Federalization With A Constitutional Guarantee To Secession Controversies Paradoxes and Imponderables in Ethiopia

Regional & Federal Studies
ISSN: 1359-7566 (Print) 1743-9434 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/frfs20
Federalization with a Constitutional Guarantee

to Secession: Controversies, Paradoxes and
Imponderables in Ethiopia
Tesfa Bihonegn
To cite this article: Tesfa Bihonegn (2015) Federalization with a Constitutional Guarantee
to Secession: Controversies, Paradoxes and Imponderables in Ethiopia, Regional & Federal
Studies, 25:1, 45-70, DOI: 10.1080/13597566.2014.944863
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13597566.2014.944863
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Federalization with a Constitutional

Guarantee to Secession: Controversies,
Paradoxes and Imponderables in
Ethiopia
TESFA BIHONEGN
Department of Civics and Ethical Studies, Dilla University, Dilla, Ethiopia
ABSTRACT Ethiopias federal design has a number of anomalies interesting for comparative
federalism. The explicit right to secede provided to member states has become, however, real
political dynamite in the country. This article deals with this right, its constitutionalization, its
constitutional and ideological underpinnings, and its practical impacts on federal construction
in the country for the last two decades. It challenges the political expediency views on its
constitutionalization and argues that the inclusion of the right in the federal constitution is
motivated by ideological reasons. By having a look at the powers member states are provided
by this generous constitution, it reveals its staggering paradoxes. As far as the practical
impacts of the right are concerned, the hefty controversy the constitutionalization of the right
has continued creating in the country, the article argues, is a significant federal nuisance.
KEY WORDS:
Nuisance
Explicit right to secede, Federal anomaly, Perversion of federalism, Federal
Introduction
What perturbed most multinational states contemplating some form of federal design
to deal with problems of competing nationalisms is secessionism. Fears that federalism
would lead to truncation or dissolution of a state militate against federal construction or
reconstruction. Such fears, of course, could not be dismissed as mere nationalistic
apologies against federal adoption by political leaders and governments. It is now
almost a common knowledge that federalism is not a panacea to secessionism and
federations are not immune from secessionists. Despite the fact that it has those
most desired features that would inhibit secessionism, federalism has also secession-inducing factors (Erk and Anderson, 2009: 96), and even results.1 In some
cases, however, the compelling factors of federalism might outweigh the fear factors
in that multinational states that are being bedevilled by conflicts resulted from group
Correspondence Address: Tesfa Bihonegn, Department of Civics and Ethical Studies, Dilla University, Dilla,
Ethiopia 419. Email: tesfabihone@gmail.com
# 2014 Taylor & Francis
46
Tesfa B.
claims for autonomy and even independence have limited alternatives otherwise available to them. Thus, as much as it is feared, federalism is also compelling under certain
circumstances. Perplexing then is how best to design the constitutional and institutional orders of particular federations in ways that could make them maximally
less prone to secessionism?
If federations are likely to face secessionist mobilizations and pleas, a question
raised, is it not wise for federal states to prepare themselves for the imminent and
the inevitable in the first place? In other words, why federations introduce an explicit
right to secede in their constitutions to entertain secessionist demands according to
established laws than the dangers of unregulated political behaviour? These are the
arguments and advices of some writers who saw counterintuitive strategic benefits
(Roach, 2007: 446) in an explicit constitutional right to secede. In particular, Daniel
Weinstock (2000, 2001) and Wayne Norman (1998, 1999, 2006) argue that a constitutional guarantee to secession in multinational states would have in practice opposite
effects than those destructive impacts for which they are usually attributed. Fears that
the right could be used by constituent states as a cheap bargain tool to secure unfair
advantages from the federal government by just threatening secession, both Norman
and Weinstock claim, would be diminished by putting significant procedural hurdles
towards its exercise as, for instance, a qualified two-thirds majority vote. Norman
(2006), for instance, proposed that precedence must be given to keep groups together
but in case of failure in the within solutions, an explicit right to secede, or Plan B
(Monahan and Bryant, 1996) is vital. Concurring with Weinstock (2000, 2001), he
wrote that such a right, in addition to avoiding the dangers of unregulated secessionist
behaviour, would actually reduce the likelihood of secessionism by raising high the
stakes of secession.
There exist, however, varied and significant obstacles against such propositions for
an explicit right to secede in multinational federations. The first is the morality and
legitimacy of a group or region severing from an existing sovereign state on which
polemical literature exists elsewhere.2 Second, a normative question peculiar to federalism is the federality of an explicit constitutional guarantee to secession: is it
federal for a federal state to provide for a legal right to secede to its member
states? Paraphrasing the question, does the autonomy federal states render to member
states extend to include a right of walking away from the federation to form their
own sovereign states? In this regard, Michael Burgess (2006), for instance, wrote, a
conventional wisdom has evolved in the mainstream literature which asserts that secession on the part of the constituent units of a federation is candidly incompatible with the
notion of federation qua federation (271). Some argue that the inclusion of an explicit
right to secede in state constitutions makes the union a confederation than a federation
(Duchacek, 1987: 207; Filippov, Ordeshook and Shvetsova, 2004: 107). Third, more of
utilitarian is the wisdom of incorporating an explicit right to secede in multinational
state constitutions. Detractors of a constitutionalized right to secede argue that such a
right would incur significant perils on democracy, constitutionalism and federal construction. They state that the right could be used perversely both by a national government and constituent regions, the first to emasculate the powers of regions in fear of
their eventual secession and the latter to secure unfair advantages from the federation
by threatening divorce (Sunstein, 1991, 2001; Baubock, 2000; Harbo, 2008). The arts
Federalization with a Right to Secession in Ethiopia 47

of negotiation and deliberation inherent in democracy would also be endangered by
such rights that could raise high the stakes of day-to-day politics (Sunstein, 1991,
2001; Buchanan, 1998, 2004; Harbo, 2008).3 For instance, Cass Sunstein (1991)
wrote, [t]echnocratic rationality does not characterize deliberations in which the
specter of secession is involved. The mere possibility of secession, he added,
may prevent calm negotiation (653). It is always hard for antagonistic groups to
accommodate each other, wrote another and [a] right to secede will make it
harder (Horowitz, 2003: 12). Others claim that the right is best explicitly disallowed
(Filipov, Ordeshook and Shvetsova, 2004: 334). Lastly, objections against an explicit
right to secede in multinational state constitutions come from those who strongly questioned the utility of secession as a potential solution to the problems of multinational
states and in enduring long-lasting peace. Supplemented by empirical evidences,
these individuals argue that the secession of a group or region from an existing multinational state does not often provide a once-for-all remedy; it would rather brought
another chapter of conflict between the seceded and the rump states.4
My main interest in this article is not, however, to interrogate the legitimacy or
federality of the explicit constitutional guarantee to secession in the federal constitution of Ethiopia ratified in December 1994. The right has been, in fact, a limelight
for various writers and commentators on the federal system of Ethiopia, both nationals
and foreigners. It is applauded by some but rebuked by others. For instance, it is
extolled as a novel state building strategy through peaceful means (Kidane, 1997:
128). Given the eventual secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia in 1993, despite prolonged
military resistance and heavy military build-up, the right is acclaimed as an indication
to the nemesis of maintaining unity by force (Fasil, 1997: 157). Others reiterate the
assertion that the right is a confirmation to the voluntary nature and basis of union
entered by the nations, nationalities and peoples5 of the country in the federation
(Andreas, 2003; Teshome, 2003). On the other hand, its detractors are many, including
Paul Brietzke (1995), Jon Abbink (1997), James Paul (2000), John Cohen (1995),
Asnake Kefale (2003), Gebresillasie Alemante (2003) and Lovise Alaen (2002). The
right represents, of course, the most common critique of the Ethiopian federal
model (Aalen, 2002: 63). It is criticized as a recipe for disaster (Brietzke, 1995:
35), an unprecedented constitutional solution to the problems spawned by ethnic heterogeneity (Alemante, 2003: 55) and, as one put it, a reward for subversion, the
gravest threat to the survival of the Ethiopian state, and a far-fetched dogmatic
gesture that scarcely any group had asked for (Markakis, 2011: 238).
In this article I try to show how the explicit constitutional right to secede in Ethiopia came to be constitutionalized in a manner that gives precedence to disunion than
union, and in contradiction with the potential use of federalism as a means of managing
diversity in those diversified states that had been unitary prior to this. Given the centrality the right acquires in the federal system, the confederal constitutional underpinning from which the right is deduced, and the paradoxes with which it has been
proclaimed and defended; I argue that the right to secede in the federal constitution
of Ethiopia exhibit a perversion of federalism on one hand and a federal paradox on
the other. As I am going to expound soon, the Ethiopian federal system, by rushing
into the exit option without first exhausting the most desired within solutions, is
germane to Donald Horowitzs (1998) remark: [i]t seems perverse to start at the
48
Tesfa B.
rear end of the problemwith secession and the demand for recognitionrather than
to encourage domestic measures of interethnic accommodation (205).
Also addressed by the article are the practical impacts of the explicit constitutional
guarantee to secession on realizing the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, a
polity envisaged by article 2 of the same constitution. Corollary to this are the empirical corroborations the explicit right to secede in Ethiopia would offer to the wider
debate on the merits and flaws of such a right in multinational states and federal construction. The importance of such enquiry lies in the fact that Ethiopia is now the only
state that incorporates an explicit general right to secede in its constitution. Though
such a right does exist in the 1983 St Kitts and Nevis constitution, the right applies
only to Nevis and not to those within Kitts (also known as Christopher).6 The exit
law in the European Union needs not to be matched here for the EU, being an association of sovereigns, is more confederal than federal. While few constitutions allowed a
right to secede in the past (for instance, the 1977 Soviet constitution), the contemporary
trend in most constitutions ranges from prohibition of secession by affirming the indivisibility of the state to silence on the matter. In Canada, though the constitution contains no explicit right to secede, the Supreme Court Reference on Quebec Secession in
1998 established a kind of quasi-constitutional right of secession. 7 In fact, there is
recently a growing acceptance on the legitimacy of secessionist mobilization in the
West albeit without explicit constitutional regulations on the matter.8 What makes
the Ethiopian case different is the explicit provision of the right in the constitution,
or as Will Kymlica (2006) observed, the way the very idea is explicitly deduced
from first principles [constitutional order], rather than implicitly evolving out of piecemeal democratic negotiations (55). Thus, looking for the possible impacts of this
unusual constitutional arrangement in Ethiopia on its endeavours to multinational
state building and federal construction is worthy.
As much as the importance of the respective enquiry, however, there exist significant constraints that obscure attempts to unravel fully the impacts of the right in the
countrys federal construction for the last two decades. A major obstacle is that Ethiopia is not yet a federation in the substantial sense of the term and its de jure federalism
suffers from severe deficiencies of operational federalism. Here it will be sufficient to
consider the freedom of secessionists in western federations that have no such explicit
right but the criminalization and silencing of them in Ethiopia, the very country that
declared a right to secede a basic group constitutional right. Though Ethiopia exceptionally introduced a right to secede, it maintained the rule of game with secessionists
by African regimesbrute force. Thus, the imponderables are significant. In spite of
this, as I am going to explain and argue, the impact of the right that can possibly be
deciphered so far is the political dynamite the right has continued creating in the
country ever since its constitutionalizationa significant problem which I refer to
as federal nuisance in the endeavours of the country for federal construction. In
fact, the hefty controversy the right created in the country echoes one of Sunsteins
arguments against a constitutionalized right to secedethe necessity of taking
certain issues off the political agenda using constitutionalism to reduce the power
of highly controversial questions to create factionalism, instability, impulsiveness,
chaos, stalemate, collective action problems, myopia, strategic behavior, or hostilities
(1991: 642, 2001: 101).

The presentation of the article is as follows: in the first section, a brief overview of
the federal configuration and the federal system of Ethiopia is given. Then is the focus
of the article, the right to secede, in the second section. In this section, I explain the
right, its constitutionalization, and its constitutional and ideological underpinnings.
In the third section, I present my arguments on how the explicit constitutional guarantee to secession in Ethiopia is a perversion of federalism on one hand and a federal
paradox on the other. In the last section, I present what I called a federal nuisance
with regard to the practical impacts of the explicit right to secede in the federal constitution on the countrys endeavours for federal construction in the last two decades.
The Federal System of Ethiopia: A Brief Overview

Ethiopia is a post-war federation. It undertook federal configuration following protracted ethno-national conflicts that culminated in toppling a national government.
In other words, the federal system of Ethiopia did not come from the appreciation
and recognition of the countrys ethnic diversity by a national government, nor as a
compromise to placate ethno-national insurgencies struggling for different forms of
autonomy, including a separate statehood. Failing to do so and impeccably insisting
on national indivisibility, the national government, the Marxist regime of Colonel
Mengistu, was obliterated from the political scene altogether when it lost the battle
against centrifugal forces, particularly the EPLF (Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front,
hereafter EPLF) and the TPLF (Tigray Peoples Liberation Front, hereafter TPLF) in
1991. The TPLF had been fighting for the self-determination of the Tigray people
with its political agenda prevaricating from different forms of autonomy and sometimes to secession. Later, it joined with other forces and together formed the existing
ruling party, EPRDF (Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front, hereafter
EPRDF), the party that played the dominant role in the federal decomposition of the
country.9 EPLFs agenda had been clear from the beginning. It considered Ethiopia
as a colonizer and Eritreas question as one of decolonization that must be settled
nothing short of full independence, which it eventually did so. Eritreas hard-won independence in the battle in 1991 was formalized in a referendum held in 1993, sealing the
birth of a new African stateEritrea.
Thus, the federalization of the country and the constitutional and institutional
designs of the federal system were dominantly the makings of ethno-national organizations in the absence of a national/central government. Following the war, a general
peace and democracy conference was convened by EPRDF in which different
ethno-national organizations that claimed to represent the diverse groups of the
country participated.10 The conference was agreed to serve as an interim government
pending the writing of a new constitution and the holding of general elections to form a
popular government. Hence, it adopted a transitional charter in July 1991 as a guiding
rule for the transitional period, and formed a transitional executive that represented
different ethno-national organizations. The charter granted a right to selfdetermination and independence (this is how the right to secede was propounded in
the transitional charter) to all nationality groups in the country. In January 1992, a
decree was made for the establishment of 14 regional states, but the number was
later reduced to the existing nine member states of the federation.11 Following the
50
Tesfa B.
writing of the federal constitution, a Constituent Assembly dominated by EPRDF

ratified it on 8 December 1994. After a general parliamentarian election held in May
1995, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia was inaugurated on 21 August,
culminating the transitional period and government.
The fact that the federation is the making of ethno-national organizations, dominantly the ruling coalition, EPRDF, and the federal constitution is eventually endorsed
by member states, already in place, as independent entities rather than a mere bunch of
citizens has led some writers to emphasize in the origin of federalism in Ethiopia what
Alfred Stepan (1999) referred to as coming-together federalism. This is also used by
some, as I am going to consider in the coming section, to deduce some kind of logic for
the explicit right to secede in the federal constitution in that member states, since they
joined in the federation as independent units and on their will, they can also sever from
it whenever they wish to.
The federal constitution, at any rate, granted a right to self-determination indiscriminately to all groups in the country who are designated as nations, nationalities and
peoples. A literal application of this right by the constitution would have resulted in
the formation of about 80 kilils (the Ethiopian equivalent for US states and Swiss
cantons) to commensurate with the countrys diverse groups. However, the constitution established only nine kilils (Addis Ababa, the capital and Dire Dawa in the
east were made city administrations) as constituent members of the federation.
Though they have symmetric powers (Article 47(4)), the kilils (regional states) do
exhibit significant disparities in population, territory, composition and socio-economic
development. For instance, the two most populous states, Oromia and Amhara, with
populations of more than 27 and 17 million, respectively, are in stark contrast with
Harari which is only populated by less than 200,000 heads, or even those better populated states of Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambella, each with far less than a million
population.12 A special importance is the fact that only five of the kililsTigray,
Afar, Amhara, Oromia and Somaliare core nationality regions (Asnake, 2003:
265; Merera, 2003: 138; Assefa, 2007: 244) in a sense that they are dominated overwhelmingly by a single group on whose names the states are designated and run by
their languages.13 The rest fourHarari, Benishagul-Gumuz, SNNPRs (Southern
Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State), and Gambella are heterogeneous
and are constituted by different groups with none of them making a majority. The most
diversified of all is the SNNPRs which, given its hosting to more than 56 groups, is
aptly described as a federation within a federation (Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003: 84).
With regard to the division of power, member states have their own legislative,
executive and judiciary powers enumerated by article 52 of the federal constitution.
Like its US counterpart, the federal constitution of Ethiopia left residual powers to
member states. Kilil governments, like the federal government, are parliamentarian.
Kilil (state) Councils, the highest legislative bodies of member states, which are
elected for five years term in office on the same date for federal general parliamentarian elections, choose the executive body amongst their members.14 In fact, both minorities residing in majority regional states and those groups in diversified regions are
guaranteed by article 47(2) of the federal constitution a right of forming their own separate kilils (states). In other words, those groups who do not own a state individually
have a right to secede from existing member states and form separate states of their

own within the federation. Thus, the Ethiopian constitution established for both rights
of secession and separation, the first involving a right of walking away from the
federation to form an independent state and the latter a right of severing from
member states in the federation to form a separate autonomous state.
The federal system, ever since its emergence, has been heavily dominated by the
ruling coalition and its allies, which have continued to run governments both at
federal and regional state levels. At present the party staggeringly make up 98% of
the seats available in the lower house of the federal parliamentHouse of Peoples
Representatives. For the ruling party, EPDRF, which dominated the transition of the
country to a federal state and the writing of the federal constitution, the federalization
was necessary to address the problem of national inequalities in the past; to secure
peace and democracy in the country; and to maintain the territorial integrity of the
state endangered by secessionist movements. Constitutionally entrenched autonomy
to the diverse groups of the country seems to have fallen short of adequacy for the
ruling party to achieve these objectives. Thus, pushing the centrifugal forces in the
country exceptionally further and slackening the stringent pulls inherent in statenationalism elsewhere, it has masterminded the constitutionalization of an explicit
right to secede in the federation.
Three-pronged attacks have continued to be directed against the ruling party in this
regard. The first is from nationalist organizations and parties that reprimanded the
ruling partys emphasis on ethnic divisions in the state, which, they believed, put
the survival of the state apprehensively in danger. On the other hand, ethno-national
organizations outside the ruling coalition, though they are more or less consonant
with the federal design, are opposed to the dominance of the ruling and its constrictions
on the formal constitutional provisions. Third are secessionist movements, which had
first co-operated with the ruling but later, following disputes with the ruling party,
withdrew from the transitional government and returned to the armed struggle.
These are dominantly the OLF (Oromo Liberation Front) and the ONLF (Ogaden
National Liberation Front). The OLF claimed it is fighting for the independence of
the Oromos while the ONLF claimed it is struggling for the liberation of Somalis
(Ethiopian Somalis) in the country. Like the Eritrean secessionists before them, they
considered the questions of the groups they claimed to represent as one of decolonization to be settled in outright independence.
The Right to Secede: Ethiopias Federal Anomaly
First, some words on the political expediency views on the constitutionalization of the
right to secede in Ethiopia seem important. In fact, as mentioned above, such a right
was first propounded in the transitional charter adopted in July 1991 by the peace
and democracy conference. Affirming the rights of nations and nationalities of
the country to self-determination, the transitional charter granted a right to selfdetermination of independence when the concerned nation/nationality and people is
convinced that the above rights [internal self-determination rights] are denied,
abridged, or abrogated. The adoption of the transitional charter had demonstrated
the participation of other groups than the federal constitution that felt exclusively in
the hands of the ruling party and its allies after the withdrawal of major contenders
52
Tesfa B.
that had played roles in the making of the transitional charter. Nevertheless, it is this
right to self-determination of independence in article 2 of the transitional charter
that came to be incorporated as right to self-determination, including the right to
secession in article 39 of the federal constitution adopted in December 1994 and inaugurated in August 1995. The continuity between the transitional charter, co-authored
by others, particularly the OLF associated with a secessionist agenda,15 and the federal
constitution, dominantly authored by the ruling coalition, in guaranteeing a secession
right need not misinform our understanding on the actual champions of the right, or the
appropriate explanation for its constitutionalization.
One such assumption is attributing the constitutionalization of the right to the
states acquiescence to Eritreas de facto independence won in 1991 and formalized
in a referendum endorsed by the peace and democracy conference in 1993. Given
the endorsement seconded to the Eritrean cause, preventing a similar entitlement to
groups in the rump state, it is argued, was logically a blatant deployment of double
standards (Andreas, 2003: 158).16 Accordingly, depriving a constitutional right to
secede in the rump state after blessing the secession of Eritrea was considered as a contradiction. Another is attributing the constitutionalization of the right to the secessionist movements, particularly the OLF, which had allegedly requested the inclusion of
the right as a prerequisite to their participation in the transitional process. Accordingly,
the right had come to be included in the transitional charter as a psychological sop
(Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003: 86) to ingratiate secessionists (Alemu, 2005: 326 and
327; Assefa, 2007: 235). The ruling partys argument on the needs for the inclusion
of the right in both the transitional charter and the federal constitution concurs with
such views. Guaranteeing a right to secession, EPRDF claimed, had been unavoidable
in light of the secessionist agenda many armed ethno-regional groups had been promoting. Accommodating these groups in a federal structure, the ruling party argued, had
been impossible without a constitutional guarantee to secession that would allow
these groups purse their interests peacefully. Denying so, accordingly, would have
rather led to the continuation of the war these groups had been waging against the
centre.17
With no need for delving into other issues, a simple comparison between the right
to independence in the transitional charter, which could be better associated with such
claims, and the right to secession in the federal constitution reveals how such political
expediency views on the constitutionalization of the right are at best flimsy. In other
words, the manner in which the federal constitution asserted the right to secession
does not give credence to such assumptions. The right, not relegated rather revitalized
in the federal constitution, does not seem something one made as a placatory provision.
While the right to independence in the transitional charter had a substantive requirement or conditionality attached to it, the right to secession in the federal constitution
is reinvigorated and become unconditional. Unlike the transitional charter that provided a right to independence with a suffix reading, when the concerned nation/
nationality and people is convinced that the above rights [internal self-determination
rights] are denied, abridged, or abrogated, the right to secede in the federal constitution is without a shred of conditionality attached to it. The Amharic (Amharic is
the working language of the federal government and a considerable number of
member states) version of the article which has, of course, a final legal authority

(Article 107), sounds stronger than the English version in avowing the non-conditionality in the exercise of the right to secede.18 Also subsumed with the article granting
internal self-determination rights,19 the soul of the federal system, the right to
secede has become the most cherished provision in the federal constitution. It is a provision that is non-derogative even during state of emergency (Article 93(4)), and nonamendable if not supported by a qualified two-third majority vote by both chambers of
the federal parliament plus a majority vote by all state legislatures (Article 105 (1)).20
It is fair, therefore, to affirm that it is the mere ideological predilection of the ruling
party, not political expediency, which was actually behind the constitutionalization of
the right to secede in the federal system of Ethiopia. Ideologically the inclusion of the
right resulted from EPRDF verbatim of Lenins conception of the right to selfdetermination for the so-called oppressed nationalities. According to this Leninist
pronouncement, a free union is a false phrase without the right to secede (Lenin,
1977: 84), and full democracy cannot be satisfactorily assured only by declaring
the equality of groups and unless these groups are entitled with the right to free political separation (87).21 Thus, if there was another force that must share credit or
blame with the ruling party for the constitutionalization of the right to secede, it was
the Ethiopian Student Movement during which this nationalities right to self-determination up to and including secession had been first propounded in the late 1960s as a
recipe to the nationalities question in the country.22 The principle had been a gospel
(Bahru, 2008: 333) worthy of dying for the different leftist and ethno-national organizations that came to forge their ideological pedigree to the student movement, including the ruling coalition. The continuity between the Ethiopian Student Movement
during which the so-called nationalities right to self-determination up to and including
secession had been introduced into Ethiopias political vocabulary and the ruling
coalition that eventually constitutionalized the right to self-determination, including
secession is hardly polemical.
The right to secede, according to EPRDF, is none other than a testimony to the new
basis and motives of unity in Ethiopia by its diverse communities. In fact, as it is
clearly stipulated in the preamble of the federal constitution, the free will and
consent of nations and nationalities is the new basis of unity in the federation, replacing the one historically amassed through forceful incorporation and subjugation. On
the other hand, the ruling party seems convinced that secessionist desires will wither
away if groups do obtain cultural and political autonomies. As far as group claims
for equality and autonomy are realized, accordingly, secessionism will be weakened
and gradually disappear.23 Stating this optimism of the ruling coalition, Christopher
Clapham (2009) wrote, the removal of the basis of discrimination by one group
against others would in turn remove any valid source of separatism and make possible
the maintenance of a single Ethiopian state (182).
Constitutionally, the inclusion of the right to secede is the extreme end of the confederal temptation lucidly inherent in the federal constitution of Ethiopia. In the first
place, as the preamble of the constitution, which commences with the words [w]e,
the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia stipulates, the federal constitution
alludes to the formation of a single polity. Then article 8 of the constitution declared
that [a]ll sovereign power resides in the Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples of Ethiopia. The task of interpreting the constitution itself is entrusted to the second chamber
54
Tesfa B.
of the federal parliament, House of Federation, which is constituted by the representatives of these Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples of the country. Such confederal
inclinations of the federal constitution are asserted by different writers with strong
words. Cohen (1995), for instance, wrote that even if the federal constitution labels
the new country as a federal state, it is in fact based on a constitutional system more
akin to confederation, an innovative form that looks like federalism but appears
closer to an international treaty among ethnic groups having the power to secede
(157 and 158). In a similar fashion, Britezeke (1995) argues that the formal provisions
in the constitution seem an international treaty such as the Treaty of Rome (33).
Vaughan and Tronvoll (2003), on the other hand, depict the constitutional pronouncements as providing for a radically devolved confederation (84).
The explicit right to secede guaranteed in the federal constitution can be construed
as an affirmation that nations and nationalities of the country have come together as
sovereigns and their togetherness in the federation is constitutionally with their
sovereignty unscathed and remaining exclusively at their disposal. Thus, nations
and nationalities can invoke their sovereignty and walk away from the federation
whenever they wish to. Startling as it is, the federal constitution ended disproportionately in making a collection of sovereigns, as confederations do elsewhere, in its
very first attempt at federalizing a historic state that had been troubled by a series of
ethno-national insurgencies vying for different forms of autonomy. A state which
had been unitary with profuse centralization of power and resource in prior, Ethiopia,
has become an exception that blessed, in the words of Edward Freeman (quoted in
Burgess, 2006: 271), a provision for its own dissolution in its first federal undertaking to manage its diversity.
With regard to the modalities of the right, despite the right is explicitly provided in
the federal constitution, there exist a significant ambiguity regarding the actual bearers
that are entitled to secede. This is because the right to secede in the constitution is
granted expressly not to member states of the federation but indiscriminately to individual nations, nationalities and peoples of the country. Remember that not all of
these groups have a state of their own and only five of them have states designated
in their names and which they overwhelmingly populated. Others do not have states,
which they individually own, or states conferred upon them and bearing their
names. They are either minorities in majority states or equals in the states they
jointly own and govern. The ambiguity here is that whether all nations, nationalities
and peoples of the country, or only those who have states designated on their names
individually, are actually entitled to the right to secede? This ambiguity in the constitutional statement has led one to state that the problem of defining the entities that are
entitled to exercise the right to secede makes the constitutional procedures of secession
vague (Asnake, 2003: 265). Given the right to separation nations, nationalities and
peoples in majority regions or those in heterogeneous states are granted in the constitution, which entitled them with a right to form their own states, the assertion that no
people can initiate the process for secession without first becoming a state (Fasil,
1997: 159) seems cogent. What is more, secession as the ultimate quest is to be
espoused and entertained normatively after the highest prize the constitution conferred
upon the diverse groups of the country, autonomous state in case of Ethiopia, is first
secured. Thus, it seems convincing that nations and nationalities are expected to

secure their own mother states prior to evoking independent statehood through the
explicit right to secede in the federal constitution.
At any rate, neither the federal government nor members of the federation, other
than the claimant state, have votes in determining moves towards possible truncation
of the federation they jointly formed. The question of secession by a regional state is to
be initiated in its legislature, kilil (state) council, and becomes eligible for a decisive
referendum if it is approved by a qualified two-thirds majority vote (Article
39(4(a))). Securing a majority vote in a popular referendum that needs to be organized
by the federal government after a three-year waiting period is enough for a regional
state to secure secession (Article 39, sub-article 4(b and c)). A proclamation issued
by the federal government in 2001 added some details on the constitutional provision.24 Accordingly, the House of Federation, the second chamber of the federal
parliament, to which the question for secession is submitted in writing by the claimant
state council, is entrusted to the task of confirming the fulfilment of the required twothirds majority vote by the respective state council and, in doing so, organizes a referendum within three years. The division of assets between the federal government and
the seceding state following a positive referendum in favour of secession is going to be
effected by this same House of Federation. In fact, during the three years waiting
period between a regional states decision to secede and the organization of popular
referendum in the claimant state, the federal government has a chance to negotiate
with the seceding region to reconsider its decision. If the respective region sticks
with its decision, however, the federal government is obliged by the constitution to
hold the decisive referendum unless it resorts to force by ignoring the constitutional
provision.
Ethiopias Perversion of Federalism and Federal Paradoxes
The fact that nations and nationalities did ratify the constitution as distinct groups than
a bunch of citizens, and member states, formed shortly before the federal constitution,
joined in the federation as independent entities leads some to mistakenly argue on
the legitimacy of the explicit constitutional right to secede in the federal system of Ethiopia. According to these views, since member states formed the federation at will and as
independent units, they are also entitled to revise the consents they made while entering
in the federation. Thus, one claimed, not only the formation of the federation was made
by the free will and consent of the member states but the survival of the federation itself
also hinges on the continued blessings of the constituent units (Andreas, 2003).
Such assessments, however, conflate mere political contingency, brought about by
the demise of the national government in the making of the federation, with crude historical reality. The national government under Colonel Mengistu had opted to go on
with its fighting against the ethno-national liberation movements until it finally lost
the battle. Unlike contemporaneous Marxist regimes in Africa that had been similarly
entangled by armed groups, as Angolas MPLA and Mozambiques FRELIMO, it did
fail eventually to secure peace deals with the rebels. The national government, obliterated from the political scene altogether after its capitulation to these armed groups
fighting for different forms of autonomy, the subsequent federal decomposition of
Ethiopia felt under the discretionary makings of ethno-national groups that claimed
56
Tesfa B.
to represent the needs of particular groups in the country.25 Thus, the federalization of
the country that followed the year 1991 comes to take the facade of coming-together
federalism in which (prior) independent states were coming together to form a new
state. This was, however, circumstantial brought by the demise of the national government with which ethno-national organizations would have to bargain. Practically,
however, the federal constitution is an attempt to federalize a historic state that had
emerged in all its present territorial possessions at least a century ago.26 Though it
was undertaken exclusively by those ethno-national organizations that had rather
been struggling against it, together a national government absent in the negotiation
leading to the federation, the federalization of the country was a reconfiguration of
an existing state into autonomous states that were non-existent in prior, not prior independent states joining together to form a new state.
In such states, as Ethiopia, the essence of federalism is managing ethno-regional
cleavages threatening a unitary state and its very survival as an integrated entity. Federalism in this regard is an option, as one aptly stated, for the bedroom separation
approach as a bargained resort to prevent outright divorce (Ryan, 1995: 395). It is
essentially an undertaking to preserve the territorial integrity of unitary states that
came to be crippled by the forces of sub-state nationalism by granting constitutionally
entrenched autonomy to constituent groups. Political and cultural autonomy the states
render through some form of federal design is essentially a trade-off between marriage
and divorce by the states with their diverse groups. Thus, autonomy seconded by the
states need to provide moral reasons for the diverse groups to uphold the territorial
integrity of the states, as Rainer Baubock (2000: 379) rightly argued, and for the
states a moral ground to sanctify their territorial integrity. In other words, federalism
in such states needs to provide for a win-win solution in which groups secure autonomous units while states maintain their existence as integrated entities. The incorporation of an explicit right to secede in these federations makes the federalism a win-lose
solution in which groups achieve both but the states secure none. Hence, constitutionalizing an explicit right to secede in these federations is a function creep against
one of the very purposes federalism is supposed to accomplishpreservation of territorial integrity from degenerating into smaller entities by subsuming them, through
constitutionally entrenched autonomy, within and under one bigger entity. It is inconsistent for such states that came to adopt some kind of federal design (Ethiopia, of
course, for the very first time) to prevent dismemberment, however, to contain a constitutional provision allowing so. Doing so in such states, as Ethiopia did, is none other
than a perversion of federalism.
What is more perverse for Ethiopia is the sheer weight and centrality the right to
secede acquires in the federal constitution. In fact, as described in the previous
section, this cardinal character of the right in the federal constitution disputes with
the political expediency views on the constitutionalization of the right. The clear confederal contemplations inherent in the preamble of the constitution from which the
right is deduced, the declaration that nations, nationalities, and peoples are sovereign (article 8), the inclusion of the right in chapter three of the constitution which
provides for fundamental rights and freedoms, the simple majority vote referendum
the right required from secessionist groups (article 39(4)) than a qualified two-thirds as
in the case of St Kitts and Nevis, the fact that the right is not even subject to suspension

or limitation during states of emergency (article 93(4)); all show how the right to
secede is the most cherished provision in the federal constitution. It is unusual for a
federal state to contain an explicit right to secede it its constitution; constitutionalizing
the right with such heft is abnormal.
In addition, given the fact that the constitutional autonomy of member states do
have significant limitations in other important areas, the provision of the right to
secede in the federal system of Ethiopia is confounding. In other words, the federal
constitution allowed the secession of constituent states before exhausting those
rights they would exercise within the federation and while denying them some vital
rights that are common in federations. In fact, the constitution extolled the nations,
nationalities, and peoples of the country in many ways. It acclaimed them as sovereigns who can review the consents they had made while entering into the federation.
Unity for the sake of unity itself was not what motivated their togetherness in the federation. As the preamble of the constitution lucidly describes, they (re)joined to form
the federation since they saw the advantages of their togetherness to pursue better their
individual and common interests. The constitution is not merely the new basis of
relation they established with the state. Though the state maintained its older name,
the pronouncements of the federal constitution stipulate the formation of a newfound
state with a new basis of unity. As authors of the constitution and owners of the federation it formed, they are empowered to interpret the constitution and arbitrate constitutional disputes. Member states, on the other hand, have legislative, executive
and judiciary powers in their own jurisdictions enlisted by article 52 of the federal constitution. The constitution only established Amharic as the working language of the
federal government and member states are left to determine theirs.27 They are also
entitled to adopt their own state constitutions and flags. Unlike other African states,
which either ban or discourage the formation of ethnic parties, Ethiopias electoral
law allows such parties and most of the parties in the country, including the ruling
coalition, are ethnic.28
In spite of such rights and privileges, two significant constrictions in particular put
the powers and privileges given to constituent units and groups in paradox. The first is
the meagre fiscal powers member states have in the federation. The second is the
unusual powers given to the second chamber of the federal parliament other than
safeguarding the needs and interests of member states in the decisions of the federal
government. Though the concentration of fiscal power at the centre may be justified,
arguably, in terms of the needs for addressing regional inequalities and the quest for
rapid development, the fact that members of the federation have no legislative
powers they share with the centre is as bizarre as their right to secede.29 This, as
one captures well, is a significant betrayal of the federal idea (Assefa, 2007: 442).
Federations commonly have second chambers that are entitled to different degrees
of legislative powers which they share with the centre so that they could have a say
in issues affecting them and the federation as a whole. The federal constitution of
Ethiopia, though established parliamentarian bicameralism as federations do elsewhere, the second chamber, House of Federation is non-legislative, making the
federal parliament operationally unicameral.30 In other words, the federal system of
Ethiopia upholds only the self-rule aspect of federalism without substantiating the
equally important shared-rule component of federalism.
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Tesfa B.
This is where the paradoxical nature of the explicit right to secede in the federal
constitution appears. A constitution, which entitled members of the federation an explicit right to walk away from the federation unconditionally, fails to ensure them from
sharing power at the centre and have stakes in the decisions of the federal government
affecting their interests and the federation they jointly formed. In other words, the constitution moved exceptionally further and allowed an explicit right to secede to
member states but it also retreated from a core principle of federalism, which federations commonly and necessarily employ, and left member states almost powerless at
the centre by establishing for a non-legislative second chamber. Depriving them
from exercising such a day-to-day right, which is benign and axiomatic, but promising
a right that they would exercise only in exceptional circumstances, which is threatening
and contentious, is not only a federal paradox; it is also a mockery to the forces whose
names and interests have been passionately invoked in defence of the constitutional
right to secede.
Apart from such paradoxes that exist in the principles of the federal constitution, de
jure federalism, practical realities in Ethiopias de facto federalism reveal that the right to
secede is the unfaithful promise the ruling coalition made to the diverse groups of the
country. Though the ruling party is a champion of the right to secede, it is against its
exercise or operational observance. Its commitment to the realization of Eritrean independence was, however, evident and the alliance it had with the EPLF during the war
against Colonel Mengistus regime was not a simple strategic co-operation made
against a common enemy. The TPLF had long recognized Eritrea, similar to the creed
of the EPLF, as a colony under Ethiopia that did deserve unconditional right to independence. It was this recognition by the TPLF that had in fact served as strong glue for
the alliance between the TPLF and the EPLF during the war against the Marxist regime
of Colonel Mengistu (Young, 1996: 53; Andreas, 2003: 158). Apart from Eritrea,
however, the ruling is against secessionist demands from other groups. With no interest
for its operationalization, the ruling seems to have been overtaken by the symbolic significances of the right. Thus, while it damns nationalist parties which are opposed to the
explicit constitutional guarantee to secession as chauvinists, it also incriminates movements that assert it as narrow nationalists. What is more, though the right to secede in
the federal constitution was presumably to deal with secessionist movements peacefully
and to avoid in the country similar horrors as the one occurred during the protracted
armed struggle for Eritrean independence, the country maintained the military tradition
of its predecessor, the Marxist regime of Mengistu, in its response to secessionist movements. Though the explicit right to secede that would allow secessionists to pursue their
objectives peacefully exists in the federal constitution, secessionists in Ethiopia are in
exile and in the jungles, not at home and in the parliament. For a state as Ethiopia in
which constitutionalism (not constitutions), rule of law (not rule by law) and doing in
the interests of the people (not speaking in their names) hardly exist, this, though
painful, is a common political reality.
A Federal NuisanceDynamite over the Right to Secede in Ethiopia
Almost two decades have elapsed since the adoption of the federal constitution in
Ethiopia. Do the federal experiences of Ethiopia with a constitutional guarantee to

secession offer us insights or empirical evidences on the practical impacts of the right
in the country and to the wider debate on the wisdoms or perils of an explicit right to
secede in multinational states? A simple answer to this question would be not so much.
The fact that the formal provisions in the constitution have not yet become fully operational and remain concealed under the hegemony of the ruling party leaves us with a
number of imponderables to unravel the practical impacts of the right and draw appropriate substantive lessons. This is while, in addition to the constitutional guarantee to
secession, Ethiopias federal design have in principle most of the features which
writers identified are secession-inducing. These include ethnic/regional parties governing member states (Brancati, 2006, 2009); formation of constituent units along
identity/ethnic lines (Roeder, 1991, 2009); member states dominated by a single
group (Hale, 2004); and significant disparities among states of the federation (Horowitz, 1985, 2008; Watts, 1996). In spite of this, since both the federal government
and constituent states have been ruled by members of the ruling coalition, EPRDF,
and its allies plus the fact that most politically sensible issues are dealt at party
levels, the full forces of the constitutional principles, including the right to secede,
have been so far unveiled. Though the ruling party is a coalition of four ethnic/regional
parties, it is its organization under the principles of democratic centralism, centrist and
by definition anti-federal (Ibrahim, 2003: 121), which militates against the realization
of the formal provisions in the constitution.
The right to secede has never been also put to test so far. Whether this is owing to
the dominance of the ruling party, which is operationally opposed to the right or the
satisfaction from cultural and political autonomies groups might enjoy in the federation
is something to be proved in the future. In this regard, drawing a parallel with the
defunct Soviet Union, it is claimed that the forces of the constitutional emphases on
ethnicity in general and the right to secede in particular in the country would be
fully felt when the central government declines or the ruling EPRDF eventually relinquish its grip on power. One dominant writer on Ethiopia, undermining a similar scenario in the country, made, however, the following caveat quoted at length:
[i]t has been said of Stalins nationality policy in the Soviet Union, from which
the Ethiopian model derived, that it had life only after death: so long as the
monolithic Soviet state remained in being controlled by the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union, the rights of national self-determination formally guaranteed under the constitution were meaningless; as soon as CPSU collapsed,
however, the division of the Soviet Union into fifteen union republics on
ethnic or national lines led to the splitting of the entire country into fifteen sovereign states.
The central question confronting the EPRDF governments approach to the
challenge of diversity is whether, by building ethnicity explicitly into the structure of political life, it has sent in train centrifugal forces which, when it eventually loses power, will lead to a similar dismemberment of Ethiopia.
(Clapham, 2004: 55)
The dismemberment of the Soviet Union was not, in fact, primarily because of the
right to secede in its constitution.31 Nor the actual seceding of the republics was
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effected through the constitutional channel. Though the Soviet constitution granted a
secession right, it had no procedures for its exercise (Sunstein, 1991: 645; Buchanan,
1991: 127; Cassese, 1995: 264). Such a provision was adopted in 1990 when things
came to surface. The law set cumbersome and complicated procedures and requirements to be followed by a seceding republic. The law required securing a two-thirds
majority vote in a popular referendum to be held no sooner than six months and no
later than nine months after a plea for secession. The seceding of the state, after a positive vote in a referendum, would be materialized not only after a five-year transition
period but also following a confirmation vote to be carried out after the end of the transition period and which needs to be confirmed by a two-thirds majority vote in favour
of secession (Cassese, 1995: 265). However, the law was not applied and the dissolution of the federation was superseded by the speed of events at the centre.
As it is well established, the collapse of the Soviet federation, though constitutional
and institutional designs might have played roles, was primarily political: lack of constitutionalism or operational unitarism under principal federalism. Ethiopias federation, it can be argued, would not be revitalized because of a right to secede, as the
ruling pontificates; it would not be dismembered simply because it allowed a right
to do so, as the opposition threatens. The fears against an explicit right to secede in
multinational state constitutions are not simply for it will encourage secessionism.
Secessionism is not merely a matter of constitutional regulation. It is a complex
issue with different socio-cultural, historical and political factors together with exogenous forces facilitating for or militating against it.32 Ethiopia, with a history of long statehood and enormous cultural interaction and integration among its diverse groups, is
not such a strongly divided state to be disintegrated at ease.
A conspicuous impact of the right to secede in the constitution on federal construction in the country for the last two decades is, however, the dynamite it has continued
creating along Ethiopias political spectrum, a significant trouble I prefer to refer as
federal nuisance. No constitutional provision has been a colossal debate in Ethiopian
contemporary political life than the explicit right to secede. The right had been contentious when it was first contemplated during the Ethiopian Student Movement in the
1960s and, after the downfall of the Marxist regime of Colonel Mengistu, legally guaranteed first in the transitional charter in July 1991 and then in the federal constitution.
As dynamite as ever, the right remains the most embattled constitutional guarantee in
Ethiopian politics after it has become a constitutional order, impeccably debated
among politicians with considerable passion and vigour. The ruling coalition,
EPRDF, defends the right as an example of unrestricted federal democracy vital to
forge real unity in the country out of the free will of constituents, replacing the
fake unity the state had historically amassed through fiat and force. On the other
hand, nationalist parties rebuked the right as an act of blessing disintegration,
making the sacred unity of Africas oldest independent state apprehensively
negotiable.
For the heft of the political sensibility it raises, the dynamite the explicit right to
secede has created in the country might not be so surprising. There are, however,
additional factors that compounded the political controversies over the right to
secede in Ethiopia. One is the countrys acquiescence to Eritrean independence. Ethiopia has become, indeed, the first and, until the recent formation of sovereign South

Sudan in July 2011, the only African state that had witnessed the success of a secessionist movement. It entered into a federal arrangement following the separation of
Eritrea that not only truncated the country but also landlocked it. The provision of a
right to secede for groups still home has created apprehension and anxiety among
many over the fate of the rump state. The nature and history of the ruling party that
championed the right and oversaw the countrys federalization is another. As a
coalition of ethnic parties, the ruling party raised doubts over its commitment to the
causes of unity. Particularly perturbing and often exploited by the opposition to undermine the rulings appeal for unity is the one-time secessionist agenda the TPLF (the
core of the ruling party at least until recently) had proclaimed for its constituency
during the armed struggle against the central government. Called manifesto 68,
this TPLFs programme declared the establishment of the Republic of Tigray as
the goal of TPLFs war against Mengistus regime. The idea of a sovereign state of
Tigray, though immediately dropped because of opposition from the ranks and files
of the Front itself, was not totally erased until the TPLF, after capturing Tigray,
decided to form a coalition with other ethnic-based organizations and marched
towards holding state power.33 Coupling its championship for the right to secede in
the constitution, this one-time agenda of the TPLF has added some kind of impetus
to the controversies over the right and its opponents exploited it hyperbolically to
present the TPLF as anti-unity.
Above all, the controversy over the explicit right to secede in the federal constitution is aggravated by the presence of secessionists, which have given meaning and
attention to the constitutional right to secede and passion and vigour to the debate
over it. Active secessionist movements currently implicated the regional states of
Oromia and Somali. Particular apprehensive in this regard is the case for the secession
of the Oromia regional state. This is because the Oromos, constituting more than 34%
of the total population, are the largest group in the country, and the regional state of
Oromia, stretching over 360,000 square kilometres in the countrys hinterland, is the
biggest of all. The secession of this region will not only cost the country people and
territory but it would also lead to its fragmentation. For instance, in party debates
for the May 2010 general parliamentarian election aired on national TV, Lidetu
Ayalew, then secretary of Ethiopian Democratic Party (EDP), one of the multiethnic opposition parties, displayed a terrible hand-sketched map of Ethiopia that
deliberately omitted the regional state of Oromia to show not only his criticism of
the constitutional guarantee to secession but also the imminence of the states fragmentation if Oromia does actually secede.
Contemporarily active secessionist movements in the country are the OLF (Oromo
Liberation Front) and the ONLF (Ogaden National Liberation Front), the first claiming
to fight for the independence of the Oromos and the latter for that of the Somalis. The
OLF was formed early in the 1970s. Its 1976 political programme stated the decolonization of Oromo lands from Ethiopia and the establishment of the peoples democratic republic of Oromia as its goal. It had been a major contender of the ruling party
during the transitional period. Following disputes with the ruling coalition, however, it
withdrew from the transitional government few days before the June 1992 district and
regional elections. Returned back to the armed struggle and its leadership in exile, the
OLF has long been outlawed and is recently labelled as a terrorist organization,
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allegedly for pursuing violence. Though the OLF has a considerable support among
educated members of the Oromo, its secessionist agenda represented only the interests
of a section of the Oromo elites. Oromo parties in conventional politics, including the
OPDO (Oromo Peoples Democratic Organization), a member of the ruling coalition
governing the Oromia region, and those in the opposition are not consonant with the
secessionist agenda of the OLF. Many have increasingly criticized the wisdom of
secession for a larger group together with the practical difficulties of divorce for a hinterland. (For such critics, see, for instance, Merera, 2003: 100 105.) Even within the
OLF, disputes over its traditional secessionist agenda have been increasingly intensified and the actual division of the Front into two groups is now reportedly crystallizing,
one insisting on a sovereign state and the other for a democratic accommodation where
the Oromos could have a proper place that would commensurate to their demographic strength.34
As far as the Somalis in Ethiopia are concerned, historical appeals for joining conationals in a Greater Somalia that had been sponsored by the government in Mogadishu shortly after the decolonization of Somalia in 1960 and propounded by such
organizations as the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF), seems now increasingly unattractive. The ONLFs agenda for a sovereign state of Ogaden, the Somali
regional state, contemporarily represented this shift from sheer irredentism to conventional secessionism. Established in 1986, the ONLF pursue the establishment of a
sovereign state of Ogadenia as its political agenda. In the 21 June 1992 district
and regional elections, it won and controlled the government of Region 5, presently
the Somali kilil. It came to fall apart with the ruling party when in June 1993 it
voted for independence in the regional council it dominated. The ruling party
responded swiftly by imprisoning leaders of the ONLF and by helping the formation
of a rival party, the ESDL (Ethiopian Somali Democratic League), the party that
won the 1995 regional election. In June 1998, the ESDL merged with a section of
the ONLF to form a new partySomali Peoples Democratic Party (SPDP), the
party that has been administering the region since the 2000 regional election. A
section of the ONLF, however, withdrew and returned to armed struggle. Outlawed
since then, it, like the OLF, has recently been labelled by the federal government as
terrorist.35
At any rate, the dynamite in Ethiopias contemporary politics created by the constitutionalization of the right to secede has been enormous. Forces in this dynamite
along the countrys political spectrum can be seen in three groups: anti-constitutional
guarantee to secession groups (opponents of the constitutionalization of the right), proconstitutional guarantee to secession groups and pro-operational right to secession
groups. The first are those that reprimand the right to secede explicitly granted in
the federal constitution and urge for its rescission. They include not only nationalist
(multi-ethnic) parties but also the different ethno-regional organizations in the
country.36 In fact, all opposition parties currently active in conventional politics,
despite the different views they hold regarding the federal system, are critics of the
right (Aalen, 2002: 45). The second are those that argue on the need for the constitutional right to secede as a testimony to the free union nations and nationalities of
the country have entered in the federation. Under present circumstances, only the
ruling party belongs to this group. The third are those that demand the

operationalization of the right to secede in the constitution for the people they claim to
represent, or are allegedly fighting for it. They include the OLF and the ONLF, or a
section of them. While EPRDF needs the right for its symbolic decoration in the
federal constitution, these groups seem seriously enticed by it.
The nuisance that resulted from the dynamite over the constitutionalization of the
right to secede in Ethiopia is hefty and pervasive. It is a hot issue impeccably debated
between the ruling and the opposition, election after election. Given its continuous
publicity by elites, the constitutional clause of the right to secede, article 39, has
become the most popular constitutional provision among the mass, hardly absent
from the minds and lips of many. In fact, it is for the ruling party, the author of constitution, the constitutionalization of the right has brought its burden. Of all the changes
it brought to the country after its military triumph over the Marxist regime, it is this
right to secede in the federal constitution that entangled it most with elites both in
the academic and political circles. It is this right, which it must defend against widespread critics from the opposition. In addition, it is this right it found hard to instil
to a section of its own members and supporters who too questioned the uprightness
of the right for the declared goal of securing unity in diversity.37 In spite of widespread
and continuous critics coming from different corners, the ruling coalition remains
adamant on its championship of the right with the intransigence characteristic to it.
In addition to the unabated controversies created over the explicit right to secede in
the federal constitution, a federal nuisance, the right has also contributed to the resurgence of centrist nationalism orchestrated by nationalist opposition parties. This was
particularly demonstrated during the May 2005 disputed general parliamentarian election in which a coalition of nationalist parties came close to unseat the ruling party.
Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD), the major contender of the ruling coalition
in the election, secured a large support and vote from the electorate mainly for its nonethnic appeals than its organizational strength (Aalen and Tronvoll, 2009: 196) or
viable policy alternatives. The resurgence of such centrist nationalism among
many during the election as part of support for the oppositions bid for power was,
in particular, due to CUDs hefty criticism of the constitutional guarantee to secession.
The sentiments clearly demonstrated during the election need not be simply construed
as outright opposition by many to ethnic federalism.38 It is an indication to the spoils
the explicit right to secede have created against a possible general public appeal to the
federal arrangement in the country. A good inference is that accommodating distinct
groups through federalism could hardly domesticate nationalist forces and envision
common appeals for a federal society when the federal design makes states territorial
integrity, nationalists article of faith, explicitly disintegrable at will by constituent
units.
Conclusion
Almost two decades have elapsed since Ethiopia, under EPRDF, has formally joined
the files of world federal states. The adoption of federalism by EPRDF was indeed
novel given Ethiopia is multi-ethnic in composition, larger in territory and had long
been bedevilled by conflicts between centrifugal and centripetal forces. In fact,
some form of federal arrangement had been imminent following the downfall of
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Colonel Mengistus totalitarian regime and the resurgence of different ethno-national

organizations vying for different forms of autonomy. The only viable instrument the
state had left, after the national government was obliterated, was a federal arrangement. Going back to a unitary state is now exactly an anachronism.
Nonetheless, Ethiopia remains a feeble federation. It is federal largely for its relevant constitutional and institutional designs; operationally it is heavily burdened by
unitary rhythms and significant democratic deficiencies. What is more, as a less bargained federation, the country is replete with elite controversies and divergences
over possible appropriate constitutional and institutional designs. The explicit right
to secede in the federal constitution stands top and remains as dynamite as ever.
Though the right represents an unfaithful promise by the ruling coalition, it has been
impeccably debated between the ruling and the opposition with considerable vehemence. For a state as Ethiopia where the gap between what is constitutionalized and
what is really consumed is often astonishingly wide, constitutional and institutional
designs per se should have been anodyne, not dynamite. However, when a constitution
attempts to regulate a highly sensible and fundamental issue as state territorial integrity, even a nominal provision, as the right to secede in the federal constitution of
Ethiopia, could become a significant nuisance.
Apart from the lingering controversy the right has continued creating in the
country, the practical impacts of the right have been so far largely unveiled. Given
secessionist groups are in exile and out of the federal process at home, we are not
able to observe how the constitutional right to secede would have fared in their
hands. What is more, the fact that governments both at federal and state levels are controlled by the ruling party and its allies seems to have concealed the impacts of the right
that would have been otherwise revealed. A reasonable inference is that the outcomes
of the right on federal construction in the country are yet to come particularly following
increased democratization and substantial federalization in the state. It is then we will
be in a position to put the impacts of right appropriately in its own terms and draw relevant empirical lessons on the wisdom or flaw of an explicit constitutional guarantee to
secession in multinational states.
In spite of these, there is a point worthy of making from what has been unfolded.
This is on the dynamite the right to secede has continued to create along the countrys
political spectrum ever since its emergence. A constitution, which is supposed to create
a common vision towards the polity it envisages, needs not to be itself the source of
trouble as it has come to be exactly the case in Ethiopia. The fact that the federal
design followed largely the convictions and prescriptions of the ruling coalition is
what makes the constitution a source of acrimony than harmony. Here it needs to be
acknowledged that federations do not always emerge out of painstaking federal
bargain. Federations forged otherwise are not also necessarily destined to fall. An
exhaustively bargained federation may end up in debilitating troubles if it overlooks
later the need for renewal or reform to address constantly changing societal realities
or newly emerging problems. On the other hand, those least bargained and improvised
federations as Ethiopia can be revitalized and transformed into vibrant federations with
wider and common appeals if they manage to negotiate on what had been initially
imposed, unseen or overlooked. In this regard, Ethiopia may not need a new federal
bargain as some suggested so but consensus making on existing controversial

constitutional and institutional orders. Given the heft and sensibility of the issue it
addresses, the dynamite it has created, and the nuisance it has brought to many; the
explicit guarantee to secession in the federal constitution is an agenda for serious
reconsideration. Hence, the ruling party needs to be heedful to the fact that successful
federal construction requires general convention, not particular conviction, and consensus making, not creed maintaining. The wisdom in the popular adage, success
has a thousand fathers, but failure is an orphan is significantly relevant for endeavours
in federal construction and reconstruction.
Acknowledgements
I am thankful to my colleagues at Dilla University (Dr. Temesgen Nigus, Dr. Asrat
Seme (now in Hawassa University), Anteneh Melu, Tasew Tadesse, Tewodrose
Bogale, Dr. Badege Fekadu, and Dr. Abdu Mohammed) for reading the first draft
of the article and providing valuable suggestions. My thanks are also to the two
anonymous reviewers of the journal.
Notes
1
There are various materials on the relationship between federalism and secession. See, among others,
Kymlicka (1998, 2005) and Erk and Anderson (2010).
2
There are multiple resources on the theories of secession and debates over it. See, for instance, Moore
(1998), Lehning (1998), Macedo and Buchanan (2003), Dahlitz (2003), Buchanan (2004) and Kohen
(2006).
3
Though Buchanan is a champion of a remedial only rights theory in international law, he is less optimistic to the incorporation of an explicit right to secede in state constitutions.
4
See, for instance, Ryan (1995) and Horowitz (1998, 2003).
5
This is how the federal constitution designated the diverse groups of the country. Article 39(5) defined
them indiscriminately as a group of people who have or share a large measure of common culture or
similar customs, mutual intelligibility of language, belief in common or related identities, a common
psychological make-up, and who inhabit an identifiable, predominantly a contiguous territory.
6
Article 113 of the constitution provided: The Nevis Island Legislature may provide that the island of
Nevis shall cease to be federated with the island of Saint Christopher. The secession of Nevis would
be effected if it is first supported by two-third majority vote by its Assembly and then by a similar twothird majority vote in a popular referendum.
7
On such issues, see Monahan and Bryant (1996), Kreptul (2003), Norman (2006) and Aronovitch
(2006).
8
In such federations, parties with secessionist agenda are free to compete in elections and propagate
their claims. Though they do not include an explicit right to secede in their constitutions, federations
in the West are increasing accepting the legitimacy of secessionist referenda. See Kymlicka (2004:
144175, 2005: 107 126).
9
The party is a coalition of four ethnic/regional parties: TPLF (Tigray Peoples Liberation Front),
ANDM (Amhara National Democratic Movement), OPDO (Oromo Peoples Democratic Organization) and SEPDM (Southern Ethiopia Peoples Democratic Movement). It has been in power formally
since 21 August 1995.
10
More than 20 ethno-regional organizations had participated in the conference to oversee the countrys
transition to democracy and federalism. However, the number of participants increasingly sagged as
time went on, since many, including the OLF, withdrew from the transitional government established
by the conference following disputes with the ruling coalition. For the conference and the transitional
process, see Vaughan (1994), Lyons (1996) and Vestal (1996).
66
Tesfa B.
11
This is because five of these regional states merged to form one Southern Nations, Nationalities, and
Peoples Regional State (SNNPRs), the most diversified of all the member states in the federation.
12
All numbers are according to the 2007 population and housing census of Ethiopia. Accordingly, the
population size of the nine kilils is as follows: Tigray (4,314,456), Afra (1,411,092), Amhara
(17,214,056), Oromia (27,158,471), Somali (4,439,147), SNNP (15,042,531), Benishangul-Gumuz
(670,847), Gambella (306,916) and Harari (183,344).
13
The dominance of one group in these core regions is as follows: Tigray (96.55% are Tigray), Amhara
(91.48% are Amharas), Afar (90.03% are Afars), Oromia (87.80% are Oromos) and Somali (97.20%
are Somalis).
14
For member state constitutions and their governments, see Tsegaye (2009).
15
Next to the ruling coalition, the OLF was the major player in the making of the transitional charter. For
the roles the OLF had played during the transitional period, see Leenco (1998, 1999) and Vaughan
(1994, 2003).
16
In a similar fashion, Brietzke (1995: 27) claimed that the right was constitutionalized only to add justification for the independence of Eritrea [without the intent of applying it equally to other parts of the
country].
17
See Ethiopian Ministry of Information (2002: 2641).
18
The Amharic version reads, be manchewem huneta and yalemnem gedeb [in all circumstances and
without any restriction].
19
Article 39, sub-articles 1 and 2 of the federal constitution described it as encompassing a right to a full
measure of self-government by the diverse groups of the country in their territories; the right to speak,
write and develop their languages; the right to express, develop and promote their culture; and the right
to preserve their histories.
20
All provisions under chapter three of the constitution, fundamental rights and freedoms, will be
amended under such stringent procedures. Other provisions will be amended if they are supported
by two-thirds majority vote in a joint session of the federal parliament, House of Peoples Representatives and House of Federation, plus a majority vote approval by at least two-thirds of the member state
councils (Article 105(2)).
21
For such conceptions of the right to self-determination in Marxist-Leninist thought and the gaps
between principle and practice, see Connor (1984).
22
The Ethiopian Student Movement had played the leading role in the instigation of the 1974 revolution
that ousted Emperor Hailesillasie from power. For a general history of the movement, see a seminal
book by Balsvick (2005). For the ideological importance and influence of the movement on Ethiopian
contemporary politics, see Vaughan (2003).
23
See, Ethiopian Ministry of Information (2002: 2641).
24
This is Proclamation No.251/2001 issued on 6 July as Consolidation of the House of Federation and
the Definition of its Powers and Responsibilities.
25
After the war, the Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE), the ruling party of Colonel Mengistu, was banned
and most of its leaders were imprisoned for charges of genocide. However, Colonel Mengistu had
fled to Zimbabwe shortly before EPRDFs capture of the capital and still resides there.
26
Ethiopia is one of the oldest states in the world with a history of long statehood. However, the modern
state of Ethiopia, with all its existing territorial confines, only came about following the territorial
expansions of Emperor Minelik II in the late nineteenth century from central Shewa to the south,
east and west.
27
Core-nationality regional states that are overwhelmingly dominated by one group proclaimed the
language of the dominant group as a working language. In heterogeneous states, however, a different
arrangement was made. In the regional states of Gambella, Benishangul-Gumuz and SNNPR,
Amharic, the working language of the federal government commonly shared by the diverse groups
in the regions, is adopted as a working language. Harari regional state, on the other hand, adopted
both Harari and Oromiffa equally as its working languages.
28
On this and African political parties, see, for instance, Salih (2003). On Ethiopian political parties, see
Kassahun (2003).
29
Some writers argue that the concentration of fiscal powers at the center would rather induce secessionism. See, for instance, Abbink (1997) and Andreas (2003).
30
The House of Federation is entrusted to interpret the constitution; to decide on issues of exercising the
right to self-determination and secession by the nations, nationalities and peoples of the country; to
resolve border disputes between member states; etc. See article 62 of the federal constitution.
31
Article 72 of the 1977 Soviet constitution provided: Each Union Republic shall retain the right freely
to secede from the USSR.
32
On secessionism and factors involved in it, see, among others, Bartkus (2004) and Hale (2008)
33
One of the founding members of the TPLF and its one time leader, Berihe Aregawi, who withdrew
from the Front before its capture of power, stated that it was only a few among the leading
members of the Front who had formulated the secession agenda. When the agenda was announced,
it encountered severe opposition amongst members of the Front and was soon dropped. He also
stated the criticism of the EPLF as vital in the shelving of the agenda (2008:195200). Even
after the shelving of the secession agenda, the goal of the TPLF was not clearly determined and
could result in anything from autonomy, federation, confederation, up to and including independence (Aalen, 2002: 39; Asnake, 2003: 259). For this and a general history of the TPLF, see also
Young (1997).
34
For the history of Oromo nationalism and the OLF, see, for instance, Baxter, Hultin and Triuulzi
(1996), Assefa (1998) and Pausewang (2009).
35
For these and other federal developments in the Somali regional state, see, among others, Markakis
(1996, 2011), Samatar (2004) and Hagmann (2005). For problems of security and military activities
of the ONLF in the regional state of Somali, see ICG (2013).
36
These, among many, include Ethiopian Democratic Party (EDP), Unity for Justice and Democracy
(UJD), Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD), Oromo National Congress (ONC), All Ethiopia
Unity Organization (AEUO), Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front (ARDUF), Southern Ethiopian Peoples Democratic Alliance (SEPDE) and All Amhara Peoples Organization (AAPO).
37
It is known to the ruling party that critics of the right to secede come not only from those who are
generally opposed to it and its policies but also amongst its members and supporters. See Ethiopian
Ministry of Information (2002: 2641).
38
The May 2005 general parliamentarian election in Ethiopia, although it ended in bloody disputes over
its final result between the ruling EPRDF and the main contender CUD, was the first most open electoral contest in Ethiopia following the federalization of the country. On the election, see, among others,
Harbeson (2005) and Aalen and Tronvoll (2009).
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Federalization with a Constitutional

Explicit right to secede, Federal anomaly, Perversion of federalism, Federal

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The Federal System of Ethiopia: A Brief Overview

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writing of the federal constitution, a Constituent Assembly dominated by EPRDF

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Federalization with a Right to Secession in Ethiopia 63

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Colonel Mengistus totalitarian regime and the resurgence of different ethno-national

Federalization with a Right to Secession in Ethiopia 65

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Federalization with a Right to Secession in Ethiopia 67

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Federalization with a Right to Secession in Ethiopia 69

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