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United States District Court

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

GREGORY MCKENNA,
Plaintiff
Vs.
THE COUNTY OF ST. LOUIS, OFFICERS CHARLES Case No. 4:09cv1113CDP
BOSCHERT, KENNETH WILLIAMS,
8 UNKNOWN AGENTS OF THE FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, MARK JURY DEMANDED
KAPPELHOFF, APPLE INC., A-1 PRIVATE
INVESTIGATIONS, TIMOTHY BONINE, D’ANGELO
AUTOMOTIVE, CATHERINE PERRY
Defendants
______________________________________________________________________________

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

CATHERINE PERRY

I. INTRODUCTION

Pro se Plaintiff Gregory McKenna respectfully moves this Court, pursuant to Title 28 USC

455(a) and (b)*, to disqualify United States District Court Judge Catherine Perry from the above

titled case on the grounds that she has shown acute prejudice against the Plaintiff and blatant

partiality for the Defendants, and that the judge has become a party to the case. Judge Perry has

advantaged the Defendants by providing no protection to the Plaintiff against liabilities for the

criminal neglect of the Mafia stalking, extortion, torture, and deprivation of his Constitutional rights
*Title 28 USC 455 (a) states: “Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify
himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. (b) He shall also
disqualify himself in the following circumstance: (1) where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a
party; and (5)(i) he is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party.”

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committed in connection with this case. Judge Perry has further concealed the pertinent Mafia

crimes by violating criminal laws such as 18 USC § 3 (accessory after the fact), 18 USC § 4

(misprision of felony), 18 USC § 241 (conspiracy against rights), 18 USC § 1505 (obstruction of

court proceedings), 18 USC § 3041 (power of courts and magistrates), 18 USC § 2381 (treason), 18

USC § 2382 (misprision of treason), RSMo 562.016 (5) (criminal negligence), and other statutes.

She has provided a safe haven for continued malfeasance by the Defendants, the Italian Mafia, and

their organized crime syndicate in the United States through withholding her mandatory judicial

duties and violating statutory law. In each case, Judge Perry has failed to adhere to, and to

administer, the relevant laws and has thereby obstructed the proper conduct of justice.

The protection provided by Judge Perry to the Defendants in her Judgment on January 4,

2010, despite their blatant continuing violations of law, demonstrated extrajudicial “conduct

prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts” such that

this case cannot be decided in accordance with the laws of the United States of America. As such,

Plaintiff Gregory McKenna respectfully moves this Court to disqualify Judge Perry from this case

because she is a party to the case, because of prejudicial acts against Plaintiff, for failing to perform

her mandatory duties, and for criminal acts against Plaintiff and the United States.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When considering a claim under ß 455(a), [a Court] must consider “whether a reasonable

and objective person, knowing all of the facts, would harbor doubts concerning the judge's

impartiality.” In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 121 F.3d 163, 165 (5th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation

marks omitted) (emphasis added). This is because the goal of this provision is to “avoid even the

appearance of partiality.” Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860, 100 L.

Ed. 2d 855, 108 S. Ct. 2194 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, recusal may be

required even though the judge is not actually partial. In re Cont'l Airlines Corp., 901 F.2d 1259,

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1262 (5th Cir. 1990). “Under ß 455(a), we consider whether the judge’s impartiality might

reasonably be questioned by the average person on the street who knew all the relevant facts of a

case.” In re KPERS, 85 F.3d at 1358. In determining whether a judgment should be vacated for a

violation of ß 455 (a), it is appropriate to consider (1) the risk of injustice to the parties in the

particular case, (2) the risk that the denial of relief will produce injustice in other cases, and (3) the

risk of undermining the public’s confidence in the judicial process. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133,

136, 99 L. Ed. 942, 75 S. Ct. 623 (1955) (citation omitted) (We must continuously bear in mind that

“to perform its high function in the best way ‘justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.’”).

Additionally, there is no timeliness requirement under which a justice, judge, or magistrate must

disqualify himself. (Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 867 F.2d 1415, certiorari denied 109

S.Ct. 1956, 490 U.S. 1047, 104 L.Ed.2d 425; El Fenix de Puerto Rico v. M/Y JOHANNY, 36 F.3d

136, on remand 954 F.Supp. 23 (1994) (Recusal order disabled recused judge from simultaneously

setting aside final judgment entered some three weeks earlier.); Frates v. Weinshienk, 882 F.2d

1502 (1989) (Recusal motion should be permitted at any time it becomes apparent that judge is

biased or suffers from appearance of bias). Once a judge has disqualified himself, he or she may

enter no further orders in the case; his power is limited to performing ministerial duties necessary to

transfer the case to another judge. Moody v. Simmons, 858 F.2d 137, rehearing denied, certiorari

denied 109 S.Ct. 1529, 489 U.S. 1078, 103 L.Ed.2d 835.

III. BACKGROUND

A. The Mafia Conspiracy to Stalk, Extort and Torture Plaintiff Involving Defendants the

County of St. Louis, Unknown FBI Agents, Kappelhoff, Boschert, Williams, A1 Investigations,

Bonine, and Apple Inc.

Plaintiff brought this lawsuit against the Defendants seeking monetary, equitable,

declaratory and other relief under titles 42 USC 1983, 1985, 1986, 1988, and others for their

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wrongful actions done in connection with an Italian Mafia stalking, extortion and torture

conspiracy. The crux of Plaintiff’s allegations is that the Defendants willfully conspired with the

Mafia to perpetuate the stalking, extortion and torture through unlawful acts or omissions in their

professions. The conspiracy began in August of 2001 in St. Louis when Mafia members approached

McKenna and threatened to murder and rape him and others for refusing to continue modeling in

New York City. (See Complaint, ¶ 44). When Plaintiff attempted to file emergency complaints with

Defendants the County of St. Louis (i.e., the St. Louis County Police Department), Unknown FBI

Agents, Charles Boschert, Kenneth Williams, and Assistant US Attorney General Mark Kappelhoff,

the Defendants maliciously neglected to protect Plaintiff’s Constitutional rights despite knowledge

of the continuing crimes and Plaintiff’s reliance on them for assistance. (Id., ¶¶ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 22, 69,

85, 99, 102, 123, 177, 188.). The conspiracy continued and worsened in 2006 when Plaintiff was

instructed by Defendants Boschert and the STLPD to hire a private investigation company to

perform a bug sweep of his property. (Id. at ¶103.). When Defendants A-1 and Timothy Bonine

performed a bug sweep of Plaintiff’s St. Louis residence and Toyota Camry that verified the

existence of illegal communication devices, they proceeded to lie to the Police and other third

parties by stating Plaintiff’s residence and vehicle were not bugged. (Id. at ¶¶ 111, 121, 122.).

Plaintiff proffered A-1 and Bonine’s positive bug sweep report and a recorded transcript of them to

prove they lied to the Police to obstruct justice and perpetuate the Mafia crimes. Nonetheless, the

Police and FBI maliciously neglected the crimes despite their affirmative duty to enforce the laws in

furtherance of the Mafia crimes. (Id. at ¶¶ 131, 135, 170, 186).

The Mafia crimes worsened when Defendants D’Angelo Automotive and Apple Inc.

allegedly conspired with the Mafia to perpetuate the use of illegal communication devices. When

the Mafia discovered Plaintiff’s plans to repair a loud noise originating from illegal communication

devices in his Audi A4 Quattro, they proceeded to allegedly bribe Defendant D’Angelo to

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misdiagnose Plaintiff’s vehicle and conceal their existence. (Id. at ¶146). Although D’Angelo

fabricated a loose wheel bearing diagnosis and feigned repairs to conceal the devices, the Mafia

continued to use the devices to harass Plaintiff out of sheer malice and uncontrollable hatred for the

Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶¶ 141, 142). The conspiracy intensified when the Mafia conspired to bug

Plaintiff’s Apple equipment. On or around February of 2009, Plaintiff discovered clear and

convincing evidence of the Mafia conspiring with Apple to install illegal communication devices in

his Apple iPod Nano when he recorded death threats that repeatedly stated, “I’m about to kill him.”

(Id. at ¶181.). Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Police and FBI for Apple Inc. conspiring with the

Mafia but was maliciously neglected in furtherance of the crimes. (Id. at ¶¶ 183, 186). Accordingly,

D’Angelo and Apple conspired with the Mafia and the Defendants to perpetuate the stalking,

extortion and torture of Plaintiff.

B. Plaintiff’s Lawsuit and Judge Perry’s Prejudicial Acts Against Plaintiff

When Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit on July 15, 2009, the Mafia continued to stalk, extort

and torture him in reckless disregard for law enforcement authority. On or around October 8, 2009,

Plaintiff filed an Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order for the continuing Mafia

crimes and the Defendant law enforcement officials’ malicious neglect of Plaintiff’s Constitutional

rights. In response, Judge Perry refused to order an evidentiary hearing and grant Plaintiff an

injunction despite knowledge of the continuing Mafia crimes. (See Plaintiff’s Motion for

Temporary Restraining Order; see also Judge Perry’s Order filed on October 20, 2009). On or

around October 24, Plaintiff filed an Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunction for the

continuing Mafia crimes. Plaintiff substantiated his motion with evidence by proffering testimony,

recordings of death threats, video recordings of positive confirmations of telephone tap tests, a

private investigator’s bug sweep report that confirmed the existence of the devices, complaint letters

ignored by the Police, and other evidence of the continuing crimes. (See Plaintiff’s Motion to

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Proffer Evidence In Support of His Motion For Preliminary Injunction, Exhibits 1 to 12). Despite

Plaintiff’s prima facie case of Constitutional and statutory rights violations being maliciously

neglected by law enforcement officials, on January 4, 2010 Judge Perry proceeded to order a sua

sponte Judgment to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint and deny him injunctive relief.

Judge Perry’s rationale for dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint was based on the fallacious

pretense that Government officials have no duty to protect. In effect, Judge Perry’s Judgment

knowingly violated well-established Constitutional norms that preclude Government officials from

authorizing deliberate deprivations and acts of gross negligence. Additionally, the Judgment was

filed in violation of criminal statutes, such as misprision of felony, aiding and abetting, treason,

misprision of treason, criminal negligence and other criminal statutes established by the legislature.

Accordingly, Judge Perry acted outside the scope of her official capacity and committed

malfeasance in public office* to demonstrate acute prejudice to the Plaintiff and warrant recusal.

Therefore, Plaintiff brings this Motion to Disqualify Judge Perry for prejudicial acts done in

violation of criminal statutes, common-law authority, and Plaintiff’s Constitutional rights.

IV. PREJUDICIAL ACTS BY JUDGE PERRY

The extrajudicial acts committed by Judge Perry were maliciously done in patent dereliction to

criminal statutes and common law authority to demonstrate her prejudice to the Plaintiff. The

following extrajudicial acts committed by Judge Perry demonstrate her impartiality to warrant

recusal:

* *InDaugherty v. Ellis, 142 W. Va. 340, 357-8, 97 S.E.2d 33, 42-3 (W. Va. 1956), the Court defined
malfeasance in office as “a wrongful act which the actor has no legal right to do; as any wrongful conduct
which affects, interrupts or interferes with the performance of an official duty; as an act for which there is no
authority or warrant of law.” Id. Concurrent with its definition, the crimes committed by Judge Perry
constitute extrajudicial acts sufficient to warrant recusal.

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1. Sanctioning the Stalking, Extortion, and Torture of Plaintiff In Violation of Federal

Criminal Statutes and Plaintiff’s Constitutional Rights

Judge Perry demonstrated acute prejudice to the Plaintiff by sanctioning the Mafia crimes in

violation of criminal statutory provisions. Although Judge Perry relied on DeShaney and its progeny

to support her belief that Government officials have no duty to protect, Judge Perry violated

criminal statutes by maliciously sanctioning the Defendants’ criminal neglect of Plaintiff’s peril in

violation of 18 USC § 4, 28 USC §1361, 18 USC § 2381, RSMo 626.016 and others*. Pursuant to

these statutes, Judge Perry possessed a legally mandated duty to report the Mafia crimes to the

Attorney General, award Plaintiff an injunction, and take preventative measures to end the Mafia

crimes, but maliciously neglected her judicial duties. Notwithstanding, the Courts cannot rely on

their common-law authority in disregard of existing constitutional and statutory provisions. Dayton

v. State, 120 P.3d 1073, 1080 (2005) (“[When] the legislature enacts a statute to govern the same

matter, the statute controls”); Dandova v. State, 72 P.3d 325, 333 (2003); Roberts v. Alaska Dept. of

Revenue, 162 P.3d 1214, 1220-21 (2007) (applying this same rule). Additionally, it is well-

established precedent that judges cannot violate criminal statutes when performing their judicial

duties. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 414 U. S. 503 (1974) (Judges are subject to criminal

prosecutions as are other citizens.). In effect, Judge Perry demonstrated the appearance of partiality

by disregarding statutory laws to commit criminal acts against the Plaintiff sufficient for recusal.

See In re Kensington Int'l Ltd., 368 F.3d 289, 301 & n.12 (3d Cir. 2004) (“If a reasonable person,

with knowledge of all the facts, would reasonably question a judge’s impartiality, the judge must

recuse under ß 455(a).”).


*The criminal statutes violated by Judge Perry in her Judgment include but are not limited to: 18 USC § 3,
Accessory After the Fact; 18 USC § 4, Misprision of Felony; 18 USC § 2381, Treason; 18 USC § 2382,
Misprision of Treason; 18 USC § 241, Conspiracy Against Rights; 18 USC § 242, Deprivation of Rights
Under Color of Law; 18 USC § 1505, Obstruction of Justice; 18 USC § 371, Conspiracy to Commit Offense;
28 USC § 535(b)(1), Investigation of Crimes Involving Government Officers; RSMo 562.016, Criminal
Negligence; and others.

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Pursuant to title 18 USC § 4, the legislature has mandated as a matter of statutory law,

“Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a court of the

United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the same to some judge or

other her person in civil or military authority under the United States” is guilty of misprision of

felony. As soon as possible make known the same to some person in authority who would take

action requires action that is peremptory in the context of this law. Accordingly, once the crimes of

the Mafia and Defendants were made known to Judge Perry, she had an intrinsic duty in terms of

Title 18 USC § 4 to administer the law. In patent dereliction of her judicial obligations, however,

Judge Perry allowed the stalking, extortion, torture, and criminal neglect to go unpunished and

indeed to continue unimpeded with her full knowledge and tacit consent. Judge Perry thereby

provided protection to the Mafia and Defendants and concealed their crimes. She concealed their

crimes by failing to take action and did not as soon as possible make the same known to a person in

authority who would take action, action which is peremptory in the context of this law.

As a fundamental principle of law, the Constitution forbids arbitrary decision making by

Government officials who wield authoritative power. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 110 S. Ct.

975, 983, 108 L. Ed. 2d 100 (1990) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331, 88 L. Ed. 2d

662, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986) (“The substantive component of the due process clause bars certain

arbitrary, wrongful government actions ‘regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to

implement them.’”). In violation of this norm, Judge Perry arbitrarily ruled against Plaintiff to allow

the criminal wrongs in contravention to her former rulings that affirmed “malice” and the

“deliberate indifference rule” as elements sufficient for a well-pled Section 1983 claim. See Steven

Kern v. City of Gerald, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89447, p.10 (8th Cir. 2008) (“Plaintiffs have set forth

very broad allegations stating that the defendants acted recklessly and willfully in failing to properly

train, hire and supervise the police officers for the City of Gerald… these facts would likely

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overcome the protections afforded by official immunity or the public duty doctrine, even assuming

that these defenses were applicable…dismissal at this stage is not warranted.”) (quoting Judge

Perry); see also Acevado v. City of O’Fallon, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38062, p. 11 (8th Cir. 2007)

(Conditions of confinement claims asserted by pretrial detainees are analyzed under the “deliberate

indifference standard” to determine if an inmate’s rights are violated under Section 1983) (citations

omitted). Indeed, despite Plaintiff’s myriad allegations of malice and deliberate indifference by the

Defendants (See Complaint, ¶¶ 3, 5, 6, 7, 12, 22), Judge Perry contravened her former rulings to

knowingly sanction the Mafia crimes. Accordingly, Judge Perry’s Judgment violates “the

substantive component of the due process clause [that] bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government

actions.” Therefore, because Judge Perry arbitrarily decided to sanction the Mafia crimes to

unlawfully further the Mafia crimes, she is unable to dispense justice impartially and recusal is

warranted.

2. Deliberately Misapplying Case Law To Plaintiff’s Complaint To Deny Him Relief

In addition to committing several criminal offenses and neglecting to perform her mandatory

duties in furtherance of the Mafia crimes, Judge Perry deliberately misapplied case law in her

Judgment. Accordingly, the following points and authorities demonstrate Judge Perry’s deliberate

misapplication of case law to further the Mafia crimes and prejudice the Plaintiff.

A. Deliberate Negligence Imputes Liability To Government Officials

The underlying basis for Judge Perry’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint was that

Government actors do not have a Constitutional duty to protect. DeShaney v. Winnebago County

Dep’t of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989) (“…nothing in the language of the Due Process

Clause requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by

private actors.”); see also Sellers v. Bayer, 28 F.3d 895, 898 (8th Cir. 1997). However, myriad

appellate and Supreme Court rulings have ruled that DeShaney and its progeny are inapplicable to

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intentional acts and omissions committed by government actors. Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 350

(1985). Indeed, it is a well-established Constitutional norm that deliberate deprivations are

prohibited by Government officials. Id. What’s more, the Supreme Court has consistently ruled that

grossly negligent conduct or reckless disregard on the part of the Defendants is sufficient to charge

them with arbitrary use of government power under ß 1983.* Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 334

n.3, 88 L. Ed. 2d 662, 106 S. Ct. 662; see also Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d at 1106 (1987), see also

Nishiyama v. Dickson County, Tenn., 814 F.2d 277, 283 (1987) (en banc).

“Gross negligence” is not a simple standard to define, [but it can be stated that] “a person

may be said to act in such a way as to trigger a Section 1983 claim if he intentionally does

something unreasonable with disregard to a known risk or a risk so obvious that he must be

assumed to have been aware of it, and of a magnitude such that it is highly probable that harm will

follow.” Jones at 1106. Further, when determining whether a Government actor can be held liable

to a victim under Section 1983, the Courts have repeatedly held that a Plaintiff correctly pleads a

claim for relief if a Government official neglects his duty to protect despite knowledge of a

dangerous situation. (See Gregory v. City of Rogers, 974 F.2d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir.1992) (en banc))

(If sufficient evidence existed from which a jury could reasonably infer that police officers knew or

should have known that a dangerous situation was apparent when car passengers were intoxicated,

the plaintiff would have correctly stated a section 1983 claim). Concurrently, Plaintiff’s Complaint

included allegations of the Defendants maliciously neglecting the Mafia crimes despite knowledge

of his injuries. (See Complaint ¶¶ 3, 5, 6, 7, 12, 22, 54, 63, 85, 116, 119, 121, 138, 177).

Accordingly, the Defendants’ deliberate neglect of Plaintiff’s peril satisfies the sufficient conditions

*Other courts have resolved this question in a number of different ways. One circuit has held that recklessness or
deliberate indifference is both necessary and sufficient for liability. Bass v. Jackson, 790 F.2d 260, 262-63 (2d Cir.
1986). Others hold that gross negligence is enough. Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663, 668 & n.3 (3d
Cir. 1988) (over Judge Garth's vigorous dissent, id. at 675-81); Metzger v. Osbeck, 841 F.2d 518, 520 n.1 (3d Cir. 1988)
(over Judge Weis's dissent, id. at 523); Vinson v. Campbell County Fiscal Court, 820 F.2d 194, 199-200 (6th Cir. 1987).

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for a well-pled Section 1983 claim.

The deliberate deprivation rule is a well-established norm that sufficiently imputes liability

to Government actors. “Whoever wields official power may not deliberately injure anyone.” Archie

v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1218 (7th Cir. 1988) (In denying Plaintiff a right to relief for a

Government actor’s negligent refusal to dispatch rescue services that inadvertently caused the death

of a victim, the Court ruled that the City of Racine would be liable if it deliberately refused to

provide competent ambulatory services). “To injure is to deprive of life or liberty without due

process. When holding in Davidson and Daniels that the Due Process Clause does not forbid

negligent deprivations, the Court recognized that the Constitution forbids deliberate, unauthorized

deprivations.” Id. Combining the deliberate deprivation rule with the tort law’s view of causation,

the Defendants are liable to the Plaintiff for deliberately neglecting their duty to enforce the laws

despite knowledge of his injuries. (See Complaint, ¶¶ 3, 5, 6, 7, 12, 22). Accordingly, Judge Perry’s

belief that “a state actor’s failure to investigate or prevent private violence does not give rise to a

cognizable claim” is erroneous (citing Judge Perry’s reference to Dorothy J. v. Little Rock School.

Distr. in her Judgment, p. 9). Defendants are liable when they maliciously refuse to investigate

despite knowledge of injuries to a victim. Id. Moreover, since the Plaintiff alleged the Defendants

deliberately neglected enforcement of the laws, Plaintiff stated a bona fide Section 1983 claim and

his Complaint is well-pled.

The Court sometimes treats the reckless infliction of injury as equivalent to intentional

infliction. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319-21, 89 L. Ed. 2d 251, 106 S. Ct. 1078 (1986)

(Cruel and Unusual Punishments clause); cf. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 334 n.3 (reserving the question

whether either recklessness or gross negligence would be enough to make out a due process claim).

The equation of recklessness with deliberate conduct is familiar on the ground that reckless

disregard of a great risk is a form of knowledge or intent. E.g., Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical

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Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1039-40 (7th Cir. 1977) (securities laws); Model Penal Code ß 210.2(1)(b)

(1980) (treating reckless homicide as murder). An act is reckless in the pertinent sense when it

reflects complete indifference to risk--when the actor does not care whether the other person lives or

dies, despite knowing that there is a significant risk of death. See Model Penal Code 21 (defining

recklessness as “conscious disregard of [a] risk . . . [that] manifests extreme indifference to the

value of human life”). (See also Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321, adopting this court's definition in

Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (1985), of recklessness (or “deliberate indifference”) in

constitutional law as “an act so dangerous that the defendant's knowledge of the risk can be

inferred”). This is the standard used in criminal law, for as the Courts have emphasized the use of

the more lenient tort-law definition of recklessness would not adequately recognize the difference

between constitutional and common law obligations. E.g., Duckworth and Smith-Bey v. Hospital

Administrator, 841 F.2d 751, 759-60 (7th Cir. 1988). Accordingly, the Supreme Court would hold

that a Government official who deliberately denies a person protection of the laws deprives that

person without Due Process of law.

Applying the correct common-law authority, it is clear that the Defendants are proscribed

from deliberately neglecting the Mafia crimes that are knowingly continuing. Judge Perry’s reckless

disregard of the well-established deliberate deprivation rule blatantly demonstrates her intentional

misapplication of common-law authority. On the one hand, the continuing Mafia crimes shock the

conscious and should have alerted Judge Perry to identify criminal wrongs being maliciously

neglected that required immediate judicial action pursuant to 18 USC § 4, 28 USC § 1361 and

others. On the other hand, Judge Perry is a sophisticated litigant who is cognizant of the deliberate

deprivation rule as a Constitutional norm. (See Steven Kern v. City of Gerald; Acevado v. City of

O’Fallon). Effectively, Judge Perry deliberately neglected the Mafia crimes despite knowing that

Daniels, Davidson, and their progeny reject Deshaney, Dorothy, Sellers, and others-- rulings that

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are applicable only to incidental wrongs committed by Government officials. Therefore, since Judge

Perry deliberately misapplied common law and rejected the deliberate deprivation rule, she

demonstrated acute prejudice to the Plaintiff to warrant recusal.

B. A Special Relationship Can Be Reasonably Inferred From Plaintiff’s Complaint

Where Judge Perry recklessly ignored the deliberate neglect committed by the Defendants,

she also wrongfully stated that Plaintiff alleged no facts to suggest that the Defendants

“affirmatively created” his peril or “acted to render [him] more vulnerable to danger” to give rise to

a cognizable section 1983 claim. (See Carlton v. Cleburne County, Ark., 93 F.3d 505, 508 (8th Cir.

1996). In contravention, it can be reasonably inferred from Plaintiff’s Complaint that a special

relationship exists between the Plaintiff and the Defendant law enforcement officials. The Courts

have repeatedly held that Government officials are liable to plaintiffs under section 1983 if a special

relationship exists*. “To establish that a special relationship exists between a local governmental

entity and an individual… the following elements must be shown: (1) an assumption by the local

governmental entity, through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the

party who was injured; (2) knowledge on the part of the local governmental entity’s agents that

inaction could lead to harm; (3) some form of direct contact between the local governmental entity's

agents and the injured party; and (4) that party's justifiable reliance on the local governmental

entity's affirmative undertaking.” Syl. Pt. 2, Wolfe v. City of Wheeling, 182 W. Va. 253, 387 S.E.2d

307 (1989). Concurrently, Plaintiff alleged in his Complaint that: (1) the Defendant law

enforcement officials assumed a duty to act (See Complaint ¶¶ 47, 79, 102, 103, 114, 188); (2) the

Defendants instructed Plaintiff to hire a private investigator before conducting an investigation but

* A review of the cases suggests at least two factors to consider in deciding whether a special relationship exists. One
factor that has been stressed is whether the danger which the defendant allegedly had a duty to prevent was directed at
the public at large or only at a specific individual. See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285, 100 S. Ct. 553, 559,
62 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1980); Fox v. Custis, 712 F.2d 84, 88 (4th Cir. 1983). Another factor to consider is how closely the
danger to the plaintiff is linked to actions of the defendant. See Byrne, 738 F.2d at 1446. Taking the Complaint as true,
the danger alleged was limited to the Plaintiff and the neglect of the Defendants was directly linked to his peril.

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then maliciously neglected the private investigator lying to the Police to obstruct justice and worsen

his peril (Id. at ¶¶ 103, 116, 121, 131-133); (3) the Defendants had knowledge of the harm inflicted

on Plaintiff as a result of their omission (Id. at ¶¶ 131-133, 135, 183-184, 186); (4) direct contact

existed between the officers and Plaintiff through his conversations and written correspondence (Id.

at ¶¶ 135, 186); and (5) Plaintiff reasonably relied on the Defendants’ representations to offer help

(Id. at ¶ 103, 187-188). Thus, the Complaint reasonably inferred a special duty exists and the

Defendant law enforcement officials are liable to the Plaintiff.

In contravention to Judge Perry’s ruling, the Government has an obligation to give aid [to a

Plaintiff who files a section 1983 claim] when it monopolizes the avenues of relief. See United

States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 445, 34 L. Ed. 2d 626, 93 S. Ct. 631 (1973) (“When the government

does not monopolize the avenues of relief, or when it has already afforded process sufficient to

yield accurate decisions, it has no further obligation to give aid”); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656,

35 L. Ed. 2d 572, 93 S. Ct. 1172 (1973); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 41 L. Ed. 2d 341, 94 S. Ct.

2437 (1974); United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 48 L. Ed. 2d 666, 96 S. Ct. 2086 (1976);

Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 107 S. Ct. 1990, 95 L. Ed. 2d 539 (1987). Plaintiff alleged in

detail that the primary means by which the Mafia stalks, extorts, and tortures him is through illegal

communication devices accessed via amateur radio. (See Complaint, ¶ 8). The Federal

Communications Commission (FCC) and FBI are the only agencies in the United States responsible

for monitoring perpetrators who access radio waves to transmit or receive illegal communications.

Despite Plaintiff contacting the FCC and myriad third parties for protection, such as private

investigators, politicians, the ACLU, and others (See Complaint, ¶¶ 106, 187), Plaintiff was

repeatedly referred to the FBI to seek law enforcement assistance. Nonetheless, the FBI maliciously

denied Plaintiff’s complaint despite possessing the only resources to end the Mafia crimes.

Accordingly, since the Government monopolizes the avenues for relief and Plaintiff relies on the

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Defendants to provide protection, a special relationship was reasonably inferred and Judge Perry

recklessly neglected it to demonstrate the appearance of partiality.

C. Defendants A-1 and Bonine Acting Under the Color of Law

Judge Perry dismissed Defendants A-1 and Bonine from Plaintiff’s section 1983 claim since,

“To state a [1983] claim that private individuals are fairly said to be state actors, a plaintiff must

allege facts showing a ‘joint action or conspiracy with state authorities.’” Skurtu v. Mukasey, 552

F.3d 648, 651 (8th Cir. 2008). Additionally, the Defendants were dismissed since “providing

information to a government agency is not grounds for a conspiracy.” Miller, 122 F.3d at 1098. In

contrast, once existence of a conspiracy is established, even slight evidence connecting a defendant

to a conspiracy may be sufficient proof of involvement in a scheme; it is necessary to show only

that he knowingly contributed. U.S. v. Lee, 743 F.2d 1240 (C.A.8 1998). Plaintiff affirmatively

stated that A-1 and Bonine partook in the conspiracy and shared a mutual understanding with the

Mafia and Defendants by knowingly impugning Plaintiff’s evidence to prevent an investigation. (Id.

¶121). Plaintiff alleged A-1 and Bonine made “malicious statements” and lied to the Police to

conceal bug sweep results that indicated Plaintiff’s residence and vehicle were bugged. (Id.) Not

only did A-1 and Bonine make malicious statements to the Police, but they also made the same

statements to doctors attempting to help Plaintiff. (Id.) Accordingly, A-1 and Bonine were not

merely negligent actors when answering questions for the STLPD. Rather, A-1 and Bonine had a

mutual understanding or implied agreement to obstruct justice, violate Plaintiff’s Constitutional

rights, and further the Mafia crimes. In accord with Davidson, Daniels, and their progeny, the

deliberate wrongs performed under the color of law impute liability for a well-pled Section 1983

claim. Albeit Judge Perry was aware that the deliberate deprivation rule was violated, she turned a

blind eye to plaintiff’s peril and maliciously misapplied case law to perpetuate the Mafia crimes. As

such, Judge Perry dispensed justice impartially to demonstrate the appearance of partiality.

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D. Selective Enforcement By the Defendants Is Grounds For A Section 1985 Claim

Judge Perry also deliberately misapplied case law in her Judgment by alleging Plaintiff did

not allege he was a member of a discriminated class. To establish a violation of equal protection, a

Plaintiff must show that: (1) he was selectively treated compared with others similarly situated, and

(2) the selective treatment was based upon impermissible considerations, such as membership in a

suspect class, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of a constitutional right, or malicious or bad

faith intent to injure. Giordano v. City of New York, 274 F.3d 740, 750-51 (2001); Lisa's Party City,

Inc. v. Town of Henrietta, 185 F.3d 12, 16 (1999); LaTrieste Rest. & Cabaret v. Vill. of Port

Chester, 40 F.3d 587, 590 (1994). Concurrently, the following elements were logically inferred in

Plaintiff’s Complaint to demonstrate Judge Perry’s impartiality:

1. Selective Treatment Compared With Others Similarly Situated

To establish selective treatment, a plaintiff must prove that he or she was similarly situated

to other people but was nevertheless treated differently. Penlyn Dev. Corp. v. Incorporated Vill. of

Lloyd Harbor, 51 F. Supp. 2d 255, 264 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). “To be similarly situated, the persons at

issue need not be identical, but must be similar in all material respects.” Holmes v. Gaynor, 313 F.

Supp. 2d 345, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “The test is whether

a prudent person, looking objectively at the incidents, would think them roughly equivalent. Exact

correlation is neither likely nor necessary, but the cases must be fair congeners.” Penlyn Dev. Corp.,

51 F. Supp.2d at 264.

From the record, it is clear that the Defendants discriminated against the Plaintiff by

maliciously neglecting enforcement of the laws. When Plaintiff asked the STLPD’s Sergeant

Hampton if the Police followed a policy or procedure when investigating crimes, Hampton replied,

“Yeah, it’s called a crime. If it is true a crime, officers are bound by law to investigate. That’s what

16
their oath is. The investigation that we’d have to look into is if there is probable cause and if there

was an actual crime committed.” (See Complaint ¶114). Concurrent with Hampton’s statements,

since the STLPD Defendants are “bound by law to investigate” when probable cause is established,

it is reasonably inferred from Plaintiff’s Complaint that Plaintiff was discriminated against

compared to similarly situated complainants. Plaintiff proffered positive confirmations of bug

sweeps, recordings of death threats, transcripts of A-1 and Bonine intentionally obstructing justice,

complaint letters that were maliciously neglected by Police officers, and other compelling evidence

that established probable cause of a crime. (Id. at ¶¶ 117, 135). Despite the STLPD’s custom of

investigating crimes against citizens, the Defendant police officers maliciously refused to enforce

the laws and intentionally allowed the Mafia crimes to persist. (Id. 122.). Thus, an issue of material

fact exists as to whether similarly situated complainants would receive Police assistance for Mafia

stalking, extortion, and torture.

2. Malicious Intent To Discriminate Against Plaintiff As a Member of Personal Animus

“The branch of equal protection law that protects individuals from unequal treatment

motivated by ‘malicious or bad faith intent to injure’ provides protection from adverse

governmental action that is not motivated by ‘legitimate governmental objectives.’” Bizzarro v.

Miranda, 394 F.3d 82, 87 (2005) (quoting Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 180 (1995). Police

officers are under a “statutorily imposed duty to enforce the laws equally and fairly,” Thurman, 595

F. Supp. at 1527 (quoting Smith v. Ross, 482 F.2d 33, 36 (6th Cir. 1973) (per curiam). Although

victims lack a constitutional right under the equal protection clause to compel criminal prosecution

(Doe v. Mayor and City Council of Pocomoke City, 745 F. Supp. 1137, 1139 (D. Md. 1990) (“The

Court is not aware of a constitutional, statutory, or common law right that a private citizen has to

require a public official to investigate or prosecute a crime.”), the district court in Thurman

determined that “[p]olice action is subject to the equal protection clause… whether in the form of

17
commission of violative acts or omission to perform required acts pursuant to the police officer’s

duty to protect.” 595 F. Supp. at 1527. Applying Bizzaro, Doe and Thurman, a Police officer’s

failure to investigate is considered a Constitutional wrong in circumstances when malice is used.

(See also Davidson and Daniels). A leading legal commentator on Constitutional issues agrees. See

Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 124 (2d ed. 1988) (“The interest in the just

administration of the laws, including the interest in nondiscriminatory criminal enforcement, is

presumptively deemed nonjusticiable… only if the litigant is immediately affected as a target of

enforcement then can that presumption be overcome”). Therefore, since the Mafia crimes are

continuing as a direct cause of the Defendant law enforcement officials’ malicious non-enforcement

of the laws (See Complaint, ¶¶ 51, 65, 85, 103, 119, 136, 138, 186, 188), Plaintiff correctly pled a

valid Section 1985 claim.

Where Plaintiff’s Complaint does not claim that the unequal treatment was due to his

membership in any protected class or racial or gender group, it can be reasonably inferred that he is

categorized as a “class-of-one” since he suffered malicious discrimination. (See Complaint, ¶¶ 5, 6,

7, 22, 51, 85, 102, 138, 149, 177, 200). In Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 145 L.

Ed. 2d 1060, 120 S. Ct. 1073 (2000) (per curiam), the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs need not

allege that they are part of a suspect class to state an Equal Protection claim. See also Bartell v.

Aurora Pub. Schs., 263 F.3d 1143, 1148-49 (10th Cir. 2001) (“Equal Protection affords protection

to an individual injured by intentional or purposeful discrimination without identification of a

class.”). In their per curium opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the class-of-one theory finding

that the purpose of equal protection “is to secure every person within the State's jurisdiction against

intentional and arbitrary discrimination.” Id. at 564, quoting Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota

County, 260 U.S. 441, 445, 67 L. Ed. 340, 43 S. Ct. 190 (1923) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Court stated that “these allegations [of irrational and wholly arbitrary treatment],… are

18
sufficient to state a claim for relief under traditional equal protection analysis.” Olech, 528 U.S. at

565. Clearly, Plaintiff’s allegations of malice and ill-will by the Defendants logically infer he was

discriminated against as a “class-of-one.”

Some courts have attempted to cabin the reach of class-of-one equal protection cases by

demanding that plaintiffs present evidence not merely of arbitrariness but of malice or ill-will

against the plaintiff. Discovery House, Inc. v. Consol. City of Indianapolis, 319 F.3d 277, 283 (7th

Cir. 2003) (adopting Justice Breyer’s concurrence as the holding of Olech; noting that the malice

requirement “is a very significant burden” put in place to ensure that federal courts do not become

“zoning boards of appeal”); Harlen Assocs. v. Inc. Vill. of Mineola, 273 F.3d 494, 499-500 (2d. Cir.

2001) (personal animus is an element of a class-of-one case); Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944, 951

(11th Cir. 2001) (explaining Olech as “holding that plaintiff stated a constitutional Equal Protection

Clause cause of action by alleging that the village acted irrationally, wholly arbitrarily, and out of

malice toward plaintiff”). Other courts have adopted a similar approach. Bartell dismissed the class-

of-one claim because plaintiff provided “no concrete evidence of a ‘campaign of official harassment

directed against him out of sheer malice.’” 263 F.3d at 1149, quoting Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d

176, 179 (7th Cir. 1995).). Despite the significant burden of stating an Equal Protection claim by

alleging malice, Plaintiff alleged ad nauseam that he suffered several adverse actions that were not

prompted by legitimate Government objectives and was singled out in violation of his Equal

Protection rights. (See Complaint, ¶¶ 5-7, 23, 85, 132, 177, 188, 202(A)). The outright use of malice

by Government officials is demonstrative to the exceptional circumstances of this case where the

Mafia is attempting to further their malevolent campaign against Plaintiff by conspiring with public

officials in plain view. Concurrently, based on the foregoing, a rational jury would conclude that the

Defendants’ actions were based on a personal vendetta against the Plaintiff. Moreover, Plaintiff’s

Complaint reasonably infers that he was singled out in violation of his Equal Protection rights, and

19
Judge Perry deliberately neglected the malicious discrimination to dismiss his Section 1985 claim.

3. Maliciously Neglecting Her Mandatory Duty To Order A Preliminary Injunction To

Further the Mafia Crimes

Pursuant to 28 USC § 1361, “The district courts have original jurisdiction of any action in the

nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to

perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.” Concurrently, Judge Perry had a mandatory duty to grant

Plaintiff’s two emergency motions for injunction when probable cause indicated the Defendant law

enforcement officials were maliciously neglecting their affirmative duty to enforce the laws in

furtherance of the Mafia crimes. Notwithstanding, Judge Perry joined the aims of the conspiracy

and prejudiced the Plaintiff by denying Plaintiff’s Motion for TRO without conducting an

evidentiary hearing. The United States Supreme Court has noted in passing that “[t]he notice

required by Rule 65(a) before a preliminary injunction can issue implies a hearing in which the

defendant is given a fair opportunity to oppose the application and to prepare for such opposition.”

Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 432 n. 7, 94 S.Ct. 1113, 1121 n. 7, 39

L.Ed.2d 435 (1974). Although “Rule 65(a) does not expressly require a hearing on every motion for

injunctive relief… where there is a presumption of irreparable harm… the court should conduct an

evidentiary hearing before granting or denying the motion.” Baker v. Buckeye Cellulose

Corporation, 856 F.2d 167 (11th Cir. 1988).

In contravention to Rule 65(a), Judge Perry alleged in her Order that she believed Plaintiff

could not offer any evidence in support of his allegation that the Defendants were neglecting the

Mafia crimes. (See Judge Perry’s Order, 10/20/09). Judge Perry’s erroneous ruling was made in

contravention to Plaintiff’s evidence of Constitutional rights violations and irreparable injuries that

included, “…testimony, positive bug sweep confirmations, witness’ testimonies of damages and

injuries caused by the Mafia crimes, recordings of death threats, audio and video recordings of

20
harassment from illegal communication devices, bugged equipment, and other evidence.” (See

Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion for TRO, p.3). Although Judge Perry had a duty to accept as true

Plaintiff’s factual allegations (Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (2007) (“[F]acial

plausibility” exists “when the plaintiff pleads factual contents that allow the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”)), she recklessly

neglected to prevent Plaintiff from being awarded an injunction without conducting an evidentiary

hearing. In patent dereliction to Rule 65(a), then, Judge Perry prejudiced the Plaintiff by refusing to

grant an injunction without holding an evidentiary hearing despite the presumption of irreparable

injury.

Despite Plaintiff proffering clear and convincing evidence of continuing rights violations that

overcame Judge Perry’s grounds for denying Plaintiff a TRO, Judge Perry proceeded to erroneously

allege Plaintiff was time barred by the 2-year statute of limitations since he allegedly “discovered”

violations of the Communications Act in 2001. In contrast, according to the “discovery rule,” there

is no actual or constructive knowledge of a wrong until the plaintiff has sufficient information to

file a complaint that would survive a motion to dismiss. Burd v. New Jersey Tel. Comp., 76 N.J.

284, 291-92 (1978). “The discovery rule is essentially a rule of equity” developed “as a means of

mitigating the often harsh and unjust results which flow from a rigid and automatic adherence to a

strict rule of law.” See Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 273-274 (1973). The determinative factors [in

discovery of a wrong or injury] may include but need not be limited to: the nature of the alleged

injury, the availability of witnesses and written evidence, the length of time that has elapsed since

the alleged wrongdoing, whether the delay has been to any extent deliberate or intentional, whether

the delay may be said to have peculiarity or unusually prejudiced the defendant. Id. at 276. In

accord with the Complaint, Plaintiff was entitled to injunctive relief since the discovery of

information equating to a cause of action was not fully discovered until May of 2009 when

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Assistant Attorney General Mark Kappelhoff denied Plaintiff’s Complaint against the Defendants*.

(See Complaint ¶ 188).

The Supreme Court has held that “the discovery rule centers upon an injured party’s knowledge

concerning the origin and existence of his injuries as related to the conduct of another person.”

Lynch v. Rubacky, 85 N.J. 65, 70 (1981) (emphasis added). Thus, “when a party is either unaware

that he has sustained an injury or, although aware that an injury has occurred, he does not know that

it is, or may be, attributable to the fault of another, the cause of action does not accrue until the

discovery of the injury or facts suggesting the fault of another person.” Tevis v. Tevis, 79 N.J. 422,

432 (1979). Consequently, “[t]he discovery principle modifies the conventional limitations rule ...

to the extent of postponing the commencement of accrual of the cause of action until plaintiff

learns, or reasonably should learn, the existence of that state of facts which may equate in law with

a cause of action.” Burd v. New Jersey Tel. Comp., 76 N.J. 284, 291-92 (1978). Hence, because

Plaintiff was maliciously obstructed by the Defendants from discovering the origin of illegal

communication devices and did not possess knowledge sufficient for a cause of action until the

obstruction ended in May of 2009, Plaintiff was within the limitations period and an injunction was

warranted.

In addition to the discovery rule, the “continuing violation” doctrine states that activity

*Defendants A-1 and Bonine denied the presence of illegal communication devices in January 2007 to
prevent knowledge of the devices from being obtained. (See Complaint ¶¶106, 122). Although Plaintiff
discovered the presence of an illegal phone tap in March 2007 to disprove A-1 and Bonine’s malicious
statements (Id. at ¶127), the STLPD proceeded to obstruct justice and wrongfully deny him an investigation
for the Mafia crimes in September 2007. (Id. at ¶138). In lieu of the STLPD’s refusal to investigate and
discover the crimes, Plaintiff discovered sufficient evidence for a cause of action for the use of the devices in
January of 2008 when threats were recorded from his Apple iPod equipment. (Id. at ¶155). Plaintiff
proceeded to file a complaint against Bonine, Apple, the STLPD, and LAPD with the FBI in March of 2008.
(Id. at ¶168). After the FBI directed Plaintiff to file a complaint with the state Police (Id. at ¶170), Plaintiff
refiled his complaint with the STLPD and again the FBI in March of 2009. (Id. at ¶183, 186). Plaintiff
finally received actual knowledge of the USDOJ’s refusal to correct the official misconduct in May 2009.
(Id. at 188). Thus, Plaintiff was obstructed until May 2009 from seeking injunctive relief, and he promptly
filed this lawsuit on or around July 15, 2009.

22
occurring beyond a statute of limitations period can be challenged if it is part of a pattern of

discrimination that extends into the limitations period. Chambers v. American Trans Air, Inc., 17

F.3d 998 (1994), certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 512, 513 U.S. 1001, 130 L.Ed.2d 419. For continuing

violations, the Courts link time barred acts with acts in the limitations period as one continuous act

that ends within the limitations period. Shanoff v. Illinois Dept. of Human Services, 258 F.3d 696

(2001). Furthermore, under the “continuing wrong doctrine,” when a tort involves continuing or

repeated injury, a cause of action accrues at, and limitations begin to run from, the date of last

injury; in other words, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the wrong is over and

done with. Tiberi v. CIGNA Corp., 89 F.3d 1423 (1996); see also Kahn v. Kohlberg, Dravis,

Roberts & Co., 970 F.2d 1030 (1992) (Claim accrues each time plaintiff sustains damages). Applied

to Plaintiff’s current calamity, the Mafia’s current use of illegal communication devices extends

Plaintiff’s right to injunctive relief for an additional 2 years or until the continuing violations end.

Capital Telephone Co., Inc. v. F.C.C., 777 F.2d 868 (1985). (Two-year statute of limitations did not

preclude the Federal Communications Commission from finding unlawful discrimination on part of

wire line company against radio common carrier, where wire line company’s actions constituted

continuing violation such that FCC could predicate perspective relief on long-standing conduct);

see also Communications Act of 1934 § 415(b), 47 U.S.C.A. § 415(b). Therefore, Plaintiff was

entitled to injunctive relief and Judge Perry deliberately ignored new and reoccurring violations of

the Communications Act to wrongfully render criminal assistance to the Defendants and

demonstrate prejudice to the Plaintiff.

4. Conspiring With the Mafia To File A Sua Sponte Judgment To Prevent Plaintiff From

Seeking Relief

Judge Perry’s knowledge of the Mafia crimes and her malicious neglect of her judicial

duties are sufficient to demonstrate she conspired with the Mafia to wrongfully dismiss the

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Complaint and prejudice the Plaintiff. U.S. v. Lee, 743 F.2d 1240 (1984) (Once existence of a

conspiracy is established, even slight evidence connecting a defendant to a conspiracy may be

sufficient proof of involvement in a scheme; it is necessary to show only that he knowingly

contributed.). Even a single act may be enough to draw a defendant within the ambit of a conspiracy

where it is established that the defendant knew of the conspiracy and associated himself with it.

U.S. v. Kirk, 534 F.2d 1262, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1976. Judge Perry’s unlawful motive to file a sua sponte

Judgment and perpetuate the crimes was evidenced in the Mafia’s threats to throw out the case and

the illicit stalking, extortion and torture that continued despite her mandatory duty to order an

injunction and end the Mafia crimes. (See Complaint, ¶¶ 94*, 161, 171; see also Plaintiff’s Motion

for TRO, Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and Motion to Proffer Evidence). Accordingly, Judge

Perry’s filing of a sua sponte Judgment despite knowledge of the Defendants’ malicious neglect and

continuing crimes demonstrates she conspired to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint and prejudice the

Plaintiff.

Sua sponte Judgments are typically not favored and complaints should not be dismissed if it

appears beyond doubt that a plaintiff can prove facts that would entitle him to relief. Murphy v.

Lane, 833 F.2d 106 (1987); See also Hicks v. Tarrant County Texas, 242 Fed.Appx. 160 (2007)

(Sua sponte dismissal of state prisoner’s §1983 complaint for failure to state a claim without

affording him an opportunity to offer a more detailed set of factual claims was premature, since

allegations that county jailers violated his rights by failing to protect him, if developed further,

might have stated a cognizable §1983 claim.). Where a complaint can be remedied by an

amendment, a district court may not dismiss the complaint with prejudice, but must permit a

plaintiff to amend. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992). Judge Perry was aware Plaintiff

* In October 2005 and dates thereafter, the Mafia taunted Plaintiff and referred to controlling Eastern District
of Missouri’s Judge Autrey and the FBI by exclaiming, “Autrey!” and, “The FBI is the Illuminati!” (i.e., a
terrorist group that allegedly controls the Mafia).

24
could change the name of Defendant “the St. Louis County Police Department” to “the County of

St. Louis” to correctly state a cause of action but recklessly dismissed his Complaint to prevent him

from amending. Nonetheless, Plaintiff changed the name of Defendant “the STLPD” to “the County

of St. Louis” in his Request for an Order in Response To Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion For

Preliminary Injunction. Although a plaintiff may not amend his complaint through arguments in his

brief, he may explain in his memorandum that the complaint as worded encompasses a claim that

would entitle him to relief. Harrell v. United States, 13 F.3d 232, 236 (7th Cir. 1993); see also

Swofford v. Mandrell, 969 F.2d 547, 549 (7th Cir. 1992) (The court’s obligation to liberally

construe a pro se plaintiff's pleadings includes a duty to consider allegations found in other

documents filed by Plaintiff.). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint inferred that the County of St.

Louis has a custom of neglecting criminal complaints by citizens against the Mafia to demonstrate

an unlawful custom in violation of Section 1983. (See Complaint, ¶ 6). Despite the reasonable

inferences that entitled Plaintiff to a cause of action, Judge Perry deliberately ignored facts and

ordered a sua sponte Judgment to prevent him from seeking relief.

The district court should not dismiss a complaint sua sponte without first giving the plaintiff an

opportunity to respond. Huber v. Taylor, 532 F.3d 237. In contravention to Judge Perry’s belief that

Defendant Unknown FBI Agents filed a motion to dismiss (See Judge Perry’s Judgment, p. 10

footnote), the record shows that the FBI never filed a response. Bennett v. U.S., 389 F.Supp.2d 121

(2005) (Sua sponte dismissals are erroneous unless the Plaintiff has been afforded notice and an

opportunity to amend the complaint or otherwise respond.); see also American United Life Ins. Co.

v. Martinez, 480 F.3d 1043 (2007). Additionally, Plaintiff was prevented from filing a Second

Amended Complaint when the US Post Office neglected timely delivery of the opposing parties’

documents to the Plaintiff. (See Plaintiff’s Notice To the Court Regarding His Motion To Respond

To Defendants STLPD, Boschert, and Williams’ Motion To Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Complaint; see

25
also Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time, submitted on December 31, 2009). Plaintiff’s Second

Amended Complaint would have cured the Complaint of its alleged deficiencies (e.g., changing the

name STLPD to “County of St. Louis”). Notwithstanding, Judge Perry hastened to file a sua sponte

Judgment to prevent Plaintiff from seeking relief and to further the Mafia crimes. Therefore,

because Judge Perry conspired with the Mafia to dismiss his Complaint, she demonstrated

impartially to warrant recusal.

V. CONTINUING CONSPIRACY

Currently, a major treason conspiracy is afoot in the United States that involves the Mafia

corrupting citizens, businesses, and Government officials to strengthen their cartel in the United

States. According to the Italian Parliament’s Anti-Mafia Commission, the Italian Mafia operates

primarily through Freemasonry (i.e., a religious fraternity that practices black magic for the worship

of Satan) “to offer the Mafia a formidable instrument to extend their own power, to obtain favors

and privileges in every field: both for the conclusion of big business and ‘fixing trials,’ as many

collaborators with justice have revealed.” Relazione sui Rapporti tra Mafia e Politica, p. 59 (Rome,

1993). Plaintiff has proven and rightfully believes that the Mafia has used its connections to cause

Judge Perry’s unlawful Judgment and extend their tyrannical control over the United States. Judge

Perry’s bizarre and unlawful sanctioning of the stalking, extortion and torture demonstrates the

Mafia’s disorganized attempt to further their psychopathic stalking campaign that has lasted over 9

years.

On or around January 8, 2010, Plaintiff proceeded to file a complaint with the Beverly Hills

Police Department to prevent the continuing Mafia crimes (See Exhibit 1, Letter to BHPD Sergeant

Publicker). Nonetheless, because Judge Perry erroneously ruled that the Plaintiff could never seek

injunctive relief for the Mafia using illegal communication devices and the Police and FBI have no

Constitutional duty to protect, the Mafia proceeded to allegedly conspire with BHPD officers to

26
maliciously neglect Plaintiff’s injuries. Consequently, the abridgement of Plaintiff’s rights

continued as he was prevented from establishing relationships, pursuing modeling, acting and career

opportunities, worshipping peacefully at his Beverly Hills church, residing in safety at his

residence, and contracting in society. The conspiracy worsened when Plaintiff proceeded to

purchase two Blackberry cellular phones that the Mafia bugged to perpetuate their stalking

campaign. The crimes would not have occurred if Judge Perry performed her mandatory duty

inherent within 18 USC § 4, 18 USC § 3041, 18 USC § 2382, 28 USC § 1361, 18 USC § 1505,

RSMo 562.016(5), and others. Accordingly, Judge Perry maliciously caused the Mafia crimes and

dispensed justice partially to prejudice the Plaintiff and warrant recusal.

VI. CONCLUSION

Imperative judicial duties inherent in 28 USC §1361, 18 USC § 4, 18 USC § 1505, 18 USC

§ 3041 and other statutes obligated Judge Perry to perform her mandatory duty to act without delay

in the exceptional circumstances of this case. By and through her Judgment, Judge Perry unlawfully

rendered criminal assistance to the Defendants by sanctioning their criminal neglect of the Mafia

crimes. Judge Perry possessed knowledge of their commission and had a mandatory duty to

administer statutes and laws established by the legislature, but maliciously neglected her judicial

duties-which is treason. In effect, Judge Perry acted outside the scope of her judicial capacity to

maliciously neglect Constitutional and statutory rights violations occurring to Plaintiff. Every one of

these willful, prejudicial, and illegal acts and omissions favor the Defendants to the detriment of the

Plaintiff and have without a doubt left Judge Perry’s impartiality in question. Statute 28 USC § 455

expressly forbids a judge to continue under these circumstances.

Pursuant to 18 USC § 2381, “Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war

against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States or

elsewhere, is guilty of treason… and shall be incapable of holding any office under the United

27
States.” Concurrently, Judge Perry’s malfeasance in public office demonstrates her allegiance to the

Mafia and their unlawful designs against democracy in the United States. Judge Perry willfully and

knowingly turned a blind eye to the sadistic ritual abuse of Plaintiff by maliciously neglecting her

judicial duties. The record clearly reflects her prejudicial disposition toward the Plaintiff in her

arbitrary decision making and malicious neglect of her mandatory duty to grant a preliminary

injunction that would have ended the irreparable injuries suffered by the Plaintiff.

If followed, Judge Perry’s Judgment would allow other extremist terrorist groups to commit

treason against the United States through sanctioning criminal negligence committed by law

enforcement officials. However, it is well established that Police officers are not immune from acts

of deliberate negligence. The authorizing of deliberate deprivations and arbitrary decision-making

by Government officials violates basic Constitutional norms. Furthermore, since statutory law is

instructive to common law and Judge Perry violated several criminal statutes, she demonstrated

extrajudicial conduct to warrant recusal. Any average person on the street with knowledge of the

circumstances would reasonably question Judge Perry’s impartiality. Therefore, since the

appearance of partiality is grounds for recusal under Section 455, Judge Perry should be

disqualified.

WHEREFORE, because Judge Perry has dispensed justice partially in violation of Section

455, Plaintiff Gregory McKenna moves this Honorable Court to disqualify Judge Perry for her

prejudicial acts against the Plaintiff. Plaintiff also prays that this Honorable Court perform its

mandatory duty in terms of 28 USC §1361, 18 USC § 4, and others and order a preliminary

injunction to immediately end to the Constitutional and statutory rights violations, Mafia crimes,

and treason against the United States. Plaintiff also prays for all other relief that this Court deems

just and equitable.

Date: March 17, 2010.

28
Respectfully Submitted,

Gregory McKenna
Pro Se Plaintiff

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