Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
CA
Police Power
FACTS: Due to the death of one Maricris Sioson in 1991, Cory banned the deployment
of performing artists to Japan and other destinations. This was relaxed however with the
introduction of the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council which later proposed a plan
to POEA to screen and train performing artists seeking to go abroad. In pursuant to the
proposal POEA and the secretary of DOLE sought a 4 step plan to realize the plan which
included an Artists Record Book which a performing artist must acquire prior to being
deployed abroad. The Federation of Talent Managers of the Philippines assailed the
validity of the said regulation as it violated the right to travel, abridge existing contracts
and rights and deprives artists of their individual rights. JMM intervened to bolster the
cause of FETMOP. The lower court ruled in favor of EIAC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the regulation by EIAC is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of the lower court. The regulation is a valid exercise of
police power. Police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere
with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare or the common
good. As the assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that the
burden rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that the said order, particularly, its ARB
requirement, does not enhance the public welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or
unreasonably. The welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women was
paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3. Short of a total and absolute ban
against the deployment of performing artists to high risk destinations, a measure which
would only drive recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the very least
rationalizes the method of screening performing artists by requiring reasonable
educational and artistic skills from them and limits deployment to only those individuals
adequately prepared for the unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad. It
cannot be gainsaid that this scheme at least lessens the room for exploitation by
unscrupulous individuals and agencies.
Lutz vs. Araneta
Facts: Commonwealth Act No. 567, otherwise known as Sugar Adjustment Act was
promulgated in 1940 to stabilize the sugar industry so as to prepare it for the eventuality
of the loss of its preferential position in the United States market and the imposition of
export taxes. Plaintiff, Walter Lutz, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the
Intestate Estate of Antonio Jayme Ledesma, seeks to recover from the Collector of
Internal Revenue the sum of P14,666.40 paid by the estate as taxes, under Sec.3 of the
Act, alleging that such tax is unconstitutional and void, being levied for the aid and
support of the sugar industry exclusively, which in plaintiffs opinion is not a public
purpose for which a tax may be constitutionally levied. The action has been dismissed by
the Court of First Instance.
Issue: Whether or not the tax imposed is constitutional.
Held: Yes. The act is primarily an exercise of the police power. It is shown in the Act that
the tax is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and
stabilization of the threatened sugar industry.
It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and
it has been repeatedly held that inequalities which result from a singling out of one
particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation.
The funds raised under the Act should be exclusively spent in aid of the sugar industry,
since it is that very enterprise that is being protected. It may be that other industries are
also in need of similar protection; but the legislature is not required by the Constitution to
adhere to a policy of all or none.
ASLP vs. Sec of Dar
Equal Protection
FACTS: These are 3 cases consolidated questioning the constitutionality of the
AgrarianReform Act. Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a call for
theadoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law,undertake
an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regularfarmworkers, who
are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, inthe case of other
farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA
3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already been enacted by Congress on August
8, 1963. This was substantially superseded almost a decade later by PD 27, whichwas
promulgated on Oct 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide for thecompulsory
acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and tospecify
maximum retention limits for landowners. On July 17, 1987, Cory issued EO228,
declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providingfor the
valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the mannerof their
payment. This was followed on July 22, 1987 by PP 131, instituting acomprehensive
agrarian reform program (CARP), and EO 229, providing themechanics for its
implementation. Afterwhich is the enactment of RA 6657,Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988, which Cory signed on June 10. Thislaw, while considerably
changing the earlier mentioned enactments, neverthelessgives them suppletory effect
insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions.In considering the rentals as
advance payment on the land, the executive order alsodeprives the petitioners of their
property rights as protected by due process. Theequal protection clause is also violated
because the order places the burden ofsolving the agrarian problems on the owners only
of agricultural lands. No similarobligation is imposed on the owners of other
properties.The petitioners maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under PD 27 to be
theowners of the lands occupied by them, EO 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and
soviolated due process. Worse, the measure would not solve the agrarian problem because
even the small farmers are deprived of their lands and the retention rights guaranteed by
the Constitution.In his comment the Sol-Gen asserted that the alleged violation of the
equal protection clause, the sugar planters have failed to show that they belong to a
different class and should be differently treated. The Comment also suggests the
possibility of Congress first distributing public agricultural lands and scheduling the
expropriation of private agricultural lands later. From this viewpoint, the petition for
prohibition would be premature.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.
HELD:
The SC ruled affirming the Sol-Gen. The argument of the small farmers thatthey have
been denied equal protection because of the absence of retention limitshas also become
academic under Sec 6 of RA 6657. Significantly, they too have notquestioned the area of
such limits. There is also the complaint that they should notbe made to share the burden
of agrarian reform, an objection also made by thesugar planters on the ground that they
belong to a particular class with particularinterests of their own. However, no evidence
has been submitted to the Court thatthe requisites of a valid classification have been
violated.Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to
eachother in certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars.To
be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:(1) it must be based on
substantial distinctions(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;(3) it must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the
class.The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the measures
herechallenged as arbitrary and discriminatory.Equal protection simply means that all
persons or things similarly situated must betreated alike both as to the rights conferred
and the liabilities imposed. Thepetitioners have not shown that they belong to a different
class and entitled to adifferent treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also
owners of otherproperties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform
must berejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners
thatis clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate onthis
matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for avalid
classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts
of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill ofRights.
Among the arguments against the constitutionality of the law are a.) it is violative of the
constitutional provision on non-imprisonment due to debt, and b.) it impairs freedom of
contract.
ISSUE: Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional.
HELD: Yes, BP 22 is constitutional.
The Supreme Court first discussed the history of the law. The SC explained how the law
on estafa was not sufficient to cover all acts involving the issuance of worthless checks;
that in estafa, it only punishes the fraudulent issuance of worthless checks to cover prior
or simultaneous obligations but not pre-existing obligations.
BP 22 is aimed at putting a stop to or curbing the practice of issuing checks that are
worthless, i.e. checks that end up being rejected or dishonored for payment. The practice
is proscribed by the state because of the injury it causes to public interests.
BP 22 is not violative of the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt. The
debt contemplated by the constitution are those arising from contracts (ex contractu).
No one is going to prison for non-payment of contractual debts.
However, non-payment of debts arising from crimes (ex delicto) is punishable. This is
precisely why the mala prohibita crime of issuing worthless checks as defined in BP 22
was enacted by Congress. It is a valid exercise of police power.
Due to the insufficiency of the Revised Penal Code, BP 22 was enacted to punish the
following acts:
any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he
makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a
credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90)
days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee
bank.
And
any person who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value, knowing
at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of said check in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the
bank to stop payment.
Congress was able to determine at that time that the issuance of worthless checks was a
huge problem. The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter
of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance
to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.
Checks are widely used due to the convenience it brings in commercial transactions and
confidence is the primary basis why merchants rely on it for their various commercial
undertakings. If such confidence is shaken, the usefulness of checks as currency
substitutes would be greatly diminished or may become nil. Any practice therefore
tending to destroy that confidence should be deterred for the proliferation of worthless
checks can only create havoc in trade circles and the banking community. Thus, the
Congress, through their exercise of police power, declared that the making and issuance
of a worthless check is deemed a public nuisance which can be abated by the imposition
of penal sanctions.
The Supreme Court however also explained that (regardless of their previous explanation
on ex delicto debts) the non-payment of a debt is not the gravamen of the violations of BP
22. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not
the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or
designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain
of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation.
Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the
law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against
public order.
may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate
demands of public interest or public welfare.
City of Manila vs. Chinese community
FACTS: Petitioner (City of Manila) filed a petition praying that certain lands be
expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement namely, the extension
of Rizal Avenue, Manila and claiming that such expropriation was necessary.
Herein defendants, on the other hand, alleged (a) that no necessity existed for said
expropriation and (b) that the land in question was a cemetery, which had been used as
such for many years, and was covered with sepulchres and monuments, and that the same
should not be converted into a street for public purposes.
The lower court ruled that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the particular
strip of land in question.
Petitioner therefore assails the decision of the lower court claiming that it (petitioner) has
the authority to expropriate any land it may desire; that the only function of the court in
such proceedings is to ascertain the value of the land in question; that neither the court
nor the owners of the land can inquire into the advisable purpose of the expropriation or
ask any questions concerning the necessities therefor; that the courts are mere appraisers
of the land involved in expropriation proceedings, and, when the value of the land is fixed
by the method adopted by the law, to render a judgment in favor of the defendant for its
value.
ISSUE: W/N the courts may inquire into and hear proof upon the necessity of the
expropriation?
HELD: Yes. The courts have the power to restrict the exercise of eminent domain to the
actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law.
When the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it
must comply with the conditions accompanying such authority. The necessity for
conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent
domain is, without question, within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the
municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the
conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question that the courts have the right to
inquire into.
Pp vs fajardo
Facts
Aug. 15, 1950 - Juan Fajardo was the mayor of Baoo, Camarines Sur. During his term
the municipal council passed Ordinance No. 7 which prohibited the construction or
repair of any building without a written permit from the mayor prior to construction
or repairing.
1954 - Fajardo and Babillonia (Fajardos son-in-law) applied for a permit to construct a
building adjacent to their gas station, still on Fajardos private land, separated from
public plaza by a creek.
Jan. 16, 1954 request denied because it would destroy the view of the public plaza.
o Applicants appealed but were turned down again on Jan. 18, 1954.
o
o
Fajardo and Babillonia proceeded to construct even without a permit because they
claimed that they needed a residence badly due to a typhoon destroying their previous
place of residence
Feb. 26, 1954 Fajardo et at., were charged and convicted by peace court of Baoo for
violating Ordinance no. 7
CFI Affirmed
CA forwarded the case to the SC because the appeal attacks the constitutionality of the
ordinance in question.
Issue/Held: W/N Ordinance No. 7 is a valid exercise police power in its regulation of
property.
NO. Ordinance No. 7 went beyond the authority that the municipality could enact and is
therefore null and void. Fajardo et al., acquitted.
Ratio:
The ordinance is not merely lacking in providing standards to guide and/or control
the discretion vested by the ordinance. STANDARDS ARE ENTIRELY LACKING
IN THIS CASE.
Ordinance grants mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant/deny
construction/repair permits
IN THIS CASE: there were no fire limits or safety regulations that the municipal council
promulgated in order to set a standard in the type of building that can be safely
constructed in the public plaza.
Republic vs castelvi
FACTS: After the owner of a parcel of land that has been rented and occupied by the
government in 1947 refused to extend the lease, the latter commenced expropriation
proceedings in 1959. During the assessment of just compensation, the government argued
that it had taken the property when the contract of lease commenced and not when the
proceedings begun. The owner maintains that the disputed land was not taken when the
government commenced to occupy the said land as lessee because the essential elements
of the taking of property under the power of eminent domain, namely (1) entrance and
occupation by condemnor upon the private property for more than a momentary period,
and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of
all beneficial enjoyment of the property, are not present.
ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of property has taken place when the condemnor has
entered and occupied the property as lesse.
HELD: No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings
commenced in 1959.
The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must enter a private property,
(2) for more than a momentary period, (3) and under warrant of legal authority, (4)
devoting it to public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it
in such a way as (5) substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment thereof.
In the case at bar, these elements were not present when the government entered and
occupied the property under a contract of lease.
Philippine press institute vs comelec
FACTS: COMELEC issued resolution 2772 directing newspapers to provide provide free
print space of not less than one half (1/2) page for use as Comelec Space which shall be
allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates within the area in
which the newspaper, magazine or periodical is circulated to enable the candidates to
make known their qualifications, their stand on public issues and their platforms and
programs of government. Philippine Press Institute, a non-stock, non-profit organization
of newspaper and magazine publishers asks the Court to declare said resolution
unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the
Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private
property for public use without just compensation.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of Comelec alleged that the resolution does
not impose upon the publishers any obligation to provide free print space in the
newspapers. It merely established guidelines to be followed in connection with the
be expropriated were valued by the NHA at one peso (P1.00) per square meter adopting
the market value fixed by the provincial assessor in accordance with presidential decrees
prescribing the valuation of property in expropriation proceedings.
Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate possession of the properties.
The NHA deposited the amount of P158,980.00 with the Phil. Natl Bank, representing
the total market value of the subject 25 ha. of land, pursuant to P.D. No. 1224 which
defines the policy on the expropriation of private property for socialized housing upon
payment of just compensation.
On January 17, 1978, respondent Judge Buenaventura S. Guerreroissued a writ of
possession pertaining to the subject parcels of land. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration on the ground that they had been deprived of the possession of their
property without due process of law. This was however, denied. Hence, this petition
challenging the orders of respondent Judge and assailing the constitutionality of P.D. No.
1224, as amended.
Petitioners contend that the taking of their property subsumed under the topics of public
use, just compensation, and due process.
Issues:
(1) Whether socialized housing as defined in P.D. 1224, as amended, for the purpose of
condemnation proceedings is not public use since it will benefit only a handful of
people, bereft of public character, hence it is not a valid exercise of the States power
of eminent domain.
(2) Whether NHA has the discretion to determine the size of the property/properties to be
expropriated.
(3) Whether P.D. 1224, as amended, allows unjust and unfair valuations arbitrarily fixed
by government assessors.
(4) Whether petitioners were denied due process because their parcels of land were
immediately possessed by the NHA by virtue of the writ of possession ordered by
the respondent judge.
Held:
(1) P.D. 1224 defines socialized housing as, the construction of dwelling units for the
middle and lower class members of our society, including the construction of the
supporting infrastructure and other facilities. The public use requirement for a valid
exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by
changing conditions. The taking to be valid must be for public use. As long as the
purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. It is
accurate to state then that at present, whatever may be beneficially employed for the
general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. Ergo, socialized housing falls
within the confines of public use.
(2) The State acting through the NHA is vested with broad discretion to designate the
particular property/properties to be taken for socialized housing purposes and how much
thereof may be expropriated. Absent a clear showing of fraud, bad faith, or gross abuse of
discretion, which petitioners failed to demonstrate, the Court will give due weight to and
leave undisturbed the NHAs choice and the size of the site for the project. The right to
use, enjoyment and disposal of private property is tempered by and has to yield to the
demands of the common good.
(3) Yes. The provisions on just compensation found in Presidential Decrees No. 1224,
1259, and 1313 are the same provisions found in P.D. No.s 76, 464, 794, and 1533 which
were declared unconstitutional for being encroachments on judicial prerogative. Just
compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair
and full equivalent for the loss sustained. Tax values can serve as guides but cannot be
absolute substitute for just compensation.
(4) Yes. The petitioners were denied of due process. P.D. 1224, as amended, violates
procedural due process as it allows immediate taking of possession, control and
disposition of property without giving the owner his day in court. Respondent Judge
ordered the issuance of a writ of possession without notice and without hearing.
just compensation. The lot owners must prove the value of the land by evidence. On the
other hand, MERALCO must be given an opportunity to rebut any evidence presented by
lot owners.
Facts: Petitioners, who are professionals in the city, assail Ordinance No. 3398 together
with the law authorizing it (Section 18 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila). The
ordinance imposes a municipal occupation tax on persons exercising various professions
in the city and penalizes non-payment of the same. The law authorizing said ordinance
empowers the Municipal Board of the city to impose a municipal occupation tax on
persons engaged in various professions. Petitioners, having already paid their occupation
tax under section 201 of the National Internal Revenue Code, paid the tax under protest
as imposed by Ordinance No. 3398. The lower court declared the ordinance invalid and
affirmed the validity of the law authorizing it.
Issue: Whether or Not the ordinance and law authorizing it constitute class legislation,
and authorize what amounts to double taxation.
Held: The Legislature may, in its discretion, select what occupations shall be taxed, and
in its discretion may tax all, or select classes of occupation for taxation, and leave others
untaxed. It is not for the courts to judge which cities or municipalities should be
empowered to impose occupation taxes aside from that imposed by the National
Government. That matter is within the domain of political departments. The argument
against double taxation may not be invoked if one tax is imposed by the state and the
other is imposed by the city. It is widely recognized that there is nothing inherently
terrible in the requirement that taxes be exacted with respect to the same occupation by
both the state and the political subdivisions thereof. Judgment of the lower court is
reversed with regards to the ordinance and affirmed as to the law authorizing it.
Lladoc vs. CIR
Facts: In 1957, the MB Estate Inc. of Bacolod City donated P10,000 in cash to the parish
priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental; the amount spent for the construction of a new
Catholic Church in the locality,m as intended. In1958, MB Estate filed the donors gift
tax return. In 1960, the Commissioner issued an assessment for donees gift tax against
the parish. The priest lodged a protest to the assessment and requested the withdrawal
thereof.
Issue: Whether the Catholic Parish is tax exempt.
Held: The phrase exempt from taxation should not be interpreted to mean exemption
from all kinds of taxes. The exemption is only from the payment of taxes assessed on
such properties as property taxes as contradistinguished from excise taxes. A donees gift
tax is not a property tax but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by way of
gift inter vivos. It does not rest upon general ownership, but an excise upon the use made
of the properties, upon the exercise of the privilege of receiving the properties. The
imposition of such excise tax on property used for religious purpose do not constitute an
impairment of the Constitution.
The tax exemption of the parish, thus, does not extend to excise taxes.
TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD [151 SCRA 208; G.R. No. L75697; 18 Jun 1987]
Held: Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power. The levy of the
30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for
regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant
violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes.
And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax
remains a valid imposition.
We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing
Presidential Decree No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void. While the underlying
objective of the DECREE is to protect the moribund movie industry, there is no question
that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering "the unfair competition
posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public
brought about by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes containing
pornographic films and films with brutally violent sequences; and losses in government
revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the activities
of video establishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayor's permit and
municipal license fees are required to engage in business."
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs