metropolitan Trial Court
as sufficient to cover the bond required for the issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction, is likewise incorrect. Petitioner
argues that, said supersedeas bond is posted solely and primarily
to answer for a specific purpose which is for the payment of
unpaid rentals accruing up to the final judgment. This cannot be
held answerable for damages to petitioner should it later be found
out that the private respondent is not entitled to the issuance [of
a writ of preliminary injunction].[15]

Note that Section 4(b), Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides

that:

(b) Unless exempted by the court, the applicant files

with the court where the action or proceeding is pending,
a bond executed to the party or person enjoined, in an
amount to be fixed by the court, to the effect that the
applicant will pay to such party or person all damages
which he may sustain by reason of the injunction or
temporary restraining order if the court should finally
decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto. Upon
approval of the requisite bond, a writ of preliminary
injunction shall be issued;

However, in Hualam Construction and Dev't. Corp. v. Court of

Appeals,[16] the Court expounded on what damages may be
recovered in actions for forcible entry or unlawful detainer, to wit:

As to damages, We have on several occasions ruled that

since the only issue raised in forcible entry or unlawful
detainer cases is that of rightful physical possession, the
damages recoverable in these cases are those which the
plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor, i.e.,
those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the
property, and not the damages which he may have
suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of
material possession. x x x Simply put, damages in the
context of Section 8 of Rule 70 [now Section 19, Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court] is limited to rent or fair rental value for
the use and occupation of the property.[17]

Since the only damages that petitioner may be entitled to in an

action for unlawful detainer are those arising from its loss of the
use or occupation of subject premises, the only damages
petitioner can claim by reason of the stay of execution of the RTC
judgment is also only for the rent or fair rental value for the
property in question. Therefore, the CA did not err in considering
the supersedeas bond filed with the MTC, which answers for
unpaid rentals, as sufficient bond for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction.

In light of the foregoing, it is quite clear that there is no reason to

compel the RTC to immediately implement the writ of execution in
this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The

Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, dated February 13, 2002 and

June 28, 2002,

are AFFIRMED.

respectively,

in

CA-G.R.

SP

No.

66668,

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

LOURDES B. FERRER and

PROSPERIDAD M. ARANDEZ,
Complainants,

-versus -

A.M. No. MTJ-05-1580

[Formerly OCA IPI No. 04-1608-MTJ]

Present:
CARPIO MORALES, Chairperson,
BRION,
BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ.

JUDGE ROMEO A. RABACA,

Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch Promulgated:
25, Manila,
October 6, 2010
Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This administrative case charges Hon. Romeo A. Rabaca, then the Presiding Judge
of Branch 25 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC), with ignorance of
the law, disregard of the law, dereliction of duty, knowingly rendering an unjust
interlocutory order, and violation of the Code of Conduct for Government Officials.

The complainants were the President and the Executive Director of the
plaintiff in Civil Case No. 176394-CV of the MeTC, an ejectment suit
entitled Young Womens Christian Association, Inc. v. Conrado Cano. After trial,
Civil Case No. 176394-CV was decided on June 22, 2004 by respondent Judge,
[1]
who disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant ordering the latter as
follows:
(a) to vacate the premises located at Ground Floor, YMCA, 1144
Gen. Luna St., Ermita, Manila; and surrender possession thereof to
plaintiff;
(b) to pay plaintiff the sum of Php45,211.80 representing his arrears
in rentals from February 2003 to July 2003 at Php7,535.30 a month plus
the further sum of Php7,535.30 a month as reasonable value for the
continued use and occupation of the premises starting August 2003 until
the same is finally vacated and possession thereof is turn-over to
plaintiff;
(c) to pay the plaintiff the sum of Php20,000 as attorneys fees; and
(d) to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

On July 12, 2004, the plaintiffs counsel filed a motion for immediate
execution, praying that a writ of execution be issued for the immediate execution
of the aforesaid Judgment. The plaintiff cited Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court as basis for its motion.[2]
In his order dated July 14, 2004, however, respondent Judge denied
the motion for immediate execution,[3] stating:
A Notice of Appeal dated July 9, 2004, having been seasonably filed by
counsel for the defendant, let the records of the above-captioned case be,

as it is hereby ordered, elevated to the Regional Trial Court of Manila for

appropriate proceedings and disposition.
In view thereof, no more action shall be taken on the Motion for
Execution dated July 8, 2004 filed by the plaintiff thru counsel.
SO ORDERED.

According to the complainants, their counsel talked with respondent Judge about
the matter. Allegedly, respondent Judge told their counsel that if you think the court
is wrong, file a motion for reconsideration. With that, the plaintiff filed a motion
for reconsideration, which respondent Judge nonetheless denied in his order
dated July 28, 2004,[4]thuswise:
Considering that the Court has already given due course to the appeal of
the defendant which was perfected within the reglementary period, no
more action will be taken on the Motion for Reconsideration dated July
19, 2004 filed by the plaintiff thru counsel.
The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed to immediately forward the
records of this case to the Regional Trial Court, Manila.
SO ORDERED.

The complainants averred that respondent Judges denial of their motions had
rendered their victory inutile, and had unfairly deprived the plaintiff of the
possession of the premises. They further averred that respondent Judges refusal to
perform an act mandated by the Rules of Court had given undue advantage to the
defendant to the plaintiffs damage and prejudice.
The Court required respondent Judge to comment on the administrative complaint
against him.
In his comment dated September 16, 2004,[5] respondent Judge denied the
charges. He explained that he had honestly thought that his court had lost
jurisdiction over the case pursuant to the provision of Section 9, Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court (which provides that in appeals by notice of appeal, the court
loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time

and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties) once he had given due
course to the defendants notice of appeal. He claimed that he had issued the orders
in good faith and with no malice after a fair and impartial evaluation of the facts,
applicable rules, and jurisprudence; and that if he had thereby committed lapses in
the issuance of the orders, his doing so should be considered as error of judgment
on his part.
He lastly insisted that he did not know personally the parties in Civil Case No.
176394-CV, and had absolutely no reason to give undue favor or advantage to the
defendant; that the complainants did not submit evidence to show that the orders
had been issued for a consideration, material or otherwise, or that his issuance of
the orders had been motivated by ill-will or bad faith.
In their reply dated September 22, 2004,[6] the complainants contended that
respondent Judge exhibited his ignorance of the law and procedure in relying on
Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court which referred to appeals from the
Regional Trial Court; that Rule 40, which contained provisions on appeal from the
Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts, and which provided in its
Section 4 that the perfection of the appeal and the effect of such perfection should
be governed by the provisions of Section 9 of Rule 41, concerned appeals by notice
of appeal in general; and that instead, the applicable rule should be Section 19,
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
The complainants pointed out that respondent Judge apparently did not know that
appeal in forcible entry and detainer cases was not perfected by the mere filing of a
notice of appeal (as in ordinary actions) but by filing of a notice of appeal and a
sufficient supersedeas bond approved by the trial judge executed to the plaintiff to
pay the rents, damages and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment
appealed from. They asserted that respondent Judges invocation of good faith and
error of judgment did not absolve him of liability, because he had grossly neglected
his duties mandated by law by failing and refusing to act on their motion for
immediate execution and motion for reconsideration and by giving due course to
the appeal despite no supersedeas bond having been filed and approved by the trial
court.

In his memorandum dated January 13, 2005,[7] then Court Administrator Presbitero
J. Velasco, Jr., now Associate Justice of the Court, recommended that the
administrative complaint against respondent Judge be re-docketed as a regular
administrative matter; and that respondent Judge be fined in the amount
of P5,000.00 with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be
dealt with more severely, based on an evaluation of the charges, as follows:
EVALUATION: We agree with the complainants that respondent erred
when he did not act on complainants motion for immediate execution.
Section 19, Rule 70 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure
provides:
SEC. 19. If judgment is rendered against the defendant,
execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal
has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a
supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and
executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and
costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from,
and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with
the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time
under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the
Municipal Trial Court. XXXX XXXX XXXX.
It is clear from the foregoing that the perfection of an appeal by itself is
not sufficient to stay the execution of the judgment in an ejectment
case. The losing party should likewise file a supersedeas bond executed
in favor of the plaintiff to answer for rents, damages and costs, and, if the
judgment of the court requires it, he should likewise deposit the amount
of the rent before the appellate court from the time during the pendency
of the appeal. Otherwise, execution becomes ministerial and
imperative. (Philippine Holding Corporation vs. Valenzuela, 104 SCRA
401 as cited in Hualam Construction and Development Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 612, 626).
In the case at bar, defendant seasonably filed his Notice of Appeal
dated 9 July 2004 on 13 July 2004; he however failed to file any
supersedeas bond. Prior to the filing of such notice of appeal, more
specifically on 12 July 2004, complainants have already filed their
Motion for Execution dated 8 July 2004. Instead of acting on the Motion

for Execution, respondent Judge Rabaca gave due course to the appeal in
an Order dated 14 July 2004 and directed his Branch Clerk of Court to
elevate the records of the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The
Branch Clerk of Court however failed to forward the records to the
RTC. This fact is clear from Judge Rabacas Order dated 28 July
2004 wherein he directed the Branch Clerk of Court to forward the
records of the case to the Manila Regional Trial Court immediately.
From the foregoing, it is clear that when the complainant moved for the
immediate execution of Judge Rabacas decision, the latter still had
jurisdiction over the case. He therefore clearly erred when he refused to
act on the Motion for Execution. The relevant question that we should
resolve however is whether such error is an error of judgment or an error
amounting to incompetence that calls for administrative discipline.
Judge Rabaca claims that he refused to act on the complainants Motion
for execution because he honestly thought that when he gave due course
to the defendants appeal which was seasonably filed, and ordered the
elevation of the records to the appellate court, his court already lost
jurisdiction over the case.. In making his ruling, respondent asserts he
relied on the provisions of Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. This
provision reads as follows:
In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction
over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time
and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
He likewise allegedly relied on the ruling of the Court
in Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 03-1513-MTJ: Susana Joaquin
Vda. De Agregado vs. Judge Thelma Bunyi-Medina, MeTJwherein the
Court said thatRespondent Judge is correct in saying that she had lost
jurisdiction to entertain the motion for execution after the
perfection of the appeal and after she issued an order to transmit
the records of the case to the appellate court for review.
The facts of the case against Judge Bunyi-Medina are however
different from those prevailing in the instant case. In the Medina case,
the fifteen (15) day period within which to perfect the appeal had already
lapsed before the complainant therein moved for the execution of the

execution judgment. Clearly therefore, appeal had already been

perfected. In the instant case, although the defendant had filed his
appeal, the period to appeal had not yet lapsed since the plaintiff still had
his own period to appeal from the judgment and such period had not yet
lapsed.The provision relied upon by judge Rabaca, more specifically,
Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, clearly states that, In appeals
by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon
perfection of the appeals filed on due time and the expiration of the time
to appeal of the other parties. Moreover and more importantly, the herein
complainants filed their Motion for Execution even before the defendant
had filed his Notice of Appeal. Such motion was therefore still well
within the jurisdiction of the lower court.
It is basic rule in ejectment cases that the execution of judgment in
favor of the plaintiff is a matter of right and mandatory. This has been
the consistent ruling of the Court in a number of cases involving the
same issue posed before the respondent judge. Respondent Judge is
expected to know this and his justification of erroneous application of
the law, although mitigating, could not exculpate him from liability.

We agree with and adopt the evaluation of the Court Administrator.

Indeed, respondent Judge should have granted the plaintiffs motion for immediate
execution considering that the defendant did not file the sufficient supersedeas
bond despite having appealed. Granting the plaintiffs motion for immediate
execution became his ministerial duty upon the defendants failure to file the
sufficient supersedeas bond. Section 19, Rule 70, of the Rules of Court clearly
imposes such duty, viz:
Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same. If
judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue
immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and
the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond,
approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the
plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the
time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the
pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the
amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as
determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. In the
absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the

reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the
preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment of the
lower court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or
period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial
Court, with the other papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to
which the action is appealed.
xxx

Respondent Judges excuse, that he had lost jurisdiction over the case by virtue of
the defendants appeal, was unacceptable in light of the clear and explicit text of the
aforequoted rule. To begin with, the perfection of the appeal by the defendant did
not forbid the favorable action on the plaintiffs motion for immediate execution.
The execution of the decision could not be stayed by the mere taking of the appeal.
Only the filing of the sufficient supersedeas bond and the deposit with the appellate
court of the amount of rent due from time to time, coupled with the perfection of
the appeal, could stay the execution. Secondly, he could not also credibly justify
his omission to act according to the provision by claiming good faith or honest
belief, or by asserting lack of malice or bad faith. A rule as clear and explicit as
Section 19 could not be misread or misapplied, but should be implemented without
evasion or hesitation. To us, good faith, or honest belief, or lack of malice, or lack
of bad faith justifies a non-compliance only when there is an as-yet unsettled doubt
on the meaning or applicability of a rule or legal provision. It was not so herein.
And, thirdly, given that his court, being vested with original exclusive jurisdiction
over cases similar to Civil Case No. 176394-CV, had been assigned many such
cases, he was not a trial judge bereft of the pertinent prior experience to act on the
issue of immediate execution, a fact that further exposed the abject inanity of his
excuses.
We agree with the complainants insistence, therefore, that respondent Judges
omission to apply Section 19 was inexcusable. He had ignored the urging to follow
the clear and explicit provision of the rule made in the plaintiffs motion for
immediate execution. Had he any genuine doubt about his authority to grant
the motion for immediate execution, as he would have us believe, he could have
easily and correctly resolved the doubt by a resort to the Rules of Court, which he
well knew was the repository of the guidelines he was seeking for his judicial
action. Neither was it relevant that he did not know any of the parties, or that he

did not corruptly favor the defendant by his omission. His mere failure to perform
a duty enjoined by the Rules of Court sufficed to render him administratively
accountable.
This case is an opportune occasion to remind judges of the first level courts to
adhere always to the mandate under Section 19, Rule 70, of the Rules of Court to
issue writs of execution upon motion of the plaintiffs in actions for forcible entry
or unlawful detainer when the defendant has appealed but has not filed a sufficient
supersedeas bond. The summary nature of the special civil action under Rule 70
and the purpose underlying the mandate for an immediate execution, which is to
prevent the plaintiffs from being further deprived of their rightful possession,
should always be borne in mind.
The recommended penalty of P5,000.00 with warning that a repetition of the same
or similar act would be dealt with more severely is also correct. The Court
Administrator rationalized the recommendation of the penalty thuswise:
Under A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, Gross Ignorance of the Law or
Procedure is classified as serious offense for which the imposable
penalty ranges from a fine to dismissal. However, we find respondents
acts not ingrained with malice or bad faith. It is a matter of public policy
that in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corrupt motive, the acts of a
judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even
though such acts are erroneous. In Domingo vs. Judge Pagayatan, A.M.
No. RTJ-03-1751, 10 June 2003, the penalty of fine in the amount of five
thousand pesos was deemed sufficient where it was held that respondents
lack of malice or bad faith frees him from administrative liability but not
for gross ignorance of the law.

We concur with the rationalization of the Court Administrator. Verily, even

if respondent Judges omission would have easily amounted to gross
ignorance of the law and procedure, a serious offense under Section 8,[8] Rule
140, of the Rules of Court, as amended, the fact that the complainants did not
establish that malice or bad faith impelled his omission to act, or that fraud,
dishonesty, or a corrupt motive attended his omission to act demands a
downgrading of the liability. In the absence of any showing that he had been held
guilty of any other administrative offense,[9] and without our attention being called

to other circumstances that might demonstrate respondent Judges dark motives for
his inaction, we should find and consider the recommended penalty of P5,000.00
with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more
severely to be commensurate to the offense.[10]
WHEREFORE, we find respondent JUDGE ROMEO A. RABACA, Presiding
Judge of Branch 25, Metropolitan Trial Court, in Manila guilty of ignorance of the
law and procedure, and, accordingly, impose upon him a fine of P5,000.00 with
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124292. December 10, 1996]

GREGORIO C. JAVELOSA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

SPOUSES CORAZON J. DE LEON & MELVIN DE LEON,
SPOUSES KRISTINE SOLINAP & ALFONSO SOLINAP, MARLINA
J. BALLEZA, MYRNA J. SERVANDO, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:

The subject land, with an area of 2,061 square meters, situated in

Jaro, Iloilo City,
was
originally
owned
by
petitioner
Gregorio
Javelosa. Sometime in the 70s, petitioner , mortgaged said land to Jesus
Jalbuena to secure several loans. Petitioner failed to pay his loans and
Jalbuena, as mortgagee, foreclosed on the land and purchased it as highest
bidder at the foreclosure sale.
During the one-year period of redemption, petitioner-mortgagor filed an
action against the mortgagee at the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Iloilo City to annul the mortgage contracts and public auction sale
(Civil Case No. 16460).[1] He claimed that the mortgage contracts were illegal
and the conduct of the foreclosure sale was irregular.

While the case was pending, the period of redemption

prescribed. Consequently, the mortgagee consolidated title over the land,
caused the cancellation of the mortgagors title and the issuance of a
new title in his name. Thereafter, petitioner obtained an Order[2] from the
RTC in Civil Case No. 16460 restraining the mortgagee from further effecting
the foreclosure sale of the property.
In the early part of December 1986, the mortgagee divided the subject
land
among
his
married
daughters
(private
respondents
herein). On December 27, 1986, the mortgagee died. He was substituted by
his heirs, private respondents, in the pending RTC case for annulment of
mortgage and foreclosure sale. On January 19, 1987, title to the subject lot
was issued in the names of private respondents.
In the meantime, the RTC case for annulment of mortgage and foreclosure
sale continued to drag on. On June 1, 1993, private respondents, as
registered owners, sent a letter to petitioner-mortgagor demanding that he
vacate the subject premises within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. Despite
receipt of the demand letter on June 4, 1993, petitioner-mortgagor refused to
vacate said lot. Thus, on August 6, 1993, private respondents filed a
complaint for illegal detainer before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in
Cities, Iloilo City, and sought to eject petitioner from the premises.
Petitioner, in his Answer,[3] asserted his ownership over the disputed
land. He claimed that he had a TCT in his name but that the mortgagee (father
and predecessor-in-interest of private respondents), in bad faith, was able to
cause his title to be cancelled and a new title issued in his name despite the
pendency of the RTC case questioning the award of the subject land to the
mortgagee in the foreclosure proceedings. Thus, petitioner denied he was
illegally occupying the land. He claimed that he was legally entitled to the
continued possession thereof by virtue of pending legal incidents in his RTC
case for annulment of mortgage and foreclosure sale, from which transactions
the mortgagee (predecessor-in-interest of private respondents) derived his
title.
The MTC decided the unlawful detainer case in favor of private
respondents and ordered petitioner to vacate the premises and pay

reasonable rental. The MTC held that the pendency of the case for annulment
of mortgage in the RTC would not abate the proceedings in the unlawful
detainer case filed before it for the issues in these cases are distinct from
each other.[4]
Petitioner elevated the case to the RTC. He alleged that the ejectment
case was improperly filed with the MTC for private respondents (plaintiffs
therein) should have prayed instead for the issuance of a writ of possession
with the RTC where the case for annulment of mortgage and foreclosure sale
was pending.
Without ruling on the propriety of the filing of the ejectment case before the
MTC, the RTC reversed the MTC decision on a different ground. It held that
the complaint was filed out of time for under Section 1, rule 70 of the Rules of
Court, and unlawful detainer case must be filed within one year from the time
title was issued in private respondents name, i.e., from January 19, 1987, and
not from the last demand to vacate made by private respondents (plaintiffs
therein). Thus, the ejectment case initiated on August 6, 1993 was filed
beyond the one-year prescriptive period. The RTC dismissed the ejectment
case.[5]
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, private respondents alleged that
the RTC erred in holding that the complaint for unlawful detainer was filed out
of time. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision and reinstated the
decision of the MTC. It held that the complaint for unlawful detainer was filed
on time for the prescriptive period should be counted not from the issuance of
title in the name of paintiffs (private respondents herein), but from the date of
the last demand to vacate made against the defendant. Moreover, the fact that
private respondents were never in prior physical possession of the subject
land is of no moment for prior physical possession is necessary only in
forcible entry cases. The Court of Appeals thus ordered the petitioner
(defendant in the ejectment case) to vacate the premises and pay reasonable
rentals.[6]
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

In this Court, petitioner does not raise the issue regarding the timeliness of
the filling of the ejectment case against him. For the first time, he puts in issue
the nature of the suit filed against him. He contends that the complaint filed
before the MTC is not an unlawful detainer suit but one for accion
publiciana cognizable by the RTC. Petitioner argues that a reading of the
complaint reveals there was no allegation as to how entry on the land was
made by petitioner-mortgagor or when the latter unlawfully took possession of
said land. Citing the case of Sarona v. Villegas, [7] petitioner contends that the
omission of these jurisdictional facts stripped the MTC of jurisdiction over the
case.
The petition is devoid of merit.
It is settled that jurisdiction of court over the subject matter of the litigation
is determined by the allegations in the complaint. It is equally settled that an
error in jurisdiction can be raised at any time and even for the first time on
appeal.[8]
The issue of jurisdiction in the case at bar depends on the nature of the
case filed by private respondents in the MTC. If it is an unlawful detainer case,
the action was properly filed with the MTC. However, if the suit is one
for accion publiciana, jurisdiction is with the RTC and the complaint should be
dismissed. To resolve the issue, we should examine the specific allegations
made by private respondents in their complaint. The complaint for unlawful
detainer[9] contained the following material allegations, viz:
xxx
2. Plaintiffs (private respondents) are the registered owners of a parcel of land x x x
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-74417 x x x;
3. Defendant (petitioner-mortgagor) has been illegally occupying the above described
property without the consent of the herein plaintiffs, thus unlawfully withholding
possession of the same from them who are the owners and the ones entitled to the
physical possession thereof;

4. On June 1, 1993, plaintiffs x x x sent a letter dated May 26, 1993 to the defendant
demanding that he vacate the premises within ten days from receipt of the said letter x
x x;
xxx
6. The said letter was received by the defendant on June 4, 1993 x x x;
xxx
8. Having received the demand to vacate the property in question, defendant is
now unlawfully withholding possession of the x x x property from the plaintiffs who
are entitled to the physical possession thereof;
9. As a consequence of the refusal of the defendant to vacate the premises x x x the
plaintiffs were constrained to file this action for illegal detainer against him in order to
take away the physical possession thereof from them and to place them in de
facto possession of the said property;
x x x"
Clearly, private respondents (as plaintiffs therein) alleged in their complaint
that they are the registered owners of the subject land and therefore, entitled
to possession thereof; that petitioners were illegally occupying the premises
without their consent and thus unlawfully withholding possession from them;
and, despite receipt of their demand to vacate the premises, petitioner refused
to leave the property. On the face of the complaint, it also appears that private
respondents were seeking to recover merely the physical possession or
posession de factoof the subject land. Private respondents did not allege the
incidents respecting the mortgage of the land and the pending RTC case
questioning the mortgage contract as the issue involved therein is ownership
which has no place in an ejectment case. In fine, the allegations in the
complaint make out a case for unlawful detainer. We have ruled in a long line
of cases[10] that in an action for unlawful detainer, a simple allegation that
defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from plaintiff is x x x sufficient
for the words `unlawfully withholding imply possession on the part of
defendant, which was legal in the beginning, having no other source than a

contract, express or implied, possession which had later expired as a right

and is being withheld by defendant. Thus, in the case at bar, private
respondents allegation in their complaint that petitioner was unlawfully
withholding possession of the land from them is sufficient to make out a case
for unlawful detainer.
In Co Tiamco v. Diaz,[11] the Court emphasized that the principle underlying
the brevity and simplicity of pleadings in forcible entry and unlawful detainer
cases rests upon considerations of public policy. Ejectment cases are
summary in nature for they involve perturbation of social order which must be
restored as promptly as possible and, accordingly, technicalities or details of
procedure should be carefully avoided.
The ruling in the Sarona case[12] cited by petitioner i.e., that a complaint for
unlawful detainer should allege when and how entry on the land was made by
the defendant, finds no application to the case at bar. In Sarona, the main
issue was the timeliness of the filing of the complaint before the MTC. In
forcible entry cases, the prescriptive period is counted from the date of
defendants actual entry on the land; in unlawful detainer, from the date of the
last demand to vacate. Hence, to determine whether the case was filed on
time, there was a necessity to ascertain whether the complaint was one for
forcible entry or unlawful detainer. In light of these considerations, the Court
ruled that since the main distinction between the two actions is when and how
defendant entered the land, the determinative facts should be alleged in the
complaint. Thus, in Sarona, the jurisdiction of the MTC over the complaint was
never in issue for whether the complaint was one for forcible entry or unlawful
detainer, the MTC had jurisdiction over it. The case at bar is different for at
issue is the jurisdiction of the MTC over the unlawful detainer case for
petitioner (defendant therein) asserts that the case is one for accion
publiciana cognizable by the RTC.
Petitioner likewise insists that he is entitled to the physical possession of
the property since he has been in actual, continuous possession thereof as
owner-mortgagor. He contends that private respondents have never been in
actual physical possession of the land since they have not prayed for the
issuance of a writ of possession with the RTC where the case assailing the

sale of the land was pending and where the parties adverse claims of
ownership are being litigated.
We find petitioners contentions untenable.
Again, it is settled that prior physical possession is indispensable only in
actions for forcible entry but not in unlawful detainer. Since we have ruled that
MTC case filed against petitioner is one for unlawful detainer, petitioners prior
possession of the land is of no moment. Private respondents are entitled to its
possession from the time title was issued in their favor as registered
owners. An action for unlawful detainer may be filed when possession by a
landlord, vendor, vendee or other person against whom the possession of any
land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of
their right to hold possession, by virtue of a contract, express or implied.[13]
Under the Rules, if the mortgaged property is not redeemed within one
year from the foreclosure sale, the purchaser at public auction is entitled to
possession of the property.[14] To obtain possession, the vendee or purchaser
may either ask for a writ of possession or bring an appropriate independent
action, such as a suit for ejectment, which private respondents did.The RTC
case assailing the public auction sale of the property and seeking annulment
of mortgages did not preclude the filing of an ejectment case against
petitioner.[15] We have consistently ruled that the pendency of an action for
annulment of sale and reconveyance (which necessarily involves the issue of
ownership) may not be successfully pleaded in abatement of an action for
ejectment, the issue in the latter being merely physical possession.[16] To be
sure, private respondents most effective remedy was to file a separate action
for unlawful detainer against petitioner.[17] They cannot ask for a writ of
possession from the RTC where the case for annulment of mortgage and
foreclosure sale is pending because after the mortgagee was able to
consolidate his title on the land and a new title issued in his name, petitioner
was able to obtain an Order[18] from the RTC directing the mortgagee
(predecessor-in-interest of private respondents) to desist from further
enforcing the foreclosure proceedings.
The case of Joven v. Court of Appeals[19] cited by petitioner is not on all
fours with the case at bar. In Joven, DBP as mortgagee was not able to

consolidate its title over the foreclosed land nor cause the cancellation of title
in the mortgagors name. Although the title was still in the name of the
mortgagor, DBP sold the land to private respondents and the latter, without
first securing a court order, took the law into their own hands and entered said
land. Hence, it was the mortgagor who filed and successfully maintained an
action for forcible against private respondents, the transferees of the
mortgagee.
The factual mould of the case at bar is different. The mortgagee
(predecessor-in-interest of private respondents) was able to consolidate his
ownership over the foreclosed land, cause the cancellation of title in the name
of petitioner-mortgagor and the issuance of a new title in his own name. It was
this title that he passed on to his daughters, private respondents herein.As
aforestated, a restraining order was issued by the RTC where the case for
annulment of foreclosure sale is pending after the mortgagee had
consolidated his ownership over the land, hence, private respondents were
left with no choice but to file a separate and independent action for unlawful
detainer to recover physical possession of the property. Unlike in the Joven
case, private respondents did not take the law into their own hands and
entered the property without the benefit of a court order. They sought the aid
of the court precisely to settle the issue of physical possession or
possession de facto of the land when they filed the ejectment case with the
MTC.
We find that private respondents have adequately proved that they are
entitled to possess the subject land as the registered owners thereof. The
age-old rule is that the person who has a torrens title over a land is entitled to
possession thereof.[20] Except for the bare claim that the title of private
respondents was obtained in bad faith, petitioner has pointed to no right to
justify his continued possession of the subject property.
Be that as it may, we reiterate the rule that the award of possession de
facto over the subject land to private respondents would not constitute res
judicata as to the issue of ownership thereof, which issue is still being litigated
before the RTC of Iloilo City where the case for annulment of mortgages and
foreclosure proceedings is pending.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals, dated January 17, 1996, is AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 118284. July 5, 1996]

SPOUSES MAMERTO REFUGIA and FELIZA PAYAD-REFUGIA,

RODOLFO REFUGIA, and CANDELARIA REFUGIA, petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ARTURO REFUGIA and
AURORA TIMBANG-REFUGIA, respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision[1] of respondent Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 34647 promulgated on December 9, 1994 which
reversed and set aside the judgment[2] dated April 29, 1994 of the Regional
Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 172, in Civil Case No. 4347-V-94 affirming
with some modifications the decision[3] rendered by the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Valenzuela, Branch 81, in Civil Case No. 6089 on March 4, 1994.
The records en bloc of the aforesaid cases show that private respondentspouses Arturo Refugia and Aurora Timbang-Refugia are the registered
owners of a parcel of land and a duplex apartment building constructed
thereon located at No. 16 Meriales Street, Marulas, Valenzuela, as evidenced
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 218979. Apparently, said title was issued
pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on September 11, 1975 in favor
of respondent Arturo Refugia, but the purchase price of P20,000.00 was
reportedly advanced by his father, herein petitioner Mamerto
Refugia. Thereafter, respondent Arturo Refugia obtained a housing loan from
the Social Security System, using the land as collateral to secure payment
thereof. In 1976, after the construction of the duplex apartment building,

herein petitioners immediately began to occupy one door while respondents

stayed in the other unit.
It appears, however, that things did not turn out well between petitioners
and private respondents, especially between petitioner Feliza Refugia and her
daughter-in-law, Aurora, such that in February of 1993, petitioners were told
by private respondents to vacate the unit that they were occupying because,
according to private respondents, the family of one of their children who is
married needed a place of their own. Petitioners refused to leave, claiming
that they own the unit they are occupying by reason of the fact that it was
actually Mamerto Refugia who bought the lot on which the duplex apartment
stood. Because of this, the matter was brought before the barangay court of
conciliation. No amicable settlement having been reached between the
parties, private respondents instituted an action for ejectment on October 20,
1993 in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 81.
On March 4, 1994, the court a quo rendered judgment dismissing the
complaint for ejectment based on its finding that herein petitioners are the
lawful occupants of the premises. Thus, it held that:
Like in any other ejectment suit, the pivotal issue is whether the defendants are
unlawfully with(h)olding possession of the premises in question. The question that
perturbs the mind of the Court which is not fully explained by plaintiffs is whether the
stay of the defendants in the premises was indeed by plaintiffs tolerance alone. From
the evidence on hand the Court is more disposed to believe the position of the
defendants that it was Mamerto who bought the lot where the duplex apartment was
constructed by plaintiff Arturo Refugia. As stated earlier, the amount of P20,000.00
was withdrawn on September 11, 1975, the date the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibits F
and F-1) was executed. The consideration of the sale is for P20,000.00. The fact that a
two-door apartment was indeed constructed likewise regenerates the claim of
defendants that they shall be co-owners of the lot and shall dwell in one of the doors
of said apartment. If the averment of plaintiffs that they exclusively own the property
is not to be trusted what have motivated them to construct a two-door apartment
instead of a single and a larger house? These facts are small tributaries that lead us to
the bigger lake of truth, that is, the stay of the defendants in the premises is not on the
basis of mere tolerance.

It may also be pointed out that the certification to file action (Exhibit E) issued by the
Barangay is for Land Dispute not for ejectment. (Italics ours) In the handwritten
transcripts of the proceedings in the barangay, it appears that this case is merely an
off-shoot of a misunderstanding between plaintiff Aurora Refugia and her in-laws. It
was admitted by Aurora that she offered to pay the amount of P20,000.00 but that the
defendants refused to accept the same. Then and there plaintiff Aurora said that she
would prefer to sell the unit to another and that out of the proceeds of the sale, she
will pay the defendants.These circumstances lead the Court to conclude that it is not
true that plaintiffs daughter is in need of the premises.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 172, in its
aforementioned decision, affirmed with modification the judgment of the lower
court by declaring herein petitioners and private respondents co-owners of the
lot and the two-door apartment. Their motion for reconsideration having been
denied, private respondents duly filed a petition for review before respondent
Court of Appeals.
On December 9, 1994, said respondent court rendered its questioned
judgment which reversed and set aside the aforestated decisions of the
Metropolitan Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court, and thereafter ordered
petitioners and their privies to vacate the subject premises and to surrender
possession thereof to private respondents. In so ruling, respondent court
declared that the Regional Trial Court, in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction over an ejectment case, had no authority to resolve the issue of
ownership and to declare herein petitioners as co-owners because its power
is limited only to a determination of the issue of possession; that petitioners
bare allegation of ownership cannot prevail over the transfer certificate of title
and deed of sale in favor of private respondents; and that petitioners have
been occupying the subject premises by mere tolerance.
Hence, this petition wherein petitioners aver that respondent Court of
Appeals erred: (a) in giving due course to respondents appeal despite the fact
that it was filed beyond the fifteen (15) day reglementary period to appeal; (b)
in disregarding jurisprudence that factual findings of the trial court should not
be disturbed on appeal; (c) in holding that petitioners claim of co-ownership of
the subject premises is a mere allegation unsupported by any concrete
evidence; (d) in ruling that the issue of ownership, as raised by petitioners, is

foreign to the issue of possession in an ejectment case; and (e) in reversing

the decisions of both lower courts and ordering petitioners eviction from the
disputed premises.
Anent the first issue, petitioners contend that private respondents received
a copy of the decision of the Regional Trial Court on May 4, 1994 and thus
they had until May 19, 1994 within which to file a petition for review before the
Court of Appeals. However, private respondents filed instead a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied by the Regional Trial Court in its Order
dated June 21, 1994. Petitioners argue that since the motion for
reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on Summary
Procedure and that the filing thereof did not interrupt the running of the
prescriptive period, the petition for review which was filed by private
respondents only on July 21, 1994 was already way beyond the 15-day
reglementary period and should not have been given due course by
respondent court.
In the case of Jakihaca vs. Aquino, et al.,[4] this Court categorically ruled
that:
The Rule on Summary Procedure applies only in cases filed before the Metropolitan
Trial Court and Municipal Trial Courts, pursuant to Section 36 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129. Summary procedures have no application to cases before the Regional Trial
Courts. Hence, when the respondents appealed the decision of the Municipal Trial
Court to the Regional Trial Court, the applicable rules are those of the latter court.
It is thus settled that a motion for reconsideration may be filed from a
decision of the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction
over decisions of the inferior courts in ejectment cases. Accordingly, this
argument of petitioners has to be rejected.
There is nonetheless appreciable merit in their contention that the petition
for review was belatedly filed in the Court of Appeals. This is because in case
of a judgment or final order of the Regional Trial Court rendered in an appeal
from the judgment or final order of an inferior court, the former may be
appealed to the Court of Appeals through a petition for review within fifteen
days from receipt of said judgment or final order. If a motion for

reconsideration is filed, the losing party has only the remaining period within
which to file that petition for review. The filing, therefore, of a motion for
reconsideration has the effect of only suspending the period to appeal. This
rule has been clarified in the case of Lacsamana, et al. vs. The Honorable
Second Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.,[5] as
follows:
3) APPEALS BY PETITION FOR REVIEW TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
The final judgment or order of a regional trial court in an appeal from the final
judgment or order of a metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court and municipal
circuit trial court, may be appealed to the Court of Appeals through a petition for
review in accordance with Section 22 of B.P. No. 129 and Section 22(b) of the Interim
Rules, or to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari in accordance with
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and Section 25 of the Interim Rules. The reason for
extending the period for the filing of a record on appeal is also applicable to the filing
of a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. The period for filing a petition for
review is fifteen days. If a motion for reconsideration is filed with and denied by a
regional trial court, the movant has only the remaining period within which to file a
petition for review. Hence, it may be necessary to file a motion with the Court of
Appeals for extension of time to file such petition for review. (Italics supplied).
It is not disputed that private respondents received a copy of the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela on May 4, 1994, and that their
motion for reconsideration was filed with said court only on the fifteenth day of
the reglementary period to appeal, that is, May 19, 1994. In such a case, the
rule is that the aggrieved party has only one day from receipt of the order
denying the motion for reconsideration within which to file a petition for review
before the Court of Appeals.[6] In the case at bar, private respondents received
a copy of the order denying their motion for reconsideration on July 6, 1994,
and, without moving for extension of time, were able to file their petition for
review only on July 21, 1994; hence their appeal was not seasonably
perfected. Strictly speaking, therefore, the appeal should not have been given
due course, following the pronouncement in the case of Miranda vs.
Guanzon, et al.[7] to the effect that the requirement regarding the perfection of
an appeal within the reglementary period is not only mandatory but
jurisdictional.

This rule, however, has been relaxed in the later case of Tijam, et al. vs.
Sibonghanoy, et al.[8] where it was held that a party, after voluntarily submitting
a cause, is estopped from attacking the jurisdiction of the court simply
because it thereafter obtained an adverse decision on the merits. The Court
explained therein that the party is barred from such conduct not because the
judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but
for the reason that such a practice cannot be tolerated obviously for reasons
of public policy. It will be noted that the jurisdictional issue involved in the
instant case was raised only for the first time in the present petition for review
on certiorari. The lack or absence of appellate jurisdiction was never
questioned by petitioners either in their Comment [9] submitted with respondent
court or in their Motion to Dismiss Appeal[10] which was grounded solely on the
fact that the petition for review filed before said court was not verified.
Despite several opportunities to raise the issue of jurisdiction in the Court
of Appeals, petitioners did not challenge its appellate jurisdiction and did so
only after an adverse decision was rendered against them. To be more
precise, they raised the issue of jurisdiction, for the nullification of the decision
of the Court of Appeals, when the case was already on appeal before this
Court. They are now barred from doing so under the doctrine of estoppel by
laches.[11] Additionally, having participated actively in the proceedings before
the appellate court, petitioners can no longer question its authority.[12]
The main issue in this case demands the determination of whether the
Metropolitan Trial Court, as well as the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction, have jurisdiction to resolve the issue of ownership in
an action for unlawful detainer where the issue of possession cannot be
resolved without deciding the question of ownership. In the affirmative, it
becomes necessary to delineate the extent and legal effect of such
adjudication.
Under Republic Act No. 296, or the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, the
jurisdiction of the then municipal and city courts over actions for forcible entry
and unlawful detainer was defined as follows:
Sec. 88. Original jurisdiction in civil cases. x x x In forcible entry and detainer
proceedings, the municipal judge or judge of the city court shall have original

jurisdiction, but the said municipal judge or city judge may receive evidence upon the
question of title therein, whatever may be the value of the property, solely for the
purpose of determining the character and extent of possession and damages for
detention. In forcible entry proceedings, he may grant preliminary injunctions, in
accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, to prevent the defendant from
committing further acts of dispossession against the plaintiff. (As amended by
Republic Acts Nos. 2613 and 3828).
The law was subsequently amended by Republic Act No. 5967 [13] which
vested in the city courts special jurisdiction to resolve the issue of
ownership in conjunction with the issue of possession whenever the question
of ownership is brought in issue by the pleadings, thus:
Sec. 3. Besides the civil cases over which the City Courts have jurisdiction under
Section eighty-eight of Republic Act Numbered Two hundred ninety-six, as amended,
it shall likewise have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of First Instance over the
following:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) In ejection cases where the question of ownership is brought in issue in the
pleadings. The issue of ownership shall therein be resolved in conjunction with the
issue of possession.
This special jurisdiction of city courts was differentiated from the power
ordinarily accorded the inferior courts to receive evidence of title only for the
purpose of determining the character or extent of the possession in
dispute. This Court had the occasion to apply and interpret the aforequoted
statutory provision in Pelaez vs. Reyes, et al.[14] which raised the issue of
whether a decision of a city court in an ejectment case involving the question
of ownership was appealable to the Regional Trial Court or to the Court of
Appeals, in this wise:
In the light of these provisions, petitioner insists that respondents should have
appealed to the Court of First Instance. Specifically, his contention is that the
inclusion of the issue of ownership in the pleadings did not change the character of the
proceeding as an action of unlawful detainer over which city and municipal courts

have original exclusive jurisdiction. He claims that his contention is supported by the
very provision of Section 3, just quoted, to the effect that when ownership is brought
in issue in the pleadings in an ejection case before the city courts, said courts are to
resolve the issue of ownership only in conjunction with the issue of possession. In
other words, he posits that since the action is one of unlawful detainer, the main issue
to be settled by the city court remains to be possession, and that to resolve the issue of
ownership in conjunction with the issue of possession is not the same as resolving it in
a judicial litigation where it is the sole issue.
We are not impressed. Regardless of the juridical value of the significance petitioner
is trying to thus draw from the rather peculiar language of the statute, We are of the
considered opinion that the evident import of Section 3 above is to precisely grant to
the city courts concurrent original jurisdiction with the courts of first instance over the
cases enumerated therein, which include ejection cases where the question of
ownership is brought in issue in the pleadings. To sustain petitioners contention about
the meaning of the last phrase of paragraph (c) of said section regarding the resolution
of the issue of ownership in conjunction with the issue of possession is to disregard
the very language of the main part of the section which denotes unmistakably a
conferment upon the city courts of concurrent jurisdiction with the courts of first
instance over ejection cases in which ownership is brought in issue in the pleadings. It
is to Us quite clear that the fact that the issue of ownership is to be resolved in
conjunction with the issue of possession simply means that both the issues of
possession and ownership are to be resolved by the city courts. And the jurisdiction is
concurrent with the Courts of First Instance precisely because usually questions of
title are supposed to be resolved by superior courts. In other words, this grant of
special jurisdiction to city courts is to be distinguished from the power ordinarily
accorded to municipal courts to receive evidence of title only for the purpose of
determining the extent of the possession in dispute.
It being clear, therefore, that in the main ejection case, x x x, the issue of ownership is
involved as shown by the pleadings therein filed by the parties, and that under Section
3 of Republic Act 5967, said city court exercised original jurisdiction over the same
concurrently with the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, the appeal of
respondents was rightly made by them to the Court of Appeals (Italics ours).
However, on August 14, 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, or the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, was approved and it redefined the jurisdiction of

the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts and the inferior
courts. Specifically, the new law modified the power of inferior courts to
resolve the issue of ownership in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases,
subject, however, to the qualification that a resolution thereof shall only be for
the purpose of determining the issue of possession, to wit:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer: Provided, That when in such cases, the defendant raises the question of
ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to
determine the issue of possession.
Subsequently, this Court promulgated its Interim Rules and Guidelines in
the implementation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Section 10 of which
provides:
10. Jurisdiction in ejectment cases. Metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts,
and municipal circuit trial courts, without distinction, may try cases of forcible entry
and detainer even if the question of ownership is raised in the pleadings and the
question of possession could not be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership,
but the question of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of
possession.
These issuances changed the former rule under Republic Act No. 296
which merely allowed inferior courts to receive evidence upon the question of
title solely for the purpose of determining the extent and character of
possession and damages for detention, which thereby resulted in previous
rulings of this Court to the effect that if it appears during the trial that the
principal issue relates to the ownership of the property in dispute and any
question of possession which may be involved necessarily depends upon the
result of the inquiry into the title, then the jurisdiction of the municipal or city

courts is lost and the action should be dismissed. With the enactment of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, the inferior courts now retain jurisdiction over an
ejectment case even if the question of possession cannot be resolved without
passing upon the issue of ownership, with the express qualification that such
issue of ownership shall be resolved only for the purpose of determining the
issue of possession. In other words, the fact that the issues of ownership and
possession de facto are intricately interwoven will not cause the dismissal of
the case for forcible entry and unlawful detainer on jurisdictional grounds.
The intendment of the law was reinforced by the revision of the former
Rule on Summary Procedure involving special cases before the inferior
courts, which was promulgated pursuant to Section 36 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129. The old Rule, which took effect on August 1, 1983, stated that:
Section 1. Scope. This Rule shall govern the procedure in the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the
following cases:
A. Civil Cases
(1) Cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, except where the question of
ownership is involved, or where the damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered
by the plaintiff exceed twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) at the time of the filing of
the complaint.
This Rule was revised pursuant to a resolution of the Court En Banc which
took effect on November 15, 1991, and the aforequoted provision now reads
as follows:
Section 1. Scope. This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling within their jurisdiction:
A. Civil Cases
(1) All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, irrespective of the amount of
damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered. Where attorneys fees are awarded,
the same shall not exceed twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00).

Under the original Rule, ejectment cases were covered by the summary
rules only where the unpaid rentals do not exceed P20,000.00 and no
question of ownership is involved. As presently formulated, however, all
ejectment cases are now unqualifiedly covered by the summary procedure,
which necessarily implies that even if there is a need to resolve the issue of
ownership, such fact will not deprive the inferior courts of jurisdiction over
these cases.
Subsequently, Republic Act No. 7691, entitled An Act Expanding the
Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, was
passed and took effect on April 15, 1994.[15] The jurisdiction of the inferior
courts over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases as defined under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 was retained. In addition, they now exercise limited
original jurisdiction over civil actions involving title to, or possession of, real
property or any interest therein depending on the assessed value and location
of the property.
Parenthetically, it might be argued that since inferior courts are anyway
vested with jurisdiction over real actions, then it can very well resolve the
issue of ownership raised in the ejectment case, under the conditions stated in
Section 32(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No.
7691. It must not be overlooked, however, that proceedings in ejectment
cases are summary in nature, whereas actions for recovery of ownership
require a full-blown trial on the merits. The difference in the procedure in
special civil actions, like ejectment, and in ordinary civil actions, such
as accion reivindicatoria, inveigh against the consolidation of said cases or the
joinder of the different causes of action involved. It could also be violative
under certain circumstances of the rule on permissive joinder of causes of
action since Section 6 of Rule 2 requires inter alia due observance of the rules
on jurisdiction and joinder of parties, and that said causes of action arise out
of the same contract, transaction or relation between the parties.
As the law on forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases now stands, even
where the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the
question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of

ownership, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts nevertheless have the undoubted competence to resolve
the issue of ownership albeit only to determine the issue of possession.[16]
On the bases of the foregoing disquisitions, it is clear that prior to the
effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the jurisdiction of inferior courts was
confined to receiving evidence of ownership in order to determine only the
nature and extent of possession, by reason of which such jurisdiction was lost
the moment it became apparent that the issue of possession was intricately
interwoven with that of ownership. The law, as revised, now provides instead
that when the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the
issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine
the issue of possession. On its face, the new Rule on Summary Procedure
was extended to include within the jurisdiction of the inferior courts ejectment
cases which likewise involve the issue of ownership. This does not mean,
however, that blanket authority to adjudicate the issue of ownership in
ejectment suits has been thus conferred on the inferior courts.
At the outset, it must here be stressed that the resolution of this particular
issue concerns and applies only to forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases
where the issue of possession is intimately intertwined with the issue of
ownership. It finds no proper application where it is otherwise, that is, where
ownership is not in issue, or where the principal and main issue raised in the
allegations of the complaint as well as the relief prayed for make out not a
case for ejectment but one for recovery of ownership.
In the case of De la Santa vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,[17] this Court, in
making a distinction between the reception of evidence and the resolution of
the issue of ownership, held that the inferior court may look into the evidence
of title or ownership and possession de jure insofar as said evidence would
indicate or determine the nature of possession. It cannot, however, resolve the
issue of ownership, that is, by declaring who among the parties is the true and
lawful owner of the subject property, because the resolution of said issue
would effect an adjudication on ownership which is not sanctioned in the
summary action for unlawful detainer. With this as a premise and taking into
consideration the amendment introduced by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, it may
be suggested that inferior courts are now conditionally vested with

adjudicatory power over the issue of title or ownership raised by the parties in
an ejectment suit.
Withal, it will be observed, that the passage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
has spawned seemingly conflicting jurisprudence on the proper interpretation
and application thereof. Thus, in several cases decided by the Court after the
effectivity of this law, regardless of whether the complaint for ejectment was
filed with the inferior court prior thereto or otherwise, it was held that the
jurisdiction of the inferior court is lost and the ejectment case should be
dismissed where the issue of possession cannot be resolved without
determining the issue of ownership.[18]In all of these cases, the Court declared
that inferior courts may only admit evidence and proof of ownership but they
cannot adjudicate on the question of ownership. Conversely, in also not a few
instances, the jurisdiction of the inferior courts to resolve the issue of
ownership in order to determine the issue of possession was upheld by this
Court.[19] Apparently, it could have been some imprecision in language or a
misperception of the statutory text which generated the ostensible doctrinal
variance.
After due deliberation, we find and so hold that by virtue of the express
mandate set forth in Section 33(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, inferior courts
have jurisdiction to resolve the question of ownership raised as an incident in
an ejectment case where a determination thereof is necessary for a proper
and complete adjudication of the issue of possession. Certain guidelines,
however, must be observed in the implementation of this legislative
prescription, viz.:
1. The primal rule is that the principal issue must be that of possession, and that
ownership is merely ancillary thereto, in which case the issue of ownership may be
resolved but only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession. Thus, as
earlier stated, the legal provision under consideration applies only where the inferior
court believes and the preponderance of evidence shows that a resolution of the
issue of possession is dependent upon the resolution of the question of ownership.
2. It must sufficiently appear from the allegations in the complaint that what the plaintiff
really and primarily seeks is the restoration of possession. [20] Consequently, where
the allegations of the complaint as well as the reliefs prayed for clearly establish a
case for the recovery of ownership, and not merely one for the recovery of
possession de facto, or where the averments plead the claim of material possession

as a mere elemental attribute of such claim for ownership, [21] or where the issue of
ownership is the principal question to be resolved, [22] the action is not one for forcible
entry but one for title to real property.
3. The inferior court cannot adjudicate on the nature of ownership where the
relationship of lessor and lessee has been sufficiently established in the ejectment
case,[23] unless it is sufficiently established that there has been a subsequent change
in or termination of that relationship between the parties. This is because under
Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the tenant is not permitted to deny the
title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and
tenant between them.
4. The rule in forcible entry cases, but not in those for unlawful detainer, is that a party
who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the
owner himself. Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property and
whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority
in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is
lawfully ejected by a person having a better right through an accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.[24] Corollarily, if prior possession may be
ascertained in some other way, then the inferior court cannot dwell upon or intrude
into the issue of ownership.
5. Where the question of who has prior possession hinges on the question of who the
real owner of the disputed portion is, the inferior court may resolve the issue of
ownership and make a declaration as to who among the contending parties is the
real owner.[25] In the same vein, where the resolution of the issue of possession
hinges on a determination of the validity and interpretation of the document of title or
any other contract on which the claim of possession is premised, the inferior court
may likewise pass upon these issues. This is because, and it must be so
understood, that any such pronouncement made affecting ownership of the disputed
portion is to be regarded merely as provisional, hence, does not bar nor prejudice
an action between the same parties involving title to the land. [26] Moreover, Section
7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that the judgment rendered in an
action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be effective with respect to the
possession only and in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or
building.

The interpretative rules we have herein adopted are not without

justification. It is our considered opinion that they are more in keeping with the
avowed objective of actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer which
have purposely been made summary in nature so that there may be a
peaceful, speedy and expeditious means of preventing an alleged illegal
possessor of property from unjustly continuing his possession for a long time,

thereby insuring the maintenance of peace and order in the community, as,
otherwise, the party illegally deprived of possession might feel the despair of
long waiting and decide, as a measure of self-protection, to take the law into
his hands and seize the same by force and violence.[27] And since the law
discourages continued wrangling over possession of property for they involve
perturbation of social disorder which must be restored as promptly as
possible, technicalities or details of procedure which may cause unnecessary
delays should accordingly and carefully be avoided.[28]
As a matter of judicial experience, there have been cases where persons
who have failed to adduce any legal ground for their continued stay on
property belonging to another have nonetheless managed to stave off eviction
for several years through the improper use of procedural technicalities.
[29]
Conformably, if we were to allow the dismissal of an ejectment case for the
reason that the question of ownership is incidentally involved in determining
the question of possession, we are in effect providing the defendants in
ejectment cases with the opportunity to prolong their occupancy of premises,
over which they have ceased to have any valid possessory right, during the
time that an action for recovery of ownership, which involves a more tedious
and lengthy court proceeding, is actually pending in court.
It is indeed ironic that a forcible entry or unlawful detainer case which is
intended to be disposed of in summary fashion has oftentimes proved to be
the most cumbersome and difficult to decide. It is thus about time that this
situation be remedied if only to contribute to the solution of the worsening
problem of court congestion, by refusing to edify these cases by giving them a
full-blown treatment in all the courts in the judicial structure, and thereby save
the courts the expenditure of precious time and energy which could otherwise
be devoted to more significant and vital litigations.[30]
With these considerations in mind, we now proceed to the merits of the
present case. Petitioners claim to be co-owners of the subject premises on the
basis of an alleged verbal agreement between the parties to subdivide the
property, as well as the payment made by petitioner Mamerto Refugia for the
purchase of the lot in the amount of P20,000.00. On the other hand, private
respondents property rights are supported by sufficient documents and
muniments of ownership, namely, the deed of absolute sale, transfer

certificate of title, and building permit in their names, the regularity in the
issuance of which was never controverted nor put in issue by petitioners.
The Metropolitan Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court are not in accord
on whether to treat the P20,000.00 as a loan or as payment for petitioners
share in the subject premises, while respondent Court of Appeals believes
that the same is actually a loan. It bears significant notice that petitioners
never refuted nor denied, in any of their pleadings filed in this case from the
court of origin and all the way up to this Court, the allegation that private
respondents gave P5,000.00 as partial payment for the loan. No
countervailing explanation was advanced by petitioners why such payment
was made to and accepted by them as such.
Furthermore, the allegation of petitioners that there was a verbal
agreement to subdivide the property between them and private respondents is
self-serving and evidentiarily baseless at this stage. In addition, their theory of
an implied trust was not raised in issue in the trial court and cannot therefore
be raised for the first time in the present petition. [31] At most, it was merely
alluded to in petitioners Rejoinder filed with the Court of Appeals, but
petitioners never bothered to expound on or substantiate the
same. Consequently, it cannot now be raised as an assignment of error in the
present petition.
In sum, and as held by respondent court, the Regional Trial Court
overstepped its bounds in ruling that petitioners and private respondents are
co-owners of the property, which issue should be finally determined in the
separate action for specific performance reportedly pending between the
parties. At this juncture, however, the evidence conduces to a finding that
private respondents are in possession of the premises in the concept of and
consequent to their being owners thereof. Even on such prima facie showing,
therefore, private respondents can maintain the ejectment case involved.
While it may be argued that petitioners were able to prove prior
possession, such, however, is not the issue involved in this action for unlawful
detainer. An action for unlawful detainer is different from a forcible entry case
in that the former involves an act of unlawfully withholding the possession of
the land or building against or from a landlord, vendor or vendee or other

person after the expiration or termination of the detainers right to hold

possession by virtue of a contract, express or implied, [32] and neither is prior
physical possession of the property by the plaintiff necessary; [33] whereas in
the latter, the main issue is one of priority of possession.[34]
In the case at bar, petitioners failed to show that they were legally entitled
to continue occupying the unit in question. On the considerations hereinbefore
detailed, we agree with the position of respondent Court of Appeals that
petitioners would in effect be occupying the premises by mere tolerance. A
person who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or
permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an
implied promise that he will vacate the same upon demand, failing which a
summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him.[35] The status
of petitioners is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease
has expired but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner.[36]
It has further been held that such tolerance must be present right from the
start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as
one of unlawful detainer.[37]Here, it cannot be gainsaid that petitioners
possession was by mere tolerance of private respondents from the very
beginning. At any rate, it has likewise not been denied by herein petitioners
that one of their sons also owns a residential house where they can live.
Notwithstanding the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, and the
Metropolitan Trial Court for that matter, to qualifiedly resolve the issue of
ownership raised in the present ejectment suit, but their findings thereon being
devoid of basis in fact and in law, respondent Court of Appeals was fully
justified in decreeing a reversal of their judgments.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. RTJ-00-1543. August 4, 2000]

TERESITA JASON, complainant, vs. JUDGE BRICCIO C. YGAA,

Branch Clerk of Court, LEILANI M. RODRIGUEZ, and Sheriff MARIO
S. PANGILINAN, respondents.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Complainant was a defendant in an ejectment case, Civil Case No.
5335, entitled Alberto Huang v Teresita Jason, of Branch 69 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City. On 18 July 1997, a decision was
rendered therein the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, ordering the latter
and all persons claiming rights under her to:
1.....vacate and peacefully surrender possession to the plaintiff
one of the twin units she is occupying located at Lot 2-E Andrea
Village, Rosario, Pasig City;
2.....pay plaintiff the sum of P4,000.00 per month from the date of
the filing of the complaint until she vacates the same for the
reasonable use of said premises;
3.....pay plaintiff the sum of P10.00.00 as and by way of attorney's
fees; and
4.....pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. (See Annex "B" of Complaint.)
Complainant appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig City. The appeal was docketed as Special Civil Action (SCA) No.
1480 and raffled to Branch 153. Respondents Judge Briccio C. Ygaa,
Leilani M. Rodriguez and Mario P. Pangilinan are the Presiding Judge,
Clerk of Court and Sheriff IV, respectively, of said Branch.

On 4 August 1997 the RTC, Branch 153, per respondent judge Ygaa,
rendered decision in SCA No. 1480 affirming in toto the decision in Civil
Case No. 5335. Complainant did not appeal from the decision.
However, on 13 March 1998, she filed with the RTC of Pasig City a
complaint for "Annulment of Deed of Conditional Sale of House and Lot,
Re-Awarding of Subject House and Lot, with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction" against the Social Security System and others including
Alberto Huang, the plaintiff in the ejectment case. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 66714, and was assigned to Branch 154 of
said court. On 24 March 1998 the Pairing Judge of Branch 154 issued
a status quo order.
On 9 February 1998 plaintiff Alberto Huang filed a Motion for Immediate
Execution in SCA No. 1480 which respondent Judge Ygaa granted on 6
April 1998.
On 7 April 1998, respondent Clerk of Court Rodriguez issued a Writ of
Execution (Annex "B" of Complaint), which was assigned to respondent
Pangilinan for implementation. On 8 April 1998 Pangilinan levied on
execution some personal properties of the complainant; issued a Notice
to Vacate giving complainant a period of five days within which to vacate
the premises and prepared a Notice of Levy and Sheriffs Sale.
On 21 April 1998 complainant filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator the complaint in this case charging respondents with
ignorance, negligence, incompetence, grave abuse of duty, improvident
issuance and implementation of a writ of execution, drastic execution of
said writ in a manner most prejudicial to the best interest of service and
property rights of complainant and her family.
Complainant alleges in her complaint that the writ of execution was
improvidently issued because of the pendency before Branch 54 of the
RTC of Pasig City of Civil Case No. 66714. Besides, the implementation
or execution of the final decision must come from the court of origin and
not the appellate court. Complainant further avers that the writ of
execution, notice to vacate and notice of levy and sheriff's sale were not
properly served as these were merely served on the same date on 8

April 1998 to her children who were mostly minors and who did not
know what to do with these court processes. Respondent sheriff
together with SPO1 Arsenio Reyes and Soliven, younger brother of the
plaintiff, levied and took some of complainant's belongings listed in the
Notice of Levy and Sheriff's Sale in the absence of complainant.
In separate indorsements to the respondents, the OCA required the
latter to comment on the complaint.
In his Comment of 20 July 1998, respondent Judge Ygaa prays that the
complaint be dismissed for being baseless and devoid of merit. He
explains that considering no appeal was interposed by complainant from
the decision he rendered, the same became final and executory. The
plaintiff filed a motion for immediate execution, which was set for
hearing on 20 February 1998. Despite notice, complainant failed to
appear on that date, and despite the five-day period given her to
comment on or object to the motion, she again failed to do so. Instead,
on 2 April 1998, she filed a written compliance to which was attached a
copy of her complaint in Civil Case No. 66174. Since the motion for
execution was well taken and complainant's compliance contained no
allegation in opposition to the motion, he granted the motion.
Respondent Judge further maintains that the writ of execution was
properly issued "pursuant to Circular No. 24-94, now Section 1 of Rule
39 of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure."
In her Comment dated 22 July 1998, respondent Leilani Rodriguez
alleged that it was her ministerial duty to issue the writ of execution
pursuant to the Order of the Court of 6 April 1998. Thus, she only acted
within the confines of her duties in her official capacity as Branch Clerk
of Court and further alleges that under Circular No. 24-94 now
incorporated under Section 1, Rule 30 [which should be Rule 39] of the
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, it is "the judgment obligee ... is given the
option to file motion for execution with the court of origin and the
appellate court and the appellate court could only direct the court of
origin to issue the writ of execution again on motion in the same case."

In this case plaintiff did not exercise the option; instead he filed a Motion
for Immediate Execution with the appellate court on 12 February 1998.
Further, respondent Rodriguez asserts that complainant was afforded
ample opportunity to oppose the issuance of the writ; yet, she did not.
In his comment, respondent Sheriff Pangilinan claims that he properly
served all the alleged documents to complainant's son Michael who is of
legal age; he gave her five (5) days within which to vacate the premises;
in fact complainant padlocked the premises thereby compelling him to
secure a special order from the court to break open. However, the order
was rendered academic when complainant voluntarily vacated the
premises. He properly implemented the writ of execution.
We referred the case to the OCA for evaluation, report and
recommendation. It submitted its report and recommendation on 8
February 2000.
In the resolution of March 2000 we ordered the docketing of this case as
a regular administrative proceeding and required the parties to manifest
if they are willing to submit this case for resolution on its merits on the
basis of the pleadings already filed. In their separate manifestations all
the parties responded in the affirmative.
In its Evaluation the OCA made the following findings and conclusions:
EVALUATION: We find respondent judge administratively liable.
But first, we would like to correct the contention of complainant
that respondent judge should have suspended the proceedings
due to the pendency of Civil Case No. 66714 which seeks to
annul the deed of conditional sale covering the premises subject
of the ejectment case. It is an established rule that suits or actions
for the annulment of sale, title or documents do not abate any
ejectment action respecting the same property (Corpus vs. Court
of Appeals, 274 SCRA 275, 280). This principle is based on the
premise that an ejectment suit involves only the issue of material
possession to possession de facto. (Punio vs. Go, 296 SCRA 1,

6). But this notwithstanding, complainant is correct in asserting

that the writ of execution should have been issued by the court of
origin. In Salientes vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (246 SCRA
150, 160-161, citing Sy vs. Romero, 214 SCRA 187) it was held
that:
"xxx [a]lthough the decision in the ejectment case
binds the petitioner, the execution thereof, or the
issuance of the demolition order, falls within the
jurisdiction of the City Court now the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Kalookan City which rendered the decision in
Civil Case no. 13199. In an ejectment case, the
appellate court, which affirmed the decision brought
before it on appeal cannot decree its execution in the
guise of an execution of the affirming decision. The
only exception is unless said appellate court grants an
execution pending appeal."
It cannot be said that the writ of execution in this case was issued
by respondent judge pending appeal because according to him
the decision was already final and executory. As such, respondent
should have remanded the case to the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 69 of Pasig City for execution. (City of Manila vs. Court of
Appeals, 204 SCRA 362, 369).
As to respondent clerk of court and respondent sheriff, we find no
fault on their part.
The function of ordering the execution of a judgment devolves
upon the judge whereas the act of issuing the writ of execution
can be performed by another person, viz., the clerk of court. As
the rule now stands the clerk of court may, under the direction of
the court or judge, make out and sign all writs and processes
issuing from the court. (Viray vs. Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA
475). In this case, respondent judge issued an order granting the
plaintiffs Motion for Immediate Execution and directing the
issuance of a writ. (Annex A of Comment of Respondent Clerk of

Court). Hence, respondent Clerk of Court was left with no choice

but to issue the writ as directed.
As to respondent sheriff, it appears that he properly served the
writ of execution. It appears from both the Notice to Vacate and
the Writ of Execution that these were served on a certain Michael
Jason. (Annexes A and B, respectively, of respondent sheriffs
Comment). The complaint did not specifically assail the capacity
of this Michael Jason, either before the respondent judge or in this
administrative case, to receive the notice and the writ. All she said
was that these court processes were served on her children "who
were mostly minors". (Complaint, p. 3). This is not enough to hold
respondent sheriff liable. It has been said that a sheriff's report, as
a document, is clothed with presumption of regularity and since it
was not objected to by complainant, it must be upheld. (Sy vs.
Yerro, 253 SCRA 340, 345).
As to the implementation of the writ, we likewise find respondent
sheriff faultless. Complainant is complaining that respondent
sheriff levied her personal property which disregarded the five-day
grace period provided in the notice to vacate. It must be
remembered that the Writ of Execution and the Notice to Vacate
were served on the same day, April 8, 1998. Having properly
served the writ, respondent was duty bound to implement the
same by levying the personal property of complainant in order to
satisfy the money judgment. Well-settled is the rule that when a
writ is placed in the hands of the sheriff, it is his ministerial duty to
proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute in
accordance with its mandate. (Onquit vs. Binamira-Parcia, 297
SCRA 354, 264). The grace period referred to by complainant is
given to them only with respect to that part of decision ordering
them to vacate the premises. (San Manuel Wood products, Inc.
vs. Tupas, 249 SCRA 466, 476). If we accept the opinion of
complainant it is quite possible that respondent sheriff would not
be able to levy anything since herein complainant would use the
grace period to defeat the judgment by hiding his property.

Finally, the fact that respondent erred in granting the Motion for
Immediate Execution does not necessarily mean that since the
acts of respondent clerk of court and respondent sheriff are based
on the said erroneous order, they too similarly erred. In the first
place, on its face there is nothing patently erroneous in the order
of respondent as to put the other respondents on guard. Second,
they merely implemented the order of respondent judge for which
they can not be blamed. (Bobis vs. Provincial Sheriff of Camarines
Norte, 121 SCRA 28, 39).
The OCA then recommended that:
1 ........ respondent judge Briccio C. Ygana be FINED in the
amount of P3,000 for gross ignorance of the law with a WARNING
that a repetition of the same offense in the future shall be dealt
with more severely; and
2 ........ the complaint against Branch Clerk of Court Leilani M.
Rodriguez and Sheriff Mariano S. Pangilinan be DISMISED for
lack of merit.
We agree with the conclusion of the Office of the Court Administrator
that respondent judge Ygaa is liable for gross ignorance of the law.
Since his decision in SCA 1480 affirmed in toto the decision of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City in an ejectment case, Civil Case
No. 5335, and the affirming decision had become final and executory,
the case should have been remanded to the Metropolitan Trial Court for
execution.
This issue has long been resolved. In City of Manila vs. Court
of Appeals, (204 SCRA 362, 269 [1991]) we held:
The rule is that if the judgment of the metropolitan trial court is
appealed the regional trial court and the decision of the latter is
itself elevated to the Court of Appeals, whose decision thereafter
become final, the case should be remanded through the regional
trial court to the metropolitan trial court for execution. The only

exception is the execution pending appeal, which can be issued

by the regional trial court under Section 8 of Rule 70 or the Court
of Appeals or the Supreme Court under Section 10 of the same
Rule.
In Sy v Romero (214 SCRA 187, 195 [1992]), we explicitly stated:
... In an ejectment case, the appellate court which affirms a
decision brought before it on appeal cannot decree its execution
in the guise of an execution of the affirming decision. The only
exception to that is when said appellate court grants an execution
pending appeal.
It may be pointed out that Section 21 of Rule 70 (forcible Entry and
Unlawful Detainer) of the 1997 Rules of Civil procedure provides:
SEC. 21. Immediate execution on appeal to Court of Appeals on
Supreme Court. -- The judgment of the Regional Trial Court
against the defendant shall be immediately executory without
prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom.
This section authorizes the Regional Trial Court to issue a writ of
execution pending appeal. This section presupposes that the defendant
is still unsatisfied with the judgment of the Regional Trial Court and
decides to appeal therefrom to a superior court. This section replaces
Section 10 of the former rule (HERRERA, REMEDIAL LAW, vol. III,
[1999 ed.,], 508).
Respondents judge Ygaa and Clerk of Court Rodriguez invoke Section I
of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which incorporates
Circular No. 24-94 issued on 8 April 1994 by then Chief justice Andres
R. Narvasa. Unfortunately, the Section gives them no refuge. Said
section reads:
SEC. 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders.. -- Execution
shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or
order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the

expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been

duly perfected. (1a).
If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the
execution may forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on
motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true
copies of the judgment or final order or orders sought to be
enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.
The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the
interest of justice so requires, direct the court of origin to issue the
writ of execution. (n)
Nothing in this section authorizes the appellate court which has resolved
the appeal to order the execution of its own judgment. What is
authorized is the execution of the judgment by the court of origin even
before remand to the latter by the appellate court of the records of the
case solely on the basis of the certified true copy of the judgment of the
appellate court and of the entry thereof. The reasons for the new rule
are as follows:
The second paragraph of this section is an innovation in response
to complaints over delay caused by the former procedure in
obtaining a writ of execution of a judgment, which has already
been affirmed on appeal, with notice to the parties. As things then
stood, after the entry of judgment in the appellate court, the
prevailing party had to wait for the records of the case to be
remanded to the court of origin when and where he could then
move for the issuance of a writ of execution. The intervening time
could sometimes be substantial, especially if the court a quo is in
a remote province, and could also be availed of by the losing
party to delay or thwart actual execution.
The third paragraph of this section, likewise a new provision, is
due to the experience of the appellate courts wherein the trial
court, for reasons of its own or other unjustifiable circumstances,
unduly delays or unreasonably refuses to act on the motion for

execution or issue the writ therefor. On motion in the same case

while the records are still with the appellate court, or even after
the same have been remanded to the lower court, the appellate
court can direct the issuance of the writ of execution since such
act is merely in the enforcement of its judgment and which it has
the power to require. (REGALADO, REMEDIAL LAW
COMPENDIUM, vol. I [seventh revised ed., 1999], 399-400).
Howsoever viewed, respondent judge Ygaa either deliberately
disregarded our ruling in City of Manila v. Court of Appeals
(supra), and Sy v. Romero (supra), or was totally unaware thereof. The
Court Administrator is of the opinion that it was more of the latter and
considers it "gross ignorance of the law." We agree for we cannot
expect a judge to deliberately disregard an unequivocal rule on
execution of judgment and a doctrine laid down by this Court. Time and
again we have stressed that a judge is called upon to exhibit more than
just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is
imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles. Canon 4 of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics requires that the judge should be studious
of the principles of law, and Canon 18 mandates that he should
administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the
law itself, remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary power, but
a judge under the sanction of law. (Estoya v. Abraham Singson, 237
SCRA 1, 21 [1994], citing authorities).
For failure to know and apply a basic law or rule on execution of
judgment in ejectment cases, respondent Judge Ygaa cannot avoid
administrative sanction. The fine of P3,000 recommended by the Court
Administrator is too light. It is hereby increased to P10,000.
Respondent Branch Clerk of Court Rodriguez, as a lawyer, cannot be
exonerated solely on the basis of having performed a ministerial duty.
Being a lawyer and a Clerk of Court for sometime she was expected to
know the basic law and doctrines on execution of judgment in ejectment
cases appealed from the courts of origin. She ought to know that her
court cannot issue a writ of execution on its final judgment affirming that
of the court of origin. Consequently, she could have called the attention

of respondent Judge Ygaa. Her failure to do so amounted to neglect of

duty for which she should be censured.
Sheriff Pangilinan, however, may be exonerated because he merely
implemented the writ of execution and at the same time he cannot be
expected to hold the same degree of discretion as his co-respondents.
WHEREFORE, respondents (a) Judge Briccio C. Ygaa is hereby FINED
in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) for gross ignorance of
the law; (b) Branch Clerk of Court Leilani M. Rodriguez is CENSURED
for neglect of duty; and (c) Sheriff Mario Pangilinan is exonerated and
the case against him ordered dismissed.
Let copies of this resolution be attached to the personal records of
respondents in the Office of the Court Administrator.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 139500. July 27, 2000]
LEOPOLDO DALUMPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, (First
Division), and DOMINGO ESTOYA, respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the

December 10, 1998 Decision[1] and July 9, 1999 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 41661. The Court of Appeals (CA) set aside the Decision [3] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, Branch 56, in Civil Case
No. 460 reversing the Decision [4]of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Hinigaran in Civil
Case No. MTC-159 for ejectment.
The CA narrated the factual antecedents of this case as follows:

On August 25, 1989, Atty. Oscar M. Lagtapon, a notary public for the past 27
years (pp. 4 and 8, tsn, October 25, 1994; pp. 65 and 69, Rollo) prepared and
notarized two documents, viz: a Deed of Absolute Sale and a Declaration of
Heirship and Deed of Absolute Sale (pp. 4-5 and 12, tsn, October 25, 1994;
pp. 65-66 and 73, Rollo). The first document, the Deed of Absolute Sale
stated that Primitiva Estoya, Saturnina Estoya, Alfonso Estoya and Domingo
Estoya are the owners of Lot 725 of the Cadastral Survey of Hinigaran,
Negros Occidental covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-78497 (pp. 87
and 171, Rollo). It further stated that the owners of said Lot 725 are selling a
half portion thereof to the heirs of Norberto Gerial for a consideration
of P6,000.00 (Ibid). The Estoyas did not affix their respective signatures above
their respective names as vendors on the deed, but affixed their respective
signatures on the acknowledgment portion written thereafter (Ibid).
The second document, the Declaration of Heirship and Deed of Absolute Sale,
on the other hand, stated that Norberto Gerial was the owner of Lot No. 725 of
the Cadastral Survey of Hinigaran, Negros Occidental which was covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-78497 (p. 88, Rollo). Said document further
stated that Norberto Gerial, having died intestate, was succeeded by his heirs
Moises Gerial, Pastor Gerial, Bernardo Gerial, Maximina Gerial-Borbon and
Jocelyn Pescador Abada to the ownership of said land (pp. 88-89, Rollo). Said
document also stated that the heirs of Norberto Gerial are selling Lot 725 to
Leopoldo Dalumpines for a consideration of P12,000.00 (Ibid). Both vendors
and vendee affixed their respective signatures on the document (Ibid).
On the basis of both the Deed of Absolute Sale and the Declaration of
Heirship and Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-78497
covering Lot 725 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-151598 was issued in the name of Leopoldo Dalumpines (p. 168,
Rollo).
Armed with his new transfer certificate of title over Lot 725, Dalumpines on
July 14, 1994, filed a complaint for unlawful detainer with the Municipal Trial
Court of Hinigaran, Negros Occidental against Domingo Estoya who was
occupying a portion of Lot 725 for residential purposes since his birth (pp. 3234 and 96, Rollo). The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. MTC-159
(p. 48, Rollo).

Suspicious of the two documents which facilitated the cancellation of Transfer

Certificate of Title No. T-78497 and the corresponding issuance of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-151598 in the name of Dalumpines, the contents of
which contradicted each other (pp. 6-7 of MTC Decision; pp. 53-54, Rollo), the
Municipal Trial Court rendered decision on November 22, 1995 holding that
Estoya cannot be ejected from the premises in question (p. 7 of MTC
Decision; p. 54, Rollo). The decretal portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby
rendered against the plaintiff and in favor of the defendant as follows:
1. The plaintiff is ordered to pay defendant P10,000.00 as attorneys fee and
appearance fee at P500.00 per court appearance;
2. The plaintiff is ordered to pay defendant P5,000.00 by way of litis expenses;

Cost against the plaintiff.

SO ORDERED. (pp. 7-8 of MTC Decision; pp. 54-55, Rollo)
Dalumpines appealed the Municipal Trial Courts decision to the Regional Trial
Court of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental (p. 57, Rollo). His appeal was
docketed as Civil Case No. 460 (p. 56, Rollo). On August 2, 1996, Branch 56
thereof rendered decision reversing the decision appealed from as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed decision is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is rendered in favor of the
plaintiff-appellant, as follows:
1.1. Defendant-appellee is hereby ordered to vacate the premises of Lot 725,
Hinigaran Cadastre;
2. Defendant-appellee is ordered to pay plaintiff-appellant the amount of P5,000.00 for
attorneys fee plus P500.00 for every court appearance.
3. Costs against defendant-appellee.

SO ORDERED. (p. 7 of RTC Decision; p. 62, Rollo)[5]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the RTC and reinstated
that of the MTC for the following reasons:

Petitioner Domingo Estoya argues that contrary to the respondent courts

finding, the Deed of Absolute Sale prepared and notarized by Atty. Oscar M.
Lagtapon, is invalid and could not have transferred ownership over Lot 725 in
favor of the heirs of Norberto Gerial, the reason therefor being the Estoyas
failure to affix their respective signatures to the Deed of Absolute Sale which
manifests the fact that they did not consent to the sale of one-half portion of
Lot 725 in favor of Norberto Gerials heirs (pp. 21-27, Rollo). Per Article of the
New Civil Code which states:
A contract which is the direct result of a previous illegal contract, is also void
and inexistent. petitioner therefore concludes that respondent Dalumpines
could not have acquired ownership over Lot 725 from Norberto Gerials heirs
by way of the Declaration of Heirship and Deed of Absolute Sale (pp. 27-28,
Rollo).
In his comment to the petition for review, Dalumpines stands pat on the
validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale which facilitated the transfer of the title to
Lot 725 in his name (pp. 153-164, Rollo).
The Court agrees with petitioner. The decision under review must be set aside
and the Municipal Trial Courts decision reinstated.
The basis of Dalumpines right of possession over Lot 725 is the transfer
certificate of title in his name which covers it. It is however, obvious from the
evidence on record that said title was secured through fraud and
misrepresentation perpetrated by then heirs of Norberto Gerial, with the
complicity of the notary public Oscar M. Lagtapon, and with the full knowledge
of respondent Dalumpines.
It is true that the case at bar is not the proper forum in which Dalumpines title
over Lot 725 can be attacked, but in the face of the aforecited facts, the Court
can determine whether or not he has a right to possess the property.
The question that keeps nagging on the courts mind is why would the notary
public prepare and notarize two documents purporting to convey Lot 725, with

each document containing statements that are contrary to each other? And
both documents were even prepared and notarized on the same day, August
25, 1989. Thus, the Deed of Absolute Sale states that the owners of Lot 725
were the Estoyas who sold half thereof to the heirs of Norberto Gerial. The
Declaration of Heirship and Deed of Absolute Sale on the other hand, stated
that Norberto Gerial was the owner of Lot 725 which his heirs acquired by way
of succession when he died intestate. Also, the Deed of Absolute Sale states
that the heirs of Norberto Gerial acquired ownership of half a portion of Lot
725 by way of sale, while the Declaration of Heirship and Deed of Absolute
Sale stated that they acquired ownership over the entire Lot 725 by way of
succession. These contrary statements certainly cast serious doubts on the
veracity of both documents.
The truth is, Norberto Gerial never owned Lot 725 as stated in the Declaration
of Heirship and Deed of Absolute Sale, because his heirs had to buy only a
half portion thereof from the Estoyas as stated in the Deed of Absolute
Sale. And assuming that the Deed of Absolute Sale were intrinsically and
extrinsically valid, Norbertos heirs can only transfer ownership of a half portion
of Lot 725 to Dalumpines by way of sale since they bought only a half-portion
thereof from the Estoyas. But Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-151598 states
that Dalumpines is the owner of the entire Lot 725 of the Cadastral Survey of
Hinigaran (p. 168, Rollo). How then was he able to acquire ownership of the
other half of Lot 725?
Norbertos heirs did not convey title to the entire Lot 725 to Dalumpines per the
Declaration of Heirship and Deed of Absolute Sale because they are not and
never were the owners of the lot in question.
The Court rules that Dalumpines has derived his alleged possessory right
from a questionable, if not inexistent right of ownership over Lot 725. He
cannot, by the simple expedient of a complaint for unlaw ful detainer, wrest
possession thereof from petitioner Estoya.[6]
and disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, as prayed for in the instant petition for review, the Decision
dated August 2, 1996 rendered by public respondent Regional Trial Court of

Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, Branch 56 in Civil Case No. 460 is hereby

REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision dated November 22, 1995
rendered by the Municipal Trial Court of Hinigaran, Negros Occidental in Civil
Case No. MTC-159 is hereby reinstated.
SO ORDERED.[7]
The Court of Appeals denied reconsideration in its Resolution of July 9, 1999.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari where petitioner raises the
following issues for consideration of this Court:
I

WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED

IN DISREGARDING THE TESTIMONY OF NOTARY PUBLIC ATTY.
OSCAR LAGTAPON AND GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF
PRIVATE RESPONDENT DOMINGO ESTOYA.
II

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS ERRED IN

HOLDING THAT THE HEIRS OF THE LATE LAMBERTO ESTOYA HAVE
NOT SOLD THE REAL PROPERTY WHICH IS THE SUBJECT MATTER
OF THE CONTROVERSY.
III

WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS HAS

COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE
PETITION FOR REVIEW WHICH WAS FILED OUT OF TIME BY THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENT DOMINGO ESTOYA.[8]
The petition is devoid of merit.
In order to resolve the issue of possession, the CA passed upon the question of
ownership with the express qualification that such issue of ownership shall be resolved
only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession. It has been held that where
the resolution of the issue of possession hinges on a determination of the validity and
interpretation of the document of title or any other contract on which the claim of

possession is premised, the inferior court may pass upon these issues. [9] However, the
resulting judgment would be conclusive only with respect to the possession but not the
ownership of the property.[10] The CA found that the two documents ( the Deed of
Absolute Sale and the Declaration of Heirship and Deed of Absolute Sale) from which
petitioner Dalumpines supposedly derived his title to the entire Lot 725 are questionable
and of doubtful validity to the end that petitioner Dalumpines could not use the said
documents to wrest possession from private respondent Estoya.
Petitioner, however, insists that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Primitiva,
Alfonso, Saturnina, Enriqueta and Domingo, all surnamed Estoya (as vendors), and the
heirs of Norberto Gerial(as vendees)[11] is valid as it bears the signatures of all the
above-named Estoyas with their Residence Certificate Numbers on the
Acknowledgement portion of the deed evincing their consent to the sale. Petitioner
Dalumpines further argues that private respondent Estoya admitted during the
clarificatory hearing held in the MTC that it is his signature which appears on the Deed
of Absolute Sale and that Atty. Oscar Lagtapon who notarized the subject document
stated in his affidavit that the heirs of the late Lamberto Estoya, namely, Primitiva
Santillan Estoya, Saturnina Estoya, Alfonso Estoya, Domingo Estoya and Enrique
Estoya have signed the Deed of Absolute Sale selling one half portion of lot 725,
Hinigaran Cadastre, in favor of the heirs of the late Norberto Gerial on August 25, 1989.
[12]
According to petitioner, this statement of the notary public should prevail over the
testimony of private respondentEstoya that the Estoyas did not give their consent to the
sale.
Petitioners arguments fail to persuade.
First, the signatures of the Estoyas as the alleged vendors were affixed in the
Acknowledgement portion of the deed, and not on the space reserved for vendees after
the recital of the terms and conditions of the sale. True, private respondent Estoya
admitted that it is his signature that appears in the acknowledgment portion of the deed,
however, there is no deed or instrument to acknowledge as the spaces reserved for the
vendors in the Deed of Absolute Sale were absolutely blank. Section 1 of Public Act. No.
2103 provides:

(a) The acknowledgement shall be made before a notary public or an officer

duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgements of
instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The notary
public or the officer taking the acknowledgement shall certify that the person
acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the
same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act

and deed. The certificate shall be made under his official seal, if he is by law
required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.
It is obvious that a party cannot acknowledge an inexistent contract for want of the
signatures of the contracting parties. Petitioner Dalumpines himself mentioned that the
Estoyas are unschooled rural folk, hence, greater care should have been taken in the
execution of the deed in order to bind the parties thereto. The absence of the signatures
of the contracting parties on the deed itself casts serious doubt in the preparation
and execution of the deed consequently, the claim of private respondent Estoya that he
did not consent to the sale is more plausible than petitioner Dalumpines claim to the
contrary.
Second, the fact that a deed of sale is a notarized document does not necessarily
justify the conclusion that the said sale is a true conveyance to which the parties thereto
are irrevocably and undeniably bound. [13] Notary public Oscar Lagtapon when
questioned in the hearing conducted on October 25, 1994 as to why he did not advise
the vendors to sign in the proper place, simply answered that he was busy with his
work. He also testified that he did not bother to have them sign in the proper place when
he discovered the omission since they already left. While the document was notarized,
the same is not entitled to full faith and credit considering that the notary public who is
designated by law to certify to the due execution of deeds, i.e. instruments affecting title
to real property, did not observe utmost care in the performance of his duty and took for
granted the solemn duties appertaining to his office.
Third, the glaring inconsistency between the Deed of Absolute Sale and the
Declaration of Heirship and Deed of Absolute Sale taints both documents as spurious or
fraudulent. The Deed of Absolute Sale states that the Estoyas sold half of Lot 725 to the
heirs of Norberto Gerial while the Declaration of Heirship and Deed of Absolute
Sale states that the heirs of Norberto Gerial acquired ownership of the entire lot by way
of succession and sold the same to Leonardo Dalumpines. Apparently realizing the
discrepancy between the two deeds,petitioner Dalumpines chooses, oddly enough,
to focus on the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale between the Estoyas and the
Gerials and mentions nothing about the Declaration of Heirship and Deed of Absolute
Sale, which instrument directly conveys title to the entire Lot 725 in his favor.
The foregoing irregularities and inconsistencies aside, petitioner Dalumpines has
inadvertently, if not inevitably and inescapably admitted in his pleadings that the Deed of
Absolute Sale between the Estoyas and the Gerials covered only one half portion of lot
725. Even the affidavit of notary public Oscar Lagtapon heavily relied upon by petitioner
Dalumpines to establish the validity of the subject deed clearly states that the Deed of
Absolute Sale covers only the half portion of Lot 725. This demolishes petitioner

Dalumpines claim of possession over the entire lot. Verily, petitioner who derives his title
from the Gerials could not claim ownership of the entire lot and eject private respondent
Estoya who is entitled to remain on the lot in question as co-owner with his brothers and
sisters of the unsold one-half portion.
Clutching at straws, petitioner now changes his story and claims for the first time
that Norberto Gerial acquired ownership over Lot 725 by virtue of a Deed of Sale
executed by Florencia and Leonardo Togle executed on October 2, 1973 and that TCT
No. 78479 covering the subject lot was issued in the name of Norberto Gerial. Petitioner
goes on to state that after the issuance of TCT No. 78497, the Estoyas began
complaining to the Gerials concerning their alleged share over Lot 725. To buy peace,
the heirs of Norberto Gerial entered into a Deed of Absolute Sale with the
Estoyas wherein it was made to appear that the Estoyas were selling half portion of Lot
725 to the Gerials in consideration of the sum of P6,000.00, despite the fact that they
are no longer the owners of Lot 725 or any portion thereof.
This is a new matter which was not averred in the complaint nor raised during the
trial in the court below and in the appeals to both the RTC and to the Court of
Appeals. It is elementary that a party may not initiate and try his case under one theory
or upon a set of facts on which he bases his cause of action and then switch to another
subsequently.[14] This is referred to as the theory of the case which pertains to the facts
on which the cause of action is based as alleged in the complaint. A party is prohibited
from changing his theory on appeal as this is offensive to fair play or due process . [15]
Lastly, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in giving due course to the
petition for review filed by private respondent Estoya before said court for having been
filed out of time. Petitioner Dalumpines points out that while private respondent Estoya
filed his petition within the extended period granted by the Court of Appeals, he could
not have availed of the extended period since the motion for extension of time was filed
for and on behalf of petitioner Leonardo Dalumpines.
It appears that the last day of the original period for filing the petition before the
Court of Appeals fell on August 27, 1996. On August 22, 1996, counsel for private
respondent Estoyafiled a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review,
however, Dalumpines was captioned as the petitioner instead of Estoya. The following
day, counsel for private respondentEstoya filed a manifestation before the Court of
Appeals pointing out the clerical error and rectifying the same. On September 10, 1996,
counsel for private respondent Estoya filed the appropriate pleading within the extended
period prayed for.

Obviously, the motion for extension of time was not filed for and on behalf of
Dalumpines as it was filed by Estoyas counsel of record and the formers name was
placed there through inadvertence. This matter was brought to the attention of the Court
of Appeals the very next day and rectified. It has been said that liberal construction of
the Rules may be invoked in situations wherein there may be some excusable formal
deficiency or error in the pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence
of the proceeding.[16]This is one of those instances, hence, the Court of Appeals did not
err in giving due course to the petition.
In giving recognition to the action for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, the
purpose of the law is to protect the person who in fact has actual possession. [17] It
is undisputed that private respondent Estoya is already 68 years old and had been in
actual possession of a portion of Lot 725 since birth. Forcible entry and unlawful
detainer cases are summary proceedings designed to provide for an expeditious means
of protecting actual possession or right to possession of the property involved. [18] In the
instant case, private respondent Estoya is clearly deserving of this protection.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED and
the questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED without prejudice to the
filing by either party of an action regarding the ownership of the property involved.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 143395. July 24, 2003]

WILFREDO SILVERIO, ERNESTO DEL CASTILLO, and HONORATO

DEL CASTILLO, JR., petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
and GELARDA TOLENTINO represented by her attorney-in-fact
MATILDE T. BADILLO, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review of the resolution dated February 15,

2000 of the Court of Appeals denying the petitioners appeal from the
[1]

[2]

decision dated November 10, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
146, of Makati City which in turn affirmed the decision dated February 25,
1999 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 62, of Makati City.
[3]

Petitioners Wilfredo Silverio, Ernesto del Castillo and Honorato del

Castillo, Jr. claim that their aunt, Eugenia del Castillo, owned a 355 squaremeter lot (evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17283 issued by the
Register of Deeds of Rizal) and three residential houses erected thereon
located at Economia Street, Makati City. When she died in 1983, they, as
forced heirs of Eugenia, became the co-owners of the subject lot and so they
lived in the houses thereon.
In 1997, petitioners discovered that a certain Manuel del Castillo already
owned the subject lot by virtue of a deed of donation executed by Eugenia in
favor of Manuel who later had it titled in his name. On March 10, 1997,
petitioner Honorato annotated an adverse claim on Manuels title. Despite the
notice, the property was nonetheless transferred to Manuels wife, Blesilda del
Castillo, and their minor children and a new title issued in their name. Blesilda
and her minor children then sold the property to herein respondent Gelarda
Tolentino. After the sale was judicially approved by the RTC of Quezon City,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 211301 was issued in the name of respondent.
Thereafter, respondent went to the subject premises and verbally asked
the petitioners to vacate the premises. When petitioners pleaded to be given
sufficient time to leave, respondent granted them until June 15, 1998 to
vacate. However, the said period lapsed without the petitioners vacating the
subject lot. Respondents legal counsel then sent a demand letter to the
petitioners but the latter refused to receive the same and even threatened to
hurt the messenger if he insisted on having the document officially received.
Hence, the letter was served by registered mail and a copy of the same was
posted at the entrance of the subject property.
On August 25, 1998, petitioners filed a case for reconveyance of property
and damages against respondent and the Register of Deeds of Makati City.
On September 19, 1998, respondent countered by filing before the MTC of
Makati City the subject ejectment case against the petitioners.

On February 25, 1999, the MTC rendered a decision in favor of

respondent. Three days after the receipt of the decision, the petitioners filed a
notice of appeal and paid the docket fee. Since no supersedeas bond was
filed within the reglementary period, respondent filed a motion for execution
pending appeal. The trial court granted the motion and issued a writ of
execution.
Thereafter, the RTC of Makati City denied the petitioners appeal in a
decision dated November 10, 1999.
Said decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals. On February 15,
2000, the Court of Appeals denied the appeal on the ground that the
petitioners failed to attach (1) a duplicate original or true copy of the decision
of the MTC (2) material pleadings and (3) documents to support their petition,
in violation of Section 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The
appellate court also denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration because
they did not bother to correct the deficiencies in the petition.
[4]

[5]

Hence, this petition arguing that the Court of Appeals erred:

I

IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR REVIEW IN CA-G.R. NO. SP. 56306 ON

MERE TECHNICALITY AND IN DISREGARD OF THE MERITS OF
PETITIONERS CAUSE; and
II

IN NOT GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION PURSUANT TO AND IN

ACCORDANCE WITH ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE LAID DOWN BY
THIS HONORABLE COURT ON IDENTICAL CASES.
[6]

According to the petitioners, the appellate court erroneously denied the

petition on a technical issue without considering its substantial merits. The
petitioners also seek the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that
respondent did not sufficiently prove that a demand was effected prior to the
filing of the ejectment case. The courts a quo likewise erred for its failure to
suspend the ejectment proceedings on account of the pendency of the

petitioners civil case for reconveyance and damages against the respondent.
Lastly, the petitioners argue that the RTC erred in issuing a writ of execution
pending appeal despite the fact that their appeal was filed within the
reglementary period.
We deny the petition.
Petitioners argue that the rigid application of procedural rules should be
avoided when it frustrates substantial justice. Hence, the appellate court
should have disregarded the procedural lapses in their petition, i.e., the
absence of a clearly legible duplicate original or true copy of the decision of
the MTC, pleadings and other relevant portions of the records, and should
have instead looked at the substantial merits of their claims.
Did the Court of Appeals err in denying the petition for the failure of the
petitioners to attach a duplicate original or true copy of the decision of the
MTC, material pleadings and documents to support their petition? In Paras vs.
Baldado, this Court, thru then Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes,
ruled that a party-litigant should be given the fullest opportunity to establish
the merits of his complaint or defense. He ought not to lose life, liberty, honor
or property on technicalities. Rules of procedure should be viewed as mere
tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid
application based on technicalities will only frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice. We held that the alleged failure of a party to attach to the
petition certified true copies of the impugned RTC orders did not merit the
denial of the petition because the records indubitably showed that duplicate
original copies of the said RTC orders were in fact attached to one of the
seven copies of the petition filed in the Court of Appeals. Moreover, copies of
the same orders were submitted by the petitioners in their motion for
reconsideration.
[7]

In the case at bar, it was inappropriate for the Court of Appeals to deny the
petition on the ground alone that the petitioner failed to attach to the said
petition a duplicate original or true copy of the MTC decision because it was
supposed to review the decision not of the MTC but of the RTC,
notwithstanding that the latter affirmed in toto the judgment of the MTC. In
short, the failure to attach the MTC decision did not adversely affect the

sufficiency of the petition because it was, in any event, accompanied by the

RTC decision sought to be reviewed.
All this notwithstanding the petition has no merit.
Petitioners pray for the dismissal of the ejectment case due to the failure
of the respondent to prove that she made a demand on them to leave the
premises prior to the filing of the suit.What prevents a trial court from acquiring
jurisdiction in ejectment cases is the failure to allege in the complaint that a
demand was made, not the fact that plaintiff failed to prove said allegation. In
ejectment cases, the trial court does not assume jurisdiction if the complaint
fails to allege that a demand has been made. In case the plaintiff fails to
prove said demand despite allegations in the complaint to that effect, the case
should be dismissed not because of lack of jurisdiction but because the
complainant did not meet the evidentiary requirement (preponderance of
evidence) to merit the judicial eviction of a defendant.
[8]

In the case at bar, the complaint shows that respondent made an oral and
thereafter a written demand on the petitioners to vacate the premises.
Paragraph 9 of the complaint reads as follows:
9. On 01 September 1998, the undersigned counsel, conformably (sic) to the
instruction of plaintiff, effected a demand against defendants to vacate the subject
property. Although the intention was to have the aforestated demand letter personally
delivered, this was not effected by reason for (sic) defendants repeated refusal to
receive the same. Hence, resort to service through registered mail was adopted and a
copy of the demand letter was consequently posted in the entrance of the Subject
Property.
[9]

Consequently, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case because
the complaint expressly alleged that respondent made a demand on
petitioners to leave the subject premises. And, based on the records, both the
MTC and RTC found that respondent proved that she made oral and written
demands on the petitioners. We have no reason to depart from this factual
disquisition of the courts a quo in view of the rule that findings of fact of the
trial courts are, as a general rule, binding on this Court.
[10]

Petitioners also allege that the subject ejectment case should have at least
been suspended pending their action for reconveyance and damages filed
against respondent. We do not think so. The pendency of an action
questioning the ownership of the property does not bar the filing or
consideration of an ejectment suit nor the execution of the judgment therein.
[11]

Lastly, petitioners question the order granting the writ of execution on the
ground that the same was issued despite the perfection of their appeal. The
filing of the notice of appeal and the payment of the necessary docket fees
should have stayed the execution of the decision. We disagree. In conformity
with Section 19, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, we have
consistently ruled that, to stay the immediate execution of a judgment in an
ejectment case while appeal is pending, the defendant must: (a) perfect his
appeal; (b) file a supersedeas bond; and (c) periodically deposit the rentals
which become due during the pendency of the appeal. Because petitioners
did not file a supersedeas bond, the trial court, upon motion of the respondent,
correctly ordered the execution of the judgment.
[12]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. Costs

against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 150633. November 12, 2003]

HEIRS OF DEMETRIO MELCHOR, represented by CLETO

MELCHOR, petitioners, vs. JULIO MELCHOR, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The Municipal Trial Court would not have jurisdiction over a purported
unlawful detainer suit, if the complaint fails to allege jurisdictional facts.
The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules

of Court, seeking to nullify the August 16, 2001 Decision and the October 18,
2001 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 63465. The
dispositive portion of the assailed Decision is as follows:
[1]

[2]

[3]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED DUE

COURSE and accordingly DISMISSED, for lack of merit. The Joint Decision dated
February 5, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20 of Cauayan, Isabela
which embodied the assailed judgment in Civil Case No. 20-1125 and affirmed the
Decision dated September 1, 2000 of the Municipal Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela,
dismissing the complaint for ejectment of the petitioners in Civil Case No. 2325,
entitled Heirs of Demetrio Melchor represented by Cleto Melchor v. Julio Melchor, is
hereby AFFIRMED and REITERATED.
Costs against the petitioners.

[4]

The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts
The facts of the case are narrated by the CA as follows:
Petitioners, who are the heirs of DEMETRIO MELCHOR, claim to be the owners, by way of
succession, of the subject property allegedly in possession of respondent JULIO
MELCHOR. The subject property is a portion of the twenty (20) hectares of land registered in
the name of PEDRO MELCHOR, evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No.I-6020 of the

Registry of Deeds for Isabela. The said property was purchased by the late
DEMETRIO MELCHOR from PEDRO MELCHOR, the deceased father of herein
respondent JULIO MELCHOR. During the lifetime of the late DEMETRIO
MELCHOR, a request for the approval of the Deed of Sale dated February 14,
1947 between DEMETRIO MELCHOR and PEDRO MELCHOR was made to
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on September 4, 1953, which was
subsequently approved. Since February 14, 1947 up to the present, petitioners further
allege that respondent has been occupying the subject property and has been
harvesting crops thereon and using it for grassing cows and carabaos.
A demand letter dated August 21, 1999 was allegedly sent by the petitioners to the
respondent, demanding him to vacate and surrender the said property, but the latter

refused. The disagreement reached thebarangay authorities, which case was not
amicably settled, resulting in the issuance of a certification to file action.
Petitioners filed against respondent a complaint for ejectment before the MTC of
Cauayan, Isabela which they subsequently refiled in their Second Amended
Complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 2325 and dated May 31, 2001, to
accommodate additional allegations therein.
For his part, the defendant (now respondent) in Civil Case No. 2325 principally raised
the matter of ownership by alleging affirmative/special defenses, among others, that
the parcel of land in possession of the defendant is registered in the name of
ANTONIA QUITERAS, the deceased mother of the defendant, as per Transfer of
Certificate of Title No. T-274828 of the Registry of Deeds for Isabela, and that the
same property is now owned by the defendant and his three (3) sisters and one (1)
brother, having inherited the same from their late mother, ANTONIA QUITERAS.
The Decision dated September 1, 2000, which was penned by acting MTC Judge
BERNABE B. MENDOZA, was rendered in favor of the respondent, the pertinent
portions of which read:
There is no allegation that plaintiffs have been deprived of the possession of the land
by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.
The dispossession was made in 1947. As such, ejectment is not the proper remedy.
WHEREFORE, a judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the case.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20 of Cauayan, Isabela, presided over by
Executive Judge HENEDINO P. EDUARTE, rendered, together with another related
complaint for ejectment, i.e., Civil Case No. 20-1126, the Joint Decision dated
February 5, 2001, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Affirming the decision in Civil Case No. Br. 20-1126 entitled, Heirs of Liberato
Lumelay, et al. vs. Heirs of Julio Melchor. Costs against the appellants.
2. Affirming the decision in Civil Case No. 201-1125, entitled, Heirs of Demetrio
Melchor, et al. vs. Julio Melchor. Costs against the appellants.
SO ORDERED.

[5]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Sustaining the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the CA ruled that petitioners
had failed to make a case for unlawful detainer. It opined that the MTC had
never acquired jurisdiction over the case, because there was no allegation
that the parties had entered into a contract -- express or implied -- or that
there was possession by tolerance.
Furthermore, the appellate court held that the proper remedy should have
been a plenary action for recovery of possession, not a summary action for
ejectment.
Hence, this Petition.

[6]

The Issue
In their Memorandum, petitioners raised only one alleged error:
[7]

The Court of Appeals committed a grave error when it ruled that the Second Amended
Complaint does not allege a sufficient cause of action for x x x unlawful detainer.
[8]

The Courts Ruling

The Petition has no merit.
Lone Issue:
Sufficiency of the Complaint
for Ejectment

Petitioners filed a summary action for ejectment based on Rule 70 of the

Rules of Court. Under Section 1 of the Rule, two separate remedies are
available -- one for forcible entry and another for unlawful detainer.
Petitioners maintain that while the Complaint does not support a cause of
action for forcible entry, the allegations therein certainly indicate one for
unlawful detainer. They add that they did not commit any jurisdictional infirmity
in failing to allege prior physical possession, because that fact is not an
element of unlawful detainer.
[9]

We do not agree. Even if petitioners may be correct in saying that prior

physical possession by the plaintiff need not be alleged in an action for
unlawful detainer, the absence of such possession does not ipso facto make
their Complaint sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the MTC.
[10]

In ejectment cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the

allegations of the complaint. The test for determining the sufficiency of those
allegations is whether, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid
judgment in accordance with the prayer of the plaintiff.
[11]

[12]

A review of the Second Amended Complaint of petitioners discloses these

pertinent allegations: the absolute owner of the subject land was their father,
Demetrio Melchor, who bought it on February 14, 1947 from respondents
father, Pedro Melchor; being the heirs of Demetrio Melchor, petitioners
became the owners of the property by reason of succession; as such, they
sent a formal demand letter to respondent, who had been using the property
since February 14, 1947, for grazing cows and carabaos and for planting
crops; and in that letter, they asked him to vacate and surrender the property,
but he failed to do so.
[13]

[14]

[15]

[16]

[17]

Accordingly, petitioners prayed for judgment ordering respondent to vacate

the property and to pay P500,000, which represented the income earned
from February 14, 1947 to the present, as well the costs of the suit.
[18]

It is clear from the foregoing that the allegations in the Complaint failed to
constitute a case for either forcible entry or unlawful detainer. These actions,
which deal with physical or de facto possession, may be distinguished as
follows:
[19]

(1) In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege and prove that he was in
prior physical possession of the premises until deprived thereof, while in illegal
detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession; and (2) in
forcible entry, the possession by the defendant is unlawful ab initio because he
acquires possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, while in
unlawful detainer, possession is originally lawful but becomes illegal by reason of the
termination of his right of possession under his contract with the plaintiff. In pleadings
filed in courts of special jurisdiction, the special facts giving the court jurisdiction
must be specially alleged and set out. Otherwise, the complaint is demurrable.
[20]

As correctly held by the appellate court, [f]orcible entry must be ruled out
as there was no allegation that the petitioners were denied possession of the
subject property through any of the means stated in Section 1, Rule 70 [of the
Rules of Court].
[21]

Neither was unlawful detainer satisfactorily alleged. In determining the

sufficiency of a complaint therefor, it is not necessary to employ the
terminology of the law. Not averred in this case, however, were certain
essential facts such as how entry was effected, or how and when
dispossession started. Petitioners merely alleged their ownership of the land,
which had supposedly been possessed by respondent since 1947. There was
no allegation showing that his possession of it was initially legal -- by virtue of
a contract, express or implied -- and that it became illegal after the expiration
of his right to possess.
[22]

[23]

Neither did the Complaint claim as a fact any overt act on the part of
petitioners showing that they had permitted or tolerated respondents
occupancy of the subject property. It is a settled rule that in order to justify an
action for unlawful detainer, the owners permission or tolerance must be
present at the beginning of the possession. Furthermore, the complaint must
aver the facts showing that the inferior court has jurisdiction to try the case; for
example, by describing how defendants possession started or continued.
[24]

[25]

[26]

The prayer of petitioners contradicts, however, the existence of

possession by tolerance. It must be noted that they seek to be paid P500,000
as payment for the use of the property by respondent from 1947 to the

present. This allegation implies that they never permitted him to possess the
land.
Since the Complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of a
valid cause for forcible entry or unlawful detainer, the appellate court was
correct in holding that the MTC had no jurisdiction to hear the case.
Verily, the failure of petitioners to properly allege a case for ejectment does
not leave them without any other remedy. Under the proper circumstances,
what may be filed is a case either for accion publiciana, which is a plenary
action intended to recover the better right to possess; or an accion
reivindicatoria, a suit to recover ownership of real property. This principle
was laid down in Ong v. Parel as follows:
[27]

[28]

The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint
fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does
not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, as in the case
at bar, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion
reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court.
If private respondent is indeed the owner of the premises subject of this suit and she
was unlawfully deprived of the real right of possession or the ownership thereof, she
should present her claim before the regional trial court in an accion publiciana or
an accion reivindicatoria, and not before the municipal trial court in a summary
proceeding of unlawful detainer or forcible entry. For even if one is the owner of the
property, the possession thereof cannot be wrested from another who had been in the
physical or material possession of the same for more than one year by resorting to a
summary action for ejectment.This is especially true where his possession thereof was
not obtained through the means or held under the circumstances contemplated by the
rules on summary ejectment.
WHEREFORE,
the
Petition
is DENIED, and
Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

the

assailed