PEOPLE VS MATEO

[Judicial Power]
FACTS:
The MTC, Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 1 found Mateo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 10 counts of rape and to indemnify the complainant for
actual and moral damages. Mateo appealed to the CA. Solicitor General assailed the factual findings of the TC and recommends an acquittal
of appellant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case should be directly be forwarded to the Supreme Court by virtue of express provision in the constitution on
automatic appeal where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death.
RULING:
Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate review over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (or lower but involving offenses committed on the same occasion or arising out of the same
occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed).
The practice finds justification in the 1987 Constitution
Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and
orders of lower courts in:
x x x x x x x x x
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
It must be stressed, however, that the constitutional provision is not preclusive in character, and it does not necessarily prevent the Court,
in the exercise of its rule-making power, from adding an intermediate appeal or review in favour of the accused.
In passing, during the deliberations among the members of the Court, there has been a marked absence of unanimity on the crucial point
of guilt or innocence of herein appellant. Some are convinced that the evidence would appear to be sufficient to convict; some would
accept the recommendation of acquittal from the Solicitor General on the ground of inadequate proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Indeed, the occasion best demonstrates the typical dilemma, i.e., the determination and appreciation of primarily factual matters, which
the Supreme Court has had to face with in automatic review cases; yet, it is the Court of Appeals that has aptly been given the direct
mandate to review factual issues.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NELSON ABON Y NOVIDO, accused-appellant.

Facts:
This is an automatic review of the June 6, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the June 23, 1998 Decision of the
Urdaneta City, Pangasinan Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 48, convicting accused-appellant Nelson Abon of the crime of qualified rape
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death.
In the last week of May 1995, at about 11 p.m., in Binalonan, Pangasinan, accused-appellant entered the room where his daughter,
AAA, who was then 13 years old, and his son, were sleeping. Accused-appellantembraced AAA. He removed AAAs pajama, then his shorts
and brief, and went on top of AAA. Accused-appellant silenced AAA and threatened to strangle her if she made any noise.
Accused-appellant succeeded in inserting his penis inside AAAs vagina, and then made a push and pull movement of his penis inside her
vagina for about 20 to 30 minutes. Thereafter, he left.
Cristeta Bayno assisted AAA in reporting the matter to the police. Thereafter, AAA was physically examined and the findings showed that her
hymen was already ruptured and she had old lacerations.
An Information for qualified rape was filed against Nelson.
When arraigned, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. During the trial, he interposed denial and alibi as his defenses.
On June 23, 1998, the RTC rendered a Decision sentencing Nelson to suffer death penalty.
Due to the penalty imposed, the case was forwarded to this Court for automatic review. However, in accordance with the ruling in People v.
Mateo, this Court, transferred this case to the CA for intermediate review.
The CA affirmed the trial courts judgment of conviction, but it modified the award of damages.
Issue: Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the court a quo.
Held: No
Ratio:
An appeal is a proceeding undertaken to have a decision reconsidered by bringing it to a higher court authority.It is not a right but a mere
statutory privilege to be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.
Recent developments in criminal law and jurisprudence have brought about changes in the rules on appeal, specifically in cases where the
penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. To clarify the present rules, we shall discuss these developments.
Section 3 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure states:
SEC. 3. How appeal taken.(a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional
Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the
judgment or final order appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall
be by petition for review under Rule 42.
(c) The appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court is death, reclusion perpetua,
or life imprisonment, or where a lesser penalty is imposed but for offenses committed on the same occasion or which arose out of

the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment is imposed, shall be by filing a notice of appeal in accordance with paragraph (a) of this section.
(d) No notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the death penalty is imposed by the Regional Trial Court. The same shall be
automatically reviewed by the Supreme Court as provided in section 10 of this Rule.
(e) Except as provided in the last paragraph of section 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the Supreme Court shall be by petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45.
The provision provides that where the penalty imposed by the RTC is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, an appeal is made directly to
this Court by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and by serving a copy
thereof upon the adverse party. On the other hand, a case where the penalty imposed is death will be automatically reviewed by the Court
without a need for filing a notice of appeal.
However, Mateo modified these rules by providing an intermediate review of the cases by the CA where the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua, life imprisonment, or death. Pursuant to Mateos ruling, the Court issued A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC 2004-10-12, amending the
pertinent rules governing review of death penalty cases, thus:
Rule 122
Sec. 3. How appeal taken.(a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by
the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall be by notice of appeal filed with the court
which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall
be by petition for review under Rule 42.
(c) The appeal in cases where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court is reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment or where a lesser penalty is imposed for offenses committed on the same occasion or which arose out
of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more, serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua,
or life imprisonment is imposed, shall be by notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals in accordance with paragraph (a)
of this Rule.
(d) No notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the Regional Trial Court imposed the death penalty. The Court of Appeals shall
automatically review the judgment as provided in Section 10 of this Rule.
Sec. 10. Transmission of records in case of death penalty.In all cases where the death penalty is imposed by the trial court, the
records shall be forwarded to the Court of Appeals for automatic review and judgment within twenty days but not earlier than
fifteen days from the promulgation of the judgment or notice of denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. The transcript
shall also be forwarded within ten days after the filing thereof by the stenographic reporter.
Rule 124
Sec. 12. Power to receive evidence.The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive
evidence and perform all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction,
including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings. Trials or hearings in the Court of Appeals must be
continuous and must be completed within three months, unless extended by the Chief Justice. 12(a)
Sec. 13. Certification or appeal of case to the Supreme Court.(a) Whenever the Court of Appeals finds that the penalty of death
should be imposed, the court shall render judgment but refrain from making an entry of judgment and forthwith certify the case
and elevate its entire record to the Supreme Court for review.
(b) Where the judgment also imposes a lesser penalty for offenses committed on the same occasion or which arose out of the
same occurrence that gave rise to the more severe offense for which the penalty of death is imposed, and the accused appeals, the
appeal shall be included in the case certified for review to, the Supreme Court.

(c) In cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall
render and enter judgment imposing such penalty. The judgment may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of
appeal filed with the Court of Appeals.
Also affecting the rules on appeal is the enactment of Republic Act No. (RA) 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty
in the Philippines, which took effect on June 29, 2006. Under Sec. 2 of RA 9346, the imposition of the death penalty is prohibited, and in
lieu thereof, it imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC); or life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the RPC.
Consequently, in the provisions of the Rules of Court on appeals, death penalty cases are no longer operational.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS NICANOR SALOME

FACTS:
Salome entered into the house where 13 year old Sally Idanan was sleeping. He poked a knife against her neck and then raped her. He
threatened Idanan so that she may not report the incident to authorities. When she found out that shes pregnant, she reported the
incident. Salome offered the defense of alibi in court claiming that he went fishing at the time of the incident. Trial court convicted Salome
of rape qualified by the use of a bladed weapon, committed inside the dwelling of Sally, as defined and penalized under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of dwelling be appreciated against Salome.
HELD:
Yes. The Court finds Salomes denial untenable.
The aggravating circumstance of dwelling is appreciated against him. It suffices to state that private complainant categorically testified that
she was sleeping inside her house when appellant came and perpetrated the crime. This is proof enough of the absence of provocation on
the part of private complainant. For a sleeping thirteen (13) year old barrio girl cannot possibly give any kind of provocation to appellant
under the circumstances.

Since the crime of rape was committed by appellant with the use of a deadly weapon, punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, the
presence of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, without the presence of any mitigating circumstance, justified the trial courts
imposition of the death penalty. However, pursuant to RA 9346 which suspends the death penalty, his penalty is sustained at reclusion
perpetua without parole.

A.M. No. RTJ-08-2126 [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2896-RTJ]January 20, 2009ATTY. ERNESTO A. TABUJARA III, Complainant
vs. JUDGE FATIMAGONZALES-ASDALA, Respondent.
Abuse of contempt power
SC found the respondent guilty of gross ignorance of law and procedure.
1. As found by the CA, respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when she acted on the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Order Respondent
to Comply with the Writ of Habeas Corpus with Urgent Motion For Partial Reconsideration (Of the Order dated May 31, 2006). That Judge
Bay may have left the court premises in the afternoon of May 31, 2006 did not justify her acting on even date on motion of complainants
wife, as her authority as pairing judge commenced only the following day, June1, 2006, when Judge Bays leave of absence started; Nor did
respondents opinion on the urgency of the case justify her sacrificing law and settled jurisprudence for the sake of expediency.

2. Respondent also abused her contempt powers. If at all, complainant was guilty of indirect contempt. Indirect or constructive contempt is
committed outside of the sitting of the court and may include misbehavior of an officer of the court in the performance of his official duties
or in his official transactions, disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction
granted by a court or a judge, any abuse or any unlawful interference with the process or proceedings of a court not constituting direct
contempt, or any improper conduct tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice.

3. For not affording complainant the opportunity to explain why he should not be cited in contempt, she blatantly disregarded Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court. In Lim v. Domagas where the therein judge declared the therein complainant guilty of contempt and ordered his arrest for
failure to bring three minors before the court without the benefit of a hearing, the Court faulted the therein judge not only for grave abuse
of discretion but also for gross ignorance of the law.

VILLEGAS VS. CA

FACTS:
This case originated from a libel suit filed by then Assemblyman Antonio V. Raquiza against then Manila Mayor Antonio J. Villegas, who
allegedly publicly imputed to him acts constituting violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. He did this on several occasions in
August 1968 xxx

An Information for libel was filed against Villegas who denied the charge. After losing in the 1971 elections, Villegas left for the United
States where he stayed until his death. Nevertheless, trial proceeded on absentia. Two months after the prosecution rested its case, the
court issued an order dismissing the criminal aspect of the case but reserving the right to resolve its civil aspect.
Subsequently the Court awarded Raquiza actual, moral, exemplary damages and cost of suit. On appeal, the CA affirmed but reduced the
amount of damages. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: (related to the subject matter) did the death of the accused before final judgment extinguish his civil liability?

HELD:
NO (Guys, take note of Article 33 of the Civil Code. Raquizas right to recover damages arose from this article not from delict)
Fortunately, this Court has already settled this issue with the promulgation of the case of People v. Bayotas (G.R. No. 102007) on
September 2, 1994, 4 viz.:

1 Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability xxx
2 Corollarily the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of (the) accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source
of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may
arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x x x x x x x

e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of
filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. 8 This separate civil
action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator o(f) the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon
which the same is based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where
during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private offended party instituted together therewith the civil
action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case (Art.
1155)

The source of Villegas civil liability in the present case is the felonious act of libel he allegedly committed. Yet, this act could also be deemed
a quasi-delict within the purview of Article 33 9 in relation to Article 1157 of the Civil Code.
The Bayotas ruling, however, makes the enforcement of a deceased accuseds civil liability dependent on two factors, namely, that it be
pursued by filing a separate civil action and that it be made subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended.

Obviously, in the case at bar, the civil action was deemed instituted with the criminal. There was no waiver of the civil action and no
reservation of the right to institute the same, nor was it instituted prior to the criminal action. What then is the recourse of the private
offended party in a criminal case such as this which must be dismissed in accordance with the Bayotas doctrine.
Now, where the civil action was impliedly instituted with it?

The answer is likewise provided in Bayatas, thus:

Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamalas civil civil for damages was to be considered instituted together with the criminal
action still, since both proceedings were terminated without finals adjudication, the civil action of the offended party under Article 33 may
yet be enforced separately

The resolution of the civil aspect of the case after the dismissal of the main criminal action by the trial court was technically defective. There
was no proper substitution of parties, as correctly pointed out by the Heirs and repeatedly put in issue by Atty. Quisumbing. What should
have been followed by the court a quo was the procedure laid down in the Rules of Court, specifically, Section 17, Rule 3, in connection with
Section 1, Rule 87.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 82562 is GRANTED and the petition in G.R. No. 82592 is DENIED xxx without prejudice to the right of
the private offended party Antonio V. Raquiza, to file the appropriate civil action for damages against the executor or administrator of the
estate or the heirs of the late Antonto J. Villegas in accordance with the foregoing procedure

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JAIME AYOCHOK Y TAULI, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

FACTS:

That on or about the 15th day of July, 2001, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, the above-named accused, being then armed with a
gun, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation and by means of treachery and with cruelty by deliberately and inhumanly outraging
at the victim, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot SPO1 CLAUDIO CALIGTAN y NGODO in the
following manner, to wit: that while the victim was relieving himself with his back turned to the accused, the latter coming from the blind
side of the victim, shoot him several times hitting him on the different parts of his body and there was no opportunity or means to defend
himself from the treacherous act of the assailant, thereby inflicting upon the latter: hypovolemic shock due to massive hemorrhage;
multiple gunshot wounds on the head, neck, and upper extremities which directly caused his death.

When arraigned, Ayochok pleaded not guilty.

After trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. 18658-R, the RTC rendered a Decision on August 13, 2003. The Court finds the accused
Jaime Ayochok guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code

as amended, qualified by treachery as charged in the Information and hereby sentences him to reclusion perpetua. The accused Jaime
Ayochok being a detention prisoner is entitled to be credited 4/5 of his preventive imprisonment in the service of his sentence in accordance
with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

While Ayochok,is rendering his sentence through counsel, filed several Notices of Appeal with the Court of Appeals conveying his
intention to appeal of the Decision of the court. On December 29, 2006, the Judicial Records Division of the Court of Appeals elevated the
original records of CA-G.R. CR No. 00949 and Ayochok's appeal was docketed as G.R. No. 175784.

However, in a letter dated February 16, 2010, Julio A. Arciaga, the Assistant Director for Prisons and Security of the Bureau of
Corrections, informed us that Ayochok had died on January 15, 2010 at the Philippine General Hospital, Manila. A copy of the death report
signed by a medical officer of the New Bilibid Prison Hospital was attached to said letter.

ISSUES:
Whether or not he was guilty of the crime charged has become irrelevant since, following Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code,
assuming Ayochok had incurred any criminal liability, it was totally extinguished by his death. Moreover, because Ayochok's appeal was still
pending and no final judgment of conviction had been rendered against him when he died, his civil liability arising from the crime, being civil
liability ex delicto, was likewise extinguished by his death.

RULING:

Costs de oficio.The death of accused-appellant Jaime Ayochok y Tauli, the Decision dated June 28, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 00949 is SET ASIDE and Criminal Case No. 18658-R before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City is DISMISSED.

FRANCISCO MAGESTRADO, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ELENA M. LIBROJO

1.

Francisco Magestrado loaned a sum of money from Elena M. Librojo. As security for the said load, Magestrado executed a mortgage
in favor Librojo. The said title to the property was surrendered to Librojo.

2.

Private respondent Elena M. Librojo filed a criminal complaint 3 for perjury against petitioner with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City.

3.

After the filing of petitioners counter-affidavit and the appended pleadings, the Office of the City Prosecutor recommended the
filing of an information for perjury against petitioner. Thus, Assistant City Prosecutor Josephine Z. Fernandez filed an information
for perjury against petitioner with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City.
-

Magestrado executed an Affidavit of Loss before Notary Public falsely alleging that he lost Owners Duplicate Certificate of TCT
No. N-173163, which document was used in support of a Petition For Issuance of New Owners Duplicate Copy of Certificate of
Title and filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, to which said Magestrado signed and swore on its verification,

The said accused knowing fully well that the allegations in the said affidavit and petition are false, the truth of the matter being
that the property subject of Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-173163 was mortgaged to complainant Elena M. Librojo as
collateral for a loan in the amount of P 758,134.42 and as a consequence of which said title to the property was surrendered
by him to the said complainant by virtue of said loan,

4.

The case was raffled to the MeTC of Quezon City, Branch 43 entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Francisco Magestrado."

5.

Magestrado filed a motion5 for suspension of proceedings based on a prejudicial question. Petitioner alleged that Civil Case No. Q98-34349, a case for recovery of a sum of money pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 84, and
Civil Case No. Q-98- 34308, a case for Cancellation of Mortgage, Delivery of Title and Damages, pending before the RTC of Quezon
City, Branch 77, must be resolved first before Criminal Case No. 90721 may proceed since the issues in the said civil cases are
similar or intimately related to the issues raised in the criminal action.

6.

MeTC-Branch 43 issued an Order6 denying petitioners motion for suspension of proceedings. Hence, the trial of this case shall
proceed as previously scheduled on July 19 and August 2, 1993 at 8:30 in the morning.

7.

A motion7 for reconsideration was filed by Magestrado but was denied by the MeTC.

8.

Aggrieved, Magestrado filed a Petition for Certiorari 9 under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, with a prayer for Issuance of a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 83, on the ground that MeTC Judge Billy J. Apalit committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying his motion to suspend the proceedings in Criminal
Case.

9.

RTC-Branch 83 dismissed the petition and denied the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, reasoning that
there is no prejudicial question involved as to warrant the suspension of the criminal action to await the outcome of the civil cases.

10. Again, Magestrado filed a motion for reconsideration 11 but this was denied by RTC- Branch 83.
11. Dissatisfied, Magestrado filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari 13 under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court,
Petitioner alleged that RTC Judge Estrella T. Estrada committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in denying the Petition for Certiorari
12. The Court of Appeals dismissed14 the Petition on the ground that petitioners remedy should have been an appeal from the
dismissal by RTC-Branch 83 of his Petition for Certiorari in Q-99-39358. The Court of Appeals ruled that:

Issue: Whether or not this instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is the correct and appropriate remedy?
We rule negatively. The resolution or dismissal in special civil actions, as in the instant petition, may be appealed x x x under Section 10,
Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and not by petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the same rules.
13. The Court of Appeals denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration 16 in a Resolution17 dated 3 May 2001.
14. Magestrado comes before the Supreme Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
raising the following issues:

People vs Velasco
Can the government appeal from a judgment acquitting the accused after trial on the merits without violating the
constitutional precept against double jeopardy?
ANSWER:
NO.
In People v. Velasco the government, by way of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, appealed the decision of Hon.
Tirso D.C. Velasco acquitting accused Honorato Galvez of the charges of murder and double frustrated murder due to insufficiency of
evidence, and of the charge of unauthorized carrying of firearm on the ground that the act charged was not a violation of law. This Court
dismissed the petition. We ruled:
. . . Therefore, as mandated by our Constitution, statutes and cognate jurisprudence, an acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of
double jeopardy, whether it happens at the trial court level or before the Court of Appeals.
In general, the rule is that a remand to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal brought before the Supreme Court on certiorari cannot be
had unless there is a finding of mistrial, as in Galman v. Sandiganbayan. . . .

Thus, the doctrine that double jeopardy may not be invoked after trial may apply only when the Court finds that the criminal trial was a
sham because the prosecution representing the sovereign people in the criminal case was denied due process.
. . . Thus, emerging American consensus on jury acquittals notwithstanding, on solid constitutional bedrock is well engraved
our own doctrine that acquittals by judges on evidentiary considerations cannot be appealed by government. The jurisprudential metes and
bounds of double jeopardy having been clearly defined by both constitution and statute, the issue of the effect of an appeal of a verdict of
acquittal upon a determination of the evidence on the constitutionally guaranteed right of an accused against being twice placed in jeopardy
should now be finally put to rest.

Ong vs Genio
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Court of
Appeals (CA) Resolution2 dated January 7, 2008.
Petitioner Elvira O. Ong (petitioner) filed a criminal complaint against respondent Jose Casim Genio (respondent) for Robbery which was
dismissed by the City Prosecutor of Makati City. However, pursuant to the Resolutions dated September 15, 2006 3 and October 30, 20064 of
the Department of Justice, respondent was charged with the crime of Robbery in an Information 5 which reads:
That in or about and sometime the month of January, 2003, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, divest and carry away kitchen and canteen
equipment as well as her personal things valued at Php 700,000.00, belonging to complainant, ELVIRA O. ONG, to the damage and
prejudice of the said owner in the aforementioned amount of Php 700,000.00.

On November 21, 2006, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Case for Lack of Probable Cause Pursuant to Sec. 6(a), 6 Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court and, in View of Compelling Grounds for the Dismissal of the Case to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of the Warrant of
Arrest7 (Motion to Dismiss). Petitioner filed an Opposition 8 dated December 11, 2006 to respondent's Motion to Dismiss.
In its Order9 of December 15, 2006, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 56, dismissed the case because the other
elements of
the crime of Robbery, specifically the elements of intent to gain, and either
violence against or intimidation of any person or force upon things, were not specifically alleged in the Information filed against respondent.
Despite the dismissal of the case, respondent filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration 10 dated January 2, 2007, reiterating that the
Information should be dismissed in its entirety for lack of probable cause. Petitioner filed her Opposition 11 to this motion on February 15,
2007.
In its Order12 dated February 12, 2007, the RTC granted respondents Partial Motion for Reconsideration and dismissed the case for lack of
probable cause pursuant to Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The RTC held that the evidence on record
failed to establish probable cause to charge respondent with the crime of Robbery.
On March 6, 2007, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration, 13 claiming that the RTC erred in relying on Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, since the said provision relates to the issuance of a warrant of arrest, and it does not cover the
determination of probable cause for the filing of the Information against respondent, which is executive in nature, a power primarily vested
in the Public Prosecutor.
In its Order14 dated June 1, 2007, the RTC denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, holding that the aforementioned provision
authorizes
the RTC to evaluate not only the resolution of the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation and eventually filed the
Information in court, but also the evidence upon which the resolution was based. In the event that the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause, the RTC may dismiss the case.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus 15 before the CA on August 28, 2007. Respondent filed a Motion to
Dismiss16 the petition, raising the issue of lack of personality of petitioner to appeal the dismissal of the criminal case, because the authority
to do so lies exclusively with the State as represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). In its Resolution 17 dated September 10,
2007, the CA observed that the People of the Philippines was impleaded as petitioner without showing, however, the OSG's participation.
Thus, the CA ordered petitioner to furnish the OSG with a copy of the Petition, and the latter to comment thereon.
On October 22, 2007, the OSG filed its Comment,18 taking the stand of respondent that only the Solicitor General can bring or defend
actions on behalf of the People of the Philippines filed before the CA or the Supreme Court. The OSG submitted that, for being fatally
defective, the said Petition should be dismissed insofar as the criminal aspect was concerned, without prejudice to the right of petitioner to
pursue the civil aspect of the case.
On January 7, 2008, the CA rendered its Resolution, 19 dismissing the case without prejudice to the filing of a petition on the civil aspect
thereof on the basis of the arguments raised by both respondent and the OSG. Undaunted, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration20 which the CA denied in its Resolution21 dated March 27, 2008.

Ivler vs. San Pedro

FACTS:
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Pasig City (MTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by

respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the
death of respondent Ponces husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponces vehicle.
Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge on the first delict
and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information for the second delict
for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.
The petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC), in a petition for certiorari while Ivler sought from
the MTC the suspension of proceedings in criminal case, including the arraignment his arraignment as a prejudicial question.
Without acting on petitioners motion, the MTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioners absence, cancelled his
bail and ordered his arrest.
Seven days later, the MTC issued a resolution denying petitioners motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment
until after his arrest. Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.

ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief from his petition for certiorari when the MTC ordered his arrest following
his non-appearance at the arraignment in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent;
and
2. Whether petitioners constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponces husband.

RULING:
The accused negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense" protects him from,
among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a
valid information.
Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MTC
ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not."
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable. Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple,
are distinct species of crime, separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new.
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other
crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its
various resulting acts, undergirded this Courts unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365.

These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional right
under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48,
but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light
offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by
extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single
prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of
quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should
cushion the effect of this ruling.
People vs Lagon

Nature: Petition for Review filed by the People as represented by the Fiscal arguing that the City Court of Roxas City had
jurisdiction and that it had erred in issuing its Order dismissing the case.
Facts:

Libertad Lagon was charged with estafa under par2(d) RPC 315 in the amount of P4,232.80 as payment for goods or merchandise.

April 1975 - alleged commission of the crime [arresto mayor max to PC min]

Oct 22 1975 PD 818 was enacted increasing the penalty to PM med

July 1976 criminal information filed at City Court

Dec 1976 - City Court dismissed the information because the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged was beyond

the court's authority to impose.

City Court: at the time of the institution of the action

OSG: agreed with the City Court

Issues/Ruling:
1. WON the City Court has jurisdiction. Whether the court jurisdiction is determined by the law in force at a) the time of the institution
of the action or at b) the time of the commission of the crime?

Court jurisdiction is determined by the law at the time of the institution of the action. Therefore, the City Court has no

jurisdiction over the case. Petition for review dismissed.

Section 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948: jurisdiction of municipal and city courts... offense in which the penalty does not exceed

prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six (6) years or fine not exceeding P6,000.00 or both . . . ."

2. Would application of the doctrine not result in also applying PD 818, in disregard of the rule against retroactivity of penal
laws?

RPC 22 permits penal laws to have retroactive effect only "insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual

criminal, . . . "

Subject-matter jurisdiction is determined by the authority of the court to impose the penalty imposable under the applicable statute

given the allegations of a criminal information.

In People v.Purisima and People v. Buissan:

. . . The issue here is one of jurisdiction, of a court's legal competence to try a case ab origine. In criminal prosecutions, it is settled that

the jurisdiction of the court is not determined by what may be meted out to the offender after trial, or even by the result of the
evidence that would be presented at the trial, but by theextent of the penalty which the law imposes for the misdemeanor, crime or
violation charged in the complaint.

Should the information be refiled in the RTC, that court may only impose the penalty provided in the law at the time of the

commission of the crime.

PEOPLE, petitioner, vs. GUTIERREZ, ET. AL., respondents.

FACTS:
In the morning of May 22, 1970, a group of armed persons set fire to various inhabited houses in barrio Ora Centro, Bantay, Ilocos
Sur.
On the afternoon of the same day, several residential houses were likewise burned in barrio Ora Este of the same municipality and
province, which resulted to the destruction of various houses and resulted in the death of an old woman.
Two informations were filed in the Court of First Instance (one for arson with homicide and the other for arson), charging the 17
private respondents, together with 82 other unidentified persons,
confederating, conspiring, constabulating and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously burn or
caused to be burned several residential houses, knowing the said houses to be occupied.
Two of the accused furnished bail and voluntarily appeared before respondent Judge, were arraigned and pleaded not guilty.
The Secretary of Justice issued Administrative Order No. 221, authorizing the Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second
Judicial District to hold a special in Ilocos Sur.
Three days after, the Secretary of Justice further issued Administrative Order No. 226, authorizing respondent Judge to transfer the
criminal cases to the Circuit Criminal Court.
The prosecution moved the respondent Judge for a transfer of said cases to the Circuit Criminal Court, invoking the abovementioned administrative Orders and calling attention to the circumstance that they were issued at the instance of the witnesses for reason
of security and personal safety.
The accused opposed such transfer and the respondent Judge declined the transfer sought on the ground that said Administrative
Order only provided for transfer of cases to the Circuit Criminal Court where the interest of justice required it for more expeditious disposal
of the cases; and in the cases involved the accused had already pleaded; that if the objective of the proposed transfer was to subsequently
obtain a change of venue from the Supreme Court under Sec. 4 of RA No. 5179 the same should have been done right at the very inception
of these cases.
RA 5179 created the Criminal Circuit Courts for the purpose of alleviating the burden of the CFI, and to accelerate the disposition of
criminal cases pending or to be filed therein, but nowhere indicates an intent to permit the transfer of preselected individual cases to the
circuit courts.
In view of the lower courts denial of the motion to transfer the cases to the Criminal Court, the prosecution resorted to the SC for
writs of certiorari and mandamus, charging abuse of discretion and praying to set aside the order of denial of transfer and to compel the CFI
to remand the cases to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Secondary Judicial District.
Respondents in their answer denied any abuse of discretion in view of the fact that the Administrative Order merely authorized the
court below, but did not require or command it.

ISSUE:
Whether the lower court committed abuse of discretion in denying to transfer cases to the Circuit Criminal Court.

RULING:
YES. Respondent Judge, in construing Administrative Order No. 226 as permissive and not mandatory, acted within the limits of his
discretion and violated neither the law nor the EOs mentioned. HOWEVER, in refusing to consider Department AO No. 226 of the Secretary
of Justice as mandatory, respondent Judge failed to act upon the contention of the prosecuting officers that the cases should be transferred
to the Criminal Circuit Court of the Second Judicial District because a miscarriage of justice was impending, in view of the prosecution
witnesses to testify in the court where they felt their lives would be endangered.

This refusal by the witnesses to testify due to security and safety manifest the imperious necessity of transferring the place of trial
to a site outside of Ilocos Sur, if the cases are to be judicially inquired into conformably to the interest of truth and justice and the State is
to be given a fair chance to present its side of the case.
The Constitution has vested the Judicial Power in the SC, and such inferior courts as may be established by law, and such judicial
power connotes certain incidental and inherent attributes reasonably necessary for an effective administration of justice. The courts can by
appropriate means do all things necessary to preserve and maintain every quality needful to make the judiciary an effective institution of
government.
One of these incidental and inherent powers of courts is that of transferring the trial of cases from one court to another of equal
rank in a neighboring site, whenever the imperative of securing a fair and impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice, so
demands.

Thus, the SC held:

That RA No. 5179 creating the Circuit Criminal Courts did not, and does not, authorize the Secretary of Justice to transfer thereto
specified and individual cases;
That the SC, in the exercise of the Judicial Power vested by the Constitution upon it and other statutory Courts, possesses inherent
power and jurisdiction to decree that the trial and disposition of a case pending in a CFI be transferred to another CFI within the same
district whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand, and there are serious and weighty reasons to believe that a trial by the court
that originally had jurisdiction over the case would not result in a fair and impartial trial and lead to a miscarriage of justice.
That in the present case there are sufficient and adequate reasons for the transfer of the hearing of th.e said criminal cases of the
CFI of Ilocos Sur to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, in the interest of truth and justice

People v. Pilotin, 65 SCRA 635 (1975)

Contention c/o CrisologoHis life would be in jeopardy if he were to be confined in the Vigan municipal jail during the trial because there are
many political enemies of the Crisologo family in that vicinity.Held & RatioThe Const itut ion e xpress ly em powers the Cou rt to order
a chang e of venu e or p lace o f trial to avoid a m isc arriag e of justice. What is involved in the case at bar is not merely a
miscarriage of justice but the personal safety of Crisologo. Itwould be absurd to compel him to undergo trial in a place where his life
would be imperiled.DispositiveThe municipal court of Vigan is directed to transfer the record of Crisologos Criminal Case to the city court
of Quezon Citywhere it should be redocketed and raffled to any Judge. The case may be tried at Camp Crame. The usual precautions
andsecurity measures should be adopted in bringing Crisologo to Crame on the occasion of the hearing.
Notes in class
Applies to criminal cases (civil cases inhibition venue can be transferred but not jurisdiction.)Jurisdiction Subject matter Person Territory

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. LANTION

FACTS:
Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the extradition Treaty
Between the Government of the Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty.
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a
request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jiminez to the United States.

On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of
the aforestated extradition documents, Mark Jiminez through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies of the official
extradition request from the U.S Government and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received
copies of the requested papers but the petitioner denied the request for the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in
Article 7 that the Philippine Government must present the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for
extradition.

ISSUE: Whether or not to uphold a citizens basic due process rights or the governments ironclad duties under a treaty.

RULING:

Petition dismissed.

The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence
over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when
they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of binding
obligations under generally accepted principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land.

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situation in which there appears to be a conflict
between a rule of international law and the provision of the constitution or statute of the local state.

Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant
him (Mark Jimenez) a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.

Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no further legislative action is needed to
make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere.

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict
between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state.

Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted
with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the incorporation clause in the above cited
constitutional provision.

In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and a municipal
law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts, for the reason that such courts are organs of
municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.

The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over
national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of
international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex
posterior derogate priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the Constitution is
the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with
the constitution

ELIZALDE MALALOAN and MARLON LUAREZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Lt. Absalon V. Salboro of the CAPCOM filed with the RTC of Kalookan City an application for search warrant. The search warrant
was sought for inconnection with an alleged violation of P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions). Firearms, explosive
materials and subversive documents were seized and taken during the search. Petitioners presented a Motion for Consolidation, Quashal of
Search Warrant and For the Suppression of All Illegally AcquiredEvidence. However, the court denied the quashal of the search warrant and
the validity of which warrant was upheld invoking paragraph 3(b) of the Interim Rulesand Guidelines which provides that search warrants
can be served not only within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court but anywhere in the judicial region of the issuing court.
ISSUE: W/N a court may take cognizance of an application for a search warrant in connection with an offense committed outside
its territorial boundary and, thereafter, issue the warrant to conduct a search on a place outside the court's supposed territorial jurisdiction
HELD:
A warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes process. A search warrant is defined in our
jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer,
commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court. 5 A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin
to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity. A judicial
process is defined as a writ, warrant, subpoena, or other formal writing issued by authority of law. It is clear, therefore, that a search
warrant is merely a judicial process designed by the Rules to respond only to an incident in the main case, if one has already been
instituted, or in anticipation thereof. Since a search warrant is a judicial process, not a criminal action, no legal provision, statutory or
reglementary, expressly or impliedly provides a jurisdictional or territorial limit on its area of enforceability. Moreover, in our jurisdiction, no
period is provided for the enforceability of warrants of arrest, and although within ten days from the delivery of the warrant of arrest for
execution a return thereon must be made to the issuing judge, said warrant does not become functus officio but is enforceable indefinitely
until the same is enforced or recalled. The following are the guidelines when there are possible conflicts of jurisdiction where the criminal
case is pending in one court and the search warrant is issued by another court for the seizure of personal property intended to be used as
evidence in said criminal case:
1. The court wherein the criminal case is pending shall have primary jurisdiction to issue search warrants necessitated by and for
purposes of said case. An application for a search warrant may be filed with another court only under extreme and compelling circumstances
that the applicant must prove to the satisfaction of the latter court which may or may not give due course to the application depending on
the validity of the justification offered for not filing the same in the court with primary jurisdiction there over.
2. When the latter court issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the same may be filed in and shall be resolved by said court,
without prejudice to any proper recourse to the appropriate higher court by the party aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court. All
grounds and objections then available, existent or known shall be raised in the original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the
warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed waived.
3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the issuing court, the interested party may move in the
court where the criminal case is pending for the suppression as evidence of the personal property seized under the warrant if the same is
offered therein for said purpose. Since two separate courts with different participations are involved in this situation, a motion to quash a
search warrant and a motion to suppress evidence are alternative and not cumulative remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping, a
motion to quash shall consequently be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not available, existent or

known during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress. The resolution of the
court on the motion to suppress shall likewise be subject to any proper remedy in the appropriate higher court.
4. Where the court which issued the search warrant denies the motion to quash the same and is not otherwise prevented from
further proceeding thereon, all personal property seized under the warrant shall forthwith be transmitted by it to the court wherein the
criminal case is pending, with the necessary safeguards and documentation therefore.
5. These guidelines shall likewise be observed where the same criminal offense is charged in different informations or complaints
and filed in two or more courts with concurrent original jurisdiction over the criminal action. Where the issue of which court will try the case
shall have been resolved, such court shall be considered as vested with primary jurisdiction to act on applications for search warrants
incident to the criminal case.
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is DENIED