Assignment 2 Compilation

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II
ATTY. CHRISTIAN VILLASIS

ASSIGNMENT NO. 2
CASE NO. 1
UNTALAN, CYRUS D.C.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED LUZ GARCIA. PABLO G. UTULO VS.
LEONA PASION VIUDA DE GARCIA, OPPOSITOR-APPELLANT.
G.R. NO. 45904 SEPTEMBER 30, 1938
FACTS: Juan Garcia died intestate and in the proceedings instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Tarlac for the administration of his property, Leona Pasion Vda. de Garcia,
the surviving spouse and the herein oppositor, was appointed judicial administratrix. The
said deceased left legitimate children, one of whom is Luz Garcia, and his wife as heirs.
However, during the pendency of the intestate proceedings, Luz died and she left no
legitimate descendants hence her only heirs were her mother and husband. Her
husband then applied for judicial administration of the property despite the absence of a
will from his late wife. This was opposed to by Leona Pasion Vda. De Garcia but she
was overruled and the court decided in favor of herein petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether the lower court erred in deciding in favor of herein petitioner.
RULING: Yes. Sec. 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure providing in part that "if no
executor is named in the will, or if a person dies intestate, administration shall be
granted" etc. This provision enunciates the general rule that when a person dies living
property in the Philippine Islands, his property should be judicially administered and the
competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in the
section, in case the deceased left no will, or in case he had left one should he fail to
name an executor therein. This rule, however, is subject to the exceptions established
by sections 596 and 597 of the same Code, as finally amended.
According to the first, when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due
from the estate, they may agree in writing to partition the property without instituting the
judicial administration or applying for the appointment of an administrator. While in the
second, if the property left does not exceed six thousand pesos, the heirs may apply to
the competent court, after the required publications, to proceed with the summary
partition and, after paying all the known obligations, to partition all the property
constituting the inheritance among themselves pursuant to law, without instituting the
judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator. Construing the scope of
section 596, this court repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving pending
obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the
property to a judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are
superfluous and unnecessary proceedings. When there are no debts existing against
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ASSIGNMENT 2
the estate, there is certainly no occasion for the intervention of an administrator in the
settlement and partition of the estate among the heirs. When the heirs are all of lawful
age and there are no debts, there is no reason why the estate should be burdened with
the costs and expenses of an administrator. The property belonging absolutely to the
heirs, in the absence of existing debts against the estate, the administrator has no right
to intervene in any way whatever in the division of the estate among the heirs. They are
co-owners of an undivided estate and the law offers them a remedy for the division of
the same among themselves. There is nothing in the present case to show that the
heirs requested the appointment of the administrator, or that they intervened in any way
whatever in the present actions. If there are any heirs of the estate who have not
received their participation, they have their remedy by petition for partition of the said
estate.
The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as
completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same
before his death. There is no weight in the argument adduced by the appellee to the
effect that his appointment as judicial administrator is necessary so that he may have
legal capacity to appear in the intestate of the deceased Juan Garcia Sanchez. As he
would appear in the said intestate by the right of the representation, it would suffice for
him to allege in proof of his interest that he is a usufructuary forced heir of his deceased
wife who, in turn, would be a forced heir and an interested and necessary party if she
were living. In order to intervene in said intestate and to take part in the distribution of
the property it is not necessary that the administration of the property of his deceased
wife be instituted an administration which will take up time and occasion
inconvenience and unnecessary expenses. The appealed order should be reversed,
with the costs of this instance to the applicant-appellee. So ordered.
CASE NO. 2
VELACHA, LAARNIE T.
MARIA VDA. DE REYES VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 92436, JULY 26, 1991
FACTS: During his lifetime, one Gavino Reyes owned a parcel of land of approximately
70 hectares. He sought to bring said land under the operation of the Torrens System of
registration of property. Unfortunately, he died in 1921 without the title having been
issued to him. The application was prosecuted by his son, Marcelo Reyes, who was the
administrator of his property.

ASSIGNMENT 2
In 1936 the above property was surveyed and subdivided by Gavino's heirs. It appears
therein that two lots, one of which is Lot No. I A-14, were allotted to Rafael Reyes, Sr.,
one of Gavino's children. The children thereafter secured tax declarations for their
respective shares.
In 1941, or about twenty (20) years after the death of Gavino, the original certificate of
title for the whole property OCT No. 255 was issued. It was, however, kept by
Juan Poblete, son-in-law of Marcelo Reyes, who was by then already deceased. The
heirs of Gavino were not aware of this fact.
On 3 December 1943, Rafael Reyes, Sr. sold a parcel of land with an area of 23,431
square meters, more or less, to private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola.
In 1945 or thereabouts, Juan Poblete "revalidated" the original Certificate of Title. As

reconstituted, the new title is OCT (0-4358) RO-255.
On 21 October 1967, when the heirs of Gavino Reyes executed a Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate based on the aforestated subdivision plan, the lot that was
intended for Rafael Reyes, Sr., who was already deceased, was instead adjudicated to
his only son and heir, Rafael Reyes, Jr. (the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners
herein). Private respondent Rosario Martillano signed the deed in representation of her
mother, Marta Reyes, one of the children of Gavino Reyes.
As a result of the Extrajudicial Settlement, OCT RO-255 was cancelled and in lieu
thereof, several transfer certificates of title covering the subdivided lots were issued in
the names of the respective adjudicatees. The Transfer Certificates of Title were,
however, kept by one Candido Hebron.
On 10 January 1969, some of the heirs of Gavino Reyes filed a case of Annulment of
Partition and Recovery of Possession before the Court of First Instance of Cavite City.
ASSIGNMENT 2
The case was dismissed on 18 September 1969, but Candido Hebron was ordered by
the trial court to deliver to the heirs concerned all the transfer certificates of title in his
possession.
After obtaining the Transfer Certificate of Title for Lot No. 1-A-14 from Hebron,
petitioners herein, as successors-in-interest of Rafael Reyes, Jr., filed a case against
private respondents (defendants therein) for recovery of possession or, in the
alternative, for indemnification, accounting and damages. They alleged that they have
been deprived by said defendants of the rightful possession and enjoyment of the
property since September 1969.
In their answer, private respondents deny the material averments in the complaint and
assert that they are the owners of the lot in question, having bought the same from
Rafael Reyes, Sr., that the issuance of TCT No. 27257 is null and void, for such sale
was known to Rafael Reyes, Jr.; that they have been in possession of the property and
have been paying the land taxes thereon; and that petitioners are barred by prescription
and/or laches.
In its decision of 1 October 1986, the trial court concluded that petitioners' "title over the
subject property is valid and regular and thus they are entitled to its possession and
enjoyment,"
On appeal the CA concluded that the trial court erred when it ordered the private
respondents or anyone acting in their behalf to relinquish the possession or vacate the
property in question.
ISSUE: Whether the oral partition made by Reyes children is valid despite the
requirement under Sec. 1 of Rule 74 that it must be in a public document.

ASSIGNMENT 2
RULING: Yes. The Court of Appeals correctly held that the partition made by the
children of Gavino Reyes in 1936, although oral, was valid and binding. There is no law
that requires partition among heirs to be in writing to be valid.
In Hernandez vs. Andal, supra, this Court, interpreting Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules
of Court, held that the requirement that a partition be put in a public document and
registered has for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time the
protection of the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The object of registration is to
serve as constructive notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition
not executed with the prescribed formalities does not come into play when there are no
creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. Where no such rights are involved, it
is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution in a
manner and upon a plan different from those provided by law. There is nothing in said
section from which it can be inferred that a writing or other formality is an essential
requisite to the validity of the partition. Accordingly, an oral partition is valid.
Barcelona, et al. vs. Barcelona, et al., supra, provides the reason why oral partition is
valid and why it is not covered by the Statute of Frauds: partition among heirs or
renunciation of an inheritance by some of them is not exactly a conveyance of real
property for the reason that it does not involve transfer of property from one to the other,
but rather a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property by the heir renouncing
in favor of another heir accepting and receiving the inheritance.
The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the
decedent. The estate of the decedent would then be held in co-ownership by the heirs.
The co-heir or co-owner may validly dispose of his share or interest in the property
subject to the condition that the portion disposed of is eventually allotted to him in the
division upon termination of the co-ownership.
In the case at bar, the lot sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private respondent Dalmacio
Gardiola is his share in the estate of his deceased father, Gavino Reyes. It is the same
property which was eventually adjudicated to his son and heir, Rafael Reyes, Jr.,
represented in turn by his heirs-petitioners herein-in the extrajudicial settlement of 1967.
However, petitioners, as mere successors-in-interest of Rafael Reyes, Jr., son of Rafael
Reyes, Sr., can only acquire that which Rafael, Jr. could transmit to them upon his
death. The latter never became the owner of Lot No. 1-A-14 because it was sold by his
father in 1943. The issuance of TCT No. T-27257 in the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr., in so
ASSIGNMENT 2
far as Lot No. 1-14-A is concerned, was clearly erroneous because he never became its
owner. An extrajudicial settlement does not create a light in favor of an heir.
Thus, since he never had any title or right to Lot No. 1-14-A, the mere execution of the
settlement did not improve his condition, and the subsequent registration of the deed
did not create any right or vest any title over the property in favor of the petitioners as
heirs of Rafael Reyes, Jr. The latter cannot give them what he never had before. Nemo
dare potest quod non habet.
There is one more point that should be stressed here. As categorically admitted by
petitioners in their complaint and amended complaint, it was only in or about September
1969 when, after the delivery of TCT No. 27257 by Candido Hebron to them, that they
definitely discovered that they were the owners of the property in question. And yet,
despite full knowledge that private respondents were in actual physical possession of
the property, it was only about thirteen and one-half (13 1/2) years later that they
decided to file an action for recovery of possession. The instant petition then is without
merit.
CASE NO. 3
VILLANUEVA, LIEZL O.
SAMPILO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. L-10474, FEBRUARY 28, 1958
FACTS: Teodoro Tolete, died leaving his wife and nephews and nieces who are children
of his deceased brothers and sisters. His wife executed an affidavit of self adjudicating
saying that Teodoro had no children or or dependents, neither ascendants or
acknowledged natural children, neither brothers, sisters, nephews, and nieces.Then, his
wife sold the properties to Sampilo, then the latter sold it to Salacup.
Sinopera instituted estate proceedings asking for letters of administration. She alleged
that Teodors wife, has no right to execute the affidavit of self-adjudication for there
others heirs aside from her.
The trial court ruled in favor of Sinopera. In their appeal, the petitioners argue that
Sinoperas cause of action has already prescribed because according to the rules of
court, persons deprived of their rights due to the partition or self adjudication for there
are other heirs aside from her. The CA modified the ruling stating that the affidavit of
Teodoros wife is null and void, but the subsequent sales are valid insofar as it is not
above her share from Teodoros estate.
ISSUE: Whether or not the casue of action has already prescribed.
ASSIGNMENT 2
RULING: No. The rule applies only to persons who participated in the said special
proceedings and does not prejudice those who did not have the chance to participate.
There are two significant provisions in section 1, and 4 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.
In Section 1, it is required that if there are two or more heirs, both or all of them should
take part in the extrajudicial settlement. This requirement is made more imperative in
the old law (Section 596, Act No. 190) by the addition of the clause "and not otherwise".
By the title of Section 4, the "distributees and estate" are indicated as the persons to
answer for rights violated by extrajudicial settlement. On the other hand, it is also
significant that no mention is made expressly of the effect of the extrajudicial settlement
on persons who did not take part therein or had no notice or knowledge thereof. There
cannot be any doubt that those who took part or had knowledge of the extrajudicial
settlement are bound thereby. As to them the law is clear that if they claim to have been
in any manner deprived of their lawful right or share in the estate by the extrajudicial
settlement, they may demand their rights or interest within the period of two years, and
both the distributees and estate would be liable to them for such rights or interest.
Evidently, they are the persons who, in accordance with the provision, may seek to
remedy the prejudice to their rights within the two-year period. But as to those who did
not take part in the settlement or had no notice of the death of the decedent or of the
settlement, there is no direct or express provision, and it is unreasonable and unjust that
they also be required to assert their claims within the period of two years. To extend the
effect of the settlement of them, to those who did not take part or had no knowledge
thereof, without any express legal provision to that effect, would be violative of the
fundamental right to due process of law.
CASE NO. 4
ABAD, SHAREL ANN N.
JOSEPH CUA VS. GLORIA A. VARGAS, AURORA VARGAS, RAMON VARGAS,
MARITES VARGAS, EDELINA VARGAS AND GEMMA VARGAS
FACTS: A parcel of residential land with an area of 99 square meters located in San
Juan, Virac, Catanduanes was left behind by the late Paulina Vargas. On February 4,
1994, a notarized Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was executed by and among
Paulina Vargas' heirs, namely Ester Vargas, Visitacion Vargas, Juan Vargas, Zenaida V.
Matienzo, Rosario V. Forteza, Andres Vargas, Gloria Vargas, Antonina Vargas and
Florentino Vargas, partitioning and adjudicating unto themselves the lot in question,
each one of them getting a share of 11 square meters. Florentino, Andres, Antonina and
Gloria, however, did not sign the document. Only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and
Rosario signed it. The Extra Judicial Settlement among Heirs was published in the
Catanduanes Tribune for three consecutive weeks.
On November 15, 1994, an Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale was again
executed by and among the same heirs over the same property and also with the same
sharings. Once more, only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario signed the
ASSIGNMENT 2
document and their respective shares totaling 55 square meters were sold to Joseph
Cua, petitioner herein.
Respondents claimed that as co-owners of the property, they may be subrogated to the
rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him the price of the sale. They likewise alleged
that the 30-day period following a written notice by the vendors to their co-owners for
them to exercise the right of redemption of the property had not yet set in as no written
notice was sent to them. In effect, they claimed that the Extra Judicial Settlement
Among Heirs and the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale were null and
void and had no legal and binding effect on them.
According to Gloria Vargas, the widow of Santiago Vargas and one of respondents
herein, she came to know of the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale dated
November 16, 1994 only when the original house built on the lot was being demolished
sometime in May 1995.She likewise claimed she was unaware that an earlier Extra
Judicial Settlement Among Heirs dated February 4, 1994 involving the same property
had been published in the Catanduanes Tribune. Gloria Vargas tried to redeem the
property, when the offer to redeem was refused; Gloria Vargas filed a case for
annulment of Extra Judicial Settlement and Legal Redemption of the lot with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Virac, Catanduanes against petitioner.
MTC rendered a decision13 in favor of petitioner, dismissing the complaint. The MTC
upheld the sale to petitioner because the transaction purportedly occurred after the
partition of the property among the co-owner heirs. The MTC opined that the other heirs
could validly dispose of their respective shares. RTC affirmed MTC decision, but the CA
reversed the lower courts decision declaring that the Extra Judicial Settlement Among
Heirs and the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale, dated February 4, 1994
and November 15, 1994, respectively, were void and without any legal effect.
ISSUE: Whether heirs are deemed constructively notified and bound, regardless of their
failure to participate therein, by an extrajudicial settlement and partition of estate when
the extrajudicial settlement and partition has been duly published.
RULING: No. The rule plainly states, that persons who do not participate or had no
notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby. It contemplates a notice
that has been sent out or issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition is
agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of
extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not after such an agreement has already
been executed as what happened in the instant case with the publication of the first
deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.
The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs
who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because the same was notice after the
fact of execution. The requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors
and was never intended to deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent's
estate. In this connection, the records of the present case confirm that respondents
ASSIGNMENT 2
never signed either of the settlement documents, having discovered their existence only
shortly before the filing of the present complaint. Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial
settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition made without their knowledge
and consent is invalid insofar as they are concerned.
Nevertheless, respondents are given the right to redeem these shares pursuant to
Article 1088 of the Civil Code. The right to redeem was never lost because respondents
were never notified in writing of the actual sale by their co-heirs. It bears emphasis that
the period of one month shall be reckoned from the time that a co-heir is notified in
writing by the vendor of the actual sale. Written notice is indispensable and mandatory,
actual knowledge of the sale acquired in some other manner by the redemptioner
notwithstanding. It cannot be counted from the time advance notice is given of an
impending or contemplated sale. The law gives the co-heir thirty days from the time
written notice of the actual sale within which to make up his or her mind and decide to
repurchase or effect the redemption.
Considering, therefore, that respondents' co-heirs failed to comply with this requirement,
there is no legal impediment to allowing respondents to redeem the shares sold to
petitioner given the former's obvious willingness and capacity to do so.
CASE NO. 5
ALEGRE, MUTYA S.
SPOUSES GORGONIO BENATIRO AND COLUMBA CUYOS-BENATIRO
SUBSTITUTED BY THEIR HEIRS, NAMELY: ISABELITA, RENATO, ROSADELIA
AND GORGONIO, JR., SURNAMED BENATIRO, AND SPOUSES RENATO C.
BENATIRO AND ROSIE M. BENATIRO VS. HEIRS OF EVARISTO CUYOS, NAMELY:
GLORIA CUYOS-TALIAN, PATROCENIA CUYOS-MIJARES, NUMERIANO CUYOS,
AND ENRIQUE CUYOS, REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, SALUD
CUYOS
G.R. NO. 161220 JULY 30, 2008
FACTS: Spouses Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos were blessed with nine
children. In 1966, Evaristo died leaving six parcels of land. In 1971, one of the heirs
(respondent Gloria) filed before the CFI a petition for Letters of Administration. It was
opposed by her brother Francisco. Both their counsels manifested that the parties had
come to an agreement to settle their case and suggested that the Clerk of Court, Atty.
Taneo, be appointed to act as Commissioner to effect the agreement and prepare the
project of partition for the approval of the court. In his Commissioners Report, Atty.
Taneo stated that he issued subpoenae supplemented by telegrams to all the heirs to
cause their appearance for a conference to arrive at an agreement; that out of nine
heirs, only the three respondents failed to attend; and that they decided to go ahead
with the meeting. The Report further stated that Columba, one of the heirs, informed all
those present of her desire to buy the properties of the estate, to which everybody
agreed. On December 16, 1976, the CFI issued an Order approving the compromise
agreement. The administrator executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the six parcels of
ASSIGNMENT 2
land in favor of Columba. In February 1998, the heirs of Evaristo Cuyos (respondents)
learned of the transfer of titles and discovered the existence of the assailed CFI Order.
They filed with the CA a petition for annulment of the Order alleging, among others, that
Commissioners Report practically deprived them of due process in claiming their share
of their fathers estate. The CA granted the petition ruling that the Certificates of Titles
obtained by herein petitioners were procured fraudulently.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error in annulling the CFI Order
dated December 16, 1976, which approved the Commissioners Report
RULING: We rule in the negative. Although Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court
provides that annulment of a final judgment or order of an RTC may be based "only on
the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction," jurisprudence recognizes denial
of due process as additional ground therefor. While we find that the CA correctly
annulled the CFI Order dated December 16, 1976, we find that it should be annulled not
on the ground of extrinsic fraud, as there is no sufficient evidence to hold Atty. Taneo or
any of the heirs guilty of fraud, but on the ground that the assailed order is void for lack
of due process. There is nothing in the records that would establish that the alleged
subpoenae, supplemented by telegrams, for the heirs to appear in the scheduled
conference were indeed sent to the heirs. Moreover, there was no evidence showing
that the heirs indeed convened for the purpose of arriving at an agreement regarding
the estate properties, since they were not even required to sign anything to show their
attendance of the alleged meeting. In fact, the Commissioner's Report, which embodied
the alleged agreement of the heirs, did not bear the signatures of the alleged attendees
to show their consent and conformity thereto.
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule
plainly states, however, that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an
extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby. It contemplates a notice that has been
sent out or issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a
notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial
settlement and partition), and not after such an agreement has already been executed.
The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs
who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because the same was notice after the
fact of execution. The requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors
and was never intended to deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent's
estate. In this connection, the records of the present case confirm that respondents
never signed either of the settlement documents, having discovered their existence only
shortly before the filing of the present complaint. Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial
settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition made without their knowledge
and consent is invalid insofar as they are concerned. What matters is whether the heirs
were indeed notified before the compromise agreement was arrived at, which was not
established, and not whether they were notified of the Commissioner's Report
embodying the alleged agreement afterwards.
We also find nothing in the records that would show that the heirs were called to a
hearing to validate the Report. The CFI adopted and approved the Report despite the
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ASSIGNMENT 2
absence of the signatures of all the heirs showing conformity thereto. The CFI adopted
the Report despite the statement therein that only six out of the nine heirs attended the
conference, thus, effectively depriving the other heirs of their chance to be heard. The
CFI's action was tantamount to a violation of the constitutional guarantee that no person
shall be deprived of property without due process of law. We find that the assailed Order
dated December 16, 1976, which approved a void Commissioner's Report, is a void
judgment for lack of due process.
CASE NO. 6
ANGANGAN, ALFRENDO JR. T.
PEDROSA V. CA
GR. NO. 118680 MARCH 5, 2001
FACTS: On 1946, spouses Miguel Rodriguez and Rosalina J. de Rodriguez initiated
proceedings before the CFI of Ozamiz City for the legal adoption of Maria Elena
Rodriguez Pedrosa (Petitioner), which was granted.
When Miguel died intestate, Petitioner and Rosalina entered into an extrajudicial
settlement of Miguels estate. Private respondents filed an action to annul the adoption
of petitioner, but the action was denied. Private respondents appealed.
While the appeal was pending, the Rodriguezes entered into an extrajudicial settlement
with respondent Rosalina for the partition of the estate of Miguel and of another sister,
Pilar. Rosalina acted as the representative of the heirs of Miguel Rodriguez. Pilar had
no heirs except his brothers and sisters. Due to the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement
and Partition, respondents Rodriguezes were able to secure new Transfer Certificates
of Title (TCTs) and were able to transfer some parcels to the other respondents herein.
The Court of Appeals eventually dismissed the appeal and upheld the validity of the
adoption of petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner sent her daughter, Loreto Jocelyn, to claim
their share of the properties from the Rodriguezes. The latter refused saying that Maria
Elena and Loreto were not heirs since they were not their blood relatives.
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Petitioner, then, filed a complaint to annul the 1983 partition. The said complaint was
filed on January 28, 1987. Said complaint was later amended on March 25, 1987 to
include the allegation that earnest efforts toward a compromise were made between the
plaintiffs and the defendants, but the same failed.
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the complaint for annulment of the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement and Partition had already prescribed;
(2) Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to recover the lots which had already been
transferred to the respondent buyers.
RULING: (1) NO. The complaint for annulment of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement
and Partition has NOT prescribed yet. RTCs dismissal and CAs affirmation of RTC was
reversed.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides:
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a

newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding
section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not
participated therein or had no notice thereof. (Underlining supplied)
Section 4, Rule 74 provides for a two year prescriptive period (1) to persons who have
participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and in addition (2)
when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that
all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or
are represented by themselves or through guardians.
ASSIGNMENT 2
Petitioner, as the records confirm, did not participate in the extrajudicial

partition. Patently then, the two-year prescriptive period is not applicable in her case. To
say that Maria Elena was represented by Rosalina in the partitioning is imprecise. Maria
Elena, the adopted child, was no longer a minor at the time Miguel died and cannot be
represented.
The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4) years as provided in Gerona vs. De
Guzman, 11 SCRA 153 (1964). Considering that the complaint of the petitioner was filed
on January 28, 1987, or three years and ten months after the questioned extrajudicial
settlement dated March 11, 1983, was executed, we hold that her action against the
respondents on the basis of fraud has not yet prescribed.
Furthermore, the provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will also not apply when the deed of
extrajudicial partition is sought to be annulled on the ground of fraud. A deed of
extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had no
knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious.
(2) NO. Petitioner could no longer redeem the properties from buyers because they
have TCTs already. Well settled is the doctrine that a Torrens Title cannot be collaterally
attacked. The validity of the title can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for
such purpose.
But the Court granted ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS to petitioner
as damages (to be paid by respondents) in view of the technical injury she has suffered.
CASE NO. 7
BALTAZAR, ESTRELLA C.
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED JOSEFA

DELGADO
ASSIGNMENT 2
G.R. NO. 155733 JANUARY 27, 2006
FACTS: This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia
and Josefa Delgado. The main issue in this case is relatively simple: who, between
petitioners and respondents, are the lawful heirs of the decedents.
The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be divided
into two groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and fullblood siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the
alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters, his nephews and nieces, his
illegitimate child, and the de facto adopted child (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.
On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis Delgado, filed the
original petition for letters of administration of the intestate estates of the "spouses
Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia" with the RTC of Manila, Branch 55. This petition
was opposed by the following: (1) the sisters of Guillermo Rustia, namely, Marciana
Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz; (2) the heirs of Guillermo Rustias
late brother, Roman Rustia, Sr., and (3) the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia.
The opposition was grounded on the theory that Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao and the
other claimants were barred under the law from inheriting from their illegitimate halfblood relative Josefa Delgado.
In November of 1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings,
claiming she was the only surviving descendant in the direct line of Guillermo Rustia.
Despite the objections of the oppositors (respondents herein), the motion was granted.
On April 3, 1978, the original petition for letters of administration was amended to state
that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia were never married but had merely lived
together as husband and wife.
On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents herein) filed a motion to dismiss the
petition in the RTC insofar as the estate of Guillermo Rustia was concerned. The motion
was denied on the ground that the interests of the petitioners and the other claimants
remained in issue and should be properly threshed out upon submission of evidence.
On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa substituted for her sister, Luisa
Delgado vda. de Danao, who had died on May 18, 1987.
On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa as
administratrix of both estates.
ASSIGNMENT 2
RULING: In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid
marriage existed between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of
more than 50 years cannot be doubted. Their family and friends knew them to be
married. Their reputed status as husband and wife was such that even the original
petition for letters of administration filed by Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975
referred to them as "spouses."
The Lawful Heirs Of Josefa Delgado
To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the questioned status of the
cohabitation of her mother Felisa Delgado with Ramon Osorio must first be addressed.
As mentioned earlier, presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable.
Conclusive presumptions are inferences which the law makes so peremptory that no
contrary proof, no matter how strong, may overturn them. On the other hand, disputable
presumptions, one of which is the presumption of marriage, can be relied on only in the
absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary.
Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon
Osorio. The oppositors (now respondents) chose merely to rely on the disputable
presumption of marriage even in the face of such countervailing evidence as (1) the
continued use by Felisa and Luis (her son with Ramon Osorio) of the surname Delgado
and (2) Luis Delgados and Caridad Concepcions Partida de Casamiento identifying
Luis as "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado).
All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame the rebuttable
presumption of marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married.
Hence, all the children born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio
and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose,
Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado, were her natural
children.
Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood,
except Luis Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they
may inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from Josefa
Delgado.
We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the nephews, nieces,
grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil
Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor of the
children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it cannot be
ASSIGNMENT 2
exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces. Therefore, the only collateral relatives of

Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her brothers and
sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time of her death on September 8,
1972. They have a vested right to participate in the inheritance. The records not being
clear on this matter, it is now for the trial court to determine who were the surviving
brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of her death.
Together with Guillermo Rustia, they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in
accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code.
The Lawful Heirs Of Guillermo Rustia
Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child of Guillermo
Rustia. As such, she may be entitled to successional rights only upon proof of an
admission or recognition of paternity. She, however, claimed the status of an
acknowledged illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia only after the death of the latter on
February 28, 1974 at which time it was already the new Civil Code that was in effect.
There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate child
from her birth until the death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia. However, this did
not constitute acknowledgment but a mere ground by which she could have compelled
acknowledgment through the courts. Furthermore, any (judicial) action for compulsory
acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the
putative parent. On the death of either, the action for compulsory recognition can no
longer be filed. In this case, intervenor Guillermas right to claim compulsory
acknowledgment prescribed upon the death of Guillermo Rustia on February 28, 1974.
The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillermas second ground) must likewise fail. An
authentic writing, for purposes of voluntary recognition, is understood as a genuine or
indubitable writing of the parent (in this case, Guillermo Rustia). This includes a public
instrument or a private writing admitted by the father to be his. Did intervenors report
card from the University of Santo Tomas and Josefa Delgados obituary prepared by
Guillermo Rustia qualify as authentic writings under the new Civil Code? Unfortunately
not. The report card of intervenor Guillerma did not bear the signature of Guillermo
Rustia. The fact that his name appears there as intervenors parent/guardian holds no
weight since he had no participation in its preparation. Similarly, while witnesses
testified that it was Guillermo Rustia himself who drafted the notice of death of Josefa
Delgado which was published in the Sunday Times on September 10, 1972, that
published obituary was not the authentic writing contemplated by the law. What could
have been admitted as an authentic writing was the original manuscript of the notice, in
the handwriting of Guillermo Rustia himself and signed by him, not the newspaper
ASSIGNMENT 2
clipping of the obituary. The failure to present the original signed manuscript was fatal to
intervenors claim.
The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina Rustia Rustia, who was
never adopted in accordance with law. Although a petition for her adoption was filed by
Guillermo Rustia, it never came to fruition and was dismissed upon the latters death.
We affirm the ruling of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals holding her a legal
stranger to the deceased spouses and therefore not entitled to inherit from them ab
intestato.
Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the estate of Guillermo
Rustia, namely, intervenor Guillerma Rustia and the ampun-ampunan Guillermina
Rustia Rustia, are not lawful heirs of the decedent. Under Article 1002 of the new Civil
Code, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving
spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting
of his sisters, nieces and nephews.
Entitlement To Letters Of Administration
An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate estate of
the decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an order of
preference in the appointment of an administrator:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named
in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give a
bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both,
in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or
wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the
person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow
or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply
for administration or to request that the administration be granted to some other
person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent
and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted
to such other person as the court may select.
ASSIGNMENT 2
In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the

estate of the one to be appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the
appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases wherejustice and equity demand
that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estates, a
situation which obtains here.
It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the persons of Carlota
Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and nieces of Guillermo
Rustia. They are the next of kin of the deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo
Rustia, respectively.
CASE NO. 8
BITUIN,REMY ROSE ANN S.
MARQUEZ VS. CA
G.R. NO. 125715 / DECEMBER 29, 1998
FACTS: During the lifetime of spouses Rafael Marquez, Sr. and Felicidad Marquez they
begot twelve children; they also acquired a parcel of land with a lot area of 161 square
meters in San Juan Del Monte, Rizal, more particularly described in TCT No.
47572,wherein they constructed their conjugal home.
In 1952, Felicidad Marquez died intestate. Thirty years later or in 1982, Rafael Marquez,
Sr. executed an Affidavit of Adjudication vesting unto himself sole ownership to the
property described in TCT No. 47572. Consequently, TCT No. 47572 was cancelled and
TCT No. 33350 was issued in his name on June 16, 1982. Thereafter, on December 29,
1983 Rafael Marquez, Jr. executed a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos covering the land
described in TCT No. 33350 as well as the house constructed thereon to three of his
children, namely: (1) petitioner Rafael Jr.; (2) Alfredo; and (3) Belen, both private
respondents herein, to the exclusion of his other children, petitioners herein. As a result
of the donation, TCT No. 33350 was cancelled and TCT No. 47572 was issued in
private respondents name.
From 1983 to 1991, private respondents were in actual possession of the land.
However, when petitioners learned about the existence of TCT No. 47572 they
immediately demanded that since they are also the children of Rafael Marquez, Sr.,
they are entitled to their respective share over the land in question. Unfortunately, efforts
to settle the dispute proved unavailing since private respondents ignored petitioners
demands.
Petitioners alleged that both the Affidavit of Adjudication and Deed of Donation Inter
ASSIGNMENT 2
Vivos were fraudulent since the private respondents took advantage of the advanced
age of their father in making him execute the said documents.
On the other hand, private respondents argued that petitioners action was already
barred by the statute of limitations, since the same should have been filed within four
years from the date of discovery of the alleged fraud.
After due proceedings, the trial court on April 29, 1993, rendered its decision in favor of
the petitioners, in this wise:
Prescription cannot set in because an action to set aside a document which is void ab
initio does not prescribe. Both the Affidavit of Adjudication and the Donation Inter Vivos
did not produce any legal effect and did not confer any right whatsoever. Equally,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 33350 and 46461 issued pursuant thereto, are likewise
null and void ab initio. Therefore, the inexistence of these documents and certificates of
title is permanent and cannot be the subject of prescription.
The CA reversed the aforementioned decision. Hence, the petitoners herein are now
before this Court to raise the issue of whether their action for reconveyance had
prescribed.
ISSUE: Whether or Not the heirs of the decedent Felicidad can still file an action for
reconveyance representing their rightful shares as an heir.
RULING: The action had not yet prescribed. It must be noted that Felicidad Marquez
died in 1952; thus, succession to her estate is governed by the present Civil Code.
Under Article 887 thereof, her compulsory heirs are her legitimate children, petitioners
and private respondent herein, and her spouse, Rafael Marquez, Sr. Now, in 1982,
Rafael Marquez, Sr. decided to adjudicate the entire property by executing an Affidavit
of Adjudication claiming that he is the only sole and surviving heir of his deceased wife
Felicidad F. Marquez.
As such, when Rafael Marquez, Sr., for one reason or another, misrepresented in his
unilateral affidavit that he was the only heir of his wife when in fact their children were
still alive, and managed to secure a transfer of certificate of title under his name, a
constructive trust under Article 1456 was established. Constructive trusts are created in
equity in order to prevent unjust enrichment. They arise contrary to intention against one
who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property
which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to hold.
Cognizant of the fact that the disputed land was conjugal property of the spouses Rafael
Sr. and Felicidad, ownership of the same is to be equally divided between both of them.
Therefore, prescinding therefrom, Rafael Marquez Sr., as trustee of his wifes share
cannot validly donate that portion to the respondents because obviously, he cannot, as
expressly provided in Art. 736 of the Civil Code, thus:
Art. 736. Guardian and trustees cannot donate the property entrusted to them.
ASSIGNMENT 2
Moreover, nobody can dispose of that which does not belong to him.
CASE NO. 9
JOSEPH BUSTAMANTE
GERONA ET AL. V. DE GUZMAN ET AL.
G.R. NO. L-19060 MAY 29, 1964
FACTS: Petitioners herein alleged that they were the legitimate children of Domingo
Gerona and Placida de Guzman, the latter was the legitimate daughter of Marcelo de
Guzman by his first marriage. They asserted that after the death of his first wife,
Marcelo married Camila Ramos, who begot him several children, referring to
respondents herein. Accordingly, after Marcelos death, respondents executed a deed of
"extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the deceased Marcelo by fraudulently
misrepresenting that they were the only surviving heirs of the deceased, although they
well knew that petitioners were, also, his forced heirs. Further, petitioners alleged that
respondents had succeeded fraudulently in causing the transfer of title to seven (7)
parcels of land, issued in the name of said deceased and that such fraud was only
discovered by them the year before the institution of the case. Hence, an action was
filed and sought from respondents their share over the said properties, to the extent of
1/8th interest thereon. Respondents maintained that petitioners' mother, the deceased
Placida de Guzman, was not entitled to share in the estate of Marcelo, she being merely
a spurious child of the latter, and that petitioners' action is barred by the statute of
limitations. After appropriate proceedings, the trial court rendered a decision finding that
petitioners' mother was a legitimate child, by first marriage, of Marcelo but ruled that the
properties described belonged to the conjugal partnership of Marcelo and his second
wife, Camila. Further, the court ruled that petitioners' action has already prescribed, and
dismissed the complaint. On appeal, CA affirmed the trial courts ruling.
ISSUE: Whether the action prescribed.
RULING: Yes. The Court ruled that generally, an action for partition among co-heirs
does not prescribe, this is true only as long as the defendants do not hold the property
in question under an adverse title. The statute of limitations operates as in other cases,
from the moment such adverse title is asserted by the possessor of the property.
When respondents executed the aforementioned deed of extra-judicial settlement
stating therein that they are the sole heirs of the late Marcelo, and secured new transfer
certificates of title in their own name, they thereby excluded the petitioners from the
estate of the deceased, and, consequently, set up a title adverse to them. And this is
why petitioners have brought this action for the annulment of said deed upon the ground
that the same is tainted with fraud. Inasmuch as petitioners seek to annul the
ASSIGNMENT 2
aforementioned deed of "extra-judicial settlement" upon the ground of fraud in the

execution thereof, the action therefor may be filed within four (4) years from the
discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place, in the case at
bar, on June 25, 1948, when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and
new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents exclusively, for the
registration of the deed of extra-judicial settlement constitute constructive notice to the
whole world.
CASE NO. 10
CATLI, FELY JANE
CYNTHIA V. NITTSCHER VS DR. WERNER KARL JOHANN NITTSCHER
G.R. NO. 160530
NOVEMBER 20, 2007
FACTS: On January 31, 1990, Dr. Werner Karl Johann Nittscher filed with the RTC of
Makati City a petition for the probate of his holographic will and for the issuance of
letters testamentary to Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales. After the hearing and with due notice to
the compulsory heirs, the probate court issued an order allowing the said holographic
will.
On September 26, 1994, Dr. Nittscher died. Hence, Atty. Nogales filed a petition for
letters testamentary for the administration of the estate of the deceased. Dr. Nittschers
surviving spouse, Cynthia V. Nittscher, moved for the dismissal of the petition. However,
the court denied petitioners motion to dismiss, and granted respondents petition for the
issuance of letters testamentary.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but her motion was denied for lack of merit. Atty.
Nogales was issued letters testamentary and was sworn in as executor. Petitioner
appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that respondents petition for the issuance of
letters testamentary should have been dismissed outright as the RTC had no jurisdiction
over the subject matter and that she was denied due process.
Petitioner contends that respondents petition for the issuance of letters testamentary
lacked a certification against forum shopping. She adds that the RTC has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of this case because Dr. Nittscher was allegedly not a resident
of the Philippines; neither did he leave real properties in the country. Petitioner claims
that the properties listed for disposition in her husbands will actually belong to her. She
ASSIGNMENT 2
insists she was denied due process of law because she did not receive by personal
service the notices of the proceedings.
Respondent Atty. Nogales, however, counters that Dr. Nittscher did reside and own real
properties in Las Pias, Metro Manila. He stresses that petitioner was duly notified of
the probate proceedings. Respondent points out that petitioner even appeared in court
to oppose the petition for the issuance of letters testamentary and that she also filed a
motion to dismiss the said petition. Respondent maintains that the petition for the
issuance of letters testamentary need not contain a certification against forum shopping,
as it is merely a continuation of the original proceeding for the probate of the will.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not certification against non-forum shopping is required.
2. Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter.
3. Whether or not petitioner was not duly given notice.
RULING:
1. No
The petition for the issuance of letters testamentary is not an initiatory pleading, but a
mere continuation of the original petition for the probate of the will. Hence, respondents
failure to include a certification against forum shopping in his petition for the issuance of
letters testamentary is not a ground for outright dismissal of the said petition.
2. Yes
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his
will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in
Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the time of his death , and if
he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Regional Trial Court of any province in which
he had estate. (Emphasis supplied.)
The RTC and the Court of Appeals was correct in finding that Dr. Nittscher was a
resident of Las Pias, Metro Manila at the time of his death. Hence, Dr. Nittscher
correctly filed in the RTC of Makati City, which then covered Las Pias, Metro Manila,
the petition for the probate of his will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to
respondent.
ASSIGNMENT 2
3. Yes
Dr. Nittscher asked for the allowance of his own will. In this connection, Section 4, Rule
76 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or
personally.
If the testator asks for the allowance of his own will, notice shall be sent only to
his compulsory heirs.
Petitioner, with whom Dr. Nittscher had no child, and Dr. Nittschers children from his
previous marriage were all duly notified, by registered mail, of the probate proceedings.
Petitioner even appeared in court to oppose respondents petition for the issuance of
letters testamentary and she also filed a motion to dismiss the said petition. She
likewise filed a motion for reconsideration of the issuance of the letters testamentary
and of the denial of her motion to dismiss. Hence, petitioner was accorded every
opportunity to defend her cause and was not denied of due process.
The allowance of her husbands will is conclusive only as to its due execution. The
authority of the probate court is limited to ascertaining whether the testator, being of
sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by
law. Thus, petitioners claim of title to the properties forming part of her husbands estate
should be settled in an ordinary action before the regular courts.
CASE NO. 11
CERIA, MONALIZA G.
RAFAEL E. MANINANG AND SOLEDAD L. MANINANG VS. COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. RICARDO L. PRONOVE, JR., AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF RIZAL AND BERNARDO S. ASENETA
G.R. NO. L-57848 JUNE 19, 1982
FACTS: On May 21, 1977, Clemencia Aseneta, single, died at the Manila Sanitarium
Hospital at age 81. She left a holographic will declaring that all her real properties
located in Manila, Makati, Quezon City, Albay and Legaspi City and all personal
properties shall be inherited by Dra. Soledad L. Maninang with whose family she have
lived continuously for around the last 30 years. And, stating that she is not incompetent
as Nonoy would like her to appear and she does not consider Nonoy as her adopted
son.
Petitioner Soledad Maninang filed a Petition for probate of the Will of the decedent. Few
days after, herein respondent Bernardo Aseneta (Nonoy), who, as the adopted son,
claims to be the sole heir of decedent Clemencia Aseneta, instituted intestate
proceedings. The Testate and Intestate Cases were ordered consolidated.
ASSIGNMENT 2
Respondent Bernardo then filed a Motion to Dismiss the Testate Case on the ground
that the holographic will was null and void because he, as the only compulsory heir, was
preterited. In her Opposition to said Motion to Dismiss, petitioner Soledad averred that it
is still the rule that in a case for probate of a Will, the Courts area of inquiry is limited to
an examination of and resolution on the extrinsic validity of the will; and that respondent
Bernardo was effectively disinherited by the decedent.
The lower Court ordered the dismissal of the Testate Case and denied the
reconsideration and appointed Bernardo as the administrator of the intestate estate of
the deceased Clemencia Aseneta.
Petitioners Maninang resorted to a Certiorari Petition before respondent Court of
Appeals. The respondent Court denied Certiorari and ruled that the trial Judges Order
of dismissal was final in nature as it finally disposed of the Testate Case and, therefore,
appeal was the proper remedy, which petitioners failed to avail of. Continuing, it said
that even granting that the lower Court committed errors in issuing the questioned
Orders, those are errors of judgment reviewable only by appeal and not by Certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the lower Court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it dismissed the
Testate Case.
RULING: Generally, the probate of a Will is mandatory. The law enjoins the probate of
the Will and public policy requires it, because unless the Will is probated and notice
thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by Will
may be rendered nugatory.
Normally, the probate of a will does not look into its intrinsic validity. x x x The
authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity
of the testator and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law
prescribes for the validity of wills. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge
the validity or efficiency (sic) of the provisions, these may be impugned as being vicious
or null, notwithstanding its authentication. The questions relating to these points remain
entirely unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated x x x
As held in the case of Vda. de Precilla vs. Narciso, x x x it is as important a matter of
public interest that a purported will is not denied legalization on dubious grounds.
Otherwise, the very institution of testamentary succession will be shaken to its
foundation, x x x
Coming now to the procedural aspect, suffice it to state that in view of our finding that
respondent Judge had acted in excess of his jurisdiction in dismissing the Testate Case,
Certiorari is a proper remedy. An act done by a Probate Court in excess of its
jurisdiction may be corrected by Certiorari. And even assuming the existence of the
remedy of appeal, we harken to the rule that in the broader interests of justice, a petition
for Certiorari may be entertained, particularly where appeal would not afford speedy and
adequate relief.
ASSIGNMENT 2
CASE NO. 12
CHAN, RICHARD P.
DANILO ALUAD, LEONORA ALUAD, DIVINA ALUAD, PROSPERO ALUAD, AND
CONNIE ALUAD VS. ZENAIDO ALUAD
G.R. NO. / DATE: G.R. NO. 176943 / OCTOBER 17, 2008
FACTS: Petitioners mother Maria and respondent Zenaido Aluad were raised by the
childless spouses Matilde and Crispin Aluad. Crispin was the owner of six lots in Capiz.
After Crispin died, his wife Matilde adjudicated the lots to herself.
On November 14, 1981, Matilde executed a Deed of Donation in favor of Maria covering
all the lots, which provided that it will become effective upon the death of the Donor, but
in the event that the Donee should die before the Donor, it shall be deemed rescinded
and that anytime during the lifetime of the Donor or anyone of them who should survive,
they could use, encumber or even dispose of any or even all of the parcels of the land.
On August 26, 1991, Matilde sold one of the lots (Lot No. 676) to respondent Zenaido.
On January 14, 1992, Matilde executed a last will and testament, devising four lots to
Maria and Lot No. 674 to respondent Zenaido. Matilde died on January 25, 1994, while
Maria died on September 24 of the same year.
On August 21, 1995, Marias heirs filed before the RTC a complaint for declaration and
recovery of ownership and possession of Lot Nos. 674 and 676, alleging that Matilde
could not have transmitted any right over said lots to respondent, she having previously
alienated them to Maria via the Deed of Donation.
The respondent alleged that he owned Lot 674 as this lot was adjudicated to him in the
Last Will and Testament of Matilde while Lot 676 was purchased by him from Matilde.
On September 20, 1996, the trial court decided in favor of the petitioners. On August
10, 2006, the CA reversed the trial courts decision, it holding that the Deed of Donation
was actually a donation mortis causa, not inter vivos, and as such it had to, but did not
comply with the formalities of a will.
ISSUE: Whether the Deed of Donation inter vivos in favor of petitioners mother is in
fact a donation mortis causa
RULING: The Court finds the donation to petitioners mother one of mortis causa, it
having the following characteristics:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the
transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the
ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;
ASSIGNMENT 2
(2) That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be revocable by the
transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a
reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
The phrase in the earlier-quoted Deed of Donation "to become effective upon the death
of the DONOR" admits of no other interpretation than to mean that Matilde did not
intend to transfer the ownership of the six lots to petitioners mother during her
(Matildes) lifetime.
The statement in the Deed of Donation reading "anytime during the lifetime of the
DONOR or anyone of them who should survive, they could use, encumber or even
dispose of any or even all the parcels of land herein donated" means that Matilde
retained ownership of the lots and reserved in her the right to dispose them. For the
right to dispose of a thing without other limitations than those established by law is an
attribute of ownership. The phrase in the Deed of Donation "or anyone of them who
should survive" is of course out of sync. For the Deed of Donation clearly stated that it
would take effect upon the death of the donor, hence, said phrase could only have
referred to the donor Matilde.
The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should have been
observed but they were not.
The Deed of Donation which is one of mortis causa, not having followed the formalities
of a will, it is void and transmitted no right to petitioners mother. But even assuming
arguendo that the formalities were observed, since it was not probated, no right to Lot
Nos. 674 and 676 was transmitted to Maria. Matilde thus validly disposed of Lot No. 674
to respondent by her last will and testament, subject of course to the qualification that
her (Matildes) will must be probated. With respect to Lot No. 676, the same had, as
mentioned earlier, been sold by Matilde to respondent on August 26, 1991.
CASE NO. 13
CHENG, RENLYN B.
PABLO RALLA VS. HON. ROMULO P. UNTALAN, HON. DOMINGO CORONEL
REYES, AND LEONIE RALLA, PETER RALLA AND MARINELLA RALLA
G.R. NOS. L-63253-54
APRIL 27, 1989
FACTS: On January 27, 1959, Rosendo Ralla, a widower, filed a petition for the probate
of his own will in the Court of First Instance of Albay (Special Proceedings No. 564). In
his will he left his entire estate to his son, Pablo leaving nothing to his other son, Pedro.
In the same year, Pedro Ralla filed an action for the partition of the estate of their
mother, Paz Escarella.
ASSIGNMENT 2
In the course of the hearing of the probate case (Special Proceedings No. 564), Pablo
Ralla filed a motion to dismiss the petition for probate on the ground that he was no
longer interested in the allowance of the will of his late father, Rosendo Ralla, for its
probate would no longer be beneficial and advantageous to him. On the scheduled
hearing on November 3, 1966, the petitioner reiterated his lack of interest in the probate
of the subject will. Consequently, the court, through Judge Perfecto Quicho, declared
Pedro and Pablo Ralla the only heirs of Rosendo Ralla who should share equally upon
the division of the latter's estate, and thereupon converted the testate proceedings into
one of intestacy.
Meanwhile, the brothers agreed to compromise in the partition case (Civil Case No.
2023). On December 18, 1967, they entered into a project of partition whereby sixtythree parcels of land, apparently forming the estate of their deceased mother, Paz
Escarella, were amicably divided between the two of them. This project of partition was
approved on December 19,1967 by Judge Ezekiel Grageda.
Eleven years later, Joaquin Chancoco, brother-inlaw of Pablo filed a petition, for the
probate of the same will of Rosendo Ralla on the ground that the decedent owed him
P5,000.00. Pablo Ralla then filed a manifestation stating that he had no objections to
the probate. Likewise, the petition for probate was granted; Teodorico Almine, son-inlaw of the petitioner, was appointed special administrator, over and above the objection
of the heirs of Pedro Ralla. However, in taking possession of the properties belonging to
the estate of Rosendo Ralla, Teodorico Almine also took possession of the sixty-three
parcels of land covered by the project of partition mentioned earlier. Consequently, the
heirs of Pedro Ralla (the private respondents herein) moved to exclude from the estate
of Rosendo Ralla the aforesaid parcels of land.
ISSUE: Whether the parcels of lands in question should be excluded from the probate
proceedings.
RULING: Yes. The properties involved in the present petition were the subject of the
project of partition signed by both the petitioner, Pablo Ralla, and Pedro Ralla in Civil
Case No. 2023; the lower court approved the said project of partition on December 19,
1967; subsequently, Pablo and Pedro Ralla jointly manifested that they had already
received "the ownership and possession of the respective parcels of land adjudicated to
them in the said project of partition," and upon their motion Judge Ezekiel Grageda
declared the partition case closed and terminated in its Order of December 29, 1967;
there was no appeal made from this decision within the reglementary period to do so,
consequently, it attained finality.
Where a partition had not only been approved and thus become a judgment of the
court, but distribution of the estate in pursuance of such partition had fully been carried
out, and the heirs had received the property assigned to them, they are precluded from
subsequently attacking its validity or any part of it. Where a piece of land has been
included in a partition, and there is no allegation that the inclusion was effected through
improper means or without the petitioners' knowledge, the partition barred any further
litigation on said title and operated to bring the property under the control and
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jurisdiction of the court for proper disposition according to the tenor of the partition . . .
They cannot attack the partition collaterally, as they are trying to do in this case.
The partition in Civil Case No. 2023 is valid and binding upon the petitioner and Pedro
Ralla, as well as upon their heirs, especially as this was accompanied by delivery of
possession to them of their respective shares in the inheritance from their mother, the
late Paz Escarella.
CASE NO. 14
CHU, LEA MONA P.
DIONISIO FERNANDEZ, EUSEBIO REYES and LUISA REYES vs. ISMAELA
DIMAGIBA
G.R. NO. L-23638 OCTOBER 12, 1967
FACTS: Respondent Ismaela Dimagiba submitted to the Court of First Instance a
petition for the probate of the purported will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes,
executed on October 22, 1930, and annexed to the petition. The will instituted the
petitioner as the sole heir of the estate of the deceased. The petition was set for
hearing, and in due time, claimants to be heirs of the deceased filed oppositions to the
probate asked. Grounds advanced for the opposition were forgery, vices of consent of
the testatrix, estoppel by laches of the proponent and revocation of the will by two
deeds of conveyance of the major portion of the estate made by the testatrix in favor of
the proponent in 1943 and 1944, but which conveyances were finally set aside by this
Supreme Court.
After trial, the Court of First Instance, found that the will was genuine and properly
executed; but deferred resolution on the questions of estoppel and revocation "until
such time when we shall pass upon the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will or
when the question of adjudication of the properties is opportunely presented."
Oppositors Fernandez and Reyes petitioned for reconsideration, and/or new trial,
insisting that the issues of estoppel and revocation be considered and resolved;
whereupon, on July 27, 1959, the Court overruled the claim that proponent was in
estoppel to ask for the probate of the will, but "reserving unto the parties the right to
raise the issue of implied revocation at the opportune time."
Subsequently, the CFI appointed Ricardo Cruz as administrator for the sole purpose of
submitting an inventory of the estate.
On February 27, 1962, after receiving further evidence on the issue whether the
execution by the testatrix of deeds of sale of the larger portion of her estate in favor of
the testamentary heir, made in 1943 and 1944, subsequent to the execution of her 1930
testament, had revoked the latter under Article 957(2) of the 1950 Civil Code (Art. 869 of
the Civil Code of 1889), the trial Court resolved against the oppositors and held the will
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of the late Benedicta de los Reyes "unaffected and unrevoked by the deeds of sale."
Whereupon, the oppositors elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
The CA held that the order admitting the will to probate had become final for lack of
opportune appeal; that the same was appealable independently of the issue of implied
revocation; that contrary to the claim of oppositors-appellants, there had been no legal
revocation by the execution of the 1943 and 1944 deeds of sale, because the latter had
been made in favor of the legatee herself, and affirmed the decision of the Court of First
Instance.
Oppositors then appealed before the Supreme Court. Oppositors-appellants contend
that the order allowing the will to probate should be considered interlocutory, because it
fails to resolve the issues of estoppel and revocation propounded in their opposition.
They argue that they were entitled to await the trial Court's resolution on the other
grounds of their opposition before taking an appeal, as otherwise there would be a
multiplicity of recourses to the higher Courts.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the decree of the Court of First Instance allowing the will to
probate had become final for lack of appeal.
2. Whether or not the order of the Court of origin dated July 27, 1959, overruling the
estoppel invoked by oppositors-appellants had likewise become final.
RULING: 1. Yes. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the appellant's stand is
untenable. It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles all
questions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper execution and witnessing
of his last will and testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and
enforceable or otherwise. As such, the probate order is final and appealable; and it is so
recognized by express provisions of Section 1 of Rule 109, that specifically prescribes
that "any interested person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or
judgment . . . where such order or judgment: (a) allows or disallows a will."
There being no controversy that the probate decree of the Court below was not
appealed on time, the same had become final and conclusive. Hence, the appellate
courts may no longer revoke said decree nor review the evidence upon which it is made
to rest. Thus, the appeal belatedly lodged against the decree was correctly dismissed.
The alleged revocation implied from the execution of the deeds of conveyance in favor
of the testamentary heir is plainly irrelevant to and separate from the question of
whether the testament was duly executed. For one, if the will is not entitled to probate,
or its probate is denied, all questions of revocation become superfluous in law, there is
no such will and hence there would be nothing to revoke. Then, again, the revocation
invoked by the oppositors-appellants is not an express one, but merely implied from
subsequent acts of the testatrix allegedly evidencing an abandonment of the original
intention to bequeath or devise the properties concerned. As such, the revocation would
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not affect the will itself, but merely the particular devise or legacy. Only
the total and absolute revocation can preclude probate of the revoked testament.
2. As to the issue of estoppel, we have already ruled in Guevara vs. Guevara, 98 Phil.
249, that the presentation and probate of a will are requirements of public policy, being
primarily designed to protect the testator's, expressed wishes, which are entitled to
respect as a consequence of the decedent's ownership and right of disposition within
legal limits. Evidence of it is the duty imposed on a custodian of a will to deliver the
same to the Court, and the fine and imprisonment prescribed for its violation (Revised
Rule 75). It would be a non sequitur to allow public policy to be evaded on the pretext of
estoppel. Whether or not the order overruling the allegation of estoppel is still
appealable or not, the defense is patently unmeritorious and the Court of Appeals
correctly so ruled.
CASE NO. 15
CUDALAP, DAGIW-A K.
REMEDIOS NUGUID VS. FELIX NUGUID AND PAZ SALONGA NUGUID
G.R. NO. L-23445, JUNE 23, 1966
FACTS: Rosario Nuguid, died on December 30, 1962, single, without descendants,
legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and
Paz Salonga Nuguid, and 6 brothers and sisters,
Remedios Nuguid, one of Rosarios sister filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a
holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11
years before her demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that
letters of administration with the will annexed be issued to her.
Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, opposed on the ground that by the institution of
petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors who are
compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line were illegally preterited
and that in consequence the institution is void.
The court's order of November 8, 1963, held that "the will in question is a complete
nullity and will perforce create intestacy of the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid"
and dismissed the petition without costs.
A motion to reconsider having been thwarted below, petitioner came to this Court on
appeal.
ISSUES:
ASSIGNMENT 2
1. Whether or not the probate court may rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the
provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy therein.
2. Whether or not the institution of one of the sister of the deceased as the sole,
universal heir preterited the compulsory heirs.
RULING:
1. The case is for the probate of a will. The court's area of inquiry is limited to an
examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will. The due execution
thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity, and the compliance with the requisites or
solemnities by law prescribed, are the questions solely to be presented, and to be acted
upon, by the court. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called upon to
rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any
devise or legacy therein.
A peculiar situation is here thrust upon us. The parties shunted aside the question of
whether or not the will should be allowed probate. For them, the meat of the case is the
intrinsic validity of the will. Normally, this comes only after the court has declared that
the will has been duly authenticated. But petitioner and oppositors, in the court below
and here on appeal, travelled on the issue of law, to wit: Is the will intrinsically a nullity?
If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On the
contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the
event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come
up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will.
Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical
considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of
the validity of the provisions of the will in question. After all, there exists a justiciable
controversy crying for solution.
2. Yes. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But
she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents, now oppositors Felix
Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid. And, the will completely omits both of them: They thus
received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither
were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition as provided for in
Article 854 of the Civil Code. The one-sentence will here institutes petitioner as the sole,
universal heir nothing more. No specific legacies or bequests are therein provided
for. It is in this posture that we say that the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid
died intestate.
ASSIGNMENT 2
Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of
them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are
neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited." Disinheritance, in turn, "is
a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for
a cause authorized by law. "
The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. It
simply omits their names altogether. Said will rather than be labeled ineffective
disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer from preterition.
On top of this is the fact that the effects flowing from preterition are totally different from
those of disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code, we repeat, "shall
annul the institution of heir". In disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the
estate of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived.
The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question "a complete nullity". Article
854 of the Civil Code in turn merely nullifies "the institution of heir". Considering,
however, that the will before us solely provides for the institution of petitioner as
universal heir, and nothing more, the result is the same. The entire will is null.
CASE NO.17
GURO, JAMAIYAH G.
DE ARANZ VS. GALING

G.R. NO. 77047 MAY 28, 1988
FACTS:Private respondent filed a petition for the probate and allowance of the last will
and testament of the late Montserrat R-Infante y G-Pola. The petition specified the
names and addresses of herein petitioners as legatees and devisees.
The probate court issued an order setting the petition for hearing. Said order was
published in the "Nueva Era" A newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila once a
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week for three (3) consecutive weeks. However, on the date of the hearing, no oppositor
appeared. On the same day, private respondent presented his evidence ex-parte and
placed Arturo Arceo one of the testamentary witnesses, on the witness stand. During
the proceedings, private respondent was appointed executor.
The herein petitioners alleged that as named legatees, no notices were sent to them as
required by Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court and that they pray that they be given a
period of ten (10) days to file their opposition to the probate of the will. Further, they
allege that personal notice of probate proceedings to the known legatees and devisees
is a jurisdictional requirement in the probate of a will.
ISSUE: WON the requirement of notice on individual heirs, legatees and devisees is
mandatory
RULING: In the herein case YES. It is clear from the rules of court that notice of the
time and place of the hearing for the allowance of a will shall be forwarded to the
designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees residing in the Philippines at
their places of residence, if such places of residence be known. There is no question
that the residences of herein petitioners legatees and devisees were known to the
probate court. The petition for the allowance of the will itself indicated the names and
addresses of the legatees and devisees of the testator. But despite such knowledge,
the probate court did not cause copies of the notice to be sent to petitioners. The
requirement of the law for the allowance of the will was not satisfied by mere publication
of the notice of hearing for three (3) weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province.
CASE NO. 18
HINGPES, MARK JOSEPH BAJADO
ASSIGNMENT 2
NAPOLEON D. NERI, ALICIA D. NERI-MONDEJAR, VISMINDA D. NERICHAMBERS, ROSA D. NERI-MILLAN, DOUGLAS D. NERI, EUTROPIA D. ILLUTCOCKINOS AND VICTORIA D. ILLUT-PIALA VS. HEIRS OF HADJI YUSOP UY AND
JULPHA* IBRAHIM UY
G.R. NO. 194366 OCTOBER 10, 2012
FACTS: Anunciacion Neri had seven children, two (2) from her first marriage with
Gonzalo Illut (Gonzalo), namely: Eutropia and Victoria, and five (5) from her second
marriage with Enrique Neri (Enrique), namely: Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda, Douglas and
Rosa. Throughout the marriage of spouses Enrique and Anunciacion, they acquired
several homestead properties.
Anunciacion died intestate and thereafter her husband, Enrique, in his personal
capacity and as natural guardian of his minor children Rosa and Douglas, together with
Napoleon, Alicia, and Vismindaexecuted an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with
Absolute Deed of Sale adjudicating among themselves the said homestead properties,
and thereafter, conveying them to the late spouses Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim
Uy (spouses Uy).
The children of Enrique filed a complaint for annulment of sale of the said homestead
properties against spouses Uy. The complaint was later amended to include Eutropia
and Victoriaas additional plaintiffs for having been excluded and deprived of their
legitimes as children of Anunciacion from her first marriage.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the extra-judicial settlement is valid.
RULING: No. It bears to stress that all the petitioners herein are indisputably legitimate
children of Anunciacion from her first and second marriages with Gonzalo and Enrique,
respectively, and consequently, are entitled to inherit from her in equal shares, pursuant
to Articles 979 and 980 of the Civil Code which read:
ART. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and
other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come
from different marriages.
ART. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own
right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.
As such, upon the death of Anunciacion on September 21, 1977, her children and
Enrique acquired their respective inheritances.
ASSIGNMENT 2
Hence, in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute
Deed of Sale in favor of spouses Uy, all the heirs of Anunciacion should have
participated. Considering that Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly excluded and that
then minors Rosa and Douglas were not properly represented therein, the settlement
was not valid and binding uponthem and consequently, a total nullity.
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs.
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a
newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section;
but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not
participated therein or had no notice thereof. (Underscoring added)
The effect of excluding the heirs in the settlement of estate was further elucidated
in Segura v. Segura, thus:
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question which was
null and void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers only valid
partitions. The partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of the
nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule
"no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated
therein or had no notice thereof." As the partition was a total nullity and did not affect the
excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their right to challenge
the partition had prescribed after two years from its execution
CASE NO. 19
JUAN, MA. BARBARA RAIZZA J.
NOLI ALFONSO AND ERLINDA FUNDIALAN VS SPOUSES HENRY AND LIWANAG
ANDRES
G.R. NO.166236 JULY 29, 2010
FACTS: Respondents Spouses Henry and Liwanag Andres filed a complaint for accion
publiciana with damages against petitioners Spouses Reynaldo and Erlinda Fundialan.
The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of the respondents ordering the
petitioners to vacate the premises located at 236 General Luna St. Dulongbayan, San
Mateo, Rizal.
Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the petitioners were directed to file
appellants' brief within 45 days from receipt of the notice. However, before the 45 days
expired, the counsel for the petitioners filed a Motion to Withdraw Appearance. The
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petitioners themselves filed several extensions within which to file their brief. However,
despite the extension until March 5, 2004, the petitioners still failed to file their brief and
cause the Entry of Appearance of their new counsel. The CA dismissed the the appeal
filed by the petitioners.
On September 6, 2004, the Public Attoryneys Office filed their Motion for
Reconsideration which requested for a fresh period within which to file the appellant's
bried. However, the same was denied by the CA.
The petitioners contended that their failure to file the appellant's brief within the required
period was due to their indigency and poverty. They said that the late filing of their brief
should be excused under the circumstances so that the case may be decided on the
merits and not merely on technicalities.
On the other hand, the respondents argued that ailure to file appellants' brief on time is
one instance where the CA may dismiss an appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the petitioner's appeal is highly unjustified,
iniquitous and unconscionable because it overlooked and/or disregarded the merits of
the case which invollves a deprivation of their property rights?
RULING: Based on the facts of the case, the Court has no compelling reason to
disregard technicalities.
Petitioners theorize that publication of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate
of Marcelino Alfonso is required before their father, Jose Alfonso (Jose) could validly
transfer the subject property. The Court is not convinced. In Alejandrino v. Court of
Appeals, the Court upheld the effectivity of a deed of extrajudicial settlement that was
neither notarized nor published.
Significantly, the title of the property owned by a person who dies intestate passes at
once to his heirs. Such transmission is subject to the claims of administration and the
property may be taken from the heirs for the purpose of paying debts and expenses, but
this does not prevent an immediate passage of the title, upon the death of the intestate,
from himself to his heirs. The deed of extrajudicial settlement executed by Filomena
Santos Vda. de Alfonso and Jose evidences their intention to partition the inherited
property. It delineated what portion of the inherited property would belong to whom.
The sale to respondents was made after the execution of the deed of extrajudicial
settlement of the estate. The extrajudicial settlement of estate, even though not
published, being deemed a partition of the inherited property, Jose could validly transfer
ownership over the specific portion of the property that was assigned to him.
The records show that Jose did in fact sell to respondents the subject property. The
deed of sale executed by Jose in favor of the respondents being a public document, is
entitled to full faith and credit in the absence of competent evidence that its execution
was tainted with defects and irregularities that would warrant a declaration of nullity. As
found by the RTC, petitioners failed to prove any defect or irregularities in the execution
ASSIGNMENT 2
of the deed of sale. They failed to prove by strong evidence, the alleged lack of consent
of Jose to the sale of the subject real property. As found by the RTC, although Jose was
suffering from partial paralysis and could no longer sign his name, there is no showing
that his mental faculties were affected in such a way as to negate the existence of his
valid consent to the sale, as manifested by his thumbmark on the deed of sale. The
records sufficiently show that he was capable of boarding a tricycle to go on trips by
himself. Sufficient testimonial evidence in fact shows that Jose asked respondents to
buy the subject property so that it could be taken out from the bank to which it was
mortgaged. This fact evinces that Joses mental faculties functioned intelligently.
CASE NO. 20
NOCON, AUDREY ROSE S.
CORNELIA BALADAD VS SERGIO A. RUBLICO
G.R. NO. 160743 AUGUST 4, 2009
FACTS: Two parcels of land located in then called the Municipality of Makati, Province
of Rizal were registered in the name of Julian Angeles. Julian and Corazon got married.
Julian was already 65 years old then, while Corazon was already 67. At that time,
Corazon already had a son, respondent Sergio A. Rublico, by Teofilo Rublico .After
Teofilos death, Corazon cohabited with Panfilo de Jesus and then, later, with Julian.
Julian died leaving no compulsory heirs except his wife and his brother, Epitacio. While
on her death bed, Cornelia was surrounded by four individuals to notarize a deed
entitled Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Absolute Sale. In his testimony, Atty.
Francisco said that Corazon imprinted her thumbmark on the document after he read
and explained the contents thereof in Tagalog to her. In said document, Corazon and
Epitacio adjudicated unto themselves the two lots registered in the name of Julian with
three-fourths of the property going to Corazon and the remaining one-fourth () to
Epitacio. The document also stated that both Corazon and Epitacio conveyed by way of
absolute sale both their shares in the said lots in favor of Cornelia, Epitacios daughter,
in exchange for the amount of P107,750.00. Corazons thumbmark was imprinted at the
bottom of the said deed. Two days later, Corazon passed away. Respondent Sergio
executed an Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased Person
adjudicating unto himself the same parcels of land which had been subject of the deed
of sale between Corazon and Cornelia. Sergio filed a petition for reconstitution of the
owners copy of TCT. The petition was granted. Sergio sold the two lots to spouses
Laureano and Felicidad Yupano for P100,000.00. Sergios certificate of title was
cancelled and TCTwas issued in favor of the Yupanos. Meanwhile, there were seven
families who occupied the lots and paid rentals to Julian and, later, to Corazon. After
Corazons death, they paid rentals. When the Yupanos demanded payment of rentals
from the tenants, the latter filed a complaint for interpleader on Makati RTC rendered a
Decision, declaring the Yupanos as the legal and lawful owners of the two lots. Cornelia
ASSIGNMENT 2
argued that Sergio knew of the sale made by Corazon in her favor and was even given
part of the proceeds. Cornelia also averred that the Yupanos could not be considered as
buyers in good faith, because they only lived a block from the disputed properties and
had knowledge that the two lots had been sold to Cornelia prior to Corazons death.
Respondents argued that the Extrajudicial Settlement with Absolute Sale could not have
been executed because at the time, Corazon was already dying. Makati RTC ruled in
favor of Cornelia. CA reversed the RTC ruling.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Absolute Sale
purportedly executed by Corazon prior to her death is valid.
RULING: Yes. The Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Absolute Sale executed by
Corazon and Epitacio through the latters attorney-in-fact, Vicente Angeles, partakes of
the nature of a contract. To be precise, the said document contains two contracts, to wit:
the extrajudicial adjudication of the estate of Julian Angeles between Corazon and
Epitacio as Julians compulsory heirs, and the absolute sale of the adjudicated
properties to Cornelia. While contained in one document, the two are severable and
each can stand on its own. Hence, for its validity, each must comply with the requisites
prescribed in Article 1318 of the Civil Code, namely (1) consent of the contracting
parties; (2) object certain, which is the subject matter of the contract; and (3) cause of
the obligation which is established.
During the trial, respondents argued that the document was not valid because at the
time it was executed, Corazon was already weak and could not have voluntarily given
her consent thereto. One of the witnesses for the defense even testified that it was
Vicente who placed Corazons thumbprint on a blank document, which later turned out
to be the Extrajudicial Adjudication with Absolute Sale. The Affidavit of Adjudication by
Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased person executed by Sergio Rublico to be void and
without any effect. The sale made by him to spouses Yupano is, likewise, declared null
and void.
CASE NO. 21
OLAYTA, JESTER KUTCH A.
TAYCO VS HEIRS OF CONCEPCION TAYCO-FLORES

G.R. NO. 168692 DECEMBER 13, 2010
ASSIGNMENT 2
FACTS: After the death of deceased spouse Fortunato Tayco and Diega Regalado,
their children inherited several parcel of land. Subsequently, Francisco Tayco and
Consolacion Tayco executed a deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the estate of
deceased Diega Regalado with confirmation of sale of shares transferring their shares
on the properties to their sister Concepcion Tayco-Flores. The said document was
notarized. Later Concepcion and Consolacion executed the confirmation of Quitclaim of
Shares in the 3 parcel of lands. Afterwards Consolacion and Concepcion died one after
the other.
Therafter, petitioner Francisco filed a case for nullity of documents and partition with
damages with the RTC. He claimed that the documents executed above are null and
void. He alleged that at the time the deed of extrajudicial settlememt was executed,
Concepcion was in need or money and wanted the properties tk be mortgaged to the
bank. However the mortgage did not push through and requested his sister to cancel
the deed which ensured him that the document had no effect. Further, he claimed that
he has no knowledge on the execution of the confirmation of the Quitclaim of shares
between his sisters which covered the 3 parcel of lands and had the tax declaration and
certificates under the name of Concepcion. He alleged that he only came to know of the
said facts after he had the properties surveyed for the purpose of partition and some
heirs of Concepcion objected to the survey.
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner holding that the extrajudicial settlement is a
simulated document to make it appear that Concepcion Tayco-Flores was the owner of
the properties, so that it would be easy for her to use the same as a collateral for a
prospective loan and as evidence disclosed that the intended loan with any financial
institution did not materialize, hence, the document had no more effect On appeal, the
CA reversed the RTC decision on the ground that t the genuineness and due execution
of the Extrajudicial Settlement was not disputed and was duly signed by the parties and
notarized. It added that the recital of the provisions of the said document is clear that it
is an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of deceased Diega Regalado and that
petitioner and his sister Consolacion confirmed the sale of their shares to Concepcion.
Hence this petition,
ISSUE: Can the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the deceased Diega
Regalado with confirmation of sale of shares divest co-heir and co-owner Francisco
Tayco of his shares in the three (3) parcels of land in question?
RULING: The Court held in the negative. Preliminarily, the case falls under the
exception where a question of fact may be brought before the court since there are
contradicting findings between the CA and RTC, Thus a review of the facts can be done
by the court.
ASSIGNMENT 2
Anent the issue of the validity of the documents, section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court provides that : The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall
be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the
next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any
person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof. The act of notarizing
the document which should have the effect of making the document a public document
as a formal requirement has been superseded by Art 1082 of the Civil Code which
states:
ART. 1082. Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and
legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale,
an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction.
By this provision, it appears that when a co-owner sells his inchoate right in the coownership, he expresses his intention to "put an end to indivision among (his) co-heirs."
Partition among co-owners may thus be evidenced by the overt act of a co-owner of
renouncing his right over the property regardless of the form it takes. x x x 15
Furthermore, although the defendants alleged that there was publication, there was no
affidavit of such publication was made. Only a receipt Only an alleged receipt was
presented (Exh. 2) but does not prove its purpose.
It further held that, an extrajudicial settlement is a contract and it is a well-entrenched
doctrine that the law does not relieve a party from the effects of a contract, entered into
with all the required formalities and with full awareness of what he was doing, simply
because the contract turned out to be a foolish or unwise investment. 19 However, in the
construction or interpretation of an instrument, the intention of the parties is primordial
and is to be pursued.20 If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the
intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control. 21 If
the contract appears to be contrary to the evident intentions of the parties, the latter
shall prevail over the former.
Lastly, the fact that the share was sold for Php 50.00 for a 1/3 share of about 16,000 sq
meters shows that it is below the market value at that time. It would appear; therefore,
that Exhibit A is merely a simulated document to make it appear that Concepcion TaycoFlores is the owner of the properties so that it will be easy for her to use the same as
collateral for a prospective loan. Should the encumbrance not materialize or if it did after
the obligation thereunder has been paid, the document shall become null and void and
without effect. As to the second document, the nullity of the first document renders it
void because its effectivity is anchored on the validity of the first document. The
ASSIGNMENT 2
Confirmation of Quitclaim of Shares in Three Parcels of Land came into fruition merely
to confirm the existence of the first document.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. Consequently,
the Court of Appeals' Decision dated November 17, 2004 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 9, dated
October 2, 2001, is UPHELD and REINSTATED.
CASE NO. 23
ANGELI L. QUINTUA
ORTEGA V. VALMONTE
G.R. NO. 157451 DECEMBER 16, 2005
FACTS: Placido Valmonte lived for a long time in the United States until he finally
reached retirement. In 1980, Placido finally came home to stay in the Philippines, and
he lived in San Antonio Village, Makati, which he owned in common with his sister
Ciriaca Valmonte. Two years after his arrival from the United States and at the age of 80
he wed Josefina who was then 28 years old in 1982. But in a little more than two years
of wedded bliss, Placido died on October 8, 1984 of a cause written down as COR
PULMONALE.
Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting of
two (2) pages, and dated June 15, 1983 but acknowledged only on August 9, 1983. The
allowance to probate of this will was opposed by Leticia on the grounds that the subject
will was procured by fraud or trickery, and that Placido Valmonte never intended that the
instrument should be his last will and testament. She also opposed the appointment as
Executrix of Josefina alleging her want of understanding and integrity.
At the hearing, the petitioner Josefina testified and called as witnesses the notary public
Atty. Floro Sarmiento who prepared and notarized the will, and the instrumental
witnesses spouses Eugenio Gomez, Jr. and Feliza Gomez and Josie Collado. Notary
Public Floro Sarmiento explained that though it appears that the will was signed by the
testator and his witnesses on June 15, 1983, the day when it should have been
executed had he not gone out of town, the formal execution was actually on August 9,
1983. He reasoned that he no longer changed the typewritten date of June 15, 1983
because he did not like the document to appear dirty. The notary public also testified
that to his observation the testator was physically and mentally capable at the time he
affixed his signature on the will.
The trial court disallowed the probate of the will. Reversing the trial court, the appellate
court admitted the will of Placido Valmonte to probate. The CA upheld the credibility of
the notary public and the subscribing witnesses who had acknowledged the due
execution of the will. Moreover, it held that the testator had testamentary capacity at the
ASSIGNMENT 2
time of the execution of the will. It added that his sexual exhibitionism and unhygienic,
crude and impolite ways did not make him a person of unsound mind.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the will was procured by fraud or trickery.
2. Whether or not Placido Valmonte has no testamentary capacity at the time he
allegedly executed the subject.
RULING:
1. Existence of Fraud in the Execution of a Will
No. As correctly ruled by the appellate court, the conflict between the dates appearing
on the will does not invalidate the document, because the law does not even require
that a [notarial] will x x x be executed and acknowledged on the same occasion. More
important, the will must be subscribed by the testator, as well as by three or more
credible witnesses who must also attest to it in the presence of the testator and of one
another. Furthermore, the testator and the witnesses must acknowledge the will before
a notary public. In any event, we agree with the CA that the variance in the dates of the
will as to its supposed execution and attestation was satisfactorily and persuasively
explained by the notary public and the instrumental witnesses. [
Notably, petitioner failed to substantiate her claim of a grand conspiracy in the
commission of a fraud. There was no showing that the witnesses of the proponent stood
to receive any benefit from the allowance of the will. The testimonies of the three
subscribing witnesses and the notary are credible evidence of its due execution. Their
testimony favoring it and the finding that it was executed in accordance with the
formalities required by law should be affirmed, absent any showing of ill motives.
2. Capacity to Make a Will
Yes. According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability to
know to be considered of sound mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be
disposed of, (2) the proper objects of the testators bounty, and (3) the character of the
testamentary act. Applying this test to the present case, we find that the appellate court
was correct in holding that Placido had testamentary capacity at the time of the
execution of his will.
It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately
the kinds of property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their
locations. As regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified
his wife as sole beneficiary. As we have stated earlier, the omission of some relatives
from the will did not affect its formal validity. There being no showing of fraud in its
execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.
ASSIGNMENT 2
The law favors the probate of a will. Upon those who oppose it rests the burden of
showing why it should not be allowed. In the present case, petitioner has failed to
discharge this burden satisfactorily. For this reason, the Court cannot attribute any
reversible error on the part of the appellate tribunal that allowed the probate of the will.
CASE NO. 24
VILLACARLOS, RIGEL KENT
RABADILLA V. CA
G.R. NO. 113725 JUNE 29, 2000
FACTS: In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza,
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S.
Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of 511, 855 square meters of that parcel of land
surveyed as Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre. The said Codicil, which was duly
probated and admitted in Special Proceedings No. 4046 before the then Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental.
Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the deceased, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44498 thereto issued in his name.
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and children
Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.
On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 5588, before Branch 52 of the Regional Trial
Court in Bacolod City, against the above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to
enforce the provisions of subject Codicil.
On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff (private respondent) and a certain Alan Azurin, sonin-law of the herein petitioner who was lessee of the property and acting as attorney-infact of defendant-heirs, arrived at an amicable settlement and entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement on the obligation to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar.
However, there was no compliance with the aforesaid Memorandum of Agreement
except for a partial delivery of 50.80 piculs of sugar corresponding to sugar crop year
1988 -1989.
On July 22, 1991, the Regional Trial Court came out with a decision, dismissing the
complaint and disposing it on the ground that "the action is prematurely filed as no
cause of action against the defendants has as yet arose in favor of plaintiff."
On appeal to the CA, the appellate court reversed the decision and decided in this wise:
"the evidence on record having established plaintiff-appellant's right to receive 100
piculs of sugar annually out of the produce of Lot No. 1392; defendants-appellee's
obligation under Aleja Belleza's codicil, as heirs of the modal heir, Jorge Rabadilla, to
ASSIGNMENT 2
deliver such amount of sugar to plaintiff-appellant; defendants-appellee's admitted noncompliance with said obligation since 1985"
ISSUE: Whether or not, there is absence or prematurity of the cause of action.
RULING: Contrary to his supposition that the Court of Appeals deviated from the issue
posed before it, which was the propriety of the dismissal of the complaint on the ground
of prematurity of cause of action, there was no such deviation. The Court of Appeals
found that the private respondent had a cause of action against the petitioner. The
disquisition made on modal institution was, precisely, to stress that the private
respondent had a legally demandable right against the petitioner pursuant to subject
Codicil; on which issue the Court of Appeals ruled in accordance with law.
It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are transmitted
from the moment of death of the decedent10 and compulsory heirs are called to
succeed by operation of law. The legitimate children and descendants, in relation to
their legitimate parents, and the widow or widower, are compulsory heirs.11 Thus, the
petitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of law, without need of further proceedings,
and the successional rights were transmitted to them from the moment of death of the
decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and
obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at
the time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of
the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the
deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon
his death.
In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
subject to the condition that the usufruct thereof would be delivered to the herein private
respondent every year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs
succeeded to his rights and title over the said property, and they also assumed his
(decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of the lot involved to herein private
respondent. Such obligation of the instituted heir reciprocally corresponds to the right of
private respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or performance of which is now
being demanded by the latter through the institution of the case at bar. Therefore,
private respondent has a cause of action against petitioner and the trial court erred in
dismissing the complaint below.
ASSIGNMENT 2
CASE NO. 25
SIA, JON MARI Z.
ALABAN V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 156021 SEPTEMBER 23, 2005
FACTS: Respondent Francisco Provido (respondent) filed a petition before the RTC of
Iloilo for the probate of the Last Will and Testament of the late Soledad Provido
Elevencionado alleging that he was the heir of the decedent and the executor of her will.
Subsequently, the RTC rendered its Decision, allowing the probate of the will of the
decedent and directing the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent.
More than four (4) months later herein petitioners filed a motion for the reopening of the
probate proceedings. They also filed an opposition praying that the letters testamentary
issued to respondent be withdrawn and the estate of the decedent disposed of under
intestate succession.The RTC denied petitioners motion.
The petitioners, thereafter, filed an action for annulment of RTCs decision allowing the
probate of the decedents will before the Court of Appeals on the ground of extrinsic
fraud.
Petitioners assert that as a result of respondents deliberate omission or concealment of
their names, ages and residences as the other heirs of the decedent in his petition for
allowance of the will, they were not notified of the proceedings, and thus they were
denied their day in court. Respondent, for his part, argues that no extrinsic fraud exists
to warrant the annulment of the RTCs decision, since there was no showing that they
were denied their day in court. Petitioners were not made parties to the probate
proceedings because the decedent did not institute them as her heirs.
The CA ruled in favor of the respondent. Thus, petitioners appealed to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were denied their day in court by reason of lack
of notice.
RULING: No. According to the Rules, notice is required to be personally given to known
heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. A perusal of the will shows that respondent
was instituted as the sole heir of the decedent. Petitioners, as nephews and nieces of
the decedent, are neither compulsory nor testate heirs who are entitled to be notified of
the probate proceedings under the Rules. Respondent had no legal obligation to
mention petitioners in the petition for probate, or to personally notify them of the same.
Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled to be so notified, the purported
infirmity is cured by the publication of the notice. After all, personal notice upon the heirs
is a matter of procedural convenience and not a jurisdictional requisite. Publication is
notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who
might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be
established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party
ASSIGNMENT 2
in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. Thus, even though
petitioners were not mentioned in the petition for probate, they eventually became
parties thereto as a consequence of the publication of the notice of hearing.
CASE NO. 26
LEGASPINO, GEOVANI JR., N.
UY KIAO ENG V. NIXON LEE
G. R. NO. 176831 / JANUARY 15, 2010
FACTS: Alleging that his father passed away on June 22, 1992 in Manila and left a
holographic will, which is now in the custody of petitioner Uy Kiao Eng, his mother,
respondent Nixon Lee filed, on May 28, 2001, a petition for mandamus with damages
before the RTC of Manila, to compel petitioner to produce the will so that probate
proceedings for the allowance thereof could be instituted. Allegedly, respondent had
already requested his mother to settle and liquidate the patriarchs estate and to deliver
to the legal heirs their respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so without any
justifiable reason.
In her answer, petitioner denied that she was in custody of the original holographic will
and that she knew of its whereabouts. She, moreover, asserted that photocopies of the
will were given to respondent and to his siblings. Petitioner further contended that
respondent should have first exerted earnest efforts to amicably settle the controversy
with her before he filed the suit.
The RTC heard the case. After the presentation and formal offer of respondents
evidence, petitioner demurred, contending that her son failed to prove that she had in
her custody the original holographic will. Importantly, she asserted that the pieces of
documentary evidence presented, aside from being hearsay, were all immaterial and
irrelevant to the issue involved in the petition as they did not prove or disprove that she
unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoined as a
duty resulting from an office, trust or station, for the court to issue the writ of mandamus.
The RTC granted the petitioners demurrer to evidence. On appeal, the CA ruled for the
respondent, issued the writ of mandamus, and ordered the production of the will. It held
that respondent was able to show by testimonial evidence that his mother had in her
possession the holographic will.
ISSUE: Whether the remedy of mandamus can be availed of by respondent Lee so that
probate proceedings for the allowance of the subject will could be instituted.
RULING: The Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation involved
here in the production of the original holographic will is in the nature of a public or a
private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent
Lee because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
ASSIGNMENT 2
course of law. Let it be noted that respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he
seeks the production of the original for purposes of probate. The Rules of Court,
however, does not prevent him from instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of
the will whether the same is in his possession or not. Rule 76, Section 1 relevantly
provides:
Section 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will. Any executor, devisee, or legatee
named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time, after the
death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed,
whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
An adequate remedy is further provided by Rule 75, Sections 2 to 5, for the production
of the original holographic will. Thus
SEC. 2. Custodian of will to deliver. The person who has custody of a will shall,
within twenty (20) days after he knows of the death of the testator, deliver the will to the
court having jurisdiction, or to the executor named in the will.
SEC. 3. Executor to present will and accept or refuse trust. A person named as executor
in a will shall within twenty (20) days after he knows of the death of the testator, or
within twenty (20) days after he knows that he is named executor if he obtained such
knowledge after the death of the testator, present such will to the court having
jurisdiction, unless the will has reached the court in any other manner, and shall, within
such period, signify to the court in writing his acceptance of the trust or his refusal to
accept it.
SEC. 4. Custodian and executor subject to fine for neglect. A person who neglects any
of the duties required in the two last preceding sections without excuse satisfactory to
the court shall be fined not exceeding two thousand pesos.
SEC. 5. Person retaining will may be committed. A person having custody of a will after
the death of the testator who neglects without reasonable cause to deliver the same,
when ordered so to do, to the court having jurisdiction, may be committed to prison and
there kept until he delivers the will.
There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the
production of the subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of.
ASSIGNMENT 2
CASE NO. 27
UNTALAN, CYRUS D.C.
ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR, SEBASTIAN M. BALTAZAR, ANTONIO L.
MANGALINDAN, ROSIE M. MATEO, NENITA A. PACHECO, VIRGILIO REGALA, JR.,
AND RAFAEL TITCO VS. LORENZO LAXA
G.R. NO. 174489 APRIL 11, 2012
FACTS: Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made her last will and
testament entitled "Tauli Nang Bilin o Testamento Miss Paciencia Regala"7 (Will) in the
Pampango dialect on September 13, 1981. The Will, executed in the house of retired
Judge Limpin, was read to Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia expressed in the
presence of the instrumental witnesses that the document is her last will and testament.
She thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the said document on page 38 and
then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof. The witnesses to the Will were Dra.
Limpin, Francisco and Faustino. The three attested to the Wills due execution by
affixing their signatures below its attestation clause and on the left margin of pages 1, 2
and 4 thereof, in the presence of Paciencia and of one another and of Judge Limpin
who acted as notary public. Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia
bequeathed all her properties to respondent and his wife Corazon F. Laxa and their
children. Six days after the execution of the Will, Paciencia left for USA. There, she
resided with Lorenzo and his family until her death on January 4, 1996. In the interim,
the Will remained in the custody of Judge Limpin. More than four years after the death
of Paciencia, Lorenzo filed a petition with the RTC for the probate of the Will of
Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of Administration in favor.
Antonio filed an opposition to Lorenzos petition contending that Paciencias Will was
null and void because ownership of the properties had not been transferred and/or titled
to Paciencia before her death pursuant to Article 1049, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code.
Petitioners also filed an Amended Opposition asking the RTC to deny the probate of
Paciencias Will on the following grounds: the Will was not executed and attested to in
accordance with the requirements of the law; that Paciencia was mentally incapable to
make a Will at the time of its execution; that she was forced to execute the Will under
duress or influence of fear or threats; that the execution of the Will had been procured
by undue and improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo or by some other persons for
his benefit; that the signature of Paciencia on the Will was forged; that assuming the
signature to be genuine, it was obtained through fraud or trickery; and, that Paciencia
did not intend the document to be her Will. Simultaneously, petitioners filed an
Opposition and Recommendation reiterating their opposition to the appointment of
Lorenzo as administrator of the properties and requesting for the appointment of
Antonio in his stead.
Rosie testified that Paciencia was referred to as "magulyan" or "forgetful" because she
would sometimes leave her wallet in the kitchen then start looking for it moments later.
RTC rendered its Decision denying the petition thus the court gave considerable weight
ASSIGNMENT 2
to the testimony of Rosie and concluded that at the time Paciencia signed the Will, she
was no longer possessed of sufficient reason or strength of mind to have testamentary
capacity. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC Decision and granted the probate of the
Will of Paciencia. The appellate court did not agree with the RTCs conclusion that
Paciencia was of unsound mind when she executed the Will. It ratiocinated that "the
state of being magulyan does not make a person mentally unsound so [as] to render
[Paciencia] unfit for executing a Will." Moreover, the oppositors in the probate
proceedings were not able to overcome the presumption that every person is of sound
mind. Further, no concrete circumstances or events were given to prove the allegation
that Paciencia was tricked or forced into signing the Will.
ISSUE: Whether the authenticity and due execution of the notarial Will was sufficiently
established to warrant its allowance for probate.
RULING: Faithful compliance with the formalities laid down by law is apparent from the
face of the Will. Courts are tasked to determine nothing more than the extrinsic validity
of a Will in probate proceedings. This is expressly provided for in Rule 75, Section 1 of
the Rules of Court, which states: No will shall pass either real or personal estate unless
it is proved and allowed in the proper court. Subject to the right of appeal, such
allowance of the will shall be conclusive as to its due execution. Due execution of the
will or its extrinsic validity pertains to whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely
executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. These formalities
are enshrined in Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code, Here, a careful
examination of the face of the Will shows faithful compliance with the formalities laid
down by law. The signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia, her instrumental witnesses and
the notary public, are all present and evident on the Will. Further, the attestation clause
explicitly states the critical requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses
signed the Will in the presence of one another and that the witnesses attested and
subscribed to the Will in the presence of the testator and of one another. In fact, even
the petitioners acceded that the signature of Paciencia in the Will may be authentic
although they question her state of mind when she signed the same as well as the
voluntary nature of said act.
We agree with the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful does not
necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a Will.
Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. It shall be sufficient if the
testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate to be
disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.
On the other hand, we find more worthy of credence Dra. Limpins testimony as to the
soundness of mind of Paciencia when the latter went to Judge Limpins house and
voluntarily executed the Will. "The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a Will
concerning the testators mental condition is entitled to great weight where they are
truthful and intelligent." More importantly, a testator is presumed to be of sound mind at
the time of the execution of the Will and the burden to prove otherwise lies on the
oppositor. The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of
making his dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the
ASSIGNMENT 2
testator, one month, or less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane, the
person who maintains the validity of the will must prove that the testator made it during
a lucid interval. Here, there was no showing that Paciencia was publicly known to be
insane one month or less before the making of the Will. Clearly, thus, the burden to
prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind lies upon the shoulders of petitioners.
However and as earlier mentioned, no substantial evidence was presented by them to
prove the same, thereby warranting the CAs finding that petitioners failed to discharge
such burden.
We are convinced that Paciencia was aware of the nature of her estate to be disposed
of, the proper objects of her bounty and the character of the testamentary act. Bare
allegations of duress or influence of fear or threats, undue and improper influence and
pressure, fraud and trickery cannot be used as basis to deny the probate of a will.
Furthermore, "a purported will is not [to be] denied legalization on dubious grounds.
Otherwise, the very institution of testamentary succession will be shaken to its
foundation, for even if a will has been duly executed in fact, whether x x x it will be
probated would have to depend largely on the attitude of those interested in [the estate
of the deceased]."
Court should be convinced by the evidence presented before it that the Will was duly
executed. Petitioners dispute the authenticity of Paciencias Will on the ground that
Section 11 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court was not complied with.
We note that the inability of Faustino and Judge Limpin to appear and testify before the
court was satisfactorily explained during the probate proceedings. As testified to by his
son, Faustino had a heart attack, was already bedridden and could no longer talk and
express himself due to brain damage. We thus hold that for all intents and purposes,
Lorenzo was able to satisfactorily account for the incapacity and failure of the said
subscribing witness and of the notary public to testify in court. Because of this the
probate of Paciencias Will may be allowed on the basis of Dra. Limpins testimony
proving her sanity and the due execution of the Will, as well as on the proof of her
handwriting. It is an established rule that "[a] testament may not be disallowed just
because the attesting witnesses declare against its due execution; neither does it have
to be necessarily allowed just because all the attesting witnesses declare in favor of its
legalization; what is decisive is that the court is convinced by evidence before it, not
necessarily from the attesting witnesses, although they must testify, that the will was or
was not duly executed in the manner required by law."
Moreover, it bears stressing that "[i]rrespective x x x of the posture of any of the parties
as regards the authenticity and due execution of the will x x x in question, it is the
mandate of the law that it is the evidence before the court and/or [evidence that] ought
to be before it that is controlling." The very existence of [the Will] is in itself prima facie
proof that the supposed [testatrix] has willed that [her] estate be distributed in the
manner therein provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that, if legally tenable, such
desire be given full effect independent of the attitude of the parties affected thereby."
This, coupled with Lorenzos established relationship with Paciencia, the evidence and
the testimonies of disinterested witnesses, as opposed to the total lack of evidence
ASSIGNMENT 2
presented by petitioners apart from their self-serving testimonies, constrain us to tilt the
balance in favor of the authenticity of the Will and its allowance for probate. Hence, the
decisions of the court of appeals are affirmed.
CASE NO. 28
VELACHA, LAARNIE T.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE LAST WILL AND
TESTAMENT OF ENRIQUE LOPEZ
G.R. NO. 189984, NOVEMBER 12, 2012
FACTS: On June 21, 1999, Enrique S. Lopez (Enrique) died leaving his wife, Wendy B.
Lopez, and their four legitimate children, namely, petitioner Richard B. Lopez (Richard)
and the respondents Diana Jeanne Lopez (Diana), Marybeth de Leon (Marybeth) and
Victoria L. Tuazon (Victoria) as compulsory heirs. Before Enriques death, he executed a
Last Will and Testament on August 10, 1996 and constituted Richard as his executor
and administrator.
On September 27, 1999, Richard filed a petition for the probate of his father's Last Will
and Testament before the RTC of Manila with prayer for the issuance of letters
testamentary in his favor. Marybeth and Victoria opposed the petition contending that
the purported last will and testament was not executed and attested as required by law,
and that it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of
Richard.
After submitting proofs of compliance with jurisdictional requirements, Richard
presented the attesting witnesses and the notary public who notarized the will, Atty.
Perfecto Nolasco (Atty. Nolasco).
On the other hand, the oppositors presented its lone witness, Gregorio B. Paraon
(Paraon), Officer-in-Charge of the Notarial Section, Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC,
Manila. His testimony centered mainly on their findings that Atty. Nolasco was not a
notary public for the City of Manila in 1996, which on cross examination was clarified
after Paraon discovered that Atty. Nolasco was commissioned as such for the years
1994 to 1997.
The RTC disallowed the probate of the will for failure to comply with Article 805 of the
Civil Code which requires a statement in the attestation clause of the number of pages
used upon which the will is written. The CA affirmed RTC and ruled that the failure to
state the number of pages of the will in the attestation clause was fatal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the failure to state the number of pages of the will in the
attestation clause can be a ground for the disallowance of the will.
ASSIGNMENT 2
RULING: Yes. The law (Articles 805 and 809 of the Civil Code on the provisions of the
Civil Code on Forms of Wills) is clear that the attestation must state the number of
pages used upon which the will is written. The purpose of the law is to safeguard
against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and prevent any
increase or decrease in the pages.
While Article 809 allows substantial compliance for defects in the form of the attestation
clause, Richard likewise failed in this respect. The statement in the Acknowledgment
portion of the subject last will and testament that it "consists of 7 pages including the
page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are written" 10 cannot be deemed
substantial compliance. The will actually consists of 8 pages including its
acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be explained by mere examination of the
will itself but through the presentation of evidence aliunde.
On this score is the comment of Justice J.B.L. Reyes regarding the application of Article
809, to wit:
x x x The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied
by an examination of the will itself: whether all the pages are consecutively
numbered; whether the signatures appear in each and every page; whether the
subscribing witnesses are three or the will was notarized. All these are facts that
the will itself can reveal, and defects or even omissions concerning them in the
attestation clause can be safely disregarded. But the total number of pages, and
whether all persons required to sign did so in the presence of each other must
substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only check against
perjury in the probate proceedings.
Hence, the CA properly sustained the disallowance of the will. Moreover, it correctly
ruled that Richard pursued the wrong mode of appeal as Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court explicitly provides that in special proceedings, as in this case, the appeal
shall be made by record on appeal.
CASE NO. 29
VILLANUEVA, LIEZL O.
PALAGANAS VS. PALAGANAS
G.R. NO. 169144, JANUARY 26, 2011
FACTS: Ruperta C. Palaganas a Filipino who became a naturalized U.S. citizen, died
single and childless. In the last will and testament she executed in California, she
designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas as the executor of her will for she had left
properties in the Philippines and in the U.S.
Respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas another brother of Ruperta, filed a petition for the
probate of will and for his appointment as special administrator of her estate.
ASSIGNMENT 2
Petitioners Manuel and Benjamin, nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the
ground that Rupertas will should not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S.where
she executed it. Manuel and Benjamin added that, assuming Rupertas will could be
probated in the Philippines, it is invalid nonetheless for having been executed under
duress and without the testators full understanding of the consequences of such
act. Ernesto, they claimed, is also not qualified to act as administrator of the estate.
Respondent Ernesto filed a motion with the RTC for leave to take deposition of
Rupertas foreign-based siblings, Gloria Villaluz and Sergio, which it granted. RTC
directed the parties to submit their memorandum. RTC issued an ord eradmitting to
probate Rupertas last will, appointing respondent as special administrator and issuing
the Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto.
Petitioner appealed to the (CA) arguing that an unprobated will executed by an
American citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated for the first time in the Philippines. CA
rendered a decision affirming the assailed order of the RTC, Manuel and Benjamin
came to this Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in
the Philippines although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the country
where it was executed.
RULING: Yes. Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must
show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages,
and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the
probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d) the name of the person
for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the
name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of
the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate
court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such
province.[7] The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed
and probated in the country of its execution.
In insisting that Rupertas will should have been first probated and allowed by the court
of California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure for
the reprobate of will before admitting it here. But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will
already probated and allowed in a foreign country is different from that probate where
the will is presented for the first time before a competent court. Reprobate is specifically
governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioners stance, since this
latter rule applies only to reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the present
case. In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign
probate court provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be established.
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