Assignment1 Compilation

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II
ATTY. CHRISTIAN VILLASIS

ASSIGNMENT NO.1
CASE NO. 1
ABAD, SHAREL ANN N.
RAMON S. CHING AND PO WING PROPERTIES, INC. vs. HON. JANSEN R.
RODRIGUEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional trial Court of
Manila, Branch 6, JOSEPH CHENG, MERCEDES IGNE AND LUCINA SANTOS,
substituted by her son, EDUARDO S. BALAJADIA
G.R. NO. 192828 NOVEMBER 28, 2011
FACTS: Respondents filed a complaint against the petitioners and Stronghold
Insurance Company, Global Business Bank, Inc., Elena Tiu Del Pilar, Asia Atlantic
Resources Ventures Inc., Registers of Deeds of Manila and Malabon, and all persons
claiming rights or titles from Ramon Ching (Ramon) and his successors-in-interest. The
Complaint, captioned as one for "Disinheritance, Declaration of Nullity of Agreement and
Waiver, Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement, Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer
Certificates of Title with Prayer for [the] Issuance of [a] Temporary Restraining Order
and [a] Writ of Preliminary Injunction," was docketed as Civil Case No. 02-105251 and
raffled to Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC).
Respondents alleged that they are the heirs of Lim San, also known as Antonio Ching /
Tiong Cheng / Ching Cheng Suy (Antonio). Respondents Joseph Cheng (Joseph) and
Jaime Cheng (Jaime) are allegedly the children of Antonio with his common-law wife,
respondent Mercedes Igne (Mercedes). Respondent Lucina Santos (Lucina) claimed
that she was also a common-law wife of Antonio. The respondents averred that Ramon
misrepresented himself as Antonio's and Lucina's son when in truth and in fact, he was
adopted and his birth certificate was merely simulated. Ramon misrepresented that
there were only six real estate properties left by Antonio. The respondents alleged that
Ramon had illegally transferred to his name the titles to the said properties. On October
29, 1996, Ramon executed an Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate
adjudicating solely to himself Antonio's entire estate to the prejudice of the respondents.
Ramon sold Antonio's two parcels of land in Navotas to co-defendant Asia Atlantic
Business Ventures, Inc. Another parcel of land, which was part of Antonio's estate, was
sold by Ramon to co-defendant Elena Tiu Del Pilar at an unreasonably low price. By
reason of Ramon's lack of authority to dispose of any part of Antonio's estate, the
conveyances are null and void ab initio.
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint would disclose
that the action delves mainly on the question of ownership of the properties described in
1 | REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II
ASSIGNMENT 1
the Complaint which can be properly settled in an ordinary civil action, but was denied
by the RTC. CA upheld RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC should have granted the Motion to Dismiss filed by the
PETITIONERS on the alleged ground of the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the complaint.
RULING: No reversible errors were committed by the RTC and the CA when they both
ruled that the denial of the petitioners' second motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 02105251 was proper. Even without delving into the procedural allegations of the
respondents that the petitioners engaged in forum shopping and are already estopped
from questioning the RTC's jurisdiction after having validly submitted to it when the latter
participated in the proceedings, the denial of the instant Petition is still in order.
An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action,
whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as
advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special
proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided
for in the Rules of Court. A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is distinguished from an ordinary civil
action where a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong. To initiate a special proceeding, a petition and not a
complaint should be filed.
Under Article 916 of the NCC, disinheritance can be effected only through a will wherein
the legal cause therefor shall be specified. This Court agrees with the RTC and the CA
that while the respondents in their Complaint and Amended Complaint sought the
disinheritance of Ramon, no will or any instrument supposedly effecting the disposition
of Antonio's estate was ever mentioned. Hence, despite the prayer for Ramon's
disinheritance, Civil Case No. 02-105251 does not partake of the nature of a special
proceeding and does not call for the probate court's exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether or not
the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. As a
necessary consequence, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon
the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the
question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendant. What
determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing
from the allegations in the complaint. The averments in the complaint and the character
of the relief sought are the matters to be consulted.
Court agrees with the CA that the nullification of the documents subject of Civil Case
No. 02-105251 could be achieved in an ordinary civil action, which in this specific case
was instituted to protect the respondents from the supposedly fraudulent acts of Ramon.
ASSIGNMENT 1
Civil Case No. 02-105251 was not instituted to conclusively resolve the issues relating
to the administration, liquidation and distribution of Antonio's estate, hence, not the
proper subject of a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person under Rules 73-91 of the Rules of Court.
CASE NO. 2
ALEGRE, MUTYA S.
LUISA KHO MONTAER, ALEJANDRO MONTAER, JR., LILLIBETH MONTAERBARRIOS, AND RHODORA ELEANOR MONTAER-DALUPAN - VERSUS - SHARIA
DISTRICT COURT, FOURTH SHARIA JUDICIAL DISTRICT, MARAWI CITY, LILING
DISANGCOPAN, AND ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAER
G.R. NO. 174975 JANUARY 20, 2009
FACTS: In 1956, petitioner Luisa Kho Montaner, a Roman Catholic, married Alejandro
Montaner, Sr. In 1995, Alejandro died. In 2005, private respondents Liling and her
daughter Almahleen filed a Complaint for the judicial partition of properties before the
Sharia District Court, alleging that: the late Alejandro Montaner, Sr. is a Muslim; the
petitioners are his first family; Liling is his widow; and Almahleen is his daughter. They
prayed for the partition of the estate of the decedent and for the appointment of an
administrator. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the court has no
jurisdiction because the decedent was a Roman Catholic. The Sharia District Court
dismissed the complaint, but granted the motion for reconsideration and allowed the
private respondents to adduce evidence.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Sharia District Court has jurisdiction over the complaint
2. Whether or not the Sharia District Court acquired jurisdiction over the estates
and properties of the decedent
RULING: 1. YES. Article 143(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, provides that the Sharia District
Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of deceased
Muslims. The determination of the nature of an action or proceeding is controlled by the
averments and character of the relief sought in the complaint or petition. Although
private respondents designated the pleading filed before the Sharia District Court as a
Complaint for judicial partition of properties, it is a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the decedent. It contains
sufficient jurisdictional facts required for the settlement of the estate of a deceased
Muslim, such as the fact of Alejandro Montaer, Sr.s death as well as the allegation that
he is a Muslim. The said petition also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal
heirs, so far as known to the private respondents, and a probable list of the properties
left by the decedent, which are the very properties sought to be settled before a probate
ASSIGNMENT 1
court. Furthermore, the reliefs prayed for reveal that it is the intention of the private
respondents to seek judicial settlement of the estate of the decedent. These include the
following: (1) the prayer for the partition of the estate of the decedent; and (2) the prayer
for the appointment of an administrator of the said estate.
2. YES. Petitioners argument, that the prohibition against a decedent or his estate from
being a party defendant in a civil action applies to a special proceeding such as the
settlement of the estate of the deceased, is misplaced. Unlike a civil action which has
definite adverse parties, a special proceeding has no definite adverse party. The
definitions of a civil action and a special proceeding, respectively, in the Rules illustrate
this difference. A civil action, in which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong necessarily has definite
adverse parties, who are either the plaintiff or defendant. On the other hand, a special
proceeding, by which a party seeks to establish a status, right, or a particular fact, has
one definite party, who petitions or applies for a declaration of a status, right, or
particular fact, but no definite adverse party. In the case at bar, it bears emphasis that
the estate of the decedent is not being sued for any cause of action. As a special
proceeding, the purpose of the settlement of the estate of the decedent is to determine
all the assets of the estate, pay its liabilities, and to distribute the residual to those
entitled to the same.
CASE NO. 3
ANGANGAN, ALFRENDO JR. T.
SHEKER v. ESTATE OF ALICE SHEKER
GR. NO. 157912 DECEMBER 13, 2007
FACTS: Alice Sheker died and her estate was left under the administration of Victoria
Medina. Alice left a holographic will which was admitted to probate by the Regional Trial
Court of Iligan City. The trial court issued an order for all creditors to file their claims
against the estate. Alan Joseph Sheker, a creditor of the estate, filed a contingent
money claim in the amount of Php 206,250.00 representing the amount of his
commission as an agent for selling some properties for Alice; and another Php
275,000.00 as reimbursements for expenses he incurred.
Medina moved for the dismissal of Alan Shekers claim, alleging among others that the
money claim filed by Alan Sheker did not attach a certification of non-forum shopping
thereto. RTC dismissed the complaint.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the money claim filed by Alan Sheker is void due to nonattachment of certification of non-forum shopping;
(2) Whether separate docket fees have to be paid for money claim against an estate
ASSIGNMENT 1
RULING: (1) NO. The money claim is not void. RTCs dismissal of the complaint was
reversed.
The Supreme Court held that the certification of non-forum shopping is required only for
complaints and other initiatory pleadings. A money claim against the estate is NOT an
initiatory pleading and does not require a certification of non-forum shopping. It was the
probate proceeding itself, not the money claim, that was initiated upon the filing of the
petition for allowance of the decedents will.
In the case at bar, the probate proceeding was initiated NOT by Alan Shekers money
claim but rather upon the filing of the petition for allowance of the Alice Shekers will.
Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after granting letters of
testamentary or of administration, all persons having money claims against the
decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate administrator of their
respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain
exceptions.
A money claim in a probate proceeding is like a creditors motion for claims which is to
be recognized and taken into consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of
the estate. And as a motion, its office is not to initiate new litigation, but to bring a
material but incidental matter arising in the progress of the case in which the motion is
filed. A motion is not an independent right or remedy, but is confined to incidental
matters in the progress of a cause. It relates to some question that is collateral to the
main object of the action and is connected with and dependent upon the principal
remedy.
(2) NO. On the issue of filing fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of Appeals, that
the trial court has jurisdiction to act on a money claim (attorney's fees) against an estate
for services rendered by a lawyer to the administratrix to assist her in fulfilling her duties
to the estate even without payment of separate docket fees because the filing fees shall
constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court,
or the trial court may order the payment of such filing fees within a reasonable time.
After all, the trial court had already assumed jurisdiction over the action for settlement of
the estate. Clearly, therefore, non-payment of filing fees for a money claim against the
estate is not one of the grounds for dismissing a money claim against the estate.

ASSIGNMENT 1
CASE NO. 4
BALTAZAR, ESTRELLA C.
HON. JOSE F. FERNANDEZ, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE,
NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, ASUNCION MARAVILLA, ET AL. VS. HERMINIO
MARAVILLA
G.R. NO. L-18799 MARCH 31, 1964
FACTS: On August 25, 1958, respondent Herminio Maravilla filed with he Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental a petition for probate of the will of his deceased wife
Digna Maravilla who died on August 12 of that same year. In the will the surviving
spouse was named as the universal heir and executor.
On September 30, 1958, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla (brother and sisters of
the deceased Digna Maravilla) filed an opposition to the probate of the will, on the
ground, inter alia, that the will was not signed on each page by the testatrix in the
presence of the attesting witnesses and of one another.
On March 16, 1959, on motion of respondent Herminio, which was opposed by Pedro,
Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, the court issued an order appointing him special
administrator of the estate of the deceased.
On February 8, 1960, the court rendered a decision denying probate of the will, as it
was not duly signed on each page by the testatrix in the presence of the attesting
witnesses and of one another.
On February 17, 1960, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, filed with the court a
petition for appointment of Eliezar Lopez (son of Asuncion Maravilla) as special coadministrator to protect their interests, on the ground that the will, having been denied
probate, they are the legal heirs of the decedent.
After said joint hearing, the court appointed Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator in
an order dictated open court, to protect the interests of Pedro, Asuncion and Regina
Maravilla.
From this order, respondent, on March 7, 1960, filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari and prohibition (with prayer for preliminary injunction) to annul the order
appointing Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator, and to prohibit the probate court
from further proceeding with the petition for the removal of respondent as special
administrator. The Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary injunction on March 9,
1960 which was amended on March 11, 1960 to make it more specific.
On October 6, 1960, petitioners Regina Maravilla, et al. filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition to certify the case to the Supreme Court, on the grounds that the principal
amount in controversy in this case exceeds P200,000.00, and the writs (of certiorari and
ASSIGNMENT 1
prohibition) prayed for are not in aid of appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals,
since the probate case is not on appeal before it. To this petition, respondent filed an
opposition. on the grounds that the amount in controversy is less than P200,000.00 and
the decision of the probate court (of February 8, 1960) is now on appeal before the
Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R); hence, the writ prayed for is in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction, and the present case does not involve title to or possession of real
estate exceeding in value P200,000.00.
On May 16, 1961, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the writs ( certiorari
and prohibition) prayed for by respondent, and declaring null and void the appointment
of Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator.
Petitioners Regina Maravilla, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision,
but it was denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue the writs of certiorari and
prohibition prayed for by respondent.
RULING: We agree with petitioners. The Court of Appeals, in the decision appealed
from, assumed jurisdiction over the present case on the theory that "the amount in
controversy relative to the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator to
protect the interests of respondents (herein petitioners) is only P90,000.00 more or less,
i.e., one fourth of the conjugal property" (of respondent and the deceased Digna
Maravilla) which, is per inventory submitted by respondent as special administrator is
valued at P362,424.90. This theory is untenable. Note that the proceedings had on the
appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator are merely incidental to the
probate or testate proceedings of the deceased Digna Maravilla presently on appeal
before the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R) where petitioners' motion to elevate
the same to the Supreme Court, on the ground that the amount herein involved is within
the latter's exclusive jurisdiction, is still pending, resolution. That the Court of Appeals
has no appellate jurisdiction over said testate proceedings cannot be doubted,
considering that the properties therein involved are valued at P362,424,90, as per
inventory of the special administrator.
Under Section 2, Rule 75, of the Rules of Court, the property to be administered and
liquidated in testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse is, not only that
part of the conjugal estate pertaining to the deceased spouse, but the entire conjugal
estate. This Court has already held that even if the deceased had left no debts, upon
the dissolution of the marriage by the death of the husband or wife, the community
property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated in the testate or intestate
proceedings of the deceased spouse (Vda. de Roxas v. Pecson, et al., L-2211,
December 20, 1948; 82 Phil. 407; see also Vda. de Chantengco v. Chantengco, et al.,
L-10663, October 31, 1958). In a number of cases where appeal was taken from an
order of a probate court disallowing a will, this Court, in effect, recognized that the
amount or value involved or in controversy therein is that of the entire estate (Suntay v.
ASSIGNMENT 1
Suntay, L-3087, July 31, 1954, 50 O.G. 5321; Vano v. Vda. de Garces, et al., L-6303,
June 30, 1954, 50 O.G. 3045). Not having appellate jurisdiction over the proceedings in
probate (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R), considering that the amount involved therein is more
than P200,000.00, the Court of Appeals cannot also have original jurisdiction to grant
the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by respondent in the instant case, which
are merely incidental thereto.
Note also that the present proceedings under review were for the annulment of the
appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator and to restrain the probate
court from removing respondent as special administrator. It is therefore, a contest for
the administration of the estate and, consequently, the amount or value of the assets of
the whole estate is the value in controversy (4 C.J.S. 204). It appearing that the value of
the estate in dispute is much more than P200,000.00, the Court of Appeals clearly had
no original jurisdiction to issue the writs in question.
CASE NO. 5
BITUIN, REMY ROSE ANN S.
MATUTE VS. CA
G.R. NO. L-26751, G.R. NO. L-26085, G.R. NO. L-26106 / JANUARY 31, 1969
FACTS: On August 20, 1965 when Carlos S. Matute, one of the Matute heirs and a fullblood brother of both the petitioner and the herein respondent Matias S. Matute, filed in
Special Proceeding (settlement of the Matute estate) a petition praying for the removal
of Matias as co-administrator and his appointment in such capacity.
Carlos alleged that for a period of more than two years from the date of his
appointment, said Matias S. Matute has neglected to render a true, just and complete
account of his administration and that he is not only incompetent but also negligent in
his management of the estate under his charge consisting of five haciendas.
The respondent Matias opposed the allegation that it is completely without basis and
false. Records show that he made an accounting and the same was submitted to the
court. That his competence to act as administrator has been established to the
satisfaction of the court.
It appears that during the reception of evidence conducted on December 29, 1965 by
the probate court, Carlos S. Matute and the other heirs submitted their respective lists of
exhibits in support of their motion to ousts Matias. On January 8, 1966 Matias filed a
written objection to the admission of the movants exhibits on the ground that the same
were hearsay, self-serving, irrelevant and/or mere photostatic copies of supposed
originals which never properly identified nor shown in court. four days later, the Counsel
for Matias filed with leave of Court a Motion to Dismiss and/or Demurrer to Evidence
ASSIGNMENT 1
which avers that there is no sufficient evidence on record to justify and support the
motions for the removal of the herein co-administrator Matias S. Matute.
Instead of
resolving the foregoing motion, the probate judge issued the controverted order
removing the respondent as co-administrator without giving him the opportunity to
adduce his own evidence despite his explicit reservation that he be afforded the chance
to introduce evidence in his behalf in the event of denial of his motion to dismiss and/or
demurrer to evidence.
The probate court issued an order removing Matias S. Matute as co-administrator.
Hence, the certiorari. The respondent contends that the disputed order removing him
as co-administrator is a patent nullity. Upon the other hand, the petitioner advances the
reason in support of the order of removal that the probate judge accorded the
respondent all the opportunity to adduce his evidence but the latter resorted to dilatory
tactics such as filing a motion to dismiss or demurrer to evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rule 35 (now Rule 33) regarding judgment on demurrer to
evidence is applicable to special proceedings; such that its disregard by the probate
court amounts to grave abuse of discretion.
RULING: Yes. Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court provides that in the absence of
special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary civil actions shall be, as far as
practicable, applicable in special proceedings. The application of the above cited Rule
in special proceedings, like the case at bar, is authorized by the Rules. Instead of
resolving the foregoing motion, the probate judge issued the controverted order
removing the respondent as co-administrator without giving him the opportunity to
adduce his own evidence despite his explicit reservation that he be afforded the chance
to introduce evidence in his behalf in the event of denial of his motion to dismiss and/or
demurrer to evidence. The Court view that the above actuation of the probate judge
constituted grave abuse of discretion which dooms his improvident order as nullity.
To bolster, the ruling of the Supreme Court, to wit: This duty is projected into bolder
relief if we consider, which we must, that the aforesaid motion is in form as well as in
substance a demurrer to evidence allowed by Rule 35, by virtue of which the defendant
does not lose his right to offer evidence in the event that his motion is denied. Said Rule
states:
After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant without
waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a
dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and law the plaintiff has shown no right to
relief.
The application of the abovecited Rule in special proceedings, like the case at bar, is
authorized by section 2 of Rule 72 which direct that in the "absence of special
provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary civil actions shall be, as far as practicable,
applicable in special proceedings."
ASSIGNMENT 1
CASE NO. 6
JOSEPH BUSTAMANTE
VENTURA V. VENTURA
G.R. NO. L-26306 APRIL 27, 1988
FACTS: Appellant Maria Ventura is the illegitimate daughter of the deceased Gregorio
Ventura while Miguel Ventura and Juana Cardona are his son and saving spouse who
are also the brother and mother of Maria Ventura. On the other hand, appellees
Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the deceased's legitimate children with his former
wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano but the paternity of appellees was denied by the
deceased in his will.
Before his death, Gregorio Ventura filed a petition for the probate of his will which was
eventually admitted. This however, did not include the appellees. In the will, the
appellant, although an illegitimate child, was named and appointed by the testator to be
the executrix of his will and the administratrix of his estate. After the death of Gregorio,
appellant Maria filed later on a motion for her appointment as executrix and for the
issuance of letters testamentary. Such was granted. Thereafter, Maria filed her accounts
of administration but which was opposed due to the veracity of the reports as not
reflecting the true income of the estate and expenses, by the spouses Exequiel Victorio
and Gregoria Ventura and by the spouses Mercedes Ventura and Pedro Corpuz. As
incident thereto, four motions were filed by Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura,
one of which was to remove Maria as the executrix of said estate on the grounds that
she is grossly incompetent; maliciously and purposely concealed certain properties of
the estate in the inventory; merely an illegitimate daughter who can have no harmonious
relations with the appellees; she has neglected to render her accounts of administration;
and that she has with permanent physical defect hindering her from efficiently
performing her duties as an executrix. Maria filed her opposition to the aforesaid four
motions, and prayed that such be denied or held in abeyance until after the status of
Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as heirs of the testator is finally decided. The Court of
First Instance however ruled for her (Maria) removal as such and appointed in her place
Mercedes and Gregoria upon filing of a bond and be issued with letters of administration
upon their qualification.
ISSUE: Whether the removal was proper.
RULING: Yes. Mercedes and Gregoria in the decision in Civil Cases Nos.1064 and
1476 (different case) were declared to be the legitimate children of the deceased
Gregorio Ventura and his wife, Paulina Simpliciano, and as such are entitled to the
annulment of the institution of heirs made in the probated will of said deceased.
Further, the Court held that under Article 854 of the Civil Code, "the pretention or
omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at
the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the
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ASSIGNMENT 1
institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not
inofficious," and as a result, intestacy follows, thereby rendering the previous
appointment of Maria Ventura as executrix moot and academic. This would now
necessitate the appointment of another administrator, under the following provision:
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court: When and to whom letters of administration
granted.-If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, a petition
shall be granted: (a)To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be or next of kin,
or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or
wife, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband
or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;"
xxx
xxx
xxx
In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura is Juana
Cardona while the next of kin are: Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and Maria and
Miguel Ventura. The "next of kin" has been defined as those persons who are entitled
under the statute of distribution to the decedent's property. It is generally said that "the
nearest of kin, whose interest in the estate is more preponderant, is preferred in the
choice of administrator. 'Among members of a class the strongest ground for preference
is the amount or preponderance of interest. As between next of kin, the nearest of kin is
to be preferred."
As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme Court, Mercedes and
Gregoria Ventura are the legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife, the late
Paulina Simpliciano. Therefore, as the nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura they are
entitled to preference over the illegitimate children of Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria
and Miguel Ventura. Hence, under the aforestated preference provided in Section 6 of
Rule 78, the person or persons to be appointed administrator are Juana Cardona, as
the surviving spouse, or Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as nearest of kin, or Juana
Cardona and Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the discretion of the Court, in order to
represent both interests.
CASE NO. 7
CATLI, FELY JANE
PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO VS COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 129242
JANUARY 16, 2001
FACTS: Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1966 Maria Clara Street, Sampaloc, Manila died
intestate on February 14, 1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar, and his eleven (11)
children. At the time of his death, Troadio Manalo left several real properties located in
Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a business under the name and style
Manalos Machine Shop. On November 26, 1992, respondents, who are eight (8) of the
ASSIGNMENT 1
surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo, filed a petition with the respondent
Regional Trial Court of Manila for the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father,
Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as
administrator thereof.
The trial court issued an order setting the petition for hearing and directing the
publication of the order for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in Metro Manila, and further directing service by registered mail of the said
order upon the heirs named in the petition at their respective addresses mentioned
therein. During the hearing of the petition, the trial court issued an order declaring the
whole world in default, except the government, and set the reception of evidence of the
petitioners. Petitioners file their opposition. Several pleadings were subsequently filed
by petitioners culminating to the filing of an Omnibus Motion.
Petitioners claim that the petition in SP. PROC No. 92-63626 is actually an ordinary civil
action. They point out that it contains certain averments, which, are indicative of its
adversarial nature. According to the petitioners, the same should be dismissed under
Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Revised Rules of Court for failure of the petitioners to aver in
the petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made involving
members of the same family prior to the filing of the petition pursuant to Article 222 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for judicial settlement of estate is a special
proceeding.
RULING: Yes. The Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and
Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is a special proceeding and, as such,
it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact. The petitioners therein (private respondents herein) merely seek to
establish the fact of death of their father and subsequently to be duly recognized as
among the heirs of the said deceased so that they can validly exercise their right to
participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with
the limited and special jurisdiction of the probate court.
It is a fundamental rule that, in the determination of the nature of an action or
proceeding, the averments and the character of the relief sought in the complaint, or
petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling. A careful scrutiny of the Petition for
Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP.
PROC. No. 92-63626 belies herein petitioners claim that the same is in the nature of an
ordinary civil action. The said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a
petition for the settlement of estate of a deceased person such as the fact of death of
the late Troadio Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in the City of
Manila at the time of his said death. The fact of death of the decedent and of his
residence within the country are foundation facts upon which all the subsequent
proceedings in the administration of the estate rest. The petition in SP. PROC. No. 9212 | R E M E D I A L L A W R E V I E W I I
ASSIGNMENT 1
63626 also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative
list of the properties left by the deceased which are sought to be settled in the probate
proceedings. In addition, the reliefs prayed for in the said petition leave no room for
doubt as regard the intention of the petitioners therein (private respondents herein) to
seek judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased father, Troadio Manalo.
It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the
essentially valid petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Troadio Manalo by
raising matters that are irrelevant and immaterial to the said petition. It must be
emphasized that the trial court, sitting, as a probate court, has limited and special
jurisdiction and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters and issues which may be
properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action. In addition, the rule has always
been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the concomitant nature of an
action, is determined by the averments in the complaint and not by the defenses
contained in the answer. If it were otherwise, it would not be too difficult to have a case
either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple stratagem. So it
should be in the instant petition for settlement of estate.
Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines states: Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or
maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest
efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to
the limitations in Article.
The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is
clear from the term suit that it refers to an action by one person or persons against
another or others in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the
law affords him for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law
or in equity. A civil action is thus an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party
sues another for the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
CASE NO. 8
CERIA, MONALIZA G.
OSCAR C. REYES VS. HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, BRANCH 142,
ZENITH INSURANCE CORPORATION, AND RODRIGO C. REYES
G.R. NO. 165744 AUGUST 11, 2008
FACTS: Oscar and private respondent Rodrigo C. Reyes are two of the four children of
the spouses Pedro and Anastacia Reyes. Pedro, Anastacia, Oscar, and Rodrigo each
owned shares of stock of Zenith Insurance Corporation, a domestic corporation
established by their family. When the spouses died, Pedros estate was judicially
partitioned among his heirs, no similar settlement and partition appear to have been
made with Anastacias estate, which included her shareholdings in Zenith.
ASSIGNMENT 1
Subsequently, Zenith and Rodrigo filed a complaint with the Securities and Exchange
Commission against Oscar. The complaint stated that it is a derivative suit initiated and
filed by Reyes to obtain an accounting of the funds and assets of ZENITH INSURANCE
CORPORATION which are now or formerly in the control, custody, and/or possession of
respondent and to determine the shares of stock of deceased spouses Pedro and
Anastacia Reyes that were arbitrarily and fraudulently appropriated by Oscar for himself
and which were not collated and taken into account in the partition, distribution, and/or
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouses.
Oscar filed a Motion to Declare Complaint as Nuisance or Harassment Suit. And,
claimed that it is not a bona fide derivative suit as it partakes of the nature of a petition
for the settlement of estate of the deceased Anastacia that is outside the jurisdiction of a
special commercial court.
The RTC denied the motion in part. Oscar went to the CA on a petition for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus. The appellate court affirmed the RTC Order. A petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court was filed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court, sitting as a special commercial court, has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of Rodrigos complaint.
RULING: The rule is that a complaint must contain a plain, concise, and direct
statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action and must
specify the relief sought. Section 5, Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that
in all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake
must be stated with particularity. These rules find specific application to Section 5(a) of
P.D. No. 902-A which speaks of corporate devices or schemes that amount to fraud or
misrepresentation detrimental to the public and/or to the stockholders.
Allegations of deceit, machination, false pretenses, misrepresentation, and threats are
largely conclusions of law that, without supporting statements of the facts to which the
allegations of fraud refer, do not sufficiently state an effective cause of action. The late
Justice Jose Feria, a noted authority in Remedial Law, declared that fraud and mistake
are required to be averred with particularity in order to enable the opposing party to
controvert the particular facts allegedly constituting such fraud or mistake. Tested
against these standards, we find that the charges of fraud against Oscar were not
properly supported by the required factual allegations. While the complaint contained
allegations of fraud purportedly committed by him, these allegations are not particular
enough to bring the controversy within the special commercial courts jurisdiction; they
are not statements of ultimate facts, but are mere conclusions of law.
Not every allegation of fraud done in a corporate setting or perpetrated by corporate
officers will bring the case within the special commercial courts jurisdiction. To fall within
this jurisdiction, there must be sufficient nexus showing that the corporations nature,
structure, or powers were used to facilitate the fraudulent device or scheme. Contrary to
this concept, the complaint presented a reverse situation. No corporate power or office
ASSIGNMENT 1
was alleged to have facilitated the transfer of the shares; rather, Oscar, as an individual
and without reference to his corporate personality, was alleged to have transferred the
shares of Anastacia to his name, allowing him to become the majority and controlling
stockholder of Zenith, and eventually, the corporations President. This is the essence of
the complaint read as a whole.
In ordinary cases, the failure to specifically allege the fraudulent acts does not constitute
a ground for dismissal since such defect can be cured by a bill of particulars. In cases
governed by the Interim Rules of Procedure on Intra-Corporate Controversies, however,
a bill of particulars is a prohibited pleading. It is essential, therefore, for the complaint to
show on its face what are claimed to be the fraudulent corporate acts if the complainant
wishes to invoke the courts special commercial jurisdic.
CASE NO. 9
CHAN, RICHARD P.
JOSELITO MUSNI PUNO VS. PUNO ENTERPRISES, INC.
G.R. NO. / DATE: G.R. NO. 177066 / SEPTEMBER 11, 2009
FACTS: Carlos L. Puno, who died on June 25, 1963, was an incorporator of
respondent Puno Enterprises, Inc. On March 14, 2003, petitioner Joselito Musni Puno,
claiming to be an heir of Carlos L. Puno, initiated a complaint for specific performance
against respondent. Petitioner averred that he is the son of the deceased with the
latters common-law wife, Amelia Puno. As surviving heir, he claimed entitlement to the
rights and privileges of his late father as stockholder of respondent. The complaint thus
prayed that respondent allow petitioner to inspect its corporate book, render an
accounting of all the transactions it entered into from 1962, and give petitioner all the
profits, earnings, dividends, or income pertaining to the shares of Carlos L. Puno.
It was granted by the lower court but, the CA said that petitioner had no right to demand
that he be allowed to examine respondents books. Petitioner was not a stockholder of
the corporation but was merely claiming rights as an heir of Carlos L. Puno, an
incorporator of the corporation. His action for specific performance therefore appeared
to be premature; the proper action to be taken was to prove the paternity of and his
filiation to Carlos L. Puno in a petition for the settlement of the estate of the latter.
ISSUE: Whether the heir automatically becomes a stockholder of the corporation and is
entitled to the rights and privileges of a stockholder upon the death of the stockholder
RULING: Upon the death of a shareholder, the heirs do not automatically become
stockholders of the corporation and acquire the rights and privileges of the deceased as
shareholder of the corporation. The stocks must be distributed first to the heirs in estate
proceedings, and the transfer of the stocks must be recorded in the books of the
corporation. Section 63 of the Corporation Code provides that no transfer shall be valid,
except as between the parties, until the transfer is recorded in the books of the
ASSIGNMENT 1
corporation. During such interim period, the heirs stand as the equitable owners of the
stocks, the executor or administrator duly appointed by the court being vested with the
legal title to the stock. Until a settlement and division of the estate is effected, the
stocks of the decedent are held by the administrator or executor. Consequently, during
such time, it is the administrator or executor who is entitled to exercise the rights of the
deceased as stockholder.
Corollary to this is the doctrine that a determination of whether a person, claiming
proprietary rights over the estate of a deceased person, is an heir of the deceased must
be ventilated in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of settling the
estate of the latter. The status of an illegitimate child who claims to be an heir to a
decedents estate cannot be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action, as in a case for the
recovery of property. The doctrine applies to the instant case, which is one for specific
performance to direct respondent corporation to allow petitioner to exercise rights
that pertain only to the deceased and his representatives.
CASE NO. 10
CHENG,RENLYN B.
CELESTINO BALUS VS. SATURNINO BALUS AND LEONARDA BALUS VDA. DE
CALUNOD
G.R. NO. 168970 JANUARY 15, 2010
FACTS: Herein petitioner and respondents are the children of the deceased Rufo Balus
who died on July 6, 1984. In 1979, Rufo mortgaged his land as security for a loan he
obtained from the Rural Bank. Rufo failed to pay his loan. As a result, the mortgaged
property was foreclosed and was subsequently sold to the Bank as the sole bidder.
On October 10, 1989, herein petitioner and respondents executed an Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate adjudicating to each of them a specific one-third portion of the
subject property. The Extrajudicial Settlement also contained provisions wherein the
parties admitted knowledge of the fact that their father mortgaged the subject property
to the Bank and that they intended to redeem the same at the soonest possible time.
Three years after the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, herein respondents
bought the subject property from the Bank. Subsequently a TCT was issued in the name
of respondents. Meanwhile, petitioner continued possession of the subject lot. On June
27, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages
against petitioner, contending that they had already informed petitioner of the fact that
they were the new owners of the disputed property, but the petitioner still refused to
surrender possession of the same to them.
ISSUE: whether co-ownership by petitioner and respondents over the subject property
persisted even after the lot was purchased by the Bank and title thereto transferred to
ASSIGNMENT 1
its name, and even after it was eventually bought back by the respondents from the
Bank.
RULING: No. The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of
his death. In addition, the inheritance of a person consists of the property and
transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his death, as well as those
which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession. In the present case,
since Rufo lost ownership of the subject property during his lifetime, it only follows that
at the time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no longer formed part of his estate
to which his heirs may lay claim. Stated differently, petitioner and respondents never
inherited the subject lot from their father.
Also, there is nothing in the subject Extrajudicial Settlement to indicate any express
stipulation for petitioner and respondents to continue with their supposed co-ownership
of the contested lot. On the contrary, a plain reading of the provisions of the Extrajudicial
Settlement would not, in any way, support petitioner's contention that it was his and his
sibling's intention to buy the subject property from the Bank and continue what they
believed to be co-ownership thereof. Petitioner and respondents, therefore, were wrong
in assuming that they became co-owners of the subject lot. Furthermore, petitioner's
contention that he and his siblings intended to continue their supposed co-ownership of
the subject property contradicts the provisions of the subject Extrajudicial Settlement
where they clearly manifested their intention of having the subject property divided or
partitioned by assigning to each of the petitioner and respondents a specific 1/3 portion
of the same. Partition calls for the segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion
of the property owned in common. It seeks a severance of the individual interests of
each co-owner, vesting in each of them a sole estate in a specific property and giving
each one a right to enjoy his estate without supervision or interference from the other. In
other words, the purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership, an objective
which negates petitioner's claims in the present case.
CASE NO. 11
CHU, LEA MONA P.
RUFINA LUY LIM vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AUTO TRUCK TBA CORPORATION,
SPEED DISTRIBUTING, INC., ACTIVE DISTRIBUTORS, ALLIANCE MARKETING
CORPORATION, ACTION COMPANY, INC
G.R. NO. 124715 JANUARY 24, 2000
FACTS: On 11 June 1994, Pastor Y. Lim died intestate. Herein petitioner, as surviving
spouse and duly represented by her nephew George Luy, filed a joint petition for the
administration of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim before the RTC of Quezon City. Private
respondent corporations, whose properties were included in the inventory of the estate
of Pastor Y. Lim, then filed a motion for the lifting of lis pendens and motion for exclusion
of certain properties from the estate of the decedent.
ASSIGNMENT 1
In an order dated 08 June 1995, the RTC, sitting as a probate court, granted the private
respondents' twin motions. The Court ordered the exclusion of the real properties of
private respondents from probate proceedings.
Subsequently, Rufina Luy Lim filed a verified amended petition. She alleged that the late
Pastor Y. Lim personally owned during his lifetime the following business entities, to wit:
Alliance Marketing, Inc., Speed Distributing Inc., Auto Truck TBA Corp., Active
Distributors, Inc. and Action Company. All the enumerated companies capital, assets
and equity were however, personally owned by the late Pastor Y Lim. Hence the alleged
stockholders and officers appearing in the respective articles of incorporation of the
above business entities were mere dummies of Pastor Y. Lim, and they were listed
therein only for purposes of registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Petitioner also averred that TCT No. 617726 and TCT No. 27896 registered in the name
of Auto Truck Corporation and Alliance Marketing Corp., respectively, were actually
acquired by Pastor Y. Lim during his marriage with petitioner. Therefore, all the
properties are considered conjugal in nature, having been acquired by him during the
existence of his marriage with petitioner.
Acting on petitioner's motion, the Regional Trial Court set aside order dated 08 June
1995.
Thereafter, the probate court appointed Rufina Lim as special administrator and Miguel
Lim and Lawyer Donald Lee, as co-special administrators of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim,
after which letters of administration were accordingly issued.
In an order dated 12 September 1995, the probate court denied anew private
respondents' motion for exclusion. And on 15 September 1995, the probate court acting
on an ex parte motion filed by petitioner, issued an order compelling the private
respondent corporations to produce and submit to the special administrators their
respective records of the savings/current accounts/time deposits and other deposits in
the names of Pastor Lim and/or corporations above-mentioned, showing all the
transactions made or done concerning savings/current accounts from January 1994 up
to their receipt of this court order.
On appeal, the CA ruled in favor of the respondents.
Hence, petitioner filed petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Petitioner argues that the parcels of land covered under the Torrens system and
registered in the name of private respondent corporations should be included in the
inventory of the estate of the decedent Pastor Y. Lim, alleging that after all the
determination by the probate court of whether these properties should be included or
not is merely provisional in nature, thus, not conclusive and subject to a final
determination in a separate action brought for the purpose of adjudging once and for all
the issue of title.
ASSIGNMENT 1
ISSUE: Whether or not the probate court may decide on the issue whether to include or
exclude in the inventory of the estate of the decedent certain real properties duly
registered in the name of private respondents.
RULING: We reiterated the rule in PEREIRA vs. COURT OF APPEALS:
. . . The function of resolving whether or not a certain property should be included
in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator is one
clearly within the competence of the probate court. However, the court's
determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to
the final decision in a separate action which may be instituted by the parties.
In CUIZON vs. RAMOLETE, where similarly as in the case at bar, the property subject
of the controversy was duly registered under the Torrens system, We categorically
stated:
. . . Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question
was in the possession of third parties and more important, covered
by a transfer certificate of title issued in the name of such third
parties, the respondent court should have denied the motion of the
respondent administrator and excluded the property in question
from the inventory of the property of the estate. It had no authority
to deprive such third persons of their possession and ownership of
the property. . .
Inasmuch as the real properties included in the inventory of the estate of the Late
Pastor Y. Lim are in the possession of and are registered in the name of private
respondent corporations, which under the law possess a personality separate and
distinct from their stockholders, and in the absence of any cogency to shred the veil of
corporate fiction, the presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor of private
respondents should stand undisturbed.
Accordingly, the probate court was remiss in denying private respondents' motion for
exclusion. While it may be true that the Regional Trial Court, acting in a restricted
capacity and exercising limited jurisdiction as a probate court, is competent to issue
orders involving inclusion or exclusion of certain properties in the inventory of the estate
of the decedent, and to adjudge, albeit, provisionally the question of title over properties,
it is no less true that such authority conferred upon by law and reinforced by
jurisprudence, should be exercised judiciously, with due regard and caution to the
peculiar circumstances of each individual case.
ASSIGNMENT 1
Notwithstanding that the real properties were duly registered under the Torrens system
in the name of private respondents, and as such were to be afforded the presumptive
conclusiveness of title, the probate court obviously opted to shut its eyes to this gleamy
fact and still proceeded to issue the impugned orders.
By its denial of the motion for exclusion, the probate court in effect acted in utter
disregard of the presumption of conclusiveness of title in favor of private respondents.
Certainly, the probate court through such brazen act transgressed the clear provisions
of law and infringed settled jurisprudence on this matter.
As to the order of the lower court, dated 15 September 1995, the Court of Appeals
correctly observed that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93 acted without jurisdiction in
issuing said order; The probate court had no authority to demand the production of bank
accounts in the name of the private respondent corporations.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the Court of Appeals which nullified
and set aside the orders issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93, acting as a
probate court, dated 04 July 1995 and 12 September 1995 is AFFIRMED.
CASE NO. 12
CUDALAP, DAGIW-A K.
ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD
DIVISION, MANUEL CUENCO, LOURDES CUENCO, CONCEPCION CUENCO
MANGUERRA, CARMEN CUENCO, CONSUELO CUENCO REYES, AND TERESITA
CUENCO GONZALEZ
G.R. NO. L-24742 OCTOBER 26, 1973
FACTS: On 25 February 1964 Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died at the Manila
Doctors' Hospital. He was survived by his widow, the herein petitioner, and their 2 minor
sons, all residing in Quezon City, and by his children of the first marriage, respondents
herein, all of legal age and residing in Cebu.
Lourdes, one of the children from the first marriage, filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration with the CFI Cebu, alleging that the senator died intestate in Manila but a
resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu and Quezon City.
In the meantime, or specifically on 12 March 1964, (a week after the filing of the Cebu
petition) Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed a petition with the court of first instance of Rizal
(Quezon City) for the probate of the deceased's last will and testament and for the
issuance of letters testamentary, where she was named executrix. Rosa also filed an
ASSIGNMENT 1
opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but this court held in abeyance resolution
over the opposition until CFI Quezon shall have acted on the probate proceedings.
Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon, on ground of lack of
jurisdiction and/or improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu already acquired
exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The opposition and motion to dismiss were denied.
On appeal, the CA ruled in favor of Lourdes and issued a writ of prohibition to CFI
Quezon to refrain perpetually from proceeding with the testate proceedings and
annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to
probate of the decedent's last will and testament and appointing petitioner-widow as
executrix. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution of
respondent Court of Appeals, dated 8 July 1965; hence the herein petition for review
on certiorari.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the
Quezon City court.
2. Whether the Quezon City court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate
proceedings in pursuance of the Cebu court's order expressly consenting in deference
to the precedence of probate over intestate proceedings
RULING:
1. Yes. The Judiciary Act confers original jurisdiction upon all CFI over "all matter of
probate, both of testate and intestate estates." On the other hand, Rule 73 of the Rules
of Court specifies that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of
a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." It is equally
conceded that the residence of the deceased or the location of his estate is not an
element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. It should be noted
that the Rule on venue does not state that the court with whom the estate or intestate
petition is first filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction.
Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's
last will has been presented in another court where the decedent obviously had his
conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow and their minor children, and that
the allegation of the intestate petition before it stating that the decedent
died intestate may be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition and
hold the petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the second court which has
before it the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged last will. Under these facts,
the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and deferring to
the Quezon City court.
ASSIGNMENT 1
2. No. Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition before it
and assumed jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and deference of the Cebu
court, the Quezon City court should be left now, by the same rule of venue of said Rule
73, to exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
Under the facts of the case and where respondents submitted to the Quezon City court
their opposition to probate of the will, but failed to appear at the scheduled hearing
despite due notice, the Quezon City court cannot be declared, as the appellate court
did, to have acted without jurisdiction in admitting to probate the decedent's will and
appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof in accordance with the
testator's testamentary disposition.
Further, in the relatively recent case of Uriarte vs. Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental with facts analogous to the present case, the Court upheld the doctrine of
precedence of probate proceedings over intestate proceedings.
CASE NO.14
GURO, JAMAIYAH G.
FULE VS. CA
G.R. NO. L-40502 NOVEMBER 29, 1976
FACTS: Petitioner Virginia G. Fule, debtor of the decedent Amado G. Garcia filed with
the CFI of Laguna a petition for letters of administration alleging, inter alia, "that on April
26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the
City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in
other places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court." At the same time, she
moved ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate. On even
date, her motion was granted.
Preciosa B. Garcia, the spouse of the late Amado G. Garcia filed a motion for
reconsideration contending that the court has no jurisdiction over the case and that
venue was improperly laid as she alleged that the petition should have been filed in
Quezon City, the residence of the late Amado Garcia at the time of his death.
Petitioner alleged that during the lifetime of the deceased, he was elected as
Constitutional Delegate for the First District of Laguna and his last place of residence
was at Calamba, Laguna.
ISSUE: 1. WON then CFI has jurisdiction over the case
2. WON the petition was correctly filed in Calamba, Laguna
3. WON Garcia being the spouse should have been preferred than that of Fule
ASSIGNMENT 1
RULING: 1. The CFI has jurisdiction over the subject matter

The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First Instance
jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of residence of the
deceased. Section 1, Rule 73, specifically the clause "so far as it depends on the place
of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in reality a matter of
venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased
Persons. Venue and Processes. It could not have been intended to define the
jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of
procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction
over the subject matter is another. The power or authority of the court over the subject
matter "existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause began." That power or
authority is not altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the manner in
which the power or authority shall be fully and justly exercised.
A fortiori, the place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will,
and issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an element of jurisdiction
over the subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue. And it is upon this reason that
the Revised Rules of Court properly considers the province where the estate of a
deceased person shall be settled as "venue."
2. The petition should have been filed in Quezon City and not in Calamba, Laguna
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." In the application of venue statutes and rules "resides" should
be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence
in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely
residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence
simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile
requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's
domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the
residence must be more than temporary.
As applied to the herein case, the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G.
Garcia was at Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is
admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his death. As it is, the
death certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was presented in evidence by Virginia G.
Fule herself and also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that his last place of residence was
at Quezon City.
3. The judge may consider the order of preference in the appointment of a regular
administrator in appointing a special administrator
ASSIGNMENT 1
Section 1 of Rule 80 provides that "(w) hen there is delay in granting letters
testamentary or of administration by any cause including an appeal from the allowance
or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special administrator to take
possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing the
delay are decided and executors or administrators appointed. Nothing is wrong for the
judge to consider the order of preference in the appointment of a regular administrator
in appointing a special administrator. After all, the consideration that overrides all others
in this respect is the beneficial interest of the appointee in the estate of the
decedent. Under the law, the widow would have the right of succession over a portion of
the exclusive property of the decedent, besides her share in the conjugal partnership.
For such reason, she would have as such, if not more, interest in administering the
entire estate correctly than any other next of kin.
CASE NO. 15
HINGPES, MARK JOSEPH BAJADO
ARTURIO TRINIDAD VS. COURT OF APPEALS, FELIX TRINIDAD (DECEASED)
AND LOURDES TRINIDAD
G.R. NO. 118904. APRIL 20, 1998
FACTS: Plaintiff [herein petitioner] filed with the Court of First Instance of Aklan, Kalibo,
Aklan, an action for partition of four (4) parcels of land, claiming that he was the son of
the late Inocentes Trinidad, one of three (3) children of Patricio Trinidad, who was the
original owner of the parcels of land. Patricio Trinidad died in 1940, leaving the four (4)
parcels of land to his three (3) children, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. In 1970, plaintiff
demanded from the defendants to partition the land into three (3) equal shares and to
give him the one-third (1/3) individual share of his late father, but the defendants
refused.
In their answer, denied that plaintiff was the son of the late Inocentes
Trinidad. Defendants contended that Inocentes was single when he died in 1941,
before plaintiffs birth. Defendants also denied that plaintiff had lived with them, and
claimed that the parcels of land described in the complaint had been in their
possession since the death of their father in 1940 and that they had not given
plaintiff a share in the produce of the land.
They also claim that the action of petitioner is time barred because of the fact that
the property in question has already been under the ownership of the defendants by
reason of acquisitive prescription.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the action for partition has already prescribed by reason of
acquisitive prescription.
RULING: No. Private respondents have not acquired ownership of the property in
question by acquisitive prescription. In a co-ownership, the act of one benefits all the
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other co-owners, unless the former repudiates the co-ownership. Thus, no prescription
runs in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his or her co-owners or co-heirs, so long
as he or she expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
In this particular case, it is undisputed that, prior to the action for partition, petitioner, in
the concept of a co-owner, was receiving from private respondents his share of the
produce of the land in dispute. Until such time, recognition of the co-ownership by
private respondents was beyond question. There is no evidence, either, of their
repudiation, if any, of the co-ownership of petitioners father Inocentes over the
land. Further, the titles of these pieces of land were still in their fathers name. Although
private respondents had possessed these parcels openly since 1940 and had not
shared with petitioner the produce of the land during the pendency of this case, still,
they manifested no repudiation of the co-ownership. In Mariategui vs. Court of
Appeals, the Court held:
x x x Corollarily, prescription does not run again private respondents with
respect to the filing of the action for partition so long as the heirs for whose
benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the
co-ownership. In the other words, prescription of an action for partition does not
lie except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner (Del
Banco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55 [1987] citing Jardin vs.
Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]).
Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the
other co-owners absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated
to the other co-owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342
[1987]). Furthermore, an action to demand partition is imprescriptible and cannot
be barred by laches (Del Banco vs. IAC, 156 SCRA 55 (1987). On the other
hand, an action for partition may be seen to be at once an action for declaration
of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of
the property involved (Roque vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 118 [1988]).
Considering the foregoing, Respondent Court committed reversible error in holding that
petitioners claim over the land in dispute was time-barred.
CASE NO. 16
JUAN, MA. BARBARA RAIZZA J.
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS EDMUND SANTIBAEZ AND FLORENCE
SANTIBAEZ ARIOLA
G.R. NO. 149926 FEBRUARY 23, 2005
FACTS: On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim
M. Santibaez entered into a loan agreement in the amount of P128,000.00. The
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amount was intended for the payment of the purchase price of one (1) unit Ford 6600
Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor. Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a
promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal annual
amortizations ofP43,745.96 due on May 31, 1981 and every May 31st thereafter up to
May 31, 1985.
On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement,
this time in the amount ofP123,156.00. It was intended to pay the balance of the
purchase price of another unit of Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor, with
accessories, and one (1) unit Howard Rotamotor Model AR 60K. Again, Efraim and his
son, Edmund, executed a promissory note for the said amount in favor of the FCCC.
Aside from such promissory note, they also signed a Continuing Guaranty Agreement
for the loan dated December 13, 1980.
Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. Subsequently in
March 1981, testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City. Edmund, as
one of the heirs, was appointed as the special administrator of the estate of the
decedent.
During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his
sister Florence Santibaez Ariola, executed a Joint Agreement dated July 22, 1981,
wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the three (3)
tractors; wherein each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late father to
FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them.
Subsequently, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilitieswas executed by and
between FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the
assignor, among others, assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank.
Demand letters for the settlement of his account were sent by petitioner Union Bank of
the Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the latter failed to render payment. Thus, on
February 5, 1988, the petitioner filed a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of
Efraim Santibaez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City. Summonses
were issued against both, but the one intended for Edmund was not served since he
was in the United States and there was no information on his address or the date of his
return to the Philippines.
In her answer, respondent Florence S. Ariola alleged that the loan documents did not
bind her since she was not a party thereto. Considering that the joint agreement signed
by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was null and
void; hence, she was not liable to the petitioner under the joint agreement.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The RTC
stated that the claim of the petitioner should have been filed with the probate court
before which the testate estate of the late Efraim Santibaez was pending, as the sum
of money being claimed was an obligation incurred by the said decedent.
Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the decision of the RTC was affirmed by the
appellate court.
ASSIGNMENT 1
ISSUES:
1.
whether or not the partition in the Agreement executed by the heirs is valid
2.
whether or not the heirs assumption of the indebtedness of the deceased is valid
3.
whether the petitioner can hold the heirs liable on the obligation of the deceased.
RULING: The agreement executed by the heirs is not valid.

In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will
has been probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it,
because unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right
of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory. The
authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity
of the testator and the compliance with those requirements or solemnities which the law
prescribes for the validity of a will.
In the present case, the deceased, Efraim Santibaez, left a holographic will which
contained the provision which reads as follows:
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later after
my demise, shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately preceding
paragraph in favor of Edmund and Florence, my children.
The Supreme Court (SC) agree with the appellate court that the above-quoted is an allencompassing provision embracing all the properties left by the decedent which might
have escaped his mind at that time he was making his will, and other properties he may
acquire thereafter. Included therein are the three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any
partition involving the said tractors among the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement
executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves, is
invalid, specially so since at the time of its execution, there was already a pending
proceeding for the probate of their late fathers holographic will covering the said
tractors.
It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already acquired jurisdiction over
all the properties of the deceased, including the three (3) tractors. To dispose of them in
any way without the probate courts approval is tantamount to divesting it with
jurisdiction which the Court cannot allow. Every act intended to put an end to indivision
among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should
purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction. Thus, in
executing any joint agreement which appears to be in the nature of an extra-judicial
partition, as in the case at bar, court approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot just
divest the court of its jurisdiction over that part of the estate.
Moreover, it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to determine the identity of the
heirs of the decedent. In the instant case, there is no showing that the signatories in the
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joint agreement were the only heirs of the decedent. When it was executed, the probate
of the will was still pending before the court and the latter had yet to determine who the
heirs of the decedent were. Thus, for Edmund and respondent Florence S. Ariola to
adjudicate unto themselves the three (3) tractors was a premature act, and prejudicial to
the other possible heirs and creditors who may have a valid claim against the estate of
the deceased.
For the second issue, the Court ruled in the negative.
Perusing the joint agreement, it provides that the heirs as parties thereto " have agreed
to divide between themselves and take possession and use the above-described
chattel and each of them to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel
taken as herein after stated which is in favor of First Countryside Credit Corp." The
assumption of liability was conditioned upon the happening of an event, that is, that
each heir shall take possession and use of their respective share under the agreement.
It was made dependent on the validity of the partition, and that they were to assume the
indebtedness corresponding to the chattel that they were each to receive. The partition
being invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs in effect did not receive any such tractor. It
follows then that the assumption of liability cannot be given any force and effect.
For the last issue, the Court notes that the loan was contracted by the
decedent.However, the petitioners should have filed its money claim with the probate
court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court.
From the records of the case, nothing therein could hold private respondent Florence S.
Ariola accountable for any liability incurred by her late father. The documentary
evidence presented, particularly the promissory notes and the continuing guaranty
agreement, were executed and signed only by the late Efraim Santibaez and his son
Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at most, it
may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the said promissory
notes and continuing guaranty, of course, subject to any defenses Edmund may have
as against the petitioner. As the court had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of
Edmund, we find it unnecessary to delve into the matter further.
CASE NO. 17
NOCON, AUDREY ROSE
HILADO VS. CA
G.R. NO. 164108
MAY 8, 2009
FACTS: The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate. He was
survived by his wife, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto (administratrix
Benedicto), and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-Paulino. At the time of his
death, there were two pending civil cases against Benedicto involving the petitioners.
private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for
the issuance of letters of administration in her favor which was granted. private
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respondent submitted an Inventory of the Estate, Lists of Personal and Real Properties,
and Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased husband. it included as among the liabilities
the two pending claims. petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a Manifestation. Private
respondent opposed the manifestation/motion, disputing the personality of petitioners to
intervene in the intestate proceedings of her husband. Petitioners also filed other
pleadings or motions with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the part of private
respondent in her administration of the estate, and assailing the inventory that had been
submitted thus far as unverified, incomplete and inaccurate. The Manila RTC denied the
manifestation/motion, on the ground that petitioners are not interested parties. CA
affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has the right to intervene in the intestate
proceedings of the estate of Roberto Benedicto.
RULING: No, Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an
intervenor "has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of
the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court x x x" While the
language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from intervening in
the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held that the legal interest required
of an intervenor "must be actual and material, direct and immediate, and not simply
contingent and expectant." Section 2, Rule 72 further provides that "[i]n the absence of
special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as
practicable, applicable to special proceedings." notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72,
intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent
whose credit is based on a contingent claim. The definition of "intervention" under Rule
19 simply does not accommodate contingent claims.
CASE NO. 18
OLAYTA, JESTER KUTCH A.
HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON VS RICAFORTE
G.R. NO. 198680 JULY 8, 2013
FACTS: Petitioners filed a complaint against respondent for cancellation of title and
Reconveyance with damages. In the said complaint, they alleged that deceased
Magdaleno Ypon died intestate and childless leaving properties behind. Claiming to be
the sole heir of the deceased, respondent Gaudioso executed an affidavit of selfadjudication which caused the cancellation of certificate of title covering the properties
of deceased to the prejudice of the petitioners who are collateral relatives and
successors-in-interest of deceased.
In his answer, respondent claimed that he is the lawful son of the deceased as
evidenced by the following documents: (a) his certificate of Live Birth; (b) two (2) letters
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from Polytechnic School; and (c) a certified true copy of his passport. Further he
claimed that petitioners have no cause of action against him; the complaint fails to state
a cause of action and that case is not prosecuted by parties-in-interest as the
petitioners have not been judicially declared lawful heirs of deceased.
The RTC ruled in favor of respondents, finding that the complaint failed to state a cause
of action. It held that while the plaintiffs therein had established their relationship with
Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding for the issuance of letters of
administration, this did not mean that they could already be considered as the
decedents compulsory heirs. On the other hand, respondent was able to satisfactorily
establish that he is the son hence his compulsory heir of the deceased through the
documents submitted to the court which included the marriage contract of the decased
and one Epegenia Evangelista. After the motion for reconsideration was denied, it
sought direct recourse to this Court. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTCs dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject
complaint failed to state a cause of action was proper.
RULING: The Court held in the affirmative. Preliminarily, Cause of action is defined as
the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. It is well-settled that the
existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint.
Accordingly if the allegations furnish sufficient allegations the case should not be
dismissed. In the case at bar, although petitioners made allegations that they are lawful
heirs of the deceased, , the rule that the determination of a decedents lawful heirs
should be made in the corresponding special proceeding precludes the RTC, in an
ordinary action for cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the same
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased
must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for
recovery of ownership and possession of property.1wphi1 This must take precedence
over the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently
ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the
reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. It is then
decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special
proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status
or right.
As was settled in prior jurisprudence, matters relating to the rights of filiation and
heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted
precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. By way of exception, the need to
institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of heirship may be
dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had
voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence
regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment
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thereon, or when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed
and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.
In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to
exist. Hence, there lies the need to institute the proper special proceeding in order to
determine the heirship of the parties involved, ultimately resulting to the dismissal of
Civil Case No. T-2246.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 is
hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice to any subsequent proceeding to determine the
lawful heirs of the late Magdaleno Ypon and the rights concomitant therewith.
CASE NO. 20
ANGELI L. QUINTUA
SABIDONG VS. SOLAS
A.M. NO. P-01-1448; JUNE 25, 2013
FACTS: Trinidad Sabidong, complainants mother, is one of the longtime occupants of
the one-half portion of Lot 11 originally registered in the name of C. N. Hodges (Hodges
Estate), as the other half-portion was occupied by Priscila Saplagio. Lot 11 was the
subject of an ejectment suit filed by the Hodges Estate in the MTCC Iloilo City ("Rosita
R. Natividad in her capacity as Administratrix of C.N. Hodges Estate, plaintiff vs. Priscila
Saplagio, defendant"). A decision was rendered in said case ordering the defendant to
immediately vacate the portion of Lot 11 leased to her and to pay the plaintiff rentals
due.
Respondent offered to purchase on installment Lots 11 and 12. The Administratrix of the
Hodges Estate rejected respondents offer in view of an application to purchase already
filed by the actual occupant of Lot 12, "in line with the policy of the Probate Court to give
priority to the actual occupants in awarding approval of Offers".
After few attempts, respondents Offer to Purchase Lot 11 was approved upon the
courts observation that the occupants of the subject lots have not manifested their
desire to purchase the lots and another Order granting respondents motion for
issuance of a writ of possession in his favor. Title of Lot 11 was transferred to
respondent and a writ of demolition against all adverse occupants of Lot 11.
A sworn letter-complaint alleged that respondent, then Clerk of Court III, MTCC, Iloilo
City, has knowledge, by reason of his position that in 1983 Hodges Estate was ejecting
occupants of its land. Took advantage of this inside information that the land subject of
an ejectment case in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Iloilo City, whom respondent is a
Clerk of Court III, the respondent surreptitiously offered to buy the said lot in litigation.
ASSIGNMENT 1
Respondent made the complainant and his family believed that he is the representative
of the estate and that he needed a downpayment right away. All the while, the Sabidong
family (who belong to the underprivileged) relied on the representations of the
respondent that he was authorized to facilitate the sale, with more reason that
respondent represented himself as the City Sheriff. Respondent was able to collect
sums totaling P20,000 from complainants family.
ISSUE: Whether or not a property forming part of the estate under judicial settlement
continues to be subject of litigation.
RULING: Yes. In the case at bar, when respondent purchased Lot 11-A on November
21, 1994, the Decision in Civil Case No. 14706 which was promulgated on May 31,
1983 had long become final. Be that as it may, it cannot be said that the property is no
longer "in litigation" at that time considering that it was part of the Hodges Estate then
under settlement proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. 1672).
A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in
court, but also from the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the
judge. A property forming part of the estate under judicial settlement continues to be
subject of litigation until the probate court issues an order declaring the estate
proceedings closed and terminated. The rule is that as long as the order for the
distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot
be deemed closed and terminated. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate
under administration only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate
delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. Since there is no evidence to show
that Sp. Proc. No. 1672 in the RTC of Iloilo, Branch 27, had already been closed and
terminated at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale With Mortgage dated
November 21, 1994, Lot 11 is still deemed to be "in litigation" subject to the operation of
Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code.
This notwithstanding, we hold that the sale of Lot 11 in favor of respondent did not
violate the rule on disqualification to purchase property because Sp. Proc. No. 1672
was then pending before another court (RTC) and not MTCC where he was Clerk of
Court.
CASE NO. 21
REGINALDO, MARRIANNE G.
FILOMENO COCA VS. CRISPIN BORROMEO AND GUADALUPE PIZARRAS VDA.
DE PANGILINAN AND HER CHILDREN
G.R. NO. L-29545 JANUARY 31, 1978
FACTS: This include two related cases and their adjudication in a single decision was
allowed in this Court's resolution of August 13, 1969.
ASSIGNMENT 1
The spouses Juan Pan and Teresa Magtuba died intestate in 1943 and 1948,
respectively. They possessed a homestead, consisting of two parcels of land, located at
Barrio Bunawan or Mauswagon, Calamba, Misamis Occidental. One parcel is identified
as Lot No. 1927. It has an area of 3.9791 hectares. The other parcel is Identified as Lot
No. 1112. It has an area of 18.0291 hectares. According to Guadalupe Pizarras and her
children, a third parcel, Lot No. 1920, with an area of eight hectares which was
surveyed in the name of Concepcion Pan and which adjoins Lots Nos. 1927 and 1112,
also forms part of the estate of the deceased Pangilinan spouses.
The administrator presented a project of partition wherein the combined areas of Lots
Nos. 1112 and 1927, or 22.0082 hectares, were partitioned. It was also provided in the
project of partition that the sum of P5,088.50, as the alleged debt of the estate to
Concepcion Pan should be divided equally among the three sets of heirs, or P1,696.16
for each set of heirs, and that Prima Pangilinan and the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan
should pay that amount to the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan.
The heirs of Francisco Pangilinan opposed that project of partition. They contended that
the proposed partition contravened the lower court's order of December 6, 1963 which
recognized the right of the heirs of Francisco Pan to a twelve-hectare portion of Lot No.
1112; that Prima Pangilinan, who sold her share to Francisco Pan should be excluded
from the partition; that the total share of the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan in Lot No.
1112 is 12.6720 hectares, while that of the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan is 6.3360
hectares, and that the claim of the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan for 115,088.50 had
not been properly allowed.
The lower court deferred action on the project of partition until the ownership of the
twelve hectares, which were claimed by the heirs of Francisco Pan and the six hectares,
which were claimed by Crispen Borromeo is determined in an ordinary action.
The heirs of Francisco Pangilinan filed a supplemental opposition wherein they asked
that Lot No. 1920, with an area of eight hectares, should be included in the project of
partition. The lower court, apparently acting on its own volition, tackled once more the
project of partition. After noting that no separate action had been filed to determine the
ownership of the twelve hectares, it issued an order approving the project of partition
but excluding the twelve hectares claimed by the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan.
That order on its face appears to be incomplete because, after excluding the twelve
hectares, the lower court did not bother to decide how the remainder should be
partitioned and whether Prima Pangilinan had a share in that remainder. That is the
order under appeal in L-27082 by Filomeno Coca as administrator, Prima Pangilinan
and the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan. However, the said appellants in their brief also
assail the lower court's order of December 6, 1963, excluding eighteen hectares from
the inventory, which order was sustained by the Court of Appeals in its decision.
ASSIGNMENT 1
The appellant contend that the lower court, as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to
decide the ownership of the twelve-hectare portion of Lot No. 1112. On the other hand,
the appellees" or the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan counter that the lower court did not
decide the ownership of the twelve hectares when it ordered their exclusion from the
project of partition.
ISSUE: Whether the ownership of a parcel of land should be decided in the intestate
proceeding or in a separate action.
RULING: We hold that the instant case may be treated as an exception to the general
rule that questions of title should be ventilated in a separate action.
As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be passed upon in the
estate or intestate proceeding. That question should be ventilated in a separate action.
That general rule has qualifications or exceptions justified by expediency and
convenience.
Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or testate
proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of
property without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action. Although
generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the
interested parties are all heirs or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the
parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of
'third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the
question of ownership.
Here, the probate court had already received evidence on the ownership of the twelvehectare portion during the hearing of the motion for its exclusion from title inventory. The
only interested parties are the heirs who have all appeared in the intestate proceeding.
As pointed out by the appellees, they belong to the poor stratum of society. They should
not be forced to incur additional expenses (such as filing fees) by bringing a separate
action to determine the ownership of the twelve-hectare portion.
The just, expeditious and inexpensive solution is to require the heirs of Francisco
Pangilinan to the in the intestate, proceeding, Special Proceeding No. 568, a motion in
the form of a complaint wherein they should set forth their claim for the twelve hectares
in question, stating the ultimate facts in support of their claim, such as the partition
made by Juan C. Pangilinan, their acquisition of the share of Prima Pangilinan and the
usufructuary rights of their parents, their long possession of the said portion, their claim
for the produce of the land, the expenses incurred by them in Civil Case No.
560, Labaria vs. Pangilinan, and their contention that Lot No. 1920 forms part of the
estate of the Pangilinan spouses.
Copies of that motion should be served upon the administrator and upon Prima
Pangilinan and the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan (who are all represented by the
ASSIGNMENT 1
same lawyers). They should answer the motion within fifteen days from service. In their
answer the appellants should set forth the ultimate facts and the defenses (such as the
violation of section 118 of the Public Land Law) to support their theory that Lot No. 1112
still forms part of the estate of the spouses Juan C. Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba and
that the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan should bear one-third of the expenses incurred by
Concepcion Pan in Civil Case No. 560.
CASE NO. 22
SIA, JON MARI Z.
PRECY BUNYI AND MILA BUNYI VS. FE S. FACTOR
G.R. NO. 172547 JUNE 30, 2009
FACTS: Respondent Fe S. Factor is one of the co-owners of an 18-hectare piece of
land located in Almanza, Las Pias City. The ownership of the land originated from
respondents paternal grandparents Constantino Factor and Maura Mayuga. The
children of Constantino Factor and Maura Mayuga-Factor thereafter sold seven (7)
hectares of the Factor family property. The siblings, except Enrique Factor, respondents
father, shared and divided the proceeds of the sale among themselves. Enrique
acquired his own share of the property.
When Enrique Factor died, the administration of the Factor compound and the rest
house was transferred and entrusted to Enriques eldest child, Gloria Factor-Labao, who
together with her husband Ruben Labao, lived in Tipaz, Taguig, Metro Manila but visited
and sometimes stayed in the rest house. When Gloria died on January 15, 2001, the
administration and management of the Factor compound passed on to respondent Fe
S. Factor as co-owner of the property. Ruben Labao, thereafter, married petitioner Precy
Bunyi. At about this time, respondent discovered that petitioners forcibly opened the
doors of the rest house and stole all the personal properties. Thus, respondent Fe S.
Factor filed a complaint for forcible entry against herein petitioners Precy Bunyi and Mila
Bunyi, the petitioners.
The METC ruled in favor of respondent. The RTC and thereafter, the CA, affirmed the
decision.
Petitioners questioned Fes claim of ownership of the subject property and the alleged
prior ownership of her father Enrique Factor. They asserted that the subject property
was owned by Ruben Labao.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have better right over the property.
RULING: No. The right of respondents predecessors over the subject property is more
than sufficient to uphold respondents right to possession over the same. Respondents
right to the property was vested in her along with her siblings from the moment of their
fathers death. As heir, respondent had the right to the possession of the property,
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which is one of the attributes of ownership. Such rights are enforced and protected from
encroachments made or attempted before the judicial declaration since respondent
acquired hereditary rights even before judicial declaration in testate or intestate
proceedings.
After the death of Enrique Factor, it was his eldest child, Gloria Factor-Labao who took
over the administration of the subject property. And as a consequence of coownership, soon after the death of Gloria, respondent, as one of the surviving coowners, may be subrogated to the rights of the deceased co-owner, which includes the
right to the administration and management of the subject property.
As found by the Court of Appeals, petitioners unsupported claim of possession must
yield to that of the respondent who traces her possession of the subject property to her
predecessors-in-interest who have always been in possession of the subject property.
ASSIGNMENT 1

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REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II

ATTY. CHRISTIAN VILLASIS

5 | REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II

RULING: 1. The CFI has jurisdiction over the subject matter

RULING: The agreement executed by the heirs is not valid.

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