ARTICLE IN PRESS

Energy Policy 37 (2009) 28702880

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Energy Policy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol

Future energy efciency improvements within the US department of defense:

Incentives and barriers$
Ryan J. Umstattd
National Laboratories Technologies Fellow, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, USA

a r t i c l e in f o

a b s t r a c t

Article history:
Received 6 August 2008
Accepted 3 March 2009
Available online 21 April 2009

The present work describes the military impact of improved efciency and then highlights existing
technological, political, and nancial barriers for improving overall energy efciency. As the largest user
of energy within the US government, the Department of Defense (DOD) is rightly concerned that any
disruption to the nations energy supply may have an extremely adverse impact on its military
capabilities. The total solution to providing energy security will be multi-faceted with progress required
on many fronts. Increasing the use of renewable energy sources and improving energy storage
capabilities are gradually creating a positive impact, but investing in improving the overall efciency of
the military effort provides both immediate and long-lasting payback. One might suppose that a
decrease in the energy used by the DOD should lead to a decrease in military capability, but historical
data proves otherwise. It is shown that the military has additional impetus, compared to civilian
consumers, to pursue energy-efciency improvements. Many tools are available to help the DOD along
this path, yet there remain obstacles which must rst be identied and analyzed as discussed herein.
Published by Elsevier Ltd.

Keywords:
Energy efciency
Military
Financing

1. Introduction
In Fiscal Year 2006 (FY06), the Department of Defense (DOD)
was responsible for 80% of the energy used by the US government
and almost 1% of the nations total energy use (EIA, 2007). Thus,
the DOD has a large vested interest in maintaining a stable and
secure supply of the energy it needs to accomplish its mission.
This notable market share also translates into a unique ability to
help shape the future of how the US generates, transports, stores,
and uses various energy sources. Given the current volatility and
uncertainty in the fossil-fuel market, it is imperative that the DOD
nd ways to insulate its mission-effectiveness from these energy
price uctuations. The scale of the problem is mind-boggling
when one considers that the DOD used 844 trillion British thermal
units (Btus; 1 Btu 1055 J) of energy in FY06 (EIA, 2007) which is
roughly equivalent to the usage of a country such as Bulgaria,
Denmark, or New Zealand (BP, 2007). It is therefore useful to
examine potential energy security solutions on a more manageable scale. Solutions can be classied as follows: (1) develop and
eld new primary energy sources that do not rely on petroleum
and are preferably renewable, (2) reduce consumption through
conservation, and (3) improve the efciency of energy use so that
more mission is accomplished per unit of energy input.

$
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do
not reect the ofcial policy or position of the US government or the Department
of Defense.
E-mail address: ryan.umstattd@us.af.mil

0301-4215/$ - see front matter Published by Elsevier Ltd.

doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2009.03.003

Efforts are currently underway within the DOD in all three of

these categories. Finding new energy sources is a signicant
research and development task that is beginning to return on
investment through successes such as ying military aircraft
including B-52s and C-17s on a 50/50 blend of JP-8 and synthetic
fuel which can be made from coal or natural gas (Drinnon, 2007).
Such research will continue and is expected to change the face
of how the DOD meets its energy needs in the long run. In
contrast, conservation efforts yield a more immediate payback.
Conservation is encouraged as an important part of the mindset of
all DOD employees (DUSD(I&E), 2008), but it can only be taken so
far before it begins to have a negative impact on accomplishing
the mission; while reducing the number of training hours own
by military pilots does indeed save fuel, it does so at the cost of
the readiness and skill of those same pilots. Finally, improving
energy efciency provides both immediate and long-term payback. If a buildings heating, cooling, and lighting can be renovated
such that the building now uses half as much energy as before, the
saved energy can be either used immediately to power a second
building or placed in the bank as savings to be expended at a later
date. Best of all, these savings continue to accrue year after year
following such a renovation.
This study focuses on improving energy efciency as part of
the total energy solution for the DOD. Over time, the energy
intensity of the US economy has improved from using 18 kBtu
while generating a chained 2000 dollar of gross domestic product
(GDP) in 1970 to using less than 9 kBtu to do the same in 2006
(EIA, 2007, p. xix). While this energy-intensity improvement by

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R.J. Umstattd / Energy Policy 37 (2009) 28702880

itself does not provide insight into possible sectoral or environmental considerations, it can be stated that the economy is
literally doing more with less by increasing the energy efciency
of doing business. This factor of two improvement serves as a role
model for potential DOD advances in energy efciency. Of course,
the DOD is not in the business of making wealth or even a
product, so its overall efciency is more difcult to dene much
less calculate. The DOD has many tasks that require large amounts
of energy such as transporting an entire infantry division across
the Atlantic Ocean over the span of several days. Such energyintensive tasks can still be considered efcient as long as the
desired task is accomplished with only minimal waste. To further
rene this study, the scope is limited to the energy used to keep
facilities running. In FY07, buildings and infrastructure accounted
for 26% of the energy used by the DOD at a total cost of $3.4B
(DUSD(I&E), 2007). For this signicant portion of the energy
budget, the calculation of efciency becomes more straightforward: how much energy per square foot of facility space is needed
to stay in operation? The desired end state is to maximize the
productivity of the people while minimizing the energy required
to sustain their working environment.
At present, there exist many energy-efcient building technologies that when combined using a holistic system approach, have
resulted in buildings with near-zero net energy use averaged over
a calendar year (ORNL Review, 2007, pp. 25). By combining
technologies such as solar panels, geothermal energy, consolidated utility walls, structural insulated panels, controlled ventilation, and advanced exterior nishes (ORNL Review, 2007, pp. 67),
both ofce buildings and residential homes can lower their energy
needs such that they are capable of generating much of their
required energy input on-site. As the DOD looks at its current
infrastructure and plans for future facilities, how can it best take
advantage of these potential improvements in energy efciency?
The method of the present study is to contrast a survey of DOD
energy use data and DOD energy policy documents against the
backdrop of commercial/industrial energy use and government
energy policy as presented and studied in the both the open and
technical literature. By identifying the overlaps and disparities
between the energy perspective of the DOD and other large
organizations, the aim of the study is to provide new insights that
may be of use to future military energy policy. These insights are
limited in scope to those that apply to improving energy efciency
within DOD facilities. The paper begins in Section 2 by rst
examining historical trends in DOD energy usage and looking for
relevant comparisons. Section 3 then presents the energy problem
from the particular DOD perspective and describes several key
military benets of improved energy efciency in areas such as
logistics and overall force effectiveness. Because of the size and
complexity of the issue, Section 4 is devoted to an examination of
the barriers that obstruct the adoption of existing energyefciency improvements specically within DOD facilities. Identifying these current impediments is a rst step towards nding
ways to overcome them. As described herein, the development of
sustainable DOD facilities will not only reduce energy use and
external dependence, but will also diminish the total logistics tail
thereby improving military capability. Thus, sustainability
through improved energy efciency is a force multiplier that can
enhance military effectiveness in the face of shrinking access to
conventional energy resources.

2. DOD energy use and concerns

In recent years, the DOD has become increasingly concerned
with energy security, for modern US warfare relies heavily upon
the force multiplier of being able to access and deliver vast

2871

quantities of energy. This concern is demonstrated through a

Defense Science Board (2001) report on reducing the DODs fuel
consumption, through a variety of service-level studies on energy
topics (Air Force Science Advisory Board, 2006; Navy Research
Advisory Council, 2005; Army Corps of Engineers, 2005), through
several individual studies by various service members (Amidon,
2005; Blackwell, 2007; Hornitschek, 2006; Kuntz, 2007; Lengyel,
2007), and, most recently, by the Defense Science Board (2008)
report on DOD Energy Strategy. This subject has also been
examined in the technical literature (Hadder et al., 1989; Hall,
1992; Vallentin, 2008). The purpose of these studies, as with the
present study, is to illuminate the path forward for a secure
energy future. Before looking to this future, let us rst examine
how historical DOD energy use and budget compare to the
traditional concept of economic energy intensity.
In personnel, budget, and energy use, the DOD is equivalent to
a small nation. In 2006, the DOD employed over 2 million people,
executed a budget of $499B, and used 840 TBtu of energy
(Historical Tables, 2008; EIA, 2007, p. 25). Thus, one might expect
to see a correlation between DOD energy use and DOD budget
that is similar to the correlation often observed between a nations
energy use and GDP. If such a correlation exists, then perhaps a
causality relationship can be determined to help shape future
DOD policy. Mozumder and Marathe (2007) summarized over 25
different studies from around the world of the causal relationship
between energy usage and economic growth and found no
consistent result that could be applied across countries, so
causality must still be investigated on a case-by-case basis.
We look for this possible correlation in Fig. 1 which shows DOD
budget (labeled according to the president that submitted that
years budget request) and total energy use.
The story told by Fig. 1 is more complicated than the linear
relationship often observed when examining a nations GDP and
energy usage. For the DOD, energy use and income do not appear
to be correlated. It is encouraging to see that total energy use has
generally been declining since 1990, but the reduction is not
directly in response to a declining budget. Since the energy use
per person was relatively at, the decrease in total energy use is
attributed to the sharp drawdown in the number of DOD
personnel that occurred in the 1990s following the end of the
cold war. While both budget and energy use increased dramatically following September 2001, the energy use per person has
recently returned to a more typical value near 400 MBtu per
person (average US citizen energy use is approximately 340 MBtu
per person (EIA, 2007, p. xix)). Since energy use and income do not
share the same correlation seen at the national level, one must
scrutinize carefully any models, strategies, or policies designed to
improve national economic energy intensity before applying them
to the DOD. Fig. 1 also serves to point out another key difculty in
analyzing the DODs energy efciency: what is the appropriate
metric? For a nation, it seems reasonable to expect a relationship
between wealth generation and energy use. For the DOD, one
would like instead to tie mission accomplishment to energy use.
Ideally, there would be a straightforward measurement of military
effectiveness per unit of energy used, but no such metric exists. In
spite of this difculty, we can still use the data that we do have to
take a closer look at DOD energy use and search for potential
efciencies to reap.
In FY07, the DOD used 865 TBtu of energy at a total cost of
$13.2B (DUSD(I&E), 2007). Given the $530B DOD budget that year
(Historical Tables, 2008), the energy cost equates to roughly 2.5%
of the total budget. Over the last 30 years, US national energy
expenditures averaged 8% of the GDP (EIA, 2007, p. 13), so the DOD
fraction of income that is spent on energy costs is signicantly less
than the national average. In this aspect, the DOD looks more like
an average US household where residents spent roughly 2.44.0%

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R.J. Umstattd / Energy Policy 37 (2009) 28702880

DOD Budget & Energy Use vs Time

500

1.5
Carter

Reagan
~ 3.1 Million

Bush

Clinton

Budget (FY2000 $B)

450
# of DOD
Personnel

Bush

1.4

$B
QBtu

1.3
1.2

400

1.1
1
0.9

350

0.8
Gulf War I
Recovery /
Reconstitution

300

250
1970

1975

1980

1985

~ 2.1 Million

Energy Used (QBtu)

Ford

0.7
0.6

1990

1995

2000

0.5
2010

2005

DOD per capita Budget & Energy Use vs Time

Budget (FY2000 $k / person)

210

Ford

Carter

Reagan

Bush

Clinton

Bush

460

190

440

170

420

150

400

130

380

110

360

90

Budget
Energy

70
50
1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

340

Energy Used (MBtu / person)

480

230

320

300
2010

Fig. 1. (a) Total and (b) per capita DOD Energy Use & Budget (chained 2000 $). Sources: data from EIA (2007, p. 25); Historical Tables (2007); conversion to chained 2000
dollars from the consumer price index, available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics at http://www.bls.gov/cpi/.

of their household income on energy during the years between

1987 and 2004 (Buildings Energy Data Book, 2006). This
comparison is awed, however, considering that a typical household does not have multi-million dollar acquisition programs as
line items on the budgetthe DOD makes such purchases
routinely without incurring the energy usage that is required for
the contractors to build the systems.
To draw a comparison between the DOD and the US business
sector, let us compare energy use in facility space (transportation
fuel costs are excluded). While commercial ofce space averaged
$1.80 in 2004 for energy expenditures per square foot (Buildings
Energy Data Book, 2006), the DOD spent $1.75 per square foot in
FY07 for its 2B square feet of oor space (DUSD(I&E), 2007). Thus,
in facility space energy use, the DOD compares favorably to the
commercial US market. Credit for this standing is largely due to a
federally mandated program that led to a 30% improvement in
government facility energy efciency between 1985 and 2005. As
a follow-on to this program, President Bush issued Executive
Order (EO) 13,423 in January 2007. This EO requires that every
federal agency, including the DOD, improve their facility energy
efciency by 3% annually or by 30% total by 2015 (relative to a
2005 baseline). This goal attempts to accelerate by a factor of two
the improvements seen in the previous 20-year program. To
encourage development of additional renewable energy resources,
this EO also requires that at least 50% of renewable energy
purchases be from sources commissioned after 1 January 1999.

Thus, the DOD has incentive to improve facility energy efciency

not just to potentially save money but also to comply with federal
mandate. As will be discussed further below, there are other
reasons, even more signicant, for the DOD to pursue energy
efciency.
Many past and on-going efforts seek a long-term solution to
assured fuel (see references at the beginning of this section), so
the present study has elected to focus instead on the $3.4B spent
powering DOD facilities. This facility space is spread across more
than 400 sites throughout the US in over 500,000 separate
buildings; almost one third of these buildings are greater than
50-years old (Environmental Security Technology Certication
Program, 2008). We examine the energy supply and relative cost
mix to power these DOD facilities in Fig. 2.
The energy usage mix in DOD facility space is not notably
different from the mix within the US commercial building sector.
While electricity accounted for 47% of the energy needed by DOD
facilities, it accounted for 63% of the expenditureselectricity
is a high delity energy source that provides on-demand
versatility at a premium price. Conversely, natural gas accounted
for 32% of facility energy needs, but accounted for only 18% of the
expendituresa relative bargain that is leveraged mostly for
heating facility space. Electricity and natural gas combined
account for roughly 80% of both DOD energy needs and
expenditures, so these are the two most attractive source targets
for improving overall facility energy efciency.

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R.J. Umstattd / Energy Policy 37 (2009) 28702880

2873

FY2007 DOD Facility Energy Use

As a percentage of 220 TBtu

3%

7%

1%
47%

10%

Electricity
Natural Gas
Fuel Oil
Purch.Steam
Coal
LPG/Propane

32%
FY2007 DOD Facility Energy Expenditures
As a percentage of $3.4B
6%
10%

2% 1%
63%

Electricity
Natural Gas
Fuel Oil
Purch.Steam
Coal

18%

LPG/Propane
Fig. 2. (a) Energy usage and (b) cost by source for DOD facilities in FY 2007. Source: data from DUSD(I&E) (2007).

Table 1
Military benets of improved energy efciency.
Benet

Impact

Simplicity (Defense Science Board, 2001, p. 10)

Surprise (Defense Science Board, 2001, p. 10)
Reduced logistics tail
Force multiplication
Increased resilience (Defense Science Board, 2008, p. 35)
Increased endurance (Defense Science Board, 2008, p. 35)

Decreased complexity and frequency of resupply and logistics planning.

Improved stealth through reduced heat signature (less waste heat).
Reduced vulnerability; frees combat forces from force protection mission.
Each system/soldier is more effective (e.g. carrying more ammunition rather than reserve energy).
Total force is resistant to energy catastrophe and able to recover rapidly.
Ability to provide sustained operations between fewer replenishments.

3. Motivation for improved efciency within the DOD

Since both homeowners and commercial companies are
heavily inuenced by nancial bottom-lines, energy-efciency
investments often require a fairly rapid net positive return. The
DOD, however, is in the business of delivering military effectiveness. While cost savings from energy efciency are benecial, the
true driver for DOD efciency improvements should be the
enhanced ability to meet the objectives of the National Defense
Strategy including defending the external physical security of the
US While measuring total military effectiveness may not be
straightforward, there are several key enhancements to military
effectiveness that result from improving energy efciency as
shown in Table 1.
It should be noted that all of these enhancements are possible
without sacricing other militarily-prized attributes such as
speed, stealth, or precision. Each of these characteristics may
require a nancial investment, but with a clear benet to military
effectiveness. Thus, the DOD, unlike residential or commercial
energy consumers, has strong motivation to pursue increased
energy efciency even if there are additional costs involved. Recall
that the entire DOD energy bill was only 2.5% of the DOD budget
in FY07, so the dollars at stake in the energy portion of the DOD
budget should not be the most signicant factor in efciency
decisions. While efciency improvements may lead to returning

some portion of this 2.5% as savings, the true enormous potential

for savings is apparent when one looks beyond the energy portion
of the DOD budget as in the following example.
In 1944, the 1 million US troops in the elds of WWII
consumed an average of 1.8 million gallons of fuel per day. Sixty
years later in Gulf War II, 150,000 US troops used 4.1 million
gallons per day (DiPetto, 2008). Not only has the total fuel usage
grown by over a factor of two, but the fuel use per soldier has
skyrocketed from 1.8 gallons per day to 27 gallons per day! In
supporting a deployed Army unit today, 70% of the resupply
tonnage is fuel (Defense Science Board, 2001, p. 13). This fuel
powers not only the vehicles and weapons systems in the eld,
but also much of the electronics at the most forward-deployed
locations via fuel-driven generators. To reliably deliver this fuel,
the DOD has developed an extensive and expensive infrastructure.
As of late 2007, approximately 80 military-guarded convoys were
continuously on the road between destinations in Iraq and Kuwait
(Defense Science Board, 2008, p. 15). From the thousands of troops
trained specically for the petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL)
career elds, to eets of air and ground fuel tankers, to the force
protection, care, and feeding of these assets, secure fuel delivery is
an expensive undertaking. Estimates for the true cost of fuel
in the eld range from 10 times greater than the purchase
price (for air tanker delivered fuel) to over 100 times greater
than the purchase price (for fuel delivered to deep forward

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R.J. Umstattd / Energy Policy 37 (2009) 28702880

operating bases) (Defense Science Board, 2001, p. ES-3). When

the system as a whole is considered, the potential nancial
gains at stake through reduced fuel use become signicantly
more than just the 2.5% of the DOD budget that goes towards
energy.
The total forecast savings from improving energy efciency is
thus much more than simply the reduction in the energy
purchased. Over time, signicant savings accumulate through
reductions in required infrastructure. While using less energy may
also help extend the life of limited fossil-fuel-based energy
reserves, the greater impact will be the improvement to military
effectiveness through enhanced endurance, a reduced logistics
tail, force multiplication, and increased resilience. In his analysis
of military energy efciency, Hornitschek (2006, p. 44) noted,
The military has always valued capabilities and effectiveness (such as speed, mass, stealth, and so forth) over efciency
for good reasonrestraint when national survival is at risk is
illogical. However, this is a short-term perspective and in an
energy-constrained environment, efciency becomes its own effect,
enabling the sustained application of other desired military
effects. [Emphasis added] For the DOD, improvements in energy
efciency should be pursued not simply because they make
defense cheaper or because they are mandated by Executive
Order, but because they make for a more effective ghting force.
Rather than evaluate potential efciency investments based only
upon near-term cost savings, the DOD should recognize and be
willing to pay for these military benets of improved energy
efciency.

riers, so these considerations are here addressed in a single

political category. Individual behavior and cultural barriers can be
signicant challenges when attempting to reduce energy use
through conservation. The goal of this study, however, is to
improve energy efciency rather than increase conservation
efforts. For the purposes of improving energy efciency, wasteful
individual behavior and group culture often change or may be
nullied when presented with new technologies that come along
at the right time and right price. As an example, since its inception
in 1992 in the US, over 2B ENERGY STAR qualied products across
more than 50 different product categories have been purchased
resulting in an estimated $14B in energy cost savings in 2006
(ENERGY STAR, 2006). Thus, these behavioral and cultural
impediments may be treated in the technological category. For
the present study then, the barriers have been focused into three
main groupings: technological, political, and nancial. In some
cases, a particular barrier bleeds over into more than one of
these categories, which is a characteristic of barriers noted
previously by Weber (1997) and Sorrell et al. (2000). In addition,
because improving facility energy efciency is such a large-scale
problem, many of these barriers and potential solutions reach
beyond the normal realm of DOD responsibilitythe DOD will
need the assistance of other federal ofces, organizations and US
industry if they are to truly maximize their energy efciency. Let
us now examine several impediments in each of these three
categories.

4.1. Technological
4. Impediments: classication and analysis
While improving energy efciency can very often quickly
become a winning nancial investment in the commercial and
residential sectors, we have seen that the DOD has an even
stronger impetus to pursue efciency as a path to increased
military effectiveness. A variety of technological, political, and
nancial tools are currently available to help improve energy
efciency, and yet there still remains much inefciency within
DOD facilities. An important rst step towards progress is to rst
identify and understand the barriers that presently prevent the
DOD from rapidly adopting such tools.
As energy efciency has been receiving increasing attention as
one of the cornerstones of energy security; many studies by
authors of very different backgrounds have provided a variety of
perspectives on what prevents us from becoming more efcient
(Brown, 2001; Gan et al., 2007; Lovins, 2005; Rohdin et al., 2007;
Sola and Xavier, 2007; Wilbanks, 1994). These studies have
identied barriers in all sectors (commercial, residential, and
industrial) and at all scales from national economies down to
individual household members. In addition to the studies of
specic barriers above, signicant theories on the benets and
limitations of performing barrier analyses are also available (Jaffe
and Stavins, 1994; Sorrell et al., 2000; Sorrell et al., 2004; Weber,
1997). It should be recognized that barrier models alone do not
successfully determine an optimal level of efciency (Jaffe and
Stavins, 1994), but they can nevertheless illuminate areas that
may warrant intervention via public policy (Sorrell et al., 2000).
The categorization of these barriers differs somewhat from author
to author and includes areas such as nancial, behavioral,
organizational, policy, awareness, institutional, market imperfections, cultural, technological, and regulatory issues. While the
overlap and dividing lines amongst these categories are nearly
impossible to prescribe denitively, let us here attempt to rene a
list for the DOD through consolidation. Regulation or policy can
inuence many institutional, organizational, or awareness bar-

4.1.1. Insufcient energy storage

Lack of affordable, efcient energy storage hinders our ability
to decouple real-time energy supply from real-time energy
demand. To take full advantage of solar, wind, or other localized
distributed energy systems, we must be able to store excess
energy whenever instantaneous input exceeds instantaneous
demand so that it can be used later. Greater energy storage
capacity also improves the ability of an energy supply network to
respond to uctuations in supply or demand. Fig. 3 is an
illustration of the dichotomy faced when selecting among many
presently available energy storage options.
Our man-made attempts to create energy storage media such
as batteries, ywheels, compressed air, or pumped hydro are
orders of magnitude more heavy and costly compared to the fossil
fuels that nature has provided; a notable exception is the candy
bar which has an energy density and energy cost near that of
hydrogen. We also see that delivered electricity is over 1000 times
cheaper than the cost to store this energy for later use. One might
pay only half a cent for the electricity needed to power a computer
for 4 h, but if one wants this computer to be a portable laptop, one
must pay $100 for the luxury of having a battery that makes this
amount of energy available where and when it is needed. With
such a large disparity between the cost of generating versus
storing electrical energy, it will be extremely difcult for
intermittent renewable energy sources such as solar and wind
power to realize their full potential. An increasing ability to
manufacture biofuel may help displace some of the need for fossil
fuels, but generating electricity from biofuel will likely suffer the
same dismal 3035% delivery efciency typically seen when
burning fossil fuels. Hydrogen is a promising energy storage
optionit can be used both as a combustion fuel (generating only
water vapor as exhaust) or as a source for electricity (if feeding a
fuel cell). However, signicant hurdles still face a potential
hydrogen economy including improving the affordability and
efciency of hydrogen production, transport, and storage (Sims
et al., 2007).

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R.J. Umstattd / Energy Policy 37 (2009) 28702880

2875

100000

petroleum fuels, hydrogen,

biofuels, candy bars

1000
100
10

cost of elecricity
at $0.10 per kW/hr

10000
more portable

Energy Density (kJ / kg)

1000000

batteries, flywheels,
compressed air,
pumped hydro

more affordable
1
0.1

10

100

1000

10000

100000

Energy Cost (kJ / $)

Fig. 3. Energy density versus cost for various energy storage options. Source: numbers are approximates averaged from several vendor web sites.

4.1.2. Tunnel vision

When applying technological solutions to improve energy
efciency, one always receives the most benet by stepping back
to view the larger system rather than just the specic gadget. By
pursuing an overall system-level perspective, we can minimize
the chance that we will implement an incremental improvement
while overlooking a revolutionary one. Lovins (2005, p. 16) uses
his home in Colorado as an example:
In outdoor temperatures down to 44 1C, it is feasible to grow
bananas at 2200 m elevationy with no heating system, yet
with reduced construction cost, because the superwindows,
superinsulation, air-to-air heat exchangers, and other investments needed to eliminate the heating system cost less to
install than the heating system would have cost to instally
optimizing a house as a system rather than optimizing a
component in isolation, and optimizing for lifecycle costy can
make a superefcient house cheaper to build, not just to run,
by eliminating costly heating and cooling systems.
One can apply this same principle to the efciency of a
facilitys electricity supply system. At present, nearly all electricity
generation occurs at massive generation plants. Fuel is shipped in
and expended, then waste heat and electricity are sent out.
Centralized generation makes sense because the economy of scale
reduces the cost of the fuel delivery and helps safely manage any
hazardous wastes or otherwise dangerous parts of the process.
When fuel supply and environmental safety can be otherwise
ensured, then distributed electricity generation can be employed
instead with huge potential efciency gains. A combined cooling,
heating and power system is an example of how incoming natural
gas can be used to locally generate the desired comforts while
preventing the losses associated with waste heat at a central
power plant or electricity transmission losses. Overall system
efciencies can reach 7080% compared to the present 30%
delivery efciency of the US electrical grid (EIA, 2007, p. 221).
Finally, the principle of taking a systems-level view should be
used when it appears the efciency ceiling has been hit. If the
science and engineering will not allow the efciency of a part or
process to increase, can the waste of the system be put to good
use? Combined cooling, heating and power systems and combined solar photovoltaic/thermal panels both take advantage of
what would otherwise be waste heat in order to boost their
overall efciency. As a further example, when organic waste
decomposes at a landll, the biogas that is generated can either be
released into the atmosphere or processed rather simply yielding

fuel equivalent to natural gasby looking at the landll as a

whole system, one can take what was a greenhouse gas emission
and transform it into a renewable energy solution. There are
doubtless many DOD facilities (and systems within these facilities) that could benet from this sort of analysis. Getting this
analysis, however, will not be easy:
Such system design requires a diverse background, deep
curiosity, often a transdisciplinary design team, and meticulous attention to detail. Whole-system design is not what any
engineering school appears to be teaching, nor what most
customers currently expect, request, reward, or receive. But it
represents a key part of the overhang of practical, protable,
unbought energy efciency that so far remains missing from
virtually all ofcial studies. (Lovins, 2005, p. 19)
4.1.3. Missing data
In management, you pay attention to what you measure.
Conversely, it becomes quite difcult to focus useful attention on
an issue if you cannot measure its features. Remarkably, many of
the buildings within the federal government do not even have an
electricity meter! To remedy this problem, Section 103 of the
Energy Policy Act of 2005 requires that all federal buildings have
metered electricity by 1 October 2012. At the end of FY07, only
34% of the DODs electricity was metered at the building level
(DUSD(I&E), 2007). As the DOD closes this gap, they have an
opportunity to leap forward by installing advanced metering that
can provide daily updates and break out hourly consumption. If
preparing for future on-site electricity generation, installed
meters should not be simply two-way (i.e., rolling backwards or
forwards depending on net electricity ow), but rather the meters
should measure gross electricity consumption and production
separately and simultaneously. Such data may be critical in a
future where more utility companies may charge separately for
the delivered electricity and for the ability to transport energy
over their network.
Individual metering of buildings is critical not just to achieving
better facility efciencies but also to maintaining this performance. The Air Force and Department of Energy have recently
collaborated on energy audits geared at improving the energy
efciency at various Air Force facilities (Lalley, 2007). To receive
the largest possible benet from an energy-efciency expert
evaluation, one must have accurate building-by-building data.
This data becomes even more important when building occupancy or function changes and energy use creeps up, at which
point a re-commissioning may be in order. Another data tool that

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has proven useful during facility-efciency evaluations has been

the thermal imaging camera. Commercially available relatively
affordable cameras now allow inspectors to clearly see even very
small temperature differences that may indicate improper seals or
interior insulation.
By gathering the right data, one may even come to surprising
conclusions regarding energy efciency that can help guide future
actions. In a Netherlands study of energy use versus personal
values, Vringer et al. (2007) found that households sorted by
extremely different value patterns (categorized as caring faithful,
conservatives, hedonists, balanced, materialists, professionals,
broad minded, and social minded) all used nearly the same
amount of energyto within75%! A much better discriminator
for energy use was found to be the household incomehighincome households on an average used twice as much energy as
low-income households. Thorough analysis empowered by being
able to ask and answer the right questions may yet lead to further
facility-efciency improvements.

4.2. Political
4.2.1. Wrong driver
Near-term energy cost savings is the wrong basis for making
most DOD efciency improvement decisions. Any policy to use
1836 month projected energy cost savings as the primary driver
for such decisions severely limits the scope of what can be
accomplished through efciency improvements. Recall that the
entire DOD energy bill in FY07 was only 2.5% of the total DOD
budget, so even if energy efciency magically improved and cut
energy use in half, the total energy cost savings would amount to
only 1.25% of the DOD budget. This miniscule potential savings
tends to reduce the priority of improving DOD energy efciency
during the decision-making process. The calculation of the true
benet of energy-efciency improvements must also include cost
savings in other arenas such as logistics, transportation, personnel, etc. With fuel being 70% of the resupply tonnage to deployed
Army units (Defense Science Board, 2001, p. 13), the cost savings
reaped by cutting this tonnage in half is orders of magnitude
greater than the cost of the saved fuel. DOD policy is starting to
move in the right direction to correct this oversight; the Under
secretary of Defense for Acquisition, technology and logistics
initiated a pilot program in April 2007 that will develop the best
business practices to enable acquisition programs to account for
the fully burdened cost of fuel in their program calculations and
decisions (Krieg, 2007). While burdened calculations will not have
a large direct impact on the cost of fuel gures for DOD facilities
within the continental US, the lesson learned is valuable and
applicable nonetheless: one must look further than simple 1836
month energy cost savings for accurate assessments of potential
energy-efciency savings.
Ideally, the calculation of the benets of improving energy
efciency would also take into account the benets of force
multiplication, increased resilience, and increased endurance.
While these attributes may be difcult to observe or calculate
when looking at a single system, their effects quickly become
apparent during large-scale exercises. Many war games and other
simulation packages do incorporate system efciencies during
their execution, but they would be of higher utility if they also
allowed the user to easily adjust efciency numbers to perform
quick trade-off studies, particularly in support of acquisition
program decisions. Along a similar vein, the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council has agreed to selectively apply an Energy
Efciency Key Performance Parameter as necessary for some
acquisition programs (Giambastiani, 2006). It is certainly a step in
the right direction, but it is doubtful that this policy alone can

fully capture the benets that improved energy efciency can

bring to military effectiveness.
4.2.2. Inadequate metrics
The DOD does not have a metric that measures military
effectiveness per unit of input energy. Lacking such a metric, they
cannot establish a clear goal and then measure their progress
towards that goal. Lacking such a metric, they cannot determine
when they have cut too deeply and started to actually reduce
military effectiveness. Perhaps such a metric is an impossibility,
but there certainly remains progress to be made towards that
ideal.
With regards to facilities, what is done at present is measure
energy usage per square foot. This energy-intensity metric is
common within the commercial industry and is used by federal
agencies to track their progress towards meeting facility efciency
goals such as the 30% energy-intensity reduction required
between 2005 and 2015 according to Executive Order 13,423. In
delivered energy per square foot, the DOD and US commercial
sector are quite comparable: the DOD used 112 kBtu per square
foot averaged over their 2B square feet of facility space in FY07
(DUSD(I&E), 2007), while the US commercial sector used 110 kBtu
per square foot averaged over their 75B square feet of space in
2004 (Buildings Energy Data Book, 2006, Summary Sheet 9). Since
much of the DOD facility space is ofce space identical to the
commercial sector, the energy source (electricity, natural gas, etc.)
and end-use (lighting, heating, cooling, etc.) breakouts are also
quite comparable. Thus, looking for best practices from the
commercial industry is an excellent strategy for improving DOD
facility energy efciency. The Air Force is actively pursuing this
strategy through events such as the expert panel discussion that
took place at the USAF Energy Forum II; panel members included
facility energy executives from CB Richard Ellis, IBM Corporation,
Biswanger Advisory Services, Inc., General Motors, Jones Lang
LaSalle, and the Air Force (Energy Forum II, 2008).
Even this seemingly appropriate metric of energy use per
square foot must be used with some caution, however. What
people truly desire is to have a space that is comfortable in terms
of temperature, humidity, lighting, and ability to power our
appliances and electronics. Thus, arbitrarily continuing to reduce
the target for energy use per square foot will eventually have a
deleterious effect on occupants ability to perform normal duties
unless we nd innovative ways to supply these same comforts
using less energy per square foot. As the DOD continues to
improve its facility efciency, it will become necessary to
reevaluate the goals and the metrics used to measure progress
towards those goals. They must design and select metrics that
measure progress towards the truly desired end state.
4.2.3. Inconsistent backing
Political support for various paths towards improved energy
efciency has suffered from spotty, and sometimes nonexistent,
backing from the federal government and DOD. As this support is
often in the form of nancial incentives, we see here an example
of a barrier that is both political and nancial in nature. Adding
wind or solar renewable energy sources to the power grid is an
effective efciency gain because this energy reduces the amount
of electrical energy and waste heat that would otherwise be
produced at a conventional fossil-fuel-burning plant. Yet two
critical US incentives to develop more wind and solar energy
are presently being allowed to expire at the end of 2008: the
Production Tax Credit (PTC) and the Investment Tax Credit. The
Production Tax Credit stimulates the creation of new wind energy
plants by supplying utility companies with a 2 cent credit for
every kilowatt-hour of wind energy produced during a facilitys

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R.J. Umstattd / Energy Policy 37 (2009) 28702880

5000

Years with no Production Tax Credit

2000

77% decrease

3000

73% decrease

4000
93% decrease

U.S. Annual Wind Capacity

Installed (MW)

6000

1000
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Fig. 4. Impact of lapses in the production tax credit for wind energy. Source: data
from American Wind Energy Association, http://www.awea.org/legislative/accessed 20 March, 2008.

rst 10 years of operation. Since it is inception in 1992, the PTC

has been provided off-and-on via various 1 and 2 year extensions.
In fact, it has even been allowed to lapse during three separate
years. The catastrophic effect of these lapses is seen clearly in
Fig. 4.
Installation of new wind energy nearly came to a stand still in
2000, 2002, and 2004 because of these lapses. Conversely, the
consistent incentive available from 2005 through 2007 is almost
certainly a key ingredient in the explosive growth seen in 2007.
The expiration of the PTC due to occur at the end of this year is
likely already resulting in reduced wind investment as these
projects often take many months to become operational. The
Investment Tax Credit (ITC) provides for up to a $2000 credit on
residential installation of solar energy and will expire at the same
time. One current proposal on the table is to extend both credits
for 8 years, double the ITC credit, and make the ITC credit
available also to utility companies. At the time of this writing, it
remains to be seen whether or not Congress will nd a way to
make the commitment to long-term support for these renewable
energy sources. [Post-submission update: On 3 October, 2008,
Congress extended the PTC by only 1 year but the ITC by 8 years.
In addition, the $2000 cap for residential installation credit has
been lifted on the ITC so that it will provide a true 30% tax credit,
and utility companies are no longer prohibited from beneting
from the credit.]
Within the DOD, there are also uctuations regarding support
for efciency improvement tools. Several nancial vehicles have
been available to federal agencies now for more than two decades.
As with the tax credits above, though, there have been occasional
lapses in the federal authority to use some of these tools. Perhaps
the most powerful of these tools, the Energy Savings Performance
Contract (ESPC) is presently authorized for initiation through
2016 by the Energy Policy Act of 2005. In an ESPC, efciency
improvements implemented by the contractor are paid for using
the majority of the energy cost savings, a process which can take
1025 years to complete the payback. Since 1998, several Super
ESPCs, designed to serve either a large geographic region or a
specic-energy technology, have been in place to help streamline
the challenging contracting process. In addition, the Federal
Energy Management Program offers assistance to all federal
agencies in utilizing these Super ESPCs to accomplish their energy
use goals and upgrade their energy infrastructure. According to
the Department of Energys Federal Energy Management Program,
as of 2007 over 400 ESPC projects had been awarded in 46 states
by 19 different federal agencies resulting in a total savings of
16 TBtu per yearenough energy to supply city of 450,000 for one
year. While the DOD has regularly taken advantage of this

2877

program (10 new ESPC tasks were awarded in FY07 (DUSD(I&E),

2007), in October of 2007 the Air Force increased the burden of
the ESPC approval process and centralized the oversight (Eulberg,
2007). In fact, across the DOD in 2007, the use of ESPCs declined
enough that the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations
and Environment) issued a policy memo in January 2008
requiring the services to include ESPCs in their plans for reducing
energy consumption (DUSD(I&E), 2008). In response, the December 2008 Air Force Energy Program Policy Memorandum requires
that each ESPC be evaluated to ensure it provides the best return
on investment for the Air Force (Donley, 2008). Thus, while the
DOD is encouraging the use of ESPCs as part of an energy savings
strategy, the Air Force instead is emphasizing cost savings in their
selection of ESPCs, thereby limiting the application of these longterm investment tools.
Another missing piece of energy-efciency policy is the
stimulation that would be provided by federal legislation that
enables a cap and trade market for carbon dioxide emissions.
While the present study does not address reducing greenhouse
gas emissions, it should be noted that any serious effort to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions will include a large component
dedicated to energy-efciency improvement. Though the US
withdrew from the 1997 Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change in
March of 2001, other countries around the world embarked on
their efforts to meet the terms of the Protocol. In fact, Europe has
had carbon caps in place since 2005 and is well on their way to
establishing a well regulated and protable carbon trading
market. The lethargy of the US is even more puzzling in the face
of the enormously successful role that the sulfur dioxide emission
market has played herein eliminating the problem of acid rain
ever since this market was born out of the emission restrictions
imposed by the Clean Air Act of 1990. According to Richard Sandor
(2008), the Chicago Climate Exchanges chairman and CEO, the
idea of a sulfur dioxide exchange market attracted a surprising
number of environmentalists, because it called for large and
specic reductions; conservatives who usually oppose regulation
approved of the market-driven solution. Through the use of the
sulfur dioxide exchange market, emissions have successfully been
reduced from 18 million tons to 9 million tons and are expected to
be below 5 million tons by 2010. This was accomplished because
there was money to be made while addressing the mandatory
emission reductions; when there is real money at stake,
innovative solutions have a way of surfacing. Sandor (2008)
continues: The lesson is important: price stimulates inventive
activity. Even if you think the price is too low or ridiculous. Carbon
has to be rationed, like water and clean air. But I absolutely
promise that if you design a law and a trading scheme properly
you are going to nd everyone from professors at M.I.T. to the guys
in Silicon Valley coming out of the woodwork. That is what we
need, and we need it now. Legislated carbon dioxide emission
caps and the money at stake in the subsequent trade market
would almost certainly stimulate energy-efciency improvements, thereby potentially killing two birds with one stone.

4.2.4. Fragmentation
One further notable hurdle facing facility energy-efciency
improvements is the extreme fragmentation of the US building
industry. When a new technology is demonstrated to be both
energy efcient and affordable, it still remains extremely difcult
to achieve market penetration because there is no short list of
major players in construction. Instead, new technologies are
adopted painfully slowly, if at all, in one small pocket after
another. This fragmentation is not unique to the US as it has also
been observed in the UK (Sorrell, 2003). The residential building
sector is even more fragmented than the commercial sector; in

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2005, the top 5 residential homebuilders together accounted for

only 15% of homes built, and the top 100 together accounted for
only 37% (Buildings Energy Data Book, 2006, Summary Sheet 22).
A solution to this fragmentation problem perhaps lies in the
efforts of groups like the National Institute of Building Sciences,
the American Institute of Architects, the National Association of
Home Builders, and the Alliance to Save Energyorganizations
that can rally the critical mass needed to adopt a new technology
or policy by bringing people together, recognizing best practices
alongside outstanding performers, and spreading the word.

4.3. Financial
4.3.1. Disincentives
Perhaps the most insidious barriers to improving facility
energy efciencies are the nancial disincentives that are
intertwined with the way we presently do business. Let us borrow
a simple illustration from Lovins (2005, p. 19): In a typical US
ofce, using one-size-fatter wire to power overhead lights would
pay for itself within 20 weeks. Why wasnt that done? Because:
(1) The wire size was specied by the low-bid electrician, who
was told to meet code, and the wire-size table in the [US]
National Electrical Code is meant to prevent res, not to save
money. Saving money by optimizing resistive losses takes wire
about twice as fat. (2) The ofce owner or occupant will buy the
electricity, but the electrician bought the wire. An electrician
altruistic enough to buy fatter wire is not the low bidder and
wont win the job. Similarly, the owner versus tenant disincentive plays a crucial role in many commercial and residential
buildings. An owner who leases or rents the property has no
incentive to install energy-efcient features because they typically cost more; likewise, a tenant lacks incentive because shortterm energy cost savings will not likely repay the investment.
A related disincentive lurks in the way most US utility
companies supply energy. With most commodities, the prots
increase with sales volumeif you sell less product, you will reap
less prot. Why would utility companies want to help their
customers improve their energy efciency if the improvements
result in reduced prots? To address this issue, several states have
started decoupling utility company prots from sales volumes.
One way to accomplish this decoupling is to charge separately for
energy usage versus energy transmissionif customer energy
usage falls such that the utility company does not recoup its costs
for maintaining or upgrading the transmission infrastructure,
then the transmission fees can be raised. Utility company prots
are thus protected even if energy usage falls, and while customers
see little if any cost savings from their reduced energy usage, they
benet indirectly by not having to pay for the increased energy
infrastructure that would otherwise be needed if overall usage
increased. Led by California, which decoupled prots from sales
volume in 1982, many other states have taken similar steps
including Oregon, Maryland, Idaho, New York, and Minnesota,
but the vast majority of utilities across the nation have yet
to be decoupled. There are several variations on how to
accomplish this decoupling; in each market, the implementation
must be tailored carefully to avoid unintended consequences. To
encourage the growth of efcient distributed energy systems,
such decoupling should be designed to allow utility companies to
charge transmission fees for energy either downloaded from or
uploaded to the grid. Under such a model, utility companies can
encourage the growth of point-of-use, small-scale electricity
generation without suffering a severe prot loss. Both the utility
company and customers then benet from a more robust energy
source network enhanced by additional generation and storage
capacity.

4.3.2. Missing local rewards

When residential or commercial consumers manage to save
money through energy-efciency improvements, they can enjoy
this savings by using it however they see t. Within the DOD,
however, this same exibility does not exist. In most cases, money
that is intended to pay for energy bills must pay for energy
onlyif a base saves money by reducing their energy costs, the
base commander cannot use the savings to reward the community. While commanders have been given the exibility to locally
spend energy savings on other energy-related projects, it requires
extreme creativity to nd ways to otherwise motivate people to
improve their energy efciency.
Another unfortunate reality within the DOD is that money
not spent during the year often becomes money lost the next
year. Leaders are thus concerned that showing a cost savings
now will result in a reduced budget in the future. This effect
should not be a concern if the leader is convinced that the savings
are true and will continue year after year, but this effect
does inhibit energy-efciency experiments that might work one
year because of a particular weather pattern or personnel
priorities. If energy costs rise the next year, the scramble to cover
the increase will likely result in having to cut other programs or
services.

4.3.3. Unfunded requirements

Unfunded requirements often become unaccomplished requirements. When a requirement to improve energy efciency is
levied without the identication of additional funding to support
the effort, success becomes an unlikely outcome. In the interest of
saving money, some leaders would like to accomplish such
efciency improvement using organic resources, but which team
member has the expertise and time to devote to the project? And
how will any capital costs be paid? Within the US federal
government, several nancial tools are available to help save the
project. Energy Savings Performance Contracts and Utility Energy
Service Contracts can provide the expertise, manpower, and
capital to accomplish efciency improvements with little or no
investment from the federal agency. As the DOD struggles with
how to take the next steps to improve energy efciency, there are
perhaps novel combinations or applications of these nancial
tools that can be applied to maximize their impact. The Air Force
is currently examining options for offering Enhanced Use Leases
on base to companies willing to build, own, and operate solar and
nuclear energy plants; adding a Power Purchase Agreement
between the Air Force and the company can then help to ensure
the protability of such a venture (Air Force Real Property Agency,
2008). Given the Air Forces current interest in domestically
produced fuel, can an on-base nuclear plant be collocated with a
renewable fuels plant that utilizes the nuclear plants waste heat
for processing the fuel?
To address the manpower aspect of unfunded requirements,
some bases have begun to employ resource-efciency managers
(REMs). These contractors are energy experts who provide their
services by covering their salaries year-to-year using a portion of
the savings they generate. Taken to the limit, REMs should
eventually work themselves out of their jobs, leaving in their wake
a vast number of facility-efciency improvements. In general, an
organization should have approximately $3M or more of annual
energy expenditures for the hiring of a dedicated REM to be cost
effective. Smaller facilities, though, can still benet from a REM by
sharing the cost of the REM with other small facilities. As of July
2004, only 25 REMs were in place servicing approximately 40
federal facilities (Federal Energy Management Program, 2004).
Given that DOD facility energy costs were $3.4B in FY07, such
expenditure could justify employment of closer to 1000 REMs.

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Table 2
Ten key impediments.
Impediment
Technological
Insufcient energy
storage
Tunnel vision
Missing data
Political
Wrong driver

Inadequate metrics

Inconsistent backing

Fragmentation

Financial
Disincentives
Missing local rewards
Unfunded requirements

Solution agents

Public and private research and development

funding agents
Systems and electrical engineers, university
curriculum directors, utility companies
Local building managers or energy managers
Senior DOD leadership within installations and
energy as well as within acquisitions, technology
and logistics, energy managers, acquisition
program managers
Senior DOD leadership within installations and
energy as well as within acquisitions, technology
and logistics
Executive and legislative branches, senior DOD
leadership within installations and energy as
well as within acquisitions, technology, and
logistics
Professional organizations within the building
industry, efciency-oriented political action
groups
Federal, state and local governments, utility
companies
Congress and senior DOD nance ofcials
Federal energy management program, senior
DOD leadership within installations and energy

This self-funding expert manpower has yet to be fully utilized to

improve DOD facility energy efciency.
While the foundational pillars of technology, policy, and
nancing must each be in place and strong for an energyefciency improvement to take hold, within the DOD there is a
further requirement. As noted by the recently retired commander
of the Air Forces Air Combat Command (Keys, 2008), only
mission drives long-term commitment. Thus, as the DOD moves
forward with removing or circumventing the efciency barriers
described here, they must do so with the understanding that their
efforts are doomed to fail unless the end result improves their
ability to get the job done. Table 2 is a summary of the 10 key
obstacles identied in this study along with recommended action
agents that either are or could be pursuing remedies.

5. Conclusion
While improving efciency saves energy, an even more
signicant benet of improved efciency for the DOD is the
resulting increase in military effectiveness. Efciency improvements bring with them many military enhancements worth
paying for such as simplicity, surprise, a reduced logistics tail,
force multiplication, increased resilience, and increased endurance. Thus, energy cost savings should not be a principle factor
when deliberating over proposed energy-efciency improvements. The true savings incurred through efciency improvements are often many times greater than the simple cost of the
energy, so there is much more at stake than the $3.4B of the DOD
budget that is presently consumed by facility energy costs. While
a plethora of tools exist to help the DOD on the path towards
improved energy efciency within its facilities, there are still
many roadblocks that must be overcome. To assist in focusing
future efciency improvement efforts, the 10 obstacles discussed
herein were assigned to 3 general barrier categories, and lead
agencies were proposed for resolving each of these impediments.

2879

By addressing these technological, political, and nancial barriers

that stand in the way of DOD facility energy-efciency improvements, the DOD can deliver a secure energy future while
simultaneously improving both their sustainability and military
effectiveness.

Acknowledgements
The author performed this study as a National Technologies
Laboratory Fellow supported by the US Air Forces Air University
and the Department of Energys Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
Additional nancial support was provided by the USAF Institute
for National Security Studies. The author gratefully acknowledges
the knowledge, guidance, and time of the following individuals:
T. Vane, K. Meidel, S. Thomas, R. Hawsey, P. Hughes, D. Stinton,
T. King, T. Wilbanks, D. Greene, and A. Desjarlais at the Oak Ridge
National Laboratory; S. Hearne, D. Sheets, and J. Fittipaldi at the
Army Environmental Policy Institute; G. Doddington and J. Snook
at the Air Force Civil Engineering Support Agency; J. Barnett
and J. Dominick at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory;
R. Rude at Minot AFB; G. Denslow at Dyess AFB; and W. Turner at
Fairchild AFB.
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