nityatva and apauru!

eyatva in language
N. Kazanas, Athens,

0. Abstract. This paper was first written in 2007 for the Centre for Sanskrit Studies (in JNU)
but has been revised since. It argues that apauru!eyatva and nityatva can be found only in a
deeper level of language where operate entities like the k"rak"#i as distinct from the
vibhaktaya$ declension-cases.
1. Can these two qualities non-humanness and eternality/universality be found in any
aspect of language as we know language in our times - beyond the ak!ara sounds?
It is an axiom of the M!m"#s" philosophical system that the Veda is apauru!eya of nonhuman origin; it is also nitya eternal, universal. The Veda is, of course, the three Vedas
%k, yajus and s"ma. This triad is known also as tray& vidy" triple knowledge. This is another
meaning of veda knowledge and the triple knowledge pertains in another sense to the
material world, the divine (or mental) and the spiritual. So knowledge too has
apauru!eyatva non-humanness and nityatva eternality, universality. Moreover, as has often
been observed, the Veda was called 'abda word, sound both in the P$rvaM!m"#s" and the
UttaraM!m"#s" or Ved"nta (Pandurangi 2006; Raju 1971). So by a simple extension
apauru!eyatva and nityatva belong to 'abda also.
This view is much older than the M!m"#s" and other philosophical systems. We do not
know the exact dates when these systems were formulated (absolute dates given are
conjectural), but in the forms we now have them they are certainly post-Vedic and just as
certainly, they presuppose the Upanishads (Up, hereafter) and the hymns of the (gveda. In
the Upanishads the philosophical doctrine has the general appellation 'abdabrahman the
Word [is] Absolute or the Word [is] the Holy Power; naturally, brahman is both apauru!eya
and nitya. The 'abdabrahman doctrine is found fully developed in the V"kyapad&ya of the
comparatively late philosopher-grammarian Bhart%hari (late 5th cent CE?) with its four
states: vaikhar& gross, spoken and written utterance; madhyam" mental, but with most
features of the gross language; pa'yant& spiritual, undifferentiated, full of potential and
outside all common experience (=silence); par" the absolute state, beyond description (VP
1975; Aklujkar 1990). But we find it enunciated in the Maitr& Up 6.22: dve v"va brahma#&
abhidhyeye 'abda'c"'abda'ca two brahman aspects are to be meditated upon, one of sound
and one of silence; the passage further says that by &abda alone is the silent one revealed
and ends with the indication - 'abdabrahma#i ni!#"ta$ para) brahma adhigacchati whoever is
well versed in the sounding brahman reaches the supreme [silent] brahman. In other
words, through the manifest gross language one can reach the Supreme which remains
unmanifest in its own sphere.
The B%had"ra#yaka Up 4.1.2 changes the terms somewhat: it substitutes v"k for 'abda
saying emphatically v"g vai brahma speech/language indeed is brahman, the Absolute and
that brahman should be approached/worshipped as praj" intelligence, wisdom. This
formulation takes us through the 'ra(yakas and Br"hma(as back to the (gveda where v"c, a
mighty goddess as well as the speech of man, stands in place of 'abda. In one )f the bestknown passages of those Hymns we find catv"*ri v"*k primit" pad"*ni speech/language has
been measured out in four divisions/levels. These are not named but the same stanza tells
*
us that while the three higher ones lie hidden (gh"), tur&ya)
vac manu!y"+ vadanti men
speak the fourth (lower) level of speech (RV 1.164.45). Stanza 35 says that brahm"*y) vac$
param) vyma the brahma (=sanctity) is the highest heaven (=abode) of Speech. Plainly

NAL 2

there is no reason not to take the four levels of Speech V"c here as corresponding to, and
being the basis for, the four states of Bhart%haris view of language.
2. Having accepted the M!m"#s" general axiom that vidy" and 'abda (or v"c) have nonhuman origin and eternality, can we find these qualities or a reflection of them in an
actual spoken and written language like English, Hind! or Sanskrit? Yes, we can find them
in the K"rak"#i factors contributing to the start, continuance and completion of an action
as given in P"(inis A!,"dhy"y&. The dh"tu root, seed-element also has them as well as the
ak!ara basic phonemes of language as distinct from enunciated sounds in speech (or letters
in writing).
Now it is observable that all sounds (belonging to the general category of dhvani and
being called var#a) have beginning and end. They are uttered by humans, manifest briefly
and disappear into silence: thus they are both pauru!eya and anitya. The thinking in words
that precedes it, as much as the spoken utterance itself, belongs to the ordinary human
condition and has beginning and end: this too employs linguistic elements (vocables, verbs,
nouns etc) that are man-made and are subject to change. Thus French has different sounds,
words, idioms, syntax etc from Italian, even though both languages derive largely from
Latin. Similarly Bengali and Marathi differ in all these aspects even though both derive
largely from Sanskrit. These differences have come about through human everyday use and
to a degree, through contact with other, alien languages. The ordinary aspect of these
languages is very much pauru!eya. And since the pronunciation and meanings of their
lexemes (nouns, verbs etc) have changed over the years, nityatva also is absent.
On the other hand, a is a always and everywhere: hence we have the term ak!ara
indestructible which applies to all phonemes (i, u, ka, ta, kha, tha, etc) in this their
eternal aspect. This aspect obviously does not belong to our common human usage,
characterized by mutability (vaikhar& and madhyam"); it belongs to the pa'yant& level of
language. This must be classed as apauru!eya and nitya.
There are other human phenomena or experiences that are universal and fall outside
the range of ordinary volition or intent. One such common phenomenon is love. All people
throughout the world and throughout history love something or somebody. That love is a
universal, eternal state is indicated also by the common idiom to fall in love: so here we
find nityatva. In addition, we dont choose to fall in or out of love and dont know why or
how this happens. Only after the event do we try to find reasons and rationalize it. So, in
this sense, love has also apauru!eyatva. The same holds for some other human experiences.
Everybody has a desire for (more) knowledge and consequently people read various
publications or ask questions and so on, but, again, we dont know whence this desire
comes.
Such human experiences, too, at least in their inception, must belong to the pa'yant&
level and must have nityatva.
3. We can now simplify the four-level scheme into two levels and so deal more clearly with
our subject but must not get carried away into thoughts of duality since the scheme is
single and our analysis is given only to facilitate understanding. The two levels can be and
have been termed surface structure, corresponding moreorless to Bhart%haris two lower
states vaikhar& and madhyam", and deep structure, corresponding largely to the pa'yant&
state; or we can talk even more simply of gross and subtle levels/states. Clearly the
qualities of non-humanness and eternality will be found in the subtle aspect or the deep
structure of language.
There seem to be at least three features of language that belong to the subtle aspect of
language and have apauru!eyatva and nityatva. One is the ak*ara which we touched upon in

NAL 3

the preceding section. The other is the dh"tu the study of which is most revealing. The third
one is the k"rak"#i. The dh"tu would require a separate and lengthy study since it touches
on the origin itself of languages (for some preliminary thoughts on this see Kazanas 2007,
22). In this paper we concentrate on the k"rakas as contributors to the action expressed
by the verb.
4. At the start we need to make a clarification. We have actions (or transitive movements)
and states (or intransitive conditions). In ultra-modern linguistics we meet new terms,
thought to be scientific, but they add little to the distinctions I make here, so I leave them
aside. The verb in every statement in the ordinary language denotes an action and is
categorized as transitive or a state and is termed intransitive. Although there are
important and valid differences between the two, yet one can be translated into terms of
the other. The simple I sit/stand (intransitive) can be rendered into (transitive) I have
moved my body to a condition where I sit/stand; or the transitive I kick the ball into the
intransitive [You see that] I am in the state of having my leg kicking the ball. Some details
change but the core meaning is unaltered. Hereafter I shall use only act/action (transitive)
for simplicity. But we should note also the Pr"ti&"khya definition of verb: We have tad
"khy"ta- yena bhava- sa dh"tu$ (12.5) a verb is that by which we mark existence, which is a
dh"tu+; but in 7 is added: kriy"v"cakam-"khy"tam the verb expresses an action (Mller
1859: 161-162)1. It is interesting to note in passing that both Y"ska in Nirukta and Aristotle
in Poetics ascribe to noun being/existence (embodied) and to verb being with a temporal
continuity.
In a sentence the action is expressed by the verb kick, hold, give, fill, drink, cure etc.
In the statement a doctor cures certain things are implied but left unsaid. A fuller version
would be a doctor cures ill people by means of medicines, diet and exercise. But even this
could raise questions like where, when, for what reason?
In fact there are six essential constituents, explicit or implicit, in every statement
describing an action. They were termed k"raka by P"(ini and all six are necessary for the
unfolding of the action: the environment or locus wherein the action takes place temporal
and spatial; the performer who acts releasing some energy (subject); the entity thing or
person acted upon (direct object); the further entity receiving the effect of the action
(indirect object); the means whereby the action is promoted (instrument); the cause,
material or otherwise, which supplies the energy but itself remains stable. Thus a complete
description without additional elements (adjectives, adverbs) would read something like
this:
In the night, in the palace, the doctor restored
health to the kings son by means of a mantra out of
his knowledge and his devotion to the king.
In English (and other analytical languages like French or Hind!) we use many
prepositions to show the relation of the constituents to the action-verb (=restore). In a
highly inflected language like Sanskrit the noun-terminations would do this. Thus,
although I have not seen this particular statement or any other quite so full, in Sanskrit, it
would read approximately like this:
1 Most of Mllers observations are quire illuminating. His dates, however, which have
become mainstream doctrine (RV 1200 down to S!tra period 200 BCE) are hopelessly late,
based as they are on his identification of K"ty"yana with Vararuci from a ghost story in
Somadevas Kath"sarits"gara(c 1100 CE) assigning the s!trakara to c 300 (Mller 1859:
240-244). Although later Mller himself repudiated those dates suggesting for the RV 3000 or
even 5000 BCE, they have stuck and bedevil Indology even to our days.

NAL 4

r"trau n%pag%he vaidyo mantre#a bh.pati-bhaktiheto$

svavidy"y"$ sv"sthyam r"japutr"ya pratyap"dayat.
(Indian traditional texts do give a sentence-example but I find it gross and limited.)
5. Before we delve into the deep structure of this statement, we need perhaps to
distinguish between the contributing factors k"raka and the cases of nouns vibhakti. English
has not much inflexion and compensates for this with the use of prepositions. So do many
other languages French, Spanish, Hind! etc. Sanskrit has a very full system of inflexion;
other languages like Latin, Greek, Russian and Lithuanian are not quite so full as Sanskrit
but do have rich declensions of nouns.
Now the cases perform certain syntactical functions in the sentence, as is obvious in
our example above, but these are not absolute or invariable. In the Indian grammatical
tradition this fact is acknowledged by naming the vibhaktaya$ with numerals. In the West
the cases are given special terms that attempt to indicate the functions of the nouns in the
sentence. They do not succeed fully and their use has continued (mostly) in inflected
languages out of habit and respect for the classical tradition. But it is obvious that
nominative could apply to any case since names of things, of creatures and of persons are
being used in all cases while the accusative rarely accuses of anything blameworthy!
Ablative again is an absolute misnomer since it indicates the entity which does not move but
from which ablation proceeds! And so on. But let us look at the whole picture:
Sanskrit

Western

pratham"
dvit!y"
t%t!y"
caturth!
pacam!

*a*,h!
saptam!
sambodhana

nominative
accusative
instrumental
dative
ablative

genitive
locative
vocative

Our example
vaidya$
sv"sthyam
mantre#a
(r"ja)putr"ya
vidy"y"$
bhaktiheto$
compound
r"trau, g%he

doctor
health
mantra
(kings) son
knowledge
out of devotion
Kings
night, palace

The Western names derive from Latin (and Greek usage). The first practical work was
The Art of Grammar of Dionusios Thrax (2nd cent BCE) in Greek (though this is doubted by
several modern scholars) and was translated into Latin as Ars Grammatica. The term case
derives from Latin casus meaning falling off, loss of position and translating the Greek
pt/sis a fall. Aristotle, as was noted in 4, used pt/sis for both nouns and verbs
distinguishing the latter by ascribing to it a temporal element (Poetics C20). But the five
pt/sis for the noun were introduced by the Stoics. The cases are thought to be falls from
the upright one (orth0 in Greek), which was subsequently named nominative, i.e.
naming the subject, agent. The other terms accusative etc also derive from Latin names,
which translated Greek ones. (See Kemp 1991 and Law 2003 with references.) However, the
Western system has some faults and is misleading because any given case does not perform
invariably the same syntactical function; it is not always related in the same way to the
verb. For instance, Greek had no instrumental and the dative was used to fulfill this need; it
had no ablative so the genitive (and some preposition) was used instead. In Sanskrit too the

NAL 5

t%t&y" is sometimes used in place of the pacam& (e.g. bhakty" or premn") and the saptam& in
place of the caturth& (siddhau for siddhyai), etc.. The commonest perhaps example is seen in
the use of the t%t&y" instrumental in the passive construction. Taking the example from our
sentence above we could write quite correctly:
the health has been restored by the doctor
sv"sthyam vaidyena pratip"ditam.
Here the health sv"sthyam, which was the object (in the second or accusative) in the active
construction of our sentence now becomes the grammatical subject in the nominative
pratham" and the doctor, who was the subject in the nominative, now appears in the t%t&y"
instrumental even though he continues to be the actual subject/performer of the action.
The names nominative, accusative etc are therefore misnomers.
The cases themselves, the vibhaktaya$, do not have valid grounds for apauru!eyatva and
nityatva due to two defects. First, as was said, many languages have only a most
rudimentary system of inflexion (eg. English: genitive cows horns; nominative plural
ox>oxen, chicken>chickens, goose>geese; but little else). Second, the cases have no
invariable functions despite their names in the Western tradition. They are adventitious,
neither eternal nor universal. So we put aside the inflexion itself. (It is possible that at some
very ancient period the k"rak"#i had definite and invariable vibhaktaya$ for their
expression.)
6. The Indian grammatical tradition distinguished between vibhaktis and k"rakas and
very rightly so. The former belong to the surface or gross aspect of language and are
subject to human intervention and mutability. The latter form an aspect of the deep or
subtle structure which is universal and invariable.
Although it is possible that earlier wise grammarians and/or philosophers made the
distinction between the two, the glory now goes to P"(ini who actually left us the earliest
extant formulation of the two linguistic categories in the fourth section of the first book of
his A!,"dhy"y&. Below I present the s$tras defining the six k"rakas in the sequence given in
the A!,"dhy"y& since this has some important philosophical nuances.
1. dhruvam apaye p"d"nam (1, 4, 24): the immovable/ permanent
in any departure is the ap"d"na the source. This is the cause.
2. karma#" yam abhipraiti sa samprad"nam (1, 4, 32): whomever
someone intentionally approaches with a deed, that is
samprad"na the recipient (i.e. the indirect or further object).
Thus we have a movement, a giving away (apa+"-d"na) from
what is immovable relatively to what moves and this reaches a
recipient.
3. s"dhakatama) kara#am (1, 4, 42): what is most beneficial/
efficacious, that is kara#a the instrument [for the completion
of the action/movement]. The action, the giving away or
movement in 1 and 2 above is done through some efficient
means or instrument.
4. "dh"ro dhikara#am (1, 4, 45): what holds [the action] is
adhikara#a the overseeing, surrounding [i.e. the framework or
environment of space and time wherein the action unfolds].
5. kartur &psitatama) karma (1, 4, 49): what is most beloved of the
agent/performer kart% that is karma the immediate workobject.
6. svatantra$ kart" (1, 4, 54): kart% the agent/performer is

NAL 6

independent (self-extending and having his own system), i.e.

the actual/real subject.
We have now six indispensable factors contributing to the start, continuation and
completion of the action. (I have left out the tat prayojako hetu'ca the mover thereof and the
cause 1.4.55, which is an (important) extension of the kart%.)
7. r"trau n%pag%he vaidyo mantre#a bh.patibhaktiheto$
svavidy"y"$ sv"sthyam r"japutr"ya pratyap"dayat:
In the night, in the palace, the doctor restored
health to the kings son by means of a mantra
out of his knowledge and his devotion to the king.
Here I give two causes/sources (ap"d"na), the devotion bhakti and the knowledge vidy"
(efficient and material causes respectively). The recipient (samprad"na) is the kings son
r"japutra the indirect object. The instrument (kara#a) is the mantra whereby the
restoration of health is effected. Night (r"tr&) and palace (n%pag%ha), both are the
environment wherein the act of health-restoration is performed. The object karma of the
doctor/performer, what he wants most, is health sv"sthyam. Finally, the agent/performer
kart% is the doctor who has an independent connexion with the system of knowledge out of
which he selected the most efficient mantra for the cure.
8. One could go on to a much more detailed and extensive analysis of the philosophical
aspects connected with the six k"rakas but this would carry us too far from our immediate
object the identification of non-humanness and eternality in language. Of course, this too
is a philosophical matter and one could argue that all k"rakas are ultimately manifest forms
of the One Absolute in the play of creation. What the readers must realize (if they have not
done so already) is that the six factors are always and invariably present in every action
even if we dont see them all in every case.
One may object that impersonal statements like It rains do not have the six factors.
However, a little reflexion would show that rain falls from some ap"d"na (cloudy sky) and is
received by the soil and water-masses, in the rivers and oceans (samprad"na). On the one
side it fertilizes the seeds in the earth and on the other it is a stage in the cyclical
movement of water>steam>rain>water. This is effected through the instrumentality of heat,
air and cold (kara#a). The natural scenery or environment, the water masses on the earth,
the atmosphere, air currents etc, constitute the adhikara#a. The rainfall itself is the
immediate object karma and the kart% is the natural water-cycle. In old mythologies there
was a god, Zeus in Greece, Enlil in Mesopotamia, Parjanya in India, who generated the rains
and storms. All these are non-human.
One may also object that the performer is often human, like the doctor in our example.
True, but what ultimately is the origin of human beings? And when we act as humans
having our own purpose, as we see it then, can we be absolutely certain that we are not, all
unbeknown to us, propelled into action by forces beyond our ken? For instance, I know that
I derive great pleasure in writing this essay and hope to please the editor, and also acquire
some fame among the scholars who read it. But it is very probable that there are subtle
forces that have caused me to write this paper for purposes unknown to me. In addition,
humans have non-human, or at least unknown, derivation in that, beyond their material
embodiment, their origin and their source of intelligence, life, energy and perception,
belong to a level not usually associated with ordinary gross humanity: these attributes are
not strictly of our own making, though we can extend or develop them.
Thus the k"rak"#i, implicit in every statement, exhibit the two qualities postulated by
the M!m"#s" philosophy.

NAL 7

9. However, there is another aspect philosophical and historical at the same time. The
native tradition states, as we saw (1), that the Veda, whether as pure knowledge or as the
sacred lore enshrined in the Vedic Scriptures, is apauru!eya and nitya. The %*is who actually
communicated, say, the hymns of the (gveda did not really compose them but heard/saw
them at some otherworldly plane and then expressed them: the hymns were and are always
there unchanging beyond our common world of change. Nonetheless, we know of RV 1.164
hymn because D!rghatamas Aucathya heard/saw it and revealed it to us. I could not
perceive this nor can millions of others. In this respect, in perceiving and revealing it to us
in a language that, at its own level at least, has changed palpably over the centuries, the
Kavi has himself contributed to the expression and, always in this respect, the hymn as we
have it is very much pauru!eya. So the revealed veda or 'abda is both apauru!eya and
pauru!eya.
But here another thought presents itself from some unknown depth of the mind.
Having said all this, I feel I should add that, since according to the UttaraM!m"#s", man
has for his true self ("tman) the universal Self (brahman), then, in this sense, everything is
pauru!eya. For the puru*a encompasses all and everything in his being. As the Bhagavad G&t"
puts it: sarvabh.tastham-"tm"na) sarvabh.t"ni c"tmani
himself in all beings and all beings in himself (6. 29).
But this is quite another matter.

NAL 8

Bibliography
Aklujkar A.

1990 Trik"#1& or V"kyapad&ya, with V%tti on Books 1&2 in H.G. Coward &
K. Kunnuji Raja eds, The Philosophy of the Grammarians vol 5, Encyclopedia
of Indian Philosophers, N Delhi, M-Banarsidass & Princeton University
Press (pp 126-172).
Kazanas N.
2007 Greek Logos, Vedic V"c: Creative Power in Dr Sh.Kumar ed,
Sanskrit across Cultures Special Centre for Sanskrit Studies, JNU, N Delhi,
Printworld.
Kemp A.
1991 The emergence of autonomous Greek Grammar in P. Schmitter
(ed) Geschichte der Sparchtetheorie vol 2, Tubingen (302-333).
Law V.
2003 The History of Linguistics in Europe... Cambridge, CUP.
Mller F. Max
1859 History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature, London, Williams & Norgate.
Pandurangi
2006 P$rvam!m"#s" Perspective on Veda as Word in Dr Sh. Kumar ed,
Veda as Word Special Centre for Sanskrit Studies, JNU, N Delhi,
Printworld.
Raju P.T.
1971 The Philosophical Traditions of India London, Allen&Unwin.
VP= Bhart%h"ris V"kyapad&ya, k"#1as 1&2 ed and transl K. R. Pillai, N Delhi, M Banarsidass.