23. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

ABE VALDEZ y
DELA CRUZ, accused-appellant.
G.R. NO. 129296

September 25, 2000

FACTS:
Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz, is charged for violating Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972. The accused was allegedly caught in flagrante delicto and without authority
of law, planted, cultivated and cultured seven (7) marijuana plants from which
dangerous drugs maybe manufactured or derived. Appellant was arraigned and with
assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits then ensued.
The prosecution presented its witnesses, all member of the police force, who
testified how the information was received, the commencement of their operation and
its details. Accordingly, they found appellant alone in his nipa hut. They, then,
proceeded to look around the area where appellant had his kaingin and saw seven (7)
five-foot high, flowering marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters away
from his nipa hut. PO2 Balut asked appellant who owned the prohibited plants and,
according to Balut, the latter admitted that they were his. They uprooted the seven
marijuana plants, took photos of appellant standing beside the cannabis plants and
arrested him.
The appellant claimed that he was weeding his vegetable farm when he was called
by a person whose identity he does not know. This unknown person then brought
appellant to the place where the marijuana plants were found, approximately 100
meters away from his nipa hut. Five armed policemen were present and they made him
stand in front of the hemp plants. He was then asked if he knew anything about the
marijuana growing there. When he denied any knowledge thereof, SPO2 Libunao poked
a fist at him and told him to admit ownership of the plants. Appellant was so nervous
and afraid that he admitted owning the marijuana and then he was brought to the police
station. At the police headquarters, appellant denied knowing about the marijuana
plants seized. Appellant contends that there was unlawful search. First, the records
show that the law enforcers had more than ample time to secure a search
warrant. Second, that the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot does not
remove appellant from the mantle of protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in the present
case is lawful and the seized evidence admissible.
(2) Whether or not the seized plants are admissible in evidence against the
accused.
HELD:
In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination of the existence of probable cause given the fact that police had ample
time to obtain said warrant. The protection against illegal search and seizure is
constitutionally mandated and only under specific instances are searches allowed
without warrants. The mantle of protection extended by the Bill of Rights covers both
innocent and guilty alike against any form of high-handedness of law enforcers,
regardless of the praiseworthiness of their intentions.
With respect to the first issue, the confiscated plants were evidently obtained during an
illegal search and seizure. As to the second issue, which involves the admissibility of the
marijuana plants as evidence for the prosecution, the said plants cannot, as products of
an unlawful search and seizure, be used as evidence against appellant. They are fruits of
the proverbial poisoned tree. It was, therefore, a reversible error on the part of the

court a quo to have admitted and relied upon the seized marijuana plants as evidence to
convict appellant.

24. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CHUA HO SAN @

TSAY HO SAN, accused-appellant.
GR 128222
June 17, 1999
Facts:
In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband,
Jim Lagasca Cid, as Chief of Police of the Bacnotan Police Station, of La Union began
patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his officers. While monitoring the coastal area of
Barangay Bulala on 29 March 1995, he intercepted a radio call from Brgy. Capt. Almoite
requesting police assistance regarding an unfamiliar speedboat the latter had spotted,
which looked different from the boats ordinarily used by fisherfolk of the area.
Cid and his men, proceeded to thte beach and observed that the speedboat ferried
a passenger. Upon landing, the male passenger alighted and carried what a strawbag. By
this time, Cid and Badua, in their uniform and issued side-arms, became suspicious of
the man as he suddenly broke into a run upon seeing the approaching officers.
Badua, prevented the man from fleeing. Cid then introduced themselves as police
officers. Speaking in English, in Tagalog, and in Ilocano, Cid requested the man to open
his bag, but he seemed not to understand. Cid then motioned to the man to open the
bag. The man apparently understood and acceded to the request.
A search of the bag yielded several transparent plastic packets containing
yellowish crystalline substances. As Cid wished to proceed to the police station, he
signaled the man to follow, but the latter did not comprehend. Hence, Cid placed his
arm around the shoulders of the man and escorted the latter to the police headquarters.
At the police station, Cid then "recited and informed the man of his constitutional
rights" to remain silent, to have the assistance of a counsel, etc. Eliciting no response
from the man, Cid ordered his men to find an interpreter.
Mr. Go Ping Guan apprised the constitutional rights of the foreign national.
When the policemen asked the man questions, he retreated to his obstinate reticence
and merely showed his ID with the name Chua Ho San printed thereon. The conducted
laboratory examination of 29 plastic packets confirmed that the contents are shabu.
Issue:
Whether or not the facts obtained constitute "probable cause."
Held:

No. Enshrined in the Constitution is the inviolable right to privacy of home and
person. It explicitly ordains that people have the right to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose. Inseparable, is the exclusionary principle which decrees
that any evidence obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible.
The prosecution and the defense painted extremely divergent versions of the
incident, but the Court is certain that Chua was arrested and his bag searched without
the benefit of a warrant. There are no facts on record reasonably suggestive or
demonstrative of Chuas participation in an ongoing criminal enterprise that could have
spurred police officers from conducting the obtrusive search.
Persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other contraband
articles, Chua's watercraft differing in appearance from the usual fishing boats, Chuas
illegal entry into the Philippines, Chuas suspicious behavior, and the apparent ease by
which Chua can return to and navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards
the high seas, do not constitute "probable cause."

There was no information that a foreigner would disembark at Tammocalao

beach bearing prohibited drugs on the date in question. Chua was not identified. The
fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishing boats of
the area did not automatically mark him as in the process of perpetrating an offense.
The search cannot therefore be denominated as incidental to an arrest.
From all indications, the search was nothing but a fishing expedition. Casting
aside the regulated substance as evidence, the same being the fruit of a poisonous tree,
the remaining evidence on record are insufficient, feeble and ineffectual to sustain
Chuas conviction.
25. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MEDEL
TANGLIBEN Y BERNARDINO, defendant-appellant.
GR L-63630
April 6, 1990
Facts:
In the late evening of 2 March 1982, Patrolmen Silverio Quevedo and Romeo L.
Punzalan of the San Fernando Police Station, together with Brgy. Tanod Sacdalan, were
conducting surveillance mission at the Victory Liner Terminal compound.
The surveillance mission was aimed, not only against persons who may commit
misdemeanors at the said place, but also on persons who may be engaging in the traffic
of dangerous drugs based on the information supplied by informers. Around 9:30 p.m.,
said Patrolmen noticed a person carrying a red traveling bag who was acting
suspiciously and they confronted him. The person was requested by the Patrolmen to
open the bag but the person refused, only to accede later on when the patrolmen
identified themselves. Found inside the bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic
wrapper and weighing one kilo.
The person was asked of his name and the reason why he was at the said place
and he gave his name as Medel Tangliben and explained that he was waiting for a ride to
Olongapo City to deliver the marijuana leaves. The accused was taken to the police
headquarters at San Fernando, Pampanga, for further investigation; and that Pat.
Quevedo submitted to his Station Commander his Investigator's Report. The RTC of San
Fernando, Pampanga, found Medel Tangliben y Bernardino guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972 as amended) and sentenced him to life imprisonment. Tangliben appealed.
Issue: Whether the warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest, even in light of the
Courts ruling in People vs. Aminnudin.
Held:

One of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant is a search
incident to a lawful arrest.
Section 12 of Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that "A
person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant."
Meanwhile, Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) provides that "A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person: When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense."
Tangliben was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying marijuana at the time of
his arrest. This case therefore falls squarely within the exception. The warrantless search
was incident to a lawful arrest and is consequently valid. The Court is not unmindful of
its decision in People v. Aminnudin. In that case the PC officers had earlier received a
tip from an informer that accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City
and was carrying marijuana. Acting on this tip, they waited for him one evening,
approached him as he descended from the gangplank, detained him and inspected the
bag he was carrying. Said bag contained marijuana leaves.
The Court held that the marijuana could not be admitted in evidence since it was
seized illegally, as there was lack of urgency, and thus a search warrant can still be
procured. However, herein, the case presented urgency. Although the trial court's
decision did not mention it, the transcript of stenographic notes reveals that there was

an informer who pointed to Tangliben as carrying marijuana. Faced with such on-thespot information, the police officers had to act quickly. There was not enough time to
secure a search warrant.
The Court cannot therefore apply the ruling in Aminnudin herein. To require
search warrants during on-the-spot apprehensions of drug pushers, illegal possessors of
firearms, jueteng collectors, smugglers of contraband goods, robbers, etc. would make it
extremely difficult, if not impossible to contain the crimes with which these persons are
associated.
26. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LEILA
JOHNSON Y REYES, accused-appellant.
GR 138881
December 18, 2000
Facts: Leila Reyes Johnson was, at the time was 58 years old, a widow, and a resident
of California, U.S.A. She is a former Filipino citizen who was naturalized as an American
and had since been working as a nurse, taking care of geriatric patients and those with
Alzheimer's disease, in convalescent homes in the United States.
On 16 June 1998, she arrived in the Philippines to visit her son's family in
Laguna. She was due to fly back to the US on July 26. On July 25, she checked in at the
Philippine Village Hotel to avoid the traffic on the way to the NAIA and checked out at
5:30 p.m. the next day. At around 7:30 p.m. of that day, Olivia Ramirez was on duty as a
lady frisker at Gate 16 of said airport. Her duty was to frisk departing passengers,
employees, and crew and check for weapons, bombs, drugs, goods, and explosives.
When she frisked Johnson, she felt something hard on the latter's abdomen.
Upon inquiry, Mrs. Johnson explained she needed to wear two panty girdles as she had
just undergone an operation. Not satisfied with the explanation, Ramirez reported the
matter to her superior, SPO4 Embile, saying "Sir, hindi po ako naniniwalang panty lang
po iyon." She was directed to take Johnson to the nearest women's room for inspection.
Inside the women's room, Johnson was asked again what was on her stomach
was and she gave the same answer. Ramirez then asked her "to bring out the thing
under her girdle." Johnson brought out three plastic packs. The confiscated packs
contained a substance which was found to be "shabu."
Embile took Johnson and the plastic packs to the 1st Regional Aviation and
Security Office. Johnson's passport and ticket were taken and her luggage opened.
Pictures were taken and her belongings were itemized. Johnson was charged for the
possession of 3 plastic bags of shabu; a violation of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act).
On 14 May 1999, the RTC in Pasay City, found Johnson guilty and sentenced her
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Johnson appealed.
Issue: Whether the extensive search made on Johnson at the airport violates her right
against unreasonable search and seizure.
Held:
The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was never placed
under custodial investigation but was validly arrested without warrant pursuant to the
provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides
that "A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a)
when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) when an offense has in fact just been
committed and person to be arrested has committed it; and xxx."
The circumstances surrounding the arrest falls in either paragraph (a) or (b) of
the Rule above cited, hence the allegation that she has been subjected to custodial
investigation is inaccurate. The shabu seized from her during the routine frisk at the
airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures.
Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal
detectors and x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest any suspicious objects,
physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little
question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the
gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated
with airline travel.

Travelers are often notified through airport signs, and notices in their airline
tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are
found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on
notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures
do not apply to routine airport procedures. The packs of shabu having thus been
obtained through a valid warrantless search, are admissible.
Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although likewise without warrant, was
justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of "shabu" in her person
in flagrante delicto.
108. EDUARDO CUISON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 128540

April 15, 1998

FACTS:
Finding the accused Eduardo Cuison guilty of the crime double homicide on Feb.
7, 1898, respondent judge of RTC of Pangasinan rendered a decision and sentenced him
to suffer imprisonment.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the said decision was affirmed with the
modification that the civil indemnity was increased. Ciuson elevated the decision on a
petition for review to the Supreme Court which was later denied.
The case was remanded to the RTC. Said respondent judge promulgated the
decision of CA only modifying the civil liability of the accused but did not commit the
accused to jail to commence service of his sentence.
The matter was reported to the Solicitor General and requested that a motion for
clarification be filed.
The CA rendered a resolution which says that they modified the appealed decision of
the court in one respect only the increase of the amount paid by the appellant to
the heirs of the victims, and that they had affirmed the decision of the court with
regard to the penalty of imprisonment imposed in the said trial courts decision.
Respondent judge then set the promulgation of the decision anew. The
accused filed a Motion to Set Aside Promulgation on the grounds that the judgement
in said case was already promulgated and there is no more need to promulgate, and
to pursue with the scheduled promulgation will violate his constitutional right
against jeopardy.
The Solicitor General filed before the CA a petition for certoriari and
mandamus stating that the respondent judge seriously erred and gravely abused his
discretion in refusing to execute the penalty of imprisonment in spite of the CAs
Decision and Resolution. He prays that the Order of the Judge be nullified and the
penalty of imprisonment rendered against the accused be enforced.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners rights against double jeopardy was violated.
RULING:
N0. Petitioner contends that the promulgation by Judge Ramos of the respondents
courts decision by reading its dispositive portion has effectively terminated the criminal
cases against him. In other words, petitioner claims that the first jeopardy attached at

that point. The court is not persuaded. As a Rule, a criminal prosecution includes a civil
action for the recovery of the indemnity. Hence, a decision in such a case disposes of
both criminal as awell as civil liabilities of a accused. Here, the trial court promulgated
only the civil aspect of the case, but not the criminal.
Hence, double jeopardy cannot prosper as a defense. The constitutional proscription
of double jeopardy is not violated by a Court of Appeals order requiring the trial court to
promulgate a decision sentencing the accused to imprisonment even if, earlier, the same
decision has been promulgated in regard only to the payment of the modified civil
indemnity arising from the same criminal act.Otherwise stated, the promulgation of
only one part of the decision, i.e., the liability for civil indemnity, is not a bar to the
subsequent promulgation of the other part, the imposition of the criminal
accountability.