Going Dark DA

1NC
Current NSA has control of deep web by using existing
backdoors to bypass encryption methods.
Franceschi 07/15/15 (LORENZO FRANCESCHI-BICCHIERA is a staffwriter at
motherboard, The FBI Hacked a Dark Web Child Porn Site to Unmask Its Visitors
http://motherboard.vice.com/en_uk/read/the-fbi-hacked-a-dark-web-child-porn-siteto-unmask-its-visitors)
Its no secret that the FBI hacks into suspects computers during its investigations.
But the bureau is certainly not a fan of publicizing its methods. A recent case
involving two frequent users of an unnamed dark web child pornography site is no
different. Last week, two men from New York were indicted on child pornography
charges, and in court documents, the prosecutors and the FBI were careful not to
reveal too many details about the investigation. But a passage in the court
documents, spotted by Stanford computer science and law expert Jonathan Mayer,
reveals that the feds deployed a Network Investigative Technique to unmask the
two men and obtain their real IP address. That's the agency's current euphemism
for hacking, Mayer told Motherboard in an email. While the court document stops
short of explaining exactly what hacking technique the FBI used, the description
seems to point in the direction of a watering hole attack or a drive-by download,
techniques where hackers hijack a website and subvert it to deliver malware to all
the visitors. On February 20, 2015 the FBI seized the server hosting what the FBI
refers to only as Website A, according to court documents. That allowed the
bureau to use a Network Investigative Technique, or NIT, to monitor the electronic
communications of all visitors of the site until March 4. The NIT was designed was
designed to trick the computers of the more than 200,000 visitors of the site into
sending the FBI a host of information about the target, such as his or her actual IP
address, the computers operating system, and its MAC address, a computers
unique identifier, according to court documents. Given the way the FBI describes
how it unmasked the two suspects, Alex Schreiber and Peter Ferrell, for Mayer,
theres no other technical explanation that this was a case of hacking and use of
malware.

Deep web is a host of crimes specifically with drug trafficking

Grossman 11/11/13 (Lev Grossman, lead technology writer for the times, Nov. 11,
2013, The Secret Web: Where Drugs, Porn and Murder Live Online
http://time.com/630/the-secret-web-where-drugs-porn-and-murder-live-online/)
On the afternoon of Oct. 1, 2013, a tall, slender, shaggy-haired man left his house on
15th Avenue in San Francisco. He paid $1,000 a month cash to share it with two housemates who knew him only as
a quiet currency trader named Josh Terrey. His real name was Ross Ulbricht. He was 29 and had no police
record. Dressed in jeans and a red T-shirt, Ulbricht headed to the Glen Park branch of the public library, where he
made his way to the science-fiction section and logged on to his laptophe was using the free wi-fi. Several FBI
agents dressed in plainclothes converged on him, pushed him up against a window, then escorted him from the

The FBI believes Ulbricht is a criminal known online as the Dread Pirate
Roberts, a reference to the book and movie The Princess Bride. The Dread Pirate Roberts was the
building.

owner and administrator of Silk Road, a wildly successful online bazaar where
people bought and sold illegal goodsprimarily drugs but also fake IDs, fireworks and
hacking software. They could do this without getting caught because Silk Road was
located in a little-known region of the Internet called the Deep Web. Technically the Deep Web
refers to the collection of all the websites and databases that search engines like Google
dont or cant index, which in terms of the sheer volume of information is many times larger than the Web as
we know it. But more loosely, the Deep Web is a specific branch of the Internet thats
distinguished by that increasingly rare commodity: complete anonymity. Nothing you do on the Deep
Web can be associated with your real-world identity, unless you choose it to be. Most people never see it,
though the software you need to access it is free and takes less than three minutes
to download and install. If theres a part of the grid that can be considered off the grid, its the Deep Web.
The Deep Web has plenty of valid reasons for existing . Its a vital tool for intelligence
agents, law enforcement, political dissidents and

anybody who needs or wants to conduct

their online affairs in privatewhich is, increasingly, everybody. According to a survey published in
September by the Pew Internet & American Life Project, 86% of Internet users have attempted to delete or conceal
their digital history, and 55% have tried to avoid being observed online by specific parties like their employers or

But the Deep Web is also an ideal venue for doing things that are
unlawful, especially when its combined , as in the case of Silk Road, with the anonymous,
virtually untraceable electronic currency Bitcoin. It allows all sorts of criminals who, in
bygone eras, had to find open-air drug markets or an alley somewhere to engage in bad activity to do it
openly, argues Preet Bharara, U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York, whose office is bringing
a case against Ulbricht and who spoke exclusively to TIME. For 2 years Silk Road acted as an
Amazon-like clearinghouse for illegal goods, providing almost a million customers
worldwide with $1.2 billion worth of contraband , according to the 39-page federal complaint
the government.

against Ulbricht. The Dread Pirate Roberts, the Deep Webs Jeff Bezos, allegedly collected some $80 million in fees.

Earlier today, FBI Director James Comey implied that a broad coalition of technology
companies, trade associations, civil society groups, and security experts were either
uninformed or were not fair-minded in a letter they sent to the President
yesterday urging him to reject any legislative proposals that would undermine the
adoption of strong encryption by US companies. The letter was signed by dozens of organizations and
companies in the latest part of the debate over whether the government should be given built-in access to
encrypted data (see, for example, here, here, here, and here for previous iterations).

The comments were made at the Third Annual Cybersecurity Law Institute held at Georgetown University Law
Center. The transcript of his encryption-related discussion is below (emphasis added).

Increasingly,

communications at rest sitting on a device or in motion are encrypted .

The device is encrypted or the communication is encrypted and therefore
unavailable to us even with a court order. So I make a showing of probable cause to a judge in a
criminal case or in an intelligence case to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court judge that the content of a
particular defense or a particular communication stream should be collected to our statutory authority, and the
judge approves, increasingly we are finding ourselves unable to read what we find or were unable to open a device.
And that is a serious concern.

encryption is a good thing. I think there are tremendous societal benefits to

encryption. Thats one of the reasons the FBI tells people not only lock your cars, but
you should encrypt things that are important to you to make it harder for thieves to
take them.
I am actually I think

But we have a collision going on in this country thats getting closer and closer to an
actual head-on, which is our important interest in privacy which I am passionate about
and our important interest in public safety. The logic of universal encryption is inexorable that our
authority under the Fourth Amendment an amendment that I think is critical to ordered liberty with the right
predication and the right oversight to obtain information is going to become increasingly irrelevant. As all of our
lives become digital, the logic of encryption is that all of our lives will be covered by strong encryption, therefore all
of our lives I know there are no criminals here, but including the lives of criminals and terrorists and spies will
be in a place that is utterly unavailable to court ordered process.

And that, I think, to a democracy should be very, very concerning. I think we need to have a conversation about it.
Again, how do we strike the right balance? Privacy matters tremendously. Public safety, I think, matters
tremendously to everybody. I think fair-minded people have to recognize that there are tremendous benefits to a
society from encryption. There are tremendous costs to a society from universal strong encryption. And how do we
think about that?

A group of tech companies and some prominent folks wrote a letter to the President yesterday that I frankly found
depressing. Because their letter contains no acknowledgment that there are societal costs to universal encryption.
Look, I recognize the challenges facing our tech companies. Competitive challenges, regulatory challenges
overseas, all kinds of challenges. I recognize the benefits of encryption, but I think fair-minded people also have to
recognize the costs associated with that. And I read this letter and I think, Either these folks dont see what I see or
theyre not fair-minded. And either one of those things is depressing to me. So Ive just got to continue to have the
conversation.

I dont know the answer, but I dont think a democracy should drift to a place where suddenly law enforcement
people say, Well, actually we the Fourth Amendment is an awesome thing, but we actually cant access any
information.

Weve got to have a conversation long before the logic of strong encryption takes us to that place. And smart
people, reasonable people will disagree mightily. Technical people will say its too hard. My reaction to that is:
Really? Too hard? Too hard for the people we have in this country to figure something out? Im not that pessimistic. I
think we ought to have a conversation.

Turns case - drug trafficking has harsh economic consequences

UN 2012 (United Nation, 26 June 2012, Thematic Debate of the 66th session of the
United Nations General Assembly on Drugs and Crime as a Threat to Development
http://www.un.org/en/ga/president/66/Issues/drugs/drugs-crime.shtml )
On the occasion of the UN International Day against Drug Abuse and Illicit
Trafficking
In the past decade, there has been significant growth in the illicit trafficking of
drugs, people, firearms, and natural resources. Trafficking in these and other commodities is generally
characterized by high levels of organization and the presence of strong criminal
groups and networks. While such activities existed in the past, both the scale and the geographic scope of the current challenge are unprecedented. In 2009,

Transnational organized crime and drug

trafficking is of growing concern, and particularly illicit trades broad impact on
development. Few, if any, countries are exempt. Drug trafficking has particularly severe implications
because of the vast illegal profits it generates: an estimated 322 billion dollars a
year. In several drug production and transit regions, criminal groups undermine
state authority and the rule of law by fuelling corruption, compromising elections,
and hurting the legitimate economy . In all cases, criminal influence and money are having a significant impact on the livelihoods and quality
the value of illicit trade around the globe was estimated at US$1.3 trillion and is increasing.

of life of citizens, most particularly the poor, women and children. The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document expressed Member States grave concern at the negative effects on
development, peace and security and human rights posed by transnational crime, including the smuggling of and trafficking in human beings, the world narcotic drug problem and the
illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. (A/RES/60/1 at 111). The General Assembly has most recently reiterated this concern and noted the increasing vulnerability of states to
such crime in Resolution A/Res/66/181 (Strengthening the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme, in particular its technical cooperation capacity). The
Assembly has also recognized that despite continuing increased efforts by States, relevant organizations, civil society and non-governmental organizations, the world drug problem
undermines socio-economic and political stability and sustainable development. See A/Res/66/183 (International cooperation against the world drug problem). A number of
international conventions on drug control, and more recently the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) and its protocols on human trafficking, migrant
smuggling and trafficking of firearms, as well as the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), constitute the key framework for a strategic response. Such instruments call upon State
Parties to take into account the negative effects of organized crime on society in general, in particular on sustainable development, and to alleviate the factors that make persons,
especially women and children, vulnerable to trafficking, such as poverty, underdevelopment and lack of equal opportunity. See article 30 of the UNTOC and article 9 of the Trafficking
Protocol. See also article 62 of the UNCAC. They also commit parties to respect fundamental human rights in countering organized crime and drug trafficking. The Secretary
Generals 2005 "In Larger Freedom report highlighted that We will not enjoy development without security, and we will not enjoy security without development". The SecretaryGenerals 2010 Keeping the Promise report (A/64/665) recognized that in order to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, integrity, accountability and transparency are crucial
for managing resources, recovering assets and combating the abuse, corruption and organized crime that are adversely affecting the poor. Par. 57. As we move towards 2015, and

As
economic development is threatened by transnational organized crime and illicit
drugs, countering crime must form part of the development agenda, and social and economic
development approaches need to form part of our response to organized crime . If we are to ensure that the MDGs are
achieved, we must strengthen strategies to deliver these goals , including stepping up efforts to address
issues such as money laundering, corruption and trafficking in wildlife, people and arms, and drugs. Organized crime and drugs impact
every economy, in every country, but they are particularly devastating in weak and
vulnerable countries. Weak and fragile countries are particularly vulnerable to the effects of transnational organized crime. These countries, some devastated
by war, others making the complex journey towards democracy, are preyed upon by crime. As a result, organized crime flourishes,
successes in development are reversed, and opportunities for social and economic
advancement are lost. Corruption, a facilitator of organized crime and drug
trafficking, is a serious impediment to the rule of law and sustainable development . It
can be a dominant factor driving fragile countries towards failure. It is estimated that up to US$40 billion annually is lost through corruption in developing countries. Drugs
and crime undermine development by eroding social and human capital . This
degrades quality of life and can force skilled workers to leave, while the direct
impacts of victimisation, as well as fear of crime, may impede the development of
those that remain. By limiting movement, crime impedes access to possible employment and educational opportunities, and it discourages the accumulation of
assets. Crime is also more expensive for poor people in poor countries, and disadvantaged households may struggle to cope with the shock of victimisation. Drugs and
crime also undermine development by driving away business . Both foreign and
domestic investors see crime as a sign of social instability , and crime drives up the cost of doing business. Tourism
is a sector especially sensitive to crime issues. Drugs and crime, moreover, undermine the ability of the state
to promote development by destroying the trust relationship between the people
and the state, and undermining democracy and confidence in the criminal justice system. When people lose confidence in the
criminal justice system, they may engage in vigilantism, which further undermines
the state.
take stock of the Millennium Development Goals, there is a growing recognition that organized crime and illicit drugs are major impediments to their achievement.

Uniqueness
http://blog.acton.org/archives/71950-deep-dark-web-like-cockroaches-humantraffickers-prefer-dark.html

Recent stops of drug trafficking sites prove

Europol 14 ( Europol 7 November 2014, Global Action Against Dark Markets on Tor
Network
https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/global-action-against-dark-markets-tornetwork)
On 6 November, law enforcement and judicial agencies around the globe undertook
a joint action against dark markets running as hidden services on Tor* network. 16 European
countries,** alongside counterparts from the United States, brought down several
marketplaces as part of a unified international action from Europols operational coordination centre in The
Hague. The action aimed to stop the sale, distribution and promotion of illegal and
harmful items, including weapons and drugs , which were being sold on online dark
marketplaces. Operation Onymous, coordinated by Europols European Cybercrime Centre (EC3), the FBI, the
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcements (ICE), Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) and Eurojust, resulted in
17 arrests of vendors and administrators running these online marketplaces and more than 410 hidden services
being taken down. In addition, bitcoins worth approximately USD 1 million, EUR 180 000 euro in cash, drugs, gold
and silver were seized. The dark market Silk Road 2.0 was taken down by the FBI and the U.S. ICE HIS, and the
operator was arrested. The Joint Cybercrime Action Taskforce (J-CAT), located at Europols headquarters, supported
the operation. The J-CAT was created to serve as a platform for targeted operations against global criminal networks

we have
demonstrated that, together, we are able to efficiently remove vital criminal
infrastructures that are supporting serious organised crime. And we are not 'just' removing these
services from the open Internet; this time we have also hit services on the Darknet
using Tor where, for a long time, criminals have considered themselves beyond reach .
We can now show that they are neither invisible nor untouchab le. The criminals can run but
they cant hide. And our work continues...., says Troels Oerting, Head of EC3. Our efforts have
disrupted a website that allows illicit black-market activities to evolve and expand,
and provides a safe haven for illegal vices , such as weapons distribution, drug
trafficking and murder-for-hire, says Kumar Kibble, regional attach for HSI in Germany. HSI
and infrastructure, carried out by EC3 and our colleagues in EU Member States and beyond.

Today

will continue to work in partnership with Europol and its law enforcement partners around the world to hold
criminals who use anonymous Internet software for illegal activities accountable for their actions. Working

closely with domestic and international law enforcement, the FBI and our partners have
taken action to disrupt several websites dedicated to the buying and selling of
illegal drugs and other unlawful goods. Combating cyber criminals remains a top priority for
the FBI, and we continue to aggressively investigate, disrupt, and dismantle illicit
networks that pose a threat in cyberspace , says Robert Anderson, FBI Executive Assistant Director
of the of the Criminal, Cyber, Response and Services Branch.

Link
Backdoors key to solving for encryption on the Internet
Kravets 07/08/15 (David Kravets, July 8, 2015, FBI chief tells Senate committee
were doomed without crypto backdoors https://www.benton.org/headlines/fbichief-tells-senate-committee-were-doomed-without-crypto-backdoors)
Comey, the director of the FBI, told the Senate Judiciary Committee that the
government should have the right to lawfully access any device or electronic form of
communication with a lawful court order , even if it is encrypted. Director Comey and Deputy
Attorney General Sally Quillian Yates briefed the committee and complained that keys necessary to
decrypt communications and electronic devices often reside "solely in the hands of
the end user"-- which they said is emblematic of the so-called "Going Dark problem ."
Companies should bake encryption backdoors into their products to allow lawful
access, they said. "We are not asking to expand the government's surveillance authority, but rather we are
James

asking to ensure that we can continue to obtain electronic information and evidence pursuant to the legal authority

"Mr. Chairman,
the Department of Justice believes that the challenges posed by the Going Dark
problem are grave, growing, and extremely complex ." To counter this, the duo said the
government is actively developing its own decryption tools. The remarks said, " We should also continue to
invest in developing tools, techniques, and capabilities designed to mitigate the
increasing technical challenges associated with the Going Dark problem . In limited
that Congress has provided to us to keep America safe," read the joint prepared remarks.

circumstances, this investment may help mitigate the risks posed in high priority national security or criminal cases,
although it will most likely be unable to provide a timely or scalable solution in terms of addressing the full
spectrum of public safety needs.

Impact

econ impact
Great power war
Zhang et al., Carnegie Endowment researcher, 2011
(Yuhan, Americas decline: A harbinger of conflict and rivalry, 1-22,
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/01/22/americas-decline-a-harbinger-of-conflictand-rivalry/, ldg)
This does not necessarily mean that the US is in systemic decline, but it encompasses a trend that appears to be negative and
perhaps alarming. Although the US still possesses incomparable military prowess and its economy remains the worlds largest, the

the global distribution

of power is shifting, and the inevitable result will be a world that is less peaceful,
liberal and prosperous, burdened by a dearth of effective conflict regulation. Over
the past two decades, no other state has had the ability to seriously challenge the
US military. Under these circumstances, motivated by both opportunity and fear,
many actors have bandwagoned with US hegemony and accepted a subordinate
role. Canada, most of Western Europe, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore and the Philippines have all joined the US,
creating a status quo that has tended to mute great power conflicts. However, as the hegemony that drew
these powers together withers, so will the pulling power behind the US alliance. The
result will be an international order where power is more diffuse, American interests and
influence can be more readily challenged, and conflicts or wars may be harder to avoid. As history
attests, power decline and redistribution result in military confrontation . For example, in the
once seemingly indomitable chasm that separated America from anyone else is narrowing. Thus,

late 19th century Americas emergence as a regional power saw it launch its first overseas war of conquest towards Spain. By the
turn of the 20th century, accompanying the increase in US power and waning of British power, the American Navy had begun to
challenge the notion that Britain rules the waves. Such a notion would eventually see the US attain the status of sole guardians of
the Western Hemispheres security to become the order-creating Leviathan shaping the international system with democracy and
rule of law. Defining this US-centred system are three key characteristics: enforcement of property rights, constraints on the actions

As a result of
such political stability, free markets, liberal trade and flexible financial mechanisms
have appeared. And, with this, many countries have sought opportunities to enter
this system, proliferating stable and cooperative relations. However, what will happen to these
of powerful individuals and groups and some degree of equal opportunities for broad segments of society.

advances as Americas influence declines? Given that Americas authority, although sullied at times, has benefited people across
much of Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, as well as parts of Africa and, quite extensively, Asia, the answer to

Public imagination and academia

have anticipated that a post-hegemonic world would return to the problems of the
1930s: regional blocs, trade conflicts and strategic rivalry. Furthermore, multilateral
institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank or the WTO might give way to regional
organisations. For example, Europe and East Asia would each step forward to fill the
vacuum left by Washingtons withering leadership to pursue their own visions of regional political and economic orders. Free
markets would become more politicised and, well, less free and major powers
would compete for supremacy. Additionally, such power plays have historically
possessed a zero-sum element. In the late 1960s and 1970s, US economic power declined relative to the rise of
this question could affect global society in a profoundly detrimental way.

the Japanese and Western European economies, with the US dollar also becoming less attractive. And, as American power eroded,

A world without American hegemony is one

where great power wars re-emerge , the liberal international system is supplanted by an
authoritarian one, and trade protectionism devolves into restrictive, antiglobalisation barriers. This, at least, is one possibility we can forecast in a future that will inevitably be devoid of
so did international regimes (such as the Bretton Woods System in 1973).

unrivalled US primacy.

terror impact
Bioweapons are easily accessible by terrorists and lead to
mass deaths
Wilson 13 (Grant, 1/17/13, University of Virginia School of Law, MINIMIZING
GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC AND EXISTENTIAL RISKS FROM EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES
THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW, professor @ University of Virginia School of Law,
http://lib.law.virginia.edu/lawjournals/sites/lawjournals/files/3.%20Wilson%20%20Emerging%20Technologies.pdf, 7/15/15, SM)
ii. Risk of bioterrorism The threat of the malicious release of bioengineered organisms (i.e., bioterrorism) poses a

Bioengineering enables a malicious actor to create an organism that is

more deadly to humans, animals, or plants than anything that exists in the natural
world.76 Experts contend that the barriers for a terrorist to order a DNA sequence for a highly pathogenic virus
online or acquire a DNA synthesis machine online are surmountable. 77 Alternatively, bioterrorists could
break into laboratories housing dangerous bioengineered organismslike the
H5N1 virus, for exampleand release them. Meanwhile, third world countries with
laxer standards and lower laboratory accountability are rapidly discovering and
using bioengineering, which may give bioterrorists an easier pathway to obtain
deadly bioengineered organisms.78 There have already been several occasions in which groups
GCR/ER.75

attempted to use or successfully used biological weapons. One unsophisticated example of bioterrorism occurred
when an individual contaminated salads and dressing with salmonella in what apparently was an attempt to

occurred in 2001, when bioterrorists sent envelopes

containing anthrax spores through the mail, infecting twenty-two people and killing
five of them. 80 While these particular acts of bioterrorism did not cause widespread death, deploying
extremely deadly bioengineered organisms over a large area is a real possibility:
tests by the United States in 1964 demonstrated that a single aircraft can
contaminate five thousand square kilometers of land with a deadly bacterial
aerosol.81 The recent engineering of an airborne H5N1 virus demonstrates societys
concern over risks of bioterrorism arising from bioengineering. Before scientists could
decide a local election.79 Another example

publish their results of their bioengineered airborne H5N1 virus in the widely read journals Nature and Science, the
NSABB determined that the danger of releasing the sensitive information outweighed the benefits to society,
advising that the findings not be published in their entirety.82 The main risk is that either a state or non-state
actor could synthesize a weaponized version of the H5N1 virus to create a disastrous pandemic.83 There is
precedent of outside groups recreating advanced bioengineering experiments, such as when many scientists
immediately synthesized hepatitis C replicons upon publication of its genetic code. 84 However, the NSABBs
recommendation was nonbinding, and there is nothing to stop other scientists from releasing similar data in the
future. Furthermore, while the NSABB merely asserts that the blueprints of the virus should not be printed, other
biosecurity experts argue that the virus should never have been created in the first place because of risks that the
viruses would escape or be stolen.85