Samuel B.

Arnado

vs Atty. Homobono Adaza

Facts: Atty Samuel Arnado called the attention of the Court to the practice of Atty. Homobono Adaza of
indicating MCLE application for exemption under process in his pleadings filed in 2009, 2010, 2011 and
2012, and MCLE Application for Exemption for reconsideration in a pleading filed in 2012. When Atty
Arnado inquired from the MCLE office, he learned that Atty. Adaza did not comply with the requirements of
Bar Matter No. 850 for the First, Second, and Third compliance period. The Office of the Bar Confidant found
that respondent had been remiss in his responsibilities as a lawyer.The OBC stated that respondents failure
to comply with the MCLE requirements jeopardized the causes of his clients because the pleadings he filed
could be stricken off from the records and considered invalid. The OBC recommended that Atty Adaza be
declared a delinquent member of the bar, guilty of non-compliance with the MCLE requirements and be
suspended from the practice of law for six months.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Adaza should be held administratively liable for failure to comply with MCLE
requirements.
HELD: Yes, Atty. Adaza should be held administratively liable for failure to comply with MCLE requirements.
Bar Matter No. 850 requires members of the IBP to undergo continuing legal education to ensure that
throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession
and enhance the standards of the practice of law.
Atty Adazas failure to comply with MCLE requirements and disregard of the directives of the MCLE Office
warrant his declaration as a delinquent member of the IBP. Atty Adaza is suspended from the practice of law
for six months, or until he has fully complied with the MCLE requirements for the First, Second, Third, and
Fourth Compliance Periods, whichever is later, and he has fully paid the required non-compliance and
reinstatement fees.

LAWYER AND SOCIETY

Adm. Case No. 7332, June 18, 2013
EDUARDO A. ABELLA, Complainant, v. RICARDO G. BARRIOS, JR., Respondent.
FACTS:
Complainant obtained a favorable judgment from the Court of Appeals involving a Labor Case.
Complainant then filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution before the Regional Arbitration Branch
which the respondent was the Labor Arbiter. After the lapse of five (5) months, complainants motion
remained unacted, prompting him to file a Second Motion for Execution. However, still, there was no action
until the complainant agreed to give respondent a portion of the monetary award thereof after the latter asked
from the former how much would be his share. Thereafter, respondent issued a writ of execution but the
employer of the complainant moved to quash the said writ. Eventually, issued a new writ of execution wherein
complainants monetary awards were reduced to the effect that it modifies the DECISION of the CA, from
P1,470,082.60 to P114,585.00, inclusive of execution and deposit fees. Complainant now filed the instant
disbarment complaint before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), averring that respondent violated the
Code of Professional Responsibility for (a) soliciting money from complainant in exchange for a favorable
resolution; and (b) issuing a wrong decision to give benefit and advantage to PT&T, complainants employer.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross immorality for his violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.03, Canon
1 of the CPR.
RULING:
Yes, the respondent is guilty of gross immorality for violating Rules 1.01 and 1.03, which are
contained under Chapter 1 of the Code, delineate the lawyers responsibility to society. Rule 1.01 engraves the
overriding prohibition against lawyers from engaging in any unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful

conduct and Rule 1.03 proscribes lawyers from encouraging any suit or proceeding or delaying any mans
cause for any corrupt motive or interest.
The respondent tried to twist the meaning of the CA Decision out of all logical, reasonable and
grammatical context in order to favor PT&T. And he deliberately left complainants efforts to execute the CA
Decision unacted upon until the latter agreed to give him a portion of the monetary award thereof.
Notwithstanding their agreement, immoral and illegal as it was, respondent later went as far as turning the
proceedings into some bidding war which eventually resulted into a resolution in favor of PT&T,
compalianants employer. In this regard, respondent was found to be guilty of gross immorality.
The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that he had already been disbarred in a previous
administrative case, entitled Sps. Rafols, Jr. v. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr., which therefore precludes the Court
from duplicitously decreeing the same. In view of the foregoing, the Court deems it proper to, instead, impose
a fine in the amount of P40,000.00.
A.C. No. 9401, October 22, 2013
JOCELYN DE LEON v. ATTY. TYRONE PEDRENA
Facts: Atty. Tyrone Pedrea, a Public Attorney of Paraaque City. Jocelyn De Leon is a single mother of two
minor children. Atty. Pedrea is the counsel of Jocelyn De Leon on the case for support for the two minor
children.
Records show, as established by the IBP Investigating Commissioner, on January 30, 2006 after asking about
the status of the case Atty. Pedrea told Jocelyn De Leon then to ride with him and he would just drop
Jocelyn by the jeepney station, she refused to ride with him but Atty. Pedrea persistently told her to get in
the car, and so she acceded to his request so as not to offend him. Inside the car Atty. Pedrea rubbed the
Jocelyns right leg with his hand; tried to insert his finger into her firmly closed hand; grabbed her hand and
forcibly placed it on his crotch area; and pressed his finger against her private part. Jocelyn thereafter tried at
all cost to unlock the cars door and told him categorically that she was getting off the car. Instead he
accelerated a bit more but sensing her insistence to get off, he stopped the car, and allowed her to get off.
Jocelyn de Leon then filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint for disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law against Atty. Tyrone Pedrea.
IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended for his disbarment, the IBP Board of Governors however
modified the penalty to three-month suspension from practice of law. Upon Motion for Reconsideration by
Atty. Pedrea which the Board denied, they increased the penalty to six months. Thereafter transmitted
records and resolution to the Court for approval.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Pedrea is guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Ruling: Yes, Atty. Pedrea is guilty. The Supreme Court adopted the findings and conclusions of the
Investigating Commissioner. Yet, the Court consider the recommended penalty of suspension for six months
not commensurate with the gravity of the offensive acts committed.
Given the circumstances in which Atty. Pedrea committed them, his acts were not merely offensive and
undesirable but repulsive, disgraceful and grossly immoral. In this regard, it bears stressing that immoral
conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to
shock the communitys sense of decency.
Therefore, the Court took into consideration judicial precedents on gross immoral conduct bearing on sexual
matters. The Court consider the acts committed by Atty. Pedrea to be not of the same degree as the acts
committed by the respondent lawyer in Calub v. Suller, among other cases whereby the respondent lawyer was
disbarred for raping his neighbors wife. Unlike in Barrientos where there was deceit and in Delos Reyes where

there were threats and taking advantage of a lawyers position, Atty. Pedrea did not employ any scheme to
satiate his lust, but, instead, he desisted upon the first signs of the De Leons firm refusal to give in to his
advances.
In view of these considerations, according to the Court penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two
years is fitting and just.

Mary Ann T. Flores vs Atty. Jovencio LL. Mayor, Jr

AC 7314, August 25, 2015
FACTS:
This administrative case stemmed from the Complaint for illegal dismissal filed with the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) by the complainants husband, Jose Roberto Flores against JMJB International
Services, Inc. The case was raffled to respondent, who is a Labor Arbiter.
Respondent dismissed the case on a finding that Flores had voluntarily resigned from employment.
The case was elevated to the NLRC, but was dismissed for having been filed out of time. The case was then
brought to the Court of Appeals (CA).
The CA ruled that the appeal to the NLRC had been timely filed, sets aside the NLRC Resolution for
being null and void and granted monetary awards to Flores. On 19 February 2003, the CA Decision became
final and executory. Flores filed before respondent a Motion for Execution of the CA Decision.
Accordingly, complainant filed an administrative case against respondent, citing that the latter's act of
archiving the records of the labor case and refusal to amend the Writ of Execution constituted a violation of
the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and other ethical standards.
In a Resolution dated 11 April 2007, the IBP Board found respondent guilty and recommended his
disbarment. The gist of the report reads:
We find as unacceptable the respondent's gross delay in performing what is supposedly a purely
ministerial act on his part, his unexplained and unsanctioned resort to "archiving" which led to the
disappearance of the case records, and his gross ignorance of the law in refusing to issue a writ of execution
against what the SEC has essentially certified to be a company hiding under a new name. We believe that the
respondent's actions were not a product of ignorance, indolence, or negligence, but rather, were clearly borne
out of a willful, deliberate, and wholly malicious intent to misuse his position by favoring one of the parties in
NLRC Case No. 99-06-0972, thus causing no small degree of serious injury to the complainant therein and to
the integrity of the legal process as a whole.
ISSUE

Whether or not respondent is guilty of violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and other ethical standards.
HELD
There is a clear neglect of duty and ignorance of the law on the part of respondent on account of his
failure to immediately act on the Motion for Execution, as well as his refusal to amend the Writ of Execution
despite having been informed of the amendment of the name - but not the dissolution - of the corporation
against which the writ was issued.
As a Labor Arbiter, respondent is a public officer who must at all times be accountable to the people,
whom he must serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency. The unjustified delay in his
actions and his failure to act according to law constituted a breach of his accountability not only to
complainant, but also to the public in general. Further, respondent violated his oath as a lawyer to delay no
man for money or malice, and abandoned his professional responsibility to exert every effort and consider it
his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
The Court, however, does not hesitate to impose the penalty of disbarment when the guilty party has
become a repeat offender. Herein respondent was already suspended from the practice of law for a period of
six ( 6) months in another case, Lahm Ill v. Mayor, Jr., in which he was found guilty of gross ignorance of the
law in violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent ATTY. JOVENCIO LL. MAYOR, JR. was found guilty of grave misconduct and gross
ignorance of the law in violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility rendering
him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession.

NATIVIDAD P. NAVARRO AND

RESPONDENT
A.C. NO. 9872 (JAN 28, 2014)

HILDA

PRESBITERO,COMPLAINANTS,VS.

ATTY.

SOLIDUM,

JR.

FACTS:
In April 2006, Presbitero engaged the services of Atty. Ivan Solidum, Jr. to help her in the quieting of her title
over a parcel of land. Presbitero paid Atty. Solidum P50,000.00 as acceptance fee.
In May 2006, Ma. Theresa Yulo, daughter of Presbitero also engaged the services of Solidum for the
registration of a parcel of land. Yulo however asked the help of her sister, Natividad Navarro, to finance the
case. Hence, Navarro gave Solidum Php200,000.00 for the registration expenses.
Meanwhile, Solidum in May and June 2006, obtained a total of Php2 million from Navarro. The loan was
covered by two MOAs. The MOA was prepared by Solidum. The MOA stated that the monthly interest shall be
10%.
Solidum also borrowed Php 1 million from Presbitero during the same period. He again drafted a MOA
containing the same terms and conditions as with Navarro. As additional security for the loan, Solidum
mortgaged his 263-hectare land for P1 million in favor of Presbitero.
Nothing happened in the quieting of title case field by Presbitero since Solidum did nothing after receiving the
acceptance fee.
In the land registration case of Yulo financed by Navarro, Navarro later found out that the land was already
registered to someone else. Navarro claims that she should not have financed the case if only Solidum advised
her of the status of the land.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Ivan Solidum, Jr. should be disbarred.
HELD: Yes.

Although Solidum acted in his private capacity when he obtained a total of Php3 million from Navarro and
Presbitero, he may still be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his private capacity. The test is
whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or
whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. In this case, such act displayed by
Solidum merited his disbarment.
Solidum is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his professional capacity with
respect to his client, Presbitero, and in his private capacity with respect to Navarro. Both Presbitero and
Navarro allowed Splidum to draft the terms of the loan agreements. Solidum drafted the MOAs knowing that
the interest rates were exorbitant. Later, using his knowledge of the law, he assailed the validity of the same
MOAs he prepared.
In the case of Navarro, who financed the Yulo case, Solidum also violated Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his
client that may come into his possession. This is notwithstanding the fact that Navarro is not actually his
client in the Yulo case but was only the financier of the Yulo case.
In Presbiteros case, since Presbitero is his client, Solidum also violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients
interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Even though Solidum secured
the loan with a mortgage and a MOA, Presbiteros interest was not fully protected because the property
Solidum mortgaged was overvalued. He claimed that his 263-hectare land was worth P1 million but in fact
Solidum sold it later for only P150,000.00. Clearly, Presbitero was disadvantaged by Solidums ability to use
all the legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation. He took advantage of his knowledge of the law as well
as the trust and confidence reposed in him by his client.
Solidum was disbarred by the Supreme Court.

DR. ELMAR O. PEREZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG AND ATTY. KAREN E. BAYDO,
Respondents.
A.C. No. 5816, March 10, 2015 (EN BANC)
Facts: While having a valid and subsisting marriage, Atty. Catindig courted Dr. Perez. While courting Dr.
Perez, he told her that he is married with Lily Gomez and they have four children but he will obtain a divorce
decree so that there will be no legal impediment for their future marriage. Consequently, Atty. Catindig and
Lily Gomez obtained a divorce decree in Dominican Republic. Therefore, Atty. Catindig and Dr. Perez married
in Virginia, USA. After 17 years of marriage, atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their son. And sometime
in 2001 Dr. Perez received an anonymous letter stating that Atty. Catindig and Atty. Karen Baydo have an
amorous relationship which prompted her to file an administrative complaint for disbarment against them for
gross immorality.
Issue: Whether Atty. Catindig and Atty. Baydo committed gross immorality, which would warrant their
disbarment?

As regards Atty. Catindig, yes he violated Cannon 1.01. Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a
previous one amounts to a grossly immoral conduct. Atty. Catindigs subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of his previous one definitely manifests a deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the
marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so
corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when
committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the communitys sense of decency.
As regards Atty. Baydo, the charged was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. The Court has consistently
held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of
innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his complaint. The
evidence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence.

MELVYN GARCIA VS. ATTY. RAUL SESBRENO

FACTS: Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against Sesbreo before the IBP-CBD. He alleged that
Sesbreo is practicing law despite his previous conviction for homicide and despite the facts that he is only on
parole and that he has not fully served his sentence. Garcia alleged that Sesbreo violated Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court by continuing to engage in the practice of law despite his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude.
In his answer to the complaint, Sesbreo alleged that his sentence was commuted and the phrase "with the
inherent accessory penalties provided by law" was deleted. Sesbreo argued that even if the accessory penalty
was not deleted, the disqualification applies only during the term of the sentence. Sesbreo further alleged
that homicide does not involve moral turpitude. Sesbreo claimed that Garcias complaint was motivated by
extreme malice, bad faith, and desire to retaliate against him for representing Garcias daughters in court.
ISSUE: Whether or not conviction for the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude.
RULING: Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral
turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of
statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and
frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances.
The circumstances leading to the death of the victim, Luciano Amparado, involved moral turpitude. The
victim was just at the wrong place at the wrong time and did not do anything that justified the indiscriminate
firing done by Atty. Sesbreno that eventually led to Amparados death.
Commutation is a mere reduction of penalty and it only partially extinguished criminal liability.
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege. It is granted only to those possessing good moral character. A
violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty
against a lawyer, including the penalty of disbarment.

THE LAWYER AND SOCIETY

ANTONINA S. SOSA VS.
ATTY. MANUEL V. MENDOZA
Facts: Atty. Mendoza borrowed Php 500,000.00 from Mrs. Sosa evidenced by a signed promissory note and
an acknowledgment receipt. Atty. Mendoza also issued a postdated check as security for his loan.

Atty. Mendoza failed to pay his obligation and his check was dishonored, Drawn Against Insufficient
Fund. Despite repeated demand s for payment, Atty. Mendoza failed to pay his loan.
In the mandatory
conference scheduled by the IBP, Atty. Mendoza failed to appear. He claimed that he arrived late and that he
already had on hand Php 600,000.00 and was advised by the hearing officer to communicate with Mrs. Sosa
to settle his obligation. Atty. Mendoza did not pay. The IBP found Atty. Mendoza to be guilty of misconduct
and suspended him from the practice of law for six months, and ordered him to return the loaned amount
plus legal interest to Mrs. Sosa.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Mendoza is guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Ruling:Yes, Atty. Mendoza is guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of the CPR.
Any gross misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity is a ground for imposition of
the penalty of suspension or disbarment, because good character is an essential qualification for the
admission and continued practice of law.
Gross Misconduct is the improper or wrongful conduct, the transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent
and not mere error in judgment.
Atty. Mendoza engaged in improper or wrongful conduct as found under Rule 1.01, as the failure to
pay the loan was willful in character and implied wrongful intent and not a mere error in judgment.
The SC upgraded the penalty to one year suspension from the practice of law for violating Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Atty. Pedro L. Linsangan vs Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino
A.C. No. 6672, September 4, 2009
Facts: Atty. Pedro Linsangan filed a disbarment case against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of
clients and encroachment of professional services alleging that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe
Marie Labiano, convinced his clients to transfer legal representation to Tolentino with the promise of financial
assistance and expeditious collection on their claims. To induce them to hire his services, he persistently
called them and sent them text messages. Linsangan presented the sworn affidavit of James Gregorio
attesting that Labiano convinced him to sever his lawyer-client relations with Linsangan and use Tolentinos
services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000.00. Further, Linsangans calling card was also attached
wherein it appeared that aside from legal services, financial assistance was offered as well.
Issue: Whether Tolentino is guilty of misconduct
Held: Yes. The court adopted the IBPs finding of unethical conduct, whereby it found Tolentino to have
encroached on the professional practice of Linsangan violating Rule 8.02, which prohibits a lawyer from
stealing another lawyers client or induce the latters client to retain him by a promise of better service, good
result or reduced fees for his services.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers,
Tolentino violated Rule 16.04
The court further added that Tolentino violated Rule 2.03 of the CPR which provides A LAWYER SHALL NOT
DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY ACT DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS. Hence,
lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers. Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment. Moreover, Rule 2.03 should be
read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides: Rule 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY
CORRUPT MOTIVE OR INTEREST, ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY MANS CAUSE.
This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an attorney,
personally or through an agent in order to gain employment) as a measure to protect the community from
barratry and champerty.
The calling card contained with the phrase financial assistance, was clearly used to
entice clients to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. This crass
commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal profession.

Additionally, the court said that a lawyers best advertisement is a well-merited

reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct. For this reason,
lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple
professional cards. Hence, Atty. Tolentino was suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.
Dacanay vs. Baker & McKenzie
[A.C. No. 2131 May 10, 1985]
FACTS: Respondent Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie, which contains the names of
the ten lawyers, asked a certain Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares of Cathay Products International,
Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client. Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any liability of
Clurman to Gabriel. He requested that he be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie
and if not, what is your purpose in using the letterhead of another law office. Not having received any reply,
he filed the instant complaint. As admitted by the respondents in their memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a
professional partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members and associates in 30 cities
around the world. Respondents, aside from being members of the Philippine bar, practicing under the firm
name of Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates of Baker & McKenzie.
ISSUE: Whether or not Baker & McKenzie, an alien law firm, could practice law in the Philippines
HELD: NO. Respondents were enjoined from practicing law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie.
RATIO: Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138,
Rules of Court).
Respondents use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constituted a representation that being associated with
the firm they could render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and
others engaged in foreign trade and investment. This was unethical because Baker & McKenzie was not
authorized to practice law here
A.C. No. 10132
March 24, 2015
Heirs of Pedro Alilano, represented by David Alilano vs. Atty. Roberto E. Examen
Facts: Deeds of Absolute Sale of a parcel of land were executed between Spouses Alilano in favor of Ramon
Examen and his wife, Edna. Both documents were notarized by respondent Atty. Roberto Examen, brother of
the vendee and were presented as evidence in the subsequent recovery of possession filed by the heirs of
Pedro Alilano involving the sane parcel of land.
The complainants state the following allegations against Atty. Examen:
He violated the notarial code as notary publics are prohibited from notarizing documents when one of the
parties involved are related to him within the fourth civil degree of affinity or second civil degree; He notarized
the documents in question despite knowing that the cedula presented did not actually belong to Ramon
Examen; He acknowledged the presence of two witnesses when they did not actually appear before him, and;
He introduced these documents into evidence violating his oath as a lawyer and the CPR.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Examen violated the Notarial Code.
Held:
Yes. Although he was not prohibited from notarizing the documents as alleged because the prevailing law
governing notarization was Sections 231-259, Chapter 11 of the Revised Administrative Code where there is
no such prohibition, a lawyer commissioned as a notary public is mandated to discharge with fidelity the
sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public
interest. Faithful observance and utmost respect for the legal solemnity of an oath in an acknowledgment are
sacrosanct. He cannot simply disregard the requirements and solemnities of the Notarial Law. Section 251,
Chapter 11 of the Revised Administrative Code requires him to check if the proper cedulas were presented and
inspect if the documents to be acknowledged by him reflected the correct details.

Here, based on the submission of the complainants, it is clear that the residence certificate number used by
Ramon Examen and as notarized by Atty. Examen in both Absolute Deeds of Sale was not in fact the
residence certificate of Ramon, but Florentinas residence certificate number. Good faith cannot be considered
as a mitigating factor since such a responsibility should be personal.
A lawyers mandate includes thoroughly going over documents presented to them typed or transcribed by
their secretaries. Atty. Examen transgressed his oath as a lawyer, provisions of the CPR and Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court by his negligent act of not checking the work of his secretary and merely
perfunctorily notarizing documents, it cannot be said that he upheld legal processes thus also violating
Canon 1 of the CPR. Neither can it be said that he promoted confidence in the legal system. If anything, his
acts serve to undermine the functions of a diligent lawyer. He thus ran afoul Rule 1.02 of the CPR. For such
transgressions, Atty. Examen is suspended from the practice of law for two years and his present commission
as a notary public is revoked. He is also disqualified for a renewal of such for two years thereafter.
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY v. ARGUELLES 679 SCRA 348, 2012
FACTS: Servando and Claudio Arguelles, were registered owners of a parcel of land in Imus, Cavite. They
entered into a conditional sale of the land to Edgardo Trinidad and his wife Marilou. The Trinidads occupied
and began developing the property in 1986. They paid the real estate taxes due on it from 1987 to 1997.With
a deed of sale in their favor, the Trinidads eventually had the land titled in their names. In that same year,
they applied with Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company (Metrobank) for a loan, offering the land as collateral.
Satisfied that the Trinidads owned the property, Metrobank accepted it as collateral and lent them money.
Subsequently, Metrobank granted the couple several more loans, totaling more than P 11 million, all secured
by the land.
The Arguelleses filed a complaint against the Trinidads for the cancellation of their title in the latters names.
Subsequently, the complaint was amended to implead Metrobank and sought the cancellation of the real
estate mortgages over the property in its favor. The Arguelleses denied having executed a deed of sale in favor
of the Trinidads. They alleged that they entrusted their owners duplicate copy of title to Atty. Alejandro
Saulog, Sr., who assisted the parties in executing a conditional sale covering the land. The Trinidads used a
fictitious deed of sale, notarized by a certain Atty. Saulog, Jr. to effect the transfer of title in their names.
Respondents defense:
The Trinidads claimed that they paid for the land by installments, completing the payment on June 24, 1986
with the result that the Arguelleses executed the deed of sale in their favor. For its part, Metrobank filed a
cross-claim against the Trinidads for litigation expenses, alleging that the Trinidads were answerable for such
expenses under the mortgage contracts.
ISSUE: WON, the subject document is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of the Trinidads. Both the RTC and the CA held that the presumption of
regularity of a public document did not attach to the subject deed of sale, given that the notary public, Atty.
Saulog, Jr. failed to establish the authenticity of the signatures on it. He could not remember if the
Arguelleses, present in court as he testified, were the same persons who appeared and acknowledged the
document before him. But it is too much to expect a notary public who had but a brief time with the
Arguelleses during the notarial ceremony to remember their faces 12 years later. What matters is Atty. Saulog,
Jr.s testimony respecting the ritual of notarization that he invariably followed. He gave unbending assurance
that he ascertained the identities of the parties to documents who appeared before him, including the
Arguelleses, by requiring them to show documentary proofs of the same and to sign the documents in his
presence. Besides, the theory of the Arguelleses is that it was Atty. Saulog, Jr. who facilitated the preparation
of the falsified deed of sale for the benefit of the Trinidads. But, if this were so, it would have made more sense
for Atty. Saulog, Jr. to testify in defense of the genuineness of the transaction by claiming that he recalled the
faces of those who appeared before him 12 years ago and that they were no other than the Arguelleses.

Tenoso v Echanez
Etigenia M. Tenoso (complainant) tiled a complaint against Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez (respondent) alleging
that respondent was engaged in practice as a notary public in Cordon, lsabela, without having been properly
commissioned by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City, Isabela.
This alleged act violates Rule III of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice (A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC). To support her
allegations, complainant attached the following documents to her pleadings:
a. Two (2) documents signed and issued by RTC Santiago City Executive Judge Efren M. Cacatian bearing the
names of commissioned notaries public within the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Santiago City for the
years 2006 to 2007 and 2007 to 2008.1 Respondent's name does not appear on either list;
b. Copies of ten (10) documents that appear to have been notarized by respondent in the years 2006, 2007,
and 2008; and
c. A copy of a certification issued by Judge Cacatian stating that a joint-affidavit notarized by respondent in
2008 could not be "authenticated as to respondent's seal and signature as NO Notarial Commission was
issued upon him at the time of the document's notarization."
He dismissed such allegations as being "preposterous, full of lies, politically motivated and x x x meant to
harass or intimidate him". Also, he surmised that the documents annexed to the Affidavit-Complaint were
"tampered and adulterated," or that "somebody might have forged his signature." He failed to attend the
mandatory conference and likewise failed to file his Position Paper, he was recommended to be suspended
from the practice of law for six (6) months and disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public for
two (2) years for violating Rules 1.01 and 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is has committed the violations of the notarial law
HELD: YES

Time and again, this Court emphasizes that the practice of law is imbued with public interest and that "a
lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts,
and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State - the administration of
justice - as an officer of the court." Accordingly, '"lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of
legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing." Similarly, the duties of notaries
public are dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. "Notarization is not a routinary,
meaningless act, for notarization converts a private document to a public instrument, making it admissible in
evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity and due execution."
In misrepresenting himself as a notary public, respondent exposed party-litigants, courts, other lawyers and
the general public to the perils of ordinary documents posing as public instruments. As noted by the
Investigating Commissioner, respondent committed acts of deceit and falsehood in open violation of the
explicit pronouncements of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Evidently, respondent's conduct falls
miserably short of the high standards of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing required from lawyers. It
is proper that he be sanctioned.
WHEREFORE, We find Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez guilty of engaging in notarial practice without a notarial
commission, and accordingly, We SUSPEND him from the practice of law for two (2) years and DISQUALIFY
him from being commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years. He is warned that a repetition of the same
or similar act in the future shall merit a more severe sanction.

NOTARY PUBLIC 2nd list

WILBERTO C. TALISIC, vs. ATTY. PRIMO R. RINEN
FACTS: An administrative case filed by complainant Wilberto C. Talisic against Atty. Primo R. Rinen, charging
the latter with falsification of an Extra Judicial Partition with Sale which allowed the transfer to spouses
Benjamin Durante and Eleonor Lavifia of a parcel of land formerly owned by Wilberto's mother, Aurora
Corpuz. Wilberto claimed that his mother died and left behind as heirs her spouse, Celedonio Talisic, and
their three children, namely: Arlene, Wilberto and Alvin. It was only after his fathers death on November 2,
2000 that Wilberto and his siblings knew of the transfer of the subject parcel. While Wilberto believed that his
fathers signature on the deed was authentic, his and his siblings supposed signatures were merely forged.
The Investigating Commissioners report indicated that per Atty. Rinens admission, the subject deed was
prepared in his office and acknowledged before him. He was negligent in not requiring from the parties to the
deed their presentation of documents as proof of identity. Atty. Rinens failure to properly satisfy his duties as
a notary public was also shown by the inconsistencies in the dates that appear on the deed, to wit: "1994 as
to the execution; 1995 when notarized; and entered as Series of 1992 in the notarial book x x x."
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Rinen committed violations of his notarial duties.
RULING: Yes. "A notary publics function should not be trivialized and a notary public must discharge his
powers and duties which are impressed with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity." The Court
emphasized that "a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same
are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and
truth of what are stated therein. The presence of the parties to the deed will enable the notary public to verify
the genuineness of the signature of the affiant."
In the present case, Atty. Rinen did not deny his failure to personally verify the identity of all parties. Clearly,
there was a failure on the part of Atty. Rinen to exercise the due diligence that was required of him as a

notary public ex-officio. "Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with
substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public."
Thus, "notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their
duties." Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of public instruments would be
undermined. The notarial commission of Atty. Rinen was revoked for one year.
MANUEL G. VILLATUYA v. ATTY. BEDE S. TABALINGCOS A.C. No. 6622, July 10, 2012 Case Digest
FACTS:
Complainant, Manuel G. Villatuya filed a Complaint for Disbarment on December 06, 2004 against
respondent, Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos. In a resolution, the court required the respondent to file a comment,
which the respondent did. The complaint was then referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation.
In a mandatory conference called for by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, complainant and his
counsel, and the respondent appeared and submitted issues for resolution. The commission ordered the
parties to submit their verified position papers.

In the position paper submitted by the complainant on August 1, 2005, he averred that he was employed by
the respondent as financial consultant to assist the respondent in a number of corporate rehabilitation cases.
Complainant claimed that they had a verbal agreement whereby he would be entitled to 50,000 for every
Stay Order issued by the court in the cases they would handle, in addition to ten percent (10%) of the fees
paid by their clients. Notwithstanding, 18 Stay Orders that was issued by the courts as a result of his work
and the respondent being able to rake in millions from the cases that they were working on together, the latter
did not pay the amount due to him. He also alleged that respondent engaged in unlawful solicitation of cases
by setting up two financial consultancy firms as fronts for his legal services. On the third charge of gross
immorality, complainant accused respondent of committing two counts of bigamy for having married two other
women while his first marriage was subsisting.
In his defense, respondent denied charges against him and asserted that the complainant was not an
employee of his law firm but rather an employee of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., one of the financial
consultancy firms. Respondent alleged that complainant was unprofessional and incompetent in performing
his job and that there was no verbal agreement between them regarding the payment of fees and the sharing
of professional fees paid by his clients. He proffered documents showing that the salary of complainant had
been paid. Respondent also denied committing any unlawful solicitation. To support his contention,
respondent attached a Joint Venture Agreement and an affidavit executed by the Vice-President for operations
of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc. On the charge of gross immorality, respondent assailed the Affidavit of a
dismissed messenger of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., as having no probative value, since it had been
retracted by the affiant himself. Respondent did not specifically address the allegations regarding his alleged
bigamous marriages with two other women
On January 9, 2006, complainant filed a Motion to Admit Copies of 3 Marriage Contracts of respondent
wherein he attached the certified true copies of the Marriage Contracts referred to in the Certification issued
by the NSO.
On January 16, 2006, respondent submitted his Opposition to the Motion to Admit filed by complainant,
claiming that he was not given the opportunity to controvert them. He disclosed that criminal cases for
bigamy were filed against him by the complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. He also
informed the Commission that he filed Petition for Declaration of Nullity of the first two marriage contracts. In
both petitions, he claimed that he had recently discovered that there were Marriage Contracts in the records
of the NSO bearing his name and allegedly executed with Rowena Pion and Pilar Lozano on different
occasions.

The Commission scheduled a clarificatory hearing on 20 November 2007. Respondent moved for the
suspension of the resolution of the administrative case against him, pending outcome of petition for
nullification he filed with RTC, but was denied. The Commission resolved that the administrative case against
him be submitted for resolution.
On February 27, 2008, the Commission promulgated its Report and Recommendation addressing the specific
charges against respondent. The first charge, for dishonesty for the nonpayment of certain shares in the fees,
was dismissed for lack of merit. On the second charge, the Commission found respondent to have violated the
rule on the solicitation of client for having advertised his legal services and unlawfully solicited cases. It
recommended that he be reprimanded for the violation. As for the third charge, the Commission found
respondent to be guilty of gross immorality for violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Due to the gravity of the acts of respondent,
the Commission recommended that he be disbarred, and that his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys.
On April 15, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, through its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-154, adopted and
approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
On August 1, 2008, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the recommendation to disbar
him was premature.
On June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied the Motions for Reconsideration and affirmed their
Resolution dated April 15, 2008 recommending respondents disbarment.
ISSUES:
1. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by nonpayment of fees to complainant;
2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful solicitation; and
3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for having married thrice.
RULING:
First charge: Dishonesty for non-payments of share in the fees.
Supreme Court affirmed the IBPs dismissal of the first charge against respondent, but did not concur with
the rationale behind it. The first charge, if proven to be true is based on an agreement that is violative of Rule
9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is proscribed by the Code to divide or agree to divide
the fees for legal services rende-red with a person not licensed to practice law. In the case of Tan Tek Beng v.
David, Supreme Court held that an agreement between a lawyer and a layperson to share the fees collected
from clients secured by the layperson is null and void, and that the lawyer involved may be disciplined for
unethical conduct. Considering that complainants allegations in this case had not been proven, the IBP
correctly dismissed the charge against respondent on this matter.
Second charge: Unlawful solicitation of clients.
In its Report, the IBP established the truth of these allegations and ruled that respondent had violated the
rule on the solicitation of clients, but it failed to point out the specific provision that was breached. Based on
the facts of the case, he violated Rule 2.03 of the Code, which prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the
purpose of profit.

A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety arises, though,
when the business is of such a nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be inconsistent with the
lawyers duties as a member of the bar. This inconsistency arises when the business is one that can readily
lend itself to the procurement of professional employment for the lawyer; or that can be used as a cloak for
indirect solicitation on the lawyers behalf; or is of a nature that, if handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as
the practice of law.
It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by complainant that Jesi & Jane Management, Inc.,
which purports to be a financial and legal consultant, was indeed a vehicle used by respondent as a means to
procure professional employment; specifically for corporate rehabilitation cases.
Rule 15.08 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to inform the client whether the former is
acting as a lawyer or in another capacity. This duty is a must in those occupations related to the practice of
law. In this case, it is confusing for the client if it is not clear whether respondent is offering consultancy or
legal services.
Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the degree of prevalence of this practice by
respondent, the Supreme Court affirm the recommendation to reprimand the latter for violating Rules 2.03
and 15.08 of the Code.
Third charge: Bigamy.
The Supreme Court have consistently held that a disbarment case is sui generis. Its focus is on the
qualification and fitness of a lawyer to continue membership in the bar and not the procedural technicalities
in filing the case. Thus, in Garrido v. Garrido:
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the verification of pleadings and prejudicial
questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant
do not apply in the determination of a lawyer's qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar. We have
so ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart from this ruling. First, admission to the practice of law is
a component of the administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to
the public. The admission qualifications are also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to
practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like
criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the State may inquire into through this Court.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. In this case, complainant
submitted NSO-certified true copies to prove that respondent entered into two marriages while the latters
first marriage was still subsisting. While respondent denied entering into the second and the third marriages,
he resorted to vague assertions tantamount to a negative pregnant.
What has been clearly established here is the fact that respondent entered into marriage twice while his first
marriage was still subsisting. In Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro, 56 we held thus:
[W]e have in a number of cases disciplined members of the Bar whom we found guilty of misconduct which
demonstrated a lack of that good moral character required of them not only as a condition precedent for their
admission to the Bar but, likewise, for their continued membership therein. No distinction has been made as
to whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyers professional capacity or in his private life. This is
because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at
another. He is expected to be competent, honorable and reliable at all times since he who cannot apply and
abide by the laws in his private affairs, can hardly be expected to do so in his professional dealings nor lead
others in doing so. Professional honesty and honor are not to be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty
and dishonor in other relations. The administration of justice, in which the lawyer plays an important role
being an officer of the court, demands a high degree of intellectual and moral competency on his part so that
the courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in him.

Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar. He
made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.57 His acts of committing
bigamy twice constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule
138 of the Revised Rules of Court.58
The Supreme Court adopted the recommendation of the IBP to disbar respondent and ordered that his name
be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
THE LAWYER AND THE COURT
CRUZ VS. SALVA
G. R. No. 12871 July 25, 1959
FACTS: A certain Manuel Monroy was murderd. CFI Pasay found Castelo, De Jesus, Bonifacio, Mendoza,
Berdugo et al. guilty of murder. They all appealed and Castelo sought new trial. Castelo was found again
guilty.
President Magsaysay ordered reinvestigation. Philippine Constabulary questioned people and got confessions
pointing to persons other than those convicted. Castelo et al. wrote to Fiscal Salva to conduct reinvestigation
on basis of new confessions. Fiscal conferred with Sol Gen and the Justice Secretary decided to have the
results of investigation made available to counsel for appellants.
Chief of Philippine Constabulary furnished Fiscal Salva copies of the affidavits and confessions. Salva
organized a committee and subpoenaed Timoteo Cruz, who was implicated as instigator and mastermind in
the new affidavits and confessions. The investigation was conducted not in respondent's office but in the
session hall of the Municipal Court of Pasay City evidently, to accommodate the big crowd that wanted to
witness the proceeding, including members of the press. Cruz counsel questioned jurisdiction of the
committee and of Salva to conduct preliminary investigation because the case was pending appeal in the
Supreme Court. Counsel filed this present petition.
Salva said, he subpoenaed Cruz because of Cruz oral and personal request to allow him to appear at the
investigation.
Supreme Court issued writ of preliminary injunction stopping the preliminary investigation.
ISSUE:
Whether Fiscal Salva conducted the investigation properly.
HELD:
NO. Fiscal Salva should have done investigation privately in his office and not publicly in the session hall of
Municipal Court of Pasay where microphones were installed and media people were present. He should also
not have made the media ask questions. Supreme Court was disturbed and annoyed by such publicity.
Fiscal Salva is publicly reprehended and censured.

Lantoria vs Bunyi
A.M. No. 1769 June 8 1992
Facts:
Lantoria is the manager and supervisor of the farm owned by Mrs. Constancia Mascarinas located in
Esperanza, Agusan del Sur. Lantoria filed three cases of ejection of squatters from the aforementioned farm.
These cases were assigned to the MTC under acting judge Hon. Vicente Galicia. The defendants in the
mentioned civil cases were declared in default.
After three years, Lantoria filed this administrative case against Bunyi, seeking disciplinary action on
the ground that respondent committed acts of graft and corruption, dishonesty and conduct unbecoming of
a member of the IBP, and corruption of the judge and bribery. The complainant contends that the

respondent won the three cases because he was the one who unethically prepared the decision. The records
show their exchange of letters as support for the claim. The case was referred to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. Later on, complainant submitted a letter praying that the
complaint be withdrawn, dropped or dismissed on the ground that complainant could hardly substantiate his
charges and that he is no longer interested to prosecute the same. He added that he no longer have the
original copies of the letters.
Consequently, the respondent lawyer manifested in his answer that in the future he would be more
careful in observing his duties as a lawyer. He also apologized to the court for all the improprieties which may
have resulted from his preparation of the draft decisions.
The Solicitor General, notwithstanding the withdrawal of the complaint, submitted his report stating
that respondent is guilty of highly unethical and unprofessional conduct.
Issue: Whether or not respondent notwithstanding the withdrawal of the complaint may be subject to
disciplinary actions.
Ruling:
The Solicitor General was correct in determining the merits of the case despite the complainants
withdrawal. The respondent himself admitted that the letters in question truly exist, and that he even asked
for an apology from the court, for whatever effects such letters may have had on his duty as a lawyer.
Thus, the letters do exist and that indeed he prepared the decisions. It does not matter if it was
The respondent violated Canon 3 attempts to exert personal influence on the court of the Canons of
Professional Ethics, now shown in Canon 13 and section 1 of Rule 13 in the new Code of Professional
Responsibility, which read:

CANON 13 A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety
which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.

Rule 13.01 A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek
opportunity for, cultivating familiarity with judges.