An evaluation of Russells attack on Hegel

L.M. Geerdink
December 9, 2009

Introduction

Around 1900 B.A.W. Russell started to renounce the idealism that was dominant
at that time in England. His strong interest in mathematics and its foundations
convinced him that the monism that idealism postulated was false. He believed
that mathematics could not be understood without accepting a pluralism of entities.1
The so called English Idealists, e.g. F.H. Bradley and J.M.E. McTaggart, were
very influential at that time, and Russell could not avoid engaging them in order to
further his own logicist program, i.e. the program of proving that all mathematics
could be deduced from formal logic.
Part of this attack on English Idealism was an attack on all philosophical programs that presupposed term-logic. Russell believed that using term-logic committed one to a metaphysics of substances and attributes, which would directly
lead to either a monadistic philosophy or a monistic philosophy. This attack on
monadistic and monistic philosophies is most strongly carried out in his book the
Principles of Mathematics (Russell, 1937).
Monadistic philosophies transform all statements of relation into a multitude of
subject-predicate sentences. We will not be concerned with Monadistic philosophy
here, but according to Russell these doctrines where for instance expounded by
G.W. Leibniz and R.H. Lotze.2 Monistic philosophies, on the other hand, try
to reduce a relation between two or more objects to a statement about a single
subject that encompasses all relata. It is this subject of which something is then
predicated. Examples of monist philosophers are Spinoza, Bradley and G.F.W.
Hegel.
Here we will only examine Russells attack on Hegels philosophy. This attack
on Hegel was made explicit in Russells article Logic as the essence of philosophy
1
2

Russell recounts this development in his essay Logical Atomism (Russell, 1959)
Lotze was a German logician and philosopher, who lived from 1817 till 1881.

(Russell, 1914) and seems to have been very influential.3 We will first take a
closer look at the exact critique that Russell gives on Hegels system. Then we
will take a quick detour, and try to determine why it is so important for Russell
to refute all monistic philosophies. We will then try to evaluate this attack on
Hegel. In order to see if this attack on Hegel is justified we will study parts of
Hegels Phanomenolgie des Geistes (Hegel, 2003) and Logik (Hegel, 1812). We will
conclude this investigation in aporia. It seems that we can only show that Hegels
metaphysics and the modern logic of relations and foundations of mathematics are
inconsistent with each other.

Russell attack on Hegels use of term-logic

Russell believed that Hegels metaphysical system was ultimately the result of
Hegels use of term-logic. According to Russell [. . . ] Hegels doctrine, that philosophical propositions must be of the form, the Absolute is such-and-such, depends upon the traditional belief in the universality of the subject-predicate form
(Russell, 1914, p. 48). In order to evaluate Russells attack, we will first take
a quick look at what term-logic is. We will then see why Russell believes that
term-logic leads to either Monadism or Monism. Lastly we will see why Russell
believes that Monism is inconsistent, and thus false.
Term-logic, or traditional logic, states that each proposition is made up of two
terms, the subject and the predicate. The sentence is true when the predicate
holds for the subject. For example, the proposition all men are mortal is made
up of two terms: the subject all men and the universal predicate mortality. This
proposition is true when it holds for all men that they are mortal.
Russell believes that Hegels term-logic leads to his metaphysical Monism.
Now the traditional logic holds that every proposition ascribes a predicate to
a subject, and from this it easily follows that there can be only one subject, the
Absolute, for if there were two, the proposition that there were two would not
ascribe a predicate to either (Russell, 1914, p. 48).4
3

The exact influence that Russell has had on the analytical tradition goes beyond the scope
of this essay and will have to wait for another occasion. What we do know is that the analytical
tradition dislikes Hegels philosophy and does not really study it. I believe that this is in a large
part a direct consequence of Russells attack. Other philosophers that might have been a source
of this dislike of Hegel in the analytic tradition are G.E. Moore, A.J. Ayer and K.R. Popper. It
is interesting to note that F.L.G. Frege, who is considered the father of modern logic, does not
even mention Hegel in any of his works. This is interesting because Frege also needs a pluralistic
universe for his logicist program, just like Russell. That Russell does attack monistic philosophies
and Frege does not might be an indicator of the differences in philosophical climate in Germany
and England during these developments.
4
As was stated in the introduction Russell actually does not believe that term-logic necessarily

Lets take a closer look at why Russell believes that term-logic leads to Monism.
The problem starts when term-logic is confronted with a relational proposition,
i.e. a proposition that asserts a relation between two or more entities. Lets take
the proposition a is greater than b as our example. The problem for term-logic
here is that it seems impossible to divide this proposition into two, i.e. a subject
and a predicate. The most natural division seems to be a division into three, the
two terms a and b and the universal relation x is greater then y. Now term-logic
could try to analyze this sentence as The universal predicate being greater then b
holds for the subject a. This is the Monadistic solution.5 The other way of trying
to deal with it is taking a and b to be a composite subject ab and predicate the
universal diversity in magnitude with itself 6 of this subject. This is the Monistic
solution. If we try to solve the tension in the second, monistic, way, we will be
forced to conclude that there is only one subject, the Absolute. This is so, because
whenever we seem to have two entities and ask what the relation between these
two entities is, term-logic will force us to assert that these two entities are really
a composite entity.
Now Russell believes the Monistic metaphysics to be self-contradictory. Since
it presupposes term-logic, it presupposes that there are at least two things, the
subject and the predicate. For if the Absolute has predicates, then there are
predicates; but the proposition there are predicates is not one which the present
theory can admit (Russell, 1937, 448). The Monist will indeed not admit the truth
of the proposition there are predicates and thus is driven to the view that all
propositions are contradictory. And hence we find monists driven to the view that
the only true whole, the Absolute, has no parts at all, and that no propositions in
regard to it or anything else are quite truea view which, in the mere statement,
unavoidably contradicts itself (Russell, 1937, p. 226).

Hegels Absolute and the pluralism of mathematics

It seems that the logical conflict between Russell and Hegel can be reduced to the
opposition between monism and pluralism. Hegels term-logic leads to monism,
Russells modern logic absolutely needs pluralism. Russell thus attacks Hegel
because pluralism is a necessary condition for mathematics. Any philosophy that
leads to a monistic metaphysics. It could also lead to a Monadistic metaphysics where there is
a plurality of subjects and where each subject contains the whole universe.
5
This analysis will lead to all entities being like Leibnizian Monads, because all subjects will
ultimately contain all their relations with other entities as part of their essence.
6
This is Russells own example. It is clear that it is difficult to find an acceptable predicate
that holds for the complex subject here.

denies pluralism must be false, since it cannot understand mathematics.

The reason why Russell absolutely needs pluralism is that the logicist program
of deducing mathematics from logic seems to need the existence of a relation of
the form y is between x and z (Russell, 1937, p. 217). This relation is necessary
for the logicist program because it is only able to build up the ordering of the
natural numbers by making use of this relation.7 This relation between x, y and
z must ultimately be analyzed as a relation between two different asymmetrical
relations, a relation between x and y (the relation of being smaller than) and a
relation between y and z (the relation of being greater than). It is important to
see that these relations are asymmetrical. If x is smaller than y, then it cannot
also be the case that y is smaller then x. Saying that the subject xy has diversity
in magnitude with itself simply does not preserve this asymmetry.
In order to have this asymmetry we absolutely need a plurality of entities.
Since these relations are asymmetrical, x 6= y, i.e. if this relation holds between
anything, then there are at the very least two different objects. Since the existence
of these asymmetrical relations is a necessary condition of the logicist program it
is committed to a pluralistic metaphysics. Without pluralism it will be impossible
to deduce the natural numbers from logic.

Hegels term-logic

We have seen above that Russell attacks Hegels metaphysics on Hegels implicit use of term-logic. Russell believes this metaphysics to be ultimately selfcontradictory, because it seems committed to the idea that the only true thing is
the Absolute, and that every proposition about this Absolute contains a contradiction and is thus false.
In order to evaluate Russells argument we need to see if Hegel is indeed committed to the doctrine that Russell ascribes to him. We will first examine if Hegel
indeed uses term-logic and if this use of term-logic indeed leads him to accept only
one subject, the Absolute. We will then see if Russell is correct in stating that
for Hegel all propositions ultimately contain a self-contradiction and are therefore
false.
It seems fair to ascribe a great role to term-logic in Hegels system. Hegel never
explicitly states this, but the most telling sign of this is the fact that Hegel always
opposes two terms in his philosophical sentences. The dialectical movement never
takes place between more than two terms. That this seems the only logical choice
shows the implicit influence that term logic has on our thinking.8
7

Russell shows in the Principles of Mathematics that all other methods of trying to build up
order can be reduced to this relation of betweenness.
8
This can be contrasted with Russell, who allows a proposition to contain a multitude of

In the preface to his Phanomenologie des Geistes, Hegel discusses the relation
between subject and predicate in thinking. He first makes a distinction between
philosophical thinking and mathematical thinking9 , and tries to show that it is
only in philosophical thinking that we can see the necessity of the movement of
thought and thus have real understanding.
Mathematical thinking is defective,10 because:
In solchem unwirklichen Elemente gibt es denn auch nur unwirkliches
Wahres, d.h. fixierte, tote Satze; bei jedem derselben kann aufgehort
werden; der folgende fangt f
ur sich von neuem an, ohne da der erste
sich selbst zum andern fortbewegte und ohne da auf diese Weise ein
notwendiger Zusammenhang durch die Natur der Sache selbst entst
unde.
(Hegel, 2003, p. 40)
What is wrong with the relation between subject and predicate as understood
by mathematical thinking is, according to Hegel, that the predicate does not express the essence of the subject. By attributing the predicate to the independent
subject we do not understand why it is precisely this predicate that belongs to the
subject, or why it is necessary that this predicate is predicated of the subject in
the first place.
In the Phanomeonolgie des Geistes, Hegel gives the example of trying to understand what a right-angled triangle is. A right-angled triangle is a triangle that
has one of its interior angles measuring 90o . The proof that a right-angled triangle
can be constructed from a given straight line by ruler and compass can be found
in Euclids Elements. The problem with this proof is that: die Bewegung des
mathematischen Beweises gehort nicht dem an, was Gegenstand ist, sondern ist
ein der Sache auerliches Tun (Hegel, 2003, p. 38). The proof does not show
the necessity of each step taken in the proof. It does not follow from trying to
understand the essence of the right-angled triangle. That any of the proof is a
necessary moment in the construction of the triangle is only seen at the end of the
proof, when the construction of the triangle is completed:
Was das Erkennen betrifft, so wird vors erste die Notwendigkeit der
Konstruktion nicht eingesehen. Sie geht nicht aus dem Begriffe des
Theorems hervor, sondern wird geboten, und man hat dieser Vorschrift,
terms.
9
Since I take Russells philosophy to be a clear example of what Hegel calls mathematical
thinking, we will not discuss Hegels critique on formalistic thinking here.
10
Please be aware that Hegel does not believe mathematical knowledge to be false. Of course
Hegel believes that 3 + 6 = 9 is true, but it is true in an uninteresting way. Mathematical
knowledge is defective knowledge, since it does not concern the Absolute knowing itself. Mathematics concerns the knowing of something that is outside, and therefore it is not philosophical
knowledge and thus falls outside the concept of Science (Wissenschaft).

gerade diese Linien, deren unendliche andere gezogen werden konnten,

zu ziehen, blindlings zu gehorchen, ohne etwas weiter zu wissen, als
den guten Glauben zu haben, da dies zu F
uhrung des Beweises
zweckmaig sein werde. (Hegel, 2003, p. 39)
Philosophical thinking, on the other hand, understands that we must understand the predicate to express the essence of the subject it is predicated of. Thus,
we can now see that the sentence does not express that the predicate holds for the
subject, but that the subject and the predicate is essentially one and the same.
Formell kann das Gesagte so ausgedr
uckt werden, da die Natur des
Urteils oder Satzes u
berhaupt, die den Unterschied des Subjekts und
Pradikats in sich schliet, durch den spekulativen Satz zerstort wird,
und der identische Satz, zu dem der erstere wird, den Gegensto zu
jenem Verhaltnisse enthalt. (Hegel, 2003, p. 54)
This asserting of the identity of subject and predicate starts the dialectical
movement. The identity that we try to assert between subject and predicate
always contains a contradiction, it tries to say about two that they are one. This
contradiction is resolved by understanding that there are not two subjects, but
that the difference between the two subjects should be negated by seeing that these
two things are really different aspects of a single whole. After seeing this, we can
understand that both the subject and the predicate and their contradictory nature
were only necessary moments of this encompassing whole. We now appreciate the
necessity with which the latter has come forth out of the former.
We will look at one of these movements in detail, to see how it works. In
his Logik, Hegel famously shows that Das Seyn, das unbestimmte Unmittelbare
ist in der That Nichts, und nicht mehr noch weniger als Nichts (Hegel, 1812, p.
22). This contradiction that Seyn is Nichts is resolved, by seeing that both are
necessary moments of an encompassing whole, das Werden.
The contradiction is derived by trying to determine what the Absolute is.
Now we know from the Phanomonology, that Being is the Absolute.11 But, since
Being is the Absolute, we assert a relation, namely identity, between two thing,
the Absolute stands in the relation of identity to Being. Since they are two,
we have Being and something that is different from it, the Absolute. Since the
Absolute is different from Being, the Absolute is not-Being. Thus, Being is notBeing (Hegel, 1812, p. 36).12 To avoid the contradiction, thinking can try to think
11

See the preface of the Logik why thinking is justified in taking this as its starting point.
I have reconstructed Hegels proof like this, because here it is most clearly seen how the
movement comes forth out of the difference between subject and predicate. Earlier in the Logik
Hegel tries to show that since pure Being does not give any determination it is the same as
non-Being, i.e. Being is non-Being. Here it is the contradiction between Being and non-Being
12

of the Absolute as being not-Being. Thus, the Absolute is Being, namely Being
not-Being. Again we have asserted that Being is not-Being.
As was said above, this contradiction is resolved by seeing that both are necessary moments of an encompassing whole, not-Being becoming Being and Being
becoming not-Being. Thus the Absolute is not-Being becoming Being and Being
becoming not-Being. This determining of the Absolute will however form a new
contradiction, the infiniteness of the Absolute will contradict the restless changing
of the not-Being becoming Being, and so the dialectical movement continues from
within and shows the necessity of its movement.
Hegels metaphysics is build up by this dialectical movement of thought. It
needs the contradictions in order to move from the necessary moments of the whole
towards the whole, i.e. the Absolute. This dialectical movement needs term-logic
in order to function, it needs to oppose two terms, which it consequently sublates13
into a whole. The moment we accept relations between terms, what Hegel calls
mathematical thinking, we will have nur unwirkliches Wahres, d.h. fixierte, tote
Satze.

Does Russell actually refute Hegel?

As we have seen in section 2, Russell believes Hegels system to be ultimately

self-contradictory. Any predicate we ascribe to the Absolute will result into a false
proposition.
But, as we have also seen, it is precisely this contradictory nature of term-logic
that is necessary for Hegels metaphysics. Absolute knowing is the movement of
the Absolute thinking itself. It sees the sublating of the contradictions between
subject and predicate into a subject of a higher order as necessary moments of the
movement that is the pure concept of Absolute Knowledge. From within Hegels
system it is not problematic to believe that all propositions contain a contradiction,
it is necessary. This is Hegels famous law of contradiction.
On the other hand, assuming term-logic in order to accept Hegels metaphysics
will make it impossible to understand modern logic and modern developments in
mathematics. Modern logic and modern set theory14 were build on the foundations
of the logicist program and presupposes its pluralism of entities. As we have
seen, without pluralism we cannot build up the order of the natural numbers,
that starts the movement, instead of the contradiction between the Absolute and Being. Both
these movements can be found in the Logik and I believe that they are essentially the same.
13
I use the term sublating as a translation of the Hegelian aufhebung. The aufhebung is
the negation of the difference between subject and predicate into a whole that encompasses them
both.
14
This can be seen by the heavy use modern set theory makes of predicate logic.

and therefore we cannot understand the modern understanding of the foundations

of mathematics if we accept the universality of subject-predicate logic. Subjectpredicate logic cannot understand the asymmetrical relations that the foundations
of mathematics absolutely need. Having to deny these modern developments seems
a very high price to pay.
Thus it seems impossible to find neutral ground to decide between these two
standpoints. From the standpoint of Hegels metaphysics, the relational thinking of
mathematics is defective. I(t does not show its own necessity. From the standpoint
of modern logic, Hegels system is flawed since it denies asymmetrical relations.
What is clear is that we have to choose between the relational logic of the
logicist program and Hegels dialectical movement of the Absolute via traditional
logic. It seems that we cannot accept both, unless we find a way to sublate their
contradiction.15

References
Hegel, G. (1812). Wissenschaft der Logik. Nuernberg: Johann Leonhard Schrag.
Hegel, G. (2003). Phaenomenology des Geistes. Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun.
Russell, B. (1914). Logic as the essence of philosophy. In Our knowledge of the
external world. London: Allen and Unwin.
Russell, B. (1937). The principles of mathematics. New York and London: W.W.
Norton and Company, 2nd edition.
Russell, B. (1959). Logical atomism. In Marsh, R., editor, Logic and Knowledge.
London: Allen and Unwin.

15

I am grateful to Peter Sperber for commenting on an earlier draft of this paper.