Evolution of intelligence

The social intelligence hypothesis

Alison Jolly: Creator of Social

Intelligence hypothesis
Emphasized that primates learn lots of
information and skills from one another
(e.g. who are predators? What is food?)
Social primates must remember their
positions in dominance hierarchies

Social intelligence hypothesis

Data:
Almost all primates live in permanent social groups and
have differentiated social relationships
Some primate dyads engage in long-term cooperative
relationships in which they exchange social favors
Many primate species are known to have triadic
awareness: that is, the ability to understand the quality
of other monkeys social relationships

Nick Humphrey: further developed social

intelligence hypothesis
Noted that creative intellect is useful not only for solving
technological problems, but also social manipulation problems
Viewed evolution of intelligence as an arms race in social
manipulation skills
Humans and other primates treat nonsocial problems as social
transactions (e.g. talking to computer, car)
Wason selection task - can solve detect cheaters
problems better than logically identical problems not
phrased in this way

Social intelligence hypothesis

Conclusion: The complex social
environment of primates selects for the
ability to assess probable outcomes of social
situations based on knowledge of other
individuals social interactions in similar
contexts, and to behave adaptively on this
assessment. The need for this type of
mental ability is what drives the evolution
of brain size

Evidence for triadic awareness

Tactical deception

Dasser study: macaques can distinguish mother-infant and siblingsibling pairs from other dyad types
de Waal: subordinate chimp leads alpha to scene of copulating pair
playback experiment in which screams are played back to 3
females and non-mothers look at mother
capuchin solicitation decisions in coalitionary aggression (recruit
someone better friends with yourself than with opponent)
Gouzoules -- mothers only aided their offspring in those rhesus
scream experiments if kids were fighting with nonkin
vervets - get revenge on kin of their opponents (also complex
redirection and complex reconciliation
3rd party reconciliation in chimps

Other instances of tactical deception

Guapos lie
Menzel young chimpanzee in a
field experiment
experiments in which chimps
withhold information from dishonest
trainers

Why do we care so much about

deception?
It can inform us about theory of mind: do
nhps have a concept of the mental state of
another individual, particularly when that
mental state is different from their own? Do
they make assumptions about other
individuals feelings, intentions or
knowledge?

Autistics lack a theory of mind. Autistics

respond correctly when asked which objects a
person sees, but fail tests that require an
inference of a person's mental state based on
what the person could have seen of an event.
So can we assume that nhps understand what
others see?

What is a theory of mind good for?

(a)it is useful in deceiving other
animals into doing something
advantageous to yourself, and
(b) it is useful in teaching others
(usually your offspring) how to
perform tasks that enhance their
fitness.

Levels of intentionality:
Zero-order intentionality: no intentionality (e.g. stimulusresponse sequence)
First-order intentionality: the organism wants to do something,
but does not have any intensions that involve changing
someone's belief.

NHPs have a good understanding of

geometry -- e.g. can hide from others.
But they might have learned that these
configurations work via trial and error
learning, not by taking anothers visual
perspective

Teaching and deception indicate theory

of mind only if they exhibit
intentionality on the part of the
deceiver/teacher
To be an act of "true" deception, the
agent must know that the dupe's
misconception of the situation is what
caused the dupe to behave in a way
desired by the agent.

tactical deception is defined as "acts from

the normal repertoire of the agent,
deployed such that another individual is
likely to misinterpret what the acts
signify, to the advantage of the agent."

Second-order intentionality: when one organism wants to

change another organism's belief
Third-order intentionality: when an animal thinks that another
animal wants him to believe something.

Most or all incidences of deception in

non-apes are due to conditioning rather
than to insight about the contents of others'
minds. So deception must be common
only in species that learn very quickly.

Very few examples of teaching:

Boesch chimp nutcracking example
Washoe shapes infant sons hands to make
sign and makes sure he is watching
dolphins: female apparently taught her infant
a signature whistle by switching to a new
signature whistle until the infant had adopted
the use of it, and then switched back to her
own signature whistle.

Caro & Hausers definition of teaching:

in order to teach, an animal must
"modify its behaviour, to no immediate
benefit to itself, only in the presence of a
nave observer, and with the result that
the observer gains knowledge or learns a
skill with greater efficiency than
otherwise."

Prediction and modelling:

Once an animal has a theory of mind, it can make
predictions about what another animal would do if its
beliefs were changed from X to Y. Thus, the animal can
build scenarios about the consequences of its own actions
on the beliefs and subsequent actions of another animal.
An agent can thus evaluate the costs and benefits of
possible deceptive tactics or teaching methods, for
example. Also, animals can have arms races of deception,
once they start thinking about what others might want
them to believe.