ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

CHAPTER 4 CASES
VIII. RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE
1. ANG TIBAY v. CIR
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 46496. February 27, 1940.]
ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager
and
proprietor,
and
NATIONAL
WORKERS'
BROTHERHOOD, petitioners, vs.
THE
COURT
OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION,
INC., respondents.
Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Barcelona for
the Court of Industrial Relations.
Antonio D. Paguia; for National Labor Union.
Claro M. Recto; for petitioner "Ang Tibay".
Jose M. Casal; for National Workers' Brotherhood.
SYLLABUS
1. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; POWER. The
nature of the Court of Industrial Relations and of its power is
extensively discussed in the decision.
2. ID.; ID.; TECHNICAL RULES OF PROCEDURE; DUE
PROCESS OF LAW. The Court of Industrial Relations is not
narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure,
and Commonwealth Act No. 103 requires it to act according to
justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without
regard to technicalities or legal evidence but may inform its
mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable
(Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No.
46673). The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial
Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in
justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard
the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in
trials and investigations of an administrative character.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS. There
are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in
proceedings of this character. The first of these rights is the
right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof. Not only must the party be given
an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the
tribunal must consider the evidence presented. While the duty
to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it
does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely,
that of having something to support its decision. Not only must
there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but
the evidence must be substantial. The decision must be

rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least

contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore,
must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law
and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views
of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. The Court of
Industrial Relations should, in all controvercial questions,
render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the
reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this
duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
4. ID.; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.; CASE AT BAR ; NEW TRIAL
GRANTED. In the light of the foregoing fundamental
principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except as to the
alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National
Workers' Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and
does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to
predicate, in a rational way, a conclusion of law. This result,
however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial
prayed for by the respondent National Labor Union, Inc. The
interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given
opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to
in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to
the main issue involved. The legislation which created the
Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new.
The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not
entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the
result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and
the same is hereby, granted, and the entire record of this' case
shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with
instruction that it re-open the case, receive all such evidence
as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with
the requirements set forth in the decision.
DECISION
LAUREL, J p:
The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations in the above-entitled case has filed a
motion for reconsideration and moves that, for the reasons
stated in his motion, we reconsider the following legal
conclusions of the majority opinion of this Court:
"1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual como colectivo,
sin termino fijo de duracion o que no sea para una
determinada, termina o bien por voluntad de cualquiera de las
partes o cada vez que llega el plazo fijado para el pago de los
salarios segun costumbre en la localidad o cuando se termine
la obra;
"2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han celebrado
contrato, ya individual ya colectivamente, con ella, sin tiempo
fijo, y que se han visto obligados a cesar en sus trabajos por
haberse declarado paro forzoso en la fabrica en la cual
trabajan, dejan de ser empleados u obreros de la misma;
"3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un contrato
colectivo de trabajo con sus obreros sin tiempo fijo de duracion
y sin ser para una obra determinada y que se niega a readmitir

a dichos obreros que cesaron como consecuencia de un paro

forzoso, no es culpable de practica injusta ni incurre en la
sancion penal del articulo 5 de la Ley No. 213 del
Commonwealth, aunque su negativa a readmitir se deba a que
dichos obreros pertenecen a un determinado organismo
obrero, puesto que tales ya han dejado de ser empleados
suyos por terminacion del contrato en virtud del paro."
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand,
prays for the vacation of the judgment rendered by the majority
of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of
Industrial Relations for a new trial, and avers:
"1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26,1938,
there was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it
necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the
National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by
the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of
Accounts of native dealers in leather.
"2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by
Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically
discharge all the members of the National Labor Union, Inc.,
from work.
"3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated
September 29, 1938, (re supposed delay of leather soles from
the States) was but a scheme to systematically prevent the
forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT
with the Philippine Army.
"4. That the National Workers' Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a
company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the
existence and functions of which are illegal. (281 U. S., 548,
petitioner's printed memorandum, p. 25.)
"5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to
collective bargaining, majority rule and elective representation
are highly essential and indispensable. ( Sections 2 and
5, Commonwealth Act No. 213.)
"6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had
been (the) principal source of dissensions and continuous civil
war in Spain cannot and should not be made applicable in
interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of a modern
labor legislation of American origin where industrial peace has
always been the rule.
"7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor
practice for discriminating against the National Labor Union,
Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood.
"8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the
respondents that even with the exercise of due diligence they
could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as
evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.
"9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such farreaching importance and effect that their admission would
necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the
judgment rendered herein."

The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the

motion for reconsideration of the respondent Court of Industrial
Relations and to the motion for new trial of the respondent
National Labor Union, Inc.
In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein- after
stated with reference to the motion for a new trial of the
respondent National Labor Union, Inc., we are of the opinion
that it is not necessary to pass upon the motion for
reconsideration of the Solicitor-General. We shall proceed to
dispose of the motion for new trial of the respondent labor
union. Before doing this, however, we deem it necessary, in the
interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, to make
several observations regarding the nature of the powers of the
Court of Industrial Relations and emphasize certain guiding
principles which should be observed in the trial of cases
brought before it. We have re-examined the entire record of the
proceedings had before the Court of Industrial Relations in this
case, and we have found no substantial evidence to indicate
that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their
union affiliation or activity. The whole transcript taken contains
what transpired during the hearing and is more of a record of
contradictory and conflicting statements of opposing counsel,
with sporadic conclusion drawn to suit their own views. It is
evident that these statements and expressions of views of
counsel have no evidentiary value.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose
functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation
(Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative
board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation.
It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the
Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially
passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and
deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties
litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will
appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active,
affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or
quasijudicial functions in the determination of disputes between
employers and employees but its functions are far more
comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any
question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or
affecting, employers and employees or laborers, and landlords
and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulate the relations
between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the
provisions ofCommonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall
take cognizance for purposes of prevention, arbitration,
decision and settlement, of any industrial or agricultural dispute
causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising from
differences as regards wageshares or compensation, hours of
labor or conditions of tenancy or employment, between
employers and employees or laborers and between landlords
and tenants or farm-laborers, provided that the number of
employees, laborers or tenants or farm-laborers involved
exceeds thirty, and such industrial or agricultural dispute is
submitted to the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or
both of the parties to the controversy and certified by the
Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to be death with by
the Court for the sake of public interest. (Section A, ibid.) It

shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of such

hearing, endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them to
settle the dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph 2,
section 4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the
Philippines, it shall investigate and study all pertinent facts
related to the industry concerned or to the industries
established in a designated locality, with a view to determining
the necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting for such
industry or locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or
tenants, or a maximum "canon" or rental to be paid by the
"inquilinos" or tenants or lessees to landowners. (Section
5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the
settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or
conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective
system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in
order to determine specific controversies between labor and
capital in industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a
mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a
departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of
governmental powers.

In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.

R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had
occasion to point out that the Court of Industrial Relations is
not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and
the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and
substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities
or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of
legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it
may deem just and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act
No. 103.) It shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed
or demands made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural
dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision any
matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or
expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of
preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. (Section
13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to
this Court have been especially regulated by the rules recently
promulgated by this Court to carry into effect the avowed
legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the Court of
Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of
certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in
justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard
the fundamental and essential requirements of due Process in
trials and investigations of an administrative character. There
are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in
proceedings of this character:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing which
includes the right of the party interested or affected to present
his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. In the
language of Chief Justice Hughes, in Morgan v. U. S., 304 U.
S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed 1129, "the liberty and
property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary
requirements of fair play."
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present
his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights
which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence

presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U. S. 298 U. S.

468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 Law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this
Court in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to adduce
evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of the
board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if
the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can
thrust it aside without notice or consideration."
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation
to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be
disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its
decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a
nullity, a place when directly attached." (Edwards vs.
McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from the more
fundamental principle that the genius of constitutional
government is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power
anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding
or conclusion (City of Manila vs. Agustin, G. R. No. 45844,
promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the
evidence must be "substantial." (Washington, Virginia &
Maryland Coach Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 301 U.
S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law ed 965.) Substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion."
(Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor Relations Board,
4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National Labor Relations Board v.
Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-stillwater
Knitting Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d
758, 760.) . . . The statute provides that 'the rules of evidence
prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.'
The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free
administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so
that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed
incompetent in judicial proceedings would not invalidate the
administrative order. (Interstate Commerce Commission v.
Baird, 194 U. S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860;
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R.
Co., 227 U. S. 88, 93, 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431;
United States v. Abilene & Southern Ry. Co., 265 U. S. 274,
288, 44 S. Ct. 565, 569, 68 Law. ed. lola; Tagg Bros. &
Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420, 442, 50 S. Ct. 220,
225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this assurance of a desirable
flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to
justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational
probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does
not constitute substantial evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co.
v. National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed.
No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented
at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed
to the parties affected. (Interstate Commence Commission vs.
L. & N. R. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed.
431.)Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the
evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in
their right to know and meet the case against them. It should
not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law

is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal

methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts
material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may
be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining
the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are
only advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The
Court of Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or
agricultural dispute of any matter under its consideration or
advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal, a
justice of the peace or any public official in any part of the
Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation, and
may delegate to such board or public official such powers and
functions as the said Court of Industrial Relations may deem
necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the exercise of
the Court itself of any of its powers (Section 10, ibid.)
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges,
therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration
of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept
the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be
that the volume of work is such that it is literally impossible for
the titular heads of the Court of Industrial Relations personally
to decide all controversies coming before them. In the United
States the difficulty is solved with the enactment of statutory
authority authorizing examiners or other subordinates to render
final decision, with right to appeal to board or commission, but
in our case there is no such statutory authority.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties
to the proceeding can know the vario issues involved, and the
reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this
duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
In the light of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is
sufficient to observe here that, except as to the alleged
agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Workers'
Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and does not
satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in
a rational way, a conclusion of law.

Inc. In the portion of the petition hereinabove quoted of the

National Labor Union, Inc., it is alleged that "the supposed lack
of leather material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a
scheme adopted to systematically discharge all the members
of the National Labor Union, Inc., from work" and this averment
is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the "records of the
Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native
dealers in leather"; that "the National Workers' Brotherhood
Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated
by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are
illegal." Petitioner further alleges under oath that the exhibits
attached to the petition to prove his substantial averments "are
so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the exercise
of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained
them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial
Relations", and that the documents attached to the petition
"are of such far reaching importance and effect that their
admission would necessarily mean the modification and
reversal of the judgment rendered therein." We have
considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its arguments against
the petition. By and large, after considerable discussion, we
have come to the conclusion that the interest of justice would
be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at
the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such
other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved.
The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations
and under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the
fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the
parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion
for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby granted, and
the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of
Industrial Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case,
receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise
proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth
hereinabove. So ordered.

Avancea,
C.J.,
Villa-Real,
Concepcion and Moran, JJ., concur.

Imperial,

Diaz,

This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of

a new trial prayed for by the respondent National Labor Union,

||| (Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. 46496,

[February 27, 1940], 69 PHIL 635-645)

RULE MAKING POWER

KAPUNAN, J p:

PRINCIPLE OF NON-DELEGATION OF POWERS

Public utilities are privately owned and operated businesses

whose service are essential to the general public. They are
enterprises which specially cater to the needs of the public and
conduce to their comfort and convenience. As such, public
utility services are impressed with public interest and concern.
The same is true with respect to the business of common
carrier which holds such a peculiar relation to the public
interest that there is superinduced upon it the right of public
regulation when private properties are affected with public
interest, hence, they cease to be juris privati only. When,
therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public
has an interest, he, in effect grants to the public an interest in
that use, and must submit to the control by the public for the
common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus
created. 1

2. KMU v. GARCIA
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 115381. December 23, 1994.]
KILUSANG
MAYO
UNO
LABOR
CENTER, petitioner, vs. HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, JR., the
LAND
TRANSPORTATION
FRANCHISING
AND
REGULATORY BOARD, and the PROVINCIAL BUSES
OPERATORS
ASSOCIATION
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION

An abdication of the licensing and regulatory government

agencies of their functions as the instant petition seeks to
show, is indeed lamentable. Not only is it an unsound
administrative policy but it is inimical to public trust and public
interest as well.
The instant petition for certiorari assails the constitutionality
and validity of certain memoranda, circulars and/or orders of
the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC) and the Land Transportation Franchising and
Regulatory Board LTFRB) 2 which, among others, (a)
authorize provincial bus and jeepney operators to increase or
decrease the prescribed transportation fares without
application therefor with the LTFRB and without hearing and
approval thereof by said agency in violation of Sec. 16(c)
of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, otherwise known
as the Public Service Act, and in derogation of LTFRB's duty to
fix and determine just and reasonable fares by delegating that
function to bus operators, and (b) establish a presumption of
public need in favor of applicants for certificates of public
convenience (CPC) and place on the oppositor the burden of
proving that there is no need for the proposed service, in
patent violation not only of Sec. 16(c) of CA 146, as amended,
but also of Sec. 20(a) of the same Act mandating that fares
should be "just and reasonable." It is, likewise, violative of the
Rules of Court which places upon each party the burden to
prove his own affirmative allegations. 3 The offending
provisions contained in the questioned issuances pointed out
by petitioner, have resulted in the introduction into our
highways and thoroughfares thousands of old and smokebelching buses, many of which are right-hand driven, and have
exposed our consumers to the burden of spiraling costs of
public transportation without hearing and due process. cdrep
The following memoranda, circulars and/or orders are sought
to be nullified by the instant petition, viz: (a) DOTC
Memorandum Order 90-395, dated June 26, 1990 relative to
the implementation of a fare range scheme for provincial bus
services in the country; (b) DOTC Department Order No. 92587, dated March 30, 1992, defining the policy framework on
the regulation of transport services; (c) DOTC Memorandum
dated October 8, 1992, laying down rules and procedures to
implement Department Order No. 92-587; (d) LTFRB
Memorandum Circular No. 92-009, providing implementing
guidelines on the DOTC Department Order No. 92-587; and (e)
LTFRB Order dated March 24, 1994 in Case No. 94-3112.
The relevant antecedents are as follows:
On June 26, 1990, then Secretary of DOTC, Oscar M. Orbos,
issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-395 to then LTFRB
Chairman, Remedios A.S. Fernando allowing provincial bus
operators to charge passengers rates within a range of 15%
above and 15% below the LTFRB official rate for a period of
one (1) year. The text of the memorandum order reads in full:
One of the policy reforms and measures that is in line with the
thrusts and the priorities set out in the Medium-Term Philippine
Development Plan (MTPDP) 1987 1992) is the liberalization
of regulations in the transport sector. Along this line, the
Government intends to move away gradually from regulatory

policies and make progress towards greater reliance on free

market forces.
Based on several surveys and observations, bus companies
are already charging passenger rates above and below the
official fare declared by LTFRB on many provincial routes. It is
in this context that some form of liberalization on public
transport fares is to be tested on a pilot basis.
In view thereof, the LTFRB is hereby directed to immediately
publicize a fare range scheme for all provincial bus routes in
country
(except
those
operating
within
Metro
Manila). Transport operators shall be allowed to charge
passengers within a range of fifteen percent (15%) above and
fifteen percent (15%) below the LTFRB official rate for a period
of one year.
Guidelines and procedures for the said scheme shall be
prepared by LTFRB in coordination with the DOTC Planning
Service.
The implementation of the said fare range scheme shall start
on 6 August 1990.
For compliance. (Emphasis ours.)
Finding the implementation of the fare range scheme "not
legally feasible," Remedios A.S. Fernando submitted the
following memorandum to Oscar M. Orbos on July 24, 1990, to
wit:
With reference to DOTC Memorandum Order No. 90-395
dated 26 June 1990 which the LTFRB received on 19 July
1990, directing the Board "to immediately publicize a fare
range scheme for all provincial bus routes in the country
(except those operating within Metro Manila)" that will allow
operators "to charge passengers within a range of fifteen
percent (15%) above and fifteen percent (15%) below the
LTFRB official rate for a period of one year" the undersigned is
respectfully adverting the Secretary's attention to the following
for his consideration:
1. Section 16 (c) of the Public Service Act prescribes the
following for the fixing and determination of rates -- (a) the
rates to be approved should be proposed by public service
operators; (b) there should be a publication and notice to
concerned or affected parties in the territory affected; (c) a
public hearing should be held for the fixing of the rates; hence,
implementation of the proposed fare range scheme on August
6 without complying with the requirements of the Public
Service Act may not be legally feasible.
2. To allow bus operators in the country to charge fares fifteen
(15%) above the present LTFRB fares in the wake of the
devastation, death and suffering caused by the July 16
earthquake will not be socially warranted and will be politically
unsound; most likely public criticism against the DOTC and the
LTFRB will be triggered by the untimely motu propio
implementation of the proposal by the mere expedient of
publicizing the fare range scheme without calling a public
hearing, which scheme many as early as during the
Secretary's predecessor know through newspaper reports and

columnists' comments to be Asian Development Bank and

World Bank inspired.

REGULAR P1.60 P0.375

STUDENT P1.20 P0.285

3. More than inducing a reduction in bus fares by fifteen

percent (15%) the implementation of the proposal will instead
trigger an upward adjustment in bus fares by fifteen percent
(15%) at a time when hundreds of thousands of people in
Central and Northern Luzon, particularly in Central
Pangasinan, La Union, Baguio City, Nueva Ecija, and the
Cagayan Valley are suffering from the devastation and havoc
caused by the recent earthquake.

FIRST CLASS (PER KM.)

4. In lieu of the said proposal, the DOTC with its agencies

involved in public transportation can consider measures and
reforms in the industry that will be socially uplifting, especially
for the people in the areas devastated by the recent
earthquake.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the undersigned
respectfully suggests that the implementation of the proposed
fare range scheme this year be further studied and evaluated.
On December 5, 1990, private respondent Provincial Bus
Operators Association of the Philippines, Inc. (PBOAP) filed an
application for fare rate increase. An across-the-board increase
of eight and a half centavos (P0.085) per kilometer for all types
of provincial buses with a minimum-maximum fare range of
fifteen (15%) percent over and below the proposed basic per
kilometer fare rate, with the said minimum-maximum fare
range applying only to ordinary, first class and premium class
buses and a fifty-centavo (P0.50) minimum per kilometer fare
for aircon buses, was sought.
On December 6, 1990, private respondent PBOAP reduced its
applied proposed fare to an across-the-board increase of six
and a half (P0.065) centavos per kilometer for ordinary buses.
The decrease was due to the drop in the expected price of
diesel. llcd

LUZON P0.385
VISAYAS/MINDANAO P0.395
PREMIERE CLASS (PER KM.)
LUZON P0.395
VISAYAS/ MINDANAO P0.405
AIRCON (PER KM.) P0.415.4
On March 30, 1992, then Secretary of the Department of
Transportation and Communications Pete Nicomedes Prado
issued Department Order No. 92-587 defining the policy
framework on the regulation of transport services. The full text
of the said order is reproduced below in view of the importance
of the provisions contained therein:

WHEREAS, Executive Order No. 125 as amended, designates

the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC) as the primary policy, planning, regulating and
implementing agency on transportation;
WHEREAS, to achieve the objective of a viable, efficient, and
dependable transportation system, the transportation
regulatory agencies under or attached to the DOTC have to
harmonize their decisions and adopt a common philosophy
and direction;
WHEREAS, the government proposes to build on the
successful liberalization measures pursued over the last five
years and bring the transport sector nearer to a balanced
longer term regulatory framework;

The application was opposed by the Philippine Consumers

Foundation, Inc. and Perla C. Bautista alleging that the
proposed rates were exorbitant and unreasonable and that the
application contained no allegation on the rate of return of the
proposed increase in rates.

NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to the powers granted by laws

to the DOTC, the following policies and principles in the
economic regulation of land, air, and water transportation
services are hereby adopted:

On December 14, 1990, public respondent LTFRB rendered a

decision granting the fare rate increase in accordance with the
following schedule of fares on a straight computation method,
viz:

1. Entry into and exit out of the industry. Following the

Constitutional dictum against monopoly, no franchise holder
shall be permitted to maintain a monopoly on any route. A
minimum of two franchise holders shall be permitted to operate
on any route.

AUTHORIZED FARES
LUZON
MIN. OF 5 KMS. SUCCEEDING KM.
REGULAR P1.50 P0.37
STUDENT P1.15 P0.28

VISAYAS/MINDANAO

The requirements to grant a certificate to operate, or certificate

of public convenience, shall be: proof of Filipino citizenship,
financial capability, public need, and sufficient insurance cover
to protect the riding public.
In determining public need, the presumption of need for a
service shall be deemed in favor of the applicant. The burden
of proving that there is no need for a proposed service shall be
with the oppositor(s).
In the interest of providing efficient public transport services,
the use of the 'prior operator' and the 'priority of filing' rules

shall be discontinued. The route measured capacity test or

other similar tests of demand for vehicle/vessel fleet on any
route shall be used only as a guide in weighing the merits of
each franchise application and not as a limit to the services
offered.
Where there are limitations in facilities, such as congested
road space in urban areas, or at airports and ports, the use of
demand management measures in conformity with market
principles may be considered.
The right of an operator to leave the industry is recognized as
a business decision, subject only to the filing of appropriate
notice and following a phase-out period, to inform the public
and to minimize disruption of services.
2. Rate and Fare Setting. Freight rates shall be freed gradually
from government controls. Passenger fares shall also be
deregulated, except for the lowest class of passenger service
(normally third class passenger transport) for which the
government will fix indicative or reference fares. Operators of
particular services may fix their own fares within a range 15%
above and below the indicative or reference rate.

the LTFRB suggesting swift action on the adoption of rules and

procedures to implement above-quoted Department Order No.
92-587 that laid down deregulation and other liberalization
policies for the transport sector. Attached to the said
memorandum was a revised draft of the required rules and
procedures covering (i) Entry Into and Exit Out of the Industry
and (ii) Rate and Fare Setting, with comments and suggestions
from the World Bank incorporated therein. Likewise,
resplendant from the said memorandum is the statement of the
DOTC Secretary that the adoption of the rules and procedures
is a pre-requisite to the approval of the Economic Integration
Loan from the World Bank. 5
On February 17, 1993, the LTFRB issued Memorandum
Circular No. 92-009 promulgating the guidelines for the
implementation of DOTC Department Order No. 92-587. The
Circular provides, among others, the following challenged
portions:
xxx xxx xxx
IV. Policy Guidelines on the Issuance of Certificate of Public
Convenience:

Where there is lack of effective competition for services, or on

specific routes, or for the transport of particular commodities,
maximum mandatory freight rates or passenger fares shall be
set temporarily by the government pending actions to increase
the level of competition.

The issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience is

determined by public need. The presumption of public need for
a service shall be deemed in favor of the applicant, while
burden of proving that there is no need for the proposed
service shall be the oppositor's.

For unserved or single operator routes, the government shall

contract such services in the most advantageous terms to the
public and the government, following public bids for the
services. The advisability of bidding out the services or using
other kinds of incentives on such routes shall be studied by the
government.

xxx xxx xxx

3. Special Incentives and Financing for Fleet Acquisition. As a

matter of policy, the government shall not engage in special
financing and incentive programs, including direct subsidies for
fleet acquisition and expansion. Only when the market situation
warrants government intervention shall programs of this type
be considered. Existing programs shall be phased out
gradually.
The Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board,
the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Maritime Industry Authority are
hereby directed to submit to the office of the Secretary, within
forty-five (45) days of this Order, the detailed rules and
procedures for the Implementation of the policies herein set
forth. In the formulation of such rules, the concerned agencies
shall be guided by the most recent studies on the subjects,
such as the Provincial Road Passenger Transport Study, the
Civil Aviation Master Plan, the Presidential Task Force on the
Inter-island Shipping Industry, and the Inter-island Liner
Shipping Rate Rationalization Study.
For the compliance of all concerned. (Emphasis ours)
On October 8, 1992, public respondent Secretary of the
Department of Transportation and Communications Jesus B.
Garcia, Jr. issued a memorandum to the Acting Chairman of

V. Rate and Fare Setting

The control in pricing shall be liberalized to introduce price
competition complementary with the quality of service, subject
to prior notice and public hearing. Fares shall not be
provisionally authorized without public hearing.
A. On the General Structure of Rates
1. The existing authorized fare range system of plus or minus
15 per cent for provincial buses and jeepneys shall be widened
to 20% and -25% limit in 1994 with the authorized fare to be
replaced by an indicative or reference rate as the basis for the
expanded fare range.
2. Fare systems for aircon buses are liberalized to cover first
class and premier services.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis ours).
Sometime in March, 1994, private respondent PBOAP, availing
itself of the deregulation policy of the DOTC allowing provincial
bus operators to collect plus 20% and minus 25% of the
prescribed fare without first having filed a petition for the
purpose and without the benefit of a public hearing, announced
a fare increase of twenty (20%) percent of the existing fares.
Said increased fares were to be made effective on March 16,
1994.

On March 16, 1994, petitioner KMU filed a petition before the

LTFRB opposing the upward adjustment of bus fares.
On March 24, 1994, the LTFRB issued one of the assailed
orders dismissing the petition for lack of merit. The dispositive
portion reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Board after considering the
arguments of the parties, hereby DISMISSES FOR LACK OF
MERIT the petition filed in the above-entitled case. This petition
in this case was resolved with dispatch at the request of
petitioner to enable it to immediately avail of the legal remedies
or options it is entitled under existing laws.
SO ORDERED.6
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari with an urgent prayer
for issuance of a temporary restraining order.
The Court, on June 20, 1994, issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining, prohibiting and preventing respondents from
implementing the bus fare rate increase as well as the
questioned orders and memorandum circulars. This meant that
provincial bus fares were rolled back to the levels duly
authorized by the LTFRB prior to March 16, 1994. A
moratorium was likewise enforced on the issuance of
franchises for the operation of buses, jeepneys, and taxicabs.
Petitioner KMU anchors its claim on two (2) grounds. First, the
authority given by respondent LTFRB to provincial bus
operators to set a fare range of plus or minus fifteen (15)
percent, later increased to plus twenty (20%) and minus
twenty-five (-25%) percent, over and above the existing
authorized fare without having to file a petition for the purpose,
is unconstitutional, invalid and illegal. Second, the
establishment of a presumption of public need in favor of an
applicant for a proposed transport service without having to
prove public necessity, is illegal for being violative of the Public
Service Act and the Rules of Court.
In its Comment, private respondent PBOAP, while not actually
touching upon the issues raised by the petitioner, questions the
wisdom and the manner by which the instant petition was filed.
It asserts that the petitioner has no legal standing to sue or has
no real interest in the case at bench and in obtaining the reliefs
prayed for.
In their Comment filed by the Office of the Solicitor General,
public respondents DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia, Jr. and
the LTFRB asseverate that the petitioner does not have the
standing to maintain the instant suit. They further claim that it is
within DOTC and LTFRB's authority to set a fare range scheme
and establish a presumption of public need in applications for
certificates of public convenience.
We find the instant petition impressed with merit.
At the outset, the threshold issue of locus standi must be
struck. Petitioner KMU has the standing to sue.

The requirement of locus standi inheres from the definition of

judicial
power. Section
1
of
Article
VIII
of the
Constitution provides:

xxx xxx xxx

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
In Lamb v. Phipps,7 we ruled that judicial power is the power to
hear and decide causes pending between parties who have
the right to sue in the courts of law and equity. Corollary to this
provision is the principle of locus standi of a party litigant. One
who is directly affected by and whose interest is immediate and
substantial in the controversy has the standing to sue. The rule
therefore requires that a party must show a personal stake in
the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be
redressed by a favorable decision so as to warrant an
invocation of the court's jurisdiction and to justify the exercise
of the court's remedial powers in his behalf. 8
In the case at bench, petitioner, whose members had suffered
and continue to suffer grave and irreparable injury and damage
from the implementation of the questioned memoranda,
circulars and/or orders, has shown that it has a clear legal right
that was violated and continues to be violated with the
enforcement of the challenged memoranda, circulars and/or
orders. KMU members, who avail of the use of buses, trains
and jeepneys everyday, are directly affected by the
burdensome cost of arbitrary increase in passenger fares.
They are part of the millions of commuters who comprise the
riding public. Certainly, their rights must be protected, not
neglected nor ignored. cdll
Assuming arguendo that petitioner is not possessed of the
standing to sue, this court is ready to brush aside this barren
procedural infirmity and recognize the legal standing of the
petitioner in view of the transcendental importance of the
issues raised. And this act of liberality is not without judicial
precedent. As early as theEmergency Powers Cases, this
Court had exercised its discretion and waived the requirement
of proper party. In the recent case of Kilosbayan, Inc., et al. v.
Teofisto Guingona, Jr., et al., 9 we ruled in the same lines and
enumerated some of the cases where the same policy was
adopted, viz:
. . . A party's standing before this Court is a procedural
technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set
aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. In the
landmark Emergency Powers Cases, [G.R. No. L-2044
(Araneta v. Dinglasan); G.R. No. L-2756 (Araneta v. Angeles);
G.R. No. L-3054 (Rodriguez v. Tesorero de Filipinas); G.R. No.
L-3055 (Guerrero v. Commissioner of Customs); and G.R. No.
L-3056 (Barredo v. Commission on Elections), 84 Phil. 368
(1949)], this Court brushed aside this technicality because 'the

transcendental importance to the public of these cases

demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing
aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. (Avelino vs.
Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2621).' Insofar as taxpayers' suits are
concerned, this Court had declared that it 'is not devoid of
discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained,' (Tan v.
Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677, 680 [1972]) or that it 'enjoys an
open discretion to entertain the same or not.' [Sanidad v.
COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333 (1976)].
xxx xxx xxx
In line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi,
ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and even
association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations were
allowed to initiate and prosecute actions before this court to
question the constitutionality or validity of laws, acts, decisions,
rulings, or orders of various government agencies or
instrumentalities. Among such cases were those assailing the
constitutionality of (a) R.A. No. 3836 insofar as it allows
retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave
to Senators and Representatives and to elective officials of
both Houses of Congress (Philippine ConstitutionAssociation,
Inc. v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 [1965]); (b) Executive Order No.
284, issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on 25 July 1987,
which allowed members of the cabinet, their undersecretaries,
and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or
positions (Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194
SCRA 317 [1991]); (c) the automatic appropriation for debt
service in the General Appropriations Act (Guingona v.
Carague, 196 SCRA 221 [1991]; (d) R.A. No. 7056 on the
holding of desynchronized elections (Osmea v. Commission
on Elections, 199 SCRA 750 [1991]; (e) P.D. No. 1869 (the
charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation)
on the ground that it is contrary to morals, public policy, and
order (Basco v. Philippine Gaming and Amusement Corp., 197
SCRA 52 [1991]); and (f) R.A. No. 6975, establishing the
Philippine National Police. (Carpio v. Executive Secretary, 206
SCRA 290 [1992]).
Other cases where we have followed a liberal policy
regarding locus standi include those attacking the validity or
legality of (a) an order allowing the importation of rice in the
light of the prohibition imposed by R.A. No. 3452 (Iloilo Palay
and Corn Planters Association, Inc. v. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377
[1965]; (b) P.D. Nos. 991 and 1033 insofar as they proposed
amendments to the Constitution and P.D. No. 1031 insofar as it
directed the COMELEC to supervise, control, hold, and
conduct the referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976
(Sanidad v. Commission on Elections, supra); (c) the bidding
for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of land at Roppongi,
Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan (Laurel v. Garcia, 187 SCRA 797
[1990]); (d) the approval without hearing by the Board of
Investments of the amended application of the Bataan
Petrochemical Corporation to transfer the site of its plant from
Bataan to Batangas and the validity of such transfer and the
shift of feedstock from naphtha only to naphtha and/or liquefied
petroleum gas (Garcia v. Board of Investments, 177 SCRA 374
[1989]; Garcia v. Board of Investments, 191 SCRA 288 [1990]);
(e) the decisions, orders, rulings, and resolutions of the
Executive Secretary, Secretary of Finance, Commissioner of

Internal Revenue, Commissioner of Customs, and the Fiscal

Incentives Review Board exempting the National Power
Corporation from indirect tax and duties (Maceda v. Macaraig,
197 SCRA 771 [1991]); (f) the orders of the Energy Regulatory
Board of 5 and 6 December 1990 on the ground that the
hearings conducted on the second provisional increase in oil
prices did not allow the petitioner substantial crossexamination; (Maceda v. Energy Regulatory Board, 199 SCRA
454 [1991]); (g) Executive Order No. 478 which levied a
special duty of P0.95 per liter of imported oil products (Garcia
v. Executive Secretary, 211 SCRA 219 [1992]); (h) resolutions
of the Commission on Elections concerning the apportionment,
by district, of the number of elective members of Sanggunians
(De Guia vs. Commission on Elections, 208 SCRA 420 [1992]);
and (i) memorandum orders issued by a Mayor affecting the
Chief of Police of Pasay City (Pasay Law and Conscience
Union, Inc. v. Cuneta, 101 SCRA 662 [1980]).
In the 1975 case of Aquino v. Commission on Elections (62
SCRA 275 [1975]), this Court, despite its unequivocal ruling
that the petitioners therein had no personality to file the
petition, resolved nevertheless to pass upon the issues raised
because of the far-reaching implications of the petition. We did
no less in De Guia v. COMELEC (Supra) where, although we
declared that De Guia 'does not appear to have locus standi, a
standing in law, a personal or substantial interest,' we brushed
aside the procedural infirmity 'considering the importance of
the issue involved, concerning as it does the political exercise
of qualified voters affected by the apportionment, and petitioner
alleging abuse of discretion and violation of the Constitution by
respondent.'
Now on the merits of the case.
On the fare range scheme.
Section 16 (c) of the Public Service Act, as amended, reads:
Sec. 16. Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and
hearing. The Commission shall have power, upon proper
notice and hearing in accordance with the rules and provisions
of this Act, subject to the limitations and exceptions mentioned
and saving provisions to the contrary:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, tolls, charges,
classifications, or schedules thereof, as well as commutation,
mileage kilometrage, and other special rates which shall be
imposed, observed, and followed thereafter by any public
service: Provided, That the Commission may, in its discretion,
approve rates proposed by public services provisionally and
without necessity of any hearing; but it shall call a hearing
thereon within thirty days thereafter, upon publication and
notice to the concerns operating in the territory
affected: Provided, further, That in case the public service
equipment of an operator is used principally or secondarily for
the promotion of a private business, the net profits of said
private business shall be considered in relation with the public
service of such operator for the purpose of fixing the rates.
(Emphasis ours).

xxx xxx xxx

Under the foregoing provision, the Legislature delegated to the
defunct Public Service Commission the power of fixing the
rates of public services. Respondent LTFRB, the existing
regulatory body today, is likewise vested with the same
under Executive Order No. 202 dated June 19, 1987. Section 5
(c) of the said executive order authorizes LTFRB "to determine,
prescribe, approve and periodically review and adjust,
reasonable fares, rates and other related charges, relative to
the operation of public land transportation services provided by
motorized vehicles."

Such delegation of legislative power to an administrative

agency is permitted in order to adapt to the increasing
complexity of modern life. As subjects for governmental
regulation multiply, so does the difficulty of administering the
laws. Hence, specialization even in legislation has become
necessary. Given the task of determining sensitive and delicate
matters as route-fixing and rate-making for the transport sector,
the responsible regulatory body is entrusted with the power of
subordinate legislation. With this authority, an administrative
body and in this case, the LTFRB, may implement broad
policies laid down in a statute by "filling in" the details which
the Legislature may neither have time or competence to
provide. However, nowhere under the aforesaid provisions of
law are the regulatory bodies, the PSC and LTFRB alike,
authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier, a
transport operator, or other public service.
In the case at bench, the authority given by the LTFRB to the
provincial bus operators to set a fare range over and above the
authorized existing fare, is illegal and invalid as it is tantamount
to an undue delegation of legislative authority. Potestas
delegata non delegari potest. What has been delegated cannot
be delegated. This doctrine is based on the ethical principle
that such as delegated power constitutes not only a right but a
duty to be performed by the delegate through the
instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the
intervening mind of another. 11 The policy of allowing the
provincial bus operators to change and increase their fares at
will would result not only to a chaotic situation but to an
anarchic state of affairs. This would leave the riding public at
the mercy of transport operators who may increase fares every
hour, every day, every month or every year, whenever it
pleases them or whenever they deem it "necessary" to do so.
In Panay Autobus Co. v. Philippine Railway Co., 12 where
respondent Philippine Railway Co. was granted by the Public
Service Commission the authority to change its freight rates at
will, this Court categorically declared that:
In our opinion, the Public Service Commission was not
authorized by law to delegate to the Philippine Railway Co. the
power of altering its freight rates whenever it should find it
necessary to do so in order to meet the competition of road
trucks and autobuses, or to change its freight rates at will, or to
regard its present rates as maximum rates, and to fix lower
rates whenever in the opinion of the Philippine Railway Co. it
would be to its advantage to do so.

The mere recital of the language of the application of the

Philippine Railway Co. is enough to show that it is
untenable. The Legislature has delegated to the Public Service
Commission the power of fixing the rates of public services,
but it has not authorized the Public Service Commission to
delegate that power to a common carrier or other public
service. The rates of public services like the Philippine Railway
Co. have been approved or fixed by the Public Service
Commission, and any change in such rates must be authorized
or approved by the Public Service Commission after they have
been shown to be just and reasonable. The public service may,
of course, propose new rates, as the Philippine Railway Co.
did in case No. 31827, but it cannot lawfully make said new
rates effective without the approval of the Public Service
Commission, and the Public Service Commission itself cannot
authorize a public service to enforce new rates without the
prior approval of said rates by the commission. The
commission must approve new rates when they are submitted
to it, if the evidence shows them to be just and reasonable,
otherwise it must disapprove them. Clearly, the commission
cannot determine in advance whether or not the new rates of
the Philippine Railway Co. will be just and reasonable,
because it does not know what those rates will be.
In the present case the Philippine Railway Co. in effect asked
for permission to change its freight rates at will. It may change
them every day or every hour, whenever it deems it necessary
to do so in order to meet competition or whenever in its opinion
it would be to its advantage. Such a procedure would create a
most unsatisfactory state of affairs and largely defeat the
purposes of the public service law. 13 (Emphasis ours).
One veritable consequence of the deregulation of transport
fares is a compounded fare. If transport operators will be
authorized to impose and collect an additional amount
equivalent to 20% over and above the authorized fare over a
period of time, this will unduly prejudice a commuter who will
be made to pay a fare that has been computed in a manner
similar to those of compounded bank interest rates.
Picture this situation. On December 14, 1990, the LTFRB
authorized provincial bus operators to collect a thirty-seven
(P0.37) centavo per kilometer fare for ordinary buses. At the
same time, they were allowed to impose and collect a fare
range of plus or minus 15% over the authorized rate. Thus
P0.37 centavo per kilometer authorized fare plus P0.05
centavos (which is 15% of P0.37 centavo) is equivalent to
P0.42 centavos, the allowed rate in 1990. Supposing the
LTFRB grants another five (P0.05) centavo increase per
kilometer in 1994, then, the base or reference for computation
would have to be P0.47 centavos (which is P0.42 + P0.05
centavos). If bus operators will exercise their authority to
impose an additional 20% over and above the authorized fare,
then the fare to be collected shall amount to P0.56 (that is,
P0.47 authorized LTFRB rate plus 20% of P0.47 which is
P0.29). In effect, commuters will be continuously subject, not
only to a double fare adjustment but to a compounding fare as
well. On their part, transport operators shall enjoy a bigger
chunk of the pie. Aside from fare increase applied for, they can
still collect an additional amount by virtue of the authorized fare

range. Mathematically, the situation translates into the

following:
Year * LTFRB Fare
authorized collected
rate ** per kilometer

Range Fare

1990 P0.37 15%

1994 P0.42
+
0.05
=
0.47 20%
1998 P0.56
+
0.05
=
0.61 20%
2002 P0.73 + 0.05 = 0.78 20% (P0.16) P0.94

to

be

(P0.05) P0.42
(P0.09) P0.56
(P0.12) P0.73

Moreover, rate making or rate fixing is not an easy task. It is a

delicate and sensitive government function that requires
dexterity of judgment and sound discretion with the settled goal
of arriving at a just and reasonable rate acceptable to both the
public utility and the public. Several factors, in fact, have to be
taken into consideration before a balance could be achieved. A
rate should not be confiscatory as would place an operator in a
situation where he will continue to operate at a loss. Hence,
the rate should enable public utilities to generate revenues
sufficient to cover operational costs and provide reasonable
return on the investments. On the other hand, a rate which is
too high becomes discriminatory. It is contrary to public
interest. A rate, therefore, must be reasonable and fair and
must beaffordable to the end user who will utilize the services.
Given the complexity of the nature of the function of rate-fixing
and its far-reaching effects on millions of commuters,
government must not relinquish this important function in favor
of those who would benefit and profit from the industry. Neither
should the requisite notice and hearing be done away with.
The people, represented by reputable oppositors, deserve to
be given full opportunity to be heard in their opposition to any
fare increase.
The present administrative procedure, 14 to our mind, already
mirrors an orderly and satisfactory arrangement for all parties
involved. To do away with such a procedure and allow just one
party, an interested party at that, to determine what the rate
should be will undermine the right of the other parties to due
process. The purpose of a hearing is precisely to determine
what a just and reasonable rate is. 15 Discarding such
procedural and constitutional right is certainly inimical to our
fundamental law and to public interest.
On the presumption of public need.
A certificate of public convenience (CPC) is an authorization
granted by the LTFRB for the operation of land transportation
services for public use as required by law. Pursuant to Section
16(a) of the Public Service Act, as amended, the following
requirements must be met before a CPC may be granted, to
wit: (i) the applicant must be a citizen of the Philippines, or a
corporation or co-partnership, association or joint-stock
company constituted and organized under the laws of the
Philippines, at least 60 per centum of its stock or paid-up
capital must belong entirely to citizens of the Philippines; (ii)
the applicant must be financially capable of undertaking the
proposed service and meeting the responsibilities incident to
its operation; and (iii) the applicant must prove that the

operation of the public service proposed and the authorization

to do business will promote the public interest in a proper and
suitable manner. It is understood that there must be proper
notice and hearing before the PSC can exercise its power to
issue a CPC.
While adopting in toto the foregoing requisites for the issuance
of a CPC, LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 92-009, Part IV,
provides for yet incongruous and contradictory policy guideline
on the issuance of a CPC. The guidelines states:
The issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience is
determined by public need. The presumption of public need for
a service shall be deemed in favor of the applicant, while the
burden of proving that there is no need for the proposed
service shall be the oppositor's. (Emphasis ours).
The above-quoted provision is entirely incompatible and
inconsistent with Section 16(c)(iii) of the Public Service
Act which requires that before a CPC will be issued, the
applicant must prove by proper notice and hearing that the
operation of the public service proposed will promote public
interest in a proper and suitable manner. On the contrary, the
policy guideline states that the presumption of public need for a
public service shall be deemed in favor of the applicant. In
case of conflict between a statute and an administrative order,
the former must prevail.

By its terms, public convenience or necessity generally means

something fitting or suited to the public need. 16 As one of the
basic requirements for the grant of a CPC, public convenience
and necessity exists when the proposed facility or service
meets a reasonable want of the public and supply a need
which the existing facilities do not adequately supply. The
existence or non-existence of public convenience and
necessity is therefore a question of fact that must be
established by evidence, real and/or testimonial; empirical
data; statistics and such other means necessary, in a public
hearing conducted for that purpose. The object and purpose of
such procedure, among other things, is to look out for, and
protect, the interests of both the public and the existing
transport operators.
Verily, the power of a regulatory body to issue a CPC is
founded on the condition that after full-dress hearing and
investigation, it shall find, as a fact, that the proposed operation
is for the convenience of the public. 17 Basic convenience is
the primary consideration for which a CPC is issued, and that
fact alone must be consistently borne in mind. Also, existing
operators is subject routes must be given an opportunity to
offer proof and oppose the application. Therefore, an applicant
must, at all times, be required to prove his capacity and
capability to furnish the service which he has undertaken to
render. 18 And all this will be possible only if a public hearing
were conducted for that purpose. LLjur
Otherwise stated, the establishment of public need in favor of
an applicant reverses well-settled and institutionalized judicial,
quasi-judicial and administrative procedures. It allows the party

who initiates the proceedings to prove, by mere application, his

affirmative allegations. Moreover, the offending provisions of
the LTFRB memorandum circular in question would in effect
amend the Rules of Court by adding another disputable
presumption in the enumeration of 37 presumptions
under Rule 131, Section 5 of the Rules of Court. Such
usurpation of this Court's authority cannot be countenanced as
only this Court is mandated by law to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure. 19

||| (Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center v. Garcia, Jr., G.R. No.
115381, [December 23, 1994])

Deregulation, while it may be ideal in certain situations, may

not be ideal at all in our country given the present
circumstances. Advocacy of liberalized franchising and
regulatory process is tantamount to an abdication by the
government of its inherent right to exercise police power, that
is, the right of government to regulate public utilities for
protection of the public and the utilities themselves.

EN BANC

While we recognize the authority of the DOTC and the LTFRB

to issue administrative orders to regulate the transport sector,
we find that they committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing DOTC Department Order No. 92-587 defining the
policy framework on the regulation of transport services and
LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 92-009 promulgating the
implementing guidelines on DOTC Department Order No. 92587, the said administrative issuances being amendatory and
violative of the Public Service Act and the Rules of Court.
Consequently, we rule that the twenty (20%) per centum fare
increase imposed by respondent PBOAP on March 16, 1994
without the benefit of a petition and a public hearing is null and
void and of no force and effect. No grave abuse of discretion
however was committed in the issuance of DOTC
Memorandum Order No. 90-395 and DOTC Memorandum
dated October 8, 1992, the same being merely internal
communications between administrative officers.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is
hereby GRANTED and the challenged administrative
issuances and orders, namely: DOTC Department Order No.
92-587, LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 92-009, and the
order dated March 24, 1994 issued by respondent LTFRB are
hereby DECLARED contrary to law and invalid insofar as they
affect provisions therein (a) delegating to provincial bus and
jeepney operators the authority to increase or decrease the
duly prescribed transportation fares; and (b) creating a
presumption of public need for a service in favor of the
applicant for a certificate of public convenience and placing the
burden of proving that there is no need for the proposed
service to the oppositor. LexLib
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on June 20, 1994 is
hereby MADE PERMANENT insofar as it enjoined the bus fare
rate increase granted under the provisions of the
aforementioned administrative circulars, memoranda and/or
orders declared invalid.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ., concur.

ISSUES ON RULE-MAKING POWER

A. PERMISSIBILITY OF DELEGATION
3. PASEI v. TORRES

[G.R. No. 101279. August 6, 1992.]

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS,
INC. petitioner, vs. HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, as Secretary
of the Department of Labor & Employment, and JOSE N.
SARMIENTO, as Administrator of the PHILIPPINE
OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION, respondents.
De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for petitioner.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES;
VESTURE OF QUASI LEGISLATIVE AND QUASI JUDICIAL
POWERS. The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasijudicial powers in administrative bodies is not unconstitutional,
unreasonable and oppressive. It has been necessitated by "the
growing complexity of the modern society" (Solid Homes,
Inc. vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72, 79). More and more
administrative bodies are necessary to help in the regulation of
society's ramified activities. "Specialized in the particular field
assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with
more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the
legislature or the courts of justice."
2. LABOR LAW; OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT; DOLE AND
POEA CIRCULARS; POWER TO RESTRICT AND REGULATE
INVOLVES A GRANT OF POLICE POWER. It is noteworthy
that the assailed circulars do not prohibit the petitioner from
engaging in the recruitment and deployment of Filipino
landbased workers for overseas employment. A careful reading
of the challenged administrative issuances discloses that the
same fall within the "administrative and policing powers
expressly or by necessary implication conferred" upon the
respondents (People vs. Maceren, 79 SCRA 450). The power
to "restrict and regulate conferred by Article 36 of the Labor
Code involves a grant of police power (City of Naga vs. Court
of Appeals, 24 SCRA 898). To "restrict" means "to confine, limit
or stop" and whereas the power to "regulate" means "the
power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control with
due regard for the interests, first and foremost, of the public,
then of the utility and of its patrons" (Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation vs. Alcuaz, 180 SCRA
218).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; INVALID FOR LACK OF PROPER
PUBLICATION AND FILING IN THE OFFICE OF NATIONAL
ADMINISTRATIVE REGISTER. Nevertheless, the DOLE

and POEA circulars are legally invalid, defective and

unenforceable for lack of proper publication and filing in the
Office of the National Administrative Register as required in
Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and
Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative
Code of 1987.

Hong Kong and the accreditation of Hong Kong recruitment

agencies intending to hire Filipino domestic helpers.

DECISION

"Pursuant to Department Order No. 16, series of 1991 and in

order to operationalize the temporary government processing
and deployment of domestic helpers (DHs) to Hong Kong
resulting from the temporary suspension of recruitment by
private employment agencies for said skill and host market, the
following guidelines and mechanisms shall govern the
implementation of said policy:

GRIO-AQUINO, J p:
This petition for prohibition with temporary restraining order
was filed by the Philippine Association of Service Exporters
(PASEI, for short), to prohibit and enjoin the Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the
Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (or POEA) from enforcing and implementing
DOLE Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991 and POEA
Memorandum Circular Nos. 30 and 37, Series of 1991,
temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment
agencies of Filipino domestic helpers for Hong Kong and
vesting in the DOLE, through the facilities of the POEA, the
task of processing and deploying such workers.
PASEI is the largest national organization of private
employment and recruitment agencies duly licensed and
authorized by the POEA, to engage in the business of
obtaining overseas employment for Filipino landbased workers,
including domestic helpers. LLphil
On June 1, 1991, as a result of published stories regarding the
abuses suffered by Filipino housemaids employed in Hong
Kong, DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issuedDepartment
Order No. 16, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the
recruitment by private employment agencies of "Filipino
domestic helpers going to Hong Kong" (p. 30, Rollo). The
DOLE itself, through the POEA took over the business of
deploying such Hong Kong-bound workers.
"In view of the need to establish mechanisms that will enhance
the protection for Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong
Kong, the recruitment of the same by private employment
agencies is hereby temporarily suspended effective 1 July
1991. As such, the DOLE through the facilities of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration shall take over the
processing and deployment of household workers bound for
Hong Kong, subject to guidelines to be issued for said
purpose.
"In support of this policy, all DOLE Regional Directors and the
Bureau of Local Employment's regional offices are likewise
directed to coordinate with the POEA in maintaining a
manpower pool of prospective domestic helpers to Hong Kong
on a regional basis.
"For compliance." (Emphasis ours; p. 30, Rollo.)
Pursuant to the above DOLE circular, the POEA
issued Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of 1991, dated
July 10, 1991, providing GUIDELINES on the Government
processing and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to

"Subject: Guidelines
on
the
Temporary
Government
Processing and Deployment of Domestic Helpers to Hong
Kong.

"I. Creation of a Joint POEA-OWWA Household Workers

Placement Unit (HWPU).
"An ad hoc, one stop Household Workers Placement Unit [or
HWPU] under the supervision of the POEA shall take charge of
the various operations involved in the Hong Kong-DH industry
segment:
"The HWPU shall have the following functions in coordination
with appropriate units and other entities concerned:
"1. Negotiations with
Recruitment Agencies

and

Accreditation

of

Hong

Kong

"2. Manpower Pooling

"3. Worker Training and Briefing
"4. Processing and Deployment
"5. Welfare Programs.
"II. Documentary Requirements and Other Conditions for
Accreditation of Hong Kong Recruitment Agencies or
Principals. LexLib
"Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong intending to hire Filipino
DHs for their employers may negotiate with the HWPU in
Manila directly or through the Philippine Labor Attache's Office
in Hong Kong.
"xxx xxx xxx
"X. Interim Arrangement
"All contracts stamped in Hong Kong as of June 30 shall
continue to be processed by POEA until 31 July 1991 under
the name of the Philippine agencies concerned. Thereafter, all
contracts shall be processed with the HWPU.
"Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong shall submit to the
Philippine Consulate General in Hong Kong a list of their
accepted applicants in their pool within the last week of July.
The last day of acceptance shall be July 31 which shall then be
the basis of HWPU in accepting contracts for processing. After
the exhaustion of their respective pools the only source of
applicants will be the POEA manpower pool.

"For strict compliance of all concerned." (pp. 31-35, Rollo.)

On August 1, 1991, the POEA Administrator also
issued Memorandum Circular No. 37, Series of 1991, on the
processing of employment contracts of domestic workers for
Hong Kong.
"TO: All Philippine and Hong Kong Agencies engaged in the
recruitment of Domestic helpers for Hong Kong.
"Further to Memorandum Circular No. 30, series of 1991
pertaining to the government processing and deployment of
domestic helpers (DHs) to Hong Kong, processing of
employment contracts which have been attested by the Hong
Kong Commissioner of Labor up to 30 June 1991 shall be
processed by the POEA Employment Contracts Processing
Branch up to 15 August 1991 only.
"Effective 16 August 1991, all Hong Kong recruitment agent/s
hiring DHs from the Philippines shall recruit under the new
scheme which requires prior accreditation with the POEA.
"Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong may apply for
accreditation at the Office of the Labor Attache, Philippine
Consulate General where a POEA team is posted until 31
August 1991. Thereafter, those who failed to have themselves
accredited in Hong Kong may proceed to the POEA-OWWA
Household Workers Placement Unit in Manila for accreditation
before their recruitment and processing of DHs shall be
allowed.
"Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong who have some accepted
applicants in their pool after the cut-off period shall submit this
list of workers upon accreditation. Only those DHs in said list
will be allowed processing outside of the HWPU manpower
pool.
"For strict compliance of all concerned." (Emphasis supplied, p.
36, Rollo.)
On September 2, 1991, the petitioner, PASEI, filed this petition
for prohibition to annul the aforementioned DOLE and POEA
circulars and to prohibit their implementation for the following
reasons:
1. that the respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion
and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said
circulars;
2. that the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to
the Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and
3. that the requirements of publication and filing with the Office
of the National Administrative Register were not complied with.
There is no merit in the first and second grounds of the
petition.
Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the
power to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement
activities. LLpr

"Art. 36. Regulatory Power. The Secretary of Labor shall

have the power to restrict and regulate the recruitment and
placement activities of all agencies within the coverage of this
title [Regulation of Recruitment and Placement Activities]
and is hereby authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules
and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the
provisions of this title." (Italics ours.)
On the other hand, the scope of the regulatory authority of the
POEA, which was created by Executive Order No. 797 on May
1, 1982 to take over the functions of the Overseas Employment
Development Board, the National Seamen Board, and the
overseas employment functions of the Bureau of Employment
Services, is broad and far-ranging for:

1. Among the functions inherited by the POEA from the defunct

Bureau of Employment Services was the power and duty:
"'2. To establish and maintain a registration and/or licensing
system to private sector participation in the recruitment and
placement of workers, locally and overseas, . . . .' (Art. 15,
Labor Code, italics supplied)." (p. 13, Rollo.)
2. It assumed from the defunct Overseas Employment
Development Board the power and duty:
"'3. To recruit and place workers for overseas employment of
Filipino contract workers, on a government to government
arrangement and in such other sectors as policy may dictate . .
. .' (Art. 17, Labor Code.)" (p. 13, Rollo.)
3. From the National Seamen Board, the POEA took over:
"2. To regulate and supervise the activities of agents or
representatives of shipping companies in the hiring of seamen
for overseas employment; and secure the best possible terms
of employment for contract seamen workers and secure
compliance therewith." (Art. 20, Labor Code.)
The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in
administrative bodies is not unconstitutional, unreasonable and
oppressive. It has been necessitated by "the growing
complexity of the modern society" (Solid Homes, Inc. vs.
Payawal, 177 SCRA 72, 79). More and more administrative
bodies are necessary to help in the regulation of society's
ramified activities. "Specialized in the particular field assigned
to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with more
expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the
legislature or the courts of justice" (Ibid.).
It is noteworthy that the assailed circulars do not prohibit the
petitioner from engaging in the recruitment and deployment of
Filipino landbased workers for overseas employment. A careful
reading of the challenged administrative issuances discloses
that the same fall within the "administrative and policing
powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred" upon
the respondents (People vs. Maceren, 79 SCRA 450). The
power to "restrict and regulate conferred by Article 36 of the
Labor Code involves a grant of police power (City of Naga vs.
Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 898). To "restrict" means "to

confine, limit or stop" (p. 62, Rollo) and whereas the power to
"regulate" means "the power to protect, foster, promote,
preserve, and control with due regard for the interests, first and
foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its patrons"
(Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation vs. Alcuaz,
180 SCRA 218).

and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the

Administrative Code of 1987 which provide:

The Solicitor General, in his Comment, aptly observed:

"Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. The Department of Labor

and other government agencies charged with the
administration and enforcement of this Code or any of its parts
shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and
regulations. Such rules and regulations shall become effective
fifteen (15) days after announcement of their adoption in
newspapers of general circulation." (Emphasis supplied, Labor
Code, as amended.)

" . . . Said Administrative Order [i.e., DOLE Administrative

Order No. 16] merely restricted the scope or area of petitioner's
business operations by excluding therefrom recruitment and
deployment of domestic helpers for Hong Kong till after the
establishment of the `mechanisms' that will enhance the
protection of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. In
fine, other than the recruitment and deployment of Filipino
domestic helpers for Hongkong, petitioner may still deploy
other class of Filipino workers either for Hongkong and other
countries and all other classes of Filipino workers for other
countries. Cdpr
"Said administrative issuances, intended to curtail, if not to
end, rampant violations of the rule against excessive
collections of placement and documentation fees, travel fees
and other charges committed by private employment agencies
recruiting and deploying domestic helpers to Hongkong. [They
are] reasonable, valid and justified under the general welfare
clause of the Constitution, since the recruitment and
deployment business, as it is conducted today, is affected with
public interest.
"xxx xxx xxx
"The alleged takeover [of the business of recruiting and placing
Filipino domestic helpers in Hongkong] is merely a remedial
measure, and expires after its purpose shall have been
attained. This is evident from the tenor of Administrative Order
No. 16 that recruitment of Filipino domestic helpers going to
Hongkong by private employment agencies are hereby
'temporarily suspended effective July 1. 1991.'
"The alleged takeover is limited in scope, being confined to
recruitment of domestic helpers going to Hongkong only.
"xxx xxx xxx
" . . . the justification for the takeover of the processing and
deploying of domestic helpers for Hongkong resulting from the
restriction of the scope of petitioner's business is confined
solely to the unscrupulous practice of private employment
agencies victimizing applicants for employment as domestic
helpers for Hongkong and not the whole recruitment business
in the Philippines." (pp. 62-65. Rollo.)
The questioned circulars are therefore a valid exercise of the
police power as delegated to the executive branch of
Government.
Nevertheless,
unenforceable
Office of the
in Article 2 of

they are legally invalid, defective and

for lack of proper publication and filing in the
National Administrative Register as required
the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code

"Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following
the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette,
unless it is otherwise provided. . . . ." (Civil Code.)

Section 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the

University of the Philippines Law Center, three (3) certified
copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of
effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3)
months shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction
against any party or persons." (Underscoring supplied, Chapter
2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.)
"Section 4. Effectivity. In addition to other rule-making
requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book,
each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date
of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by
law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to
public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must
be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The
agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency
rules known to persons who may be affected by them."
(Emphasis supplied, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative
Code of 1987.)
Once more, we advert to our ruling in Taada vs. Tuvera, 146
SCRA 446 that:
" . . . Administrative rules and regulations must also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing
law pursuant also to a valid delegation," (p. 447.).LLjur
"Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature,
that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative
agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions
issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties." (p. 448.)
"We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication
at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of
the laws." (p. 448.)
For lack of proper publication, the administrative circulars in
question may not be enforced and implemented.
WHEREFORE, the writ of prohibition is GRANTED. The
implementation of DOLE Department Order No. 16, Series of
1991, and POEA Memorandum Circular Nos. 30 and 37,
Series of 1991, by the public respondents is hereby

SUSPENDED pending compliance with the statutory

requirements of publication and filing under the
aforementioned laws of the land. cdll

Roco's motion to dismiss and its insistence to hold onto the

petition rendered ripe and viable the instant petition under
Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

SO ORDERED.

2. ID.;
ID.;
THE
COURT
MAY
BRUSH
ASIDE
TECHNICALITIES OF PROCEDURE IN CASES OF
TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE. The Court may brush
aside technicalities of procedure in cases of transcendental
importance. As we stated in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr.:
A Party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality
which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view
of the importance of issues raised. In the landmark Emergency
Powers Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality
because the transcendental importance to the public of these
cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely,
brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.

Narvasa, C . J ., Gutierrez, Jr ., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,

Medialdea,
Regalado,
Davide,
Jr ., Romero,
Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ ., concur.
||| (Philippine Ass'n. of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Torres, G.R.
No. 101279, [August 6, 1992])

4. SANTIAGO v. COMELEC
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 127325. March 19, 1997.]
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA,
and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA &
CARMEN PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding
members of the People's Initiative for Reforms,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents.
SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL
ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK), MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS
FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM,
INC. (MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
(IBP), and LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO
(LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.
Roco Bunag Kapunan & Migallos for movant Raul S. Roco.
Rene V . Sarmiento and R.A.V . Saguisag for movants DIK &
MABINI.
Pete Quirino Quadra for respondents Sps. Alberto & Carmen
Pedrosa.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI;
COMELEC'S FAILURE TO ACT ON MOTION TO DISMISS
AND ITS INSISTENCE TO HOLD ON TO THE PETITION
RENDERED RIPE AND VIABLE THE PETITION UNDER
SECTION 2 OF RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the parties paid
no serious attention to the fifth issue, i.e., whether it is proper
for this Court to take cognizance of this special civil action
when there is a pending case before the COMELEC. . . It must
be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC a
motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that the
COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain the
petition. The COMELEC made no ruling thereon evidently
because after having heard the arguments of Delfin and the
oppositors at the hearing on 12 December 1996, it required
them to submit within five days their memoranda or
oppositions/memoranda. The COMELEC's failure to act on

3. CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW;
1987
CONSTITUTION;
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS; PROVISION ON THE
RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO DIRECTLY PROPOSE
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, NOT SELFEXECUTORY. Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is
not self-executory. In his book, Joaquin Bernas, a member of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission, stated: Without
implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus,
although this mode of amending the Constitution is a mode of
amendment which bypasses congressional action, in the last
analysis it still is dependent on congressional action. Bluntly
stated the right of the people to directly propose amendments
to the Constitution through the system of initiative would
remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until
Congress provides for its implementation. Stated otherwise,
while the Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the
people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason,
does not provide for its implementation.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; R.A. 6735; INTENDED TO COVER INITIATIVE
TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION.
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals,
intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505
and Senate Bill No. 17. The former was prepared by the
committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of
Representatives on the basis of two House Bills referred to
it, viz., (a) House Bill No. 497, which dealt with the initiative
and referendum mentioned in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of
the Constitution; and (b) House Bill No. 988, which dealt with
the subject matter of House Bill No. 497, as well as with
initiative and referendum under Section 3 of Article XVII of the
Constitution. Senate Bill No. 17 solely, dealt with initiative and
referendum concerning ordinances or resolutions of local
government units. The Bicameral Conference Committee
consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 into
a draft bill, which was subsequently approved on 8 June 1989
by the Senate and by the House of Representatives. This
approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONGRESS, INVESTED WITH THE
POWER TO PROVIDE FOR THE RULES IMPLEMENTING
THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT. There is, of course, no
other better way for Congress to implement the exercise of the

right than through the passage of a statute or legislative act.

This is the essence or rationale of the last minute amendment
by the Constitutional Commission to substitute the last
paragraph of Section 2 of Article XVII then reading: "The
Congress shall by law provide for the implementation of the
exercise of this right with the Congress shall provide for the
implementation of the exercise of this right." This substitute
amendment was an investiture on Congress of a power to
provide for the rules implementing the exercise of the right.
The "rules" means "the details on how [the right] is to be
carried out."
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT IN FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THE
POWER AND DUTY OF CONGRESS TO PROVIDE FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT.
First, Contrary to the assertion of public respondent
COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative
on amendments to the Constitution. The inclusion of the word
"Constitution" therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is
neither germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively
relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and local
laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to
amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier,
initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to
AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly
propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do
so
with
respect
to
"laws,
ordinances,
or
resolutions."' . . . Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of
Terms) of the Act defines initiative on amendments to the
Constitution and mentions it as one of the three systems
of initiative, and that Section 5 (Requirements) restates the
constitutional requirements as to the percentage of the
registered voters who must submit the proposal. But unlike in
the case of the other systems ofinitiative, the Act does not
provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the
Constitution. Section 5 paragraph (c) requires, among other
things, a statement of the proposed law sought to be
enacted, approve or rejected, amended or repealed, as the
case may be. It does not include, as among the contents of the
petition, the provisions of the Constitution sought to be
amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution. . . . The
use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted,
approved or rejected, amended or repealed" only strengthens
the conclusion that Section 2, quoted earlier, excludes initiative
on amendments to the Constitution.Third. While the Act
provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum
(Subtitle, II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle
III), no subtitle is provided forinitiative on the Constitution. This
conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the
main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national
and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully
provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments
to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle
therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of
interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to
directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more
important than the initiative on national and local laws. . . . The
foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is
incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and

conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the

Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive
matter are fatal and. cannot be cured by "empowering" the
COMELEC "to promulgate such rules and regulations as may
be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act."
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SUBTITLING OF THE ACT, NOT
ACCURATE. A further examination of the Act even reveals
that the subtitling is not accurate. Provisions not germane to
the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum are placed
therein, like (1) paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 9, (2) that
portion of Section 1] (Indirect Initiative) referring to indirect
initiative with the legislative bodies of local governments, and
(3) Section 12 on Appeal, since it applies to decisions of the
COMELEC on the findings of sufficiency or insufficiency of the
petition for initiative or referendum, which could be petitions for
both national and local initiative and referendum.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 18 ON AUTHORITY OF
COURTS UNDER SUBTITLE ON LOCAL INITIATIVE AND
REFERENDUM, MISPLACED. Section 18 on "Authority of
Courts" under subtitle III on Local Initiative and Referendum is
misplaced, since the provision therein applies to both national
and local initiative and referendum.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FAILED TO GIVE SPECIAL ATTENTION
ON THE SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO
THE CONSTITUTION WHICH IS MORE IMPORTANT BEING
THE PARAMOUNT SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE. While R.A.
No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing for the
details in the implementation of initiative and referendum on
national and local legislation thereby giving them special
attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so on the system of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Upon the other
hand, as to initiative on amendments to the Constitution, R.A.
No. 6735, in all of its twenty-three sections, merely (a)
mentions the word "Constitution" in Section 2. (b) defines
"initiative on the Constitution" and includes it in the
enumeration of the three systems of initiative in Section 3; (c)
speaks of "plebiscite" as the process by which the proposition,
in an initiative on the Constitution may be approved or rejected
by the people., (d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as
to the number of voters who should sign the petition; and (e)
provides for the date of effectivity of the approved proposition.
There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more
important or the paramount system of initiative. R.A. No. 6735
thus delivered a humiliating blow to the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant
lip service.

10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ARGUMENT THAT INITIATIVE ON

AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION IS SUBSUMED
UNDER SUBTITLE ON NATIONAL INITIATIVE AND
REFERENDUM, NOT ACCEPTABLE. We cannot accept the
argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution
is subsumed under the subtitle on National Initiative and
Referendum because it is national in scope. Our reading of
Subtitle II (National Initiative and Referendum) and Subtitle III
(Local Initiative and Referendum) leaves no room for doubt

that the classification is not based on the scope of the initiative

involved, but on its nature and character. It is national
initiative," if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is
a national law, or a law which only Congress can pass. It is
"local initiative" if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is
a law,ordinance, or resolution which only the legislative bodies
of the governments of the autonomous regions, provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays can pass. This
classification of initiative into national and local is actually
based on Section 3 of the Act.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COMELEC DOES NOT HAVE THE
POWER TO VALIDLY PROMULGATE RULES AND
REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT THE EXERCISE OF THE
RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO DIRECTLY PROPOSE
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION UNDER R.A. 6735.
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly
promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of
the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have
that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC's
power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is
misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are
those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of
Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate
legislation is authorized and which satisfies the "completeness"
and the "sufficient standard" tests.
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DELFIN PETITION, DEFECTIVE
BECAUSE IT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SIGNATURES OF
THE REQUIRED NUMBER OF VOTERS. Under Section 2
of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
6735, a petition for initiative on the Constitution must be signed
by at least 12% of the total number of registered voters of
which every legislative district is represented by at least 3% of
the registered voters therein. The Delfin Petition does not
contain signatures of the required number of voters. Delfin
himself admits that he has not yet gathered signatures and that
the purpose of his petition is primarily to obtain assistance in
his drive to gather signatures. Without the required signatures,
the petition cannot be deemed validly initiated.
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DELFIN PETITION, NOTHING MORE
THAN A MERE SCRAP OF PAPER. The COMELEC
acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its
filing. The petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before
its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. . . .
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A.
No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be
entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The
respondent Commission must have known that the petition
does not fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300,
for which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket
number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered as UND,
meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a
mere scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by
the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December
1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file
their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the

COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of

discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.
14. POLITICAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ;
DELEGATION OF POWER; WHAT HAS BEEN DELEGATED
CANNOT BE DELEGATED; EXCEPTIONS THEREOF. The
rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or
as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari
potest. The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section
28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution; (2) Delegation of
emergency powers to the President under Section 23 (2) of
Article VI of the Constitution; (3) Delegation to the people at
large; (4) Delegation to local governments; and (5) Delegation
to administrative bodies.
15. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES FOR VALID DELEGATION;
SUFFICIENT STANDARD; CONSTRUED; R.A. 6735
MISERABLY FAILED TO SATISFY BOTH REQUIREMENTS.
In every case of permissible delegation, there must be a
showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the
law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b)
fixes a standard the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate and determinable to which the delegate must
conform in the performance of his functions. A sufficient
standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its
limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency
to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the
legislative command is to be effected. Insofar as initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A.
No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in
subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to the
COMELEC is then invalid.
PUNO, J., concurring and dissenting:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW;
1987
CONSTITUTION;
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS: R.A. 6735; SUFFICIENTLY
IMPLEMENTS THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE TO INITIATE
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION THRU INITIATIVE.
I submit that R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently implements the right
of the people to initiate amendments to the Constitution thru
initiative. . . . We need not torture the text of said law to reach
the conclusion that it implements people's initiative to amend
the Constitution. R.A. No. 6735 is replete with references to
this
prerogative
of
the
people.
First,
the policy
statement declares: "Sec. 2. Statement of Policy. The power
of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to
directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part,
the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by
any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements
and guaranteed." Second, the law defines "initiative" as "the
power of the people to propose amendments to the
Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an
election called for the purpose," and "plebiscite" as "the
electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is
approved or rejected by the people." Third, the law provides
the requirements for a petition for initiative to amend the
Constitution. Section 5(b) states that "(a) petition for an
initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per

centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as

signatories, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered
voters therein." It also states that "(i)nitiative on the
Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5)
years thereafter." Finally, R.A. No. 6735 fixes the effectivity
date of the amendment. Section 9(b) states that "(t)he
proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a
majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become
effective as to the day of the plebiscite."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SUFFICIENTLY STATES THE POLICY AND
STANDARDS
TO
GUIDE
THE
COMELEC
IN
PROMULGATING THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS OF THE LAW; CASE AT BAR. R.A. No.
6735 sufficiently states the policy and the standards to guide
the COMELEC in promulgating the law's implementing rules
and regulations of the law. . . . In the case at bar, the policy
and the standards are bright-lined in R.A. No. 6735. A 20-20
look at the law cannot miss them. They were not written by our
legislators in invisible ink. The policy and standards can also
be found in no less than Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on Amendments or Revisions. There is thus no
reason to hold that the standards provided for in R.A. No. 6735
are insufficient for in other cases we have upheld as adequate
more general standards such as "simplicity and dignity," "public
interest," "public welfare," "interest of law and order," "justice
and equity," "adequate and efficient instruction," "public safety,"
"public policy," "greater national interest, "protect the local
consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domestic pump rates,"
and "promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in
government." A due regard and respect to the legislature, a coequal and coordinate branch of government, should counsel
this Court to refrain from refusing to effectuate laws unless
they are clearly unconstitutional.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300
MERELY PROVIDES THE PROCEDURE TO EFFECTUATE
THE POLICY OF R.A. 6735, HENCE, DID NOT VIOLATE THE
RULES ON VALID DELEGATION. In enacting R.A. No.
6735, it cannot be said that Congress totally transferred its
power to enact the law implementing people's initiative to
COMELEC. A close look at COMELEC Resolution No. 2300
will show that it merely provided the procedure to effectuate
the policy of R.A. No. 6735 giving life to the people's initiative
to amend the Constitution. The debates in the Constitutional
Commission make it clear that the rules of procedure to
enforce the people's initiative can be delegated. . . . The
prohibition against the legislature is to impair the substantive
right of the people to initiate amendments to the Constitution. It
is not, however, prohibited from legislating the procedure to
enforce the people's right of initiative or to delegate it to
another body like the COMELEC with proper standard.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ARGUMENT ON LACK OF SUB-TITLE ON

PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION,
SHOULD BE GIVEN THE WEIGHT OF HELIUM. The
argument that R.A. No. 6735 does not include people's

initiative to amend the Constitution simply because it lacks a

sub-title on the subject should be given the weight of helium.
Again, the hoary rule in statutory construction is that headings
prefixed to titles, chapters and sections of a statute may be
consulted in aid of interpretation, but inferences drawn
therefrom are entitled to very little weight, and they can never
control the plain terms of the enacting clauses.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; LAPSES IN R.A. 6735 ARE TO BE
EXPECTED, FOR LAWS ARE NOT ALWAYS WRITTEN IN
IMPECCABLE ENGLISH. It is unfortunate that the majority
decision resorts to a strained interpretation of R.A. No. 6735 to
defeat its intent which it itself concedes is to implement
people's initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution.
Thus, it laments that the word "Constitution" is neither germane
nor relevant to the Policy thrust of Section 2 and that the
statute's subtitling is not accurate. These lapses are to be
expected for laws are not always written in impeccable
English. Rightly, the Constitution does not require our
legislators to be word-smiths with the ability to write bills with
poetic commas like Jose Garcia Villa or in lyrical prose like
Winston Churchill. But it has always been our good policy not
to refuse to effectuate the intent of a law on the ground that it is
badly written. As the distinguished Vicente Francisco reminds
us: "Many laws contain words which have not been used
accurately. But the use of inapt or inaccurate language or
words, will not vitiate the statute if the legislative intention can
be ascertained. The same is equally true with reference to
awkward, slovenly, or ungrammatical expressions, that is, such
expressions and words will be construed as carrying the
meaning the legislature intended that they bear, although such
a construction necessitates a departure from the literal
meaning of the words used."
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITION AGAINST RESPONDENTS
PEDROSAS SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE IT STATES
NO CAUSE OF ACTION. The petition should be dismissed
with respect to the Pedrosas. The inclusion of the Pedrosas in
the petition is utterly baseless. The records show that the case
at bar started when respondent Delfin alone and by himself
filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Amend the Constitution
to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials by People's
Initiative. The Pedrosas did not join the petition. . . . Petitioners
sued the COMELEC, Jesus Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa and
Carmen Pedrosa in their capacities as founding members of
the People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA). The suit is an original action for prohibition with
prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. The petition on its face states no cause of action
against the Pedrosas. The only allegation against the
Pedrosas is that they are founding members of
the PIRMA which proposes to undertake the signature drive for
people's initiative to amend the Constitution.
7 ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SOLICITATION OF SIGNATURES IS A
RIGHT GUARANTEED IN BLACK AND WHITE BY SECTION
2 OF ARTICLE XVII OF THE CONSTITUTION. One need
not draw a picture to impart the proposition that in soliciting
signatures to start a people's initiative to amend the
Constitution the Pedrosas are not engaged in any criminal act.
Their solicitation of signatures is a right guaranteed in black

and white by Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution which

provides that ". . . amendments to this Constitution may
likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative . .
. ." This right springs from the principle proclaimed in Section 1,
Article II of the Constitution that in a democratic and republican
state "sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them." The Pedrosas are part of the
people and their voice is part of the voice of the people. They
may constitute but a particle of our sovereignty but no power
can trivialize them for sovereignty is indivisible.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; RESPONDENTS' RIGHT OF SOLICITING
SIGNATURES TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION, CANNOT
BE ABRIDGED WITHOUT ANY IFS AND BUTS. Section 16
of Article XIII of the Constitution provides: "The right of the
people and their organizations to effective and reasonable
participation at all levels of social, political and economic
decision-making shall not be abridged. The State shall by law,
facilitate the establishment of adequate consultation
mechanisms." This is another novel provision of the 1987
Constitution strengthening the sinews of the sovereignty of our
people. In soliciting signatures to amend the Constitution, the
Pedrosas are participating in the political decision-making
process of our people. The Constitution says their right cannot
be abridged without any ifs and buts. We cannot put a question
mark on their right.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; RESPONDENTS' CAMPAIGN TO AMEND THE
CONSTITUTION IS AN EXERCISE OF THEIR FREEDOM OF
SPEECH AND EXPRESSION AND THEIR RIGHT TO
PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR REDRESS OF
GRIEVANCES. The Pedrosas' campaign to amend the
Constitution is an exercise of their freedom of speech and
expression. We have memorialized this universal right in all our
fundamental laws from the Malolos Constitution to the 1987
Constitution. We have iterated and reiterated in our rulings that
freedom of speech is a preferred right, the matrix of other
important rights of our people. Undeniably, freedom speech
enervates the essence of the democratic creed of think and let
think. For this reason, the Constitution encourages speech
even if it protects the speechless.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; RESPONDENTS, RIGHT TO SOLICIT
SIGNATURES TO START A PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE TO
AMEND THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT DEPEND ON ANY
LAW. It is thus evident that the right of the Pedrosas to
solicit signatures to start a people's initiative to amend the
Constitution does not depend on any law, much less on R.A.
No. 6735 or COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. No law, no
Constitution can chain the people to an undesirable status quo.
To be sure, there are no irrepealable laws just as there are no
irrepealable Constitutions. Change is the predicate of progress
and we should not fear change. Mankind has long recognized
the truism that the only constant in life is change and so should
the majority.
11. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; INTENT OF THE
LEGISLATURE; THE INTENT OF R.A. 6735 IS TO
IMPLEMENT THE PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE TO AMEND THE
CONSTITUTION. Our effort to discover the meaning of R.A.
No. 6735 should start with the search of the intent of our

lawmakers. A knowledge of this intent is criticalfor the intent of

the legislature is the law and the controlling factor in its
interpretation. Stated otherwise, intent is the essence of the
law, the spirit which gives life to its enactment. . . . Since it is
crystalline that the intent of R.A. No. 6735 is to implement the
people's initiative to amend the Constitution, it is our bounden
duty to interpret the law as it was intended by the legislature.
We have ruled that once intent is ascertained, it must be
enforced even if it may not be consistent with the strict letter of
the law and this ruling is as old as the mountain. We have also
held that where a law is susceptible of more than one
interpretation, that interpretation which will most tend to
effectuate the manifest intent of the legislature will be adopted.
The text of R.A. No. 6735 should therefore be reasonably
construed to effectuate its intent to implement the people's
initiative to amend the Constitution. . . . All said, it is difficult to
agree with the majority decision that refuses to enforce the
manifest intent or spirit of R.A. No. 6735 to implement the
people's initiative to amend the Constitution. It blatantly
disregards the rule cast in concrete that the letter of the law is
its body but its spirit is its soul.
12. POLITICAL
LAW;
LEGISLATIVE
DEPARTMENT;
DELEGATION OF POWER; SUFFICIENT STANDARD;
PURPOSE THEREOF. Former Justice Isagani A. Cruz
similarly elucidated that "a sufficient standard is intended to
map out the boundaries of the delegates' authority by defining
the legislative policy and indicating the circumstances under
which it is to be pursued and effected. The purpose of the
sufficient standard is to prevent a total transference of
legislative power from the lawmaking body to the delegate."
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE COURT HAS PRUDENTIALLY
REFRAINED FROM INVALIDATING ADMINISTRATIVE
RULES ON THE GROUND OF LACK OF ADEQUATE
STANDARD. A survey of our case law will show that this
Court
has
prudentially
refrained
from
invalidating
administrative rules on the ground of lack of adequate
legislative standard to guide their promulgation. As aptly
perceived by former Justice Cruz, "even if the law itself does
not expressly pinpoint the standard, the courts will bend
backward to locate the same elsewhere in order to spare the
statute, if it can, from constitutional infirmity.
VITUG, J., separate opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW;
1987
CONSTITUTION;
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS; R.A. 6735; DELFIN
PETITION, UTTERLY DEFICIENT. The Delfin petition is
thus utterly deficient. Instead of complying with the
constitutional imperatives, the petition would rather have much
of its burden passed on, in effect, to the COMELEC. The
petition would require COMELEC to schedule "signature
gathering all over the country," to cause the necessary
publication of the petition "in newspapers of general and local
circulation," and to instruct "Municipal Election Registrars in all
Regions of the Philippines to assist petitioners and volunteers
in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates
designated for the purpose.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER ISSUED

BY THE COURT SHOULD BE HELD TO COVER ONLY THE
DELFIN PETITION. The TRO earlier issued by the Court
which, consequentially, is made permanent under the ponencia
should be held to cover only the Delfin petition and must not be
so understood as having intended or contemplated to embrace
the signature drive of the Pedrosas. The grant of such a right is
clearly implicit in the constitutional mandate on people
initiative.

FRANCISCO, J., dissenting and concurring:

1. CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW;
1987
CONSTITUTION;
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS; R.A. 6735; AMPLY COVERS
AN INITIATIVE ON THE CONSTITUTION. Republic Act No.
6735, otherwise known as "The Initiative and Referendum Act"
amply covers an initiative on the Constitution. In its definition of
terms, Republic Act No. 6735 definesinitiative as "the power of
the people to propose amendments to the constitution or to
propose and enact legislations through an election called for
the purpose." The same section, in enumerating the three
systems of initiative, included in "initiative on the constitution
which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the
constitution." Paragraph (e) again of Section 3 defines
"plebiscite" as "the electoral process by which an initiative on
the constitution is approved or rejected by the people." And as
to the material requirements for an initiative on the
Constitution, Section 5(b) distinctly enumerates the following:
"A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have
at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of the
registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative
distinct must be represented by at least three per centum (3%)
of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the constitution
may be exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification
of 1987 Constitution and only once every five years thereafter."
These provisions were inserted, on purpose, by Congress the
intent being to provide for the implementation of the right to
propose an amendment to the Constitution by way of initiative.
"A legal provision," the Court has previously said, "must not be
construed as to be a useless surplusage, and accordingly,
meaningless, in the sense of adding nothing to the law or
having no effect whatsoever thereon". . . . Clearly then,
Republic Act No. 6735 covers an initiative on the constitution.
Any other construction as what petitioners foist upon the Court
constitute a betrayal of the intent and spirit behind the
enactment.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COMELEC CANNOT TAKE ANY ACTION
ON DELFIN PETITION BECAUSE IT IS UNACCOMPANIED
BY THE REQUIRED PERCENTAGE OF REGISTERED
VOTERS; CASE AT BAR. I agree with the ponencia that the
Commission on Elections, at present, cannot take any action
(such as those contained in the Commission's orders dated
December 6, 9, and 12, 1996 [Annexes B, C and B-1 ])
indicative of its having already assumed jurisdiction over
private respondents' petition. This is so because from the tenor
of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 6735 it would appear that proof of
procurement of the required percentage of registered voters at
the time the petition for initiative is filed, is a jurisdictional

requirement.
Here
private
respondents'
petition
is
unaccompanied by the required signatures. This defect
notwithstanding, it is without prejudice to the refiling of their
petition once compliance with the required percentage is
satisfactorily shown by private respondents. In the absence,
therefore, of an appropriate petition before the Commission on
Elections, any determination of whether private respondents'
proposal constitutes an amendment or revision is premature.
3. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; EVERY PART OF THE
STATUTE MUST BE INTERPRETED WITH REFERENCE TO
THE CONTEXT. It is a rule that every part of the statute
must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that
every part of the statute must be construed together with the
other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the
whole enactment. Thus, the provisions of Republic Act No.
6735 may not be interpreted in isolation. The legislative intent
behind every law is to be extracted from the statute as a whole.
PANGANIBAN, J., concurring and dissenting:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW;
1987
CONSTITUTION;
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS; R.A. 6735; TAKEN
TOGETHER AND INTERPRETED PROPERLY, THE
CONSTITUTION, R.A. 6735 AND COMELEC RESOLUTION
2300 ARE SUFFICIENT TO IMPLEMENT CONSTITUTIONAL
INITIATIVES. While R.A. 6735 may not be a perfect law it
was as the majority openly concedes intended by the
legislature to cover and, I respectfully submit, it contains
enough provisions to effectuate an initiative on the
Constitution. I completely agree with the inspired and inspiring
opinions of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno and Mr. Justice
Ricardo J. Francisco that RA 6735, the Roco law on initiative,
sufficiently implements the right of the people to initiate
amendments to the Constitution. Such views, which I shall no
longer repeat nor elaborate on, are thoroughly consistent with
this Court's unanimous en banc rulings in Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority vs. Commission on Elections, that
"provisions for initiative . . . are (to be) liberally construed to
effectuate their purposes, to facilitate and not hamper the
exercise by the voters of the rights granted thereby'; and
in Garcia vs. Comelec, that any effort to trivialize the
effectiveness of people's initiatives ought to be rejected."
2. ID.; ID.; ID .; ID.; MAJORITY'S POSITION ALL TOO
SWEEPING AND ALL TOO EXTREMIST. I find the
majority's position all too sweeping and all too extremist. It is
equivalent to burning the whole house to exterminate the rats,
and to killing the patient to relieve him of pain. What Citizen
Delfin wants the Comelec to do we should reject. But we
should not thereby preempt any future effort to exercise the
right of initiative correctly and judiciously. The fact that the
Delfin Petition proposes a misuse of initiative does not justify a
ban against its proper use. Indeed, there is a right way to do
the right thing at the right time and for the right reason.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COMELEC CANNOT ENTERTAIN ANY
PETITION IN THE ABSENCE OF THE REQUIRED NUMBER
OF SIGNATURES. Until and unless an initiatory petition can
show the required number of signatures in this case, 12% of
all the registered voters in the Philippines with at least 3% in

every legislative district no public funds may be spent and

no government resources may be used in an initiative to
amend the Constitution. Verily, the Comelec cannot even
entertain any petition absent such signatures.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WISELY EMPOWERED THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TO PROMULGATE RULES
AND REGULATIONS. No law can completely and
absolutely cover all administrative details. In recognition of this,
R.A. 6735 wisely empowered the Commission on Elections "to
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to
carry out the purposes of this Act." And pursuant thereto, the
Comelec issued its Resolution 2300 on 16 January 1991. Such
Resolution, by its very words, was promulgated "to govern the
conduct of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and
referendum on national and local laws," not by the incumbent
Commission on Elections by one then composed of Acting
Chairperson Haydee B. Yorac, Comms. Alfredo E. Abueg, Jr.,
Leopoldo L. Africa, Andres R. Flores, Dario C. Rama and
Magdara B. Dimaampao. All of these Commissioners who
signed resolution 2300 have retired from the Commission, and
thus we cannot ascribe any vile motive unto them, other than
an honest, sincere and exemplary effort to give life to a
cherished right of our people.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THE COURT HAS NO POWER TO
RESTRAIN ANYONE FROM EXERCISING THEIR RIGHT OF
INITIATIVE. The Court has no power to restrain them from
exercising their right of initiative. The right to propose
amendments to the Constitution is really a species of the right
of free speech and free assembly. And certainly, it would be
tyrannical and despotic to stop anyone from speaking freely
and persuading others to conform to his/her beliefs. As the
eminent Voltaire once said, "I may disagree with what you say,
but I will defend to the death your right to say it." After all,
freedom is not really for the thought we agree with, but as
Justice Holmes wrote, "freedom for the thought that we hate."
DECISION

On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin

filed with public respondent Commission on Elections
(hereafter, COMELEC) a "Petition to Amend the Constitution,
to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative"
(hereafter, Delfin Petition) 5 wherein Delfin asked the
COMELEC for an order
1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the
country;
2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the
attached "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in
newspapers of general and local circulation;
3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the
Philippines, to assist Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing
signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the
purpose.
Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of
the Movement for People's Initiative, 6 a group of citizens
desirous to avail of the system intended to institutionalize
people power; that he and the members of the Movement and
other volunteers intend to exercise the power to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution granted under
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that the exercise of
that power shall be conducted in proceedings under the control
and supervision of the COMELEC; that, as required in
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature stations shall be
established all over the country, with the assistance of
municipal election registrars, who shall verify the signatures
affixed by individual signatories; that before the Movement and
other volunteers can gather signatures, it is necessary that the
time and dates to be designated for the purpose be first fixed in
an order to be issued by the COMELEC; and that to
adequately inform the people of the electoral process involved,
it is likewise necessary that the said order, as well as the
Petition on which the signatures shall be affixed, be published
in newspapers of general and local circulation, under the
control and supervision of the COMELEC.

DAVIDE, JR., J p:
The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition
for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the right
of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative under Section 2 of
Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Undoubtedly, this
demands special attention, as this system of initiative was
unknown to the people of this country, except perhaps to a few
scholars before the drafting of the 1987 Constitution. The 1986
Constitutional Commission itself, through the original
proponent 1 and the main sponsor 2 of the proposed Article on
Amendments or Revision of the Constitution, characterized this
system as "innovative". 3 Indeed it is, for both under the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions, only two methods of proposing
amendments to, or revision of, the Constitution were
recognized, viz., (1) by Congress upon a vote of three-fourths
of all its members and (2) by a constitutional convention. 4 For
this and the other reasons hereafter discussed, we resolved to
give due course to this petition.

The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to

be amended are Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, 7 Section 4 of
Article VII, 8 and Section 8 of Article X9 of the Constitution.
Attached to the petition is a copy of a "Petition for Initiative on
the
1987
Constitution" 10 embodying
the
proposed
amendments which consist in the deletion from the aforecited
sections of the provisions concerning term limits, and with the
following proposition:
DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL
ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR
THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI,
SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE
X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be
submitted to the people, and after it is signed by at least twelve

per cent of the total number of registered voters in the country

it will be formally filed with the COMELEC.
Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was forthwith given
the number UND 96-037 (INITIATIVE), the COMELEC, through
its Chairman, issued an Order 11 (a) directing Delfin "to cause
the publication of the petition, together with the attached
Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution (including the
proposal, proposed constitutional amendment, and the
signature form), and the notice of hearing in three (3) daily
newspapers of general circulation at his own expense" not later
than 9 December 1996; and (b) setting the case for hearing on
12 December 1996 at 10:00 a.m.
At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December 1996, the
following appeared: Delfin and Atty. Pete Q. Quadra;
representatives of the People's Initiative for Reforms,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA); intervenor-oppositor
Senator Raul S. Roco, together with his two other lawyers and
representatives of, or counsel for, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon
(DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN). 12Senator Roco, on that
same day, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on the
ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by
the COMELEC.
After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin
and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or
oppositions/memoranda" within five days. 13
On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein Senator
Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel
Ongpin filed this special civil action for prohibition raising the
following arguments:
(1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend
the Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed
by Congress. No such law has been passed; in fact, Senate
Bill No. 1290 entitled An Act Prescribing and Regulating
Constitutional Amendments by People's Initiative, which
petitioner Senator Santiago filed on 24 November 1995, is still
pending before the Senate Committee on Constitutional
Amendments.
(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of
initiative, namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statutes, and
on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle
initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of
initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and
Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of
people's initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some
future law. Former Senator Arturo Tolentino stressed this
deficiency in the law in his privilege speech delivered before
the Senate in 1994: "There is not a single word in that law
which can be considered as implementing [the provision on
constitutional initiative]. Such implementing provisions have
been obviously left to a separate law."
(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law
after publication in print media. This indicates that the Act

covers only laws and not constitutional amendments because

the latter take effect only upon ratification and not after
publication.
(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January
1991 to govern "the conduct of initiative on the Constitution
and initiative and referendum on national and local laws,
is ultra vires insofar as initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is concerned, since the COMELEC has no power
to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of the right of
initiative to amend the Constitution. Only Congress is
authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law.
(5) The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the
Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term
limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside the power
of the people's initiative. cdtai
(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for
people's initiative; neither the COMELEC nor any other
government department, agency, or office has realigned funds
for the purpose.
To justify their recourse to us via the special civil action for
prohibition, the petitioners allege that in the event the
COMELEC grants the Delfin Petition, the people's initiative
spearheaded by PIRMA would entail expenses to the national
treasury for general re-registration of voters amounting to at
least P180 million, not to mention the millions of additional
pesos in expenses which would be incurred in the conduct of
the initiative itself. Hence, the transcendental importance to the
public and the nation of the issues raised demands that this
petition for prohibition be settled promptly and definitely,
brushing aside technicalities of procedure and calling for the
admission of a taxpayer's and legislator's suit. 14 Besides,
there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the respondents
to comment on the petition within a non-extendible period of
ten days from notice; and (b) issued a temporary restraining
order, effective immediately and continuing until further orders,
enjoining public respondent COMELEC from proceeding with
the Delfin Petition, and private respondents Alberto and
Carmen Pedrosa from conducting a signature drive for
people's initiative to amend the Constitution.
On 2 January 1997, private respondents, through Atty. Quadra,
filed their Comment 15 on the petition. They argue therein that:
1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT IT WOULD ENTAIL EXPENSES TO
THE NATIONAL TREASURY FOR GENERAL REGISTRATION
OF VOTERS AMOUNTING TO AT LEAST PESOS: ONE
HUNDRED EIGHTY MILLION (P180,000,000.00)" IF THE
COMELEC
GRANTS
THE
PETITION
FILED
BY
RESPONDENT DELFIN BEFORE THE COMELEC."
2. NOT A SINGLE CENTAVO WOULD BE SPENT BY THE
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IF THE COMELEC GRANTS THE
PETITION OF RESPONDENT DELFIN. ALL EXPENSES IN
THE SIGNATURE GATHERING ARE ALL FOR THE

ACCOUNT OF RESPONDENT DELFIN AND HIS

VOLUNTEERS PER THEIR PROGRAM OF ACTIVITIES AND
EXPENDITURES SUBMITTED TO THE COMELEC. THE
ESTIMATED COST OF THE DAILY PER DIEM OF THE
SUPERVISING SCHOOL TEACHERS IN THE SIGNATURE
GATHERING TO BE DEPOSITED and TO BE PAID BY
DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS IS P2,571,200.00;
3. THE PENDING PETITION BEFORE THE COMELEC IS
ONLY ON THE SIGNATURE GATHERING WHICH BY LAW
COMELEC IS DUTY BOUND "TO SUPERVISE CLOSELY"
PURSUANT TO ITS "INITIATORY JURISDICTION" UPHELD
BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN ITS RECENT SEPTEMBER
26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY
METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS . COMELEC, ET . AL. G.R.
NO. 125416;
4. REP. ACT NO. 6735 APPROVED ON AUGUST 4, 1989 IS
THE ENABLING LAW IMPLEMENTING THE POWER OF
PEOPLE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION.
SENATOR
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S
SENATE BILL NO. 1290 IS A DUPLICATION OF WHAT ARE
ALREADY PROVIDED FOR IN REP. ACT NO. 6735;
5. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 PROMULGATED ON
JANUARY 16, 1991 PURSUANT TO REP. ACT 6735 WAS
UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE RECENT
SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC
BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL.
G.R. NO. 125416 WHERE THE HONORABLE COURT SAID:
"THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS CAN DO NO LESS BY
SEASONABLY AND
JUDICIOUSLY
PROMULGATING
GUIDELINES AND RULES FOR BOTH NATIONAL AND
LOCAL USE, IN IMPLEMENTING OF THESE LAWS."
6. EVEN SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL
NO. 1290 CONTAINS A PROVISION DELEGATING TO THE
COMELEC THE POWER TO "PROMULGATE SUCH RULES
AND REGULATIONS AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO CARRY
OUT THE PURPOSES OF THIS ACT." (SEC. 12, S.B. NO.
1290, ENCLOSED AS ANNEX E, PETITION);
7. THE LIFTING OF THE LIMITATION ON THE TERM OF
OFFICE OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS PROVIDED UNDER THE
1987 CONSTITUTION IS NOT A "REVISION" OF THE
CONSTITUTION.
IT
IS
ONLY AN
AMENDMENT.
"AMENDMENT ENVISAGES AN ALTERATION OF ONE OR A
FEW SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION.
REVISION CONTEMPLATES A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE
ENTIRE DOCUMENT TO DETERMINE HOW AND TO WHAT
EXTENT IT SHOULD BE ALTERED." (PP. 412-413, 2ND. ED.
1992, 1097 PHIL. CONSTITUTION, BY JOAQUIN G.
BERNAS, SJ.).
Also on 2 January 1997, private respondent Delfin filed in his
own behalf a Comment 16 which starts off with an assertion
that the instant petition is a "knee-jerk reaction to a draft
'Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution' . . . which is not
formally filed yet." What he filed on 6 December 1996 was an
"Initiatory Pleading" or "Initiatory Petition," which was legally
necessary to start the signature campaign to amend the

Constitution or to put the movement to gather signatures under

COMELEC power and function. On the substantive allegations
of the petitioners, Delfin maintain as follows:
(1) Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is a law, R.A.
No. 6735, which governs the conduct of initiative to amend the
Constitution. The absence therein of a subtitle for such
initiative is not fatal, since subtitles are not requirements for the
validity or sufficiency of laws.
(2) Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides that the
proposition in an initiative to amend the Constitution approved
by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become
effective as of the day of the plebiscite.

(3) The claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300

is ultra vires is contradicted by (a) Section 2, Article IX-C of the
Constitution, which grants the COMELEC the power to enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall; and
(b) Section 20 of R.A. 6735, which empowers the COMELEC
to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary
to carry out the purposes of the Act.
(4) The proposed initiative does not involve a revision of, but
mere amendment to, the Constitution because it seeks to alter
only a few specific provisions of the Constitution, or more
specifically, only those which lay term limits. It does not seek to
reexamine or overhaul the entire document.
As to the public expenditures for registration of voters, Delfin
considers petitioners' estimate of P180 million as unreliable, for
only the COMELEC can give the exact figure. Besides, if there
will be a plebiscite it will be simultaneous with the 1997
Barangay Elections. In any event, fund requirements
for initiative will be a priority government expense because it
will be for the exercise of the sovereign power of the people.
In the Comment 17 for the public respondent COMELEC, filed
also on 2 January 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General
contends that:
(1) R.A. No. 6735 deals with, inter alia, people's initiative to
amend the Constitution. Its Section 2 on Statement of Policy
explicitly affirms, recognizes, and guarantees that power; and
its Section 3, which enumerates the three systems of initiative,
includes initiative on the Constitution and defines the same as
the power to propose amendments to the Constitution.
Likewise, its Section 5 repeatedly mentions initiative on the
Constitution.
(2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the Constitution is not
necessary in R.A. No. 6735 because, being national in scope,
that system of initiative is deemed included in the subtitle on
National Initiative and Referendum; and Senator Tolentino
simply overlooked pertinent provisions of the law when he
claimed that nothing therein was provided for initiative on the
Constitution.

(3) Senate Bill No. 1290 is neither a competent nor a material

proof that R.A. No. 6735 does not deal with initiative on the
Constitution.
(4) Extension of term limits of elected officials constitutes a
mere amendment to the Constitution, not a revision thereof.
(5) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was validly issued under
Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 and under the Omnibus Election
Code. The rule-making power of the COMELEC to implement
the provisions of R.A. No. 6735 was in fact upheld by this
Court in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. COMELEC.
On 14 January 1997, this Court (a) confirmed nunc pro
tunc the temporary restraining order; (b) noted the
aforementioned Comments and the Motion to Lift Temporary
Restraining Order filed by private respondents through Atty.
Quadra, as well as the latter's Manifestation stating that he is
the counsel for private respondents Alberto and Carmen
Pedrosa only and the Comment he filed was for the Pedrosas;
and (c) granted the Motion for Intervention filed on 6 January
1997 by Senator Raul Roco and allowed him to file his Petition
in Intervention not later than 20 January 1997; and (d) set the
case for hearing on 23 January 1997 at 9:30 a.m.
On 17 January 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang
Konstitusyon (DIK) and the Movement of Attorneys for
Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), filed a
Motion for Intervention. Attached to the motion was their
Petition in Intervention, which was later replaced by an
Amended Petition in Intervention wherein they contend that:
(1) The
Delfin
proposal
does
not
involve
a
mere amendment to, but a revision of, the Constitution
because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, SJ., 18 it would
involve a change from a political philosophy that rejects
unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenure; and
although the change might appear to be an isolated one, it can
affect other provisions, such as, on synchronization of
elections and on the State policy of guaranteeing equal access
to opportunities for public service and prohibiting political
dynasties. 19 A revision cannot be done by initiative which, by
express provision of Section 2 of Article XVII of the
Constitution, is limited toamendments.
(2) The prohibition against reelection of the President and the
limits provided for all other national and local elective officials
are based on the philosophy of governance, "to open up the
political arena to as many as there are Filipinos qualified to
handle the demands of leadership, to break the concentration
of political and economic powers in the hands of a few, and to
promote effective proper empowerment for participation in
policy and decision-making for the common good"; hence, to
remove the term limits is to negate and nullify the noble vision
of the 1987 Constitution.
(3) The Delfin proposal runs counter to the purpose of initiative
particularly in a conflict-of-interest situation. Initiative is
intended as a fallback position that may be availed of by the
people only if they are dissatisfied with the performance of their

elective officials,
performance. 20

but

not

as

premium

for

good

(4) R.A. No 6735 is deficient and inadequate in itself to be

called
the
enabling
law
that
implements
the
people's initiative on amendments to the Constitution. It fails to
state (a) the proper parties who may file the petition, (b) the
appropriate agency before whom the petition is to be filed, (c)
the contents of the petition, (d) the publication of the same, (e)
the ways and means of gathering the signatures of the voters
nationwide and 3% per legislative district, (f) the proper parties
who may oppose or question the veracity of the signatures, (g)
the role of the COMELEC in the verification of the signatures
and the sufficiency of the petition, (h) the appeal from any
decision of the COMELEC, (i) the holding of a plebiscite, and
(g) the appropriation of funds for such people's initiative.
Accordingly, there being no enabling law, the COMELEC has
no jurisdiction to hear Delfin's petition.
(5) The deficiency of R.A. No. 6735 cannot be rectified or
remedied by COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, since the
COMELEC is without authority to legislate the procedure for a
people's initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the
Constitution. That function exclusively pertains to Congress.
Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 does not constitute a legal basis
for the Resolution, as the former does not set a sufficient
standard for a valid delegation of power.
On 20 January 1997, Senator Raul Roco filed his Petition in
Intervention. 21 He avers that R.A. No. 6735 is the enabling
law that implements the people's right to initiate constitutional
amendments. This law is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 17
and House Bill No. 21505; he co-authored the House Bill and
even delivered a sponsorship speech thereon. He likewise
submits that the COMELEC was empowered under Section 20
of that law to promulgate COMELEC Resolution No. 2300.
Nevertheless, he contends that the respondent Commission is
without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Delfin Petition and
to order its publication because the said petition is not the
initiatory pleading contemplated under the Constitution,
Republic Act No. 6735, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300.
What vests jurisdiction upon the COMELEC in an initiative on
the Constitution is the filing of a petition for initiative which
is signed by the required number of registered voters. He also
submits that the proponents of a constitutional amendment
cannot avail of the authority and resources of the COMELEC to
assist them in securing the required number of signatures, as
the COMELEC's role in an initiative on the Constitution is
limited to the determination of the sufficiency of the initiative
petition and the call and supervision of a plebiscite, if
warranted.cdt
On 20 January 1997, LABAN filed a Motion for Leave to
Intervene.
The following day, the IBP filed a Motion for Intervention to
which it attached a Petition in Intervention raising the following
arguments:
(1) Congress has failed to enact an enabling law mandated
under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.

(2) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 cannot substitute for the

required implementing law on the initiative to amend the
Constitution.
(3) The Petition for Initiative suffers from a fatal defect in that it
does not have the required number of signatures.
(4) The petition seeks, in effect a revision of the Constitution,
which can be proposed only by Congress or a constitutional
convention. 22
On 21 January 1997, we promulgated a Resolution (a) granting
the Motions for Intervention filed by the DIK and MABINI and
by the IBP, as well as the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by
LABAN; (b) admitting the Amended Petition in Intervention of
DIK and MABINI, and the Petitions in Intervention of Senator
Roco and of the IBP; (c) requiring the respondents to file within
a nonextendible period of five days their Consolidated
Comments on the aforesaid Petitions in Intervention; and (d)
requiring LABAN to file its Petition in Intervention within a
nonextendible period of three days from notice, and the
respondents to comment thereon within a nonextendible period
of five days from receipt of the said Petition in Intervention.
At the hearing of the case on 23 January 1997, the parties
argued on the following pivotal issues, which the Court
formulated in light of the allegations and arguments raised in
the pleadings so far filed:

After hearing them on the issues, we required the parties to

submit simultaneously their respective memoranda within
twenty days and requested intervenor Senator Roco to submit
copies of the deliberations on House Bill No. 21505.
On 27 January 1997, LABAN filed its Petition in Intervention
wherein it adopts the allegations and arguments in the main
Petition. It further submits that the COMELEC should have
dismissed the Delfin Petition for failure to state a sufficient
cause of action and that the Commission's failure or refusal to
do so constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction.
On 28 January 1997, Senator Roco submitted copies of
portions of both the Journal and the Record of the House of
Representatives relating to the deliberations of House Bill No.
21505, as well as the transcripts of stenographic notes on the
proceedings of the Bicameral Conference Committee,
Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, of 6 June 1989
on House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17.
Private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa filed their
Consolidated Comments on the Petitions in Intervention of
Senator Roco, DIK and MABINI, and IBP. 23 The parties
thereafter filed, in due time, their separate memoranda. 24
As we stated in the beginning, we resolved to give due course
to this special civil action.

1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a

System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds
Therefor, was intended to include or coverinitiative on
amendments to the Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as
worded, adequately covers such initiative.

For a more logical discussion of the formulated issues, we

shall first take up the fifth issue which appears to pose a
prejudicial procedural question.

2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In

re: Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative
on the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on National
and Local Laws) regarding the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the
absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of
such initiative.

THE INSTANT PETITION IS VIABLE DESPITE THE

PENDENCY IN THE COMELEC OF THE DELFIN PETITION.

3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local

officials, as proposed in the draft "Petition for Initiative on the
1987 Constitution," would constitute a revision of, or an
amendment to, the Constitution.
4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has
jurisdiction over, a petition solely intended to obtain an order
(a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering; (b)
instructing municipal election officers to assist Delfin's
movement and volunteers in establishing signature stations;
and (c) directing or causing the publication of, inter alia, the
unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution.
5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take
cognizance of the petition when there is a pending case before
the COMELEC.

Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the parties paid
no serious attention to the fifth issue, i.e., whether it is proper
for this Court to take cognizance of this special civil action
when there is a pending case before the COMELEC. The
petitioners provide an affirmative answer. Thus:
28. The Comelec has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
petition filed by private respondent Delfin. This being so, it
becomes imperative to stop the Comelec from proceeding any
further, and under the Rules of Court, Rule 65, Section 2, a
petition for prohibition is the proper remedy.
29. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ
issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction and directed to an
inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal
from usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested.
(People v. Vera, supra., p. 84). In this case the writ is an urgent
necessity, in view of the highly divisive and adverse
environmental consequences on the body politic of the
questioned Comelec order. The consequent climate of legal
confusion and political instability begs for judicial
statesmanship.

30. In the final analysis, when the system of constitutional law

is threatened by the political ambitions of man, only the
Supreme Court can save a nation in peril and uphold the
paramount majesty of the Constitution. 25

BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY, INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT

SYSTEM.

It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the

COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the
ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to
entertain the petition. 26 The COMELEC made no ruling
thereon evidently because after having heard the arguments of
Delfin and the oppositors at the hearing on 12 December 1996,
it required them to submit within five days their memoranda or
oppositions/memoranda. 27 Earlier, or specifically on 6
December 1996, it practically gave due course to the Delfin
Petition by ordering Delfin to cause the publication of the
petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative, the
signature form, and the notice of hearing; and by setting the
case for hearing. The COMELEC's failure to act on Roco's
motion to dismiss and its insistence to hold on to the petition
rendered ripe and viable the instant petition under Section 2 of
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be

directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.

SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. Where the proceedings of

any tribunal, corporation, board, or person, whether exercising
functions judicial or ministerial, are without or in excess of its or
his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is
no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file
a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding
the defendant to desist from further proceedings in the action
or matter specified therein.

Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the

exercise of this right.
This provision is not self-executory. In his book, 29 Joaquin
Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
stated:
Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate.
Thus, although this mode of amending the Constitution is a
mode of amendment which bypasses congressional action, in
the last analysis it still is dependent on congressional action.
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative
would remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution
until Congress provides for its implementation. Stated
otherwise, while the Constitution has recognized or granted
that right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for
whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.

It must also be noted that intervenor Roco claims that the

COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the Delfin Petition because
the said petition is not supported by the required minimum
number of signatures of registered voters. LABAN also asserts
that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to
dismiss the Delfin Petition, which does not contain the required
number of signatures. In light of these claims, the instant case
may likewise be treated as a special civil action
for certiorariunder Section I of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

This system of initiative was originally included in Section 1 of

the draft Article on Amendment or Revision proposed by the
Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions of the
1986 Constitutional Commission in its Committee Report No. 7
(Proposed Resolution No. 332). 30 That section reads as
follows:

In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor Roco in his

Memorandum, this Court may brush aside technicalities of
procedure in cases of transcendental importance. As we stated
in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr.; 28

(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all

its members; or

A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality

which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view
of the importance of issues raised. In the landmark Emergency
Powers Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality
because the transcendental importance to the public of these
cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely,
brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.

(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided

for in Article _____ Section _____ of the Constitution. 31

II

MR. SUAREZ.

R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM OF

INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION,

Thank you, Madam President. May we respectfully call

attention of the Members of the Commission that pursuant to
the mandate given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon

SEC. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution

may be proposed:

(b) by a constitutional convention; or

After several interpellations, but before the period of

amendments, the Committee submitted a new formulation of
the concept of initiative which it denominated as Section 2;
thus:

a complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the

proposed provision governing the matter of initiative. This is
now covered by Section 2 of the complete committee report.
With the permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2:
"The people may, after five years from the date of the last
plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to this
Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent
of the registered voters."
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee
Report No. 7. 32
The interpellations on Section 2 showed that the details for
carrying out Section 2 are left to the legislature. Thus:
FR. BERNAS.
Madam President, just two simple, clarificatory questions.
First, on Section 1 on the matter of initiative upon petition of at
least 10 percent, there are no details in the provision on how to
carry this out. Do we understand therefore that we are leaving
this matter to the legislature?

No, it does not exclude that possibility because even the

legislature itself as a body could propose that amendment,
maybe individually or collectively, if it fails to muster the threefourths vote in order to constitute itself as a constituent
assembly and submit that proposal to the people for ratification
through the process of an initiative.
xxx xxx xxx
MS. AQUINO.
Do I understand from the sponsor that the intention in the
proposal is to vest constituent power in the people to amend
the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ.
That is absolutely correct, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO.

MR. SUAREZ.

I fully concur with the underlying precept of the proposal in

terms of institutionalizing popular participation in the drafting of
the Constitution or in the amendment thereof, but I would have
a lot of difficulties in terms of accepting the draft of Section 2,
as written. Would the sponsor agree with me that in the
hierarchy of legal mandate, constituent power has primacy
over all other legal mandates?

That is right, Madam President.

MR. SUAREZ.

FR. BERNAS.

The Commissioner is right, Madam President.

And do we also understand, therefore, that for as long as the

legislature does not pass the necessary implementing law on
this, this will not operate?

MS. AQUINO.

MR. SUAREZ.
That matter was also taken up during the committee hearing,
especially with respect to the budget appropriations which
would have to be legislated so that the plebiscite could be
called. We deemed it best that this matter be left to the
legislature. The Gentleman is right. In any event, as
envisioned, no amendment through the power of initiative can
be called until after five years from the date of the ratification of
this Constitution. Therefore, the first amendment that could be
proposed through the exercise of this initiative power would be
after five years. It is reasonably expected that within that fiveyear period, the National Assembly can come up with the
appropriate rules governing the exercise of this power.
FR. BERNAS.
Since the matter is left to the legislature the details on how
this is to be carried out is it possible that, in effect, what will
be presented to the people for ratification is the work of the
legislature rather than of the people? Does this provision
exclude that possibility?
MR. SUAREZ.

And would the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy of

legal values, the Constitution is source of all legal mandates
and that therefore we require a great deal of circumspection in
the drafting and in the amendments of the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ.
That proposition is nondebatable.
MS. AQUINO.
Such that in order to underscore the primacy of constituent
power we have a separate article in the Constitution that would
specifically cover the process and the modes of amending the
Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ.
That is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO.
Therefore, is the sponsor inclined, as the provisions are drafted
now, to again concede to the legislature the process or the
requirement of determining the mechanics of amending the
Constitution by people's initiative?
MR. SUAREZ.

The matter of implementing this could very well be placed in

the hands of the National Assembly, not unless we can
incorporate into this provision the mechanics that would
adequately cover all the conceivable situations. 33
It was made clear during the interpellations that the
aforementioned Section 2 is limited to proposals to AMEND
not to REVISE the Constitution; thus:
MR. SUAREZ.
. . . This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter
of initiative, which came about because of the extraordinary
developments this year, has to be separated from the
traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in
Section 1. The committee members felt that this system of
initiative should not extend to the revision of the entire
Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1
of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. 34
xxx xxx xxx
MS. AQUINO.
In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this
process of initiative as a separate section in the Article on
Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an
amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another
subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as
another separate section as if it were a self-executing
provision?
MR. SUAREZ.
We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while
ago, this process of initiative is limited to the matter of
amendment and should not expand into a revision which
contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the
sense that was conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO.
In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish
the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the
process of revision; whereas theprocess of initiation to amend,
which is given to the public, would only apply to amendments?

MR. DAVIDE.
Madam President, I have modified the proposed amendment
after taking into account the modifications submitted by the
sponsor himself and the honorable Commissioners Guingona,
Monsod, Rama, Ople, de los Reyes and Romulo. The modified
amendment in substitution of the proposed Section 2 will now
read as follows:
"SEC. 2. AMENDMENTS TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY
LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE
THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST
TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF
REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE
PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO
AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE
AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE
RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER
THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS
RIGHT.
MR. SUAREZ.
Madam President, considering that the proposed amendment
is reflective of the sense contained in Section 2 of our
completed Committee Report No. 7, we accept the proposed
amendment. 36
The interpellations which ensued on the proposed modified
amendment to Section 2 clearly showed that it was a
legislative act which must implement the exercise of the right.
Thus:
MR. ROMULO.
Under Commissioner Davide's amendment, is it possible for
the legislature to set forth certain procedures to carry out the
initiative . . .?
MR. DAVIDE.
It can.

MR. SUAREZ.

xxx xxx xxx

That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the

Committee. 35

MR. ROMULO.

Amendments to the proposed Section 2 were thereafter

introduced by then Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr., which
the Committee accepted. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE.
Thank you Madam President. I propose to substitute the entire
Section 2 with the following:
xxx xxx xxx

But the Commissioner's amendment does not prevent the

legislature from asking another body to set the proposition in
proper form.
MR. DAVIDE.
The Commissioner is correct. In other words, the
implementation of this particular right would be subject to
legislation, provided the legislature cannot determine anymore
the percentage of the requirement.
MR. ROMULO.

But the procedures, including the determination of the proper

form for submission to the people, may be subject to
legislation.

amendment, when the Commission shall take up the Article on

the Legislative or on the National Assembly on plenary
sessions. 39

MR. DAVIDE.

The Davide modified amendments to Section 2 were subjected

to amendments, and the final version, which the Commission
approved by a vote of 31 in favor and 3 against, reads as
follows:

As long as it will not destroy the substantive right to initiate. In

other words, none of the procedures to be proposed by the
legislative body must diminish or impair the right conceded
here.
MR. ROMULO.
In that provision of the Constitution can the procedures which I
have discussed be legislated?
MR. DAVIDE.
Yes. 37
Commissioner Davide also reaffirmed that his modified
amendment strictly confines initiative to AMENDMENTS to
NOT REVISION of the Constitution. Thus:

MR. DAVIDE.
Thank you Madam President. Section 2, as amended, reads as
follows: "AMENDMENT TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY
LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE
THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST
TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF
REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE
PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO
AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE
AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE
RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER
THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.

MR. DAVIDE.
With pleasure, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG.
My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed
amendment on line 1 refers to "amendment." Does it not cover
the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when
he made the distinction between the words "amendments" and
"revision"?
MR. DAVIDE.
No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should
be covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned,
it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision." 38
Commissioner Davide further emphasized that the process of
proposing amendments through initiative must be more
rigorous and difficult than the initiative on legislation. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE.
A distinction has to be made that under this proposal, what is
involved is an amendment to the Constitution. To amend a
Constitution would ordinarily require a proposal by the National
Assembly by a vote of three-fourths; and to call a constitutional
convention would require a higher number. Moreover, just to
submit the issue of calling a constitutional convention, a
majority of the National Assembly is required, the import being
that the process of amendment must be made more rigorous
and difficult than probably initiating an ordinary legislation or
putting an end to a law proposed by the National Assembly by
way of a referendum. I cannot agree to reducing the
requirement approved by the Committee on the Legislative
because it would require another voting by the Committee, and
the voting as precisely based on a requirement of 10 percent.
Perhaps, I might present such a proposal, by way of an

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS
RIGHT. 40
The entire proposed Article on Amendments or Revisions was
approved on second reading on 9 July 1986. 41 Thereafter,
upon his motion for reconsideration, Commissioner Gascon
was allowed to introduce an amendment to Section 2 which,
nevertheless, was withdrawn. In view thereof, the Article was
again approved on Second and Third Readings on 1 August
1986. 42
However, the Committee on Style recommended that the
approved Section 2 be amended by changing "percent" to "per
centum" and "thereof" to "therein" and deleting the phrase "by
law" in the second paragraph so that said paragraph
reads: The Congress 43 shall provide for the implementation
of the exercise of this right. 44This amendment was approved
and is the text of the present second paragraph of Section 2.
The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the system of
initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of Article XVII of
the Constitution is not self-executory.
Has Congress "provided" for the implementation of the
exercise of this right? Those who answer the question in the
affirmative, like the private respondents and intervenor Senator
Roco, point to us R.A. No. 6735.
There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to
implement the exercise of the right than through the passage
of a statute or legislative act. This is the essence or rationale of
the last minute amendment by the Constitutional Commission
to substitute the last paragraph of Section 2 of Article XVII then
reading:

The Congress 45 shall by law provide for the implementation of

the exercise of this right.
with
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the
exercise of this right.
This substitute amendment was an investiture on Congress of
a power to provide for the rules implementing the exercise of
the right. The "rules" means "the details on how [the right] is to
be carried out." 46
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals,
intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505
and Senate Bill No. 17. The former was prepared by the
Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of the House of
Representatives on the basis of two House Bills referred to
it, viz., (a) House Bill No. 497, 47 which dealt with the initiative
and referendum mentioned in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of
the Constitution; and (b) House Bill No. 988, 48 which dealt
with the subject matter of House Bill No. 497, as well as with
initiative and referendum under Section 3 of Article X (Local
Government) and initiative provided for in Section 2 of Article
XVII of the Constitution. Senate Bill No. 17 49 solely dealt with
initiative and referendum concerning ordinances or resolutions
of local government units. The Bicameral Conference
Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No.
21505 into a draft bill, which was subsequently approved on 8
June 1989 by the Senate 50 and by the House of
Representatives. 51 This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.
But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty
of Congress to "provide for the implementation of the exercise
of the right?"
A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.
First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent
COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative
on amendments to the Constitution. The said section reads:
SEC. 2. Statement and Policy. The power of the people
under a system of initiative and referendum to directly
propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any
legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this
Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. (Emphasis
supplied).
The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a delayed
afterthought. That word is neither germane nor relevant to said
section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum
on national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions.
That section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As
pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only
to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the
power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole
or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative.
They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or
resolutions."

The foregoing conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that

this section was lifted from Section 1 of Senate Bill No. 17,
which solely referred to a statement of policy on local initiative
and referendum and appropriately used the phrases "propose
and enact," "approve or reject" and "in whole or in part." 52
Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act
defines initiative on amendments to the Constitution and
mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative, and that
Section 5 (Requirements) restates the constitutional
requirements as to the percentage of the registered voters who
must submit the proposal. But unlike in the case of the other
systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents
of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Section 5,
paragraph (c) requires, among other things, statement of
the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,
amended or repealed, as the case may be. It does not include,
as among the contents of the petition, the provisions of the
Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on
the Constitution. Said paragraph (c) reads in full as
follows: cda
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted,
approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may
be;
c.2 the proposition;
c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided therein;
c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more than one
hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or printed at
the top of every page of the petition. (Emphasis supplied).
The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted,
approved or rejected, amended or repealed" only strengthens
the conclusion that Section 2, quoted earlier, excludes initiative
on amendments to the Constitution.
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and
Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and
Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided forinitiative on
the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter
simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and
referendum on national and local laws. If Congress intended
R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of
the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have
provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of
things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right
of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national
and local laws.
We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is subsumed under the subtitle
on National Initiative and Referendum because it is national in

scope. Our reading of Subtitle II (National Initiative and

Referendum) and Subtitle III (Local Initiative and Referendum)
leaves no room for doubt that the classification is not based on
the scope of
the
initiative
involved,
but
on
its nature and character. It is "national initiative," if what is
proposed to be adopted or enacted is a national law, or a law
which only Congress can pass. It is "local initiative" if what is
proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance, or
resolution which only the legislative bodies of the governments
of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities,
and barangays can pass. This classification of initiative
into national and local is actually based on Section 3 of the Act,
which we quote for emphasis and clearer understanding:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms
xxx xxx xxx
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition
proposing amendments to the Constitution;
a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition proposing to
enact a national legislation; and
a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition
proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or
barangay law, resolution or ordinance. (Emphasis supplied).
Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles there
should have been a subtitle on initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. 53
A further examination of the Act even reveals that the subtitling
is not accurate. Provisions not germane to the subtitle on
National Initiative and Referendum are placed therein, like (1)
paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 9, which reads:
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved
by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become
effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority
of the votes cast in an election called for the purpose shall
become effective fifteen (15) days after certification and
proclamation of the Commission. (Emphasis supplied).
(2) that portion of Section 11 (Indirect Initiative) referring to
indirect initiative with the legislative bodies of local
governments; thus:
SEC. 11. Indirect Initiative. Any duly accredited people's
organization, as defined by law, may file a petition for indirect
initiative with the House of Representatives, and other
legislative bodies. . .
and (3) Section 12 on Appeal, since it applies to decisions of
the COMELEC on the findings of sufficiency or insufficiency of
the petition for initiative or referendum, which could be petitions
for both national and local initiative and referendum.

Upon the other hand, Section 18 on "Authority of Courts" under

subtitle III on Local Initiative and Referendum is
misplaced, 54 since the provision therein applies to both
national and local initiative and referendum. It reads:
SEC. 18. Authority of Courts. Nothing in this Act shall
prevent or preclude the proper courts from declaring null and
void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act for violation
of the Constitution or want of capacity of the local legislative
body to enact the said measure.
Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence
and care in providing for the details in the implementation of
initiative and referendum on national and local legislation
thereby giving them special attention, it failed, rather
intentionally, to do so on the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution. Anent the initiative on national
legislation, the Act provides for the following:
(a) The required percentage of registered voters to sign the
petition and the contents of the petition;
(b) The conduct and date of the initiative;
(c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition and the
required number of votes for its approval;
(d) The certification by the COMELEC of the approval of the
proposition;
(e) The publication of the approved proposition in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines; and
(f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the proposition. 55
As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the following:
(a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of signatures
of registered voters for the petition;
(b) The submission of the petition to the local legislative body
concerned;
(c) The effect of the legislative body's failure to favorably act
thereon, and the invocation of the power of initiative as a
consequence thereof;
(d) The formulation of the proposition;
(e) The period within which to gather the signatures;
(f) The persons before whom the petition shall be signed;
(g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC through its
official in the local government unit concerned as to whether
the required number of signatures have been obtained;
(h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the submission
of the proposition to the registered voters for their approval,
which must be within the period specified therein;

(i) The issuance of a certification of the result;

(j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;
(k) The limitations on local initiative; and
(l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies. 56
Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of its twenty-three sections,
merely (a) mentions, the word "Constitution" in Section 2; (b)
defines "initiative on the Constitution" and includes it in the
enumeration of the three systems of initiative in Section 3; (c)
speaks of "plebiscite" as the process by which the proposition
in an initiative on the Constitution may be approved or rejected
by the people; (d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as
to the number of voters who should sign the petition; and (e)
provides for the date of effectivity of the approved proposition.
There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more
important or the paramount system of initiative. R.A. No. 6735
thus delivered a humiliating blow to the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant
lip service. 57
The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is
incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and
conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive
matter are fatal and cannot be cured by "empowering" the
COMELEC "to promulgate such rules and regulations as may
be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act. 58
The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated
or as expressed in a Latin maxim:potestas delegata non
delegari potest. 59 The recognized exceptions to the rule are
as follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section
28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under
Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies. 60
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising
quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is
a form of delegation of legislative authority under no. 5 above.
However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must
be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if
the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy
to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate;
and (b) fixes a standard the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate and determinable to which the delegate must
conform in the performance of his functions. 61 A sufficient
standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its
limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency

to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the

legislative command is to be effected. 62
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution
is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both
requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the
power to the COMELEC is then invalid.
III
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT
PRESCRIBES RULES AND REGULATIONS ON THE
CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly
promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of
the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have
that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC's
power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is
misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are
those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of
Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate
legislation is authorized and which satisfies the "completeness"
and the "sufficient standard" tests.
IV
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING THE
DELFIN PETITION.
Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No. 6735 is a full
compliance with the power of Congress to implement the right
to initiate constitutional amendments, or that it has validly
vested upon the COMELEC the power of subordinate
legislation and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid,
the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition.
Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section
5(b)of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for initiative on the Constitution
must be signed by at least 12% of the total number of
registered voters of which every legislative district is
represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein.
The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the required
number of voters. Delfin himself admits that he has not yet
gathered signatures and that the purpose of his petition is
primarily to obtain assistance in his drive to gather signatures.
Without the required signatures, the petition cannot be deemed
validly initiated.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative
only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory pleading.
Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC,
sitting en banc. The only participation of the COMELEC or its
personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe
the form of the petition; 63 (2) to issue through its Election
Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the total number
of registered voters in each legislative district; 64 (3) to assist,
through its election registrars, in the establishment of signature

stations; 65 and (4) to verify, through its election registrars, the

signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters'
affidavits, and voters' identification cards used in the
immediately preceding election. 66
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A.
No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be
entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The
respondent Commission must have known that the petition
does not fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300,
for which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket
number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered as UND,
meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a
mere scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by
the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December
1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file
their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the
COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.
The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of
whether the proposal to lift the term limits of elective national
and local officials is an amendment to, and not a revision of,
the Constitution is rendered unnecessary, if not academic.
CONCLUSION
This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should
be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking
cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the
Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly
enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution should no longer be kept in
the cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and
strength. Congress should not tarry any longer in complying
with the constitutional mandate to provide for the
implementation of the right of the people under that
system. cdll

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered

a) GRANTING the instant petition;
b) DECLARING R. A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system
of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and to have
failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the
Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations on
the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith
DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December
1996 is made permanent as against the Commission on
Elections, but is LIFTED as against private respondents.

Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo,
Hermosisima and Torres, Jr., JJ ., concur.

Kapunan,

Padilla, J., took no part.

||| (Defensor Santiago v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 127325, [March
19, 1997], 336 PHIL 848-930)

B. VALIDITY OF DELEGATION
i. COMPLETENESS TEST
5. US v. ANG TANG HO
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-17122. February 27, 1922.]
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NAG TANG
Ho, defendant-appellant.
Williams & Ferrier for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. ORGANIC LAW. By the organic law of the Philippine
Islands and the Constitution of the United States, all powers
are vested in the Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary. It is the
duty of the Legislature to make the law; of the Executive; and
of the Judiciary to construe the law. The Legislature has no
authority to execute or construe the law; the Executive has no
authority to make or construe the law; and the Judiciary has no
power to make or execute the law.
2. POWER. Subject to the Constitution only, the power of
each branch is supreme within its own jurisdiction, and it is for
the judiciary only to say when any Act of the Legislature is or is
not constitutional.
3. THE POWER TO DELEGATE. The Legislature cannot
delegate legislative power to enact any law. If Act No. 2868 is a
law unto itself and within itself, and it does nothing more than
to authorize the Governor-General to make rules and
regulations to carry it into effect, then the Legislature created
the law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. One the
other hand, if the act within itself does not define a crime and is
not complete, and some legislative act remains to be done to
make it law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the
Governor-General, the is a delegation of legislative power, is
unconstitutional and avoid.
4. No CRIME TO SELL. After the passage of Act No. 2868,
and without any rules and regulations of the Governor-General,
a dealer in rice could sell it at any price and he would not

commit a crime. There was no legislative act which made it a

crime to sell rice at any price.
5. CRIME BY PROCLAMATION. When Act No. 2868 is
analyzed, it is the violation of the Proclamation of the
Governor-General which constitutes the crime. The alleged
sale was made a crime, if at all, because of the Proclamation
by the Governor-General.
6. UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In so far as Act No. 2868
undertakes to authorize the Governor-General, in his
discretion, to issue a proclamation fixing the price and to make
the sale of it in violation of the proclamation a crime, it is
unconstitutional and void.
7. CONSTITUTION. The Constitution is something solid,
permanent and substantial. It stability protects the rights,
liberty, and property rights of the rich and the poor alike, and its
construction ought not to change with emergencies or
conditions.
8. PRIVATE RIGHTS. In the instant case, the law was not
dealing with Government property. It was dealing with private
property and private rights which are sacred under the
Constitution.
9. PRIVATE PROPERTY. In the instant case, the rice was
the personal, private property of the defendant. The
Government had not bought it, did not claim to own it, or have
any interest in it at the time the defendant sold it to one of his
customers.
10. POWER VESTED IN THE LEGISLATURE. By the
organic act and subject only to constitutional limitations, the
power to legislate and enact laws is vested exclusively in the
Legislature, which is elected by a direct vote of the people of
the Philippine Islands.
11. OPINION LIMITED. This opinion is confined to the right
of the Governor-General to issue a proclamation fixing the
maximum price at which rice should be sold, and to make it a
crime to sell it at a higher price, and to that extent holds that it
is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. It does
not decide or undertake to construe the constitutionality of any
of the remaining portions of Act No. 2868.
DECISION
JOHNS, J p:
At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature
passed Act No. 2868, entitled "An Act penalizing the monopoly
and hoarding of, and speculation in palay, rice, and corn under
extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and
sale thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General, with the
consent of the Council of States. to issue the necessary rules
and regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for this
purpose," the material provisions of which are as follows:
"Section 1. The Governor-General is hereby authorized,
whenever, for any cause, conditions arise resulting in an
extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue

and promulgate, with the consent of the Council of States,

temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the
purpose of this Act. to wit:
"(a) To prevent the monopoly and hoarding of, and speculation
in, palay rice or corn.
"(b) To establish and maintain a government control of the
distribution or sale of the commodities referred to or have such
distribution or sale made by the Government itself.
"(c) To fix, from time to time, the quantities of palay, rice, or
corn that a company or individual may acquire, and the
maximum sale price that the industrial or merchant may
demand.
"(d) . . .
"SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful to destroy, limit, prevent or in the
other manner obstruct the production or milling of palay, rice or
corn for the purpose of raising the prices thereof; to corner or
hoard said products as defined in section three of this Act; . . ."
Section 3 defines what shall constitute a monopoly or hoarding
of palay, rice or corn within the meaning of this Act, but does
not specify the price of rice of define any basis for fixing the
price.
"SEC. 4. The violations of any of the provisions of this Act or of
the regulations, orders and decrees promulgated in
accordance therewith shall be punished by a fine of not more
than five thousand pesos, or by imprisonment for not more
than two years, or both, in the discretion of the court: Provided,
That in the case of companies or corporations, the manager or
administrator shall be criminally liable.
"SEC. 7. At any time that the Governor-General, with the
consent of the Council of State, shall consider that the public
interest requires the application of the provisions of this Act, he
shall so declare by proclamation, and any provisions of other
laws inconsistent herewith shall from then on be temporarily
suspended.
"Upon the cessation of the reasons foe which such
proclamation was issued, the Governor-General, with the
consent of the Council of States, shall declare the application
of this Act to have likewise terminated, and all laws temporarily
suspended by virtue of the same shall again take effect, but
such termination shall not prevent the prosecution of any
proceedings or cause begun prior to such termination, nor the
filing of any proceedings for an offense committed during the
period covered by the Governor-General's proclamation."
August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation
fixing the price at which rice should be sold.
August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant,
NAG Tang Ho, charging him with the sale of rice at an
excessive price as follows:
"The undersigned accuses NAG Tang Ho of a violation of
Executive Order No. 53 of the Governor-General of the

Philippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919, in relation with the

provisions of sections 1, 2 and 4 Act No. 2868, committed as
follows:
"That on or about the 6th day of August, 1919, in the city of
Manila, Philippine Islands, the said NAG Tang Ho. voluntarily,
illegally and criminally sold to Pedro Trinidad, one Janet of rice
at the price of eighty centavos (P.80). which is a price greater
than that fixed by Executive Order No. 53 of the GovernorGeneral of the Philippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919,
under the authority of section 1 of Act No. 2868. Contrary to
law."
Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to
five months' imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500, from
which he appealed to this court, claiming that the lower court
erred in finding Executive Order No. 53 of 1919, to be of any
force and effect, in finding the accused guilty of the offense
charged, and in imposing the sentence.
The official records show that Act was to take effect on its
approval; that it was approved July 30,1919; that the GovernorGeneral issued his proclamation on the 1st of August, 1919;
and that the law was first published on the 13th of August,
1919; and that the proclamation itself was first published on the
20th of August, 1919.
The question here involves an analysis and construction of Act
No. 2868, in so far as it authorizes the Governor-General to fix
the price at which rice should be sold. It will be noted that
section 1 authorizes the Governor-General, with the consent of
the Council of State, for any cause resulting in an extraordinary
rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgated
temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the
purposes of the Act. By its very terms, the promulgation of
temporary rules and emergency measures is left to the
discretion of the Governor-General. The Legislature does not
undertake reasons the Governor-General shall issue the
proclamation, but says that it may be issued " for any cause,"
and leaves the question as to what is "any cause" to the
discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also says: "For
any cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in
the price of palay, rice or corn." The Legislature does not
specify or define what is "an extraordinary rise." That is also
left to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also
says that the Governor-General, "with the consent of the
Council of State," is authorized to issue and promulgate
"temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the
purposes of this Act." It does not specify or define what is a
temporary rule or an emergency measure, or how long such
temporary rules or emergency measures shall remain in force
and effect, or when they shall take effect. That is to say the
Legislature itself has no in any manner specified or defined any
basis for the order, but has left it to the sole judgment and
discretion of the Governor-General to say what is or what is not
"a cause," and what is or what is not "an extraordinary rise in
the price of rice," and as to what a temporary rule or an
emergency measure for the carrying out the purpose of the Act
Under this state of facts, if the law is valid and the GovernorGeneral issues a proclamation fixing the minimum price at
which rice should be sold, any dealer who, with or without

notice, sells rice at a higher price, is a criminal. There may not

have been any cause, and the price may not have been
extraordinary, and there may not have been an emergency,
but, if the Governor-General found the existence of such facts
and issued a proclamation, and rice is sold at any higher price,
the seller commits a crime.

By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and the

Constitution of the United States all power are vested in the
Legislative, Executive and Judiciary. It is the duty of the
Legislature to make the law; of the Executive to execute the
law; and of the Judiciary to construe the law. The Legislature
has no authority to executive or construe the law, the Executive
has no authority to make or construe the law, and the Judiciary
has no power to make or executive the law. Subject to the
Constitution only, the power of each branch is supreme within
its own jurisdiction, and it is for the Judiciary only to say when
any Act of the Legislature is or is not constitutional. Assuming,
without deciding, that the Legislature itself has the power to fix
the price at which rice is to be sold, can it delegate that power
to another, and, if so, was that power legally delegated by Act.
No. 2868? In other words, does the Act delegate legislative
power to the Governor-General? By the Organic Law, all
legislative power is vested in the Legislature, and the power
conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be
delegated to the Governor-General, or any one else. The
Legislative cannot delegate the Legislative power to enact any
law. If Act No. 2868 is a law unto itself and within itself, and it
does nothing more than to authorize the Governor-General to
make rules and regulations to carry the law into effect, then the
Legislature itself created the law. There is no delegation of
power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the Act within itself
does not define a crime, and is not a law, and some legislative
act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing of
which is vested in the Governor-General, then the Act is a
delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and avoid.
The Supreme Court of the United States in what is known as
the Grainer Cases (94 U. S.. 183-187; 24 L, ed., 94), first laid
down the rule:
"Railroad companies are engaged in public employment
affecting the public interest and, under the decision in Mun vs.
Ill., ante subject to Legislative control as to their rates of fare
and freight unless protect by their charters.
"The Illinois statute of Mar. 23, 1874, to established reasonable
maximum rates of charges for the transportation of freights and
passengers on the different railroads of the State is not void as
being repugnant to the Constitution of the United States or to
that of the State."
It was there for the first time held in substance that a railroad
was a public utility, and that, being a public utility, the State had
power to establish reasonable maximum freight and passenger
rates. This was followed by the State of Minnesota in enacting
a similar law, providing for and empowering, a railroad
commission to hear and determine what was a just and
reasonable rate. The constitutionality of this law was attacked

and upheld by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in a learned

and exhaustive opinion by Justice Mitchell, in the case of State
vs. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ribs. Co. (38 Minn., 281), in
which the court held:
"Regulations of railway tariffs Conclusiveness of
commission's tariffs. Under Laws 1887, c. 10, sec. 8, the
determination of the railroad and warehouse commission as to
what are equal and reasonable fares rates for the
transportation of persons and property by a railway company is
conclusive, and, in proceedings by mandamus to compel
compliance with the tariff of rates recommended and published
by them, no issue can be raise or inquiry had on that question.
"Same Constitution Delegation of power to
commission. The authority thus given to the commission to
determine, in the exercise of their discretion and judgment,
what are equal and reasonable rates, is not a delegation of
legislative power."
It will be noted that the law creating the railroad commission
expressly provides
"That all charges by any common carrier for the transportation
of passengers and property shall be equal and reasonable."
With that as a basis for the law, power is then given to the
railroad commission to investigate all the facts, to hear and
determine what is a just and reasonable rate. Even then that
law does not make the violation of the order of the commission
a crime. The only remedy is a civil proceeding. It was there
held
"That the legislature itself has the power to regulate railroad
charges is now too well settled to require either argument or
citation of authority.
"The difference between the power to say what the law shall
be, and the power to adopt rules and regulations, or to
investigate and determine the facts, in order to carry into effect
a law already passed, is apparent. The true distinction is
between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and the
conferring an authority or discretion to be exercised under and
in pursuance of the law.
"The legislature enacts that all freight rates and passenger
fares should be just and reasonable. It had the undoubted
power to fix these rates at whatever it deemed equal and
reasonable.
"They have not delegated to the commission any authority or
discretion as to what the law shall be, which would not be
allowable, but have merely conferred upon it an authority
and discretion, to be exercised in the execution of the law, and
under and in pursuance of it, which is entirely permissible. The
legislature itself has passed upon the expediency of the law,
and what it shall be. The commission is intrusted with no
authority or discretion upon these questions. It can neither
make nor unmade a single provision of law. It is merely
charged with the administration of the law, and with no other
power."

The delegation of legislative power was before the Supreme

Court of Wisconsin in Doling vs Lancaster Ins. Co. (92 Wis.,
63). The opinion says:
"The true distinction is between the delegation of power to
make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to
what it shall be and conferring authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be
made.'
"The act, in our judgment, wholly fails to provide definitely and
clearly what the standard policy should contain so that it could
be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of
all others, without the determination of the insurance
commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a
legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without
which the act could not possibly be put in use as an act in
conformity to which all fire insurance policies were required to
be issued.
"The result of all the cases on this subject is that a law must be
complete, in all its terms and provisions, when it leaves the
legislative branch of the government, and nothing must be left
to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate
of the legislature, so that, in form and substances, it is a law in
all its details in presenting, but which may be left to take effect
in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any
prescribed fact or event."
The delegation of legislative power was before the Supreme
Court in United States vs. Grimed (220 U. S., 506; 55 L. ed.,
563), where it was held that the rules and regulations of the
Secretary of Agriculture as to a trespass on government land in
a forest reserve were valid constitutional. The Act there
provided that the Secretary of Agriculture " . . . may make such
rules and regulations and establish such service as will insure
the objects of such reservation; namely, to regulate their
occupancy and use, and to preserve the forests thereon from
destruction; and any violation of the provisions of this act or
such rules and regulations shall be punished, . . ."
The brief of the United States Solicitor-General says:
"In refusing permits to use s forest reservation for stock
grazing, except upon stated terms or in stated ways, the
Secretary of Agriculture merely asserts and enforces the
proprietary right of the United States over land which it owns.
The regulations of the Secretary, therefore, is not an exercise
of legislative, or even of administrative, power; but is an
ordinary and legitimate refusal of the landowner's authorized
agent to allow persons having no right in the land to use it as
they will. The right of proprietary control is altogether different
from governmental authority."
The opinion says:
"From the beginning of the government, various acts have
been passed conferring upon executive officers power to make
rules and regulations, not for the government of their
departments, but for administering the laws which did govern.

None of these statutes could confer legislative power. But

when Congress had legislated and indicated its will, it could
give to those who were to act under such general provisions
power to fill up the details' by the establishment of
administrative rules and regulations, the violation of which be
punished by fine imprisonment fixed by Congress, or by
penalties fixed by Congress, or measured by the injury done.
"That 'Congress cannot delegate legislative power is a
principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and
maintenance of the system of government ordained by the
Constitution.'
"If, after the passage of the act and the promulgation the rule,
the defendants drove and grazed their sheep upon the reserve,
in violation of the regulations, they were making an unlawful
use of the government's property. In doing so they thereby
made themselves liable to the penalty imposed by Congress."
"The subject as to which the Secretary can regulate are
defined. The lands are set apart as a forest reserve. He is
required to make provision to protect them from depredations
and from harmful uses. He is authorized 'to regulate the
occupancy and use and to use to preserve the forests from
destruction.' A violation of reasonable rules regulating the use
and occupancy of the property is made a crime, not by the
Secretary, but by Congress."

The above are leading cases in the United States on the

question of delegating legislative power. It will be noted that in
the "Grainer Cases," it was held that a railroad company was a
public corporation, and that a railroad was a public utility, and
that, for such reasons the Legislature had the power to fix and
determine just and reasonable rates for freight and
passengers.
The Minnesota case held that, so long as the rates were just
and reasonable, the legislature could delegate the power to
ascertain the facts and determine from the facts what were just
and reasonable rates, and that in vesting the commission with
such power was not a delegation of legislative power.
The Wisconsin case was a civil action founded upon a
"Wisconsin standard policy of fire insurance," and the court
held that "the act, . . . wholly fails to provide definitely and
clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could
be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of
all others, without the determination of the insurance
commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a
legislative discretion that could not be delegated.''
The case of the United States Supreme Court, supra, dealt
with rules and regulations which were promulgated by the
Secretary of Agriculture for Government land in the forest
reserve. These hold that the legislature only can enact a law,
and that it cannot delegate its legislative authority.
The line of cleavage between what is and what is not a
delegation of legislative power is pointed out and clearly
defined. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin says:

"That no part of the legislative power can be delegated by the

legislature to any other department of the government,
executive or judicial, is a fundamental principle in constitutional
law, essential to the integrity and maintenance of the system of
government established by the constitution.
"Where an act is clothed with all the forms of law, and is
complete in and of itself, it may be provided that it shall
become operative only upon some certain act or event, or, in
like manner, that its operation shall be suspended.
The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it
can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or
state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make,
its own action to depend."
"All saloons in said village shall be closed at 11 o'clock P. M.
each day and remain closed until 5 o'clock on the following
morning, unless by special permission of the president."
Construing it in 136 Wis., 526 128 A. S. R., 1100, 1 the
Supreme Court of that State says:
"We regard the ordinance as void for two reasons: First,
because it attempts to confer arbitrary power upon an
executive officer, and allows him, in executing the ordinance, to
make unjust and groundless discriminations among persons
similarly situated; second, because the power to regulate
saloons is a law-making power vested in the village board,
which cannot be delegated. A legislative body cannot delegate
to a mere administrative officer power to make a law, but it can
make a law with provisions that it shall go into effect or be
suspended in its operation upon the ascertainment of a fact or
state of facts by an administrative of board. In the present case
the ordinance by its terms gives power to the president to
decide arbitrarily, and in the exercise of his own discretion,
when a saloon shall close. This is an attempt to vest legislative
discretion in him, and cannot be sustained."
The legal principle involved there is squarely in point here.
It must conceded that, after the passage of Act No. 2868, and
before any rules and regulations were promulgated by the
Governor-General, a dealer in rice could sell it at any price,
even at a peso per "Janet," and that he would not commit a
crime, because there would be no law fixing the price of rice,
and the sale of it at any price would not be a crime. That is to
say, in the absence of a proclamation, it was not a crime to sell
rice at any price. Hence, it must follow that, if the defendant
committed a crime, it was because the Governor-General
issued the proclamation. There was no act of the Legislature
making it a crime to sell rice at any price, and without the
proclamation, the sale of it at any price was not crime.
The Executive Order 1 provides"
(5) The maximum selling price of palay, rice or corn is hereby
fixed, for the time being as follows:
"In Manila
"Palay at P6.75 per sack of 1/2 kilos, or 29 centavos per Janet.

"Rice at P15 per sack of 57 1/2 kilos, or 63 centavos per Janet.

"Corn at P8 per sack of 57 1/2 kilos, or 34 centavos per Janet.
"In the provinces producing palay, rice and corn, the maximum
price shall be the Manila price less the cost of transportation
from the source of supply and necessary handling expenses to
the place of sale, to be determined by the provincial treasures
or their deputies.
"In provinces, obtaining their supplies from Manila or other
producing provinces, the maximum price shall be the
authorized price at the place of supply or the Manila price as
the case may be, plus the transportation cost, from the place of
supply and the necessary handling expenses, to the place of
sale, to be determined by the provincial treasurers or their
deputies.
"(6) Provincial treasurers and their deputies are hereby
directed to communicate with, and execute all instructions
emanating from the Director of Commerce and Industry, for the
most effective and proper enforcement of the above
regulations in their respective localities,"
The law says that the Governor-General may fix "the maximum
sale price that industrial or merchant may demand." The law is
a general law and not a local or special law.
The proclamation undertakes to fix one price for rice in Manila
and other and different prices in other and different provinces
in the Philippines Islands, and delegates the power to
determine the other and different prices to provincial treasurers
and their deputies. Here, then, you would have a delegation of
legislative power to the Governor-General, and a delegation by
him of that power to provincial treasurers and their deputies,
who "are hereby directed to communicate with, and executive
all instructions emanating from the Director of Commerce and
Industry, for the most effective and proper enforcement of the
above regulations in their respective localities." The issuance
of the proclamation by the Governor-General was the exercise
of the power delegation of a power, and was even a
subdelegation of that power.
Assuming that it is valid, Act No. 2868 is a general law and
does not authorize the Governor-General to fix one price of
rice in Manila and another price in Iloilo. It only purports to
authorize him fix the price of rice in the Philippine Islands
under a law, which is general and uniform, and not local or
special. Under the terms of the law, the price of rice fixed in the
proclamation must be the same all over the Islands. There
cannot be one price at Manila and another at Iloilo. Again, it is
a matter of common knowledge, and of which this court will
take judicial notice, that there are many kinds of rice with
different and corresponding market values, and that there is a
wide range in the price, which varies with grade and quality.
Act No. 2868 makes no distinction in price for the grade quality
of the rice, and the proclamation, upon which the defendant
was tried and convicted, fixes the selling price of rice in Manila
"at P15 per sack of 57 1/2 kilos, or 63 centavo per Janet," and
is uniform as to all grades of rice, and says nothing about
grade or quality. Again, it will be noted that the law is confined

to palay, rice and corn. They are products of the Philippine

Islands. Hemp, tobacco, coconut, chickens, eggs, and many
other things are also products. Any law which singles out palay,
rice or corn from the numerous, but is a local or special law. If
such a law is valid, then by the same principle, the GovernorGeneral could be authorized by proclamation to fix the price of
meat, eggs chickens, coconut, hemp, and tobacco, or any
other of the Islands. In the very nature of things, all of that
class of laws should be general and uniform. Otherwise, there
would be an unjust discrimination of property rights, which,
under the law, must be equal and uniform. Act No. 2868 is
nothing more than a floating law, which, in the discretion and
by a proclamation of the Governor-General, makes it a floating
crime to sell rice at a price in excess of the proclamation,
without regard to grade or quality.
When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the
proclamation of the Governor-General which constitutes the
crime. Without that proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at
any price. In other words, the Legislature left it to the sole
discretion of the Governor-General to say what was and what
was not "any cause" for enforcing the act, and what was and
what was not "an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or
corn," and under certain undefined conditions to fix the price at
which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or quality,
also to say whether a proclamation should be issued, if so,
when, and whether or not the law should be enforced, how
long it should be enforced, and when the law should be
suspended. The Legislature did not specify or define what was
"any cause," or what was "an extraordinary rise in the price of
rice, palay or corn." Neither did it specify or define the
conditions upon which the proclamation should be issued. In
the absence of the proclamation no crime was committed. The
alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because the GovernorGeneral issued the proclamation. The act or proclamation does
not say anything about the different grades or qualities of rice,
and the defendant is charged with the sale" of one Janet of rice
at the price of eighty centavos (P0.80) which is a price greater
than fixed by Executive Order No. 53."

We are clearly of the opinion and hold that Act No. 2868 in so
far as it undertakes to authorize the Governor-General in his
discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and
to make the sale of rice in violation of the proclamation a crime,
is unconstitutional and void.
It may be urged that there was an extraordinary rise in the
price of rice and profiteering, which worked a severe hardship,
on the poorer classes, and that an emergency existed, but the
question here presented is the constitutionality of a particular
portion of a statute, and none of such matters is an argument
for, or against, its constitutionality.
The Constitution is something solid, permanent and
substantial. Its stability protects the life, liberty and property
rights of the rich and the poor alike, and that protection ought
not to change with the wind or any emergency condition. The
fundamental question involved in this case is the right of the
people of the Philippine Islands to be and live under a

republican form of government. We make the board statement

that no state or nation, living under a republican form of
government, under the terms and conditions specified in Act
No. 2868, has ever enacted a law delegating the power to any
one, to fix the price at which rice should be sold. That power
can never be delegated under a republican form of
government.
In the fixing of the price at which the defendant should sell his
rice, the law was not dealing with government property. It was
dealing with private property and private rights, which are
sacred under the Constitution. If this law should be sustained,
upon the same principle and for the same reason, the
Legislature could authorize the Governor-General to fix the
price of every product or commodity in the Philippine Islands,
and empower him to make it a crime to sell any product at any
other or different price.
It may be said that this was a war measure, and that for such
reason the provision of the Constitution should be suspended.
But the stubborn fact remains that at all times the judicial
power was in full force and effect, and that while that power
was in force and effect, such a provision of the Constitution
could not be, and was not, suspended even in times of war. It
may be claimed that during the war, the United States
Government undertook to, and did, fix the price at which wheat
and flour should be bought and sold, and that is true. There,
the United States had declared war, and at the time was at war
with other nations, and it was a war measure, but it is also true
that in doing so, and as a part of the same act, the United
States commandeered all the wheat and flour, and took
possession of it, either or constructive, and the government
itself became the owner of the wheat and flour, and fixed the
price to be paid for it. That is not case. Here, the rice sold was
the personal and private property of the defendant, who sold it
to one of his customers. The government had not bought and
did not claim to own the rice, or have any interest in it. and at
the time of the alleged sale, it was the personal, private
property of the defendant. It may be that the law was passed in
the interest of the public, but the members of this court have
taken a solemn oath to uphold and defend the Constitution,
and it ought not to be construed to meet the changing winds or
emergency conditions. Again we say that no state or nation
under a republican form of government ever enacted a law
authorizing any executive, under the conditions stated, to fix
the price at which a private person would sell his own rice, and
make the broad statement that no decision of any court, on
principle or by analogy. will ever be found which sustains the
constitutionality of that particular portion of Act No. 2868 here
in question. By the terms of the Organic Act, subject only to
constitutional limitations, the power Legislature, which is elated
by a direct vote of the people of the Philippine Island. As to the
question here involved, the authority of the Governor-General
to fix the maximum price at which palay, rice and corn may be
sold in the manner and under the conditions stated is a
delegation of legislative power in violation of the organic law.
This opinion is confined to the particular question here
involved, which is the right of the Governor-General, upon the
terms and conditions stated in the Act, to fix the price of rice
and make it a crime to sell it at a higher price, and which holds

that portion of the Act unconstitutional. It does not decide or

undertake to construe the constitutionality of any of the
remaining of the Act.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the defendant
discharged. So ordered.
Araullo, C. J., Johnson, Street, and Ostrand, JJ., concur.
Romualdez, J., concurs in the result.
||| (United States v. Ang Tang Ho, G.R. No. L-17122, [February
27, 1922], 43 PHIL 1-19)

ii. SUFFICIENT TEST STANDARD

6. YNOT v. IAC
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 74457. March 20, 1987.]
RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLA
TE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED
NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY,
REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.
DECISION
CRUZ, J p:
The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of
Themistocles to Alcibiades: "Strike but hear me first!'" It is
this cry that the petitioner in effect repeats here as he
challenges the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626A. Cdpr
The said executive order reads in full as follows:
"WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the
interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of
carabaos not complying with the requirements of Executive
Order No. 626 particularly with respect to age;
"WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the
violators still manage to circumvent the prohibition against
interprovincial movement of carabaos by transporting carabeef
instead; and.
"WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives
of Executive Order No. 626 and the prohibition against
interprovincial movement of carabaos, it is necessary to
strengthen the said Executive Order and provide for the
disposition of the carabaos and carabeef subject of the
violation;.

"NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President

of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the
Constitution, do hereby promulgate the following:
"SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended
such that henceforth, no carabao regardless of age, sex,
physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be
transported from one province to another. The carabao or
carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as
amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the
government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and
other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat
Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef,
and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of
Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.
"SECTION 2. This
immediately.

Executive

Order

shall

take

effect

"Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the

year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty.
(SGD.)
FERDINAND
President
Republic of the Philippines"

E.

MARCOS

The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat

from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were
confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac
Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. 1 The
petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of
a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the
merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the
carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced,
ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to
rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raised by
the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed
validity. 2
The
petitioner
appealed
the
decision
to
the Intermediate Appellate Court, * 3 which
upheld
the
trial court, ** and he has now come before us in this petition for
review on certiorari. prcd
The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is
unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation of
the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial
boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is
imposed without according the owner a right to be heard
before a competent and impartialcourt as guaranteed by due
process. He complains that the measure should not have been
presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There is also a
challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by
the former President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973
Constitution. 4
While also involving the same executive order, the case of
Pesigan v. Angeles 5 is not applicable here. The question
raised there was the necessity of the previous publication of
the measure in the Official Gazette before it could be

considered enforceable. We imposed the requirement then on

the basis of due process of law. In doing so, however,
this Court did not, as contended by the Solicitor General,
impliedly affirm the constitutionality of Executive Order No.
626-A. That is an entirely different matter.
This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe
a becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions,
they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same
whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest
tribunal. 6 We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to
"review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal
or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide," final
judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all
cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures. 7 This
simply means that the resolution of such cases may be made
in the first instance by these lower courts.
And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional,
that presumption is not by any means conclusive and in fact
may be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their
invalidity, and of the need to declare them so, then "will be the
time to make the hammer fall, and heavily," 8 to recall Justice
Laurel's trenchant warning. Stated otherwise, courts should not
follow the path of least resistance by simply presuming the
constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary,
they should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the
abscess, paraphrasing another distinguished jurist, 9 and so
heal the wound or excise the affliction.
Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is
demanded, there should be no shirking of the task for fear of
retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular censure, or any other
similar inhibition unworthy of the bench, especially
this Court. LLjur
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order
but it is really presidential decree, promulgating a new rule
instead of merely implementing an existing law. It was issued
by President Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that the
laws were faithfully executed but in the exercise of his
legislative authority under Amendment No. 6. It was provided
thereunder that whenever in his judgment there existed a
grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or
whenever the legislature failed or was unable to act adequately
on any matter that in his judgment required immediate action,
he could, in order to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders
or letters of instruction that were to have the force and effect of
law. As there is no showing of any exigency to justify the
exercise of that extraordinary power then, the petitioner has
reason, indeed, to question the validity of the executive order.
Nevertheless, since the determination of the grounds was
supposed to have been made by the President "in his
judgment," a phrase that will lead to protracted discussion not
really necessary at this time, we reserve resolution of this
matter until a more appropriate occasion. For the nonce, we
confine ourselves to the more fundamental question of due
process.
It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of
the charter be cast in precise and unmistakable language to

avoid controversies that might arise on their correct

interpretation. That is the ideal. In the case of the due process
clause, however, this rule was deliberately not followed and the
wording was purposely kept ambiguous. In fact, a proposal to
delineate it more clearly was submitted in the Constitutional
Convention of 1934, but it was rejected by Delegate Jose P.
Laurel, Chairman of the Committee on the Pill of Rights, who
forcefully argued against it. He was sustained by the body. 10
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it
would remain also conveniently resilient. This was felt
necessary because due process is not, like some provisions of
the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an implacable
and immutable command for all seasons and all persons.
Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very
elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make it
adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its
protection as the changing times and circumstances may
require.
Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own
specific description of due process lest they confine
themselves in a legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the
elbow room they may need to vary the meaning of the clause
whenever indicated. Instead, they have preferred to leave the
import of the protection open-ended, as it were, to be
"gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and
exclusion in the course of the decision of cases as they
arise." 11 Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S.
Supreme Court, for example, would go no farther than to
define due process - and in so doing sums it all up as
nothing more and nothing less than "the embodiment of the
sporting idea of fair play." 12
When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign
liege the reluctant promise that that Crown would thenceforth
not proceed against the life, liberty or property of any of its
subjects except by the lawful judgment of his peers or the law
of the land, they thereby won for themselves and their progeny
that splendid guaranty of fairness that is now the hallmark of
the free society. The solemn vow that King John made at
Runnymede in 1215 has since then resounded through the
ages, as a ringing reminder to all rulers, benevolent or base,
that every person, when confronted by the stern visage of the
law, is entitled to have his say in a fair and open hearing of his
cause. prLL

The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of

the sporting idea of fair play to hear "the other side" before an
opinion is formed or a decision is made by those who sit in
judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-half of the question;
the other half must also be considered if an impartial verdict is
to be reached based on an informed appreciation of the issues
in contention. It is indispensable that the two sides complement
each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to the correct
ruling after examination of the problem not from one or the
other perspective only but in its totality. A judgment based on
less that this full appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is
unnecessary or useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or

intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive regimes,

the insolence of power.
The minimum requirements of due process are notice and
hearing 13 which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed
with because they are intended as a safeguard against official
arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial
system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with
applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of
law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We have
consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome
power of the State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which
Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the
famous Dartmouth College Case, 14 as "the law which hears
before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every
person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out
of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due
process clause into a worn and empty catchword.
This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in
every case for, to be sure, there are a number of admitted
exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for example, bars the
admission of contrary evidence as long as such presumption is
based on human experience or there is a rational connection
between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed
therefrom. 15 There are instances when the need for
expeditious action will justify omission of these requisites, as in
the summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog
on the loose, which may be killed on sight because of the
immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the
people. Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and
narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily
destroyed. The passport of a person sought for a criminal
offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return
to the country he has fled. 16 Filthy restaurants may be
summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and
bawdy houses to protect the public morals. 17 In such
instances, previous judicial hearing may be omitted without
violation of due process in view of the nature of the property
involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general
welfare from a clear and present danger. cdll
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function
of the police power which both restraints and is restrained by
due process. The police power is simply defined as the power
inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the
promotion of the general welfare. 18 By reason of its function,
it extends to all the great public needs and is described as the
most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of
the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation
and eminent domain. The individual, as a member of society, is
hemmed in by the police power, which affects him even before
he is born and follows him still after he is dead from the
womb to beyond the tomb in practically everything he does
or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and
often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or
the property has some relevance to the public welfare, its
regulation under the police power is not only proper but
necessary. And the justification is found in the venerable Latin
maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut

alienum non laedas, which call for the subordination of

individual interests to the benefit of the greater number.
It is this power that is now invoked by the government to
justify Executive Order No. 626-A, amending the basic rule in
Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos
except under certain conditions. The original measure was
issued for the reason, as expressed in one of its Whereases,
that "present conditions demand that the carabaos and the
buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who
rely on them for energy needs." We affirm at the outset the
need for such a measure. In the face of the worsening energy
crisis and the increased dependence of our farms on these
traditional beasts of burden, the government would have been
remiss, indeed, if it had not taken steps to protect and preserve
them.
A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v.
Toribio, 19 where a law regulating the registration, branding
and slaughter of large cattle was claimed to be a deprivation of
property without due process of law. The defendant had been
convicted thereunder for having slaughtered his own carabao
without the required permit, and he appealed to the
Supreme Court. The conviction was affirmed. The law was
sustained as a valid police measure to prevent the
indiscriminate killing of carabaos, which were then badly
needed by farmers. An epidemic had stricken many of these
animals and the reduction of their number had resulted in an
acute decline in agricultural output, which in turn had caused
an incipient famine. Furthermore, because of the scarcity of the
animals and the consequent increase in their price, cattlerustling had spread alarmingly, necessitating more effective
measures for the registration and branding of these animals.
The Court held that the questioned statute was a valid exercise
of the police power and declared in part as follows:
"To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of
the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require such interference; and second, that the means are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose,
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. . . .
"From what has been said, we think it is clear that the
enactment of the provisions of the statute under consideration
was required by `the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class' and that the
prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human
consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural
work or draft purposes was a `reasonably necessary' limitation
on private ownership, to protect the community from the loss of
the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident
owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a
desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so
doing the productive power of the community may be
measurably and dangerously affected."
In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the
Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so to
speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a
lawful subject of Executive Order No. 626. The method chosen

in the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for the

purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals, again following the above-cited doctrine.
There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these
animals except where they are at least seven years old if male
and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the necessary
permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit for
farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident
depletion. llcd
But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the
same lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot
say with equal certainty that it complies with the second
requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that
to strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the
carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao
regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and
no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another."
The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable
connection between the means employed and the purpose
sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing.
We do not see how the prohibition of the interprovincial
transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate
slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with
no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously,
retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their
slaughter there, any more than moving them to another
province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the
carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so
says executive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply
killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the
live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter
cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason
either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant, dead meat.
Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end
were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon with the
sanction that the measure applies for violation of the
prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao
or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the
executive authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio
Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty
prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by
the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the
challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed,
and the property being transported is immediately impounded
by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited
to the government.

In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by

the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner
only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given
a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered
confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when
ordered by the trial court. The executive order defined the
prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed
punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure

struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving

him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old
guaranty of elementary fair play.
It has already been remarked that there are occasions when
notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with
notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum
guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary
action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as
procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. 20 In
the exceptional cases accepted, however, there is a
justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing,
to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected
and the urgency of the need to correct it. cdphil
In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or
action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment. The
properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require
their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why
the offense prohibited by the executive order should not have
been proved first in a courtof justice, with the accused being
accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the
Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v.
Angeles, 21 Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the
violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the
police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have
had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only
after trial and conviction of the accused.
We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of
the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the
questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the
seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions
and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National
Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of
carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the
Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of
carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an
extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is.
It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse,
and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual
standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the
limitations that the said officers must observe when they make
their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently
boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their
generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the
officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone
may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own
exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving
commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not
"canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short,
a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of
legislative powers.
To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an
invalid exercise of the police power because the method
employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably
necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the
property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his
defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The

conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to

adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear
encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the
doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an
invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers
mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the
distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these
reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626A unconstitutional.
We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police
station commander who confiscated the petitioner's carabaos
is not liable in damages for enforcing the executive order in
accordance with its mandate. The law was at that time
presumptively valid, and it was his obligation, as a member of
the police, to enforce it. It would have been impertinent of him,
being a mere subordinate of the President, to declare the
executive order unconstitutional and, on his own responsibility
alone, refuse to execute it. Even the trial court, in fact, and
the Court of Appeals itself did not feel they had the
competence, for all their superior authority, to question the
order we now annul.
The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert
and protect his rights as he saw them, this case would never
have reached us and the taking of his property under the
challenged
measure
would
have
become
a fait
accompli despite its invalidity. We commend him for his spirit.
Without the present challenge, the matter would have ended in
that pump boat in Masbate and another violation of the
Constitution, for all its obviousness, would have been
perpetrated, allowed without protest, and soon forgotten in the
limbo of relinquished rights. LLpr
The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees
but in the courage of the people to invoke them whenever they
are ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if,
like expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress.
Rights, as weapons, must be a promise of protection. They
become truly meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to them in
the free society, if they are kept bright and sharp with use by
those who are not afraid to assert them.
WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared
unconstitutional. Except as affirmed above, the decision of
the Court of Appeals is reversed. Thesupersedeas bond is
cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to the
petitioner. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera and Feliciano, JJ., on leave.
||| (Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74457,
[March 20, 1987], 232 PHIL 615-632)

iii. VALIDITY OF EXERCISE

1. NOT INCONSISTENT WITH CONSTITUTION

7. DAR v. SUTTON
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 162070. October 19, 2005.]
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by
SECRETARY JOSE MARI B. PONCE (OIC), petitioner, vs.
DELIA T. SUTTON, ELLA T. SUTTON-SOLIMAN and HARRY
T. SUTTON, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J p:
This is a petition for review filed by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals, dated September 19, 2003 and February 4, 2004,
respectively, which declared DAR Administrative Order (A.O.)
No. 9, series of 1993, null and void for being violative of the
Constitution.
The case at bar involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited
by respondents which has been devoted exclusively to cow
and calf breeding. On October 26, 1987, pursuant to the then
existing agrarian reform program of the government,
respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) 1 their
landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives
under the law.
On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law, Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law (CARL)of 1988, took effect. It included in its coverage
farms used for raising livestock, poultry and swine.
On December 4, 1990, in an en banc decision in the case
of Luz Farms v. Secretary of DAR, 2 this Court ruled that
lands devoted to livestock and poultry-raising are not included
in the definition of agricultural land. Hence, we declared as
unconstitutional certain provisions of the CARL insofar as they
included livestock farms in the coverage of agrarian reform.
In view of the Luz Farms ruling, respondents filed with
petitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS as their
landholding was devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and thus
exempted from the coverage of the CARL. 3
On December 21, 1992, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer
of Aroroy, Masbate, inspected respondents' land and found that
it was devoted solely to cattle-raising and breeding. He
recommended to the DAR Secretary that it be exempted from
the coverage of the CARL.
On April 27, 1993, respondents reiterated to petitioner DAR the
withdrawal of their VOS and requested the return of the
supporting
papers
they
submitted
in
connection
therewith. 4 Petitioner ignored their request.

lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of

June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of
the CARL. In determining the area of land to be excluded, the
A.O. fixed the following retention limits, viz: 1:1 animal-land
ratio (i.e., 1 hectare of land per 1 head of animal shall be
retained by the landowner), and a ratio of 1.7815 hectares for
livestock infrastructure for every 21 heads of cattle shall
likewise be excluded from the operations of the CARL.
On February 4, 1994, respondents wrote the DAR Secretary
and advised him to consider as final and irrevocable the
withdrawal of their VOS as, under the Luz Farms doctrine,
their entire landholding is exempted from the CARL. 6
On September 14, 1995, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D.
Garilao issued an Order 7 partially granting the application of
respondents for exemption from the coverage ofCARL.
Applying the retention limits outlined in the DAR A.O. No. 9,
petitioner exempted 1,209 hectares of respondents' land for
grazing purposes, and a maximum of 102.5635 hectares for
infrastructure. Petitioner ordered the rest of respondents'
landholding to be segregated and placed under Compulsory
Acquisition. DTAHEC
Respondents moved for reconsideration. They contend that
their entire landholding should be exempted as it is devoted
exclusively to cattle-raising. Their motion was denied. 8 They
filed a notice of appeal 9 with the Office of the President
assailing: (1) the reasonableness and validity of DAR A.O. No.
9, s. 1993, which provided for a ratio between land and
livestock in determining the land area qualified for exclusion
from the CARL, and (2) the constitutionality of DAR A.O. No. 9,
s. 1993, in view of the Luz Farms case which declared cattleraising lands excluded from the coverage of agrarian reform.
On October 9, 2001, the Office of the President affirmed the
impugned Order of petitioner DAR. 10 It ruled that DAR A.O.
No. 9, s. 1993, does not run counter to the Luz Farms case as
the A.O. provided the guidelines to determine whether a certain
parcel of land is being used for cattle-raising. However, the
issue on the constitutionality of the assailed A.O. was left
for the determination of the courts as the sole arbiters of
such issue.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the
respondents. It declared DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, void for
being contrary to the intent of the 1987 Constitutional
Commission to exclude livestock farms from the land reform
program of the government. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, DAR Administrative
Order No. 09, Series of 1993 is hereby DECLARED null and
void. The assailed order of the Office of the President dated 09
October 2001 in so far as it affirmed the Department of
Agrarian Reform's ruling that petitioners' landholding is
covered by the agrarian reform program of the government
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED. 11

On December 27, 1993, DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of

1993, 5 which provided that only portions of private agricultural

Hence, this petition.

The main issue in the case at bar is the constitutionality of

DAR A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which prescribes a maximum
retention limit for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising.
Invoking its rule-making power under Section 49 of the CARL,
petitioner submits that it issued DAR A.O. No. 9 to limit the
area of livestock farm that may be retained by a landowner
pursuant to its mandate to place all public and private
agricultural lands under the coverage of agrarian reform.
Petitioner also contends that the A.O. seeks to remedy reports
that some unscrupulous landowners have converted their
agricultural farms to livestock farms in order to evade their
coverage in the agrarian reform program.
Petitioner's arguments fail to impress.
Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in
nature, i.e., the power to make rules and regulations. They
have been granted by Congress with the authority to issue
rules to regulate the implementation of a law entrusted to them.
Delegated rule-making has become a practical necessity in
modern governance due to the increasing complexity and
variety of public functions. However, while administrative rules
and regulations have the force and effect of law, they are not
immune from judicial review. 12 They may be properly
challenged before the courts to ensure that they do not violate
the Constitution and no grave abuse of administrative
discretion is committed by the administrative body concerned.
The fundamental rule in administrative law is that, to be valid,
administrative rules and regulations must be issued by
authority of a law and must not contravene the provisions
of the Constitution. 13 The rule-making power of an
administrative agency may not be used to abridge the authority
given to it by Congress or by the Constitution. Nor can it be
used to enlarge the power of the administrative agency
beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory
provisions control with respect to what rules and
regulations may be promulgated by administrative
agencies and the scope of their regulations. 14
In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as
it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate
livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian
reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their
ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987
Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to
exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to
livestock, swine and poultry-raising. The Court clarified in
the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-raising
are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of
"agriculture" or "agricultural activity." The raising of livestock,
swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an
industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A great portion of the
investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed
assets, such as: animal housing structures and facilities,
drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill with grinders, mixers,
conveyors, exhausts and generators, extensive warehousing
facilities for feeds and other supplies, anti-pollution equipment
like bio-gas and digester plants augmented by lagoons and
concrete
ponds,
deepwells,
elevated
water
tanks,

pumphouses,
sprayers,
appurtenances. 15

and

other

technological

Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock

farms which have been exempted by the Constitution from
the coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power
in issuing the assailed A.O.
The subsequent case of Natalia Realty, Inc. v.
DAR 16 reiterated our ruling in the Luz Farms case. In Natalia
Realty, the Court held that industrial, commercial and
residential lands are not covered by the CARL. 17 We stressed
anew that while Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 provides that
the CARL shall cover all public and private agricultural
lands, the term "agricultural land" does not include lands
classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial. Thus, in Natalia Realty, even portions of the
Antipolo Hills Subdivision, which are arable yet still
undeveloped, could not be considered as agricultural lands
subject to agrarian reform as these lots were already classified
as residential lands.
A similar logical deduction should be followed in the case at
bar. Lands devoted to raising of livestock, poultry and swine
have been classified as industrial, not agricultural, lands and
thus exempt from agrarian reform. Petitioner DAR argues that,
in issuing the impugned A.O., it was seeking to address the
reports it has received that some unscrupulous landowners
have been converting their agricultural lands to livestock farms
to avoid their coverage by the agrarian reform. Again, we find
neither merit nor logic in this contention. The undesirable
scenario which petitioner seeks to prevent with the
issuance of the A.O. clearly does not apply in this case.
Respondents' family acquired their landholdings as early as
1948. They have long been in the business of breeding cattle
in Masbate which is popularly known as the cattle-breeding
capital of the Philippines. 18 Petitioner DAR does not dispute
this fact. Indeed, there is no evidence on record that
respondents have just recently engaged in or converted to the
business of breeding cattle after the enactment of
the CARL that may lead one to suspect that respondents
intended to evade its coverage. It must be stressed that what
the CARL prohibits is the conversion of agricultural lands
for non-agricultural purposes after the effectivity of
the CARL.There has been no change of business interest
in the case of respondents.

Moreover, it is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that

the reenactment of a statute by Congress without substantial
change is an implied legislative approval and adoption of the
previous law. On the other hand, by making a new law,
Congress seeks to supersede an earlier one. 19 In the case at
bar, after the passage of the 1988 CARL, Congress
enacted R.A. No. 7881 20 which amended certain provisions of
the CARL. Specifically, the new law changed the definition
of the terms "agricultural activity" and "commercial
farming" by dropping from its coverage lands that are
devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swineraising. 21With this significant modification, Congress

clearly sought to align the provisions of our agrarian laws

with the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to
exclude livestock farms from the coverage of agrarian
reform.
In sum, it is doctrinal that rules of administrative bodies must
be in harmony with the provisions of the Constitution. They
cannot amend or extend the Constitution. To be valid, they
must conform to and be consistent with the Constitution. In
case of conflict between an administrative order and the
provisions of the Constitution, the latter prevails. 22 The
assailed A.O. of petitioner DAR was properly stricken down as
unconstitutional as it enlarges the coverage of agrarian reform
beyond the scope intended by the 1987 Constitution.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated
September 19, 2003 and February 4, 2004, respectively, are
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. ISEHTa
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio
Morales,
Callejo,
Sr.,
Azcuna,
Tinga,
ChicoNazario and Garcia, JJ., concur.
||| (Department of Agrarian Reform v. Sutton, G.R. No. 162070,
[October 19, 2005], 510 PHIL 177-186)

2. NOT INCONSISTENT WITH STATUTE

8. SOL GEN v. MM
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 102782. December 11, 1991.]
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, RODOLFO A. MALAPIRA,
STEPHEN A. MONSANTO, DAN R. CALDERON, and
GRANDY N. TRIESTE, petitioners, vs. THE METROPOLITAN
MANILA AUTHORITY and the MUNICIPALITY OF
MANDALUYONG, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; PROCEDURAL RULES; MAY BE
RELAXED OR SUSPENDED IN THE INTEREST OF
SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE. Unquestionably, the Court has
the power to suspend procedural rules in the exercise of its
inherent power, as expressly recognized in the Constitution, to
promulgate rules concerning "pleading, practice and procedure
in all courts." In proper cases, procedural rules may be relaxed
or suspended in the interest of substantial justice, which
otherwise may be miscarried because of a rigid and formalistic
adherence to such rules. The Court has taken this step in a
number of such cases, notably Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil.
368, where Justice Tuason justified the deviation on the ground
that "the transcendental importance to the public of these

cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely

brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure."
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE
POWER; HELD VALID IN CASE AT BAR. The Metro Manila
Authority sustains Ordinance No. 11-Series of 1991, under the
specific authority conferred upon it by EO 392, while Ordinance
No. 7, Series of 1988, is justified on the basis of the General
Welfare Clause embodied in the Local Government Code. It is
not disputed that both measures were enacted to promote the
comfort and convenience of the public and to alleviate the
worsening traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila due in large
part to violations of traffic rules. The Court holds that there is a
valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate such
measures, it appearing that the requisites of such delegation
are present. These requisites are: 1) the completeness of the
statute making the delegation; and 2) the presence of a
sufficient standard.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; Under the first requirement, the statute must
leave the legislature complete in all its terms and provisions
such that all the delegate will have to do when the statute
reaches it is to implement it. What only can be delegated is not
the discretion to determine what the law shall be but the
discretion to determine how the law shall be enforced. This has
been done in the case at bar. As a second requirement, the
enforcement may be effected only in accordance with a
sufficient standard, the function of which is to map out the
boundaries of the delegate's authority and thus "prevent the
delegation from running riot." This requirement has also been
met. It is settled that the "convenience and welfare" of the
public, particularly the motorists and passengers in the case at
bar, is an acceptable sufficient standard to delimit the
delegate's authority.
4. ID.; ID.; QUESTION POSED IS THE VALIDITY OF THE
EXERCISE OF SUCH DELEGATED POWER; TEST TO
DETERMINE VALIDITY OF MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE. The
measures in question are enactments of local governments
acting only as agents of the national legislature. Necessarily,
the acts of these agents must reflect and conform to the will of
their principal. To test the validity of such acts in the specific
case now before us, we apply the particular requisites of a
valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles
governing municipal corporations. According to Elliot, a
municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but
may regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must
be general and consistent with public policy.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE DOES NOT
CONFORM TO EXISTING LAW. A careful study of the
Gonong decision will show that the measures under
consideration do not pass the first criterion because they do
not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD
1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the
confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations committed
in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the provisions of
Secs. 1, 3, 5 and 8 of the decree authorizing the Metropolitan
Manila Commission (and now the Metropolitan Manila

Authority) to impose such sanctions. In fact, the said

provisions prohibit the imposition of such sanctions in
Metropolitan Manila. The Commission was allowed to "impose
fines and otherwise discipline" traffic violators only "in such
amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed,"
that is, by the decree itself. Nowhere is the removal of license
plates directly imposed by the decree or at least allowed by it
to be imposed by the Commission. Notably, Section 5 thereof
expressly provides that "in case of traffic violations, the driver's
license shall not be confiscated." These restrictions are
applicable to the Metropolitan Manila Authority and all other
local political subdivisions comprising Metropolitan Manila,
including the Municipality of Mandaluyong.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. The requirement that the
municipal enactment must not violate existing law explains
itself. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by
virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the
national legislature (except only that the power to create their
own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the
Constitution itself). They are mere agents vested with what is
called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the
Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but
must obey at all times the will of their principal. In the case
before us, the enactments in question, which are merely local
in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force
and effect of a statute. The self-serving language of Section 2
of the challenged ordinance is worth nothing. Curiously, it is the
measure itself, which was enacted by the Metropolitan Manila
Authority, that authorizes the Metropolitan Manila Authority to
impose the questioned sanction. The measures in question do
not merely add to the requirement of PD 1605 but, worse,
impose sanctions the decree does not allow and in fact actually
prohibits. In so doing, the ordinances disregard and violate and
in effect partially repeal the law.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; PD 1605 APPLIES ONLY TO METROPOLITAN
MANILA AREA AND AN EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL
AUTHORITY CONFERRED BY REPUBLIC ACT 4136 ON THE
COMMISSIONER OF LAND TRANSPORTATION. We here
emphasize the ruling in the Gonong Case that PD 1605 applies
only to the Metropolitan Manila area. It is an exception to the
general authority conferred by R.A. No. 4136 on the
Commissioner of Land Transportation to punish violations of
traffic rules elsewhere in the country with the sanctions therein
prescribed, including those here questioned. The Court agrees
that the challenged ordinances were enacted with the best of
motives and shares the concern of the rest of the public for the
effective reduction of traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila
through the imposition and enforcement of more deterrent
penalties upon traffic violators. At the same time, it must also
reiterate the public misgivings over the abuses that may attend
the enforcement of such sanctions, including the illicit practices
described in detail in the Gonong decision. At any rate, the fact
is that there is no statutory authority for and indeed there is
a statutory prohibition against the imposition of such
penalties in the Metropolitan Manila area.
8. ID.; ID.; IT IS FOR CONGRESS TO EXERCISE ITS
DISCRETION TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT TO
IMPOSE THE QUESTIONED SANCTIONS. It is for

Congress to determine, in the exercise of its own discretion,

whether or not to impose such sanctions, either directly
through a statute or by simply delegating authority to this effect
to the local governments in Metropolitan Manila. Without such
action, PD 1605 remains effective and continues to prohibit the
confiscation of license plates of motor vehicles (except under
the conditions prescribed in LOI 43) and of driver's licenses as
well for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila.
DECISION
CRUZ, J p:
In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon.
Arsenio M. Gonong, G.R. No. 91023, promulgated on July 13,
1990, 1 the Court held that the confiscation of the license
plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the
sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila
Commission under PD 1605 and was permitted only under the
conditions laid down by LOI 43 in the case of stalled vehicles
obstructing the public streets. It was there also observed that
even the confiscation of drivers licenses for traffic violations
was not directly prescribed by the decree nor was it allowed by
the decree to be imposed by the Commission. No motion for
reconsideration of that decision was submitted. The judgment
became final and executory on August 6, 1990, and it was duly
entered in the Book of Entries of Judgments on July 13, 1990.
Subsequently, the following developments transpired:
In a letter dated October 17, 1990, Rodolfo A. Malapira
complained to the Court that when he was stopped for an
alleged traffic violation, his driver's license was confiscated by
Traffic Enforcer Angel de los Reyes in Quezon City.
On December 18, 1990, the Caloocan-Manila Drivers and
Operators Association sent a letter to the Court asking who
should enforce the decision in the above-mentioned case,
whether they could seek damages for confiscation of their
driver's licenses, and where they should file their complaints.
Another letter was received by the Court on February 14, 1991,
from Stephen L. Monsanto, complaining against the
confiscation of his driver's license by Traffic Enforcer A.D.
Martinez for an alleged traffic violation in Mandaluyong.
This was followed by a letter-complaint filed on March 7, 1991,
from Dan R. Calderon, a lawyer, also for confiscation of his
driver's license by Pat. R.J. Tano-an of the Makati Police
Force. cdll

Still another complaint was received by the Court dated April

29, 1991, this time from Grandy N. Trieste, another lawyer,
who also protested the removal of his front license plate by E.
Ramos of the Metropolitan Manila Authority-Traffic Operations
Center and the confiscation of his driver's license by Pat. A.V.
Emmanuel of the Metropolitan Police Command-Western
Police District.

Required to submit a Comment on the complaint against him,

Allan D. Martinez invoked Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, of
Mandaluyong, authorizing the confiscation of driver's licenses
and the removal of license plates of motor vehicles for traffic
violations.

In its Comment, the Metropolitan Manila Authority defended the

said ordinance on the ground that it was adopted pursuant to
the powers conferred upon it by EO 392. It particularly cited
Section 2 thereof vesting in the Council (its governing body)
the responsibility among others of:

For his part, A.V. Emmanuel said he confiscated Trieste's

driver's license pursuant to a memorandum dated February 27,
1991, from the District Commander of the Western Traffic
District of the Philippine National Police, authorizing such
sanction under certain conditions.

1. Formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services

requiring coordination or consolidation for the Authority; and

Director General Cesar P. Nazareno of the Philippine National

Police assured the Court in his own Comment that his office
had never authorized the removal of the license plates of
illegally parked vehicles and that he had in fact directed full
compliance with the above-mentioned decision in a
memorandum, copy of which he attached, entitled Removal of
Motor Vehicle License Plates and dated February 28,
1991. cdtai
Pat. R.J. Tano-an, on the other hand, argued that the Gonong
decision prohibited only the removal of license plates and not
the confiscation of driver's licenses.
On May 24, 1990, the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued
Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, authorizing itself "to detach
the
license
plate/tow
and
impound
attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally
parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila."
On July 2, 1991, the Court issued the following resolution:
The attention of the Court has been called to the enactment by
the Metropolitan Manila Authority of Ordinance No. 11, Series
of 1991, providing inter alia that:
SECTION 2. Authority to Detach Plate / Tow and Impound.
The Metropolitan Manila Authority, thru the Traffic Operations
Center, is authorized to detach the license plate, tow and
impound attended unattended abandoned motor vehicles
illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro
Manila. LLjur
The provision appears to be in conflict with the decision of the
Court in the case at bar (as reported in 187 SCRA 432), where
it was held that the license plates of motor vehicles may not be
detached except only under the conditions prescribed in LOI
43. Additionally, the Court has received several complaints
against the confiscation by police authorities of driver's
licenses for alleged traffic violations, which sanction is,
according to the said decision, not among those that may be
imposed under PD 1605.
To clarify these matters for the proper guidance of lawenforcement officers and motorists, the Court Resolved to
require the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the Solicitor
General to submit, within ten (10) days from notice hereof,
separate COMMENTS on such sanctions in light of the said
decision.

2. Promulgation of resolutions and other issuances of

metropolitan wide application, approval of a code of basic
services requiring coordination, and exercise of its rule-making
powers. (Emphasis supplied)
The Authority argued that there was no conflict between the
decision and the ordinance because the latter was meant to
supplement and not supplant the latter. It stressed that the
decision itself said that the confiscation of license plates was
invalid in the absence of a valid law or ordinance, which was
why Ordinance No. 11 was enacted. The Authority also pointed
out that the ordinance could not be attacked collaterally but
only in a direct action challenging its validity.
For his part, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the
ordinance was null and void because it represented an invalid
exercise of a delegated legislative power. The fee in the
measure was that it violated existing law, specifically PD 1605,
which does not permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the removal
of license plates and the confiscation of driver's licenses for
traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila. He made no mention,
however, of the alleged impropriety of examining the said
ordinance in the absence of a formal challenge to its
validity. LexLib
On October 24, 1991, the Office of the Solicitor General
submitted a motion for the early resolution of the questioned
sanctions, to remove once and for all the uncertainty of their
validity. A similar motion was filed by the Metropolitan Manila
Authority, which reiterated its contention that the incidents in
question should be dismissed because there was no actual
case or controversy before the Court.
The Metropolitan Manila Authority is correct in invoking the
doctrine that the validity of a law or act can be challenged only
in a direct action and not collaterally. That is indeed the settled
principle. However, that rule is not inflexible and may be
relaxed by the Court under exceptional circumstances, such as
those in the present controversy. Cdpr
The Solicitor General notes that the practices complained of
have created a great deal of confusion among motorists about
the state of the law on the questioned sanctions. More
importantly, he maintains that these sanctions are illegal, being
violative of law and the Gonong decision, and should therefore
be stopped. We also note the disturbing report that one
policeman who confiscated a driver's license dismissed the
Gonong decision as "wrong" and said the police would not stop
their "habit" unless they received orders "from the top."
Regrettably, not one of the complainants has filed a formal
challenge to the ordinances, including Monsanto and Trieste,

who are lawyers and could have been more assertive of their
rights.
Given these considerations, the Court feels it must address the
problem squarely presented to it and decide it as categorically
rather than dismiss the complaints on the basis of the technical
objection raised and thus, through its inaction, allow them to
fester.
The step we now take is not without legal authority or judicial
precedent. Unquestionably, the Court has the power to
suspend procedural rules in the exercise of its inherent power,
as expressly recognized in the Constitution, to promulgate
rules concerning "pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts." 2 In proper cases, procedural rules may be relaxed or
suspended in the interest of substantial justice, which
otherwise may be miscarried because of a rigid and formalistic
adherence to such rules.
The Court has taken this step in a number of such cases,
notably Araneta vs. Dinglasan, 3 where Justice Tuason
justified the donation on the ground that "the transcendental
importance to the public of these cases demands that they be
settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must,
technicalities of procedure."
We have made similar rulings in other cases, thus:
Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and
rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend
to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must
always be avoided. (Aznar III vs. Bernad, G.R. No. 81190, May
9, 1988, 161 SCRA 276.) Time and again, this Court has
suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from
their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so
require. In the instant petition, we forego a lengthy disquisition
of the proper procedure that should have been taken by the
parties involved and proceed directly to the merits of the case.
(Piczon vs. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 31) LibLex
Three of the cases were consolidated for argument and the
other two were argued separately on other dates. Inasmuch as
all of them present the same fundamental question which, in
our view, is decisive, they will be disposed of jointly. For the
same reason we will pass up the objection to the personality or
sufficiency of interest of the petitioners in case G.R. No. L3054 and case G.R. No. L 3056 and the question whether
prohibition lies in cases G.R. Nos. L-2044 and L2756. No
practical benefit can be gained from a discussion of these
procedural matters, since the decision in the cases wherein the
petitioners' cause of action or the propriety of the procedure
followed is not in dispute, will be controlling authority on the
others. Above all, the transcendental importance to the public
of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and
definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of
procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2821 cited in
Araneta vs. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368.)
Accordingly, the Court will consider the motion to resolve filed
by the Solicitor General a petition for prohibition against the

enforcement of Ordinance No. 11 -Series of 1991, of the

Metropolitan Manila Authority, and Ordinance No. 7, Series of
1988, of the Municipality of Mandaluyong. Stephen A.
Monsanto, Rodolfo A. Malapira, Dan R. Calderon, and Grandy
N. Trieste are considered co-petitioners and the Metropolitan
Manila Authority and the Municipality of Mandaluyong are
hereby impleaded as respondents. This petition is docketed as
G.R. No. 102782. The comments already submitted are duly
noted and shall be taken into account by the Court in the
resolution of the substantive issues raised.
It is stressed that this action is not intended to disparage
procedural rules, which the Court has recognized often enough
as necessary to the orderly administration of justice. If we are
relaxing them in this particular case, it is because of the failure
of the proper parties to file the appropriate proceeding against
the acts complained of, and the necessity of resolving, in the
interest of the public, the important substantive issues raised.

Now to the merits.

The Metro Manila Authority sustains Ordinance No. 11-Series
of 1991, under the specific authority conferred upon it by EO
392, while Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, is justified on the
basis of the General Welfare Clause embodied in the Local
Government Code. 4 It is not disputed that both measures
were enacted to promote the comfort and convenience of the
public and to alleviate the worsening traffic problems in
Metropolitan Manila due in large part to violations of traffic
rules. cdtai
The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative
power to promulgate such measures, it appearing that the
requisites of such delegation are present. These requisites are:
1) the completeness of the statute making the delegation; and
2) the presence of a sufficient standard. 5
Under the first requirement, the statute must leave the
legislature complete in all its terms and provisions such that all
the delegate will have to do when the statute reaches it is to
implement it. What only can be delegated is not the discretion
to determine what the law shall be but the discretion to
determine how the law shall be enforced. This has been done
in the case at bar.
As a second requirement, the enforcement may be effected
only in accordance with a sufficient standard, the function of
which is to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority
and thus "prevent the delegation from running riot." This
requirement has also been met. It is settled that the
"convenience and welfare" of the public, particularly the
motorists and passengers in the case at bar, is an acceptable
sufficient standard to delimit the delegate's authority. 6
But the problem before us is not the validity of the delegation of
legislative power. The question we must resolve is the validity
of the exercise of such delegated power.cdll
The measures in question are enactments of local
governments acting only as agents of the national legislature.

Necessarily, the acts of these agents must reflect and conform

to the will of their principal. To test the validity of such acts in
the specific case now before us, we apply the particular
requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted
principles governing municipal corporations.
According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must
not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be
unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4)
must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be
unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with
public policy. 7
A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the
measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion
because they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law
is PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of
license plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic
violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in
the following provisions of the decree authorizing the
Metropolitan Manila Commission (and now the Metropolitan
Manila Authority) to impose such sanctions:
SECTION 1. The Metropolitan Manila Commission shall have
the power to impose fines and otherwise discipline drivers and
operators of motor vehicles for violations of traffic laws,
ordinances, rules and regulations in Metropolitan Manila in
such amounts and under such penalties as are herein
prescribed. For this purpose, the powers of the Land
Transportation Commission and the Board of Transportation
under existing laws over such violations and punishment
thereof are hereby transferred to the Metropolitan Manila
Commission. When the proper penalty to be imposed is
suspension or revocation of driver's license or certificate of
public convenience, the Metropolitan Manila Commission or its
representatives shall suspend or revoke such license or
certificate. The suspended or revoked driver's license or the
report of suspension or revocation of the certificate of public
convenience shall be sent to the Land Transportation
Commission or the Board of Transportation, as the case may
be, for their records update.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 3. Violations of traffic laws, ordinances, rules and
regulations, committed with a twelve-month period, reckoned
from the date of birth of the licensee, shall subject the violator
to graduated fines as follows: P10.00 for the first offense,
P20.00 for the second offense, P50.00 for the third offense, a
one-year suspension of driver's license for the fourth offense,
and a revocation of the driver's license for the fifth offense:
Provided, That the Metropolitan Manila Commission may
imposehigher penalties as it may deem proper for violations of
its ordinances prohibiting or regulating the use of certain public
roads, streets and thoroughfares in Metropolitan Manila.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 5. In case of traffic violations, the drivers license
shall not be confiscated but the erring driver shall be
immediately issued a traffic citation ticket prescribed by the

Metropolitan Manila Commission which shall state the violation

committed, the amount of fine imposed for the violation and an
advice that he can make payment to the city or municipal
treasurer where the violation was committed or to the
Philippine National Bank or Philippine Veterans Bank or their
branches within seven days from the date of issuance of the
citation ticket.
If the offender fails to pay the fine imposed within the period
herein prescribed, the Metropolitan Manila Commission or the
law enforcement agency concerned shall endorse the case to
the proper fiscal for appropriate proceedings preparatory to the
filing of the case with the competent traffic court, city or
municipal court. cdrep
If at the time a driver renews his driver's license and records
show that he has an unpaid fine, his driver's license shall not
be renewed until he has paid the fine and corresponding
surcharges.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 8. Insofar as the Metropolitan Manila area is
concerned, all laws, decrees, orders, ordinances, rules and
regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent herewith are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly. (Emphasis supplied).
In fact, the above provisions prohibit the imposition of such
sanctions in Metropolitan Manila. The Commission was
allowed to "impose fines and otherwise discipline" traffic
violators only "in such amounts and under such penalties as
are herein prescribed," that is, by the decree itself. Nowhere is
the removal of license plates directly imposed by the decree or
at least allowed by it to be imposed by the Commission.
Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly provides that "in case of
traffic violations, the driver's license shall not be confiscated."
These restrictions are applicable to the Metropolitan Manila
Authority and all other local political subdivisions comprising
Metropolitan
Manila,
including
the
Municipality
of
Mandaluyong. cdll
The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate
existing law explains itself. Local political subdivisions are able
to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative
power from the national legislature (except only that the power
to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is
conferred by the Constitution itself.) 8 They are mere agents
vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation.
As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit
cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their
principal. In the case before us, the enactments in question,
which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the
decree, which has the force and effect of a statute.
The self-serving language of Section 2 of the challenged
ordinance is worth noting. Curiously, it is the measure itself,
which was enacted by the Metropolitan Manila Authority, that
authorizes the Metropolitan Manila Authority to impose the
questioned sanction. cdtai

In Villacorta vs. Bernardo, 9 the Court nullified an ordinance

enacted by the Municipal Board of Dagupan City for being
violative of the Land Registration Act. The decision held in part:
In declaring the said ordinance null and void, the court a
quo declared:
"From the above-recited requirements, there is no showing that
would justify the enactment of the questioned ordinance.
Section 1 of said ordinance clearly conflicts with Section 44 of
Act 496, because the latter law does not require subdivision
plans to be submitted to the City Engineer before the same is
submitted for approval to and verification by the General Land
Registration Office or by the Director of Lands as provided for
in Section 58 of said Act. Section 2 of the same ordinance also
contravenes the provisions of Section 44 of Act 496, the latter
being silent on a service fee of P0.03 per square meter of
every lot subject of such subdivision application; Section 3 of
the ordinance in question also conflicts with Section 44 of Act
496, because the latter law does not mention of a certification
to be made by the City Engineer before the Register of Deeds
allows registration of the subdivision plan; and the last section
of said ordinance imposes a penalty for its violation, which
Section 44 of Act 496 does not impose. In other words,
Ordinance 22 of the City of Dagupan imposes upon a
subdivision owner additional conditions.
xxx xxx xxx
"The Court takes note of the laudable purpose of the ordinance
in bringing to a halt the surreptitious registration of lands
belonging to the government. But as already intimated above,
the powers of the board in enacting such a laudable ordinance
cannot be held valid when it shall impede the exercise of rights
granted in a general law and/or make a general law
subordinated to a local ordinance."
We affirm.
To sustain the ordinance would be to open the floodgates to
other ordinances amending and so violating national laws in
the guise of implementing them. Thus, ordinances could be
passed imposing additional requirements for the issuance of
marriage licenses, to prevent bigamy; the registration of
vehicles, to minimize carnapping; the execution of contracts, to
forestall fraud; the validation of passports, to deter imposture;
the exercise of freedom of speech, to reduce disorder; and so
on. The list is endless, but the means, even if the end be valid,
would be ultra vires. LibLex

The measures in question do not merely add to the

requirement of PD 1605 but, worse, impose sanctions the
decree does not allow and in fact actually prohibits. In so
doing, the ordinances disregard and violate and in effect
partially repeal the law.
We here emphasize the ruling in the Gonong Case that PD
1605 applies only to the Metropolitan Manila area. It is an
exception to the general authority conferred by R.A. No. 4136
on the Commissioner of Land Transportation to punish

violations of traffic rules elsewhere in the country with the

sanctions therein prescribed, including those here questioned.
The Court agrees that the challenged ordinances were enacted
with the best of motives and shares the concern of the rest of
the public for the effective reduction of traffic problems in
Metropolitan Manila through the imposition and enforcement of
more deterrent penalties upon traffic violators. At the same
time, it must also reiterate the public misgivings over the
abuses that may attend the enforcement of such sanctions,
including the illicit practices described in detail in the Gonong
decision. At any rate, the fact is that there is no statutory
authority for and indeed there is a statutory prohibition
against the imposition of such penalties in the Metropolitan
Manila area. Hence, regardless of their merits, they cannot be
imposed by the challenged enactments by virtue only of the
delegated legislative powers. LibLex
It is for Congress to determine, in the exercise of its own
discretion, whether or not to impose such sanctions, either
directly through a statute or by simply delegating authority to
this effect to the local governments in Metropolitan Manila.
Without such action, PD 1605 remains effective and continues
to prohibit the confiscation of license plates of motor vehicles
(except under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43) and of
driver's licenses as well for traffic violations in Metropolitan
Manila.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(1) declaring Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, of the
Metropolitan Manila Authority and Ordinance No. 7, Series of
1988, of the Municipality of Mandaluyong, NULL and VOID;
and
(2) enjoining all law-enforcement authorities in Metropolitan
Manila from removing the license plates of motor vehicles
(except when authorized under LOI 43) and confiscating
driver's licenses for traffic violations within the said area.
SO ORDERED
Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras,
Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado,
Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.
Nocon, J., took no part.
||| (The Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority, G.R.
No. 102782, [December 11, 1991])

3. CANNOT AMEND ACT OF CONGRESS

9. BOIE-TAKEDA v. DELA SERNA
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 92174. December 10, 1993.]

BOIE-TAKEDA
CHEMICALS,
INC., petitioner, vs. HON.
DIONISIO C. DE LA SERNA, Acting Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment,respondent.
[G.R. No. 102552. December 10, 1993.]
PHILIPPINE
FUJI
XEROX
CORP., petitioner, vs. CRESENCIANO
B.
TRAJANO,
Undersecretary of the Department of Labor and
Employment, and PHILIPPINE FUJI XEROX EMPLOYEES
UNION, respondents.
Herrera, Laurel, De los Reyes, Roxas & Teehankee for BoieTakeda Chemicals, Inc. and Phil. Fuji Xerox Corp.
The Solicitor General for public respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; WAGES; BASIC
SALARY, CONSTRUED; CASE AT BAR. Contrary to
respondents' contention, Memorandum Order No. 28did not
repeal, supersede or abrogate P.D. 851. As may be gleaned
from the language of Memorandum Order No. 28, it merely
"modified" Section 1 of the decree by removing the P1,000.00
salary ceiling. The concept of 13th Month Pay as envisioned,
defined and implemented under P.D. 851 remained unaltered,
and while entitlement to said benefit was no longer limited to
employees receiving a monthly basic salary of not more than
P1,000.00, said benefit was, and still is, to be computed on the
basic salary of the employee-recipient as provided under P.D.
851. Thus, the interpretation given to the term "basic salary" as
defined in P.D. 851 applies equally to "basic salary"
under Memorandum Order No. 28. The term "basic salary" is to
be understood in its common, generally-accepted meaning,
i.e., as a rate of pay for a standard work period exclusive of
such additional payments as bonuses and overtime. This is
how the term was also understood in the case of Pless v.
Franks, 308 S.W. 2d. 402, 403, 202 Tenn. 630, which held that
in statutes providing that pension should not be less than 50
percent of "basic salary" at the time of retirement, the quoted
words meant the salary than an employee (e.g., a policeman)
was receiving at the time he retired without taking into
consideration any extra compensation to which he might be
entitled for extra work. In remunerative schemes consisting of
a fixed or guaranteed wage plus commission, the fixed or
guaranteed wage is patently the "basic salary" for this is what
the employee receives for a standard work period.
Commissions are given for extra efforts exerted in
consummating sales or other related transactions. They are, as
such, additional pay, which this Court has made clear do not
form part of the "basic salary." In including commissions in the
computation of the 13th month pay, the second paragraph of
Section 5 (a) of the Revised Guidelines on the Implementation
of the 13th Month Pay Law unduly expanded the concept of
"basic salary" as defined in P.D. 851. It is a fundamental rule
that implementing rules cannot add to or detract from the
provisions of the law it is designed to implement. Administrative
regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular
department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law
they are intended to carry into effect. They cannot widen its

scope. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of

Congress. (Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co., Inc. vs. Drilon, 176
SCRA 24, citing Manuel vs. General Auditing Office, 42 SCRA
660.)
DECISION
NARVASA, C.J. p:
What item or items of employee remuneration should go into
the computation of thirteenth month pay is the basic issue
presented in these consolidated petitions. Otherwise stated,
the question is whether or not the respondent labor officials in
computing said benefit, committed "grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction," by giving effect to Section 5
of the Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the
Thirteenth Month Pay (Presidential Decree No. 851)
promulgated by then Secretary of Labor and Employment,
Hon. Franklin Drilon, and overruling petitioners' contention that
said provision constituted a usurpation of legislative power
because not justified by or within the authority of the law
sought to be implemented besides violative of the equal
protection of the law clause of the Constitution.
Resolution of the issue entails, first, a review of the pertinent
provisions of the laws and implementing regulations. cdrep
Sections 1 and 2 of Presidential Decree No. 851, the
Thirteenth Month Pay Law, read as follows:
SEC. 1. All employers are hereby required to pay all their
employees receiving basic salary of not more than P1,000.00 a
month, regardless of the nature of the employment, a 13th
month pay not later than December 24 of every year.
Sec. 2. Employers already paying their employees a 13th
month pay or its equivalent are not covered by this Decree.
The Rules
and
Regulations
Implementing P.D.
851 promulgated by then Labor Minister Blas Ople on
December 22, 1975 contained the following relevant provisions
relative to the concept of "thirteenth month pay" and the
employers exempted from giving it, to wit:.
SEC. 2. Definition of certain terms. . . .
a) "Thirteenth month pay" shall mean one twelfth (1/12) of the
basic salary of an employee within a calendar year;
b) "Basic Salary" shall include all remunerations or earnings
paid by an employer to an employee for services rendered but
may not include cost-of-living allowances granted pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 525 or Letter of Instructions No.
174, profit-sharing payments, and all allowances and monetary
benefits which are not considered or integrated as part of the
regular or basic salary of the employee at the time of the
promulgation of the Decree on December 16, 1975. Cdpr
SEC. 3. Employers covered. . . . (The law applies) to all
employers except to:
xxx xxx xxx

c) Employers already paying their employees a 13-month pay

or more in a calendar year or its equivalent at the time of this
issuance;
xxx xxx xxx
e) Employers of those who are paid on purely commission,
boundary, or task basis, and those who are paid a fixed
amount for performing a specific work, irrespective of the time
consumed in the performance thereof, except where the
workers are paid on piece-rate basis in which case the
employer shall be covered by this issuance insofar as such
workers are concerned.
xxx xxx xxx
The term "its equivalent" as used in paragraph (c) shall include
Christmas bonus, mid-year bonus, profit-sharing payments and
other cash bonuses amounting to not less than 1/12th of the
basic salary but shall not include cash and stock dividends,
cost of living allowances and all other allowances regularly
enjoyed by the employee, as well as non-monetary benefits.
Where an employer pays less than 1/12th of the employee's
basic salary, the employer shall pay the difference.
Supplementary Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D.
851 were subsequently issued by Minister Ople which inter
alia set out items of compensation not included in the
computation of the 13th month pay, viz.:
SEC. 4. Overtime pay, earnings and other remunerations
which are not part of the basic salary shall not be included in
the computation of the 13th month pay. LibLex
On August 13, 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino
promulgated Memorandum Order No. 28, which contained a
single provision modifying Presidential Decree No. 851by
removing the salary ceiling of P1,000.00 a month set by the
latter, as follows:
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 851 is hereby modified to
the extent that all employers are hereby required to pay all
their rank-and-file employees a 13th month pay not later than
December 24, of every year.
Slightly more than a year later, on November 16, 1987,
Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13th Month
Pay Law were promulgated by then Labor Secretary Franklin
Drilon which, among other things, defined with particularity
what remunerative items were and were not embraced in the
concept of 13th month pay, and specifically dealt with
employees who are paid a fixed or guaranteed wage plus
commission. The relevant provisions read:
4. Amount and payment of 13th Month Pay.
xxx xxx xxx
The basic salary of an employee for the purpose of computing
the 13th month pay shall include all remunerations or earnings
paid by his employer for services rendered but does not
include allowances and monetary benefits which are not

considered or integrated as part of the regular or basic salary,

such as the cash equivalent of unused vacation and sick leave
credits, overtime, premium, night differential and holiday pay,
and cost-of-living allowances. However, these salary-related
benefits should be included as part of the basic salary in the
computation of the 13th month pay if by individual or collective
agreement, company practice or policy, the same are treated
as part of the basic salary of the employees. llcd
xxx xxx xxx
5. 13th Month Pay for Certain Types of Employees.
(a) Employees Paid by Results. Employees who are paid on
piece work basis are by law entitled to the 13th month pay.
Employees who are paid a fixed or guaranteed wage plus
commission are also entitled to the mandated 13th month pay
based on their total earnings during the calendar year, i.e., on
both their fixed or guaranteed wage and commission.
This was the state of the law when the controversies at bar
arose out of the following antecedents:
(RE G.R. No. 92174) A routine inspection was conducted on
May 2, 1989 in the premises of petitioner Boie-Takeda
Chemicals, Inc. by Labor and Development Officer Reynaldo
B. Ramos under Inspection Authority No. 4-209-89. Finding
that Boie-Takeda had not been including the commissions
earned by its medical representatives in the computation of
their 13th month pay, Ramos served a Notice of Inspection
Results 1 on Boie-Takeda through its president, Mr. Benito
Araneta, requiring Boie-Takeda within ten (10) calendar days
from notice to effect restitution or correction of "the
underpayment of 13th month pay for the year(s) 1986, 1987
and 1988 of Med Rep (Revised Guidelines on the
Implementation of 13th month pay # 5) in the total amount of
P558,810.89."

Boie-Takeda wrote the Labor Department contesting the Notice

of Inspection Results, and expressing the view "that the
commission paid to our medical representatives are not to be
included in the computation of the 13th month pay . . . (since
the) law and its implementing rules speak of REGULAR or
BASIC salary and therefore exclude all other remunerations
which are not part of the REGULAR salary." It pointed out that,
"If no sales is (sic) made under the effort of a particular
representative, there is no commission during the period when
no sale was transacted, so that commissions are not and
cannot be legally defined as regular in nature." 2 LibLex
Regional Director Luna C. Piezas directed Boie-Takeda to
appear before his Office on June 9 and 16, 1989. On the
appointed dates, however, and despite due notice, no one
appeared for Boie-Takeda, and the matter had perforce to be
resolved on the basis of the evidence at hand. On July 24,
1989, Director Piezas issued an Order 3directing Boie-Takeda:
". . . to pay . . . (its) medical representatives and its managers
the total amount of FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND

SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY SIX AND FORTY SEVEN

CENTAVOS (P565,746.47) representing underpayment of
thirteenth (13th) month pay for the years 1986, 1987, 1988,
inclusive, pursuant to the . . . revised guidelines within ten (10)
days from receipt of this Order."
A motion for reconsideration 4 was seasonably filed by BoieTakeda under date of August 3, 1989. Treated as an appeal, it
was resolved on January 17, 1990 by then Acting Labor
Secretary Dionisio de la Serna, who affirmed the July 24, 1989
Order with modification that the sales commissions earned by
Boie-Takeda's medical representatives before August 13, 1989,
the effectivity date of Memorandum Order No. 28 and its
Implementing Guidelines, shall be excluded in the computation
of their 13th month pay. 5
Hence the petition docketed as G.R. No. 92174.
[RE G.R. No. 102552) A similar Routine Inspection was
conducted in the premises of Philippine Fuji Xerox Corp. on
September 7, 1989 pursuant to Routine Inspection Authority
No. NCR-LSED-RI-494-89. In his Notice of Inspection
Results, 6 addressed to the Manager, Mr. Nicolas O. Katigbak,
Senior Labor and Employment Officer Nicanor M. Torres noted
the following violation committed by Philippine Fuji Xerox
Corp., to wit: cdrep
"Underpayment of 13th month pay of 62 employees, more or
less pursuant to Revised Guidelines on the Implementation
of the 13th month pay law for the period covering 1986, 1987
and 1988."
Philippine Fuji Xerox was requested to effect rectification
and/or restitution of the noted violation within five (5) working
days from notice.
No action having been taken thereon by Philippine Fuji Xerox,
Mr. Eduardo G. Gonzales, President of Philxerox Employees
Union, wrote then Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon requesting a
follow-up of the inspection findings. Messrs. Nicolas and
Gonzales were summoned to appear before Labor
Employment and Development Officer Mario F. Santos, NCR
Office, Department of Labor for a conciliation conference.
When no amicable settlement was reached, the parties were
required to file their position papers.
Subsequently, Regional Director Luna C. Piezas issued an
Order dated August 23, 1990, 7 disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
Respondent
PHILIPPINE FUJI XEROX is hereby ordered to restitute to its
salesmen the portion of the 13th month pay which arose out of
the non-implementation of the said revised guidelines, ten (10)
days from receipt hereof, otherwise, Mr. NICANOR TORRES,
the SR. LABOR EMPLOYMENT OFFICER is hereby Ordered
to proceed to the premises of the Respondent for the purpose
of computing the said deficiency (sic) should respondent fail to
heed this Order."
Philippine Fuji Xerox appealed the aforequoted Order to the
Office of Secretary of Labor. In an Order dated October 10,
1991, Undersecretary Cresenciano B. Trajano denied the

appeal for lack of merit. Hence, the petition in G.R. No.

102552, which was ordered consolidated with G.R. No. 92174
as involving the same issue. cdll
In their almost identically-worded petitions, petitioners, through
common counsel, attribute grave abuse of discretion to
respondent labor officials Hon. Dionisio dela Serna and
Undersecretary Cresenciano B. Trajano in issuing the
questioned Orders of January 17, 1990 and October 10, 1991,
respectively. They maintain that under P. D. 851, the 13th
month pay is based solely on basic salary. As defined by the
law itself and clarified by the Implementing and Supplementary
Rules as well as by the Supreme Court in a long line of
decisions, remunerations which do not form part of the basic or
regular salary of an employee, such as commissions, should
not be considered in the computation of the 13th month pay.
This being the case, the Revised Guidelines on the
Implementation of the 13th Month Pay Law issued by then
Secretary Drilon providing for the inclusion of commissions in
the 13th month pay, were issued in excess of the statutory
authority conferred by P.D. 851. According to petitioners, this
conclusion becomes even more evident when considered in
light of the opinion rendered by Labor Secretary Drilon himself
in "In Re: Labor Dispute at the Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company" which affirmed the contemporaneous
interpretation by then Secretary Ople that commissions are
excluded from basic salary. Petitioners further contend that
assuming that Secretary Drilon did not exceed the statutory
authority conferred by P.D. 851, still the Revised Guidelines
are null and void as they violate the equal protection of the law
clause. LLpr
Respondents through the Office of the Solicitor General
question the propriety of petitioner's attack on the
constitutionality of the Revised Guidelines in a petition
forcertiorari, which, they contend, should be confined purely to
the correction of errors and/or defects of jurisdiction, including
matters of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and not extend to a collateral attack on
the validity and/or constitutionality of a law or statute. They
aver that the petitions do not advance any cogent reason or
state any valid ground to sustain the allegation of grave abuse
of discretion, and that at any rate, P.D. No. 851, otherwise
known as the 13th Month Pay Law has already been amended
by Memorandum Order No. 28 issued by President Corazon C.
Aquino on August 13, 1986 so that commissions are now
imputed into the computation of the 13th Month Pay. They add
that the Revised Guidelines issued by then Labor Secretary
Drilon merely clarified a gray area occasioned by the silence of
the law as to the nature of commissions; and worked no
violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution, said
Guidelines being based on reasonable classification.
Respondents point to the case of Songco vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, 183 SCRA 610, wherein this Court
declared that Article 97(f) of the Labor Code is explicit that
commission is included in the definition of the term "wage".
We rule for the petitioners.
Contrary to respondents' contention, Memorandum Order No.
28 did not repeal, supersede or abrogate P.D. 851. As may be

gleaned from the language ofMemorandum Order No. 28, it

merely "modified" Section 1 of the decree by removing the
P1,000.00 salary ceiling. The concept of 13th Month Pay as
envisioned, defined and implemented under P.D. 851 remained
unaltered, and while entitlement to said benefit was no longer
limited to employees receiving a monthly basic salary of not
more than P1,000.00, said benefit was, and still is, to be
computed on the basic salary of the employee-recipient as
provided under P.D. 851. Thus, the interpretation given to the
term "basic salary" as defined in P.D. 851 applies equally to
"basic salary" under Memorandum Order No. 28.

the later and more controlling Supplementary Rules and

Regulations which categorically exclude from the definitions of
basic salary earnings and other remunerations paid by
employer to an employee. A cursory perusal of the two sets of
Rules indicates that what has hitherto been the subject of a
broad inclusion is now a subject of broad exclusion. The
Supplementary Rules and Regulations cure the seeming
tendency of the former rules to include all remunerations and
earnings within the definition of basic salary.

In the case of San Miguel Corp. vs. Inciong, 103 SCRA 139,
this Court delineated the coverage of the term "basic salary" as
used in P.D. 851. We said at some length: llcd

"The all embracing phrase 'earnings and other remunerations'

which are deemed not part of the basic salary includes within
its meaning payments for sick, vacation, or maternity leaves,
premium for works performed on rest days and special
holidays, pays for regular holidays and night differentials. As
such they are deemed not part of the basic salary and shall not
be considered in the computation of the 13th-month pay. If they
were not excluded, it is hard to find any 'earnings and other
remunerations' expressly excluded in the computation of the
13th-month pay. Then the exclusionary provision would prove
to be idle and with no purpose.

"Under Presidential Decree 851 and its implementing rules, the

basic salary of an employee is used as the basis in the
determination of his 13th month pay. Any compensations or
remunerations which are deemed not part of the basic pay is
excluded as basis in the computation of the mandatory bonus.
"Under the Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential
Decree 851, the following compensations are deemed not part
of the basic salary:
a) Cost-of-living allowances granted pursuant to Presidential
Decree 525 and Letter of Instructions No. 174;
b) Profit-sharing payments;
c) All allowances and monetary benefits which are not
considered or integrated as part of the regular basic salary of
the employee at the time of the promulgation of the Decree on
December 16, 1975.
"Under a later set of Supplementary Rules and Regulations
Implementing Presidential Decree 851 issued by then Labor
Secretary Blas Ople, overtime pay, earnings and other
remunerations are excluded as part of the basic salary and in
the computation of the 13th month pay.
"The exclusion of cost-of-living allowances under Presidential
Decree 525 and Letter of Instructions No. 174, and profitsharing payments indicate the intention to strip basic salary of
other payments which are properly considered as 'fringe'
benefits. Likewise, the catch-all exclusionary phrase 'all
allowances and monetary benefits which are not considered or
integrated as part of the basic salary' shows also the intention
to strip basic salary of any and additions which may be in the
form of allowances or 'fringe' benefits.
"Moreover, the Supplementary Rules and Regulations
Implementing Presidential Decree 851 is even more emphatic
in declaring that earnings and other remunerations which are
not part of the basic salary shall not be included in the
computation of the 13th-month pay. cdphil
"While doubt may have been created by the prior Rules and
Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree 851 which
defines basic salary to include all remunerations or earnings
paid by an employer to an employee, this cloud is dissipated in

"This conclusion finds strong support under the Labor Code of

the Philippines. To cite a few provisions: cdphil
'Art. 87. Overtime work. Work may be performed beyond eight
(8) hours a day provided that the employee is paid for the
overtime work, additional compensation equivalent to his
regular wage plus at least twenty-five (25%) percent thereof.'
It is clear that overtime pay is an additional compensation other
than and added to the regular wage or basic salary, for reason
of which such is categorically excluded from the definition of
basic salary under the Supplementary Rules and Regulations
Implementing Presidential Decree 851.
In Article 93 of the same Code, paragraph.
'c) work performed on any special holiday shall be paid an
additional compensation of at least thirty percent (30%) of the
regular wage of the employee.'.
"It is likewise clear that premiums for special holiday which is at
least 30% of the regular wage is an additional pay other than
and added to the regular wage or basic salary. For similar
reason, it shall not be considered in the computation of the
13th-month pay.
Quite obvious from the foregoing is that the term "basic salary"
is to be understood in its common, generally-accepted
meaning, i.e., as a rate of pay for a standard work period
exclusive of such additional payments as bonuses and
overtime. 8 This is how the term was also understood in the
case of Pless v. Franks, 308 S.W. 2d. 402, 403, 202 Tenn. 630,
which held that in statutes providing that pension should not be
less than 50 percent of "basic salary" at the time of retirement,
the quoted words meant the salary than an employee (e.g., a
policeman) was receiving at the time he retired without taking
into consideration any extra compensation to which he might
be entitled for extra work. 9 LibLex

In remunerative schemes consisting of a fixed or guaranteed

wage plus commission, the fixed or guaranteed wage is
patently the "basic salary" for this is what the employee
receives for a standard work period. Commissions are given
for extra efforts exerted in consummating sales or other related
transactions. They are, as such, additional pay, which this
Court has made clear do not form part of the "basic salary."
Respondents would do well to distinguish this case
from Songco vs. National Labor Relations Commission,
supra, upon which they rely so heavily. What was involved
therein was the term "salary" without the restrictive adjective
"basic". Thus, in said case, we construed the term in its generic
sense to refer to all types of "direct remunerations for services
rendered," including commissions. In the same case, we also
took judicial notice of the fact "that some salesmen do not
receive any basic salary but depend on commissions and
allowances or commissions alone, although an employeremployee relationship exists," which statement is quite
significant in that it speaks of a "basic salary" apart and distinct
from "commissions" and "allowances". Instead of supporting
respondents' stand, it would appear that Songco itself
recognizes that commissions are not part of "basic salary."
In including commissions in the computation of the 13th month
pay, the second paragraph of Section 5 (a) of the Revised
Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13th Month Pay Law
unduly expanded the concept of "basic salary" as defined
in P.D. 851. It is a fundamental rule that implementing rules
cannot add to or detract from the provisions of the law it is
designed to implement. Administrative regulations adopted
under legislative authority by a particular department must be
in harmony with the provisions of the law they are intended to
carry into effect. They cannot widen its scope. An
administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.
10 LLpr
Having reached this conclusion, we deem it unnecessary to
discuss the other issues raised in these petitions.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are hereby
GRANTED. The second paragraph of Section 5 (a) of the
Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13th Month
Pay Law issued on November 16, 1987 by then Labor
Secretary Franklin M. Drilon is declared null and void as being
violative of the law said Guidelines were issued to implement,
hence issued with grave abuse of discretion correctible by the
writ of prohibition and certiorari. The assailed Orders of
January 17, 1990 and October 10, 1991 based thereon are
SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Regalado, Nocon and Puno, JJ ., concur.
||| (Boie-Takeda Chemicals, Inc. v. De La Serna, G.R. No.
92174, 102552, [December 10, 1993])

4. CANNOT EXCEED PROVISIONS OF BASIC LAW

10. UBFHAI v. BF HOMES 310 SCRA 304

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124873. July 14, 1999.]
UNITED BF HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATION, and HOME
INSURANCE
AND
GUARANTY
CORPORATION, petitioners, vs.
BF
HOMES,
INC., respondent.
Veneranda Acayler-Cruz for
Association.

United

BF

Homeowner's

Roberto C. Abrajano for petitioner Home Insurance and

Guaranty Corp.
Hector Danny D. Uy for respondents.
SYNOPSIS
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) placed
respondent BF Homes, Inc. (BFHI) under receivership to
undergo a ten-year (10) rehabilitation program due to its
financial difficulties. Petitioner UBFHAI was created and
registered with the Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation
(HIGC) in 1989, and recognized as the sole representative of
all the homeowners' association inside the BF Homes
Paraaque Subdivision. Respondent BFHI, through its
receiver, turned over to petitioner UBFHAI the administration
and operation of the subdivision's clubhouse and a strip of
open space in 1989 and 1993, respectively. In 1994, the first
receiver was relieved and a new committee of receivers,
composed of respondent BFHI's eleven (11) members of the
board of directors was appointed. Petitioner UBFHAI filed with
the HIGC a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction
against respondent BFHI alleging that the committee of
receivers illegally revoked their security agreement with the
previous receiver. Without filing an answer to the petition with
HIGC, respondent BFHI filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for prohibition for the issuance of preliminary injunction
and temporary restraining order, to enjoin HIGC from
proceeding with the case. The Court of Appeals granted
respondent BFHI's petition for prohibition and also ordered
HIGC's hearing officer to refrain from hearing and to dismiss it
for lack of jurisdiction. Assailed in this petition for review
on certiorari is the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
The Supreme Court held that Rule II, Section 1 (b) of HIGC's
"Revised Rules of Procedure in the Hearing of Homeowners'
Disputes" is void, without ruling on the validity of the rest of the
rules. Neither can HIGC claim original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the petition for mandamus under the two other
types of disputes enumerated in PD 902-A and its revised
rules. The dispute is not one involving the members of the
homeowners association nor is it one between any and/or all of
the members and the association of which they are members.
The parties are the homeowners' association and the ownerdeveloper, acting at the same time as the corporation's
committee of receivers. The Court decision and resolution
appealed from were affirmed.

SYLLABUS
1. COMMERCIAL LAW; CORPORATION CODE; HOME
INSURANCE AND GUARANTY CORPORATION (HIGC);
POWERS AND FUNCTIONS THEREOF; LIMITATIONS.
Originally, administrative supervision over homeowners'
associations was vested by law with the Securities and
Exchange Commission. On May 3, 1979, pursuant toExecutive
Order 535, this function was delegated to the Home Insurance
and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC). Section 2 of Executive
Order 535 provides: "2. In addition to the powers and functions
vested under the Home Financing Act, the Corporation, shall
have among others, the following additional powers; (a) To
require submission of and register articles of incorporation of
homeowners associations and issue certificates of
incorporation/registration, upon compliance by the registering
associations with the duly promulgated rules and regulations
thereon; maintain a registry thereof; and exercise all the
powers, authorities and responsibilities that are vested on the
Securities and Exchange Commission with respect to
homeowners association, the provision of Act 1459, as
amended by P.D. 902-A, to the contrary notwithstanding;" By
virtue of this amendatory law, the HIGC not only assumed the
regulatory and adjudicative functions of the SEC over
homeowners' associations, but also the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving: "(b)
Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership
relations, between and among stockholders, members or
associates; between any or all of them and the corporation,
partnership or association of which they are stockholders,
members or associates, respectively; and between such
corporation, partnership or association and the state insofar as
it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such
entity." On December 21, 1989, the HIGC adopted its rules of
procedure in the hearing of homeowners' disputes. Section
1(b), Rule II enumerated the types of disputes over which the
HIGC has jurisdiction, and these include: "Section 1. Types of
Disputes The HIGC or any person, officer, body, board, or
committee duly designated or created by it shall have
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving the
following: . . . (b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate
relations between and among members of the association,
between any and/or all of them and the association of which
they are members, and insofar as it concerns its right to exist
as a corporate entity, between the association and
the state/general public or other entity." Therefore, in relation to
Section 5 (b), Presidential Decree 902-A, the HIGC's
jurisdiction over homeowners' disputes is limited to
controversies that arise out of the following intra-corporate
relations: (1) between and among members of the association;
(2) between any or all of them and the association of which
they are members or associates; and (3) between such
association and the state, insofar as it concerns their individual
franchise or right to exist as such entity.
2. POLITICAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT; AN
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY CANNOT AMEND AN ACT OF
CONGRESS; RATIONALE; CASE AT BAR. As early as
1970, in the case of Teoxon vs. Members of the Board of
Administrators (PVA), 33 SCRA 585, 588 [1970], we ruled that

the power to promulgate rules in the implementation of a

statute is necessarily limited to what is provided for in the
legislative enactment. Its terms must be followed for an
administrative agency cannot amend an Act of Congress. The
rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating
the mode or proceedings to carry into effect the law as it has
been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand
the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered
by the statute." (Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of
Appeals, 285 SCRA 404, 407 [1996]). If a discrepancy occurs
between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation,
it is the former that prevails. (Nasipit Lumber Company, Inc. vs.
National Wages and Productivity Commission, 289 SCRA 667,
681 [1981]). In the present case, the HIGC went beyond the
authority provided by the law when it promulgated the revised
rules of procedure. There was a clear attempt to unduly
expand the provisions of Presidential Decree 902-A. As
provided in the law, insofar as the association's franchise or
corporate existence is involved, it is only the State, not the
"general public or other entity" that could question this. The
appellate court correctly held that: "The inclusion of the
phrase GENERAL PUBLIC OR OTHER ENTITY is a matter
which HIGC cannot legally do . . . ." The rule-making power of
a public administrative body is a delegated legislative power,
which it may not use either to abridge the authority given it by
Congress or the Constitution or to enlarge its power beyond
the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions
control what rules and regulations may be promulgated by
such a body, as well as with respect to what fields are subject
to regulation by it. It may not make rules and regulations which
are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a
statute, particularly the statute it is administering or which
created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose
of a statute. Moreover, where the legislature has delegated to
an executive or administrative officers and boards authority to
promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose,
the rules of administrative officers and boards, which have the
effect of extending, or which conflict with the authority-granting
statute, do not represent a valid exercise of the rule-making
power but constitute an attempt by an administrative body to
legislate. "A statutory grant of powers should not be extended
by implication beyond what may be necessary for their just and
reasonable execution." It is axiomatic that a rule or regulation
must bear upon, and be consistent with, the provisions of the
enabling statute if such rule or regulation is to be valid.
DECISION
PARDO, J p:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the
decision 1 and resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals granting
respondent BFHI's petition for prohibition, and ordering Atty.
Roberto C. Abrajano, hearing officer of the Home Insurance
and Guaranty Corporation, to refrain from hearing HIGC CASE
NO. HOA-95-027 and to dismiss it for lack of jurisdiction. cdrep
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner United BF Homeowners' Association, Inc. (UBFHAI)
is the umbrella organization and sole representative of all

homeowners in the BF Homes Paraaque Subdivision, a

seven hundred sixty five (765) hectare subdivision located in
the south of Manila. Respondent BF Homes, Inc. (BFHI) is the
owner-developer of the said subdivision, which first opened in
1968. 3
In 1988, because of financial difficulties, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) placed respondent BFHI under
receivership to undergo a ten-year (10) rehabilitation program,
and appointed Atty. Florencio B. Orendain receiver. The
program was composed of two stages: (1) payment of
obligations to external creditors; and (2) payment of obligations
to Banco Filipino. 4 llcd
When Atty. Florencio B. Orendain took over management of
respondent BFHI in 1988, several things were not in order in
the subdivision. 5 Preliminary to the rehabilitation, Atty.
Orendain entered into an agreement with the two major
homeowners' associations, the BF Paraaque Homeowners
Association, Inc. (BFPHAI) and the Confederation of BF
Homeowners Association, Inc. (CBFHAI), for the creation of a
single, representative homeowners' association and the setting
up of an integrated security program that would cover the eight
(8) entry and exit points to and from the subdivision. On
December 20, 1988, this tripartite agreement was reduced into
a memorandum of agreement, and amended on March 1989.

Pursuant to these agreements, on May 18, 1989, petitioner

UBFHAI was created and registered with the Home Insurance
and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC), 6 and recognized as the
sole representative of all the homeowners' association inside
the subdivision.
Respondent BFHI, through its receiver, turned over to
petitioner UBFHAI the administration and operation of the
subdivision's clubhouse at #37 Pilar Banzon Street, 7and a
strip of open space in Concha Cruz Garden Row, 8 on June
23, 1989 and May, 1993, respectively. cdrep
On November 7, 1994, the first receiver was relieved and a
new committee of receivers, composed of respondent BFHI's
eleven (11) members of the board of directors was
appointed. 9
On April 7, 1995, based on BFHI's title to the main roads, the
newly appointed committee of receivers sent a letter to the
different homeowners' association in the subdivision informing
them that as a basic requirement for BFHI's rehabilitation,
respondent BFHI would be responsible for the security of the
subdivision in order to centralize it and abate the continuing
proliferation of squatters. 10
On the same day, petitioner UBFHAI filed with the HIGC a
petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction against
respondent BFHI. 11 In substance, petitioner UBFHAI alleged
that the committee of receivers illegally revoked their security
agreement with the previous receiver. They complained that
even prior to said date, the new committee of receivers
committed the following acts: (1) deferred petitioner UBFHAI's

purchase of additional pumps; (2) terminated the collection

agreement for the community assessment forged by the
petitioner UBFHAI with the first receiver; (3) terminated the
administration and maintenance of the Concha Cruz Garden
Row; (4) sent a letter to petitioner UBFHAI stating that it
recognized BFPHAI 12 only, and that the subdivision's
clubhouse was to be administered by it only; and (5) took over
the administration of security in the main avenues in the
subdivision. cdphil
On April 11, 1995, the HIGC issued ex parte a temporary
restraining order. Particularly, respondent BFHI was enjoined
from:
". . . taking over the Clubhouse located at 37 Pilar Banzon St.,
BF Homes Paraaque, Metro Manila, taking over security in all
the entry and exit points and main avenues of BF Homes
Paraaque Subdivision, impeding or preventing the execution
and sale at auction of the properties of BF Paraaque
Homeowners Association, Inc., in HIGC HOA-90-138 and
otherwise repudiating or invalidating any contract or agreement
of petitioner with the former receiver/BFHI concerning funding
or delivery of community services to the homeowners
represented by the latter." 13
On April 24, 1995, without filing an answer to petitioner
UBFHAI's petition with the HIGC, respondent BFHI filed with
the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition for the issuance
of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, to
enjoin HIGC from proceeding with the case. 14
On May 2, 1995, the HIGC issued an order deferring the
resolution of petitioner UBFHAI's application for preliminary
injunction, until such time that respondent BFHI's application
for prohibition with the appellate court has been resolved.
When the twenty-day (20) effectivity of the temporary
restraining order had lapsed, the HIGC ordered the parties to
maintain the status quo. 15 cda
Meanwhile, on November 27, 1995, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its decision 16 granting respondent BFHI's
petition for prohibition, as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
GRANTED, prohibiting the public respondent Roberto C.
Abrajano from proceeding with the hearing of HIGC CASE NO.
HOA-95-027. Consequently, the public respondent is hereby
ordered to DISMISS HIGC CASE NO. HOA-95-027 for lack of
jurisdiction."
"SO ORDERED." 17
On April 24, 1996, the appellate court denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration. 18
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. LexLib
Petitioner UBFHAI raises two issues: (1) whether or not the
Rules of Procedure promulgated by the HIGC, specifically
Section 1(b), Rule II of the "Rules of Procedure in the
Settlement of Homeowners' Disputes" is valid; (2) whether or
not the acts committed by the respondent constitute an attack

on petitioner's corporate existence. 19Corollary to these,

petitioner questions the appellate court's jurisdiction over the
subject case.
Originally, administrative supervision over homeowners'
associations was vested by law with the Securities and
Exchange Commission. On May 3, 1979, pursuant toExecutive
Order 535, 20 this function was delegated to the Home
Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC). 21 Section 2
of Executive Order 535 provides:
"2. In addition to the powers and functions vested under
the Home Financing Act, the Corporation, shall have among
others, the following additional powers; Cdpr
(a) To require submission of and register articles of
incorporation of homeowners associations and issue
certificates of incorporation/registration, upon compliance by
the registering associations with the duly promulgated rules
and regulations thereon; maintain a registry thereof; and
exercise all the powers, authorities and responsibilities that are
vested on the Securities and Exchange Commission with
respect to homeowners association, the provision of Act 1459,
as amended by P.D. 902-A, to the contrary notwithstanding;"
By virtue of this amendatory law, the HIGC not only assumed
the regulatory and adjudicative functions of the SEC over
homeowners' associations, but also the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving:
"(b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership
relations, between and among stockholders, members or
associates; between any or all of them and the corporation,
partnership or association of which they are stockholders,
members or associates, respectively; and between such
corporation, partnership or association and the state insofar as
it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such
entity." 22 cdll
On December 21, 1989, the HIGC adopted its rules of
procedure in the hearing of homeowners' disputes. Section
1(b), Rule II enumerated the types of disputes over which the
HIGC has jurisdiction, and these include:
"SECTION 1. Types of Disputes. The HIGC or any person,
officer, body, board, or committee duly designated or created
by it shall have jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving
the following:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate relations
between and among members of the association, between any
and/or all of them and the association of which they are
members, and insofar as it concerns its right to exist as a
corporate entity, between the association and the state/general
public or other entity." [emphasis supplied] dctai
Therefore, in relation to Section 5 (b), Presidential Decree 902A, the HIGC's jurisdiction over homeowners' disputes is limited
to controversies that arise out of the following intra-corporate
relations: (1) between and among members of the association;

(2) between any or all of them and the association of which

they are members or associates; and (3) between such
association and the state, insofar as it concerns their individual
franchise or right to exist as such entity. (Emphasis supplied.)
Though it would seem that Section 1(b), Rule II of the HIGC's
revised rules of procedure is just a reproduction of Section 5
(b), Presidential Decree 902-A, the rules deviated from the
provisions of the latter. If the provisions of the law would be
followed to the letter, the third type of dispute over which the
HIGC has jurisdiction should be limited only to a dispute
between the state and the association, insofar as it concerns
the association's franchise or corporate existence. However,
under the HIGC's revised rules of procedure, the
phrase "general public or other entity" 23 was added.
It was on this third type of dispute, as provided in Section 1(b),
Rule II of the HIGC's revised rules of procedure that petitioner
UBFHAI anchors its claim that the HIGC has original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the case. In the comment filed by the
HIGC with the appellate court, it maintained that it has original
and exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute pursuant to the
power and authority granted it in the revised rules of
procedure. Respondent BFHI disputes this, contending that the
rules or procedure relied upon by petitioner are not a valid
implementation of Executive Order No. 535, as amended, in
relation to Presidential Decree 902-A. prLL
The question now is whether HIGC, in promulgating the abovementioned rules of procedure, went beyond the authority
delegated to it and unduly expanded the provisions of the
delegating law. In relation to this, the question is whether or not
the revised rules of procedure are valid.
As early as 1970, in the case of Teoxon vs. Members of the
Board of Administrators (PVA), 24 we ruled that the power to
promulgate rules in the implementation of a statute is
necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative
enactment. Its terms must be followed for an administrative
agency cannot amend an Act of Congress. 25 "The rulemaking power must be confined to details for regulating the
mode or proceedings to carry into effect the law as it has been
enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the
statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by
the statute." 26 If a discrepancy occurs between the basic law
and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that
prevails. 27
In the present case, the HIGC went beyond the authority
provided by the law when it promulgated the revised rules of
procedure. There was a clear attempt to unduly expand the
provisions of Presidential Decree 902-A. As provided in the
law, insofar as the association's franchise or corporate
existence is involved, it is only the State, not the "general
public or other entity" that could question this. The appellate
court correctly held that: "The inclusion of the phrase
GENERAL PUBLIC OR OTHER ENTITY is a matter which
HIGC cannot legally do . . . " 28 The rule-making power of a
public administrative body is a delegated legislative power,
which it may not use either to abridge the authority given it by
Congress or the Constitution or to enlarge its power beyond

the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions

control what rules and regulations may be promulgated by
such a body, as well as with respect to what fields are subject
to regulation by it. It may not make rules and regulations which
are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a
statute, particularly the statute it is administering or which
created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose
of a statute. 29 cdrep

Moreover, where the legislature has delegated to an executive

or administrative officers and boards authority to promulgate
rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of
administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of
extending, or which conflict with the authority-granting statute,
do not represent a valid exercise of the rule-making power but
constitute an attempt by an administrative body to
legislate. 30 "A statutory grant of 'powers should not be
extended by implication beyond what may be necessary for
their just and reasonable execution." 31 It is axiomatic that a
rule or regulation must bear upon, and be consistent with, the
provisions of the enabling statute if such rule or regulation is to
be valid. 32

be immaterial. The HIGC has no jurisdiction to hear and

resolve the dispute.LLphil
Having dispensed with the question of jurisdiction, there is no
need for the HIGC to proceed with the hearing of HIGC-HOA
95-027. It would just be an exercise in futility since it has no
jurisdiction.
Furthermore, it was apparent that the board of directors of
respondent BFHI, acting as the committee of receivers, was
only trying to find ways and means to rehabilitate the
corporation so that it can pay off its creditors. The revocation of
the security agreements and the removal of administration and
maintenance of certain property that are still under the name of
respondent BFHI, were acts done in pursuance of the
rehabilitation program. All the security agreements and
undertakings were contractual in nature, which respondent
BFHI, acting as a committee of receivers and being the
successor of the former receiver, could very well alter or
modify.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review
on certiorari, for lack of merit. The decision and resolution
appealed from in CA-G.R. SP. NO. 37072 are AFFIRMED.cdll

Thus, we hold that Rule II, Section 1(b) of HIGC's "Revised

Rules of Procedure in the Hearing of Homeowners' Disputes"
is void, without ruling on the validity of the rest of the rules.

No costs.

Neither can the HIGC claim original and exclusive jurisdiction

over the petition for mandamus under the two other types of
disputes enumerated in Presidential Decree 902-A and in the
revised rules. The dispute is not one involving the members of
the homeowners' association nor is it one between any and/or
all of the members and the association of which they are
members. The parties are the homeowners' association and
the owner-developer, acting at the same time as the
corporation's committee of receivers. Cdpr

Davide, Jr.,
JJ., concur.

To reiterate, the HIGC exercises a very limited jurisdiction over

homeowners' disputes. The law confined this authority to
controversies that arise out of the following intra-corporate
relations: (1) between and among members of the association;
(2) between any and/or all of them and the association of
which they are members; and (3) insofar as it concerns its right
to exist as a corporate entity, between the association and the
state. None of the parties to the litigation can enlarge or
diminish it or dictate when it shall attach or when it shall be
removed. 33
Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to
hear, try and decide a case. Jurisdiction over the subject
matter is conferred by the Constitution or by law. Nothing can
change the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter.
That power is a matter of legislative enactment which none but
the legislature may change. 34
In light of the foregoing, we do not see the need to discuss the
second issue. Whether or not the acts committed or threatened
to be committed by the respondent against the petitioner would
constitute an attack on the latter's corporate existence would

SO ORDERED.
C.J.,

Melo,

Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago,

||| (United BF Homeowner's Ass'n. v. BF Homes, Inc., G.R. No.

124873, [July 14, 1999], 369 PHIL 568-582)

5. NOT UNREASONABLE, UNFAIR, OR DISCRIMINATORY

11. LUPANGCO v. CA 160 SCRA 848
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 77372. April 29, 1988.]
LUPO L. LUPANGCO, RAYMOND S. MUNGKAL, NORMAN
A. MESINA, ALEXANDER R. REGUYAL, JOCELYN P.
CATAPANG, ENRICO V. REGALADO, JEROME O. ARCEGA,
ERNESTO C. BLAS, JR., ELPIDIO M. ALMAZAN, KARL
CAESAR
R.
RIMANDO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION, respondents.
Balgos & Perez Law Offices for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; P.D. NO. 223; PROFESSIONAL
REGULATION COMMISSION; DECISION, ORDER OR
RESOLUTION
APPEALABLE
TO
THE
REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT. There is no law providing for the next

course of action for a party who wants to question a ruling or

order of the
Professional
Regulation
Commission.
Consequently, Civil Case No. 86-37950, which was filed in
order to enjoin the enforcement of a resolution of the
respondent Professional Regulation Commission alleged to be
unconstitutional,
should
fall
within
the
general
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, now the Regional
Trial Court.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; BASIS. What is clear from Presidential
Decree No. 223 is that the Professional Regulation
Commission is attached to the Office of the President for
general direction and coordination. Well settled in our
jurisprudence is the view that even acts of the Office of the
President may be reviewed by the Court of First Instance (now
the Regional Trial Court).
3. ID.; B.P.
BLG
129;
EXCLUSIVE
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS OVER
FINAL
ORDER OR RULING OF ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES IN
EXERCISING QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS; "QUASIJUDICIAL," DEFINED. In order to invoke the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals as provided for in
Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, there has to be a final
order or ruling which resulted from proceedings wherein the
administrative
body
involved
exercised
its quasijudicialfunctions. In Black's Law Dictionary, quasi-judicial is
defined as a term applied to the action, discretion,
etc., of public administrative officers or bodies required to
investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their
official action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. To
expound thereon, quasi- judicial adjudication would mean a
determination of rights, privileges and duties resulting in a
decision or order which applies to a specific situation.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DOES NOT COVER RULES AND
REGULATIONS OF GENERAL APPLICABILITY. This does
not cover rules and regulations of general applicability issued
by the administrative body to implement its purely
administrative policies and functions like Resolution No. 105
which was adopted by the respondent PRC as a measure to
preserve the integrity of licensure examinations.
5. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE RULES AND
REGULATIONS MUST NOT BE ISSUED ARBITRARILY. It
is an axiom in administrative law that administrative authorities
should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the
issuance of rules and regulations.
6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RESOLUTION NO. 105 ISSUED
BY THE PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION,
UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING UNREASONABLE,
ARBITRARY AND A VIOLATION OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM.
Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it
also infringes on the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by
the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate
on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves
for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from
taking all the lawful steps needed to assure the
fulfillment of their ambition to become public accountants. They

have every right to make use of their faculties in attaining

success in their endeavors. They should be allowed to enjoy
their freedom to acquire useful knowledge that will promote
their personal growth. Another evident objection to Resolution
No. 105 is that it violates the academic freedom of the schools
concerned. Respondent PRC cannot interfere with the
conduct of review that review schools and centers believe
would best enable their enrolees to meet the standards
required before becoming a full-pledged public accountant.
Unless the means or methods of instruction are clearly found
to be inefficient, impractical, or riddled with corruption, review
schools and centers may not be stopped from helping out their
students.
DECISION
GANCAYCO, J p:
Is the Regional Trial Court of the same category as the
Professional Regulation Commission so that it cannot pass
upon the validity of the administrative acts of the latter? Can
this Commission lawfully prohibit the examinees from attending
review classes, receiving handout materials, tips or the like
three (3) days before the date ofexamination? These are the
issues presented to the court by this petition for certiorari to
review the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on
January 13, 1987, in CA-G.R. SP No. 10591, * declaring null
and void the Order dated October 21, 1986 issued by the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32 in Civil Case No. 8637950 entitled "Lupo L. Lupangco, et al. vs. Professional
Regulation Commission."
The records show the following undisputed facts:
On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as
part of its "Additional Instructions to Examinees," to all those
applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in
accountancy. The resolution embodied the following pertinent
provisions:
"No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing,
conference or the like conducted by, or shall receive any handout, review material, or any tip from any school, college or
university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer,
lecturer,
instructor
official
or
employee of any of the
aforementioned or similar institutions during the three days
immediately preceding every examination day including the
examination day.
"Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the
sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8, Art. III of the Rules and
Regulations of the Commission." 1
On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees
preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy
scheduled on October 25 and November 2 of the same year,
filed in their own behalf and in behalf of all others similarly
situated like them, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch XXXII, a complaint for injunction with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against respondent

PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned

resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional.
Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21,
1987 on the ground that the lower court had no jurisdiction to
review and to enjoin the enforcement of its resolution. In an
Order of October 21, 1987, the lower court declared that it had
jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the respondent
commission from enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No.
105 which it found to be unconstitutional.
Not satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10,
1986, filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for the
nullification of the above Order of the lower court. Said petition
was
granted
in
the
Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on January 13,
1987, to wit:
"WHEREFORE, finding the petition meritorious the same is
hereby GRANTED and the order dated October 21, 1986
issued by respondent court is declared null and void. The
respondent court is further directed to dismiss with prejudice
Civil Case No. 86-37950 for want of jurisdiction over the
subject matter thereof. No costs in this instance. cdrep
SO ORDERED." 2
Hence, this petition.
The Court of Appeals, in deciding that the Regional
Trial Court of Manila had no jurisdiction to entertain the case
and to enjoin the enforcement of Resolution No. 105, stated as
its basis its conclusion that the Professional Regulation
Commission and the Regional Trial Court are co-equal bodies.
Thus it held
"That the petitioner Professional Regulatory Commission is at
least a co-equal body with the Regional Trial Court is beyond
question, and co-equal bodies have no power to control each
other or interfere with each other's acts." 3
To strengthen its position, the Court of Appeals relied heavily
on National Electrification Administration vs. Mendoza, 4 which
cites Pineda vs. Lantin 5 and Philippine Pacific Fishing, Inc. vs.
Luna, 6 where this Court held that a Court of First Instance
cannot interfere with the orders of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the two being co-equal bodies.
After a close scrutiny of the facts and the record of this case,
We rule in favor of the petitioner.
The cases cited by respondent court are not in point. It is
glaringly apparent that the reason why this Court ruled that
the Court of First Instance could not interfere with the
orders of the Securities and Exchange Commission was that
this was so provided for by the law. In Pineda vs. Lantin, We
explained that whenever a party is aggrieved by or disagrees
with an order or ruling of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, he cannot seek relief from courts of general
jurisdiction since under the Rules of Court and Commonwealth
Act No. 83, as amended by Republic Act No. 635, creating and
setting forth the powers and functions of the old Securities and

Exchange Commission, his remedy is to go to the

Supreme Court on a petition for review. Likewise, in Philippine
Pacific Fishing Co., Inc. vs. Luna, it was stressed that if an
order of the Securities and Exchange Commission is
erroneous, the appropriate remedy to take is first, within the
Commission itself, then, to the Supreme Court as mandated in
Presidential Decree No. 902-A, the law creating the new
Securities and Exchange Commission. Nowhere in the said
cases was it held that a Court of First Instance has no
jurisdiction over all other government agencies. On the
contrary, the ruling was specifically limited to the Securities and
Exchange Commission.

The respondent court erred when it placed the Securities and

Exchange Commission and the Professional Regulation
Commission in the same category. As already mentioned, with
respect to the Securities and Exchange Commission, the laws
cited explicitly provide for the procedure that need be taken
when one is aggrieved by its order or ruling. Upon the other
hand, there is no law providing for the next course of action for
a party who wants to question a ruling or order of the
Professional Regulation Commission. Unlike Commonwealth
Act No. 83 and Presidential Decree No. 902-A, there is no
provision in Presidential Decree No. 223, the law creating the
Professional Regulation Commission, that orders or
resolutions of the Commission are appealable either to
the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court.Consequently,
Civil Case No. 86-37950, which was filed in order to enjoin the
enforcement of a resolution of the respondent Professional
Regulation Commission alleged to be unconstitutional, should
fall within the general jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance,
now the Regional Trial Court. 7
What is clear from Presidential Decree No. 223 is that the
Professional Regulation Commission is attached to the
Office of the
President
for
general
direction
and
coordination. 8 Well settled in our jurisprudence is the view that
even acts of the Office of the President may be reviewed by
the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court).
In Medalla vs. Sayo, 9 this rule was thoroughly propounded on,
to wit:
"In so far as jurisdiction of the Court below to review by
Certiorari decisions and/or resolutions of the Civil Service
Commission and of the Presidential Executive Assistant is
concerned, there should be no question but that the
power of judicial review should be upheld. The following rulings
buttress this conclusion:
'The objection to a judicial review of a Presidential act arises
from a failure to recognize the most important principle in our
system of government, i.e., the separationof powers into three
co-equal departments, the executive, the legislative and the
judicial, each supreme within its own assigned powers and
duties. When a presidential act is challenged before the
courts of justice, it is not to be implied therefrom that the
Executive is being made subject and subordinate to the courts.
The legality of his acts are under judicial review, not because
the Executive is inferior to the courts, but because the law is

above the Chief Executive himself, and the courts seek only to
interpret, apply or implement it (the law). A judicial review of the
President's decision on a case of an employee decided by the
Civil Service Board of Appeals should be viewed in this light
and the bringing of the case to the Courts should be governed
by the same principles as govern the judicial review of all
administrative acts of all administrative officers." 10
Republic vs. Presiding Judge, CFI of Lanao del Norte,
Br. II, 11 is another case in point. Here, "the Executive
Office" of the
Department of Education
and
Culture
issuedMemorandum Order No. 93 under the authority of then
Secretary of Education Juan Manuel. As in this case, a
complaint for injunction was filed with the Court of First
Instance of Lanao del Norte because, allegedly, the
enforcement of the circular would impair some contracts
already entered into by public school teachers. It was the
contention of petitioner therein that "the Court of First Instance
is not empowered to amend, reverse and modify what is
otherwise the clear and explicit provision ofthe memorandum
circular issued by the Executive Office which has the force and
effect of law." In resolving the issue, We held:
" . . . , We definitely state that respondent Court lawfully
acquired jurisdiction in Civil Case No. II-240 (8) because the
plaintiff therein asked the lower court for relief, in the
form of injunction, in defense of a legal right (freedom to enter
into contracts) . . . Hence there is a clear
infringement of private respondent's constitutional right to enter
into agreements not contrary to law, which might ran the
risk of being
violated
by
the
threatened
implementation of Executive Office Memorandum Circular No.
93, dated February 5, 1968, which prohibits, with certain
exceptions, cashiers and disbursing officers from honoring
special powers of attorney executed by the payee
employees. The respondent Court is not only right but duty
bound to take cognizance of cases of this nature wherein a
constitutional and statutory right is allegedly infringed by the
administrative action of a government office. Courts of First
Instance have original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which
the subject of the litigation is not capable of pecuniary
estimation (Sec.
44, Republic
Act
296,
as
amended)." 12 (Emphasis supplied.)
In San Miguel Corporation vs. Avelino, 1 3 We ruled that a
judge of the Court of First Instance has the authority to decide
on the validity of a city tax ordinance even after its validity had
been contested before the Secretary of Justice and an opinion
thereon had been rendered.
In view of the foregoing, We find no cogent reason why
Resolution No. 105, issued by the respondent Professional
Regulation Commission, should be exempted from the general
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
Respondent PRC, on the other hand, contends that
under Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, it is
the Court of Appeals which has jurisdiction over the case. The
said law provides:

"SEC. 9. Jurisdiction. The Intermediate Appellate Court shall

exercise:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments,
decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial
Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions, except those falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the provisionsof this Act, and of subparagraph
(1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth
paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948."
The contention is devoid of merit. cdrep
In
order
to
invoke
the
exclusive
appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals as provided for in Section 9,
paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, there has to be a final order or
ruling which resulted from proceedings wherein the
administrative
body
involved
exercised
its quasijudicial functions. In Black's Law Dictionary, quasi-judicial is
defined as a term applied to the action, discretion,
etc., of public administrative officers or bodies required to
investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their
official action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. To
expound thereon, quasi- judicial adjudication would mean a
determination of rights, privileges and duties resulting in a
decision or order which applies to a specific situation. 14 This
does not cover rules and regulations of general applicability
issued by the administrative body to implement its purely
administrative policies and functions like Resolution No. 105
which was adopted by the respondent PRC as a measure to
preserve the integrity of licensure examinations.
The above rule was adhered to in Filipinas Engineering and
Machine Shop vs. Ferrer. 15 In this case, the issue presented
was whether or not the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction
over a case involving an order of the Commission on Elections
awarding a contract to a private party which originated from an
invitation to bid. The said issue came about because under the
laws then in force, final awards, judgments, decisions or
orders of the Commission on Elections fall within the exclusive
jurisdictionof the Supreme Court by way of certiorari. Hence, it
has been consistently held that "it is the Supreme Court, not
the Court of First Instance, which has exclusive jurisdiction to
review on certiorari final decisions, orders, or rulings of the
Commission on Elections relative to the conduct of elections
and the enforcement of election laws." 16
As to whether or not the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction
in said case, We said:
"We are however, far from convinced that an order of the
COMELEC awarding a contract to a private party, as a
result of its choice among various proposals submitted in
response to its invitation to bid comes within the purview of a
'final order' which is exclusively and directly appealable to
this court on certiorari. What is contemplated by the term 'final
orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC reviewable by

certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those

rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and
taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
"We agree with petitioner's contention that the order of the
Commission granting the award to a bidder is not an order
rendered in a legal controversy before it wherein the parties
filed their respective pleadings and presented evidence after
which the questioned order was issued; and that this
order of the commission was issued pursuant to its authority to
enter into contracts in relation to election purposes. In short,
the COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in
favor of Acme was not issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial
functions but merely as an incident of its inherent
administrative functions over the conduct of elections, and
hence, the said resolution may not be deemed as a ' final
order' reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being
non-judicial in character, no contempt order may be imposed
by the COMELEC from said order, and no direct and exclusive
appeal by certiorari to this Tribunal be from such order. Any
question arising from said order may be well taken in an
ordinary civil action before the trial courts. (Emphasis
supplied) 17

One other case that should be mentioned in this regard

is Salud vs. Central Bank of the Philippines. 18 Here, petitioner
Central Bank, like respondent in this case, argued that under
Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, orders of the Monetary
Board are appealable only to the Intermediate Appellate Court.
Thus:
"The Central Bank and its Liquidator also postulate, for the
very first time, that the Monetary Board is among the "quasijudicial . . . boards' whose judgments are within the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the IAC; hence, it is only said Court, 'to
the exclusion of the Regional Trial Courts,' that may review the
Monetary Board's resolutions." 19
Anent the posture of the Central Bank, We made the following
pronouncement:
"The contention is utterly devoid of merit. The IAC has no
appellate jurisdiction over resolutions or orders of the Monetary
Board. No law prescribes any mode ofappeal from the
Monetary Board to the IAC." 2 0
In view of the foregoing, We hold that the Regional
Trial Court has jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. 86-37950
and enjoin the respondent PRC from enforcing its
resolution. LexLib
Although We have finally settled the issue of jurisdiction, We
find it imperative to decide once and for all the
validity of Resolution No. 105 so as to provide the much
awaited relief to those who are and will be affected by it.

Of course, We realize that the questioned resolution was

adopted for a commendable purpose which is "to preserve the
integrity and purity of the licensure examinations." However, its
good aim cannot be a cloak to conceal its constitutional
infirmities. On its face, it can be readily seen that it is
unreasonable in that an examinee cannot even attend any
review class, briefing, conference or the like, or receive any
hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college
or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer,
lecturer,
instructor,
official
or
employee of any of the
aforementioned or similar institutions . . . . 21
The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is
caught committing the prohibited acts even without any ill
motives will be barred from taking future examinations
conducted by the respondent PRC. Furthermore, it is
inconceivable how the Commission can manage to have a
watchful eye on each and every examinee during the three
days before the examination period.
It is an axiom in administrative law that administrative
authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the
issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and
regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to secure
the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the
purposes for which they are authorized to be issued, then they
must be held to be invalid. 22
Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it
also infringes on the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by
the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate
on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves
for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from
taking all the lawful steps needed to assure the
fulfillment of their ambition to become public accountants. They
have every right to make use of their faculties in attaining
success in their endeavors. They should be allowed to enjoy
their freedom to acquire useful knowledge that will promote
their personal growth. As defined in a decision of the United
States Supreme Court:
"The term 'liberty' means more than mere freedom from
physical restraint or the bounds of a prison. It means freedom
to go where one may choose and to act in such a manner not
inconsistent with the equal rights of others, as his judgment
may dictate for the promotion of his happiness, to pursue such
callings and vocations as may be most suitable to develop his
capacities, and give to them their highest enjoyment." 23
Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it
violates the academic freedom of the schools concerned.
Respondent PRC cannot interfere with the conduct ofreview
that review schools and centers believe would best enable
their enrolees to meet the standards required before becoming
a full-fledged public accountant. Unless the means or
methods of instruction are clearly found to be inefficient,
impractical, or riddled with corruption, review schools and
centers may not be stopped from helping out their students. At
this juncture, We call attention to Our pronouncement
in Garcia vs. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola
School of Theology, 24regarding academic freedom, to wit:

. . . It would follow then that the school or college itself is

possessed of such a right. It decides for itself its aims and
objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside
coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding
public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide
spread of autonomy
certainly
extending
to
the
choice of students. This constitutional provision is not to be
construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion."
Needless to say, the enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not
a guarantee that the alleged leakages in the licensure
examinations will be eradicated or at least minimized. Making
the examinees suffer by depriving them of legitimate
means of review or preparation on those last three precious
days when they should be refreshing themselves with all that
they have learned in the review classes and preparing their
mental and psychological make-up for the examination day
itself would be like uprooting the tree to get ride of a rotten
branch. What is needed to be done by the respondent is to find
out the source of such leakages and stop it right there. If
corrupt officials or personnel should be terminated from their
loss, then so be it. Fixers or swindlers should be flushed out.

Strict guidelines to be observed by examiners should be set up

and if violations are committed, then licenses should be
suspended or revoked. These are all within the powers of the
respondent commission as provided for in Presidential Decree
No. 223. But by all means the right and freedom of the
examinees to avail of all legitimate means to prepare for the
examinations should not be curtailed. LLjur
In the light of the above, We hereby REVERSE and SET
ASIDE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
10591 and another judgment is hereby rendered declaring
Resolution No. 105 null and void and of no force and effect for
being unconstitutional. This decision is immediately executory.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa and Cruz, JJ., concur.
Grio-Aquino, J., took no part. I signed the CA decision.
||| (Lupangco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77372, [April 29,
1988], 243 PHIL 107-1006)